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162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Salazar vs. People
*
G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002.

JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa Under Art. 315 1(b)

of the Revised Penal Code.—The following are the elements of
estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code: a) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender; or

______________

** Special Member, Per Special Order No. 269.

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Salazar vs. People

denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such misappropriation or

conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and d) there is
demand made by the offended party to the offender.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Even a temporary

disturbance of property rights constitutes misappropriation; The
words “convert” and “misappropriate” as used in Article 315 par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or
disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of

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devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.—

Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon
withdrawal of the said amounts, petitioner caused the telegraphic
transfer of the amount to another account prior to petitioner’s
receipt of the amount in pesos. In fact, upon being confronted by
the prosecution with Exhibits “R” and “T” which are account debit
forms showing that certain amounts were deducted by Citibank
N.A. from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee for the
amounts withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon
withdrawal, “the dollars was converted by the bank, remitted
abroad, and given to me in pesos.” The act committed by
petitioner of remitting the funds abroad constitutes an act of
conversion or misappropriation. This Court has previously held
that even a temporary disturbance of property rights constitutes
misappropriation. The words “convert” and “misappropriate” as
used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it
were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To “misappropriate” a thing of value for one’s
own use includes, not only conversion to one’s personal advantage
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. Thus, when petitioner caused the remittance of the
amount withdrawn to another account, such act constituted
conversion or misappropriation or unauthorized disposition of the
property, contrary to the purpose for which the property was
devoted.

Same; Same; In estafa, the person prejudiced or the immediate

victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods
misappropriated—the use by the law of the word “another” instead
of the word “owner” means that as an element of the offense, loss
should have fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of the
crime.—As held in the case of First Producers Holdings
Corporation v. Co, in estafa, the person prejudiced or the
immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods
misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that “any person who shall defraud another by any
means mentioned [in Article 315]” may be held liable for estafa.
The use by the law of the word “another” instead of the word
“owner” means that as an element of the offense, loss should have
fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of the crime.
Thus, the

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Salazar vs. People

finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party prejudiced, is not
the owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify the
conviction of the petitioner.

Same; Same; The element of demand in estafa is satisfied if

demand is made upon the corporation in which the accused is an
officer if at the time of such demand it is not known that the
accused is the one primarily responsible for the act complained
of.—We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when
demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group. To require Skiva to
make a demand on petitioner himself would be superfluous and
would serve no other additional purpose. We note that at the time
when Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of the jeans,
except for the advice of Mr. Lettmayr to direct her queries to
petitioner who was in charge of procuring the materials for the
jeans, Ms. Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be
primarily responsible for the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as
Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the obligation of Aurora/Uni-
Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not
complied with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when it
demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the return of the amount
advanced. To require that demand should have been made by
Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner himself to uphold the conviction of
the trial court is to sustain a blind application of the law. In the
case of United States v. Ramirez, this Court held: “The
consummation of the crime of estafa ... does not depend on the fact
that a request for the return of the money is first made and
refused in order that the author of the crime should comply with
the obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or
conversion of money received to the prejudice of the owner thereof
are the sole essential facts which constitute the crime of estafa,
and thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed by
the Penal Code.”

Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; It is not necessary that the

proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal—a “complaint” filed with
the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person; If a
complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the
offended party and in case of an information, the same must be
filed by the fiscal.—The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110
contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal
action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is
required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed
by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” file

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a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal.

The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one
that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file
a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus, as a general rule,
a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information,
both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly

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Salazar vs. People

in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case
of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a
“complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be
filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was
validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that
petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Tumangan & Partners for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.

PUNO, J.:

In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge

Salazar was charged with estafa under Article 315
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The information
reads:

“That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the

Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the Vice President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-
Group, Inc., received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva
International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the
amount of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of
textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred dozen
stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to
said complainant, and the accused once in possession of the same,
far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then
and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously

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misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own

personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the
said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency.
1
Contrary to law.”

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty” to the

charge.

______________

1 Records, p. 1.

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Salazar vs. People

It appears that Skiva International, Inc. (“Skiva”) is a New

York-based corporation which imports clothes from the
Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines)
Inc. (“Olivier”). Aurora Manufacturing & Development
Corporation (“Aurora”) and Uni-Group, Inc. (“Uni-Group”)
are domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to
Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both
Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar,
is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a
consultant of Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been
purchasing finished clothes from Aurora and Uni-Group.
When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes,
Olivier, issues to the local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a
“Purchase Contract” and Olivier issues to Skiva a “Sales
Contract”. In these transactions, payment is usually made
by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is paid only
upon the presentation 2
of the proper shipping documents to
the designated bank.
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs
ladies jeans to be delivered sometime in January 1986.
Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita
Tujan,3 contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the
jeans. Thus, a Purchase Contract dated December 18, 1985
was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was
to supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of
“Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans” payable by

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4
means of a letter of credit at sight. The Purchase Contract
5
was confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985. A
Sales Contract was also issued by Olivier to Skiva
containing the same terms and conditions as the Purchase
Contract
6
and was confirmed by Mr. Jack Chehebar of
Skiva.
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will
advance to Aurora/Uni-Group the amount of US$41,300.00
(then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of
P20.59 to US$1.00) as

______________

2 TSN, October 9, 1991, pp. 30-31.

3 TSN, October 9, 1991, p. 22.
4 Exhibit “B”.
5 Exhibit “B-10”.
6 Exhibit “C”.

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Salazar vs. People

Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient7

funds to secure
raw materials to manufacture the jeans. It was also agreed
that the amount advanced by Skiva represents advance 8
payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. Skiva
then issued
9
a check in the said amount payable to Uni-
Group. However, due to the length of time needed for the
check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to 10
remit the funds instead by way of telegraphic transfer.
Thus, the11 check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr.
Lettmayr and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva
from its bank in New York, the Israel Discount Bank, to
the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar
12
and Mr.
and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession
and control of the passbook of the 13 said joint account,
withdrew the amount of US$21,675.21 and on January 22, 14
1986, petitioner withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00.
The prosecution also presented evidence that subsequent to
said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99
were deducted from the joint account as telegraphic
transfer fee and commission
15
for the remittance of the funds
to another account.
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-

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Group to follow up on the production of the jeans. She

learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of
Litton fabrics required for the order
16
were purchased from
Litton Mills by the petitioner. 3,000 meters of Litton
fabrics are enough to produce only 200 dozens of ladies
jeans—an amount insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva
of

______________

7 TSN, October 9, 1991, pp. 42-46.

8 Exhibit “D”.
9 Exhibit “E-1”.
10 TSN, December 6, 1991, p. 21.
11 Exhibit “E”.
12 TSN, December 6, 1991, pp. 21-22; Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and
“F-3”.
13 Exhibit “Q”.
14 Exhibit “S”.
15 Exhibits “R” and “T”; TSN, November 17, 1992, pp. 32-36.
16 TSN, December 6, 1991, p. 39.

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Salazar vs. People
17
700 dozens of ladies twill jeans. Upon inquiry with Mr.
Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the query be
directed to petitioner
18
as petitioner is in charge of securing
the materials.
19
However, Ms. Tujan could not locate the
petitioner.
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand
was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group through its President,
Mr. Lettmayr, to 20return the money advanced in the amount
of US$41,300.00.
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies
jeans or to account for the US$41,300.00 despite demand,
Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan,
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr
and petitioner. After preliminary investigation, the Public
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr. 21
Lettmayr
and an information was filed against petitioner.
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of
estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day

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of prision mayor as the minimum to fourteen (14) years,

eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
the maximum and to 22pay Uni-Group and Aurora the
amount of P595,259.00. On March 13, 1997, the lower 23
court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court24 and denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files
the instant petition for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.

______________

17 TSN, July 27, 1992, p. 41.

18 Id., pp. 40-41.
19 Id., p. 46.
20 Exhibit “L”.
21 Records, p. 83.
22 Rollo, pp. 54-62.
23 Records, pp. 431-434.
24 Rollo, pp. 44-53, 63.

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The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315

paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code: a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender; or
denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and d) there
25
is demand made by the offended
party to the offender.
We agree with the trial court’s finding that the contract
26
between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale.
Thus, upon remittance by Skiva of its advance payment in
the amount of US$41,300.00, ownership thereof was
transferred to Aurora/UniGroup and Aurora/Uni-Group
had no obligation to account or deliver the money to Skiva,
its only obligation under the contract of sale being to
deliver the 700 dozens of ladies jeans. However, petitioner,

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as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of the

specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt of the
amount, had the obligation to account for the proceeds
thereof to Aurora/UniGroup.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of
US$41,300.00 was remitted by telegraphic transfer to the
joint account of the petitioner
27
and his wife and Mr. and
Mrs. Werner Lettmayr; 2) the said amount was remitted 28
as advance payment by Skiva for the jeans it ordered; and
3) the amount of US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by
petitioner on January 16, 1986 and the amount of
US$20,000.00
29
was withdrawn by petitioner on January 22,
1986. In fact, petitioner himself admits having withdrawn
from the joint
30
account on two occasions after the remittance
was made. Peti-

______________

25 II L. B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 734 (1998); Ocampo-Paule v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145872, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 83.
26 Rollo, p. 58.
27 Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and “F-3”.
28 Exhibit “D”.
29 Exhibits “Q” and “S”.
30 TSN, February 15, 1994, pp. 23-25.

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tioner further admits having made such withdrawal for the

purpose of purchasing materials to be used for the jeans
ordered31 by Skiva and a portion thereof to be given to
Aurora. Thus, upon withdrawal by petitioner of the
amounts advanced by Skiva, petitioner received the same
in trust with an obligation to return the funds or account
for the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or
misappropriation of the amount received, petitioner claims
that a portion of the amount was used to purchase 3,000
meters 32of Litton fabrics and the balance was returned to
Aurora. However, upon cross-examination, petitioner was
unable to recall the amount paid for the purchase of the
fabrics or the amount given to Aurora nor was petitioner
able to identify whether payment for the purchase of fabric
or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash or in

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33
check.
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to
present evidence to support his defense that payment for
the purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance
of the amount received by petitioner was given to Aurora.
The only reason why the Court is inclined to believe that
3,000 meters of Litton fabrics were purchased for the
manufacture of the jeans is because the witness for the
prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified 34
the
purchase of the said materials from Litton Mills.
To support petitioner’s claim that the remainder of the
amount withdrawn was returned to Aurora, petitioner
presents a letter dated October 15, 1986 from the
Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation
(PHIVIDEC) addressed to Mr. Werner Lettmayr, President
of Aurora, regarding the financial audit of Aurora, wherein
the amount of P850,780.00
35
is indicated as an amount “due
to Uni-Group.” Atty. Cesar Singson, witness for the
defense, testified that the amount of P850,780.00 indicated
in the

______________

31 Id., August 17, 1994, p. 54.

32 Id., p. 55.
33 Id., pp. 57, 59 and 67.
34 Id., December 6, 1991, p. 39.
35 Exhibit “2-F”.

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said letter represents the peso equivalent of the advance36

payment of US$41,300.00 made by Skiva to Uni-Group.
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of
the said letter is nil. The trial court correctly ruled:

“The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the

letter] because the person who testified thereon, a certain Atty.
Cesar Singson, was not the one who prepared the document. He
was only one [of] those who was furnished a copy thereof.
Moreover, when said piece of evidence was presented, there were
inconsistencies in the testimony of the [petitioner] as to how he
was able to procure said documents. In a hearing he testified that
he personally procured said letter from the records of PHIVIDEC

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and the person who certified said copy signed the same in his
presence. On cross examination, he testified that he did not
personally obtain said letter and he was not there when the
person who authenticated said letter signed it and that it was
only given to him by his former counsel. This is further muddled
when Atty. Singson testified that he was the one who
authenticated said document on December 7, 1987 from his copy
upon the request of the accused. Atty. Singson has already
severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the year
1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no longer connected
with PHIVIDEC when he authenticated said document based on
his copy which implies that the document was not obtained from
37
the records of PHIVIDEC.”

Further, even assuming that the letter may be given

credence, we are unable to see any indication that the
amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion thereof
(assuming that the said amount represents the advance
payment made by Skiva) has been received by Aurora
and/or Uni-Group from petitioner. At most, what said letter
indicates is that Aurora acknowledges liability to Uni-
Group in the said amount or that said amount has been
received by Uni-Group from Skiva as advance payment
which Uni-Group may have, in turn, assigned to Aurora.
The glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be seen from
the said letter that there was actual receipt by Aurora from
petitioner of the amount indicated therein, or at least a
portion thereof, after deduction of the cost of the materials
purchased to manufacture the jeans ordered.

______________

36 TSN, March 8, 1995, pp. 29-30.

37 Records, pp. 59-60; citations omitted.

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Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon

withdrawal of the said amounts, petitioner caused the
telegraphic transfer of the amount to another38 account prior
to petitioner’s receipt of the amount in pesos. In fact, upon
being confronted by the prosecution with Exhibits “R” and
“T” which are account debit forms showing that certain
amounts were deducted by Citibank N.A. from the joint

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account as telegraphic transfer fee for the amounts

withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon
withdrawal, “the dollars was converted by 39the bank,
remitted abroad, and given to me in pesos.” The act
committed by petitioner of remitting the funds abroad
constitutes an act of conversion or misappropriation. This
Court has previously held that even a temporary
disturbance of40 property rights constitutes
misappropriation. The words “convert” and
“misappropriate” as used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or
disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon. To “misappropriate” a thing of value for one’s own
use includes, not only conversion to one’s personal
advantage but also every attempt
41
to dispose of the property
of another without right. Thus, when petitioner caused
the remittance of the amount withdrawn to another
account, such act constituted conversion or
misappropriation or unauthorized disposition of the
property, contrary to the purpose for which the property
was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is
not present as the party prejudiced, in accordance with the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is
Skiva, when petitioner had no obligation to account to
Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn. Petitioner
argues that consistent with the ruling of the lower court
that Aurora is the owner of the sum remitted as advance
payment, petitioner had the obligation to account42 for the
proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. Thus,
petitioner

______________

38 Exhibits “R” and “T”.

39 TSN, August 30, 1994, p. 5 (emphasis supplied).
40 Lu Hayco v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 227, 240-241 (1985).
41 Saddul v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 277 (1990).
42 Rollo, p. 21.

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maintains that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no

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damage to Aurora was alleged in the information nor did

the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the 43
case of First Producers Holdings
Corporation v. Co, in estafa, the person prejudiced or the
immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the
goods misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that “any person who shall defraud
another by any means mentioned [in Article 315]” may be
held liable for estafa. The use by the law of the word
“another” instead of the word “owner” means that as an
element of the offense, loss should have fallen 44
upon
someone other than the perpetrator of the crime. Thus,
the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party
prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum misappropriated
will not nullify the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent
as no demand was made by Skiva on petitioner. Petitioner
argues that although demand was made by Skiva to
Aurora/Uni-Group and/or Mr. Lettmayr, no demand was
shown to have been made on petitioner himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when
demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group. To require
Skiva to make a demand on petitioner himself would be
superfluous and would serve no other additional purpose.
We note that at the time when Ms. Tujan was following up
on the delivery of the jeans, except for the advice of Mr.
Lettmayr to direct her queries to petitioner who was in
charge of procuring the materials for the jeans, Ms. Tujan
could not have known that petitioner may be primarily
responsible for the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as
Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the obligation of
Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of
demand, was not complied with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted
appropriately when it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group
the return of the amount advanced.

______________

43 336 SCRA 551, 560 (2000).

44 Id.

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To require that demand should have been made by

Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner himself to uphold the
conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind application
45
of the law. In the case of United States v. Ramirez, this
Court held:

“The consummation of the crime of estafa . . . does not depend on

the fact that a request for the return of the money is first made
and refused in order that the author of the crime should comply
with the obligation to return the sum misapplied. The
appropriation or conversion of money received to the prejudice of
the owner thereof are the sole essential facts which constitute the
crime of estafa, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the
penalty imposed by the Penal Code.”
46
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals this
Court ruled that “the law does not require a demand as a
condition precedent to the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for
funds and property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation.” 47
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals, we
also held that in a prosecution for estafa, demand is not
necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no
authority to institute the present action as estafa was not
committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on
the basis of the finding that the transaction between Skiva
and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, petitioner
argues that pursuant48 to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the complaint should not have been
instituted by Skiva as it is not the “offended party”
contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation
to account

______________

45 9 Phil. 67, 70 (1907).

46 101 Phil. 114, 119 (1957).
47 172 SCRA 685, 695-696 (1989).
48 Sec. 3. Complaint defined.—A complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated. (emphasis supplied).

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Salazar vs. People

to Skiva the 49proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the

joint account.
The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates
one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in
those cases where a complaint of the offended party is
required by law, instead 50 of an information which is
generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the
proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that
unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent 51
person may
file a complaint for preliminary investigation.
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced
by a complaint or information, both of which are filed in
court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same
must be filed by the offended party and in case of an
information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However,
a “complaint” filed with the 52fiscal prior to a judicial action
may be filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the
complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of
the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account
to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
appealed judgment of the court a quo finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and

Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

______________

49 Rollo, pp. 28-32.

50 II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 229-230 (1995).
51 Ebarle, et al. v. Hon. Sucaldito, et al., 156 SCRA 803, 819 (1987).
52 Id.

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Notes.—Estafa is a crime committed by a person who

defrauds another causing him to suffer damages, by means
of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false
pretenses of fraudulent acts. (Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals,
281 SCRA 225 [1997])
Greed has always been one of man’s failings—the hope
of greater gain has lured many a man to throw caution, and
his common sense, to the wind. (People vs. Balasa, 295
SCRA 49 [1998])

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