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A. The predominance of consulting income over auditing income inclines the auditor to
be more accommodating in order to use its auditing role as both a loss leader and a
portal of entry into the client in order to maximize more lucrative consulting income;
B. Reduced competition and the de facto oligopoly enjoyed by the Big Four may invite
the auditor to be less protective of its reputational capital, instead arguably treating it
as a 'wasting asset'; in essence, the auditor may today need less to excel and
establish its professional superiority at detecting fraud, and more to accommodate
issuer management - at least without becoming caught in a scandal that jeopardizes
its reputation for integrity;
C. Investors may care less today about audited financial information and rely more on
other protections and/or other gatekeepers (including securities analysts, credit
rating agencies, and activist hedge funds); at the same time, the pervasive use of
incentive equity compensation as the primary form of executive compensation may
cause the executives at issuers to press ever more aggressively for auditors to defer
to their earnings goals; and
D. In some cases (a minority, to be sure), audit firms or engagement partners at those
firms appear to have been complicit in fraud. These cases may represent instances
in which audit firms, having exhausted their reputational capital through involvement
in prior scandals, survive by deferring to management and exercising little or no
professional independence.
5. Describe the independence of the audit committee. How does this affect the auditor?
Audit committee ought to be separate from the employees of the company. An independent
audit committee member should not be employed by, or providing any services to the
company beyond his or her duties as a committee member. The audit committee
independence is essential to prevent insiders from influencing the oversight role of the
committee