ISLAMIC PAKISTAN Good

Islamic Pakistan
ISLAMIC PAKISTAN:
ILLUSIONS & REALITY
By
Abdus Sattar Ghazali
Table Of Contents
Preface Chapter VII The Third Islamic Republic
Introduction Chapter VIII The Third Martial Law
Chapter I Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan Chapter IX The Fourth Republic
Chapter II Ulema and Pakistan Movement Chapter X Nawaz Sharif's second stint in Office
Chapter III The First Islamic Republic Chapter XI What is the true state of affairs?
Chapter IV The First Martial Law Chronology of Pakistan
Chapter V The Second Martial Law Select bibliography
Chapter VI What led to the break-up? Links
Copyright: © Ghazali
Last updated: 14th August 1999

Library of U.S.Congress No. 97-930581 r98
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Islamic Pakistan
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GHAZALI'S HOMEPAGE *
On the Golden Jubilee

Celebrations of Pakistan
Presents
ISLAMIC PAKISTAN:
ILLUSIONS & REALITY
A comprehensive
and detailed
political history of Pakistan
The author is a professional journalist, with Master's

degree in Political Science from the Punjab University.
Started his journalistic career as a sub-editor in the daily
Bang-e-Haram, Peshawar in 1960. Later worked in the
daily Anjam and the Tourist weekly Peshawar. Served as
a News Editor in the Daily News, Kuwait from 1969 to
1976. Joined the English News Department of Kuwait
Television as a News Editor in December 1976. Also
worked as the correspondent of the Associated Press of
Pakistan and the Daily Dawn, Karachi, in Kuwait. At
present working as the Editor-in-Chief of the Kuwait
Television English News.
Copyright: © Ghazali
Click here for E-mail
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Mailing addresses:
P.O.Box 21810, Safat, Kuwait-13079
P.O.Box 56505, Hayward, CA 94540
Published in Pakistan by National Book Club,
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Proceed To The Table Of Contents
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* * * Islamic Pakistan * * *
PREFACE
Interest in the idea of writing this book was first generated in April 1980 when I was conducting an
Chapter 3 opinion survey, for the daily "Arab Times", among the Pakistani expatriates in Kuwait on the political
situation in Pakistan. The two part survey report contained an introductory article and reactions of the
Pakistani expatriates about the prevalent situation in the country. When the first part of the opinion
survey was published, the then Ambassador of Pakistan in Kuwait, Mr. Mehdi Masoud, expressed his
deep displeasure to me and unsuccessfully tried to convince the Arab Times owner not to publish the
second part of the report.
He was particularly upset over these remarks in the article: "the law of necessity recognized and upheld
by Pakistan's highest judicial body is an honorable protection for military adventure in civil government.
It is the best time for the military leaders to prepare themselves for withdrawal from politics with honor
and dignity. Public indifference to military intelligence in statecraft has reached a peak." The article
concluded that "the masses do not care for this or that form of government. The vast majority needs a
peaceful and respectable living. The time to feed them on religious sentiments has ended. The economic
depression is the decisive factor for the success of a regime. The Pakistani nation by and large is praying
for an end to its miseries and agonies and is looking forward to a campaign of their cause. It just requires
a sincere attempt to steer this mood into earnest action for the welfare of the common weal." This
observation is still relevant a fter 15 years.
This book does not claim to be an exhaustive history of Pakistan. It concerns mainly with the role of the
ruling elite -- a conglomerate of feudal "feudal "lords and civil-military-bureaucracy -- in maintaining the
status quo in a bid to consolidate its grip on the power strings. In that context, the study examines the
constitutional, political and economic developments. The study also examines the religious factor in the
country's politics. Islam has been used as an important political factor since independence leading to
strengthening of "obscurantism", weakening of secular lobby and fomenting sectarian polarization. The
study should be both informative and provocative for the pointed comments that will be found throughout
the book. Every effort has been made to define the essential theme and to analyze the significant events of
the past five decades in a lucid and fast-moving manner.
I hope that this book will provide the reader with some insight into the happenings in Pakistan over the
last five decades and would help in forming an opinion of events as they unfurled in the future. If this
narrative, besides adding to the knowledge of events, provides a better understanding of our follies and
weaknesses, it would have served a useful purpose. As with all studies of this kind, I take full responsibility
for its contents and any errors of fact or interpretation are inadvertent, but mine alone.
Many thanks are due to several persons who have guided and encouraged me in the pursuit of this study.
In expressing my gratitude and thanks for being able to produce this volume I am really indebted to
Messrs Chaudhry Ahmad Khan and Anwar Beg and Zulfiqar Ahmed who went through the entire
manuscript and suggested improvements in the text. I am also thankful to Mr. Raza Ali for making
arrangement for the publication of this book in Pakistan. Last but not the least, I must express my
feelings for the affectionate encouragement I received from my family -- my wife, Meraj, daughters, Atia
and Nadia and son, Mohammad Arshad -- who showed a great tolerance even when I was using their time
for this book.

Kuwait - May 1997
Last Upate - August 1999
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* * * Islamic Pakistan * * *
| Introduction | | Links |
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Islamic Pakistan
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the chequered political history of Pakistan two factors have remained decisive: Islam and the
army, in collaboration with civilian bureaucracy and feudal aristocracy. The intact feudal structure and
Chapter 3
religious institutions all worked in tandem for common interests in retaining the status quo and still pose a
threat to any real social transformation. The dubious ruling regimes and opposition movements trying to
dislodge them, both exploited Islam to the utmost. Those in power, used "religious" sentiments of ignorant
masses to maintain their power and those thirsting for power, exploited the same sentiments in an attempt to
manoeuvre their way in.
The hierarchical system established in Pakistan, which benefits from its close relations with its benefactor and
guide, the super power, is based on two major well organized institutions of the establishment -- the civil and
the military bureaucracy. Both are closely related and inter-connected in their ideological and political
properties. Their major social base is the feudal and the post-feudal landlords class, although a strong
admixture of the commercial and industrial bureaucracy has also become gradually a shareholder and partner
in the spoils.
One of the important ingredients to this mix of which the Pakistani establishment is composed comprises the
religiously scholarly class, the mullah and the religio-politicial parties -- all veering in the direction of rightist,
pro status quo causes. The cultural and social ideas on which the ideological structure of the state has been
formed are provided by this group of religious element. But what is not clearly recognized is that both the civil
and "military" bureaucracy and the affluent elite are intimately integrated with the ideological structure and
political values promoted by the religious-cum-political elements.
Hence, the process of the so-called Islamisation worked to the satisfaction of all privileged segments of the
society, namely military, "bureaucracy", land owners and industrialists. The military elite found status quo
continuation easy with Islamization as the economically deprived lower cadres of the army got solace in it,
thanks to their traditional background. The civil bureaucracy [1] that has learnt the art of surviving in all sorts
of governments found it safe and secure, since Islamization has not substantially altered the socio-political
realities in Pakistan. The land-owning and business classes enjoyed enough protection in legitimization of
unlimited private property. The nominal land reforms introduced during Ayub and Bhutto's era were reversed
in the name of Islam.
During the last five decades a small privileged minority -- feudal aristocracy strengthened by the induction of
retired army officers and civilian bureaucrats -- reaped the benefits of economic gains in terms of better
training and education, economic prosperity and political participation. The promised and actual economic
gains never reached the deprived masses. The United Nations Development Program reports affirm this
assertion and lead us to the painful revelation that Asia has marched forward on the road to economic
progress, while Pakistan is lagging far behind. [2] The sacrosanct constitutional provisions and shameful
political intrigues made effective political participation of the people impossible. The masses are effectively
disenfranchised through illiteracy and the barriers erected by the supremacy of the English language, the elite
classes face virtually no competition in the higher spheres of social, political and economic activity. Cliques or
coteries, representing one vested interest or another, governed in the name of the people. A real sense of
participation in the affairs of nation still did not percolate down to all levels of the people.
The five elections held since 1985 have returned to the assemblies legislators committed to retain the feudal-
dominated political system in the name of democracy. Sworn political enemies share common ground against
land, labor and taxation reforms; against devolution of power; against liberalization of laws and the
independence of judiciary and distributive justice. The failure of the popular and mass movements led to a loss
of faith in change and modernization. Consequently, the masses with a traditional background took a negative
turn and in total dismay sought refuge in the religious sentiment. This was actually desired by the deliberate
policies of the ruling elite.
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Islamic Pakistan
Almost two years after independence, aberrant and freakish turn and twists of the national politics ended with
the real state power resting in the hands of senior civil servants and army generals. Political power and
authority were no longer in the hands of politicians after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan
in October 1951, as it had been snatched away by bureaucrats and generals.
The Constituent Assembly" was dissolved in 1954, with the backing and blessing of the Army Commander-in-
Chief, General Ayub Khan. The autocratic move was condoned by the judiciary under the doctrine of
necessity. The political process started defaulting with the army-hatched conspiracy, popularly called the
"Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case." The process came to a complete halt with the usurpation of power by General
Ayub Khan in 1958. The hasty retreat of army to the barracks after the tragedy of 1971, when the military
junta presided over the permanent severance of the most populous province of the country, proved to be a
tactical maneuver.
In July 1977, General Ziaul Haq again usurped power from an elected government. In 1989, Army Chief of
Staff, General "Aslam Beg" himself intervened against the restoration of this process by stopping revival of
the Junejo Assembly, dissolved illegally by his predecessor General Zia. [3] Then General Beg helped
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan -- an ex-bureaucrat -- dissolve the succeeding Assembly in August 1990.
President Ishaq Khan resorted to the same practice against the Nawaz Assembly till he was sent home by
General Abdul Waheed_ along with Nawaz Sharif in July, 1993.
Pakistan started with the ideal of a democratic state that promised the people material advancement and the
realization of social justice as enjoined by Islam. What this meant was that the instruments of a liberal
parliamentary system would be used to achieve egalitarian goals. No contradiction was admitted between
political apparatus of a democratic state -- exercise of power by elected representatives, subject to limits laid
down by them in the basic law -- and the objectives of the state. However, our civil as well as military rulers
treated the constitutions as experimental devices. Finally, General Zia subverted the state's ideology [4] and as
a result Pakistan acquired the ideology of a theocratic state.
After nearly half a century of independence, Pakistan does not have the appearance of a country that was
envisaged by the nation's creators, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Dr. Mohammad Iqbal. The
Lahore Resolution of 1940, popularly known as Pakistan Resolution, makes no mention of a specific ideology
for whatever was the future constitutional structure for the Moslems of the sub-continent. However, religion
has come to be accepted as the ideology of today's Pakistan, with attempts to give Islamsomewhat tyrannical
interpretations.
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Islamic Pakistan
Chapter I
Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan
Chapter 3
Page 1
"In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission.
We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis -- but they are all Pakistanis. They will
enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs
of Pakistan." Quaid-i-Azam, Feb. 1948 [1]
The founder of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah envisioned Pakistan as a modern
democratic state to be run strictly on the basis of merit and where all citizens will be equal before the
law. Jinnah's ideas about what the new state should be like were very clear as can be seen from his
speeches and statements. He meant Pakistan to be a progressive state in which there would be scope
neither for intolerance nor for obscurantism and whose highest aims would be expressed in the social,
cultural and economic uplift of the masses.
Before the establishment of Pakistan, the first public picture of Pakistan that Jinnah gave to the world
was in the course of an interview in New Delhi (1946) with the correspondent of Reuter's news agency:
the new state would be a modern democratic state, with sovereignty resting in the people and the
members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship, regardless of their religion, caste or
creed.
Only three days before Pakistan formally appeared on the world map, Jinnah, in his memorable speech
to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan stated the principle on which the new state was to be founded
said :
" You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the
state ...... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and citizens of one
state....... in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the
political sense as citizens of the state."
This speech as President of the Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947 is one of the clearest
expositions of a secular state. Jinnah was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus
spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own
people including non-Muslims, and for the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the
ideal to the attainment of which the new state was to devote all its energies.[2]
It is not without significance that the first Constituent Assembly inaugurated by the Quaid-i-Azam had
as its temporary chairman a scheduled caste Hindu, Joginder Nath Mandal, before the Quaid himself
was formally elected as its first chairman. The Quaid also appointed Mandal a member of his cabinet,
which, as Chief Justice Mohammad Munir points out, was consistent, "with his conception of a secular
state.[3]
Even after his unambiguous proclamation of August 11, 1947, Jinnah did not leave anything to
interpretation and took every opportunity to drive home his commitment to a secular Pakistan. One
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Islamic Pakistan
could go on quoting ad infinitum from his speeches and observations. On each occasion he insisted that
Pakistan would be a modern democracy, with the hierarchy of mullahs and priests playing no role in
the molding of its destiny. [4]
Jinnah was basically a secular liberal who had studied British political history and practiced common
law. For such a man the Muslim cause, which inescapably bound up with Islam, embraced nationalism
and patriotism as well as the strict meaning of religion. He wanted to see Pakistan as an embodiment of
dynamic and forward-looking Islam. Jinnah believed that Islam fosters, upholds and extols values such
as freedom, equality, solidarity and social justice which may also be termed secular or humanistic;
these, he repeatedly emphasized, constitute the bases of Pakistan's polity. In emphasizing the dynamic
pursuit of these transient values of religion rather than its outward, static elements, Jinnah had placed
himself in the mainstream of modernist approach that began with Shah Waliullah 1705-62), the first
reformer in the sub-continent who broke away from the orthodoxy. [5]
And his Pakistan becomes explicable only as an integral part of the deepening and hardening of the late
19th century reawakening of a political, social and religious nature into what might generally be
termed as "Islamic sentiment" which can be recognized as being religious in so far as it draws its
driving force inter alia from religion but which is directed mainly towards social and political ends.[6]
We should not forget that the struggle for Pakistan was a secular campaign led by men of politics
rather than religion. It was not the Ulema who began to organize for an independent Muslim state, but
rather the most secularized classes. The background of the men who organized the campaign for
Pakistan was not theology and Islamic law but politics and common law; not Deoband (the prominent
seat of Islamic religious learning in India), but Cambridge and the Inns of Court. Jinnah and his
lieutenants such as Liaqat Ali Khan won Pakistan in spite of the opposition by the so-called nationalist
Ulema.
A study of the Pakistan movement clearly indicates that "Islamic state" did not figure prominently
during the period of struggle. An advocacy of Pakistan as an "Islamic state" sometimes brought Jinnah
into confrontation with his colleagues. Raja Saheb of Mahmoudabad, in his memoirs recalls: "During
1941-5,.......we advocated that Pakistan should be an Islamic state. I must confess that I was very
enthusiastic about it and in my speeches I constantly propagated my ideas. My advocacy of an Islamic
state brought me into conflict with Jinnah. He thoroughly disapproved of my ideas and dissuaded me
from expressing them publicly from the League platform lest the people might be led to believe that
Jinnah share my view and that he was asking me to convey such ideas to public. As I was convinced
that I was right and did not want to compromise Jinnah's position, I decided to cut myself away and for
nearly two years kept my distance from him, apart from seeing him during the working committee
meetings and other formal occasions.[7]
The propelling slogan during the struggle for Pakistan was to establish a distinct identity of Muslims as
a nation. Islam was used as a motivating force to rally the Muslims to the cause of Pakistan politically.
But the state they aimed to create was to be secular, not a theocracy. And the method to achieve the
goal was not a religious movement but political agitation.
However, Islam's inherent drive towards a religio-political community was not the only factor at work
in the hectic, complex days of the 1940's. The coming into existence of Pakistan was conditioned by the
multitude of mundane matters, concrete and human, obtaining at that particular juncture of time and
place. Political, economic, sociological, psychological and other factors in the independence movement
and its environment were operative and important.[8]
According to Jinnah, the demand and struggle for Pakistan had been ensured mainly because there was
a danger of denial of basic rights to Moslems in the Indian sub-continent. "The story of Pakistan, its
struggle and its achievement is the story of great human ideals struggling to survive in the face of odds
and difficulties ...... I reiterate most emphatically that Pakistan was made possible because of the
danger of complete annihilation of human soul in a society based on caste."[9]

Islamic Pakistan
While scanning through records of British India's history, one finds numerous instances, where a
galaxy of Muslim political thinkers and intellectuals have professed that partition of the sub-continent
into Hindu and Muslim majority regions was the only viable solution to safeguard the legitimate
interests of the Muslims after the departure of the British rule. It was as early as in 1862 when Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan for the first time realized that Hindus and Muslims of India could not live together
peacefully as one nation. [10] This realization came to him when Hindus of Banares started an agitation
demanding to replace Urdu by Hindi in Devnagri " script in all government offices and courts. Hindu
priests further demanded that Muslims should be banned by the government from sacrificing cows and
performing their religious rites near or inside the areas dominated by Hindus.
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan saw the coming bitter split between the communities and immediately launched
opposition to the idea of the creation of the Indian national Congress as the representative body of the
whole country. He emphasized that the Indians did not form one nationality which was the basic
requirement for making democracy successful in any country. He took the stand that the Hindus and
Muslims being unequal in numerical strength and permanently divided on the basis of religion, the
democratic form of government was unworkable in India because the larger party was bound to
permanently hold the smaller one in its servility.[11]
The call for a separate Muslim homeland in South Asia should have been a predictable outcome of the
history of the region. The fact that the British appeared interested in leaving behind a unified political
state, and the Indian National Congress was determined to maintain the geographic unity of the
subcontinent in the face of the political and social realities of centuries of division and separatism,
doesn't seem most surprising. [12]
According to H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, the partition became inevitable because
Hindu leaders, including a leader as eminent as Jawaharlal Nehru failed to realize that by 1946 "the
Muslim League dominated the Muslims as the Congress dominated the Hindus and that the Congress
and the League would have to live and work together if India was to remain united. [13] In considering
whether Jinnah and the League were responsible for the partition of India by raising the cry of
Pakistan, it is necessary to ask, and answer, two questions: First, were the fears of the Muslim
community that it would be permanently dominated by a "Hindu Raj" genuine? If so, was the
community entitled to effective and not mere paper safeguards against such permanent domination?
That the fears of the Muslim community were genuine is beyond dispute.[14]
After the Congress committed the grave error of refusing to form Coalition Ministries in 1937, the first
opportunity of avoiding partition was after the 1937 elections when Jinnah showed that he was not
thinking of a separate state of Pakistan and made a public appeal to Gandhi to tackle the question of
Hindu-Muslim unity. The second opportunity of avoiding partition was the 1945 Desai-Liaquat Ali Pact
-- to form a temporary League-Congress coalition government -- which, had it been implemented with
goodwill, might have broken the deadlock. The repudiation of Bhulabhbhai Desai by the Congress put
an end to the hope of repairing the damage which had been done in 1937. One more opportunity
remained. It was seized by Azad when he put his ideas before the Cabinet Mission, and succeeded in
persuading the congress working committee to adopt his plan. The Cabinet Mission Plan remained
substantially the same as Azad's. This opportunity of keeping India united was lost, firstly, because the
Congress accepted the plan with a qualification which destroyed its value for the Muslim League;
secondly, because of the failure of the mission and, later, of the British government to make their
intention clear before damage had been done by allowing the Congress reservations about the Cabinet
Mission Plan to remain outstanding for over five months.[15]
The movement that ultimately resulted in the creation of Pakistan was comprised of diverse groups,
both regionally and socially. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League gave the various regionally based
groups a convenient voice at the center of the Indian politics. [16] The landed magnates, who ruled over
the Muslim majority provinces, backed Jinnah and Muslim League that was transformed into a mass-
based movement in the early 1940s. The idea of a Muslim nation gained ground, and Jinnah became the
embodiment of that conception. The Pakistan movement became a national movement, on the basis of
the two-nation theory that Jinnah propounded, affirming that Muslims of India were a separate nation
Islamic Pakistan
from Hindus. Insofar as their politics entailed the establishment of their own state, their objective was
the creation of a nation state and not a theocratic state. [17] Much can be written about the various
factors which culminated in the formation of a separate homeland for Muslims in the sub- continent.
However, the important issue here is to understand the ideas held by Jinnah and others when they
called for a separate state for Muslims of India.
It is important to note that Jinnah and his closest lieutenants were determined to build Pakistan into a
constitutional democracy. To them there was no contradiction between the Islamic state and a polity
governed according to modern democratic principles. Moslems tend to reason that what passes for
democracy and hence constitutionalism is at the very heart of Islamic teachings. According to this body
of opinion, fairness, justice, compassion and honesty are all tenets of Islam: therefore, Islam made it
simpler not more difficult to build democratic structures. With this in mind Pakistan's Muslim League
leaders sought to fit Islam into their contemporary constitutional design, not the reverse.[18]
Jinnah's speeches are abound with references to the Islamic principles of social justice and fairplay, but
he made it clear, on more than one occasion, that he was against theocracy. He had consistently
opposed theocratic ideas and influences and never minced his words about his commitment to a secular
state. "Make no mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the
tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those who of whatever creed
are themselves willing to play their part as true and loyal citizen of Pakistan"[19]
On another occasion Jinnah said : "The great majority of us are Muslims. We follow the teachings of
the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). We are members of the brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal
in right, dignity and self-respect. Consequently, we have a special and a very deep sense of unity. But
make no mistake : Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it."[20]

Islamic Pakistan

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Chapter II
Ulema and Pakistan Movement
Chapter 3
Page 1
Muslim religious organisations of the sub-continent -- Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, Majlis-i- Ahrar- i-Islam
and Jamat-i-Islami [1]-- were politically very active during the struggle for Pakistan but all of them
opposed tooth and nail the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims. The opposition of Jamiat
and Ahrar was on the plea that Pakistan was essentially a territorial concept and thus alien to the
philosophy of Islamic brotherhood, which was universal in character. Nationalism was an un-Islamic
concept for them but at the same time they supported the CongressParty's idea of Indian nationalism
which the Muslim political leadership considered as accepting perpetual domination of Hindu majority.
Jamat-i-Islami reacted to the idea of Pakistan in a complex manner. It rejected both the nationalist
Ulema's concept of nationalism as well as the Muslim League's demand for a separate homeland for the
Muslims.
The most noteworthy feature of the struggle for Pakistan is that its leadership came almost entirely
from the Western-educated Muslim professionals. The Ulema remained, by and large, hostile to the
idea of a Muslim national state. But during the mass contact campaign, which began around 1943, the
Muslim League abandoned its quaint constitutionalist and legalist image in favor of Muslim populism
which drew heavily on Islamic values. Wild promises were made of restoring the glory of Islam in the
future Muslim state. As a consequence, many religious divines and some respected Ulema were won
over.[2]
The Muslim political leadership believed that the Ulema were not capable of giving a correct lead in
politics to the Muslims because of their exclusively traditional education and complete ignorance of the
complexities of modern life. It, therefore, pleaded that the Ulema should confine their sphere of activity
to religion since they did not understand the nature of politics of the twentieth century.
It was really unfortunate that the Ulema, in general and the Darul Ulum Deoband in particular,
understood Islam primarily in a legal form. Their medieval conception of the Shariah remained
unchanged, orthodox and traditional in toto and they accepted it as finished goods manufactured
centuries ago by men like (Imam) Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf. Their scholasticism, couched in the old
categories of thought, barred them from creative thinking and properly understanding the problems,
social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in a post-feudal era. They were intellectually ill-
equipped to comprehend the crisis Islam had to face in the twentieth century. [3]
The struggle for Pakistan -- to establish a distinct identity of Muslims -- was virtually a secular
campaign led by men of politics rather than religion and Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his lieutenants
such as Liaquat Ali Khan who won Pakistan despite opposition by most of the Ulema.
Jinnah was continuously harassed by the Ulema, particularly by those with Congress orientation. They
stood for status quo as far as Islam and Muslims were concerned, and regarded new ideas such as the
two nation theory, the concept of Muslim nationhood and the territorial specification of Islam through
the establishment of Pakistan as innovations which they were not prepared to accept under any
circumstance. It was in this background that Jinnah pointed out to the students of the Muslim
University Union: "What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of
Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly

freed you from that undesirable element of Molvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Molvis as a
whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other, but there is a section
of them which is undesirable. Having freed ourselves from the clutches of the British Government, the
Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Molvis, may I appeal to the youth to emancipate our women.
This is essential. I do not mean that we are to ape the evils of the West. What I mean is that they must
share our life not only social but also political." [4]
The history of the Ulema in the sub-continent has been one of their perpetual conflict with intelligentsia.
The Ulema opposed Sir Syed Ahmad Khan when he tried to rally the Muslims in 1857. Nearly a
hundred of them, including Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, the leading light of Deoband, ruled that
it was unlawful to join the Patriotic Association founded by him. However, the Muslim community
proved wiser than the religious elite and decided to follow the political lead given by Sir Syed Ahmad.
The conflict between conservative Ulema and political Muslim leadership came to a head during the
struggle for Pakistan when a number of Ulema openly opposed the Quaid-i-Azam and denounced the
concept of Pakistan. It is an irony of history that Jinnah in his own days, like Sir Syed Ahmad before
him, faced the opposition of the Ulema.
The Ahrar Ulema -- Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Habibur Rahman Ludhianawi and Mazhar Ali Azhar --
seldom mentioned the Quaid-i-Azam by his correct name which was always distorted. Mazhar Ali
Azhar used the insulting sobriquet Kafir-i-Azam (the great unbeliever) for Quaid-i-Azam. One of the
resolutions passed by the Working Committee of the Majlis-i-Ahrar which met in Delhi on 3rd March
1940, disapproved of Pakistan plan, and in some subsequent speeches of the Ahrar leaders Pakistan was
dubbed as "palidistan". The authorship of the following couplet is attributed to Maulana Mazhar Ali
Azhar, a leading personality of the Ahrar:
Ik Kafira Ke Waste Islam ko Chhora

Yeh Quaid-i-Azam hai Ke hai Kafir-i-Azam.[6]
(He abandoned Islam for the sake of a non-believer woman [7], he is a great leader or a great non-
believer)
During the struggle for Pakistan, the Ahrar were flinging foul abuse on all the leading personalities of
the Muslim League and accusing them of leading un-Islamic lives. Islam was with them a weapon which
they could drop and pick up at pleasure to discomfit a political adversary. Religion was a private affair
in their dealings with the Congress and nationalism their ideology. But when they were pitted against
the Muslim League, their sole consideration was Islam. They said that the Muslim League was not only
indifferent to Islam but an enemy of it.
After independence, the Ahrar leaders came to Pakistan. But before coming, the All India Majlis-i-
Ahrar passed a resolution dissolving their organization and advising the Muslims to accept Maulana
Azad as their leader and join the Congress Party.[8]
The Jamat-i-Islami was also opposed to the idea of Pakistan which it described as Na Pakistan (not
pure). In none of the writings of the Jama'at is to be found the remotest reference in support of the
demand for Pakistan. The pre-independence views of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the
Jamat-i-Islami were quite definite:
"Among Indian Muslims today we find two kinds of nationalists: the Nationalists Muslims, namely
those who in spite of their being Muslims believe in Indian Nationalism and worship it; and the
Muslims Nationalist: namely those who are little concerned with Islam and its principles and aims, but
are concerned with the individuality and the political and economic interests of that nation which has
come to exist by the name of Muslim, and they are so concerned only because of their accidence of birth
in that nation. From the Islamic viewpoint both these types of nationalists were equally misled, for
Islam enjoins faith in truth only; it does not permit any kind of nation-worshipping at all.[9]

Maulana Maududi was of the view that the form of government in the new Muslim state, if it ever came
into existence, could only be secular. In a speech shortly before partition he said: "Why should we
foolishly waste our time in expediting the so-called Muslim-nation state and fritter away our energies in
setting it up, when we know that it will not only be useless for our purposes, but will rather prove an
obstacle in our path." [10]
Paradoxically, Maulana Maududi's writings played an important role in convincing the Muslim
intelligentsia that the concept of united nationalism was suicidal for the Muslims but his reaction to the
Pakistan movement was complex and contradictory. When asked to cooperate with the Muslim League
he replied: "Please do not think that I do not want to participate in this work because of any
differences, my difficulty is that I do not see how I can participate because partial remedies do not
appeal to my mind and I have never been interested in patch work."[11]
He had opposed the idea of united nationhood because he was convinced that the Muslims would be
drawn away from Islam if they agreed to merge themselves in the Indian milieu. He was interested
more in Islam than in Muslims: because Muslims were Muslims not because they belonged to a
communal or a national entity but because they believed in Islam. The first priority, therefore, in his
mind was that Muslim loyalty to Islam should be strengthened. This could be done only by a body of
Muslims who did sincerely believe in Islam and did not pay only lip service to it. Hence he founded the
Jamat-i-Islami (in August 1941).[12] However, Maulana Maududi's stand failed to take cognizance of
the circumstances in which the Muslims were placed [13] at that critical moment.
The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, the most prestigious organization of the Ulema, saw nothing Islamic in the
idea of Pakistan. Its president, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, who was also Mohtamim or principal
of Darul Ulum Deoband opposed the idea of two-nation theory, pleading that all Indians, Muslims or
Hindus were one nation. He argued that faith was universal and could not be contained within national
boundaries but that nationality was a matter of geography, and Muslims were obliged to be loyal to the
nation of their birth along with their non-Muslim fellow citizens. Maulana Madani said: "all should
endeavor jointly for such a democratic government in which Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and
Parsis are included. Such a freedom is in accordance with Islam." [14] He was of the view that in the
present times, nations are formed on the basis of homeland and not on ethnicity and religion.[15] He
issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from joining the Muslim League.
Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani accepted the doctrine of Indian nationalism with all enthusiasm and
started preaching it in mosques. This brought a sharp rebuke from Dr. Mohammad Iqbal. His poem on
Hussain Ahmad [16] in 1938 started a heated controversy between the so-called nationalist Ulema and
the adherents of pan-Islamism (Umma).
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a member of Indian National Congress regrets that he did not accept
Congress president ship in 1946, which led Nehru to assume that office and give the statements that
could be exploited by the Muslim League for creation of Pakistan and withdrawal of its acceptance of
the Cabinet Plan that envisaged an Indian Union of all the provinces and states of the sub-continent
with safeguards for minorities. [17] He had persuaded the pro-Congress Ulema that their interests
would be better safeguarded under a united India, and that they should repose full confidence in Indian
nationalism. However, they should make efforts to secure for themselves the control of Muslim personal
law, by getting a guarantee from the Indian National Congress, that the Muslim personal law would be
administered by qadis (judges) who were appointed from amongst the Ulema.[18]
In a bid to weaken the Muslim League's claim to represent all Muslims of the subcontinent, the
Congress strengthened its links with the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, the Ahrars and such minor and
insignificant non-League Muslim groups as the Momins and the Shia Conference.[19]
Along with its refusal to share power with the Muslim League, the Congress pursued an anti-Muslim
League policy in another direction with the help of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind . It was not enough to keep
the Muslim League out of power. Its power among the people should be weakened and finally broken.

Therefore, it decided to bypass Muslim political leadership and launch a clever movement of contacting
the Muslim masses directly to wean them away from the leadership that sought to protect them from
the fate of becoming totally dependent on the sweet will of the Hindu majority for their rights, even for
their continued existence. This strategy -- called Muslim Mass Contact Movement -- was organized in
1937 with great finesse by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. [20]
Congress leaders .... employed Molvis to convert the Muslim masses to the Congress creed. The Molvis,
having no voice in the molding of the Congress policy and program, naturally could not promise to
solve the real difficulties of the masses, a promise which would have drawn the masses towards the
Congress. The Molvis and others employed for the work tried to create a division among the Muslim
masses by carrying on a most unworthy propaganda against the leaders of the Muslim League. [21]
However, this Muslim mass contact movement failed.
It is pertinent to note here that a small section of the Deoband School was against joining the Congress.
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863-1943) was the chief spokesman of this group. Later Maulana
Shabbir Ahmad Othmani (1887-1949), a well-known disciple of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani and a
scholar of good repute, who had been for years in the forefront of the Jamiat leadership quit it with a
few other Deoband Ulema, and became the first president of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam established in
1946 to counteract the activities of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind. However, the bulk of the Deoband Ulema
kept on following the lead of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani and the Jamiat in opposing the demand
for Pakistan.
Contrary to the plea of the nationalist Ulema, the Muslim intelligentsia was worried that the end of
British domination should not become for the Muslims the beginning of Hindu domination. They
perceived through the past experience that the Hindus could not be expected to live with them on equal
terms within the same political framework. Therefore they did not seek to change masters. A homeland
is an identity and surely the Muslims of the sub-continent could not have served the cause of universal
brotherhood by losing their identity, which is what would have inevitably happened if they had been
compelled to accept the political domination of the Hindus. The Ulema thought in terms of a glorious
past and linked it unrealistically to a nebulous future of Muslim brotherhood. This more than anything
else damaged the growth of Muslim nationalism and retarded the progress of Muslims in the sub-
continent.[22]
The nationalist Ulema failed to realize this simple truth and eventually found themselves completely
isolated from the mainstream of the Muslim struggle for emancipation. Their opposition to Pakistan on
grounds of territorial nationalism was the result of their failure to grasp contemporary realities. [23]
They did not realize that majorities can be much more devastating, specifically when it is an ethnic,
linguistic or religious majority which cannot be converted into a minority through any election.[24]
The Ulema, as a class, concentrated on jurisprudence and traditional sciences. They developed a
penchant for argument and hair splitting. This resulted in their progressive alienation from the people,
who while paying them the respect due to religious scholars, rejected their lead in national affairs.
While their influence on the religious minded masses remained considerable, their impact on public
affairs shrank simply because the Ulema concentrated on the traditional studies and lost touch with the
realities of contemporary life.[25]


Islamic Pakistan
Chapter III
The First Islamic Republic
Page 1
The role of Islam in politics was not at the center of Muslim politics during the struggle for Pakistan
but was brought into the political debate after the nation was created. The issue proved to be the
beginning of a decades long quest and debate over just what Pakistan's Islamic character should be.
The Ulema identified their own political recognition with the Islamic constitution.
Ulema did not wait long to demand their share of power in running the new state. Soon after
independence, Jamat-i-Islami made the achievement of an Islamic constitution its central goal. Maulana
Maududi, after the creation of Pakistan, revised the conception of his mission and that of the rationale
of the Pakistan movement, [1] arguing that its sole object had been the establishment of an Islamic state
and that his party alone possessed the understanding and commitment needed to bring that about. [2]
Jamat-i-Islami soon evolved into a political party, demanding the establishment of an Islamic state in
Pakistan.
It declared that Pakistan was a Muslim state and not an Islamic state since a Muslim State is any state
which is ruled by Muslims while an Islamic State is one which opts to conduct its affairs in accordance
with the revealed guidance of Islam and accepts the sovereignty of Allah and the supremacy of His Law,
and which devotes its resources to achieve this end. [3] According to this definition, Pakistan was a
Muslim state ruled by secular minded Muslims. Hence the Jamat-i-Islami and other religious leaders
channeled their efforts to make Pakistan an "Islamic State."
Maulana Maududi argued that from the beginning of the struggle for Pakistan, Moslems had an
understanding that the center of their aspirations, Pakistan, would be an Islamic state, in which Islamic
law would be enforced and Islamic culture would be revived. Muslim League leaders, in their speeches,
were giving this impression. Above all, Quaid-i-Azam himself assured the Muslims that the constitution
of Pakistan would be based on the Quran. [4]
This contrasts to his views about the Muslim League leaders before independence: Not a single leader of
the Muslim League, from Quad-i-Azam, downwards, has Islamic mentality and Islamic thinking or
they see the things from Islamic point of view. [5] To declare such people legible for Muslim leadership,
because they are expert in western politics or western organization system and have concern for the
nation, is definitely ignorance from Islam and amounts to an un-Islamic mentality. [6]
On another occasion, Maulana Maududi said it was not clear either from any resolution of the Muslim
League or from the speeches of any responsible League leaders, that the ultimate aim of Pakistan is the
establishment of an Islamic government.....Those people are wrong who think that if the Muslim
majority regions are emancipated from the Hindu domination and a democratic system is established, it
would be a government of God. As a matter of fact, in this way, whatever would be achieved, it would
be only a non-believers government of the Muslims or may be more deplorable than that. [7]
When the question of constitution-making came to the forefront, the Ulema, inside and outside the
Constitutional Assembly and outside demanded that the Islamic Shariah shall form the only source for
all legislature in Pakistan.
Islamic Pakistan
In February 1948, Maulana Maududi, while addressing the Law College, Lahore, [8] demanded that
the Constitutional Assembly should unequivocally declare:
● 1. That the sovereignty of the state of Pakistan vests in God Almighty and that the government of
Pakistan shall be only an agent to execute the Sovereign's Will.
● 2. That the Islamic Shariah shall form the inviolable basic code for all legislation in Pakistan.
● 3. That all existing or future legislation which may contravene, whether in letter or in spirit, the
Islamic Shariah shall be null and void and be considered ultra vires of the constitution; and
● 4. That the powers of the government of Pakistan shall be derived from, circumscribed by and
exercised within the limits of the Islamic Shariah alone.
On January 13, 1948, Jamiat-al-Ulema-i-Islam, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, passed a
resolution in Karachi demanding that the government appoint a leading Alim to the office of Shaikh al
Islam, with appropriate ministerial and executive powers over the qadis throughout the country. [9]
The Jamiat submitted a complete table of a ministry of religious affairs with names suggested for each
post. It was proposed that this ministry be immune to ordinary changes of government. It is well known
that Quaid-i-Azam was the head of state at this time and that no action was taken on Ulema's demand.
[10] On February 9, 1948, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, addressing the Ulema-i-Islam conference
in Dacca, demanded that the Constituent Assembly "should set up a committee consisting of eminent
ulema and thinkers... to prepare a draft ... and present it to the Assembly.[11]
It was in this background that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, on March 7, 1949, moved the
Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, according to which the future constitution of
Pakistan was to be based on " the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social
justice as enunciated by Islam."
While moving the Resolution, he said: "Sir, I consider this to be a most important occasion in the life of
this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence, because by achieving
independence we only won an opportunity of building up a country and its polity in accordance with
our ideals. I would like to remind the house that the Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam, gave
expression of his feelings on this matter on many an occasion, and his views were endorsed by the
nation in unmistakable terms, Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this sub-continent wanted
to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to
demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the
life of humanity today."[12]
The resolution was debated for five days. The leading members of the government and a large number
of non-Muslim members, especially from East Bengal, took a prominent part. Non-Muslim members
expressed grave apprehensions about their position and role in the new policy.
Hindu members of the Constitutional Assembly argued that the Objectives Resolution differed with
Jinnah's view in all the basic points. Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya said: "What I hear in this
(Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan - the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even
that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honorable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the
land." [13] Birat Chandra Mandal declared that Jinnah had "unequivocally said that Pakistan will be a
secular state." [14] Bhupendra Kumar Datta went a step further: ...were this resolution to come before
this house within the life-time of the Great Creator of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam, it would not have
come in its present shape...." [15]
The leading members of the government in their speeches not only reassured the non-Muslims that
their position was quite safe and their rights were not being impaired but also gave clarifications with
regard to the import of the Resolution. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, the Deputy Leader of the House,
while defending the Resolution said: "It was remarked by some honorable members that the
interpretation which the mover of this Resolution has given is satisfactory and quite good, but Mr. B.C.
Mandal says: "Well tomorrow you may die, I may die, and the posterity may misinterpret it." First of
Islamic Pakistan
all, I may tell him and those who have got some wrong notions about the interpretation of this
resolution that this resolution itself is not a constitution. It is a direction to the committee that will have
to prepare the draft keeping in view these main features. The matter will again come to the House in a
concrete form, and all of us will get an opportunity to discuss it." [16]
In his elucidation of the implications of the Objectives Resolution in terms of the distribution of power
between God and the people, Omar Hayat Malik argued: "The principles of Islam and the laws of
Islam as laid down in the Quran are binding on the State. The people or the state cannot change these
principles or these laws...but there is a vast field besides these principles and laws in which people will
have free play...it might be called by the name of 'theo-cracy', that is democracy limited by word of
God, but as the word 'theo' is not in vogue so we call it by the name of Islamic democracy. [17]
Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi further elaborated the concept of Islamic democracy: Since Islam admits of no
priest craft, and since the dictionary meaning of the term "secular" is non-monastic -- that is,
"anything which is not dependent upon the sweet will of the priests," Islamic democracy, far from
being theocracy, could in a sense be characterized as being "secular." [18] However, he believed that if
the word "secular" means that the ideals of Islam, that the fundamental principles of religion, that the
ethical outlook which religion inculcates in our people should not be observed, then, I am afraid,...that
kind of secular democracy can never be acceptable to us in Pakistan.[19]
During the heated debate, Liaquat Ali Khan stressed: the Muslim League has only fulfilled half of its
mission (and that) the other half of its mission is to convert Pakistan into a laboratory where we could
experiment upon the principles of Islam to enable us to make a contribution to the peace and progress
of mankind.[20] He was hopeful that even if the body of the constitution had to be mounted in the
chassis of Islam, the vehicle would go in the direction he had already chosen. Thus he seemed quite sure
that Islam was on the side of democracy. "As a matter of fact it has been recognized by non-Muslims
throughout the world that Islam is the only society where there is real democracy." [21] In this
approach he was supported by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: " The Islamic state is the first
political institution in the world which stood against imperialism, enunciated the principle of
referendum and installed a Caliph (head of State) elected by the people in place of the king." [22]
The opposite conclusion, however, was reached by the authors of the Munir Report (1954) [23] who said
that the form of government in Pakistan cannot be described as democratic, if that clause of the
Objectives Resolution reads as follows: " Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah
Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for
being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust." Popular sovereignty, in the sense
that the majority of the people has the right to shape the nation's institutions and policy in accordance
with their personal views without regard to any higher law, cannot exist in an Islamic state, they added.
The learned authors of the Munir Report felt that the Objectives Resolution was against the concept of
a sovereign nation state. Corroboration of this viewpoint came from the Ulema themselves, (whom the
Munir Committee interviewed) "including the Ahrar" and erstwhile Congressites with whom before
the partition this conception of a modern national state as against an Islamic state was almost a part of
their faith. [24] The Ulema claimed that the Quaid-i-Azam's conception of a modern national
state....became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949. [25]
Justice Mohammad Munir, who chaired the committee, says that "if during Quaid-i-Azam's life,
Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister had even attempted to introduce the Objectives resolution of the
kind that he got through the Assembly, the Quaid-i-Azam would never have given his assent to it.[26]
In an obvious attempt to correct the erroneous notion that the Objectives Resolution envisaged a
theocratic state in Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly returned to the subject during his tour of the
United States (May-June 1950). In a series of persuasive and eloquent speeches, he argued that "We
have pledged that the State shall exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of
the people. In this we have kept steadily before us the principles of democracy, freedom equality,
tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam. There is no room here for theocracy, for Islam
Islamic Pakistan
stands for freedom of conscience, condemns coercion, has no priesthood and abhors the caste system. It
believes in equality of all men and in the right of each individual to enjoy the fruit of his or her efforts,
enterprise, capacity and skill -- provided these be honestly employed." [27]
The Objectives Resolution was approved on March 12, 1949. Its only Muslim critic was Mian Iftikhar-
ud-din, leader of the Azad Pakistan Party, although he believed that "the Islamic conception of a state
is, perhaps as progressive, as revolutionary, as democratic and as dynamic as that of any other state or
ideology." [28]
According to Munir, the terms of the Objectives Resolution differ in all the basic points of the Quaid-i-
Azam's views e.g: [29]
● 1. The Quaid-i-Azam has said that in the new state sovereignty would rest with the people. The
Resolution starts with the statement that sovereignty rests with Allah. This concept negates the
basic idea of modern democracy that there are no limits on the legislative power of a
representative assembly.
● 2. There is a reference to the protection of the minorities of their right to worship and practice
their religion, whereas the Quaid-i-Azam had stated that there would be no minorities on the
basis of religion.
● 3. The distinction between religious majorities and minorities takes away from the minority, the
right of equality, which again is a basic idea of modern democracy.
● 4. The provision relating to Muslims being enabled to lead their life according to Islam is
opposed to the conception of a secular state.
It was natural that with the terms of the Resolution, the Ulema should acquire considerable influence in
the state. On the strength of the Objectives Resolution they made the Ahmadis as their first target and
demanded them to be declared a minority.[30]
After the adoption of Objectives Resolution, Liaquat Ali Khan moved a motion for the appointment of
a Basic Principles Committee consisting of 24 members, including himself and two non-Muslim
members, to report the house on the main principles on which the constitution of Pakistan is to be
framed. A Board of Islamic Teaching was set up to advise the Committee on the Islamic aspects of the
constitution.
In the course of constitutional debates, a number of very crucial issues were raised that caused much
controversy, both inside and outside the Constituent Assembly over specific questions such as the
following:
1) The nature of the Islamic state: the manner in which the basic principles of Islam concerning state,
economy, and society were to be incorporated into the constitution.
● 2) The nature of federalism: questions of provincial autonomy vis-a-vis federal authority with
emphasis on the problems of representation on the basis of population and the equality of the
federating units; the structure of the federal legislature -- unicameral or bicameral.
● 3) The form of government: whether it was to be modeled on the British or the U.S. pattern --
parliamentary or presidential.
● 4) The problem of the electorate: serious questions of joint (all confessional groups vote in one
election) versus separate (each confessional group votes separately for its own candidates)
electorate.
● 5) The question of languageboth national and regional. These very fundamental issues divided
the political elites of Pakistan into warring factions that impeded the process of constitution-
making.

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter IV
The First Martial Law
Chapter 3
Page 1
On October, 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza staged a coup d'état. He abrogated the 1956
constitution, imposed martial law and appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial
Law Administrator and Aziz Ahmad as Secretary General and Deputy Chief Martial Law
Administrator. Aziz was the first civilian to hold such an office that made the civil servants partners in
the coup d'état. However, only three weeks later General Ayub -- who was openly questioning the
authority of the government prior to the imposition of martial law [1] -- deposed Iskandar Mirza on
Oct. 27, 1958 and assumed the presidency that practically formalized the militarization of the political
system in Pakistan. After three and half years of martial law rule, President Ayub Khan introduced his
constitution in May 1962 to reinforce his authority in the absence of martial law.
The new constitution, in its much watered down formulations, recognized Islamic principles, a
presidential form of government which lacked the necessary checks and balances and a federal
structure which formally provided for a maximum degree of provincial autonomy in the legislative
sphere. The federal structure was offset by the unitary character of organization of the executive
authority insofar as the President was to appoint provincial governors who would, in turn, form the
provincial cabinets without being responsible to the provincial legislatures. The provincial
governments, consequently, would be directly responsible to the president of Pakistan. There were no
fundamental rights but were added later through a constitutional amendment.
The Ayub's system was neither presidential nor federal, nor representative either in form or in
substance. In fact, what it did was to provide for an authoritarian political system which could be
geared to the process of economic development and militarization of the political system in the wake of
Pakistan's military alliances with the West within the framework of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
The word "Islamic" was omitted from the name of the state in the new constitution. [A martial law
ordinance had earlier declared that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan will be known as Pakistan.] There
was reference in the directive principles to Quran and Sunnah and the Islamic way of life but the
responsibility of giving effect to laws made in pursuance of such principles was that of the organ of the
state and nobody could question the organ's discretion. There was to be an Advisory Council of Islamic
Ideology but it consisted of lawyers and administrators and the Ulemaof liberal views, one of them
being the blind Hashim from East Pakistan who was quite modern in his views. He also set up Islamic
Research Institute of which Fazal-ur-Rehman, a modernist, was the President. [2] However, the
conservative element in the indirectly-elected National Assembly began to clamor for restoration of the
Islamic features of the 1956 constitution. Ayub could not resist the demand and they had to be restored
in 1963 through constitutional amendments.
The provision in the new constitution that no law should be repugnant to Islam was not enforceable in a
court of law, while article 198 of the 1956 constitution dealing with the same subject was enforceable in
a law court. There was no provision in the new constitution to bring the legal code of the country in
conformity with the laws of Islam. It was, however, ensured through the first amendment that "all
existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah." Further, while in the

Islamic Pakistan
original constitution of 1962 it was simply provided that "no law shall be repugnant to Islam," it was
elaborated with the additional words: "No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah." The amendment restored the footnote of Article 198
of the 1956 constitution stating that the expression Quran and Sunnah shall mean the Quran and
Sunnah as interpreted by the sect concerned. Like 1956 constitution Ayub Khan's constitution did not
make Islam the State religion of Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was against using Islam as a cliché in politics but at the same time he was well aware of the
dangers of abandoning Islam as a state policy. In his autobiography Friends Not Masters, while
discussing the role of religion in Pakistan's politics, he said: "Any attempt at interpreting the tenets of
Islam and adapting the laws to conform to the requirements of the time is a signal for the Ulema to
raise the slogan of heresy."[3]
However, like the former Law Minister, A.K.Brohi [4] Ayub believed that the Quran does not present a
constitution for an Islamic state. He said: "The Holy Quran contained the principles of guidance but
did not prescribe a detailed constitution for running a country. The example of the Holy Prophet in
organizing an Islamic State was, of course, available. After the Holy Prophet, the four caliphs organized
and administered the State according to their understanding of Islamic principles. Each one of them
had applied the principles of Islam and the teachings of the Holy Prophet in accordance with their
circumstances. No specific pattern of government or even of the election of the Head of Government
had been established. The conclusion was inescapable that Islam had not prescribed any particular
pattern of government but had left it to the community to evolve its own pattern to suit its
circumstances, provided that the principles of the Quran and the Sunnah were observed."[5]
Arguing that the burden of thinking about the interpretation of the Islamic principles must rest on the
community, Ayub Khan says: " In all this, I was guided by my understanding of the institution of ijma
(consensus) provided in Islam. According to one school of thought ijma represents the agreement, in a
matter requiring opinion or decision, of the mujthahids, people who, by virtue of their knowledge of
Islam, have a right to form their own judgment. Another school of thought interprets ijma to form as
the opinion of the majority of all Muslims. There is yet another view that the right to formulate
independent judgment on matters affecting the life of the people rests in the Legislative and not in any
body of scholars."[6]
In this view Ayub Khan was probably influenced by Dr Mohammad Iqbal who argues: "The growth of
republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a
great step in advance. The transfer of the power of ijtehad from individual representatives of school to
a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form ijma
can take in modern times."[7] Iqbal also holds that on a question of legal interpretation, even the
unanimous decision of the Companions of the Prophet would not inescapably bind later generations.[8]
Continuing his argument on ijma, Ayub Khan writes: " I did not want to prejudge the issue and
therefore in the constitutional arrangement I left it to the representatives of the people to decide how
they would like to form their judgment in matters relating to the Quran and the Sunnah. I thought it
necessary to provide an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology backed by an Islamic Research Institute
to assist the Legislature in framing laws based on the concepts of Islam. The Council was to have as
members not only those persons who possessed a knowledge of Islam but also those who understood the
economic, political, legal and administrative problems of the country so that the requirements of Islam
and the requirements of the time and circumstances could be harmonized."[9]
Realizing that Ulema would not be satisfied with this arrangement, he said: "They claimed the exclusive
right to interpret and decide matters pertaining to Islam. While they maintained this claim they
refrained from producing any detailed constitutional document, knowing that such an attempt would
only expose their internal differences. Their demand was that the government should agree to adopt an
Islamic Constitution, leaving it to the Ulema to decide whether any law or measure was Islamic or
not."[10]

Islamic Pakistan
Elaborating on Ulema's demand for an Islamic Constitution, Ayub Khan went on to say: Since no one
had defined the fundamental elements of an Islamic Constitution, no constitution could be called
Islamic unless it received the blessings of all Ulema. The only way of having an Islamic Constitution was
to hand over the country to the Ulema and beseech them, 'lead kindly light.' This is precisely what the
Ulema wanted. A constitution could be regarded as Islamic only if it were drafted by the Ulema and
conceded them the authority to judge and govern the people. This was a position which neither the
people nor I was prepared to accept."[11]
Ayub Khan's liberal interpretation of Islam reflected in his constitution. The Constitution Commission
appointed by him in 1960 recommended that "we should set up an International Muslim Commission
to advise us as to how our laws could be made to conform to the injunctions of the Holy Quran and the
Sunnah. I doubted whether a Commission of this kind would serve any useful purpose. I sounded some
Heads of State at the time but they showed no enthusiasm for the idea. It was obvious that we would
have to address ourselves to our problems and work out our own solutions." [12] The Constitution
Commission also pointed out that "the bringing of the laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah
does not by itself make a good Muslim."[13]
Ayub Khan's skepticism about the role of Ulema in politics culminated in outlawing the most organized
and vocal religious group in the country, Jamat-i-Islami, in 1963. His government saw the activities of
this religious party incompatible with the security of the state. All the government servants and military
personnel were asked to file an affidavit declaring that they do not belong to Jamat-i-Islami.
Before the promulgation of the constitution, Ayub Khan introduced the Muslim Family Laws through
an Ordinance on March 2, 1961 under which unmitigated polygamy was abolished, consent of the
current wife was made mandatory for a second marriage, brakes were placed on the practice of instant
divorce where men pronounced it irrevocably by pronouncing talaq thrice in one go. The Arbitration
Councils set up under the law in the urban and rural areas were to deal with cases of (a) grant of
sanction to a person to contract a second marriage during the subsistence of a marriage; (b)
reconciliation of a dispute between a husband and a wife; (c) grant maintenance to the wife and
children.
All Muslim marriages were to be compulsorily registered with registrars to be appointed by union
councils, one in each ward. The registrars were also empowered to perform marriages. For such
services they were to be paid substantial fees. The offices of registrars were filled by Imams and
Khatibs. A sum of Rs. 5 crore annually went into the pockets of these religious leaders as a result of the
fees prescribed by the ordinance. When Jamat-i-Islami launched an agitation against this "un-Islamic"
Law, religious leaders either supported the President or kept aloof from the movement.[14]
President Ayub promulgated the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 on October 23, 1961
under which the government took over huge and valuable properties of Muslim trusts. Enormous funds
recovered from the Waqf properties, which previously went into private pockets, were now at the
disposal of the government. Some of these funds were spent on the salaries of the Imams and Khatibs of
important mosques. The President was able thus to get further support from these religious leaders who
were already indebted to him for being provided with jobs under the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.[15]
Ayub Khan's liberal interpretation of the Islamic principles antagonized Ulema who opposed his
Family Law Ordinance to regulate Islamic personal law in a modern Islamic society. His attempts to
popularize the family planning program was declared un-Islamic by orthodox mullahs who quoted
verses from the Holy Quran to plead that the use of contraceptives was prohibited in Islam. Although
the 1968-69 political agitation against Ayub's regime was mainly directed against the system of indirect
elections, but during the demonstrations, the conservative section of population was easily aroused to
turn against Ayub Khan to protest his "anti-Islamic" policies. During Ayub Khan's talks with the
political leaders on 10th March, 1969, in Rawalpindi, leader of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan, Mufti
Mahmood, objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and demanded that the 22 points agreed by
Ulema in 1951 should be implemented in order to make Pakistan a true Islamic state.

Islamic Pakistan
Despite Ulema's vehement opposition to the Family Laws Ordinance, the role of Islam in politics
remained eclipsed during the Ayub era. However, in 1967, he faced the wrath of Ulema on two other
religious issues. The first was a controversy over the sighting of the crescent of Shawwal when the
religious leaders gave public-heeded fatwas against celebrating Eid-al-Fitr according to the decision of
the government-sponsored central moon-sighting committee. The religious leaders claimed that the
people of Pakistan follow them on religious issues and do not have any confidence in the government in
this sphere.
Another issue was the book "Islam" written by Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, the Chairman of the Islamic
Research Institute.There was a mass protest by the Ulema against the book. The author was forced to
resign his job as Ayub's government decided to avoid confrontation with the religious lobby. The
campaign against the liberal interpretation of Islam by Dr. Fazal [16] was seen as the second mass
agitation the country had witnessed after the 1953 anti-Qadiani movement.

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter V
The Second Martial Law
Chapter 3
The second martial law was imposed on March 25, 1969, when President Ayub Khan abrogated his own
constitution and handed over power to the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Agha Mohammad
Yahya Khan. [1] On assuming the presidency, General Yahya Khan acceded to popular demands by
abolishing the one-unit system in West Pakistan [2] and ordered general elections on the principle of
one man one vote.
General Yahya's regime made no attempt to frame a constitution. The expectations were that a new
constituent assembly would be set up by holding a free and fair election. In order to hold the proposed
elections, President Yahya Khan promulgated a Legal Framework Order on March 30, 1970 that also
spelled out the fundamental principles of the proposed constitution and the structure and composition
of the national and provincial assemblies.
In December, 1970 elections were held simultaneously for both the national and five provincial
assemblies. By any criteria, elections were free and fair. There was no interference from the
government; it maintained strict neutrality showing no favor or discrimination for or against any
political parties. The members of the ruling council of ministers were debarred from participation in
the elections. There were no allegations of rigging of the elections as is often alleged in elections held in
the countries of the third world.
But the results of the first and the last general elections in united Pakistan were simply disastrous from
the standpoint of national unity and demonstrated the failure of national integration. There was not a
single national party in the country which enjoyed the confidence of the people of Pakistan, both East
and West Pakistan. Two regional parties -- the Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)-- won 160 out of 162 seats allotted for East Pakistan. But in
West Pakistan it could not secure a single seat and the percentage of votes secured by the Awami
League in the four provinces of West Pakistan were: 0.07 (Punjab), 0.07 (Sindh) 0.2 (NWFP) and 1.0
(Baluchistan).
The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won 81 out of 138 seats
for West Pakistan. But the PPP did not even dare to set up a candidate in East Pakistan. The remaining
57 seats of West Pakistan were shared by seven parties and there were fifteen independent candidates.
The PPP emerged as the single largest party in West Pakistan with majorities in Sindh and the Punjab;
and the National Awami Party together with their political ally, Jamiat-ul Ulema-i-Islam, JUI, (of
Maulana Mufti Mahmood got clear majorities in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province.
None of the West Pakistani political parties, like the PPP, could win a single seat in East Pakistan. The
religious question played little or no part in the elections. There can be no doubt that in East Pakistan
the principles which won the consensus of opinion was the single basic notion of autonomy.
The Awami League (AL) had fought the elections on the basis of their six points formula, which
committed them to restructure the existing federal system in order to ensure maximum political
autonomy for East Pakistan. Under this formula, only two portfolios -- Foreign Affairs and Defence --
would be retained by the central government. The PPP, on the other hand, was not willing to dilute the
authority of the central government in-spite of assuring full provincial autonomy for all the provinces of
Pakistan. The NAP and JUI coalition sided with the Awami League so that they might obtain maximum
autonomy for their own provinces, i.e., Baluchistan and the NWFP.
Islamic Pakistan
The election results truly reflected the ugly political reality: the division of the Pakistani electorate
along regional lines and political polarization of the country between the two wings, East and West
Pakistan. In political terms, therefore, Pakistan as a nation stood divided as a result of the very first
general elections in twenty-three years of its existence.
Thus the general elections of 1970 produced a new political configuration with three distinct centers of
power:(i) the AL in East Pakistan: (ii) the PPP in Sindh and the Punjab; and (iii) the NAP-JUI in
Baluchistan and the NWFP. At the top of all this was the fourth center of power, the armed forces with
their spokesman, Yahya Khan.
There were two major claimants of power: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Both
were inordinately ambitious and unscrupulous politicians. "Both flourished on negative appeals to the
illiterate voters of Pakistan, one by whipping up regional feeling against Punjabi domination and the
other by whipping up militant national feelings against India. Neither had any constructive or positive
approach." [3] Mujib was apparently more interested in creating a separate state for Bengalis,
Bangladesh since he had no trust in the ruling elite of West Pakistan. He also seemed to have entered
into a secret deal with India for the secession of East Pakistan. India, thanks to its consistently and
persistently hostile attitude towards Pakistan, was gladly ready to help Mujib in his secession plan.[4]
On the other hand, Bhutto was more interested in getting power, no matter whether in a united or
divided Pakistan. In fact he realized that in a united Pakistan, he had little chance of becoming either
prime minister or president. According to GW Choudhury, "he realized from his discussions with
Bhutto before and after the 1970 elections that if he had to make a choice between the two 'Ps (power or
Pakistan), he would choose the former. He was more interested in getting a 21-gun salute as the head of
the state than in the maintenance of the unity of Pakistan." [5]
Negotiations were held between January and March 1971 between the two major regional leaders -
Mujib and Bhutto - and the ruling military government under President Yahya Khan. But the tripartite
negotiations for an agreed federal or even a confederal constitution was a dismal and total failure. It is
now a well-known fact that the negotiations in Dacca with Mujib were a smoke screen for gaining time
for Yahya Khan to airlift supplies and military personnel to Dacca for subsequent military operations.
[6] Under the Legal Framework Order, the President was to decide when the Assembly was to meet.
Once assembled it was to frame a new constitution within 120 days or stand dissolved. On 13th
February, 1971, the president announced that the National assembly was to meet at Dacca on 3rd
march. By this time the differences between the main parties to the conflict had already crystallized.
On December 22, 1970 the Secretary of the Awami League, Tajuddin Ahmed, claimed that his party
having won an absolute majority had a clear mandate and was quiet competent to frame a constitution
and to form a central government on its own. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman declared on January 3, 1971
that his party would not frame a constitution on its own, even though it had a majority. He refused,
however, to negotiate on the Six Points, saying that they were now public property and no longer
negotiable.
The crux of the conflict was that the majority party in the west, led by Bhutto, was convinced that a
Federation based on the Six Points would lead to a feeble confederation in name only. At best it would
lead to a feeble confederation and at worst it would result in the division of the country into two states.
These fears were evidently shared by the military leaders in the west, including President Yahya Khan
who had publicly described Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as the 'future Prime Minister of Pakistan' on
January 14, 1971.
Bhutto announced on February 15 that his party would not attend the National Assembly unless there
was 'some amount of reciprocity' from the Awami League. Sheikh Mujib replied at a press conference
on February 21, asserting that 'Our stand is absolutely clear. The constitution will be framed on the
basis of the Six Points'. He also denied that the Six Points would leave the central government at the
mercy of the provinces and contended that they were designed only to safeguard provincial autonomy.
Islamic Pakistan
On February 28, Bhutto demanded that either the 120-day limit for the national Assembly be removed
or the opening session be postponed, declaring that if it was held on March 3 as planned, there would be
a general strike throughout West Pakistan. President Yahya Khan responded next day by postponing
the Assembly meeting to March 25. The postponement of the National Assembly came as a shattering
disillusionment to the Awami League and their supporters throughout East Pakistan. It was seen as a
betrayal and as proof of the authorities of the West Pakistan to deny them the fruits of their electoral
victory. This resulted in the outbreak of violence in East Pakistan. The Awami Leaguelaunched a non-
cooperation movement and virtually they controlled the entire province.
The National Assembly, however, could not even meet on March 25 due to widespread disturbances in
East Pakistan where the army moved in on march 26, 'to control the situation' or launching ruthless
atrocities against the innocent people. The civil disobedience movement later developed into a war of
national liberation fully backed by the Indian army. As a result, Pakistani forces had to surrender to
the Indian Army, and almost over 93,000 military personnel were taken as prisoners of war on
December 16, 1971. Thus ended an important era of the largest Muslim state, Pakistan. A new and
smaller Pakistan emerged on 16 December 1971.
Demoralized and finding himself unable to control the situation, Yahya Khan surrendered power to
Bhutto who was sworn-in on December 20, 1971 as President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Among the generals, once again, there seemed to be a deep cleavage about the future course of action.
The generals close to Yahya Khan wanted him to stop transferring power to the then Commander-in-
Chief, General Abdul Hamid Khan.The hawkish generals, such as Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim
Khan, however are rumored to have practically forced Yahya Khan at gun point to transfer power to
Bhutto, who thus became the first civilian to take as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of
Pakistan. [7] Such was the background of events against which the Bhutto era of Pakistan's political
history began on December 20, 1971.
On Bhutto's role in the cessation of East Pakistan it is argued that as the National assembly was to sit at
Dacca, Bhutto prevented members of the National Assembly from West Pakistan from going to Dacca,
by threatening them that he would break the legs of those who went to Dacca. He also tore to pieces the
Polish Resolution in the United Nations which had proposed that the two belligerent states should
revert to their original positions before the war had begun. "You on that side and I on this side," is
another expression which Bhutto is alleged to have addressed to Mujib.[8]

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VI
What led to the break-up of Pakistan?
Chapter 3
Page 1
Why Pakistan could not survive as a united country? There was a long history of political, economic
and cultural causes that eventually developed the demands of provincial autonomy in East Pakistan into
a secessionist movement. It might have been saved in March 1971, but the power elites of West Pakistan
were not prepared to let the system be transformed into one more acceptable to the East.
Political system in Pakistan broke down in 1971 largely because of the inordinate delay in framing a
constitution giving birth to a stable political order, the eclipse of democracy and a deep rooted internal
dissension and conflict between East and West Pakistan. The task of constitution-making was hampered
due to the divergent perceptions in East and West Pakistan in almost every aspect. While India had
agreed on and adopted its constitution by January 26, 1949, it was not until March 7, 1949, that the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly drew up what came to be known as the Objectives Resolution and
began to concentrate on the task of evolving a constitution. The Constituent Assembly's Basic Principles
Committee (BPC) produced its first set of interim proposals in 1950. These were not received with much
favor in the eastern wing where the Awami Muslim League (the word Muslim was later dropped) had
already been formed as an indigenous political party and a potential rival to the Muslim League. Its
leadership was in the hands of Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The
party had drawn up a 42-point manifesto and its foremost demand was complete regional autonomy for
East Pakistan "in the spirit of the Lahore resolution," leaving only defense, foreign affairs, currency
and coinage with the federal government. The party also called for Bengali to be declared with Urdu as
one of the two state languages.[1]
The BPC then produced a second set of proposals which was placed before the Constituent Assembly on
December 22, 1952. These provided for parity between the two wings of the country, something that was
now strongly resented in West Pakistan which regarded East Pakistan as only one of the five federating
units of Pakistan. In the heat of the controversy, the second BPC report virtually fizzled out. It was
becoming clear that East Pakistan would be satisfied with nothing short of almost complete
autonomy.[2]
In the meantime, General Ayub Khan, who had become the first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the
army in 1951 and was to later himself confess to his own political ambitions, teamed up with the
Defense Secretary Major General Iskandar Mirza, to consolidate his grip over the levers of power. The
civil-military oligarchy at will dismissed and installed governments in the center as well as the
provinces, demonstrating an utter contempt for democratic norms. In 1953, Governor General Ghulam
Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin using a viceregal prerogative inherited
from the days of the British Raj. A year later he also dismantled the Constituent Assembly. His action
was, however, condoned by the federal judiciary.[3]
On March 23, 1956, a second Constituent Assembly, with Chaudhry Mohammad Ali (also a former civil
servant) as Prime Minister, at last promulgated the first constitution of Pakistan which reflected a
consensus. East Pakistan, nevertheless remained alienated from the center because the constitution did
not concede to it the expected measure of autonomy.
One can say that it was the agitation for the Bengali language which turned out to be the first schism in
Islamic Pakistan
the Center-East Pakistan relationship. [4] The agitation in question was afoot within months of
inception of Pakistan and, in fact, immediately after the Quaid-i-Azam had declared in a speech in
Dhaka on March 24, 1948, that Urdu and Urdu alone would be the official language of Pakistan: " Let
me tell you in the clearest language that there is no truth that your normal life is going to be touched or
disturbed so far as your Bengali language is concerned. But let me make it very clear to you that the
state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language ...... But as I have said, it will come
in time. "
A crucial point, however, came four years later, on February 21, 1952, when police opened fire on a
demonstration in favor of the Bengali language and three students of Dhaka University were killed.
Later a monument called Shaheed Minar was built to commemorate their martyrdom and February 21
was regularly observed as Bengali Language Day in East Pakistan with great fervor. However, little was
known in West Pakistan about the episode and the bitterness it had created because the media led the
people to believe that after the Quaid-i-Azam's declaration there was no question of East Pakistan not
falling in line with West Pakistan in accepting Urdu as the only official language of Pakistan. The
people of East Pakistan remained dissatisfied over the language question and after the dominating
personality of Mr. Jinnah was removed by his death, discontent became both audible and visible.
Efforts at assimilation were made by developing and encouraging the increased use or at least increased
knowledge of Urdu in East Pakistan. In the early days, the provincial government issued an order that
in schools where Urdu was the medium of instruction, Bengali must be taught as a compulsory subject
and, similarly, where Bengali was the medium of instruction, Urdu must be taught as a compulsory
subject. When Molvi Fazlul Haq_XE "Fazlul Haq"_'s party, after defeating the Muslim League took
office in 1955, the language order in question was withdrawn. It was a clear indication of the mistrust,
as well as strong feeling, which existed with reference to the problem of the national language.
Another crucial point in the history of Center-East Pakistan relationship came in 1954 when the party
in power at the Center, the Muslim League was completely routed in the East Pakistan provincial
election and the United Front of the opposition parties won more than an overwhelming majority. The
United Front fought the election on a 21-point program. The main planks in the manifesto were
recognition of Bengali as an official language and complete autonomy for East Bengal in all matters
except defense, foreign policy and currency. The manifesto also demanded that the headquarters of the
navy be located in East Pakistan and that an armament factory be established in the province. Other
demands relating to financial autonomy and East Pakistan's complete freedom from the center with
regard to export of jute were bound to create apprehension both among the western elites and business
interests.
The election results showed deep revulsions of feeling in the province. The result of this election was
that the Muslim League in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly was swept from power, from office
and almost out of sight, for it retained only nine out of 309 seats. In the Constituent Assembly the
signals had been read aright and on April 20, 1954, the Muslim League parliamentary party agreed, in
terms of a 'Language Formula' that both Urdu and Bengali should be official languages of Pakistan.
The language formula was accepted by the assembly on May 7, 1954.
The veteran leader of East Pakistan, Molvi Fazlul Haq, who moved the Pakistan Resolution at the
Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940, became the chief minister and formed the first non-
Muslim League government of Pakistan. Within two months he was dismissed being charged with
treason and complicity with India and secessionism. [5] Governor's rule was imposed in the province
and Major General Iskandar Mirza was appointed Governor.
The fact of the matter is that the West Pakistan power elite, particularly the army did not trust East
Pakistan leaders, even people like Fazlul Haq and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy who, inspite of what
happened in the preceding years, cooperated with the West Pakistani leaders and the Constituent
Assembly and produced the 1956 constitution.Two years later, in October 1958 Ayub Khan abrogated it
and imposed martial law, which in retrospect can be seen as a watershed in the history of Pakistan,
particularly in the context of the relationship between the two wings of the country.
Islamic Pakistan
The great merit of the 1956 constitution was that it represented a consensus between the political
leaders of East and West Pakistan. In this East Pakistan surrendered its numerical advantage as a
majority province by agreeing to the principle of parity with West Pakistan at the national level. Ayub
Khan's martial law upset the entire scheme of things and set the country on a new and uncharted
course altogether. It confirmed the worst fears of East Pakistani opinion-makers which they had started
entertaining earlier, noticing some straws blowing at the center. Three of the prime ministers hailing
from East Pakistan -- Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali (Bogra), and H.S.Suhrawardy -- had
either been dismissed or maneuvered out of office by the West Pakistani elite. Ayub Khan's martial law
proved to be the proverbial last straw.[6]
The feeling of alienation in East Pakistan continued to aggravate during the Ayub regime. Ayub's
election as president in 1965 was considered a hoax. He was elected, inspite of a hostile popular
sentiment, under a system of his own making, called Basic Democracy, by an electoral college which
could easily be manipulated. Having spent seven years under the yoke of Ayub's military and civil
dictatorship, another five-year term for him as president was not seen as a happy prospect. It only
added to the feeling of frustration in East Pakistan.[7]
Then came the Indo-Pak war in 1965, another watershed in the history of relationship between East
and West Pakistan. Ayub Khan had developed the fatal theory that the defense of East Pakistan lay in
the West. During the war which took place on the borders of West Pakistan, East Pakistan was totally
cut off. The Pakistanis in that wing of the country were left undefended and completely abandoned to
their fate. The theory that the battle of East Pakistan be fought in West Pakistan only added to the
feeling of isolation and alienation in East Pakistan. [8] The 1965 war instead of acting as a great
unifying force, as national wars often do, dealt a grievous blow to the incipient process of national
integration. The 1965 war thus became the "unfinished agenda" of the 1971 war.[9] Shortly after the
1965 war, signs of political unrest had indeed begun to surface in both wings of the country.

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VII
The Third Islamic Republic
Chapter 3
Page 1
The loss of East Pakistan forced General Yahya Khan and his military junta to quit power. On
December 20, 1971, General Yahya Khan handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose Pakistan
People's Party had won a land-slide victory in the 1970 elections in the western and only remaining
wing of the country.
Generally, Bhutto has been blamed for having forced the secession of Bangladesh. The advocates of this
view argue that Bhutto commanded only 80 seats out of more than 300 seats in the National Assembly
representing only the Punjab and Sindh, whereas Sheikh Mujib received an absolute majority of 169
seats. Therefore, in accordance with the theory and practice of parliamentary government, the Sheikh
and his Awami League had the legitimate right of forming a government and framing a constitution.
Neither the junta nor Bhutto could dispute Mujib's claim, but they were not prepared to accept Bengali
rule. An agreement with Mujib could not help Bhutto's cause, even if it might have served Pakistan's
larger interests. ....... Bhutto apparently did not mind sacrificing the country's tenuous unity on the alter
of his own ambition.[1]
According to General Yahya's statement published in the daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, on December 28,
1978, the responsibility for the separation of East Pakistan rested solely with Bhutto. He was
responsible for not allowing the National Assembly to meet at Dacca, as he publicly said he would break
the legs of anyone from West Pakistan if he dared to go to Dacca, to attend a meeting of the National
assembly. [2] However, the Hamoudur Rehman Commission, which probed the debacle of East
Pakistan, apparently absolved Bhutto from any responsibility because "if the report had held him
responsible for the breakup of Pakistan then General Zia, would have tried and executed him for
treason rather than for alleged murder."[3] Nevertheless, while Yahya cannot escape responsibility for
the tragic events in East Pakistan, it is also on the record that he did not act alone. [4] Similarly though
Bhutto would appear to be the primary beneficiary of the debacle of East Pakistan, not even he can be
singled out for blame.[5]
With the secession of Bangladesh, the situation in West Pakistan was simplified for Bhutto since his
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had emerged as the single largest party. Therefore, as the majority party
leader, Bhutto was in a position to form his own government at the center. However, Bhutto's PPP
majorities were confined to only two provinces -- the Punjab and Sindh while in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Baluchistan, the National Awami Party (NAP) leader, Abdul Wali
Khanand the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) leader, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, had clear majorities.
Upon assuming power, as the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Bhutto did not
restore democracy. Pakistan, for the first time, had a civilian as the martial law chief. The country
continued to be governed under martial law till August 1972. Under the provisional constitutional
order, the 1962 constitution became the interim constitution of Pakistan till a new constitution was
adopted in 1973.
The 1973 constitution provided for a parliamentary system with all powers concentrated in the prime

Islamic Pakistan
minister. He was also elected as the president of the national assembly. So there was total concentration
of both executive and legislative powers in the office of the prime minister. Under article 48 of the
original 1973 constitution the president of the country was bound by the advice of the prime minister,
and it was mandatory that every order issued by the president must be countersigned by the prime
minister and unless the prime minister had signed it, no order or decision of the president would have
any legal sanction. What he wanted was absolute power and the 1973 constitution does not obscure
Bhutto's efforts in forming a totalitarian system, something his predecessors considered but rejected as
unsound.[6]
Equipped with all the executive and legislative powers, Bhutto became a civilian dictator under the
facade of a democratic government. His rule as the all-powerful prime minister from 1973 to 1977 was
more undemocratic, more oppressive and more intolerable than the two martial law regimes, which
preceded his government.
The leaders of the opposition parties were persecuted and prosecuted to an extent unknown even during
the previous regimes in Pakistan. A prominent Muslim League leader, Khawaja Khairuddin told G.W.
Chawdhry, the author of Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, in 1979 that one evening
he was picked up by Bhutto's para-military force; he was forcibly taken by a boat to the sea and thrown
out on an island along the Indo-Pakistan sea border. He was almost drowned by the tide of water but
fortunately he was rescued by some fishermen who saw his helpless situation.[7]
Bhutto and his associates from Sindh in the central government gradually initiated policies which
ultimately led to creating fissures between his home province and the Punjab. The government of Sindh
adopted the Sindhi as the official language of the province. This occasioned language disturbances and
ethnic tensions between Sindhis and non Sindhis, including Indian migrants, and the Punjabi settlers in
the province. As might have been expected, the language bill was introduced in the province with the
active backing of the Bhutto government. However, the PPP Chief Minister of the Punjab, Mustafa
Khar, took serious note of the language disturbances and sent a provincial delegation to Sindh to assess
the extent of losses to the Punjabi settlers.[8]
The provinces complained that they were not permitted to exercise their rights which had been given to
them by the constitution. The proclamation of emergency was made when Bhutto acquired power and
continued throughout his regime. Thus the center acquired power over the provinces and the center
meant Bhutto.[9]
Bhutto sought to consolidate his power by reducing the influence of the military and by again purging
and drastically modifying the bureaucracy. He retired a number of top military officers and promoted
individuals who he believed would show absolute loyalty to him and the civilian government. As a
result, many senior officers of the Army, Navy and the Air Force were retired and replaced by hand-
picked junior offices. Lt. General Ziaul Haq was promoted to become C-in-C after superseding several
senior Generals. He accused a number of members of the defunct junta of "Bonapartism" and sent
some of them abroad in ambassadorial posts. He endeavored to develop a PPP para-military force as
well as a special police agency which became known as the Federal Security Force (FSF). These latter
bodies were to police political matters for the PPP leadership and hence avoid the use of the regular
armed forces. The central idea in these undertakings was to maintain the neutrality of the armed forces
and to prevent it from interfering again in, or taking advantage of, the political in-fighting. The military
was none too pleased with these developments but in the immediate circumstances following the loss of
East Pakistan it was unable to prevent them from going forward.[10]
The Federal Security Force was the most visible instrument of Bhutto's terror and oppression. Its
victims were both individuals and political parties. Bhutto organized the Federal Security Force not
only to suppress the rightists and Islamic forces which attacked the government through language and
religious movements, but also reduce his reliance on the army.[11] During a national assembly session
in November 1975, when a constitutional amendment limiting dissent, was being pushed through, the
FSF was brought in. Several protesting opposition members of the House were beaten up and physically
thrown out of the assembly.
Islamic Pakistan
he expenditure on the FSF went up from Rs. 36.4 million in 1973-74 to Rs. 107.7 million in 1976-77. This
expenditure did not include the Intelligence Bureau, which was under the Prime Minister's cabinet
division and for which Rs. 25.8 million was spent in 1976-77. [12] It should be noted that the total
expenditures on police and security by the central government amounted to Rs. 521.8 million for 1976-
77. This expenditure did not include expenditures on police and security incurred by the various
provinces. As compared to the central government expenditure of Rs 521.8 million on police and
security for 1976-77, the entire allocation on education (which included both federal and provincial
allocations) in the annual plan for 1976-77 was only Rs 617.7 million. The allocation for both federal
and provincial health program in the annual plan for 1976-77 was Rs. 771.9 million.[13]
A popularly elected government committed to the rapid improvement of public well-being was spending
only Rs. 95.9 million more on education than on police and only Rs 250.1 million more on health than
on police.[14] This gives credence to the argument that Bhutto was more an opportunist than a
committed ideologue. His doctrine of Islamic socialism[15] was a means toward gaining, holding and
wielding power; it was not holy writ, unchangeable and super eminent.[16]
With the military removed from the decision-making process, Bhutto attacked Central Service of
Pakistan (CSP) and ordered the privileged service dissolved. Personnel were either to be retired or
integrated into a new All Pakistan Civil Service which was graded as two levels of work and seniority,
but whose members owed allegiance to only one organization, namely the Pakistan People's Party.[17]
Through greater control over the civil services, the expansion of the police forces, and the political
management of the army, Bhutto had mobilized more effective and coercive power.
Bhutto sensed the need to build a mystique around himself and this meant no one could question his
actions, particularly in public and among his devoted subordinates.[18] He was not only the key
decision-maker, he insisted on being the only decision-maker in the country. His imperial style
replicated his Sindhi landlord experience, and Pakistan was to be governed much like his ancestral
estate in Larkana. Fear, intimidation, repression, constraint surveillance permeated Pakistani society as
Bhutto's special forces inflicted their brand of punishment on the population.[19]
Bhutto did not tolerate any dissenting voices even within his own party. Within the PPP, Bhutto
consistently discouraged the democratic process and stifled dissent in order to consolidate his personal,
autocratic leadership. He did not pay attention to the problems of reorganization within the PPP, and
during the past years no party elections were ever held. Many sincere and devoted workers left the
party in utter disgust and frustration. New, opportunistic elements were allowed to join the party ranks
and were given key positions. Thus, the party organization remained in disarray. At all levels,
factionalism became rampant. The core of party leadership at all levels -- provincial, district and local --
were engaged in a tussle for power. As party leader, Bhutto failed to mediate intra-party feuds. He also
failed to hold together ideologically disparate segments of his party, particularly the left and the right
wings. Initially, perhaps, he was able to preserve the balance between the left and the right, but
gradually he came to lean towards the right wing for support. As a result, he alienated the left wing.
Confidently, from his place in the saddle of power, Bhutto did not hesitate to humiliate somewhat
critical left wing leaders from the party ranks and consistently pursued a ruthless policy of persecuting
them. The party's Secretary General, J.A. Rahim, one of the founding fathers of the PPP was subjected
to humiliating treatment; Mairaj Mohammed Khan, a young labor leader from Karachi, whom Bhutto
had acclaimed as his right-hand man, was imprisoned and tortured. Mukhtar Rana, a labor and
peasant leader from Faisalabad [Lyallpur] remained in prison during most of Bhutto's tenure. At a
later stage, Khurshid Hasan Mir, Hanif Ramay, Dr. Mubashir Hasan,, and Mustafa Khar of the Punjab
PPP were forced out of the party. In his own province of Sindh, he mistreated, humiliated and threw
out his Sindhi colleagues asul Bukhsh Talpur and Ahmed Ali Talpur.

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VIII
The Third Martial Law
Chapter 3
Page 1
The army staged third coup d'état in Pakistan's history when General Ziaul Haq overthrew the
government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and took over as Chief Martial Law Administrator
(CMLA) on July 5, 1977. The federal and provincial governments were dismissed; political parties were
banned; national and provincial assemblies and the Senate were dissolved; the constitution was put in
abeyance; civil courts continued to function as usual but fundamental rights were suspended.
In his speech while declaring martial law, General Zia termed the take-over as a "90-day operation"
and declared that he had no political ambitions. He said "his sole aim" in staging the coup was "to
organize free and fair elections" that would be held that October. A week later, addressing the
newspaper editors, on July 11, 1977, General Zia reiterated his resolve to hold elections saying that "the
primary aim before the interim regime was the restoration of democracy in the country."
On July 15, 1977, Justice Mushtaq Husseinof Lahore High court was appointed chairman of a
committee to formulate election procedures and laws. Two days later, Justice Mushtaq Hussein also
took over as the Chief Election Commissioner and announced that elections would be held in the first
fortnight of October 1977 under the supervision of the armed forces and the judiciary. October 18 was
fixed for the general elections and nomination papers were invited between 7 and 18 August, 1977. On
Sept. 21, 1977, General Zia issued a 15-point code of ethics to regulate the election campaign which
started from Sept. 18. The code laid emphasis on the national integrity, Islamic ideology and Islam as a
religion. It prohibited all actions and deeds, including words, symbolic representations, which were
likely to prejudice the solidarity of Pakistan and its Islamic foundations.
However, on October 1, the elections were postponed indefinitely on the pretext that all the major
political groups, except the Pakistan Peoples' Party had demanded to complete the process of
accountability first and then to hold the elections. In a speech General Ziaul Haq claimed that
postponement has been made to "save the country from a dangerous crisis and to place full facts before
the public through the process of accountability." He also banned the political activity "to rid the
country of all physical and mental strains and to allow passions to cool down."
On November 10, 1977 the Supreme Court unanimously validated the imposition of martial law, under
the doctrine of necessity. The law of necessity recognized and upheld by Pakistan's highest judicial body
has proved an honorable protection for military adventure in civil government. In its judgment
dismissing Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition challenging detention under Martial Law of former Prime
Minister Z.A. Bhutto and 10 others, the nine-member court headed by Chief Justice Anwarul Haq
observed that after massive rigging of elections followed by complete breakdown of law and order
situation bringing the country on the brink of disaster, the imposition of martial law had become
inevitable. The judgment also said the court would like to state in clear terms that it had found it
possible to validate the extra constitutional action of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) not
only for the reason that he stepped in to save the country at a time of grave national crisis and
constitutional breakdown, but also because of the solemn pledge given by him that the period of
constitutional deviation shall be of as short a duration as possible. By the period of constitutional
Islamic Pakistan
deviation, the court meant, of course, the period between the martial law takeover and the holding of
elections.
The Supreme Court judgment said: It will be seen that the declared objectives of the imposition of
Martial Law are to create conditions suitable for the holding of free and fair elections in terms of the
1973 constitution, which was not being abrogated, and only certain parts of which were being held in
abeyance, namely, the parts dealing with the federal and provincial executives and legislatures. The
President of Pakistan was to continue to discharge his duties as heretofore under the same constitution.
Soon after the polls, the power is to be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. It is true
that owing to the necessity of completing the process of accountability of holders of public offices, the
holding of elections had to be postponed for the time being but the declared intention of the Chief
Martial Law Administrator still remains the same namely, that he has stepped in for a temporary
period and for the limited purpose of arranging free and fair elections so as to enable the country to
return to a democratic way of life.
"In the presence of these unambiguous declarations, it would be highly unfair and uncharitable to
attribute any other intention to the Chief Martial Law Administrator, and to insinuate that he has not
assumed power for the purposes stated by him, or that he does not intend to restore democratic
situations in terms of the 1973 constitution."
However, less than four months after the Supreme Court judgment, General Ziaul Haq made it clear
that elections would be held only when he and his colleagues were fully convinced about what he called
the "positive results." He said that Allah had granted him and his colleagues an opportunity to clean
the body-politic of the country, and unless this task was accomplished it would be futile to embark on
the election exercise.[1] A Martial Law Order was issued on February 28, 1978 debarring all politicians,
whose cases had been referred to Disqualification Tribunals, from political activities until proved not
guilty of misconduct.
In the mean-time, General Ziaul Haq started maneuvering to seek support of political leaders for his
martial law regime. On July 5, 1978, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the imposition of martial
law, General Zia announced a 22-member federal cabinet, comprising of politicians, technocrats and
army men. The following four points were declared the objective of the new cabinet: (a) to work for the
implementation of Islamic system; (b) to prepare ground for general elections at the earliest possible
date; (c) to plan improvement of the country's economic conditions; and (d) to work for stability at
home and Pakistan's prestige abroad.
As the nation was wondering about the next move by the army regime, he made a dramatic
announcement on December 2, 1978, on the occasion of the first day of the Hijra calendar to enforce the
Islamic system in the country. In a nationwide address, General Zia accused politicians of exploiting the
name of Islam saying: "many a ruler did what they pleased in the name of Islam. After assuming power
the task that the present government set to was its public commitment to enforce Nizam-e-Islam. As a
preliminary measure to establish an Islamic society in Pakistan, General Zia announced the
establishment of Shariah Benches. Speaking about the jurisdiction of the Shariah Benches he said:
"Every citizen will have the right to present any law enforced by the government before the "Shariah
Bench" and obtain its verdict whether the law is wholly or partly Islamic or un-Islamic." But General
Zia did not mention that the Shariah Benches jurisdiction was curtailed by the following overriding
clause: " (Any) law does not include the constitution, Muslim personal law, any law relating to the
procedure of any court or tribunal or, until the expiration of three years, any fiscal law, or any law
relating to the collection of taxes and fees or insurance practice and procedure." It meant that all
important laws which affect each and every individual directly remained outside the purview of the
Shariah Benches. However, he did not have a smooth sailing even with the clipped Shariah Benches.
The Federal Shariah Bench declared rajm, lapidation, to be un-Islamic, Ziaul Haq reconstituted that
court which declared rajm as Islamic.[2]
In his drive of Islamization General Ziaul Haq announced further measures on Feb. 10, 1979. In a
speech on the occasion of the birthday anniversary of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) he said:
Islamic Pakistan
All major political parties despite their other differences are agreed that the Islamic system should be
introduced in this country ...... I am formally announcing the introduction of the Islamic system in the
country." The Islamic measures were enforced through presidential orders and ordinances under
which the existing laws relating to the offenses of theft, robbery and dacoity, adultery, false charge of
adultery and wine-drinking were replaced by the fixed punishments prescribed by the Holy Quran and
Sunnah. One of the ordinances was related to the execution of the punishment of whipping.
Under Offenses Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood] Ordinance 1979, the punishment of
imprisonment or fine, or both, as provided in the existing Pakistan Penal Code for theft, was substituted
by the amputation of the right hand of the offender from the joint of the wrist by a surgeon. For
robbery, the right hand of the offender from the wrist and his left foot from the ankle should be
amputated by a surgeon.
Drinking of wine (i.e. all alcoholic drinks) was not a crime at all under the Pakistan Penal Code. In
1977, however, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims was banned in Pakistan and the sentence of
imprisonment of six months or a fine of Rs. 5000/-, or both, was provided in that law. Under Prohibition
Order these provisions of law were replaced by punishment of eighty (80) stripes for which an ijma of
the companions of the Holy Prophet ever since the period of the Second Caliph Umar, was cited.
Under the Zina Ordinance the provisions relating to adultery were replaced as that the women and the
man guilty will be flogged, each of them, with hundred stripes, if unmarried. And if they are married
they shall be stoned to death. It was argued that the section 497 of the Pakistan Penal Code dealing with
the offence of adultery provided certain safeguards to the offender in as much as if the adultery is with
the consent or connivance of the husband, no offence of adultery was deemed to have been committed in
the eye of law. The wife, under the prevailing law, was also not to be punished as abettor. Islamic law
knows no such exception.
The Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, were amended [through ordinances in
1980, 1982 and 1986] to declare anything implying disrespect to the Holy Prophet, Ahle Bait (family of
the prophet), Sahaba (companion of the prophet) and Sha'ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols), a cognizable
offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with both. Instructions were issued for regular
observance of prayers and made arrangements for performing noon prayer (Salat Al Zuhur) in the
government and semi-government offices and educational institutions, during office hours, and official
functions, and at the airports, railway stations and bus stops. An "Ehtram-i-Ramazan" (reverence for
fasting) Ordinance was issued providing that complete sanctity be observed during the Islamic month of
Ramazan, including the closure of cinema houses three hours after the Maghreb (sunset) prayers.
By amending the constitution, General Zia also provided the following definition of a Muslim and a non-
Muslim: (a) "Muslim" means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the
absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophet hood of Mohammed (peace be upon him), the last of the
prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who
claimed to be a prophet in any sense of the word or of any description, whatsoever, after Mohammed.
(b) "Non-Muslim" means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the
Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Bhuddist, or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or the Lahori
Group (who call themselves Ahmadis), or a Bahai, or a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes.
Within the framework of Islamization of economy, the National Investment Trust and the Investment
Corporation of Pakistan were asked to operate on equity basis instead of interest as of July 1, 1979.
Interest-free counters were opened at all the 7,000 branches of the nationalized commercial banks on
January 1, 1980. But interes-bearing National Savings Schemes were allowed to operate in parallel. The
Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promulgated on June 20, 1980 to empower the government to deduct
2.5 per cent Zakat annually from mainly interest-bearing savings and shares held in the National
Investment Trust, the Investment Corporation of Pakistan and other companies of which the majority
of shares are owned by the Muslims. Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificate scheme that offered fixed
interest was exempted from the compulsory Zakat deduction. This ordinance drew sharp criticism from
the Shia sect which was later exempted from the compulsory deduction of Zakat. Even Sunnis were
Islamic Pakistan
critical of the compulsory deduction and the way Zakat was distributed.[3]
On December 13, 1980, to the surprise of General Zia, the Federal Shariah Court declared the land
reforms of 1972 and 1977 as eminently in consonance with Islamic injunctions.[4] Then the so-called
Ulema were brought in who traditionally supported the landlord class. Three Ulema were inducted into
the Federal Shariah Court and two into the Shariah Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court which
reversed the FSC judgment in 1990. After the imposition of martial law, many landlords were reported
to have told their tenants to seek the protection of their benefactor, namely, Bhutto. Thousands of
tenants were forcibly evicted from the land in various districts. The martial law regime made it clear
that it was not committed to redistributive agrarian policies and described the land reforms as ordinary
politics to reward supporters and punish enemies.
General Zia's advice to the deprived and the dispossessed was that "It is not for the employers to
provide roti, kapra aur makan (obviously a jibe at Bhutto). It was for God Almighty who is the
provider of livelihood to his people. Any increase or decrease in your sustenance comes from Him.
Trust in God and He will bestow upon you an abundance of good things in life."[5] Demands for higher
wages, better working conditions, social security, old age benefits and compensation for accidents, were
no justification for protests and strikes. Industrialists were assured that any kind of industrial unrest
resulting from strikes or any other trade union activity would be suppressed. Maximum punishment to
the offenders was three years' rigorous imprisonment and/or whipping. On January 2, 1978 police
mercilessly killed 19 workers as the management of the Colony Textile Mill in Multan sought assistance
from the police in its dispute with the striking workers.
MURDER TRIAL OF BHUTTO [6]
On September 3, 1977, Bhutto was arrested in connection with the 1974 murder of the father of Ahmad
Raza Qasuri, a bitter critic of Bhutto. The Lahore High Court began the trial on Oct. 10 and gave its
judgment on March 8, 1978. During the court proceedings, Bhutto pleaded several times that the Chief
Justice Molvi Mushtaq Ahmad was biased and he would not get a fair trial but General Zia's
government ignored all his pleas. In a 134 page unanimous judgment the Lahore High Court
concluded: "All the offenses with which the accused are charged are thus proved to the hilt." Therefore,
the Chief Justice pronounced conviction of the principal accused, Bhutto and the others under relevant
sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and passed death sentence on all the five accused in the trial. On
February 6, 1979, in a majority decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Bhutto and the
others and upheld the unanimous judgment of the Lahore High Court. The main judgment written by
the Chief Justice was concurred by three other judges. The dissenting judgments were given separately
by two other judges and the third judge agreed with them. Anwarul Haq, the Chief Justice, observed on
the question of sentence that: "the facts which had been proved beyond any doubt established that
Bhutto used the apparatus of the Government namely, the agency of the Federal Security Force for a
political vendetta. This was a diabolical misuse of the instruments of state power as the head of the
administration. Instead of safeguarding the life and liberty of the citizens of Pakistan, he set about to
destroy a political opponent by using the power of the Federal Security Force, whose Director General
occupied a special position under him. Ahmad Raza Kasuri was pursued relentlessly in Islamabad and
Lahore until finally his father became the victim of the conspiracy, and Ahmad Raza Kasuri
miraculously escaped. The power of the Prime Minister was then used to stifle proper investigation, and
after to pressurize Ahmad Raza Kasuri in rejoining the Pakistan People's Party.
In upholding the Lahore High Court Judgment, the majority judgment of the Supreme Court further
concluded: "In these circumstances there is absolutely no support for the contention that the present
case was politically motivated, or was the result of international conspiracy. The case having been
registered almost three years before the ouster of the appellant from power, and a clear indication being
available as to the possible identity of assailants not only in the kind of ammunition used in both
incidents, but also in the Report of the Shafi-ur Rahman Tribunal, the investigation was deliberately
allowed to be stultified. It is, therefore, futile to urge that the prosecution of the appellant is politically
motivated, or a result of international conspiracy."

Islamic Pakistan
In his dissenting judgment, spread over 441 pages, Justice G. Safdar Shah expressed the view that
certain statements of Masood Mahmood (head of the FSF) were in the nature of hearsay and were not
admissible as evidence. Secondly, this approver (state witness) was not reliable. Therefore, he concluded
that he was convinced that the case had not been proved to the hilt by the prosecution. Accordingly, in
his view, the prosecution had failed to prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy between Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto and Masood Mahmood. Therefore, he concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the
case against Bhutto and Mian Abbas. and the conviction against them should be set aside. In an
independent judgment, disagreeing with the majority opinion, Justice Dorab Patel maintained that
neither the existence of a conspiracy between Bhutto and Masood Mahmood could be established, nor
could the evidence of Masood Mahmood be accepted, as he was not a reliable witness.
On April 1, 1979, General Zia rejected the mercy petition and the countdown for the execution began.
According to General Khalid Mahmud Arif, a close confident of General Zia: "I accompanied General
Zia to Karachi to attend a meeting held in Governor's office. Besides the Governor General S.M.
Abbasi, it was attended by Major Generals Jahandad Khan and Abdullah Malik and Mahmood Aslam
Hayat, all serving in Sindh. They explained the burial arrangements and the security measures
proposed for the occasion. It was decided with Governor Abbasi separately that, subject to other
considerations, the execution be carried out on April 3, 1979. However, the meteorological forecast for
the morning of April 3 indicated that flying conditions would be unfavorable for transporting body by
air from Rawalpindi to the place of burial. The execution was, therefore, postponed by twenty-four
hours."[7]
Until the trial and hanging of Bhutto, General Zia humored the leaders of the Pakistan National
Alliance (PNA). Once that threshold had been crossed he dropped their representatives from his
cabinet. The disillusionment of the PNA was complete when Zia canceled the elections which had been
set for November 1979. The other PNA parties went into the opposition, eventually joining hands with
the PPP in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy which was formed in February 1981.
19 JUDGES FIRED
The higher judiciary, some of whose key members had collaborated with General Zia over the question
of Bhutto's hanging, got a taste of Zia's bitter medicine in March 1981 when the Provisional
Constitutional Order (PCO) was promulgated. This was actually an instrument of martial law. The
judges were required to swear a new oath under the PCO which in effect abrogated Pakistan's 1973
constitution and replaced it with a rigid code restricting the power of the civil courts. The order
declared as void, all court judgments dealing with the legality of the martial law regime. According to
the then Chief Justice Anwarul Haq, General Zia's new Provisional Constitutional Order removed the
power of the judiciary to decide whether a legislation was valid. Any judge who took the oath bound
himself in advance not to question anything contained in the order.

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Chapter 3
Page 1
BENAZIR'S FIRST STINT IN OFFICE

The military regime of General Ziaul Haq came to an abrupt end when he was killed in a mysterious
aircrash on August 17, 1988.[1] Major crisis in Pakistan in the past had brought chaos but the sudden
removal of Zia from power did not create any confusion and the country witnessed its first ever
peaceful transition of power. General Aslam Beg became the Army Chief of Staff since General Akhtar
Abdul Rehman perished along with 27 top military officers on board the C-130 plane that came down
in flames near Bhawalphur. US Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel and the US Military Attache
Brig. General Herbert Wassom were also killed in the crash.
Senate Chairman, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, took over as the acting President, in accordance with the
constitution. He announced that the general elections would be held as scheduled in November. The
election results were not surprising. No political party won an outright victory but the Pakistan People's
Party emerged as the largest party with 92 seats while Islamic Jamhouri Alliance -- a conglomerate of
nine mainly rightist parties hastily arranged by the Inter-Services Intelligence [2] - bagged 56 seats in
the 207 seat National Assembly. Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) secured 13 seats and emerged as
the third large party. In the provincial assembly elections the IJI secured majority in Punjab with 108
seats in the 240-seat assembly while the PPP won 94 seats. The PPP secured clear victory in the Sindh
province with 67 out of the total 100 seats. In the North West Frontier Province, the IJI won 28, the PPP
20 and the National Awami Party 12 out of the total 77 seats. In Baluchistan's 34-seat assembly, the PPP
won only 3 seats, while IJI and Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam (Fazal Group) each won 8 seats and other
seats went to a number of parties and independent candidates.
Benazir Bhutto, Co-Chairperson of the PPP, took oath on Dec. 2, 1988 as the Prime Minister while the
PPP governments were formed in Sindh and the NWFP provinces. However, Mian Mohammad Nawaz
Sharif formed the IJI government in Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab. Similarly, the IJI was
able to form a coalition government in Baluchistan. This was not the first time in the history of Pakistan
that opposition parties have formed governments in provinces. Governments of opposition parties were
formed in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces in 1973 but were soon dissolved by Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. However, Benazir's government soon came into clash with the antagonistic Nawaz
government in the Punjab and the differences could not be resolved as long as she remained in power.
In Baluchistan, Governor Retired General Mohammad Musa dissolved the assembly in December 1988.
However, the Baluchistan High Court restored the assembly amid public condemnation of Governor's
move that was believed to be taken with the consent of the President and Prime Minister.
In her first press conference after taking oath as the Prime Minister, Benazir pledged to abrogate the
8th amendment which meant curtailment of powers of the president. Naturally, President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan did not like to become another Chaudhry Fazle-Ilahi [3] and became suspicious about the
government's intentions. With time the gulf between the President and the Prime Minister widened.
Her government was unable to pass any significant piece of legislation while the battle against Nawaz
Sharif raged on. The President refused to sign ordinances, saying that a democratic government should
instead pass laws through parliament.
Islamic Pakistan
The first major clash with the President came in the summer of 1989, when Benazir made an attempt to
remove Admiral Sirohey from his position as chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Defense Secretary,
the senior bureaucrat in the Defense Ministry, informed the President of her intentions before she could
summon Sirohey. The president insisted that according to the Constitution, dismissing as well as
appointing Generals was his prerogative. Benazir argued that she could dismiss them, and for weeks the
battle raged on in the press, the President and the government both using journalists in their pay to
push their line. The army feared that if Benazir got away with this act, a precedent would be set by
which she would move out all those officers, whom she was suspicious of.
The following year, she tried to secure an extension of office for Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsud, the
Lahore corps commander, to push him up to be a full General and Deputy Chief of the army. Clearly
the PPP were hoping that their own appointee would replace General Beg when he retires in August
1991, rather than Beg's choice, who could be one of their enemies such as Generals Hamid Gul or Asif
Nawaz. General Beg, simply ignored Benazir's machinations and posted a new corps commander in
Lahore, leaving Mahsud with no option but to retire on July 18, and worsened relations between the
army and the PPP.
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Benazir also clashed in 1989, over the appointment
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Election Commissioner. President's plea was
that under article 177 of the constitution, the president was empowered to appoint the chief justice and
other judges with the consultation of the chief justice. However, the Prime Minister argued that under
article 48 of the constitution, the president was bound to accept the recommendations of the cabinet and
Prime Minister. In order to end the dispute, the President decided to file a reference on the matter in
the Supreme Court. However, the dispute was resolved on December 9, when Benazir agreed to the
appointment of Mohammad Afzal Zullah as Chief Justice. Similarly, the President insisted that Justice
Naeemuddin Ahmed would continue as the Chief Election Commissioner.
Law and order situation deteriorated in the country as battle raged between the central and provincial
governments in the Punjab which witnessed bomb blasts from January 1989 to July 1990, claiming
heavy tolls. By the end of 1989 the security situation was so bad in Karachi that provides nearly three-
quarters of government revenues, that business was down to 50 per cent. Chamber of Commerce
officials said Karachi was losing $48 million per day because violence in the most populated areas
prevented workers reaching factories. Leading business organizations brought in kidnap experts from
the United States and Italy after more than eighty businessmen had to pay ransoms in six months in
1990.
It was over control of the worsening law and order situation in Sindh more than any other issue that
uneasy relations between Benazir and the military finally came to a head. The army maintained that the
PPP's inaction reflected a lack of will to come down on members of its own party who were believed to
be providing protection to dacoits as well as its student wing, which had long been involved in bloody
clashes with the MQM. Under pressure to take action before the army finally took things into their own
hands, a 'clean-up operation' was planned, with joint lists of suspected terrorists prepared by both
military and police. The army list of suspected terrorists supposedly included the names of five
provincial ministers.
On February 11, 1990, the army oversaw the messy business of exchange of 27 political workers
captured by both the MQM and the PPP sides in tit-for-tat abductions. The exchange followed talks at
the military headquarters at the instructions of Karachi Corps Commander Lt. General Asif Nawaz
Janjua.
When Benazir called on the military to restore peace to the riot-torn cities of Karachi and Hyderabad in
May 1990, they asked as quid pro quo that they be allowed into interior Sindh to carry out operations,
as well as power to set up military courts under Article 245 [4] of the constitution. She was aware that if
Article 245 was granted, the army would start arresting their own people. She refused, at the cost of
final destruction of civil-military relations, knowing that Sindh was her support base and main card
Islamic Pakistan
and that the Sindhis would never forgive her if she let the army in.
On 27 May 1990, the Sindh government launched a crackdown in Hyderabad, the bastion of the MQM
power. Shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed, and a police house-to-house search began. There were
conflicting reports over what happened next but, in what became known as the Pucca Qila massacre,
crowds of Mohajirs emerged from Hyerdabad fort, fronted by women and children holding the Holy
Quran over their heads. The PPP claimed that behind them were snipers who began shooting at the
police, while the MQM claimed that the police, unprovoked, brutally began firing at the women. Thirty-
one women and children were killed, sparking off as usual a chain reaction in Karachi. According to
some reports, the final death toll was 70 in Hyderabad and more than 250 elsewhere.
Finally the army intervened, quickly restoring peace and welcomed by banners calling for martial law.
Iqbal Haider, an adviser to the Sindh Chief Minister, said that the army's intervention caused confusion
because neither the federal nor the provincial government had called on their support. President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan denounced the Pucca Qila operation and pointed out that the terrorists were
present in all the parties, and should be eliminated without discrimination.
Corruption in any government is not uncommon in Pakistan, but under the Benazir government it was
undoubtedly more blatant. According to the Newsline, Karachi August 1990 report, 'since the Benazir
government came into power twenty months ago, the DFIs and NCBs have approved loans totaling
billions of rupees for projects whose chief merit seems to be the political connections of their sponsors.
294 million rupees for a textile mill to a federal minister who probably wouldn't recognize a bobbin if
he tripped over it, 900 million for a paper making plant based on twelve-year-old second hand
machinery from Britain, 2,300 million for a cement plant to a federal minister's son barely out of his
teens...so wholesale has become the plunder that in the words of a former DFI chief executive, "the
whole financial sector appears to be in danger of collapsing".
The Public Accounts Committee, under the chairmanship of Hakim Ali Zardari, Benazir's father-in-
law and one of her MPs, a job traditionally held by an opposition member for scrutinizing government
accounts, instead concentrated on those of the opposition, producing lists of unpaid bank loans.
Journalists walked out of his press conference in disgust when he asked them to print lists of names of
allegedly corrupt IJI members but was unable to produce evidence. Benazir's husband, Asif Ali
Zardari, became known as Mr. Ten Percent, for his alleged rake-offs in deals.
The government tried to force the Ittefaq Foundry -- owned by Sharif Group -- out of business by
instructing Pakistan Railways to refuse to cart scrap, imported from the US, from Karachi to Lahore.
Unfortunately, it is often the common man who suffers in these wranglings. Sharif group's Ittefaq
Foundry laid off 3,500 workers in summer 1989.
The US ship MB Jonathan, which arrived in Karachi on 14 June 1989, was carrying 28,000 tons of steel
scrap to be molten in Lahore. Ittefaq claimed to have had a contract since 1980 with Pakistan Railways,
to be provided 1,200 wagons every forty days and was their biggest private customer. This time, the
railways said the carriages were needed for 'items of national priority.' Shehbaz Sharif, however,
argued that more than 1,200 carriages were lying idle in Karachi, and some of his workers blocked
passengers lines in protest, causing chaos.
Despite a Supreme Court ruling that the carriages must be provided, eleven months later the ship still
had not docked, amassing demurrage charges of more than $2.5 million. Not only did it cost Ittefaq in
lost production but, Sharif pointed out, also meant a considerable loss in revenue to the country and
was not looked on kindly by the US. The US ambassador in Islamabad wrote to the President and
Prime Minister expressing his concern at the behest of the US supplier concerned, who was ultimately
responsible for the charges.
Benazir's 20-month stint witnessed worst kind of horse trading when the federal government as well as
provincial governments used money and perks to keep them in power. The horse trading started in the
NWFP, where the PPP had won less seats than the IJI but formed a coalition government with the
Islamic Pakistan
support of the National Awami Party and independent members. Later, 10 members of the IJI were
lured to join the government side. The opposition claimed that the federal government bought the
loyalty of the MPAs, by paying Rs five million and four land plots to each of them.
On August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir's government, dissolved the
national and provincial assemblies, and announced new elections to be held in October. This was the
second time that the elected assemblies were dissolved, under the Eighth Amendment to the 1973
constitution, introduced by General Zia. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, an opposition leader, was appointed as
caretaker Prime Minister.
The long list of the President's charges of corruption and official misconduct against the Benazir
government included:
● a. Rampant corruption and nepotism through the misuse of authority.

● b. Misuse of resources and government agencies and banks for political ends and for personal
gains.
● c. Failure of the National Assembly to legislate.
● d. Massive civil disturbances in the province of Sindh.
● e. Ridiculing the Senate and higher judiciary.
● f. Usurping the authority of the provinces resulting in discord and confrontation between the
federal government and the provinces.
Two days after her dismissal, addressing a press conference in Karachi on August 8, Benazir blamed
the Military Intelligence and the Military General Headquarters for the dismissal of her government.
She said that both of them pressurized the President to dissolve the assemblies otherwise the army
would take over. She also accused the army of backing a no-confidence move in the parliament in
November 1989. Later in an interview with the BBC, Benazir demanded that the role of army and Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) should be outlined clearly and the interference of army in politics should be
ended. [5]
NAWAZ SHARIF'S FIRST STINT IN OFFICE

The October 1990 elections brought the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) into power.[6] In addition to a
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, the alliance acquired control of all the four provincial
assemblies and enjoyed the support of the military and the President. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, as
leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, the most prominent party in the IJI, was elected Prime Minister
by the national assembly. He emerged as the most secure and powerful Pakistani Prime Minister since
the mid-1970s.
The relations between the newly-elected Prime Minister and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were, to
begin with, very cordial. The background of this cordiality was disclosed in 1993 by General Aslam Beg,
who was Chief of Army Staff from 1988 to 1991. He said that during the election campaign for the 1990
elections, he had received a sum of Rs. 14 crores from the head of one of the nationalized banks, and he
had divided this money between Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the President's Election Cell. The
payment for Rs. 14 crores to the General was later confirmed by Younis Habib, Chief of the failed
Mehran Bank.
However, despite his majority in the parliament and complete confidence of the civil and military
establishment, Nawaz Sharif could not survive more than two and a half year. When he became the first
Punjabi prime minister of Pakistan, he was naive enough to believe that the two-thirds majority would
automatically ensure him a full five years in power. He ignored to compromise with the reality that the
Prime Minister was expected to play, happily and voluntarily, a subordinate if not servile role allowing
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to administer the affairs of the Federation without advice or assistance
from the Federal Cabinet and any control by the parliament.[7]

Islamic Pakistan
His political strategy centered around his economic policy of privatization, which he thought would not
only reflate the stagnant economy of Pakistan but also create in this process a considerable sector of
political support. The main weakness of his overall political strategy was, that he expected that the
growing middle class, consisting of some of the upper level civil servants, lawyers and above all, traders,
merchants, and growing number of industrialists, would be adequate by itself to provide him the main
nucleus of a political movement.[8] With his strong desire to be an effective Chief Executive, Nawaz
Sharif began to take an aggressive position and a confrontationist course with the President, the
architect of his government. Consequently he had to face the wrath of his antagonized benefactor.[9]
He did not enjoy a smooth sailing with the army. The Chief of Army Staff, General Asif Nawaz had
begun to feel upset at many of Sharif's moves, most significant of them being his attempts to create rifts
within the Army. Chaudhry Nisar Ahmad and Brig. Imtiaz, the former ISI chief, were even accused by
the late General of threatening to turn him into another Gul Hasan, the army chief who was sacked by
Z.A. Bhutto and bundled into a car by Ghulam Mustafa Khar and taken to Lahore by road. It is said
that just when General Mirza Aslam Beg was about to topple Nawaz Sharif at the fag end of his tenure
in 1991, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan agreed to name General Asif Nawaz as the new COAS, three
months before he was to take over. Just when General Asif Nawaz was getting seriously worried about
the Nawaz Sharif government, he died quite suddenly in January, 1993.[10]
The first clash between the President and Prime Minister came into public on the appointment of the
Chief of Army staff after the sudden death of General Asif Nawaz Janjua in January 1993. Nawaz
Sharif wanted to place his own candidate in the vacant position, against the wishes of both the army and
the president. Considering Sharif's intentions a direct threat to his political authority, President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan used his constitutional privilege effectively to place his candidate, General Abdul
Waheed Kakar, as commander-in-chief. Nawaz Sharif reportedly threatened "not to let the new COAS
work". Within 24 hours of a statement by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the appointment of the
new COAS would take some time, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had named General Abdul Waheed as
the COAS on Jan. 11. What is more, Nawaz Sharif was told about the new appointment just a few
minutes before the ceremony. It was the first public setback to the Prime Minister, but he would not
give up easily.
Despite this set back, Nawaz Sharif intensified his political confrontation with the President. He
appealed for the abrogation of the 8th constitutional amendment, which conferred upon the President
the power to dismiss the government and dissolve elected assemblies. The President, hopeful for a
second five-year term, argued that the Eighth Amendment was an important barrier to the ambitions of
the prime minister. If Nawaz Sharif had succeeded in doing away with the Eighth Amendment or
managed to do away with Article 58(2) introduced by it, which gave the president powers to dissolve the
National Assembly without the advice of the Prime Minister, a stronger Federal Government and Prime
Minister would have emerged.

Islamic Pakistan

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Chapter X
Nawaz Shrif's second stint in Office
Chapter 3
Page 1
The general election of February 3, 1977 gave a landslide victory to the Pakistan Muslim League of
Nawaz Sharif, which has a few parallels in the country's history with perhaps the solitary exception of
Mujibur Rehman's in 1970. It won 135 seats out of total 207 seats in the National Assembly. In the
provincial assembly polls, which were held simultaneously with the NA polls, PML (N) emerged as the
largest party in the Punjab Assembly by securing an absolute majority of 211 seats in a house of 240
with the PPP and the PML (J-Chathha group) could bag only two seats each. However, the massive vote
for the PML has not made any significant qualitative change because the same faces, or families, have
re-entered the legislature.
The PPP has been reduced to the status of a regional party, largely confined to the province of Sindh.
From 118 the strength of the PPP in the National Assembly has dropped to a bare 19, in the Punjab
from 92 to a minimal 2 and in the NWFP from 25 to a meager 4. And in its own home province, an
absolute majority of 67 has declined to 36, although it remained the largest single party. The Mohajir
Qaumi Movement, which secured 12 seats in the NA, was able to win 28 seats in the Sindh Assembly
while PML(N) secured 15 seats.
The 1997 elections, boycotted by the Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan, had two
distinctive features. First, the principle of adult franchise was extended to the Tribal Areas for the first
time in their history. Secondly, the national and the provincial elections were held simultaneously. In
the past the National Assembly elections used to be held two or three days earlier and their outcome
psychologically influenced the provincial vote. The turnout ranged from 41.27 per cent in Punjab to
30.85 per cent in the Sindh, 29.33 per cent in the NWFP and 22.38 per cent in the Baluchistan.
PML[N] formed governments in the NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. In Punjab it has an absolute majority
while the Awami National Party backed it in the NWFP and in Sindh it formed a coalition with the
MQM.
On Feb. 17, Nawaz Sharif was sworn-in as the Prime Minister for the second time. Two days later he
won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly by a margin of 177-16.
Nawaz Sharif's first year in office

Nawaz Sharif completed the first year in office, on February 17, 1998, by concentrating all civilian
livers of powers in his hands and no significant political opposition. His confrontation with the judiciary
ended in damaging all established institutions of the country. He knocked out the president as a
significant political actor and brought the parliament virtually under his thumb through a
constitutional amendment that, in the name of fighting 'lotaism' and defection tendency, has reduced
MPs virtually to the status of serfs and minions of party leaders; they dare not indulge in criticism of
their own party leaders, much less vote against the party whip, which they can do on pain of losing the
membership of the house.
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He has more than two thirds majority in the Federal National Assembly, no hostile provincial
governments to contend with, a friendly superior judiciary, and his own hand-picked nominee elected
as president. Above all, the armed forces have demonstrated in no uncertain manner that they are not
willing to topple him. No Pakistani Prime Minister has ever been blessed with circumstances so
propitious for unhindered exercise of the enormous power of this post.
NEW LAW TO CURB PRESS FREEDOM
Less than one month after taking power, the government of Nawaz Sharif, on March 10, issued "the
Registration of Printing Press and Publication Ordinance, 1997" to curb the press and freedom of
expression. Article 29 authorizes magistrates and low-ranking police sub-inspectors to interfere in the
working of the Press and to initiate executive actions including the forfeiture of newspaper copies
without the process of judicial review and restraint.
The ordinance says that the copies of newspapers or books can be forfeited if they publish any material
which tend to incite willful obstruction to public servants or servants of local authorities in the
discharges of their public duties. Any police officer or any other person empowered to seize and destroy
the newspaper or magazine or book can do so after showing warrants issued by any first call or sub-
divisional magistrate or any authorized police officer.
The ordinance also bars the newspapers from publishing any account of the proceedings of the National
Assembly or the Senate or a provincial assembly if such account contains any matter which is not part
of the proceedings of such an assembly and which is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or is
opposed to morality, or amounts to contempt of court, defamation or incitement for the commission of
an offence.
The government has also been authorized to forfeit the copies of a newspaper if it contains any material
which can incite to the commission of an offence or violence or amounts to false rumors, is critical of the
creation of Pakistan, brings into hatred or contempt the government established under the law with the
intent of causing defiance of the authority of such government.
The 13th Constitutional Amendment
At midnight on April 2, 1997, all rules and procedures of the parliament were suspended and in the
middle of the night, the 13th amendment Bill was rushed through both houses, signed by the president
the next day, and notified on April 4. By this amendment, the president was disempowered and the
Prime Minister further empowered. The President cannot dissolve the National Assembly, he cannot
appoint governors at his discretion but on the advice of the prime minister, the provincial governors
cannot dissolve their assemblies, the president, though he remains supreme commander of the Armed
Forces, no longer has the power to appoint or sack the services chiefs.
Rules dictate that a constitutional amendment is an extraordinary measure involving a great deal of
deliberation on the part of the ruling party, consultation with the opposition, and an objective study of
public opinion on the subject. Thereafter, according to the rules of procedure governing parliamentary
proceedings under the 1973 constitution, a bill (other than a finance bill) upon its introduction in the
House stands referred to the relevant standing committee, unless the requirements of Rules 91 and 92
are dispensed with by the House on a motion by the member-in charge. The standing committee is
required to present its report within 30 days and, on receipt of this report, copies of the bill as
introduced, together with any modifications recommended by the standing committee, must be supplied
to each member within seven days. Two clear days then must elapse before the bill can be sent down for
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a motion under Rule 93.
Ever since Nawaz Sharif assumed power on Feb. 17, he had been apparently not feeling very
comfortable with several developments. President Leghari forced him to give PML ticket for the Senate
elections to his cousin, Mansour Leghari, who had contested the National Assembly on a PPP ticket and
was defeated. The President appointed Hamid Shahid as the Governor of Punjab against the wishes of
his brother Shahbaz Sharif, who happened to be the Chief Minister of the province. Gen. Moinuddin
Haider was appointed the Governor of Sindh against the wishes of PML and MQM. The president was
also reluctant to replace the Governor of Baluchistan, General Imaraullah Khan. At a parliamentary
meeting PML MNAs demanded repeal of the 8th amendment in order to get rid of the presidential
interference in day-to-day affairs of the government.
The 8th amendment had made more than 40 changes in the constitution. However, Nawaz Sharif opted
to remove only those parts of the 8th amendment which were a potential threat to his government but
has failed to touch those parts which pose a threat to society, particularly the weaker and
disadvantaged sections like women and minorities. There are several constitutional and legal distortions
created by the 8th amendment and several black laws, such as the Hudood Ordinances, under its
protection which need to be removed. Thousands of innocent women are languishing in jails under the
notorious Hudood laws. Some other article which deserve immediate attention and action by the
parliament are:
1. Article 51(1) that was amended to establish separate electorate for minorities.
2. Article 51 (2)b that was amended to increase the age-limit for votes from 18 to 21 years.
3. Article 51(4) that abolished the reserved seats for women in the National Assembly.
The 14th Constitutional Amendment
Less than three months after this transgression, on June 30, in the Senate, the rules of procedure were
again suspended, the 14th Amendment Bill went through like a shot, passed in less than a day, without
one single protest or dissent being recorded. On July 1, the bill was presented to the National Assembly,
again rules of procedure were suspended, and the bill was passed immediately, again without a single
protest or dissent. It went up to the president, on July 3 he put his signature to the bill, and on July 4
the 14th Amendment Act of 1997 came into force.
This amendment admittedly has the aim of putting an end to lucrative defections. But 'lotaism' only
existed because all our political parties were in the business of buying and selling bodies. However, that
was not deemed to be sufficient. The Prime Minister had to be further empowered, and so he was. A
member of a parliamentary party will also be deemed to have defected if he breaches any declared or
undeclared party discipline, code of conduct or policies, or if he votes contrary to any direction issued
by his parliamentary party, or if he abstains from voting as instructed by his party on any bill. The
prosecutor, defense counsel, judge and jury who will decide the member's fate is the head of the party,
whose decision is not justifiable in any court of law.
Ehtesab (Accountability) Law

The National Assembly, on May 29, 1997, amended the Ehtesab Ordinance to introduce major changes
in the accountability process. The most significant amendment was the shifting of the starting date for
accountability from the original 31st December 1985 (when General Zia lifted the martial law) to 6th
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August 1990 (when the first government of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed). The amendment also
transferred the power of investigating charges of corruption from the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner to
the Ehtesab Cell set up by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. "The Ehtesab Bill steam-rolled through the
National Assembly makes a mockery of accountability. The amendments incorporated in the bill before
it was presented in parliament for adoption render it an extremely flawed piece of legislation." (1)
Although the amendment excluded the first Benazir government from the purview of accountability but
the exemption for the 1985-90 period is significant since it was during this period that Mr. Nawaz
Sharif, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Punjab, was strengthening and consolidating his
industrial and political base. At the time of passage of the Ehtesab Law, there were reports that there
were 167 cases of major loan default which include 107 cases involving top leaders of the PML(N) who
got the benefit of huge write-offs and rescheduling during 1985-1990.
The transfer of the power of appointment of the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner from the president to the
federal government reduced the office of the CEC to a mere post office. The real power was transferred
to the accountability cell in the Prime Minister's secretariat. The head of the Cell, Senator Saifur
Rehman Khan, was accountable only to the PM. The amendment also extends ex post facto legal
sanction to the PM's accountability cell, which was under attack in a number of writ petitions in the
Lahore High Court.
The original ordinance had empowered the CEC to initiate a case on a reference received from the
appropriate government, on receipt of a complaint or on his own accord. Under the new amended law,
if the CEC deems a reference necessary, he must refer it to the accountability cell for investigation.
With all the accountability functions and powers concentrated in a cell functioning in his secretariat,
the prime minister will be able to keep a strict check not only on the opposition and the bureaucracy
but on his own party-men also.
Ehtesab officials get SHO's power
The federal government, on Feb. 4 1998, amended the Ehtesab Act, replacing the name, "Ehtesab Cell",
with "Ehtesab Bureau", and provided powers of an SHO to the chief of Ehtesab Bureau or any other
official designated by him for the purpose of investigation. The amendments were introduced into the
Ehtesab Act through a presidential ordinance, the first by President Rafiq Tarar, under clause 1 of
Article 87 of the constitution.
The chief of Ehtesab Bureau or any officer designated by him will enjoy all the powers of an officer-in-
charge of a police station. The chairman or designated officer will be empowered to require the
assistance of any agency or police officer. The amended law provides indemnity to officials of the
Ehtesab Bureau on acts deemed to have been done on "good faith".
By amending Section 3 of the Ehtesab Act, the government has again brought in the original definition
of "corruption and corrupt practice". In the original Ehtesab Ordinance, corruption by a government
official was defined as "favors or disfavors to any person." Through a subsequent amendment in the
original Ehtesab Ordinance of 1996, the words "any other person" were replaced with the words "his
spouse or dependents." The government has again restored the original meaning that any favor by a
government official to other person other than his/her spouse or dependents would also fall in the
definition of corruption, and he would be held responsible for that.
A reference made to the Ehtesab Bureau will now be treated as a report under section 154 of the code.
After the reference of any case to the Ehtesab Bureau by the Ehtesab Commissioner, it would be an
exclusive responsibility of the bureau to examine all the material, evidence and proof. No other agency
will have a power to look into the matter. For the purpose of inquiry into any matter referred to the
Ehtesab Bureau, the chairman and the bureau will have the powers of an officer in charge of a police

ch10
station, including the power to ask any citizen to appear before it. Every government agency, police
official or any other government official would be bound to assist the Ehestab Bureau in investigation.
After the amendment, the Ehtesab Bureau is also empowered to ask the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner to
make a request to any court for the withdrawal of any case pending in a court. If the court grants the
application, the case will be transferred to the Ehtesab Bureau.
The Chief Ehtesab Commissioner will have the powers at any stage of proceedings against an accused
under the Ehtesab Act, to order the arrest of the accused. A reference to the court by the Chief Ehtesab
Commissioner shall contain the substance of the act of corruption and corrupt practice alleged to have
been committed by the accused. The amendment has provided a right of appeal to the Chief Ehtesab
Commissioner if the Ehtesab bench acquitted any accused. Earlier this right was only with the accused.
After the amendment, the Ehtesab Act provides that on the grant of pardon from the CEC, a magistrate
appointed by the CEC himself will examine an accused.
What the Bureau now becomes is an independent investigating agency with teeth of its own and
therefore not dependent, as it formerly was, upon the powers of the FIA. This may be a sequel to the
turf war between Senator Saifur Rehman's Ehtesab machine and Ch. Shujaat Hussain's interior
ministry, both of whom were vying for control over the FIA. The first and most striking change of
course was to strip the original law of its neutrality and place the powers of investigation and
prosecution firmly in the Prime Minister's Secretariat.
In Pakistan, the word 'accountability' has only one meaning: to malign and persecute political
opponents. Glimpses of the full story can be culled from the report of the Mehran Bank commission
along with the evidence provided by General Asad Durrani and Hameed Asghar Qidwai, as well as the
jailed chief executive of the failed bank, Yunus Habib. (2)
Several references have been filed against the former Prime Minister and her husband but they are still
far from having run their full course. The rest of the Ehtesab Bureau's record is even more patchy. The
87 senior bureaucrats suspended hastily amidst a blaze of publicity have still to see any firm action
taken against them. Indeed, some of the more notorious faces in this crowd have either been let off
completely or have been allowed to go abroad. Meanwhile, the list of bank defaulters is as long and
potent as ever with hardly anything having been returned to the public purse. (3)
The annual 1997 Human Rights Report of US State Department said the Accountability Commission,
established by the caretaker government and headed by a retired judge, had been overshadowed by an
"accountability cell," headed by a close associate of the Prime Minister. This cell had been accused of
conducting politically motivated investigations of politicians, senior civil servants, and business figures,
designed to extract evidence and, in some cases, televised confessions of alleged wrongdoers. The report
gave the examples of televised confessions extracted from Salman Farooqi, secretary of commerce
under Benazir Bhutto; Ahmed Sadiq, Benazir Bhutto's principal secretary; and Zafar Iqbal, chairman
of the Capital Development Authority. It said most politicians and bureaucrats, who had been charged
with corruption or other crimes, were out on bail (in addition to murder, Benazir Bhutto's husband,
Asif Zardari, had also been charged with corruption).
Anti-terrorism Act or a license to kill?

On August 13, one day before the nation celebrated 50th anniversary of its independence, the Anti-
Terrorism Act was bulldozed through parliament without so much as a debate. The Act has justifiably
been criticized by almost across the board, even from within the ranks of the ruling party and its
coalition allies. Yet on the day that it was introduced in parliament, the ATA was endorsed within three
hours. Its numerous critics maintained that the ATA turns the country into a police state and it violates
the constitution. The ATA, in effect, gives the law enforcing agencies and army a license to kill as it
ch10
empowers the police to kill a person on mere suspicion. It also empowers the police to search a house
and arrest a person without warrant.
The ATA provides an appeal against the special court judgement to a government-notified tribunal
consisting of two High Court judges. The High Court has now power of appeal against the special court
decision. A person accused under the ATA cannot be freed on bail even by the High Court.
The judiciary also opposed the ATA and many feared that the law would be grossly abused. Punjab
Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, failed to convince Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, on August 20, of the
need to establish special courts under the ATA. The bar associations also condemned the law.
Adding to the credibility problem of the anti-terrorism law was the attitude of law minister Khalid
Anwer who first surprised his colleagues by allowing the government to push through this piece of
dubious legislation. Khalid Anwer then proceeded to distance himself from the ATA a few days after it
was enacted. He even went so far as to declare that he would have opposed the law, had he been in the
opposition. This was then followed by the claim that the law would be phased out once the situation was
under control.
Six special courts started work in the Punjab province on August 25 while the special courts were
established in the Sindh province on August 25. The critics fears came true when the police started
sending cases to special speedy trial courts set up under the ATA. The Punjab Forensic Science
Laboratory was reported under pressure from the government to issue 'positive results' about weapons
used in cases being tried by the special courts set up under the ATA.
According to a press report (4) weapons used in more than 1,000 cases were sent to the Punjab Forensic
Science Laboratory to ascertain whether or not they were used by the accused during the terrorist or
sectarian act for which he was being tried. Interestingly, all the weapons tested positive with the experts,
providing sufficient evidence for the prosecution to obtain maximum punishment for the accused.
These reports formed part of the evidence against the accused and on its basis as many as 55 people
have been sentenced to death, including three sectarian accused. Some 32 people have been sentenced to
life imprisonment or for seven years rigorous imprisonment.
Following the establishment of anti-terrorist courts police started sending cases of sectarian and
terrorist incidents to these courts for speedy adjudication. However, in a majority of cases sufficient
evidence was not available to establish the guilt of the accused and the government feared that the
courts might acquit them.
The officials of the Forensic Science Laboratory were reportedly directed by the government to issue
'positive results' in all cases involving sectarian incidents. After every incident police collected shells of
the weapons from the scene of crime. Whenever an accused was arrested, police claimed having
recovered automatic weapons from his custody. In some cases the bullet shells collected from a crime
scene years ago matched with the weapons recovered from the accused on arrest. It was ironic that
some officials insist on matching the shells recovered from a scene of crime in 1990 with that of a
weapon recovered from the custody of the accused in 1997. (5)

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Islamic Pakistan
Chapter XI
CONCLUSION:
Chapter 3 What is the true state of affairs?
Page 1
The demand for Pakistan, as a separate state for Muslims was based on the "two-nation theory" that
the Muslims of the South Asian sub-continent constituted a nation and that on the principles of national
self-determination they were entitled to a homeland of their own. The two-nation theory was put
forward by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a counter argument against the viewpoint of the
All India National Congress which argued that all Indians, irrespective of their religion, race, language
and caste constituted a single political nationality. The Hindus being in an overwhelming majority could
identify or camouflage their interests, rights and authority under the cover of Indian nationalism.
Muslims feared the domination of the Hindu majority and destruction of their distinct identity.
Pakistan was projected as the political expression of the Muslim nation. However, the emphasis was laid
not so much on Islam as on the Muslim nationalism. Religion was not in controver sy. What was in
controversy was the demand for the status and a separate homeland for the Muslims. According to
Quaid-i-Azam: "United India means a Hindu social and cultural majority dominating the Muslims
whose civilization, culture and social structure of life is totally different."[1]
Pakistan came into existence as an independent state on August 14, 1947. The Government of India Act
of 1935, with necessary modifications, together with the Independence Act of India was adopted as the
Interim Constitution of the Pakistani state. The Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was sworn in as
the first Governor-General and his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, was nominated as the first Prime
Minister. The members of the Muslim League, who were elected members of the Constituent Assembly
during the general elections held in 1946, were organized into the first Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan. That assembly functioned in a dual capacity: first, as a federal legislature; and second, as a
constitution-making body. At the same time Muslim League governments were set up in the provinces
of East Bengal, Sindh, Punjab and the North West Frontier Province. In the initial stages, the Pakistan
Muslim League remained the politically dominant party, both at the national level as well as in the
provinces. The powe r of this party rapidly eroded as a dominant political force in the country after the
death of its founder, the Quaid-e-Azam in September 1948, and after the assassination of its first Prime
Minister in October, 1951.
Political power and authority was snatched away by the bureaucrats and generals after the
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. This happened not because there was a political vacuum since many
stalwarts of the freedom movement were there who could shoulder the responsibility. This was because
the powerful bureaucrats both in Mufti and in Khaki, joined hands to seize political power.[2] With the
appointment of General (later Field Marshal) Mohammad Ayub Khan as Pakistan's first Pakistani
commander-in-chief in early 1951, the civil and military bureaucracy, operating in tandem, began to
tighten their grip on the institutions of governance. General Ayub Khan , who later confessed to his own
political ambitions, teamed up with the Defense Secretary, Major General Iskandar Mirza, to
consolidate his grip over the levers of power. In bargain, they also secured the United States' support
for modernizing and expanding the armed forces and virtually made Pakistan part of the US strategic
objective of containing commun ist expansion in the region. In this they enjoyed the support of another
former civil servant, Ghulam Mohammad, who had served as Finance Minister under the Quaid-i-
Islamic Pakistan
Azam and had, in 1948, succeeded him as Governor General.[3] The bureaucracy ultimately became
the rulers. Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, dismissed the Nazimuddin ministry with General
Ayub's backing in April 1953 although his government had won the confidence of the House only a
fortnight earlier. General Ayub himself admitted at a news conference at the Governor's House in
Karachi in October 1964, that "when there was a conflict between him (Khawaja Nazimuddin) and
Governor-General, I decided to side with the Governor-General."[4]
Only 19 months later, Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Mohammad Ali Bogra's government, a creation
of his own and took the arbitrary and unconstitutional step of dissolving the Constituent Assembly itself
at a time when it had almost finalized the draft of the constitution only because the members of the
Assembly's sub-committee had decided to curtail his powers. And this he did with the active support of
General Ayub Khan. His action was condoned by the federal judiciary. Bogra who was touring the
United States as Pakistan's Prime Minister, was sacked and literally captured on his return to Karachi
by General Ayub and Defense Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, only to be presented in the court of G.G.
Ghulam Mohammad. He forced Bogra to form another cabinet in which General Ayub Khan was taken
as a full-fledged minister in full uniform. Mirza and Ayub were the two dominant leaders of the civil-
military oligarchy that had decided that Pakistan could be governed best by tightening the grip of these
two institutions on its government and people.
Major General Iskandar Mirza who acted as a bridge between bureaucracy and the Army, entered the
Governor-General's house through political manipulation and Ayub Khan's backing. To perpetuate
himself into power General Mirza divided the Muslim League to form a party of his own - the
Republican Party - which had neither any organizational structure nor roots in the masses. It died its
own death and could not be resurrected when parties were restored years later. As many as four
governments fell during the 30-month period (March 1956 to October 1958) of his presidency since he
could manipulate politics in the National Assembly through his Republican Party. General Ayub Khan
succeeded in seizing power because he had the support of the military and could control the actions of
Iskandar Mirza, who abrogated the 1956 constitution and imposed martial law. Later when Iskandar
Mirza was still president, General Ayub disclosed that it was at his initiative that the president imposed
martial law. "I said to the President: Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your
responsibility to bring about change and if you do not, which heaven forbid, we shall force a
change."[5]
President Ayub Khan, in 1962, "gifted" the nation a constitution rooted in the concept of controlled
democracy (Basic Democracy). It provided for a central, rather than federal, structure. Nothing
contributed more to alienation between the two wings of Pakistan, than the ten years of Ayub Khan's
regime. Effective power was concentrated in the hands of Generals and civil bureaucrats, a class in
which East Pakistan was poorly represented. President Ayub's "Decade of Development" (1958-1968)
proved a masterly piece of deception. It made the rich richer, and the poor received plenty of promises.
With the breakaway of East Pakistan, Yahya Khan and his coterie of Generals were swept from power.
After the rule of two military dictators viz, Ayub and Yahya, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became a civil
dictator. A champion of the poor and downtrodden, he had no patience for the dilatory dictates of
democratic debate. Bhutto introduced his own constitution, duly providing for a democratic and
parliamentary form of government. In trying to sweep away all obstacles in his way he assumed
presidential powers and then came round to devise a constitution in which the Prime Minister became
the chief executive and the President was assigned a ceremonial role. The popular concept of personal
power is so strongly entrenched in our mind that the name of the constitutional president - Choudhry
Fazal Ilahi - became a common joke in our society.[6] However, once the constitution had been passed
by the National Assembly by acclamation, Bhutto decided not lift the emergency which had been
imposed during the Bangladesh war and in fact suspended the fundamental rights, on the pretext of
considerations of security. Bhutto himsel f did not live up to the standards of his own constitution and
allowed his feudal and autocratic nature to violate its spirit as and when he found it expedient to do so.
The political process was once again disrupted when, following the general elections called by Bhutto in
March 1977, nine opposition parties teamed up to create the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)
Islamic Pakistan
determined to dislodge Bhutto by whatever means they could. The PNA launched a mass campaign
against the Bhutto government for rigging the elections. Curiously, it is widely believed that Bhutto
could have easily secured a comfortable majority even if some of his colleagues had not resorted to
selective rigging and manipulation. A segment of the army is believed to have also encouraged the PNA
movement because of the proclivities of the army chief, General Ziaul Haq whom, ironically, Bhutto
had himself chosen in the belief that he would be more pliable than some of the other Generals senior to
him.[7] According to Prof. Ziring, even before the 1977 election campaign began, Army officers were
plotting to overthrow Bhutto. These men no longer believed that he was the savior sent to restore
Pakistan to a place in t he constellation of states.[8]
On July 5, 1977, the Chief of Army Staff, General Ziaul Haq, ousted Bhutto while the talks between the
PPP and the PNA for possible fresh elections were well in progress. General Zia's eleven years at the
helm of Pakistan's affairs were unprecedented because of his total lack of concern for democracy or
even civilized government. He had Bhutto tried and executed on a murder charge which to this day is
not universally regarded as quite credible. The General ruled by martial law edits for the initial eight
years (1977-85) and later with the help of a face of an elected party-less assembly (Majlis-e-Shoora).[9]
To fortify his position, Ziaul Haq, much more so than any of his predecessors, gave a new emphasis to
Islam in national polity. Before he was killed in an air crash, he had almost completely devastated
Pakistan of its image as a modern, democratic state, conforming to the ideals spelt out by Quaid-i-
Azam.[10]
The above review of the political development of Pakistan has brought out that the in-egalitarian power
structure which the country inherited from the colonial era remained intact with power concentrated in
the two state institutions -- the military and bureaucracy -- with the backing of the feudal class. These
power groups were not committed to establishment of democracy as it eroded their power and
privileges. The urban middle class, independent professionals and intelligentsia, who have interest in
promoting democracy, have become somewhat politically marginalized.
In Pakistan's constitutional history, neither the politicians nor the military leaders respected the Basic
Law. General Zia had once proudly proclaimed that he could tear up the constitution and throw it into
the dustbin whenever he liked. This he nearly did with his wanton disfigurement of the constitution
through the Eighth amendment.
In short, the incompetence of the political leadership which came to the top after Quaid-i-Azam,
combined with the arbitrary and autocratic nature of the governments headed by Ayub Khan, Yahya
Khan, Bhutto and Ziaul Haq, succeeded in subverting, even destroying, the main institutions of a
democratic state -- executive, legislature and judiciary. Each institution functioned largely at the whim
of the man at the top. Parliamentary democracy, in the true sense of the word, was virtually not given
the chance to strike roots in the milieu of Pakistan. It is mere polemics, therefore, to argue that
parliamentary politics has not worked.[11]
Democracy can be defined as a functional balance between the three pillars -- legislative, executive, and
judiciary -- to the ultimate satisfaction of the people, as reflected in the Press, the fourth estate. Without
this balance, and without the exercise of people's will, there is no democracy. But these conditions do
not exist now or ever existed in the past in Pakistan.[12] In parliamentary democracy the government is
responsible (i.e. answerable) to parliament, and parliament to people, in general elections. Political
parties provide the channel of this relationship. The sovereignty of people rules through the supremacy
of parliament and freedom of expression is the vehicle of people's control.[13]
Our parliament -- the first pillar -- has never been supreme. The immediate post-independence period
followed a vicergal pattern, in which the governor-general nominated the prime minister in 1947 and
dissolved the parliament in 1954 with judiciary upholding it on technical grounds. Elections under the
1956 constitution were repeatedly postponed by the sitting rulers so that power may not go to a new
team. Under the 1962 constitution the parliament was merely a talking forum for financial legislation
and was over shadowed by the veto and power of dissolution held by the president. Martial law covered
the skies of Pakistan between 1969 to 1973 and 1977 to 1985 leaving behind the crippling legacy of the
Islamic Pakistan
Eighth amendment for the assemblies elected in 1988, 1990 and 1993.[14]
DEMOCRACY - PAKISTANI STYLE
The existing structure of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan completed twelve and a half years in
May, 1997. This was the first time in the 49 year history of the country that democratic institutions
based on adult franchise had continued to function without interruption for the whole 12 years.
However, by whatever name we choose to describe our present system, neither the conservative Locke
nor revolutionary Rousseau would have called it a democracy. Perhaps we are following Bagehot who
says: "Democracy is the way to give people the greatest illusion of power, while allowing them the
smallest amount in reality."
Any electoral process which throws up Mazaris, Jatois, Mirs, Legharis, Tiwanas, Bhuttos, Nawabs,
Sardars and the like as the elected representatives of the poor haris, laborers, petty shopkeepers, office
workers and other segments of the working class in this country is not fair, transparent and well
meaning. It makes a mockery of the most fundamental principle underlying the concept of a democratic
form of government, viz. that those who run the government must be the representatives of the people.
There is no connection whatsoever between the voters and their elected representatives in any sphere of
life, social, economic or political. Elections which ensure a similar pattern with such painful regularity,
cannot be really elections as understood in the political context. It is historically undeniable that in this
country not more than 200 families have been sharing political power for the entire period of five
decades of its independence, which is a very sad reflection on any society living in the closin g years of
the 20th century.[15] As the things are today it does not matter in the least for the majority of
Pakistanis whether there is democracy in the country or dictatorship. For the masses life was the same
during General Zia's dictatorship as in Nawaz Sharif's democracy.
POLITICAL PERSECUTION
Our elected governments have generally felt no need to accommodate the opposition nor acknowledge
its role as the conscience of the society. Indeed, both the government and the opposition have operated
in a system which denies autonomy to the domain of party politics. We have a tradition that those who
do not agree with us are our enemies and should be treated as traitors. This is exactly what we did to
Sheikh Mujib who emerged as the majority leader. He was imprisoned and the army moved in to
punish the people who had elected as their leader a person who did not satisfy the whims of the military
ruler. With all this background which is dark, dready and dismal, our rulers continue to relish
untrammeled authority and consider dissent as sedition and an act of disloyalty.
In the name of democracy we continue to subvert it by framing cases against our opponents. The worst
excesses in this period were committed in the tenure of the Jam Sadiq Ali-MQM government in Sindh
between August 1990 and February 1992, when a large number of false cases were registered or existing
vaguely-worded FIRs used to intimidate and harass PPP leaders. This victimization had the full
sanction of the then-President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as the
coercion could not have been carried on if they had opposed it. Benazir, her spouse, and party workers
were tied in legal knots as long as Messrs Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif's power relations
survived. The spate of cases, arrests and sentences against PML (N) leaders and MQM leaders and
workers appeared in some, if not all instances, to be dubiously motivated, continued during the second
stint of Benazir.
Eighteen people were charged on June 12, 1995, with "high treason." The accused included a former
governor of Punjab, two former federal ministers and above all, Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, ex-
Prime Minister of Pakistan and currently the leader of the parliamentary opposition. The case was
withdrawn after it acquired an international dimension as a US State Department spokesman expressed
concern over the adverse effects these charges may have on the future of democracy in Pakistan. Our
Foreign office issued a strong statement protesting against Washington's undue interference in
Pakistan's internal affairs. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took a more benign view of the matter,
dismissing it as a minor disagreement in the broader context of improving Pakistan-US relations. As for
Islamic Pakistan
the charges against the opposition leader, her suave affirmation was ironically similar to that of dictator
Ziaul Haq, who had her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, tried and hanged: the law must take its course. The
protest ove r the American statement has been no less ingenuous and ironic. Throughout the eleven
years of Ziaul Haq's rule, leaders of the Pakistan People's Party, especially Begum Nusrat Bhutto and
Benazir Bhutto, did their utmost to bring about foreign pressure on the government of Pakistan.[16]
FLOOR CROSSING
The successive governments are keeping doors open for floor-crossing, that is the root cause of not only
our political instability which is hindering our economic development but also of top-level corruption,
which filtering down, pollutes the entire body-politic. Whether it is used in the NWFP (Feb. 1994) to
move a provincial government or applied in Islamabad to pre-empt a threat by the PML (N) to move a
no-confidence motion against the PPP government, floor-crossing undermines political values.
Weaning of partymen was checked by the Article 96 (5) of the constitution which was to lapse after ten
years by which votes of the dissidents of any party that is, votes of breakaway members of any
component of governing coalition were to be disregarded in a no-confidence motion. The eighth
amendment did away with the 1973 provisions meant to institutionalize the unwritten conventions and
mores of parliamentary systems. Caretaker Prime Minister, Dr. Moeen Qureshi, issued an ordinance, in
1993, forbidding floor-crossing. The ordinance was allowed to lapse after four months by the Benazir
government. This shows the intentions of the ruling elite which encourages horse-trading for political
maneuvering.
The absence of the anti-defection law has invested MNAs and MPAs with the power to black mail their
party leaders into extending them unreasonable concessions, triggering large-scale corruption.[17] The
establishment brokered and manipulated a more than two thirds majority for the IJI in 1990, and the
IJI resorted to blatant seduction of MPAs to prevent the PPP forming the government even in the lone
province of Sindh during its 1990-1993 tenure. Benazir government toppled NWFP Chief Minister Pir
Sabir Shah's government in February 1994 as many MPAs were lured to join hands with the central
government. In September, 1995, through the same method, the central government unsuccessfully
attempted to install a PPP government in Punjab.
LEGISLATION THROUGH ORDINANCE
The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Mohammad Munir, said of the first Constituent
Assembly that it lived in a fool's paradise if it was ever seized with the notion that it was the sovereign
body in the state.[18] This equally applies to the present democratically elected National Assembly and
provincial assemblies of the country.
Our constitutions have been based on a trichotomy of powers between the three organs of the state --
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The basic function of the parliament is to make laws, the
executive implements the laws (and also proposes laws for public interest) and the judiciary serves as a
check on any excesses of the executive. However, in practice the successive governments in the country
have always tilted the balance of power in their favor through relegating the parliament to a position of
talking show while making legislations through ordinances and curtailed the independence of judiciary
[19] by using various methods.
Parliament is supposed to be the supreme legislative organ of the state. The government has, however,
effectively marginalized parliament, usurped its powers and reduced it to a mere rubber stamp. Its
proceedings have been trivialized to little more than slanging matches between the ruling party and the
opposition. Legislation, which is initiated in parliament itself, is limited largely to the Finance Act (i.e.
the budget) and some other minor and inconsequential laws.
The democratic governments, since the end of martial law in March 1985, issued 408 presidential
ordinances upto October, 1995. Only 152 Acts were approved by the National Assembly during this
period. Junejo government issued 10 ordinances from March 1985 to May 1988. During Benazir's first
Islamic Pakistan
stint of office - December 1988 to August 1990 - not a single legislation was presented to the parliament,
while 18 ordinances were issued. Nawaz Sharif government legislated through 78 ordinances from Nov.
1990 to April, 1993. During 1995, more than 100 ordinances were issued, while the total number of
ordinances issued by the Benzir's two government reached 220 in October, 1995.
An emergency power to promulgate an ordinance in a situation requiring immediate action when the
National Assembly is not in session, is being routinely exercised by the President, to usurp the legislative
function of the state. Following the same practice, the provincial governments have also rendered
redundant the provincial assemblies by advising the governors to promulgate ordinances. The
ordinances are promulgated by the President and the governors on the binding advice of the Prime
Minister and the chief minister or their cabinets.
A piece of emergency executive legislation, as envisaged by the constitution, is not to last more than four
months unless earlier rejected or adopted by the legislature. This provision is being circumvented by
the executive to make permanent laws. Ordinances are generally re-promulgated on the day of their
demise, instead of being placed before the legislature. This practice subverts the basic structure of the
basic law, which has been raised on the principle of the division of legislative, executive and judicial
functions of the state among its three organs. It also makes a mockery of the concept of the supremacy
of parliament, which has been reduced to a little more than a debating society for all practical purposes
except that of passing budget, which has also become a ritual and in which the Senate has no say.
Incidentally, Article 89 of the constitution,[20] which confers and regulates the president's power to
promulgate ordinances, also leaves the Senate out of reckoning. An ordinance can be issued e ven if the
Senate is in session.
An ordinance is a temporary measure designed to enable the state to deal immediately with unexpected
and extraordinary situations, and is not meant to replace the normal legislation. Unfortunately,
however, like most other powers conferred by law, successive governments have blatantly abused the
power to legislate given by Article 89, to the extent that today, the executive has effectively usurped the
legislative powers and functions of the parliament. The result is that the country is inundated with a
flood of ordinances, while parliament's legislative activity has been reduced to the absolute minimum.
The abuse of the ordinance-making power can be appreciated if one examines the sort of provisions
which are the subject-matter of various ordinances.[21] For example, consider Ordinance 86 of 1994
promulgated on November 13. By this ordinance, which comprises only one operative section, the
definition of "gallantry" in the Decorations Act of 1975 has been altered. Or consider Ordinance 57 of
1994, promulgated on August 4. By this ordinance, sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Lighthouse Act of
1927 has been amended. Can it legitimately be argued that these alterations were such that immediate
action was warranted?
The real abuse of Article 89 however lies in the manner in which the same ordinance is repeatedly re-
promulgated by the government. As pointed out, an ordinance has a life of only four months. To
circumvent this "inconvenience", the government every four months (or thereabouts) promulgates a
fresh ordinance that is identical or substantially similar to the one about to expire. This process is
repeated indefinitely and the same legal provisions are thus kept alive through one ordinance after
another. In this manner, parliament has been effectively eliminated from the legislative process.
This conclusion has now been upheld by and received judicial imprimatur of the Supreme Court. In a
judgment reported in PLD 1994 SC 363, the Court concluded, in the words of Justice Saleem Akhtar,
that "on repeal of an Ordinance after expiry of four months, the President has no power to re-enact and
repeat the same". In the same case, Justice Ajmal Mian observed: "The legislative power vests in an
assembly, which power cannot be usurped by a head of the state or a province while the Assembly
exists... I am inclined to hold that if the National Assembly does not stand dissolved, the President
cannot usurp the legislative power of the National Assembly by repeating the same Ordinance without
submitting it in terms of Article 89 of the Constitution to the national Assembly."

Islamic Pakistan

Islamic Pakistan

chro
Chronology of Pakistan
1947:
The first session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held on August 10 and the next day it
Chapter 3 unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its first President. Pakistan appears on the world map on
August 14 and Mr. Jinnah was sworn in as the first Governor General. Liaquat Ali Khan becomes the
first Prime Minister of Pakistan.
1948:
Jinnah died on September 11. Khawaja Nazimuddin becomes the Governor General and Molvi
Tamizuddin Khan elected as the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly.
1949:
On March 7, the Constituent Assembly approves the Objectives Resolution and appoints a Basic
Principles Committee (BPC) to evolve the fundamental principles of the country's future constitution.
1950:
The BPC presents its interim report to the Constituent Assembly on September 28. But the report was
hastily withdrawn amid scathing criticism from the religious groups as well as the protagonists of
provincial autonomy.
1951:
On January 24, a conference of 31 prominent Ulema from different school of thoughts formulated 22
fundamental principles of the Islamic state. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on October, 16, 1951. No
one knows till now why he was assassinated, apparently, by a hired killer Said Akbar at a public meeting
in Rawalpindi. Khawaja Nazimuddin steps down (or forced to step down) to become the Prime Minister
on October 19. Malik Ghulam Mohammad, the Finance Minister, who had served as a civil servant in
the Indian Audit Service, sworn in as Governor General.
1952:
The first ethnic riots in East Pakistan against attempts to make Urdu as the national language and lack
of representation for Bengalis in central administration. The BPC presents the second revised report to
the Constituent Assembly on November 23. The report called for a parity of representation between
East and West Pakistan in parliament elected on the basis of separate balloting for minorities. It also
recommended that no law would be made in violation of the tenets of the Quran and Sunnah.
1953:
Martial Law imposed in Lahore to control the sectarian riots against Qadianis. This was the first
sectarian rioting in the country and the army was called for the first time to control a civil strife.
Governor General, Malik Ghulam Mohammad, sacked Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin (although
he enjoyed confidence of the parliament) and appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra to form a government on
April 17. Mr. Bogra was summoned by the G.G. from the Washington, where he was serving as
Pakistan's ambassador.
1954:
Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, declared emergency in the country and dissolved the
Constituent Assembly on October 24. The Assembly had passed a bill in September which made the
Governor General subservient to the advice of the Prime Minister. Mohammad Ali Bogra was again
called to form a new government in which Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, General Mohammad
Ayub Khan, became the Defense Minister. He was the first serving C-in-C to join the cabinet. Pakistan
joins Baghdad Pact (later known as Central Treaty Organization after the withdrawal of Iraq) and
South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a US-sponsored military alliance to contain
communism.
1955:
On May 10, the Federal Court, headed by Chief Justice Mohammad Munir, declared the dissolution of
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chro
the Constituent Assembly as justified on the principle of state necessity. A new Constituent Assembly,
elected on June 21, held its first meeting in Murree on July 7. The Muslim League, which had a majority
in the first Constituent Assembly, had suffered a set-back and it had only 25 members in the second
assembly. Mohammad Ali Bogra resigned and another bureaucrat, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, was
installed as Prime Minister in August. In October, Major General Iskandar Mirza becomes Governor
General following the resignation of Ghulam Mohammad because of health reasons. On October 14, the
four provinces of West Pakistan merged into One Unit, causing resentment among the smaller
provinces.
1956:
On February 29, the Constituent Assembly approves a constitutional draft which came into effect on
March 23. The constitution, based on the principle of "parity" between the two wings of the country,
empowered the Federal government to strangulate the provinces. Iskandar Mirza becomes the first
President of Pakistan. Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, who had refused to sign the 1956 constitution as a
member of the Constituent Assembly, becomes Prime Minister in September to preserve and defend the
same constitution.
1957:
In October, Ismael Ibrahim Chundrigar replaced Suharwardy as Prime Minister. He remained in office
for only 59 days and was forced to resign in December. Malik Feroz Khan Noon succeeds Chundrigar as
Prime Minister. He was the seventh Prime Minister in 10 years.
1958:
As the general elections under the 1956 constitution drew closer, President Iskandar Mirza, on October
7, abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law. On Oct. 27, the Supreme Court -- in Dosso case --
upheld the imposition of martial law as constitutional. The Chief Justice, Mohammad Munir, held that
"a victorious revolution and a successful coup d' etat is an internationally recognized legal method of
changing a constitution. On the same day President Iskandar Mirza was forced at gun point to step aside
and hand over all power to General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan.
1959:
Oct. 27, on the first anniversary of his seizure of power, Ayub Khan announces the system of Basic
Democracies, comprising 80,000 Basic Democrat Wards. Between December 1959 and January 1960
elections to the Basic Democrat units were held in both wings of the country. The elected members
formed an Electoral College to elect the members of the provincial and national assemblies.
1960:
February 14, a referendum is held to elect the president. Ayub Khan, being the only candidate, received
95.6 per cent of the votes cast. On Feb. 17, Ayub Khan was sworn in as the "elected" president.
1961:
May 6, the Constitution Commission, appointed by President Ayub Khan, presents its report to the
President. The Commission pinpoints the following as the cause of the failure of the parliamentary form
of government in Pakistan: (a) lack of proper elections and defects in the constitution; (b) undue
interference by the head of state in the ministries and political parties by the Central Government in the
functioning of governments in the provinces; and (c) lack of leadership, resulting in the lack of well
organized and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in politicians, and their undue
interference in the administration.
1962:
March 1, Ayub Khan promulgates a constitution which sought to reinforce his authority in the absence
of martial law. In April, Elections for the National and provincial assembly were held on the basis of
Basic Democracies. July, the National Assembly passes the Political Parties Act, legalizing the formation
of political parties.
1963:
To avert any possibility of political agitation, Ayub Khan, in January, amends the Political Parties Act,
which provided that the politicians disqualified under the Elected Bodies Disqualification Ordinance
(EBDO) would become liable to two years imprisonment if they indulged in any political activity. A list

chro
of fundamental rights which were incorporated in the constitution through the first Amendment.
However, a rider clause excluded some subjects from the operation of the Act of Fundamental Rights.
March 2, Pakistan and China sign a border agreement.
1964:
August, the National Assembly approves the Presidential Election Bill that called for holding of
elections, on the basis of Basic Democracies, for the President, national and provincial assemblies in
early 1965. According to the 1962 constitution, the first term of President Ayub was to expire on August
8, 1965.
1965:
January 2, Ayub Khan defeats his main opponent, Miss Fatima Jinnah in the presidential elections amid
opposition accusations of mass rigging of the polls. September 6, the Indo-Pakistan war begins as India
attacks Pakistan. The 17-day war, when the East Pakistan was left undefended, weakened the already
fraying national ties between the two wings.
1966:
January 10, Pakistan and India sign an agreement in Tashkent to formally end the hostilities between
the two countries. In February, the leader of the East Pakistan Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman
announced his six points "charter for survival" that called for limiting the federal government to
national defense and foreign affairs. December 31, the government lifts ban on the political activities of
65 prominent politicians under EBDO
1967:
April, a conference of opposition parties in Dhaka, forms the National Democratic Front and announces
an eight-point political program that called for limiting the federal government powers to defense,
foreign affairs, currency and federal finance and inter-provincial communications and trade. It also
called for a parliamentary form of government elected on the basis of adult franchise.
1968:
November, students launch a nation-wide protest campaign against an ordinance which empowered the
government to withdraw the degree of any student.
1969:
February 4, President Ayub Khan agrees to call a conference of politicians to discuss the political
problems. On February 21, President Ayub Khan announces that he will not be a candidate in the next
presidential elections. March 10-13, the government and opposition political leaders meet in Rawalpindi
but failed to reach any significant decision. March 25, President Ayub Khan violates his own
constitution, imposes martial law, and hands over power to the Commander-in-chief of the army,
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, amid mounting anti-government demonstrations demanding
resignation of Ayub Khan. March 31, General Yahya assumes the office of President. November 28,
General Yahya announces his plan to hold general elections on the basis of adult franchise.
1970:
March 29, General Yahya issued the Legal Framework Order, containing the rules relating to the
holding of general elections and framing of the future constitution. June 30, One Unit dissolved in West
Pakistan and the four provinces -- Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sindh --
restored. Elections scheduled to be held in October were postponed till December because of hurricane
and floods in East Pakistan. December 7, elections for the National Assembly. December 17, elections for
the provincial assemblies. The National Assembly elections accorded an overwhelming majority in the
eastern wing to the Awami League (151 out of 162 seats) and to the Pakistan People's Party (81 out of
138 seats) in the western wing.
1971:
February 13, Yahya Khan announces that the first session of the National Assembly will be held in
Dhaka on March 3. Feb. 17, the PPP leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announces that unless his party receives
a positive and clear assurance from the East Pakistan Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman
about the accommodation of the PPP's reasonable demands in the future constitution, he and his party
would not attend the National Assembly session to be held in Dhaka. March 1, Yahya Khan, finding an

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excuse that the PPP, the largest party from West Pakistan, is not attending the session, postpones the
first session of the National Assembly. March 16, Yahya and Mujib begin their constitutional
negotiations, but under the facade of political talks, the junta completes its preparations for a military
crackdown on the Bengalis. March 26, the Awami League declares the independence of Bangladesh.
March 27, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman is arrested for treason. Yahya Khan orders military operation t o
suppress anti-government civil and guerrilla movement. November 23, Indian forces attack East
Pakistan to help Bengalis. December 3, Indian forces also attack West Pakistan. December 17, Pakistan
army surrenders arms in Dkhaka and Bangladesh comes into existence. December 20, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto takes over as President and Chief Martial Administrator.
1972:
January 2, all major industries nationalized. Jan. 30, Pakistan quits the Commonwealth. April 20, the
Supreme Court declares Yahya Khan's martial to be illegal. April 21, the interim constitution, drafted
by the federal government, is introduced which limits the powers of the courts. May 11, Bhutto devalues
rupee by 131 per cent and begins nationalization campaign. July 2, Pakistan and India sign Simla
agreement to normalize relations. October, a special task force, the Federal Security Force created.
November 20, Pakistan's first nuclear atomic reactor commissioned.
1973:
April 10, the National Assembly approves the constitution unanimously which comes into force on
August 14. April, Baluchistan government dismissed and the NWFP government resigns in protest.
Army sent into Baluchistan to deal with insurrection. August 28, Pakistan and India sign an agreement
in New Delhi on the return of Pakistani POWs in India and Bangladeshis in Pakistan.
1974:
February 22-24, Bhutto hosts the second Islamic summit in Lahore. May 4, the first Constitution
Amendment Act redefined the territories of Pakistan and the eastern wing was excluded. May 18,
Bhutto talks about an "Islamic atom bomb" after India explodes a nuclear device. May 29, attack on
Nishter Medical College students at Rabwa railway station sparks anti-Qadiani demonstrations.
September 17, the second Constitution Amendment Act declares the Qadiani sect as non-Moslems.
November 11, a PPP dissident, Ahmad Raza Qasuri files an First Information Report in Lahore,
implicating Bhutto in the murder of his father Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan.
1975:
February 10, the National Awami Party banned. Feb. 17, the NWFP cabinet dissolved and the province
placed under governor's rule. February 18, the third Constitution Amendment Act empowered the
government to detain a person without trial upto three months. October 30, the Supreme Court declares
the NAP as illegal and held that the party had never reconciled itself to the existence and ideology of
Pakistan. November 21, the fourth Constitution Amendment Act amends 10 articles and two schedules.
December 31, Baluchistan government suspended and governor's rule imposed.
1976:
September 13, the fifth Constitution Amendment Act amends 16 articles. December 31, the sixth
Constitution Amendment Act amends four articles related to the retirement of the Supreme and High
Court judges. December, Pakistan and Bangladesh establish diplomatic relations.
1977:
January 7, Bhutto announces mid-term polls and the nine opposition parties form the Pakistan National
Alliance to contest the elections. March 10, the PNA, routed in the elections ( got only 36 out of 200 seats
in the National Assembly while the opposition boycotted the provincial assembly elections in which the
People's Party got 435 out of 460 seats ) accuses the Bhutto government of mass riggings in the elections
and demands fresh polls and the immediate resignation of Bhutto. April 21, martial law imposed in
Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore amid violent anti-government demonstrations. May 16, the seventh
Constitution Amendment Act, provided that the Prime Minister might seek a vote of confidence from
the people through a referendum. The amendment also provided that a High Court could not exercise
any jurisdiction under article 199 in relation to the areas where the army is called in aid of the civil
administration. June 8, negotiations between the government and opposition lea ders begin. July 5,
General Ziaul Haq, the hand-picked C-in-C stages a coup d'état but promises to hold elections within 90
days. October 1, General Zia announces postponement of elections until the "process of accountability
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has been completed." September 3, Bhutto is arrested in the murder case of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad
Khan Qasuri. November 10, the Supreme Court, in Begum Nusrat Bhutto case, unanimously validates
imposition of martial law under the doctrine of necessity.
1978:
March 18, Lahore High Court sentences Bhutto and four FSF officials to death in the murder case of
Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan Qasuri. May 6, the Supreme Court begins hearing an appeal against
the Lahore High Court verdict against Bhutto. September, President Chaudhry Fazal Ilahi retires as his
term of office expires and General Zia becomes president.
1979:
February 6, the Supreme Court, in a majority decision, rejects appeal of Bhutto and four others. March
25, the Supreme Court rejects a review petition of all the five convicts. April 1, President General Ziaul
Haq rejects the mercy petition and Bhutto is executed on April 4. February, General Zia, to legitimize
military rule, begins the process of Islamization with the promulgation of Hudood Ordinances and
established Shariah Benches. November 21, the US Embassy in Islamabad ransacked during the anti-US
demonstrations. December 27, Soviet troops enter into Afghanistan and Pakistan becomes a front-line
state for the west.
1980:
January, Pakistan hosts an emergency meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers to discuss the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. May, full-fledged Federal Shariah Court established. June 30, Zakat and
Ushr Ordinance promulgated.
1981:
February, Movement for Restoration of Democracy formed. March 24, General Zia promulgates a
Provisional Constitutional Order, purported to validate everything done by him since its coup, virtually
ending the independence of the judiciary -- 19 judges fired. July, Pakistan and US sign an agreement to
provide Pakistan with $ 3.2 billion economic and military aid. August 30, Pakistan Steel Mill, built with
the help of Soviet Union, inaugurated. October 20, the US Senate lifts ban on assistance to Pakistan
imposed in 1979 over its nuclear program.
1982:
July, reporting of all political news banned as Movement for Restoration of Democracy demands
elections and restoration of 1973 constitution.
1983:
Army sent into Sindh to suppress revolt against the military government.
1984:
December, General Zia holds a referendum on Islam to legitimize his dictatorial rule.
1985:
February, elections for the national and provincial assemblies are held on non-party basis. March 23,
Mohammed Khan Junejo appointed as the civilian Prime Minister while martial law remains in force.
November 9, the Majlis-e-Shoora (parliament) approved the controversial 8th amendment to the
constitution under the threat of martial law. December 31, martial law lifted.
1986:
Junejo forms Muslim League parliamentary party in the parliament elected on the basis of non-party
basis and formally allows the political parties to function. April, Benazir Bhutto returns to Pakistan to a
tumultuous welcome in Lahore. 1987: May, Junejo government curtails the defense budget and limits
certain benefits to the civilian and military bureaucracy. November, Foreign Minister, General
Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, replaced by Zain Nourani.
1988:
April 10, explosion at the Ojheri armament depot near Rawalpindi. April, 14, Pakistan signs on the
agreement on the Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan. May 29, Prime Minister Mohammad
Khan Junejo, soon after his return from a foreign tour, sacked. June 3, Nawaz Sharif appointed the
Chief Minister of the Punjab. July 20, General Zia announces that elections for the national assembly
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will be held on November 16. August 17, General Ziaul Haq dies in a C-130 plane crash and the Senate
Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan takes over as the acting president. November 16, Benazir Bhutto's PPP
emerges as the largest party in the general elections. December, Benazir sworn in as the Prime Minister;
Ghulam Ishaq Khan elected as the President; Nawaz Sharif forms government of the Punjab province;
Baluchistan Assembly dissolved.
1989:
January, law and order situation starts deteriorating amid bomb explosions in the Punjab and decoits
activities in the Sindh province. March, Benazir's federal government, fails to topple the government of
Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab province through vote of no-confidence despite horse trading. August,
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan foils Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's attempt to remove the Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sirhoney. November 1, the combined opposition unsuccessfully moves a
motion of no-confidence against Benazir's government but she found her support had dwindled from
148 to 119 in the National Assembly. December, Differences between Prime Minister Benazir and
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan emerge over the of appointment of the Supreme Court Justice.
1990:
January, the Baluchistan High Court restores the provincial assembly. May 27, security forces open fire
at a crowd of Mohajirs emerging from Hyerabad's Pucca Qila fort, killing 28 women and children
according to official accounts. July, Benazir government declines to give judicial powers to the army to
restore law and order in the Sindh province. August 6, Benazir's government sacked and the national
and provincial assemblies dissolved. October, the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad captures majority seats in
the National Assembly and Nawaz Sharif becomes Prime Minister.
1991:
National Finance Commission constituted to make recommendation on arrangements for the
distribution of domestically mobilized resources between the federal and provincial governments. Indus
Water Apportionment Treaty divides the water resources among the four provinces. Cooperative
societies scam in which the politicians robbed the national development financial institutions of over 29
billions rupees. June, the National Assembly approves the Shariah Act. July, the 12th amendment of the
constitution takes away the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court in cases that are
to be tried before the various Special Courts and provided for an increase in salaries and allowances for
the judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
1992:
January 2, the Federal Shariah Court declares riba (interest) as un-Islamic. May 19, the army called out
to restore deteriorating law and order in the Sindh province. June 19, General Asif Nawaz Janjua
launches a "cleanup operation" in the interior of Sindh as well as crackdown against the MQM.
December 19, Benazir Bhutto leads the long march to Islamabad against the Nawaz government.
1993:
January, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan appoints General Abdul Waheed Chief of Army Staff, against
the wishes of Nawaz Sharif. March, the Muslim League President, Mohammad Khan Junejo, dies and
Nawaz Sharif nominated as the next party leader which divided the PML into Nawaz and Junejo
groups. April 18, the president sacks Nawaz Sharif government and appoints Balkh Sher Mazari as the
interim Prime Minister. April , Nawaz Sharif challenges his dismissal in the Supreme Court. May 26, the
Supreme Court declares President's order as illegal and restores the Nawaz government. July, President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign under army pressure. Dr. Moeen Qureshi,
a former World Bank Vice President takes over as Prime Minister. Oct. 6, none of the political parties
get an-over all majority in the general elections but the PPP gets majority seats in the National Assembly
as well as in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. Oct. 19, Benazir Bhutto sworn-in as Prime Ministe r for
the second time. Nov. 13, Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari elected as the President.
1994:
February 27, the central government topples the Muslim League government of Pir Sabir Shah in the
NWFP through horse trading and installs the PPP government. April, the arrest of the Mehran Bank
Chief Executive Yunus Habib lifts the screen from one of the biggest financial scandals in Pakistan
history that implicated politicians of the ruling and as well opposition parties and the army generals.
November, army withdrawn from the Sindh province and replaced with Rangers, - under army officers'
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command - who launch a ruthless operation against the MQM (Altaf group).
1995:
February 22, the two Christians -- Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih sentenced to death by a Sessions
Judge for blasphemy -- acquitted from the charges by the Lahore High Court. April, the Terrorist
Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act amended to provide that a statement or confession before a police
officer of the rank of DSP and above, will be considered admissible in court. June, 280 people killed as
rangers continue operation against the MQM in Karachi. September, the central government topples the
PML/J government of Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo but fails to install the PPP government and forced
to accept Arif Nakai of the PML/J as a compromise Chief Minister. December, death toll reaches to 1800
in the anti-MQM operation, according to official count.
1996
March 20:
The Supreme Court, in a land mark judgment, held that the consultation with the Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts, in the appointment of judges to the Courts "should be effective,
meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair
play." The Supreme Court also directed the federal government to appoint permanent chief justices in
higher courts where at present constitutional functions are being performed by acting chief justices
appointed by the government. The SC judgment also upheld the rule of seniority in respect of the
appointment of high court chief justices. The Court struck down Article 203-C of the constitution,
(which provided for the transfer of judges to the Shariah Court) an amendment made by General Zia,
on the ground of conflict with Article 209.
May 19:
The Supreme Court returns a constitutional reference, filed by the president three days earlier, against
the apex court decision, saying it had not been signed by the President as required by the constitution.
On the same day the federal government files a review petition against the Supreme Court decision.
May 26:
Supreme Court Judge Mir Hazar Khan Khoso announces his dissenting judgment which, inter alia, said
that the President has the power under the constitution to appoint judges and that no time-limit can be
fixed for filling in the permanent vacancies for judges in the superior courts.
June 13:
The chief justices of the Supreme Court and the four provincial High Courts ordered the sacking 24
judges -- all of whom were appointed by the Benazir government which had refused to sack those
judges.
June 26:
The Supreme Court restored the PML (Nawaz Group) dominated, local municipal councils in Punjab,
which were disbanded in 1993 before completion of their tenure. The next day, the Punjab Assembly
passed in less than three hours, a bill to offset the Supreme Court order. The new legislation, which
repealed the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, again dissolved the local bodies.
July 2:
Pakistan's press stages a strike to protest against the imposition of a General Sales Tax on newspapers
and enhance import duty on news print.
Sept 7:
With external debt standing at $29.57 billion, Pakistan is the world's 18th most indebted country,
according to World Debt Tables.
Sept 8:
LHC asks government counsel to inquire from the MI and FIU whether an Islamabad family missing for
months is in their custody.
Sept 11:
Two sisters of Tando Bahawal village set themselves ablaze in front of the Suppression of Terrorist
Activities Court in Hyderabad to protest against the delay in punishment to the army Major Arshad
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Jamil and others convicted of the murder of nine villagers.
Sept. 20:
Mir Murtuza Bhutto, 42, brother of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and head of the Pakistan People's
Party (Shaheed Bhutto group) was gunned down by the police near his 70 clifton residence in Karachi.
Sept 23
Four gunmen opened indiscriminate fire at a Fajr congregation at Al Khair mosque in Multan, killing
23 worshippers and wounding 50 others.
Oct. 17:
Baluchistan Assembly rejects resolution on giving Urdu national language status.
Oct. 22:
President's counsel tells Supreme Court that Mr. Leghari has been found not guilty of involvement in
the Mehran Bank scandal by an inquiry committee.
Oct. 23:
Supreme Court stays LHC ruling that a Muslim woman cannot marry without the consent of her wali.
Oct. 24:
Feroza Begum of the MQM resigns from the Sindh cabinet, saying she had joined government to save
her son's life: appears before the supreme Court.
Oct. 27:
Supreme Court rejects Capt Arshad Jamil's review petition He was sentenced to be hanged in the Tando
Bahal massacre case.
Oct. 28:
Capt. Arshad Jamil is executed in Hyderabad.
Nov. 3:
The Lahore High Court restores the Watto government but asks him to seek a vote of confidence in 10
days while 85 PDF MPAs file a no-trust move against him.
-----------Supreme Court Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah says that in view of one of its rulings, it is proper
for the president to repromulgate ordinances.
Nov. 4:
President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, exercising his powers under Article 58-2(b) of the constitution,
dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly.
Nov. 18:
Ordinance to try the corrupt is promulgated: chief accountability commissioner to be appointed.
Nov. 19:
The Supreme Court returns former PM Benazir Bhutto's petition challenging the dissolution of the NA
on the ground that it is objectionable and scandalous in parts.
----------The Supreme Court stays proceedings before the STA Court No. 2, Hyderabad, which had
declared Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, caretaker CM Sindh, a proclaimed offender in a sedition case
registered in 1986.
Nov. 20:
Ghulam Mujadaid Mirza, former chief justice of Lahore High Court is appointed as the Chief
Accountability Commissioner.
Nov. 21:
Ms Bhutto submits amended petition against her dismissal to the Supreme Court.
Dec. 8:
The Mehran Bank Commission exonerates President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari from any wrong
doing in his land deal through the Mehran Bank chief Younis Habib. But the Commission did not
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mention to whom the land was sold by the President for Rs. 15 million and from which account the
money was debited to make the payment.
1997
Jan. 4:
The Jamat-e-Islami men withdraw their candidatures for the February elections.
Jan. 5:
Caretaker Prime Minister, Meraj Khalid, fears country's fragmentation in 20 years.
Jan. 6:
President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari amended the rules of business to establish the Council for
Defense and National Security (CDNS) providing a role of the army in the affairs of the government.
Jan. 12:
The Supreme Court upholds the 8th Amendment; terms Article 58(2(b as a deterrent to martial law.
Jan. 18:
Sipah-i-Sahaba Chief Maulana Ziaur Rehman Farooqi was killed along with 18 other people in a bomb
blast in the Lahore Sessions Court. The next day the SSP activists protesting against the killing of their
leader torched the Iranian Culture Center in Lahore
Jan. 26:
The Punjab government issues lists of defaulters: it includes 81 NA and 131 PA candidates.
* The president's counsel tells the Supreme Court that the central government was a partner in the extra
judicial killings in Karachi.
Jan. 29:
The Supreme Court upholds the president's order dissolving the National Assembly and dismissing Ms
Bhutto's government. PPP workers clash with the police outside the Supreme Court building. Ms Bhutto
says the court verdict is timed to influence the election results.
Jan. 30:
The JUP joins the Jamaat-e-Islami in its call for boycotting the elections.
* The PML pays Rs. 1.7 million and the PPP gives Rs. 1.25 million to PTV for air time.
Feb. 1:
General Aslam Beg tells the Supreme Court that the ISI received Rs. 140 million during the 1990
elections.
Feb. 3:
The PML sweeps the polls in the Punjab; emerges strong in the NWFP as the largest single party. ANP-
PML alliance gets 65 seats in the province. Imran Khan loses in all eight constituencies. Mustafa Khan,
Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Yousef Raza Gilani, Nasrullah Khan, Ghinwa Bhutto
were among prominent losers.
* PML, allies achieve two-thirds majority. In the Punjab, the PPP gets only two seats in the provincial
elections. Election brings in 95 new faces in the Punjab Assembly.
* The tribal area go to the polls on the basis of adult franchise for the first time.
Feb. 4:
The HRCP says there is discrepancy in the number of votes cast and the results announced.
Feb. 5:
The PPP central executive committee rejects election results but said it will not launch any movement
for the time being.
* The US State Department rejects allegations of electoral irregularities in the Pakistani elections.
Feb. 6:
LHC upholds formation CDNS, says it is up to parliament to retain or disband it.

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Feb. 14:
PML and allied parties unanimously elect Mr. Nawaz Sharif as the parliamentary leader in the National
Assembly with 146 MNAs attending.
* Maulana Fazlur Rahman, president of his own faction of the JUI alleges that the February elections
were rigged.
Feb.22:
The Human Rights Council of Pakistan declares that the February 3 elections were fair and impartial.
Feb. 17:
Nawaz Sharif sowrn-in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Feb. 19:
Nawaz Sharif won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly with 177 against 16 votes.
Feb. 20:
The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) formally assumed power in the Punjab with the swearing in of
the prime minister's brother, Shahbaz Sharif, as chief minister. Unofficially, however, the party took
control of the provincial administration the moment the Nakai government was dismissed.
Feb. 23:
In a nationwide speech the Prime Minister announces a "national debt retiring programme, urging the
people donate and invest money in government's debt retiring schemes.
* He also shifts the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday. The religious parties denounced the move as
an attempt to erase this Islamic symbol.
* Benazir Bhutto appears before the judicial tribunal and claims that President Farooq Ahmad Khan
Leghari was behind his brother, Mir Murtuza Bhutto's assassination.
Feb. 24:
General Mirza Aslam Beg, tells the Supreme Court he was not answerable to it regarding the alleged
funding of the IJI campaign in 1990.
March 2:
After scrutiny of nomination papers for Senate election, all the 12 PML candidates returned unopposed.
Among those elected unopposed were two retired judges, Rafiq Ahmad Tarar and Afzal Loan who were
on the Supreme Court bench that reinstated Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister in May 1993.
March 3:
In a train crash near Khanewal, 129 people were killed and several others injured.
* U.S. identifies Pakistan as a major money-laundering country.
March 6:
The LHC holds that an adult sane girl is fully empowered to marry without her wali's (guardian's)
consent.
March 9:
PM instructs election commission to give voting right to overseas Pakistanis.
March 10:
The Registration of Press & Publications Ordinance 1977 issued to curb freedom of press and
expression. In its judgment in the Saima case, the LHC rules that a woman can marry without the wali's
consent.
March 12:
In the Senate elections from Sindh Baluchistan and the NWFP, the PML wins 11 seats. Asif Ali Zardari
of the PPP also gets in.
March 16:
Punjab provinces faces acute shortage of flour.

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March 22:
Wasim Sajjad retains Senate chiarmanship.
April 1:
Section 58(2)B of the Eighth Amendment is deleted through the 13th Amendment passed by both
Houses of parliament (79-0 and 190-0). It does away with the president's power to dissolve parliament.
The PM also gets the power to appoint services chiefs and governors in that it will now be mandatory for
the President to seek the former's advice in this regard.
April 4:
Flour crisis worsens in the NWFP.
April 5:
Violence erupts in the NWFP over flour shortage.
April 6:
People loot flour bags in Lahore.
April 7:
Flour crisis worsens in the NWFP.
April 15:
A Pakistan Air Force officer confesses to smuggling heroin in New York.
April 24:
The Naval Chief Admiral Mansoorul Haq resigns in the backdrop of corruption allegations. Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif had asked the Admiral to quit. This was the first time in Pakistan's history that a
chief of army force had been asked to step down by the Prime Minister. The naval chief had been
charged in the national press of accepting kickbacks on a submarine deal with France.
May 23:
Chief Justices' committee opposes setting up of speedy trial courts.
May 24:
The federal government announces that it will not withdraw rangers from Karachi.
May 25:
Government agrees to pay compensation to victims of extra-judicial killings in Karachi.
May 29:
The National Assembly amends the Ehtesab Law shifting the power of investigating charges of
corruption from the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner to the Ehtesab Cell set up by Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharif. The amendment also changed the starting date for accountability from the original 31st
December 1985 to 31st December 1985 to 6 November 1990.
June 5:
Nuclear reactor near Khushab becomes operational.
June 6:
A Pakistan Air Force officer sacked, gets 10 years imprisonment for drugs smuggling.
June 8:
The special tribunal terms Mir Mutruza Bhutto's murder as extra-judicial, saying that police acted on
orders from high authority.
June 16:
A writ filed in the Supreme Court for closure of Inter-Services Intelligence's political cell.
June 18:
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Mir Aimal Kansi, accused of killing CIA employees in U.S., taken into custody and flown to U.S.
June 27:
Prime Minister forms a commission to probe extra-judicial killings in Karachi.
July 5:
Charges framed against Asif Zardari in Murtuza's murder case.
July 26:
MQM renames itself as Muttahida Qaumi Movement.
August 7:
Two PAF men convicted of drugs smuggling.
August 8:
Three former Air chiefs ask PM to eliminate kickbacks from defense purchases.
August 13:
National Assembly passes Anti-Terrorism Bill.
August 15:
Bar bodies condemn the anti-terrorism act.
August 20:
Punjab Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, fails to convince Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah of the need of
establishing special courts.
Sept 15:
Swiss government freezes bank accounts of Benazir and members of her family.
Oct 14:
DEA employee Ayaz Baloch sentenced to 10 years RI for seducing a PAF officer into drugs trafficking.
Oct. 15:
Swiss banks freeze $13.7 million in bank accounts of Benazir, Asif and Nusrat Bhutto.
Oct. 25:
The Murtaza Bhutto murder case was transferred to an anti-terrorism court, a bitter reminder that
'special' courts are merely a weapon in the hands of the ruling party.
Nov. 11:
Aimal Kansi sentenced to life imprisonment for 1993 murder of a CIA employee.
Nov. 12:
Four Americans, their driver gunned down in Karachi.
Nov. 13:
The NWFP Provincial Assembly calls for renaming the province as Pakhtunkhwa.
Nov. 14:
Aimal Kansi gets death sentence for murder of another CIA employee.
Dec. 2:
President Leghari steps down: Sentate Chairman Wasim Sajjad, takes over as acting president.
Dec. 15:
PML names Justice (retired) Rafiq arar as presidential candidate.
Dec. 16:
Nominations for presidential polls filed by 29 candidates.

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Dec. 18:
Chief Election Commissioner rejects Tarar's nomination papers for his alleged remarks against the
judiciary.
Dec. 19:
Lahore High Court stays CEC's order against Tarar.
Dec. 29:
Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, sworn-in as the Chief Election
Commissioner, to replace Justice Junejo who had rejected Tarar's nomination papers.
Dec. 31:
Senator Rafiq Tarar elected president by an over whelming majority.
CHRONOLOGY OF 1997 CONSITUTIONAL CRISIS
Sept. 1:
Government decision to reduce strength of judges challenged in the Supreme Court.
Sept. 5:
Chief Justice suspends president's order reducing the number of judges from 17 to 12.
Sept. 16:
The federal government withdraws notification curtailing SC strength.
Oct. 10:
The Acting Chief Justice, Ajmal Mian, calls a full court session to discuss the issue of number of judges
in the Supreme Court.
Oct. 12:
The Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah returns from Saudi Arabia and orders cancellation of full court
meeting and renewed his demand for the restoration of number of judges in the SC to 17.
Oct. 17:
Seven SC judges requisition full court meeting to discuss government-judiciary tussle over appointment
of judges.
Oct. 18:
CJ Sajjad Ali Shah rejects request for convening full court.
Oct. 27:
SC rejects government's appeal for in camera hearing in ISI case,
Oct. 29:
SC suspends operation of 14th Amendment. NA adopts a resolution affirming supremacy of parliament.
Oct. 30:
SC receives contempt of court petition against PM, five others over criticism of the Chief Justice in
parliament.
* SC asks president to notify elevation of five High Court judges without seeking PM's approval.
Premier asks president not to act on the order for 30 days.
Oct. 31:
PM accepts CJ's demands about the appointment of judges.
Nov. 3:
SC issues notices to PM on contempt petition.
Nov. 4:
Five judges take oath after elevated to SC.
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Nov. 14:
PM decides to appear in SC to face contempt charges.
Nov. 17:
PM appears in SC, denies committing contempt of court.
Nov. 18:
SC issues contempt notice to NA secretary for not submitting compete record of proceedings.
Nov. 19:
SC charge sheets PM, 11 others in contempt case.
Nov. 20:
SC asks President not to assent Contempt of Court bill.
* SC receives petitions challenging validity of 13th Amendment.
Nov. 21:
SC issues notice to govt. in 13th Amendment case.
Nov. 24:
SC issues notices in land allotment case.
Nov. 26:
SC Quetta bench holds CJ's appointment in abeyance.
* PM sends to president the name of the new Chief Justice for approval.
Nov. 27:
Five-member SC bench annuls Quetta bench's verdict over CJ's suspension.
* SC Peshawar bench endorses Quetta bench's order.
* Rowdy scenes in SC obstruct hearing in the 13th Amendment case.
Nov. 28:
Demonstrators demanding CJ's resignation storm SC building.
* CJ asks president to arrange army protection for judges.
* Justice Saiduzzaman assumes administrative control of SC and constitutes full court for hearing cases
against CJ.
Nov. 29:
President blames PML for SC siege; PM rejects president's request to deploy army for judges'
protection.
* CJ writes to army chief over judges' security.
* SC issues two cause lists.
Nov. 30:
PM accuses President of causing political crisis.
* CJ cancels full court orders. Ten judges ask government to ignore cancellation order.
Dec. 1:
Supreme Court Bar Association tries in vain to prevent two separate SC sittings.
Dec. 2:
Three-man bench headed by CJ suspends 13th Amendment; the other bench suspends CJ's order.
* President Leghari steps down; Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad takes over as acting president.
* 10-member SC bench asks Justice Ajmal Mian to take over administrative control.
Dec. 3:
Justice Ajmal Mian sworn in as acting chief justice.
* SC bench issues notice to Justice Sajjad in petitions challenging his appointment.
Dec 23:
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SC bench declares illegal the appointment of Sajjad Ali Shah as chief justice: Justice Ajmal Mian takes
oath as CJ
Chronology For 1998 Onwards...

Islamic Pakistan
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapter 3 Ahmad, Khurshid, Studies in the Family Law of Islam, Chiragh-e-Rah Publications, Karachi, 1961.
Ahmed, Akbar S., Pakistan Society, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1988
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, The Concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan, Vanguard, Lahore, 1991
Ahmed, Manzooruddin, Contemporary Pakistan, Royal Book Compay, Karachi, 1982.
Ali, Chaudhry Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, Research Society of Pakistan, University of
the Punjab, Lahore, 1983
Ali, Dr. Mubarak, Historian's dispute, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1992
Ali, Raza, Pakistani Atom Bomb & Regional Background (Urdu - Pakistani Atom Bomb aur Ilaqai
Pasmanzar), Progressive Publishers, 1993
Al Mujahid, Sharif, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Studies in Interpretation, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi,

1981
Arif, General Khalid Mahmud, Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, Oxford University Press,
Karachi, 1995
Asghar Khan, Mohammad, Retired Air Marshal, Generals in Politics, Vikas Publishing House Ltd.,
New Delhi, India. 1983
Awan, Abdul Ghafoor, Dismissal of the Elected Prime Minister (Urdu - Teen Wuzra-e-Azam Ki
Bartarfi), Unique Publishing Company, Lahore. 1991
Ayesh Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1995
Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Friends not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, New Delhi, India, 1993
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, My Pakistan, Biswin Sadi Publications Ltd., New Delhi, India, 1979
Binder, Leonard, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1961
Chishti, Faiz Ali, Lt. General (retired), Bhutto, Zia and Me (Urdu - Bhutto Zia aud Mein) Jung
Publishers, Lahore. 1991 __ Betrayals of Another Kind, Tri-color Books, New Delhi, 1989
Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan debates 1949-56, Government Printing Press, Karachi.
http://www.ghazali.net/book1/bibliography.htm (1 of 3) [10/14/2004 3:38:43 AM]

Islamic Pakistan
Consitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD Publishers, Lahore.
Faruqi, Zia-ul-Hasan, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Progressive Books, Lahore,
1980
Fazal-ur-Rehman, Dr., Islam, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London 1966
Gauhar, Altaf, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military ruler, Sang-e-Meel Publishers, Lahore, 1993
Ghoudhury, Golam W., Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, Scorpion Publishing Ltd.,
Essex, England, 1988
Hakim, Dr. Khalifa Abdul, Islamic Ideology, The Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1980
Iqbal, Allama Mohammad, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sheikh Mohammad
Ashraf, Lahore, 1988
Lamb, Christina, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy, Viking, New Delhi, India. 1991
Iqbal, Dr. Afzal, Islamisation of Pakistan, Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1986
Iqbal, Javid, Ideology of Pakistan, Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, 1971
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1973 __ Some recent speeches and
Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1947
Kadri, Syed Shameem Hussain, Justice, Creation of Pakistan, Army Book Club, Rawalpindi, 1983
Mahmood, Sohail, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran, Vanguard Books Ltd,
Lahore, 1995
Maluka, Zulfikar Khalid, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, Oxford University Press,
Karachi, 1995
Maududi, Abul Aala, The Islamic Law and Constitution, Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore, 1980
Munir, Muhammad, (Retired Chief Justice of Pakistan), From Jinnah to Zia, Vanguard Books Ltd.,
Lahore, 1980
Munir report, Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted to enquire into the anti-Qadiai riots of 1953,
Government Printing Press, Lahore, 1954.
Mehdi, Rubya, The islamization of the Law in Pakistan,Curzon Press Ltd., Surrey, England. 1994
Niazi, Maulana Kausar, And the Line was Disconnected (Urdu -Aur Line Cut Gai), Jung Publishers,
Lahore. 1990
Patel, Rashida, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan, Faiza Publishers, Karachi, 1986
Qureshi, Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain, Ulemas in Politic, Ma'aref Ltd., Karachi, 1972 __ The Sgtruggle for
Pakistan, University of Karachi, 1982
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, 1987
Islamic Pakistan
Saleem, Ahmad, Hamoudur Rehman Commission Report (in Urdu), Frontier Post Publishers, Lahore.
1993
Sayeed, Khalid B., Politics in Pakistan, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1980 __ Western Dominance and
Political Islam, Oxford Press, Karachi, 1995
Sayeed, Pro. S.M.A., Islamic Modernism, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1990
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, Modern Islam in India, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1963 __ Islam in
Modern History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1957
Suhail, Azhar, The Government of Agencies ( Urdu - Agenciyon ki hokumat), Vanguard Books Ltd.,
Lahore, 1993
Weiss, Anita M.,Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan, Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1987
Yousaf, Mohammad & Adkin, Mark The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's untold story, Jung Publishers,
Lahore, 1992
Ziring, Lawrence, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, Dawson Westview, Kent, England,
1980

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Chronology of Pakistan
1998
Jan. 1:
Mohammad Rafiq Tarar is sworn in as President.
Jan 9:
The New York Times reports that the Bhutto family and their associates generated more than $ 1.5
billion "in illicit profits through kickbacks in virtually every sphere of government activity" -- from
rice deals to sell of government land, airplanes deals with Dassault Aviation, even rake offs from
government welfare schemes.
* The Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP), in a statement before the Public Accounts Committee of the
National Assembly, calls for a review of the "one line budget system in vogue for defense services
grant."
Jan. 12:
A five-member bench headed Chief Justice Ajmal Mian asks the government to ensure that no
provision of the Contempt of Court Bill was violative of the independence of the judiciary. The bench
observed: "It will be desirous that the concerned functionaries should examine the contents of the Bill
in order to see whether the proposed Act contains any provision which may be violative of any
provision of the Constitution or which may tend to interfere with the independence of judiciary."
Jan. 13:
Government rejects Awami National Party's demand for renaming NWFP as Pakhtoonkhwa.
Jan 17:
A statutory audit of the accounts of 627 units and formations of defense services finds irregularities to
the tune of Rs 2.15 billion in the fiscal year 1993-94, according to a report of the Public Accounts
Committee of the National Assembly.
Jan 22:
The Sargodha police took a special court judge, Javed Iqbal, hostage in the district jail after he
convicted three police officials and magistrate of "faulty investigations" in the murder case of a former
commissioner, Tajammul Abbas. When the judge asked the jail administration to handcuff the four,
police personnel present in and outside the jail warned him that they would not let the judge leave the
premises if anybody tried to arrest the officials. They snatched keys from the driver of the judge's car
and parked official vehicles on the main gate. The siege was lifted after the four officials safely left the
jail. On Jan. 28, the Lahore Court suspended the judgment of the Sargoha Special judge and released
on bail the police officials and magistrate concerned.
Jan 27:
National Assembly Parliamentary Secretary for Law and Parliamentary Affairs Syed Zafar Ali Shah
supports the idea that the defense expenditure should be debated in parliament so that the nation could
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know how the defense budget was spent.
Other major events of January:

* Khan of Qallat dies of heart attack.
* Baluchistan rejects NFC award.
* Arrest warrants against the MQM leader Altaf Hussain withdrawn.
* Jumat-ul Wida (the last Friday of Ramadan) declared an official public holiday.
Feb 4:
The federal government amends the Ehtesab Act, replacing the name, "Ehtesab Cell", with "Ehtesab
Bureau", and provided powers of an SHO to the chief of Ehtesab Bureau or any other official
designated by him for the purpose of investigation. The amended law provides indemnity to officials of
the Ehtesab Bureau on acts deemed to have been done on "good faith". The amendments were
introduced into the Ehtesab Act through a presidential ordinance, the first by President Rafiq Tarar,
under clause 1 of Article 87 of the constitution.
Feb 6:
A division bench of the Sindh High Court acquitted Muttahida Qaumi Movement chief Altaf Hussain
and 18 other top leaders in the Major Kaleem kidnapping case and overturned Altaf Hussain's 27-year
jail sentence ordered by a special Suppression of Terrorist Activities (STA) court. The Major Kalim
kidnapping case took a new turn, on Feb. 4, when a prosecution witness confessed that the name of
MQM chief Altaf Hussain had been belatedly inserted in the FIR. The officer who had conducted the
initial investigation into the case, told the court that Mr Hussain's name was included in the challan
against him after the start of the army operation against the MQM.
Feb 7:
President Rafiq Tarar signs the Contempt of Court (Amendment) bill. The Bill was pending for assent
since Nov 20, 1997, when a three-member bench headed by the then chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah had
directed the president not to assent it. The contempt law provides right of appeal to a person convicted
under the contempt law under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and mere filing of an appeal
against the conviction will mean automatic stay. The law was passed by parliament when the Supreme
Court headed by Justice Sajjad Ali Shah had initiated contempt of court proceedings against Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, and seven other legislators.
Feb 9:
The Lahore High Court accepts the constitutional petition filed by Rafiq Tarar against his
disqualification by the (former) Acting CEC and declared him qualified to contest for and hold the
office of President. The acting CEC, Justice Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo of the Supreme Court, had found
Mr. Tarar, a former Supreme Court Judge, guilty of propagating views prejudicial to the integrity and
independence of the judiciary at the time of his nomination as a presidential candidate under Article
63(G) of the Constitution and debarred him from the December, 1997 contest.
Feb 25:
* ANP quits government as talks fail.
* Squardan Leader Farooq Ahmed Khan of the PAF, who was arrested last year in a sting operation
selling drugs to FBI agents, is sentenced by a Manhattan Federal Court in New York for one year and
one day. Sqr.Ldr Farooq was arrested in Manhattan on April 9, 1997 after he brought two kilograms of
heroin from Pakistan on a PAF cargo plane which came to pick up the arms released by the US under
the Brown Amendment.

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Other major events of February:

* Lahore-Islamabad motorway leased out to a UK firm for 25 years.
* Bill banning student involvement in politics passed.
March 2:
Census begins after 17 years under army supervision.
* Lahore High Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a direction against the government for settling
along the motorway the Pakistanis residing in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Justice Khalilur
Rehman Ramaday also prescribed a cost of Rs. 5,000 to petitioner Advocate M.D. Tahir for indulging
in frivolous litigation. The court said what was the guarantee that agents of the Indian intelligence
agency RAW had not entered the ranks of these people. It also said that it required a lot of money for
settling these people in Pakistan when there was already a lot of poverty here.
March 18:
Two civil judges were manhandled by the Vehari (Punjab) police when they visited the police station to
check irregularities and misuse of powers. There had been reports of the illegal detention of some
people at the police station and the judges asked for the reasons for their detention and wanted to
examine the daily register. The SHO responded by resorting to violence.
March 19:
The Supreme Court dismissed as "frivolous" a constitutional petition challenging the 13th Amendment
and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 10,000 as court expenses. The 13th Amendment had stripped the
president of the power to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss a government.
April 6:
Pakistan pardons a local employee of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, Ayaz Baloch, who had been
sentenced to 10 years' hard labor for persuading Sq. Ldr. Farood to carry drugs to the United States.
April 12:
About 1.5 million people are addicted to heroin in Pakistan and most of them belong to middle class
society, according to a report of the UN Drug Control Program. These addicts are between 20 and 30
years of age and their number is constantly rising in the country.
April 30:
Jaranwala Police registers a case under Hudood Ordinance against an eight year old child who was sent
to Faisalabad District jail.
Other major events for April:

* Ghauri missile tested: US condemns the test.
* LHC rules that Ehtesab Commissioner has unlimited powers.
* Sindh Chief Minister Liaqat Jatoi says all cases against the MQM legislators withdrawn.
May 6:
The bishop of Faisalabad, Dr. John Joseph, commits suicide in protest for awarding death sentence to a
Christian under the Blasphemy Law.
May 15:
The Supreme Court declares 12 provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) as invalid, and brought

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special courts on par with ordinary courts working within the existing judicial system. The court ruled
that the power to law enforcement agencies to open fire on suspicion of terrorism and accepting a
confession before a DSP as valid piece of evidence, were untenable and needed to be suitable amended.
May 18:
The Supreme Court, in a majority (6-1)decision, upheld the 14th Constitutional Amendment that bars
members of parliament to vote against their party's line or abstained from voting. The court held that
Article 63(a) would bring stability in the polity of the country as it would be instrumental in eradicating
floor crossing. However, the court ruled that an elected member should not be disqualified if he
opposed the party's policies in public. In his dissident judgment, Justice Abdul Mamoon Kazi held that
Article 63(a) was violative of fundamental rights and thus was not enforceable.
May 28:
Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests at Chagai, Balochistan in response to Indian nuclear tests.
* President promulgates emergency under Article 232.
* Freeze imposed on withdrawal of foreign currency accounts (FCAs).
May 30:
Pakistan tests sixth nuclear device.
Other major events of May:

* US blacklists Qadeer Khan's Kahuta laboratories.
* Japan imposes economic sanctions on Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests.
* PIA Fokker hijacked near Gwadar.
June 10:
A resolution ratifying the president's proclamation of emergency was passed by the joint sitting of
parliament with 166 votes in favor and 50 against it.
June 24:
A Swiss investigating judge rejects an appeal seeking review of the June 2 indictment orders passed
against three Swiss nationals involved in money laundering allegedly on behalf of Ms Benazir Bhutto
and her husband Asif Ali Zardari. Admitting that Pakistan was a "damaged party", Judge Danial
Devaud ruled that the offences these people were charged with could have inherently caused
considerable financial loss to the state of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan had made a request to
the Swiss government that Ms Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari had received huge
amounts in kickbacks and commissions in several cases including ARY Gold, submarines deals,
Cotecna, SGS, Awami Tractor scheme, rice exports and textile quota management.
Other major events of June:

* Nawaz Sharif announces a "national agenda" for construction of Kalabagh Dam.
* PM defers Kalabagh Dam construction after opposition from three provinces.
* Islamabad declares moratorium on nuclear tests and asks New Delhi to sign accord for outlawing
such tests.
* US announces sanctions against Pakistan and India.
July 8:
Government announces the census results. According to the census figures, Pakistan's population rose
to 130.5 million from 64.2 million, as recorded in 1981.

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July 9:
Sindh nationalist groups reject the census results.
July 28:
A seven-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously upholds the imposition of emergency on
May 28. However, it set aside the fundamental rights' suspension order of the same date.
Other major events for July:

* Two Ehtesab references against PM dropped.
* Alam Channa dies in New York.
Aug. 4:
Education budget slashed in austerity measures.
Aug. 14:
The MQM quits the federal government in protest against the on-going killings in Karachi.
* Ex-President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari launches Millat Party.
Aug. 20:
Pakistan receives the news of US attack on Afghanistan with shock as the US missiles fly over the
Pakistani territory.
Aug 28:
The 15th Amendment Bill proposed. The amendment is passed by the NA body concerned.
Other major events for August:

* Six bodies of Pakistanis dead in US strikes on Afghanistan arrive in Miran Shah.
* Pakistan complains to the UN against US violation of its air space.
Sept. 6:
Borrowers of 19 financial institutions were given the benefit of loans write off amounting to Rs. 4.64
billion from Jan. to Sept. 1997, according a State Bank report.
Sept 15:
The National Assembly rejects by voice vote a resolution moved by ANP's Wali Mohammad Khan,
urging the government to take steps to check adulteration and fraudulent measurement of patrol at
filling stations. During the debate, the parliamentary secretary for petroleum opposed the resolution.
Sept. 24:
The National assembly passed Foreign Exchange Temporary Restriction Bill 1998 to provide legal
cover to the freezing of the foreign currency accounts following nuclear detonation. The Senate was by-
passed as the bill was treated as a money bill. The bill was passed in the absence of the PPP members
who walked out in protest.
Sept. 27:
The British newspaper, Observer, says PM Nawaz Sharif has siphoned off millions.
Sept. 28:
Government denies the Observer report and lodges complaint with Britain's Press watchdog over the

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report.
Sept. 27:
Police registers a murder case against the officers of rangers in connection with the killing of two Shiite
activists in Karachi. Two minority Shiite youths were killed when paramilitary rangers opened fire
during the funeral of a slain local Shiite leader and his son when an unruly mob attacked the law
enforcement personnel.
Other major events for September:

* Nawaz Sharif seeks help to counter opposition to CA-15 bill.
* Opposition parties boycott CTBT debate in parliament.
Oct. 2:
Nationalists from Sindh, the NWFP, Balochistan and the Seraiki belt of Punjab, formed an alliance,
named Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM) to wage a struggle to attain provincial
autonomy. The movement issued an eight-point agenda, known as Islamabad declaration, calling for re-
naming the country as Multinational Federal Republic of Pakistan. It also asks for carving out a fifth
province of "Saraikistan", declaring all provincial languages as national languages.
Oct. 5:
In a speech at the Navy War College in Lahore, the Army Chief of Staff, General Jahangir Karamat,
said that Pakistan could not afford political unrest or "the destabilizing effect of polarization, vendettas
and insecurity-driven expedient policies. He said that the political mandate needed to be translated into
institutional strength or else "we would have a permanent election campaign environment in the
country" He proposed setting up of a National Security Council to act as an empire over and supreme
arbiter of the nation's affairs.
Oct. 6:
General Karamat's proposal about formation of National security Council to institutionalize decision
making evokes mixed reactions from political leaders. Some politicians have termed it a supra-
constitutional measure which will mar the democratic process while others termed it a positive
development to overcome the situation created due to the failure of political leadership, leading the
country economically and politically isolated.
Oct. 7:
General Karamat was summoned by Nawaz Sharif to account for his public and scathing attack on the
government. After the meeting, General Jehangir Karamat resigns. Lt. Gen. Pervez Musharraf is
appointed the new chief of army staff. General Musharraf superceding two Lt. Generals, Ali Quli
Khan, the Chief of General Staff and Khalid Nawaz Quarter Master General of the army. Lt. Gen.
Nawaz resigned immediately after Gen. Musharraf was appointed the new army chief.
Oct. 9:
The National Assembly passes CA-15 bill.
Oct. 10:
Pakistan ranked fifth in the list of countries notorious for kidnappings for ransom, according to the
London newspaper, The Independent. The report said that the annual pay-outs on this count amounts
to more than $10 million in direct contravention of government's policy which is against paying any
ransom to the kidnappers. The average ransom paid in Pakistan is around $50,000 (Rs. 3 million).

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Oct. 12:
The Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan submitted his resignation after having been
superseded by Lt. Gen. Pervez Musharraf who was appointed new Chief of Army Staff.
Oct. 17:
Hakim Saeed, his associate shot dead in Karachi.
Oct. 27:
The government repealed the Contempt of Court Act 1976 and promulgated an ordinance, widening
the scope of fair comment on the judgements of court. The new law has empowered the courts to
prohibit the publication of any proceedings through a written order. It has also allowed the publication
of substantially accurate account of what has transpired in a court. Personalized criticism of judge or
judges will constitute judicial contempt.
Oct. 28:
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accused an MPA and seven other activists of his coalition partners,
MQM, of being involved in the murder of Hakeem Saeed, and gave them three days to hand over the
accused, failing which there would be a parting of ways. He told a news conference in Karachi, that he
had "credible and incontrovertible evidence based on the statements of Aamirullah and others.
Oct. 29:
The MQM, alleging that prime minister was a central character in the conspiracy to kill Hakeem
Mohammad Saeed, announced that they had decided to scrap their alliance with the PML and quit the
government. MQM Chief Altaf Hussain asks his workers to immediately go into hiding to save their
lives as the government had launched another clean-up operation against his party.
Oct. 30:
The federal government imposes governor's rule in Sindh under emergency provisions of article 232 ( c
) of clause (2) of the constitution. Provincial cabinet was also disbanded but the Sindh Assembly was not
dissolved.
Other major event for October:

* An NWFP minister disqualified for floor crossing.
Nov. 4:
The Advocate General, M. Iqbal Raad, told the Sindh High Court that Sheikh Mohammad Aamirullah,
accused in the murder of Hakeem Mohammad Saeed, has snot so far given his confessional statement
which is required to be given before a magistrate under Section 164 CrPC. He added that the accused
has only confessed to having had a part in the murder before the police and notables. Qazi Khalid, a
former minister, submitted that there were contradictory versions of Aamirullah's "confessional
statement" given by the prime minister and the advocate general. He said the prime minister had been
on record as having told a countrywide audience that Aamirullah had confessed to murdering Hakeem
Saeed. He then observed that the prime minister has misled the nation on the television network by
claiming that Aamirullah had confessed to the whole thing, thus maligning the MQM in the eyes of the
public throughout the country through print and electronic media.
* Britain rejected a request from Pakistan government for the arrest and extradition of former
additional director general of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Rehman Malik, who was living in
self-imposed exile in London. Malik had upset Pakistan government when he released "documentary

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evidence" of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family's corruption in banking frauds to a British
newspaper as well as disclosed the details about Nawaz Sharif's properties in London.
Nov. 5:
Karachi police detains two teenaged boys for being in possession of a toy pistol. The release of these two
teenagers came only after the area Sub Divisional Magistrate threatened to raid the police station to
find out for himself how much lethal was the "weapon" seized from the boys.
Nov. 10:
Jamhoori Watan Party Senator M. Zafar introduces in the Senate the 16th Constitutional Amendment
Bill envisaging maximum provincial autonomy as provided in the 1973 constitution. It seeks
amendment in at least 45 articles of the constitution.
Nov. 16:
A session of the Sindh Assembly, summoned by MPAs belonging to the Pakistan's People Party and the
MQM could not take place as the local administration had taken the unprecedented measure of sealing
off the assembly premises and blocking all approaches with water tankers, armored personnel carriers
and barbed wires.
Nov. 20:
The government gives sweeping powers to the armed forces to arrest, interrogate and summarily try
terrorists in Sindh, by invoking Article 245 of the constitution.
Nov. 20:
Muttahida Qaumi Movement MPAs Shoaib Bokhar and Wakil Jamali arrested with three party
activists in a raid on the MPA's Hostel in Azizabad.
Nov. 23:
The Supreme Court declines to take notice of the imposition of governor's rule on Sindh and observed
that the federal government had the powers to impose governor's rule under Article 232 of the
Constitution. "Restoration of peace in Karachi is of paramount importance and court cannot declare it
(governor's rule) illegal as some individual or a party wants to do so," observed Chief Justice Ajmal
Mian.
Nov. 26:
The federal government notifies that armed forces will have the power to conduct investigation of
"appropriate cases" of terrorism. By virtue of the amendment to the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in
Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance, the armed forces have now been empowered to investigate and collect
evidence through their own intelligence agencies as per the Army Act.
* Pakistan climbs to the 14 th position from the bottom on the list of world's most corrupt nations for
1998, released by Transparency International. After attaining the 2nd spot during Benazir Bhutto's
government, Pakistan was overtaken in the last years by 12 countries including, Cameroon, Paraguary,
Honduras, Tanzania, Indonesia, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Russia, Vietnam, Kenya, Uganda and
Nigeria.
Nov. 26:
The residence of Idrees Bakhtiar, a senior staff reporter of Herald monthly and BBC correspondent
was raided by CIA police. The police harassed the family and also arrested his 28-year old son, Moonis,
who was later released.

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Nov. 27:
The Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court, Justice Amir-ul Mulk Mengal, was stopped at the
Frontier Corps check-post at Bushki. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered transfer of the FC check-
post in-charge, Captain Butt.
Nov. 28:
Mubashir Ali, who was suspected by police for arranging the travel abroad of two of the suspects in
Hakeem Saeed case, died in police custody.
Other major events for November:

* List of 580 MQM men given to police.
* Two MQM MPAs held.
Dec. 13:
A man condemned to death for murder by an 'Islamic Court' in Orakzai Agency was publicly executed
by his brother and uncle.
Dec. 22:
The extra-judicial killing of alleged outlaws in Punjab continued throughout 1998 -- on average, one
person being killed every fourth day. A total of 88 people died in 55 'encounters,' according to press
reports.
Dec. 25:
Some 78 people were killed and over 80 injured in 36 incidents of sectarian violence in the Punjab in
1998.
Dec. 31:
Over 650 people were killed in political and sectarian violence during 1998 in Sindh (mainly in Karachi)
, according to press reports.
* The national assembly is informed that the nationalized banks have recovered a little over Rs. 17
billion from their debtors during 1998, whereas Rs. 91 billion is still outstanding against the defaulters.
* A military court convict, Ashraf Chakar Irani was executed in Karachi Central Prison after
amendments were made by the governor of Sindh in the Pakistan Prisons Rules, allowing the prison
authorities to carry out an execution during Ramadan. Ashraf Chakar was convicted and sentenced to
death by a military court in Karachi on Dec. 17.
Other major events for December:

* Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and US President Bill Clinton hold summit in Washington.
* US tells Pakistan to take concrete steps on CTBT, FMCT and Osama bin Laden for removal of
sanctions.
* Three summary military courts start functioning in Karachi.
* Law enforcement agencies carry out operation in Liaquatabad and Gharibabad: six cops, a ranger
sustain injuries in exchange of fire with unidentified gunmen.
* FIA raids Rawalpindi offices of dailies Jung and The News.
* Military Court in Karachi sentences two youths to death in separate cases of gang-rape and killing of
a policemen.
* Three armed forces men found dead in a car in Karachi.

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1999
Jan. 3:
Three people were killed and two policemen injured when a powerful bomb planted underneath a
bridge on Raiwind Road exploded.
Jan 16:
The NWFP government promulgated Islamic laws in the Malakand Division and Kohistan districts of
Hazara Division.
Jan 13:
The National Assembly amid protests and walkout by the combined opposition and independent
members adopts a motion for convening a joint sitting of parliament to pass eight outstanding bills.
These bills had been passed by the National Assembly but not yet by the Senate.
Jan. 27:
Lahore High Court declares void Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restriction) Act, 1998,
freezing foreign currency accounts and ordered their immediate restoration.
Jan. 28:
The Additional District and Sessions Judge Hyderabad acquitted six persons in a case of keeping 349
peasants in illegal confinement. The peasants, including women and children, had been freed in a raid
on, what had been described as a 'private jail' of Raees Ghulam Hussain Khokhar (a feudal lord) in
November 1992. The raid was conducted jointly by police and army in a locality of Chambar town. The
peasants had claimed that some of the female victims were subjected to gang rape by certain henchmen
of the feudal lord during the captivity. The judge observed that the peasants lacked sufficient evidences
to prove the allegations leveled against the accused.
Jan 25:
The Federal Shariat Court questions the validity of several provisions of the Muslim Family Laws
Ordinance, 1961, relating to inheritance by orphaned grandsons, registration of marriage, divorce
notice, effectiveness of divorce after 90 days and procedural curbs on bigamy and polygamy.
Jan 28:
Sedition cases are registered against three Urdu dailies of Karachi, Jang, Aman and Parcham, for
publishing an advertisement of Muttahida's Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation on January 1, which
according to the police, was aimed at inciting people against the state.
Jan. 30:
The federal government amended the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Power)
Ordinance, 1998, providing that military courts can be established in the whole of Pakistan.
* Three activists of the Lashkar-I-Jhangvi allegedly involved in the Raiwind bomb blast were shot dead
in police custody.
Feb 7:
The federal government suspends work on issuing an ordinance to amend the present procedure of
treating the government officials nominated for involvement in corrupt practices, and for their speedy
trial resulting in the confiscation of the unlawfully acquired property and arrest/sentence of those found
guilty.

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Feb. 9:
Former Punjab Chief Minister Manzoor Ahmed Watto was arrested by the anti-corruption
establishment from the Lahore High Court premises on a charge of misappropriation of Baitul Maal
funds shortly after he was allowed bail by the court in another case.
Feb. 11:
Six military courts were set up in Lahore division to try cases of power thefts.
Feb. 13:
Three persons, including Senator Abul Hayee Baloch and a lady worker from Lahore, were injured
when the police baton-charged, used water cannons and threw bricks on a peaceful procession of the
Pakistan Awami Ittehad in front of the parliament house. The marched, organized by the PAI for the
freedom of the press, was led by PAI president Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, opposition leader Benazir
Bhutto and secretary general of the alliance Hamid Nasir Chatta, besides a number of sitting and
former PPP MNAs and senators.
Feb. 17:
A nine-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared the setting up of military courts for
trial of civilians in Karachi as unconstitutional. However, the court clarified that its decision would not
affect the sentences and punishment awarded and executed by the military courts as the cases would be
treated as past and closed transactions. Two people convicted by the Military Courts were executed.
Feb. 19:
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised speech, said the government would respect the Supreme
Court decision of setting aside the military courts as it was binding on him under constitution.
However, he indirectly accused the judiciary for delay in the dispensation of justice to the common
man. "Delay in justice had emboldened the terrorists to the extent that they had killed a personality like
Hakeem Saeed," he pointed out.
Feb 26:
The annual state Department Human Rights report for 1998 criticizes the government in Pakistan for
its human rights record, specifically its moves to restrict the freedom of the press, using accountability
for political purposes and condoning police brutalities.
March 1:
The Supreme Court indicts seven persons including six ruling party legislators on the charges of
contempt of court for storming the court building on November 28, 1997. The court however, withdrew
show cause notices issued to the executive and police officers of Islamabad.
March 8:
Two handcuffed MQM activists were shot dead in an alleged police-terrorists encounter in
Liaquatabad, Karachi.
March 9:
19 years after the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promulgated by General Ziaul Haq and nine years
after the Sindh High Court had struck down its Zakat provisions as manifestly discriminatory, the
Supreme Court upheld that landmark judgement and rejected the appeal of the federal government.
The Supreme Court ruled that members of all "Fiqahs" were entitled to exemption from Zakat

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deduction from their holdings, and the government had no power to reject the declaration on the
ground that he/she did not belong to Fiqah-I-Jafria.
* The Sindh government concedes that at least two incidents of extra-judicial killings had taken place in
Karachi since the imposition of governor's rule.
March 15:
The National Assembly is told that different federal and provincial government departments owe
almost Rs. 29 billion to Wapda, with army topping the list of defaulters with Rs. 3.4 billion.
* Pakistan owed a total of $26.9 billion as of December 1998 in external debts, according to a joint
report of the IMF, the World Bank, OECD and Bank for International Settlements.
March 18:
The federal government tells the National Assembly that the MQM had been patronizing terrorism in
Karachi during its 20 months ruling alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League.
March 19:
The London High Court orders Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, his brother Abbas Sharif and
father Mian Mohammad Sharif to jointly pay a sum of $32.5 million to Al Towfeek Company for Funds
Ltd., the investment Company from which they had taken a loan for Hudabiya Paper Mills Ltd. The
Queen's Division Bench of the London High Court passed the ex-parte order , as the defendants had not
defended themselves in the court.
April 2:
The owner of the Frontier Post, Rehmat Shah, was arrested in Lahore by the army-run Anti-narcotics
Force on charge of possessing 20 Kgs of charas and three guns.
April 10:
Syeda Abida Hussain, Minister for Population Welfare and Science and Technology, resigns, while
Sikandar Hayat, a retired major general and chairman of the PM's monitoring and implementation
cell, was sacked for alleged involvement of corruption practices. General Hayat was the architect of the
Khidmat Committees.
April 13: Tanzeem-I-Islam chief Dr. Israr Ahmad resigns from the chairmanship of the Ulema
Committee set up by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to restore sectarian peace to the country. His
resignation came in the wake of a rift in the committee after its meetings on April 7 and 8. The 10-
member committee suggested two bills to combat sectarian violence. On of the proposed laws envisaged
severe punishment to any person or sect which publishes or propagates anything against the Khulfai
Rshideen and Ahle Bait.
April 14: Pakistan successfully test-fired a 2,000 km range ballistic missile, Gauri-II to match India's
testing of Agni-II.
April 15: An Ehtesab Bench of Lahore High Court convicts Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari on
corruption charges and sentences them to undergo five years' imprisonment each, and to pay a fine of
$8.6 million. The court also ordered their disqualification as members of parliament, as well as
confiscation of their property.
* Pakistan successfully conducts a flight test of its Hatef-IV (Shaheen) ballistic missile, employing a
solid fuel motor, with a range of 600 kms. The missile was fired from Sonmiani base near Karachi and
covered a distance of 750 kms before striking its target in Baluchistan.

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April 19:
The outgoing chief Justice of the High Court of Sindh and judge-designate of the Supreme Court told a
full court reference held in his honor, that confidence of the people in the judiciary had been shaken. He
said it was a matter of concern that with the continuing degeneration of the moral fabric of society, the
malady of corruption had afflicted the power judiciary too, which had been made the task of
dispensation of justice all the more difficult and "has shake the confidence of the people in the courts."
April 23:
The government places before the Senate names of 49 parliamentarians, majority of them belonging to
the ruling PML, against whom Wapda had lodged cases of electricity pilferage and defaults. The list of
MNAs and Senators and MPAs included the names of Interior Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain,
Deputy Speaker National Assembly Chaudhry Jaffar Iqbal and Syeda Abida Hussain.
April 25:
Chief Ehtesabe Commissioner Justice Ghulam Mujaddi Mirza dropped three references against Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif as they have either no substance and merit or they don't pertain to the period
with which the Ehtesab Act deals. In a fourth reference the CEC excluded the prime minister as
respondent but referred the matter for inquiry and investigation to the Ehtesab Bureau. The other
respondent in the case was NWFP Chief Minister Mehtab Ahmed Khan Abbasi.
April 28:
The President promulgates an ordinance on making it possible for the Anti-Terrorist courts to function
in the light of the Supreme Court decision on military courts. The ordinance called as (Anti-Terrorism
(Amendment) Ordinance 1999, was promulgated on the official holiday of Ashura (10th of Moharram).
April 30:
Karachi is treated separately from the rest of the province in matters of jurisdiction for hearing civil
suits. In Karachi, senior civil judges are barred from hearing suits valuing more than Rs. 500,000. Civil
suits valuing more than half a million rupees can only be filed in the High Court and not before the
senior civil judges.
* The ANP rejects government move that the NWFP should be renamed Afghania. ANP Provincial
Chief, Nasim Wali Khan warned that if NWFP was named Afghania, it would provide a better chance
for Afghan displaced persons to declare it as their territory as the province situated right on the Afghan
border and 1.6 million Afghan refugees were already living here.
May 1:
The government amends the schedule of the Anti Terrorism Act, expanding its application to the
'unnatural' offences committed with a child under the age of 12 years.
May 2:
The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry reveals that only 17 influential
families/groups account for 40 per cent of the defaulted loans.
May 4:
Hussain Haqqani, Chairman of Urban democratic Front, is arrested. He is later handed over to the
Federal Investigating Agency. A hasty decision by the Ehtesab Bureau in the detention of Hussain
Haqqani, had caused some serious concern among the FIA circles to justify his arrest. All was done in
such a hurry that even the complaints against Haqqani from the relevant government agencies were

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sought after his arrest. He was produced before a court for remand in a year old case in which his name
was never mentioned before.
May 6:
The government move to let the ordinance on punishment for electricity theft lapse evokes widespread
condemnation by political parties. Some political leaders said the government's decision clearly shows
that it wants to protect the big thieves of electricity who belong to the Muslim League. At least 49 PML
legislators were reportedly among the major defaulters.
* The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) decides to submit a reference to the president to direct the
Supreme Judicial Council for removal of a Sindh High Court judge for passing remarks against a
Quranic law of inheritance. In an inheritance dispute case, Justice Shaiq Usmani remarked that law of
inheritance as pronounced in verses No. 11-14 of Al Nisa was mutable and liable to amendment.
According to the judge, the reason behind the concept of immutability of these laws was only male
chauvinistic attitudes.
May 8:
Several dozen officials of ISI stormed into the house of Najam Sethi, Editor of The Friday Times,
Lahore and dragged him out of his room. Before leaving the house with Mr. Sethi, they tied his wife
Jugnoo's hands with a rope and locked her up in a dressing room. Later the federal government
confirming the arrest said that Mr. Sethi had been taken into custody for interrogation by ISI for his
alleged connection with he Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing).
May 9:
The Punjab government dissolves 1,941 of the total 5,967 non-government organizations (NGOs)
registered with the social welfare department, frozen their bank accounts and seized their assets and
records because of their alleged involvement in corrupt practices and undesirable activities, misuse of
funds, blackmailing and working against their charity.
May 11:
The Council of Islamic Ideology declares lucrative prize schemes launched by major nationalized and
private banks as un-Islamic and said these schemes fell into the category of Riba and gambling. The CII
informed the Ministry of Finance that the Crorepati Scheme of the Habib Bank and the Maala Maal
Price Scheme of the Muslim Commercial Bank were un-Islamic and instigated the people to become
millionaires overnight.
May 14:
The Supreme Court acquitted all ruling party legislators who were indicted on the charges of contempt
of court for attacking the court building when proceedings against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were
underway in 1997. The three-member bench, which decided the case, observed that though flagrant
contempt of court was committed but showed its inability to convict the accused as the people had not
given specific evidence against them.
May 15:
Lahore Bar Council leaders expressed their disappointment at the outcome of the contempt of Court
case against the ruling party legislatures. They said that the contemners have admitted their guilt in
their apologies. A conviction could have been based on their admission and the video film of the
Supreme Court's own cameras. They said the SC verdict sets back the process of restoration of public
confidence in the superior judiciary set in by the apex court judgements on emergency and military
courts.

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* A 14 year boy, Moahmmad Saleem, who was sentenced to death by a military court and later
acquitted by the military appellate court for being minor was re-arrested by police to be tried in the
newly established anti-terrorism court under the same FIR.
May 16:
The Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Justice Ghulam Mujaddad Mirza rejected two identical complaint
made jointly against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Ehtesab Bureau Chairman Senator Saifur
Rehman on charges of causing the exchequer a loss of Rs. 13.697 million by evading duties and taxes in
import of BMW cars. It was alleged that the Estesab Bureau Chairman Senator Seifur Rehman (whose
company, REDCO Pakistan Ltd is the sole agents for BMW cars in Pakistan), in connivance with the-
then prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif had imported 25 BMW cars in September 1992 at a lower
value in a bid to evade customs duty amounting to Rs. 1.369 million.
May 17:
The Social Welfare Department of Sindh cancels the registration of 273 non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) for violating government rules. The Social Welfare Secretary, Abdul Waheed
Pirzada said that the action was initiated against those NGOs which were involved in anti-state
activities and corruption.
May 18:
Senator Asif Zardari suffers serious injuries in CIA custody. Police said that Zardari tried to commit
suicide but Zardari himself said that interrogators had tortured him to extract from him confessional
statements, implicating his wife, Benazir Bhutto in various cases. At the order of the Sindh High Court,
Zardari was shifted to Agha Khan Hospital, next day, with blood oozing from his lacerated tongue.
May 19:
The Supreme Court reserves judgment on the petition of Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan regarding
the distribution of funds by ISI among the political parties in 1990 elections. The case had originated
from the letter of Asghar Khan which he had sent to the then Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah for
appropriate action after reading the statements of General Naseerullah Khan Baber. Gen. Baber had
informed the National Assembly that ISI had collected Rs. 140 million from Habib Bank which were
distributed among different politicians before 1990 elections. Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif is one
of those politicians who received money from ISI in 1990 polls. However, the Supreme Court observed
that it would confine itself to laying guidelines for the operation of the political cell of the ISI within the
legal framework. About the distribution of the funds by the ISI, Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, head of
a three-judge bench, observed that it was "history" and the court was not concerned with it.
May 20:
Cyclone hits southern areas of Pakistan causing heavy casualties and material damage. More than 200
people were dead and hundreds of fishing boats were missing. In Thatta, 300,000 people were affected
whereas in Badin 400,000 were displaced. At least 152,000 acres of farmland was damaged in Keti
Bander and Shah Bandar alone.
May 26:
Indian fighter jets and helicopter gun-ships launch operation against the Mujahideen in Kargil.
Pakistan calls the air strikes a "very very serious" provocation because the armies of both nations
normally limit their hostilities to regular cross-border exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire.
May 27:

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Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter planes as they intruded into the Line of Control in Kashmir. One
of the pilot, Squardon Leader Ajay Ahuja was killed while the other pilot, Flight Lt. K. Nachiketa is
captured alive. The Indian planes were involved in operation against the militants in Kargil area. The
wreckage of Nachiketa's MiG-27 plane was found 12 kms inside Pakistan.
* Army formally takes over management of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and banned trade
union activities in the organization for two years.
May 28:
Pakistan marked the first anniversary of nuclear tests. The government has named May 28 as "Youm-e-
Takbeer." Speaking on this occasion, Nawaz Sharif said Pakistan's nuclear tests gave the nation a new
confidence to counter any enemy attack on equal basis. However, opposition factions of Balochistan
decided to observe this day as a "black day" to highlight plight of the country's least developed
province. Nationalist parties and students organization organized protest rallies. The nationalist leaders
criticized the rulers for conducting the nuclear tests and said a poor country like Pakistan did not
deserve to conduct such blasts. Police in Quetta reported that they had found and defused a bomb near
the residence of Balochistan Governor.
* The Supreme Court directs the Federal government to take administrative and legislative steps for
the enforcement of fundamental rights in the Northern Areas. The Court ruled that the people there
should be allowed to be governed by their elected representatives within a period of six months.
June 1:
The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, a press freedom organization, says that it is
conducting an investigation into a "hit list" prepared by the Pakistan government that contains 35
prominent journalists of Pakistan. According to reports received by the CPJ, the federal government
had decided to establish a special media cell comprising officials from the police, Intelligence Bureau
and the Federal Investigation Agency to punish the journalists who have been writing against the
government. Ehtesab Bureau Chairman, Senator Saifur Rehman Khan would head this cell which
would function simultaneously at Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar with its head office in
Islamabad.
* Anti Terrorism Court in Lahore sentenced to death two activists of Lashkar-e-Jhangwi Sunni group
accused of killing 25 Shiites. Mohammad Aziz Gujjar and Haroon Rashid were found guilty of opening
fire on a Shiite gathering at Mominpura graveyard in Lahore in January 1997. The indiscriminate
firing left 22 people dead on the spot while three others died later in hospital.
June 2:
Editor of Friday Times Najam Sethi is released after three weeks when the government cancelled the
FIR and withdrew charges of treason against him.
June 3:
Senate approves by over two-thirds majority, the Constitution (16th Amendment) bill providing for
quota for all regions and areas for 40 years. The bill was opposed by only one MQM Senator Aftab
Sheikh at all stages of the consideration and passing the bill. Both Senators Aftab Sheikh and
Jamiluddin Aali staged walk out from the House to register their protest on what they called the killing
of principle of merit.
* Pakistan freed the captured Indian fighter pilot, Flight Lt. K. Nachiketa. Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif had ordered his release as a gesture of goodwill to ease border tensions with Indian in the
disputed Kashmir region.

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June 8:
The Lahore High Court released on bail a person accused in a blasphemy case. Sheikh Muhammad
Yousaf Ali was arrested in March 1997 but never produced in any court for trial. It was alleged that the
petitioner claimed himself to be a prophet. However, the petitioner filed an affidavit in the high court
that he believed in the oneness of God and the finality of the prophet-hood of the Holy prophet (PUH).
He also said that any person claiming to be a prophet was an imposter.
June 12:
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz visits New Delhi and holds talks with his Indian counterpart,
Jaswant Singh. The talks ended in a deadlock as India refused to discuss the Kashimir issue and
insisted on withdrawal of what it called Pakistani infiltrators from Kargil.
June 14:
The Supreme Court reopened the rowdy-ism case and issued fresh notices to the Pakistan Muslim
League, Attorney General and seven alleged contemners who were first indicted and later acquitted by
a bench of the apex court. A five-member bench of the Supreme Court, headed by outgoing Chief
Justice, Ajmal Mian, converted a criminal original petition filed by Shahid Orakzai, a journalist, into
an appeal against the decision of the three-member bench of the SC.
June 15:
President Clinton asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw Pakistani troops from the Indian
part of Kashmir, in a telephone conversation between the two leaders. Clinton called the prime
minister as part of his continued efforts to reduce tensions and prevent the situation from escalating
into a full fledged conflict between the two countries. On June 14, Clinton telephoned the Indian Prime
Minister Vajpayee and praised him for the restraint shown by him in the current tense situation.
June 16:
The Stockholm-based International Peace Institute (SIPRI) says: "The risk of nuclear proliferation by
Pakistan and India in Kashmir is increasingly significant. The greatest risk of nuclear war in South
Asia arises from Pakistan's long-standing strategy of using the threat of early first use of nuclear
weapons to deter conventional war."
June 17:
The federal appoints Mamnoon Hussain, President of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is
appointed new Governor of Sindh to replace Lt. General Moinuddin Haider. Education Minister, Syed
Ghous Ali Shah was also appointed adviser to the prime minister on Sindh affairs with powers of the
chief minister. Syed Ghous Ali Shah has been asked to muster support of the disgruntled elements in
the PPP and independent MPAs in the Sindh Assembly in order to setup a Muslim League government
in the Sindh. The PML has only 15 MPAs in the 100-member provincial assembly.
June 18:
The Supreme Court accepted the government's plea that the country is not in a position now to honor
its legal obligation of allowing free operation of FCAs. The Court held that Section 2 of the Foreign
Exchange (Temporary Restriction) Act, 1998 was lawful of the constitution, subject to the declaration
that the same did not confer any power on the federation or the State Bank to compel FCA holders to
convert their foreign exchange holdings into Pakistani rupees at the officially notified rate of exchange,
or to compel the said account holders to liquidate their FCA accounts in Pakistani rupees which foreign
exchange holdings had been accepted by the respective banks as security against any loan or other
facilities extended to them. The court expressed its concern on the improper utilization of foreign

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exchange deposits of the FCA holders by the successive government in breach of the solemn
commitment given by the legislature.
June 20:
Leaders of the Group of Eight industrial nations, in Cologne, Germany, call on Pakistan and India to
end hostilities immediately and resume talks. In a statement, the G8 leaders, including US President Bill
Clinton and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin, voiced "deep concern" over the continuing military
confrontation in Kashmir, repeating their earlier charge that the fighting was the result of "the
infiltration of armed intruders which violated the Line of Control."
June 23:
The federal government suspended five articles ( 120, 122, 123, 124 and 125) of the constitution
pertaining to the presentation of a provincial budget so that the Sindh Province budget could be
announced outside the Sindh Assembly. This brought to 12 the number of articles suspended by the
federation government after the imposition of the governor's rule in Sindh. Earlier the government had
suspended articles 130 and 136 regarding the powers of the speaker. Prime Minister's advisor on Sindh,
Syed Ghous Ali Shah, announced the Sindh budget at a press conference and by passed the Sindh
Assembly.
June 24:
The Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Anthony Zinni, meets the Chief
of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, to defuse the Kargil situation. In Washington, the US
state department cautions that things could "get bad" for Pakistan. "That's for sure," a senior official
said without denying that Gen Anthony Zinni had extended some kind of an implied "warning" to
withdraw from Kargil.
June 25:
The European Union called for the immediate withdrawal of the infiltrators and urged both countries
to work for the immediate cessation of fighting, to fully respect the line of control and to prevent
further cross border infiltration.
June 27:
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sends a special envoy to New Delhi in an apparent effort to ease the
tension in Kashmir. The emissary, former foreign secretary Niaz Naik, met with Indian PM Atal Behari
Vajpayee and his National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra.
Jun 28:
Prime Minister Sharif visits Beijing and hold talks with his Chinese counterpart Zhu Rongji. The
China Daily reporting on the meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Premier Zhu Rongji, said that China
had sincerely hoped that Pakistan and India would alleviate tensions in Kashmir through talks and
return stability to the region soon.
* Pakistan and China signed four agreements following a meeting between the delegations of the two
countries. These agreements were about cooperation in the development of Super-7 aircraft,
cooperation in the cultural sector, cooperation in electronic media and consular cooperation under
which the counselor in Hong Kong would look after Pakistan's interests in Macao when it returns to
China in December.
June 29:
China called upon India and Pakistan to resolve all their disputes through dialogue, a Foreign Office

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spokesman told newsmen after an hour-long meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
Chairman of the Committee of the Chinese People's Congress, Li Peng, in Beijing at the Great Hall.
July 2:
Pakistan suffered a setback in the US Congress when the House Foreign Relations Committee adopted
a resolution calling for suspension of IMF, World Bank and Asian Bank loans to Pakistan until the
Mujahideen occupying Kargil withdraw across the LoC.
July 4:
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reached an agreement under which the
freedom fighters who crossed into certain parts of occupied Kashmir would withdraw. Clinton and
Sharif said in a joint statement after three hours of talks: "It was agreed between the president and the
prime minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control".
July 6:
British Prime Minister Tony Blair terms the joint statement issued after the meeting of Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif and President Bill Clinton as a "real progress" in reducing tension between India and
Pakistan. A British spokesman said at the conclusion of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's 30-minute
meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair that the two were of the opinion that the a quick beginning
should be made in the actions proposed in the joint statement.
July 9:
Political and religious parties rejected the Clinton-Nawaz declaration and the decision to seek a pull-out
of Mujahideen from Kargil as they held rallies in Lahore. The rallies were organized by the Pakistan
Awami Ittehad, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistan Awami Tehrik, the Khaksar Tehrik and the Markazi
Jamaat Ahal-i-Hadith.
July 11:
Pakistan announces the beginning of the "disengagement" of the Mujahideen and their withdrawal
from the heights of Kaksar and Mushkoh in Kargil sector, following an agreement on the modalities of
de-escalation and sector-wise cessation of ground and air operations between Pakistan and Indian
directors-general military operations (DGMOs). The directors-general of military operations of the
two countries had held their first contact on hotline, and then met at Wagah to decide the modalities for
de-escalation.
July 12:
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised address, said that there was an imminent threat of war
with India which was no more a secret and that there were "diplomatic complications" which were
getting extremely difficult to be handled. Giving details of his US visit, he said when the situation was
becoming serious he decided to meet President Clinton.
July 13:
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's televised address to the nation was rejected by the opposition parties as
nothing but acceptance of government's complete failure on the diplomatic front. "The question arises
as to why they had decided to launch the Kargil operation," Deputy Opposition Leader Syed Khurshid
Shah said in his reaction to the prime minister's speech. "If they have to go back to the Lahore process
then who had advised them to go for the Kargil heights, he asked, adding that who was responsible for
heavy loss of lives both to civilians and Pakistan army soldiers and officers at the Line of Control.

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July 16:
The attorney-general of Pakistan, justifying the Washington communiqué, says that Pakistan is
completely isolated and economically could not have sustained a full-fledged war. The country is
already 50 years behind the developed world and would have been thrown another 50 years back had
there been a war.
July 20:
The Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a unanimous resolution condemning the extra-judicial killings
in Karachi and demanded of the provincial government to desist from such inhuman actions.
July 25:
The chairman of Urban Democratic Front (UDF) and media coordinator for the opposition Pakistan
Awami Ittehad (PAI), Hussain Haqqani, is released from captivity. Mr Haqqani was kidnapped on May
4 in Rawalpindi Cantonment while driving with his brother, a serving army officer, and was allegedly
subjected to severe interrogation and torture. He told a press conference in Karachi that he was kicked
and punched by his captors who wanted to know why did he leave Mian Saheb in 1993 in the first
place.
* The 90 per cent out of a total of 32,000 troops of Pakistan Army were called back to barracks after
the completion of the first phase of the task of putting Wapda on right track, besides collecting a record
revenue of Rs 112.74 billions during the last 11 months. The remaining 10 per cent troops were
scheduled to stay for the second phase at 680sub-divisions,146 divisions, 36 circles and 8 chief
executives levels across the country in Wapda.
July 27:
The National Assembly passed the 16th Constitutional Amendment by two-thirds majority, extending
the provincial quota system for another 20 years. One hundred and sixty two members from the
treasury benches combined with those from the opposition and independent benches passed the
amendment in Article 27 of the Constitution. Four MQM members, who were present, opposed the
amendment. The National Assembly had in 1974 passed a bill by amending the Constitution, fixing
quota system for different provinces in the country for a period of 10 years. In 1984, the period was
extended by another 10 years, during the regime of late General Ziaul Haq. It was later felt that since
equal opportunity of education and other facilities are not yet available to all citizens of Pakistan, the
period of twenty years specified in Clause (1) of Article 27 of the Constitution be extended to forty
years. The smaller provinces, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, are in favor of continuation of the quota
system.
July 30:
The Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan observed a country-wide protest against what it called government's
undemocratic and illegal tactics to sabotage its Kargil-Kashmir March. Rallies were staged in all major
cities and towns in which speakers condemned the government for "blocking people" from attending
the march in Lahore a week earlier.
Aug.2:
Rumpus marred Senate proceedings as the house voted to reject the resolution against the murder of
Samia Sarwar and provision of necessary protection to human rights activists Asma Jahangir and
Hina Jilani. The resolution was presented in the house on April 26 with the signatures of 22 members
but most of the signatories withdrew their support while some others chose to stay away from the
house. Only three members of the PPP and an independent member, Jameeluddin Aali, stood at their

chro2
seats when Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad put to vote an impromptu motion of ANP leader Ajmal
Khattak that the house should not take up the resolution. Majority of the members present in the
house, including that of PML, ANP, PKMAP and JWP stood up at their seats in support of Mr
Khattak's motion. In the heat of the moment, the chairman even did not announce the number of
senators who voted for the verbal motion of Mr Khattak.
Aug 4:
Foreign investment in Pakistan dropped by 51 percent during 1998 due to the US-led international
sanctions over its nuclear tests according to official statistics. The flow of foreign investment declined
from 822 million dollars to just 403 million dollars during fiscal 1997-98 which ended June 30. Direct
foreign investment also plunged 37 percent to 376 million dollars while portfolio investment fell 87
percent to 27 million dollars. The leading investors were the United States, Britain and Japan.
* As many as 216 officers and personnel were dismissed from the Sindh police service in the wake of
public complaints of excesses, manhandling, misconduct and corruption while another 1,226 policemen
were given different punishments during the last nine months, according to a police spokesman in
Karachi.
Aug 6:
About 30 human rights and women rights organizations staged a demonstration in front of the
parliament house to protest against the scrapping of a resolution condemning the honour killings of
women in the Senate. The organizations included HRCP, Aurat Foundation, Women Action Forum and
Democratic Women's Association. The demonstrators chanted slogans against the senators who
opposed the resolution criticizing honour killings. They decried the killings of women in the name of
honour and condemned the insensitivity of the legislators and ministers on the issue.
Aug 8:
The pilot production of Al-Khalid, the main battle tank of the Pakistan Army, starts at the Heavy
Industries in Taxila. The go ahead for the production was given after a formal agreement was signed
between Chinese officials and the Heavy Industries' chairman earlier this month. During trials Al-
Khalid attained over 85 per cent hits on mobile battlefield targets at a distance of two kilometres while
moving at a speed of 40 kilometres per hour. The tank has an automatic gun loading system which
enhances the rate of fire to 8 rounds per minute. It is also fitted with a modern remote-controlled anti-
aircraft weapon system which can be fired while remaining inside the tank.
Aug 10:
All the 16 officers and sailors on board were killed when a Pakistan Navy training aircraft was shot
down by two Indian fighter planes. The wreckage of the plane was located 2km inside Pakistan
territory in marshy areas, Badin district, around 100 nautical miles off Karachi. The plane - French-
made Breguet Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft - had left PNS Mehran airbase in the city at 9.15am for
a routine training flight to the coastal areas of southern Sindh. It was scheduled to return to its base
after four hours.

Chapter11a
Chapter XI
C O N C L U S I O N:
What is the true state of affairs?
Page 2
JUDICIARY
The best constitutions have no meaning unless they can be enforced by an independent judiciary, and
an independent judiciary means a judiciary which is able to resist the pressures of governments and of
public opinion.[22]
The judiciary is perhaps the most important pillar of the liberal democratic system. It must act as the
ever-vigilant watch-dog over the executive, with a view to ensure that the rights of the people are not
transgressed and trampled upon by an executive which rarely, if ever, misses an opportunity to be
arbitrary and unfair. The ordinary citizen must be afforded fair protection. The judiciary is supposed
to act as a restraint on any governmental excesses, particularly against the citizenry of the state.
However, the successive governments approach towards the judiciary is to limit opportunities for
correcting wrongs and redressing grievances. The strategy adopted to neutralize and even manipulate
this vital organ of the system has been through undue control of the appointments procedure and undue
interference through dubious and obviously ill-meaning amendments of the constitution.
Meddling with the judiciary is a tradition in Pakistan.[23] Every successive government of Pakistan
seems to have the destruction of the judiciary high on its political agenda. The habit of meddling with
the judiciary has been reinforced by the nature of Pakistan's recent governments. They have been
either military -- which need the judiciary to give them legitimacy -- or weak -- which need the judiciary
to give them strength.[24]
Barring President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, each head of state or government from Ayub Khan
downwards, has done his utmost to weaken the judiciary. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his ruling People's
Party, the progenitors of the present government, were the first to mount a frontal assault on the
holders of judicial power.[25] In 1973, Mohammad Owais Murtaza, the District and Sessions Judge at
Sanghar, was arrested in his court, handcuffed and then jailed. Evidently Judge Murtaza had granted
bail to several of those arrested as he was lawfully empowered to do, much to the annoyance of Bhutto
and his minions. In those days, Sanghar was the scene of considerable political conflict and various
people were picked up and charged under the Defense of Pakistan Rules.
Only one year after the unanimous approval of the 1973 constitution, the first constitutional
amendment was introduced on May 9, 1974 to amend the Article 199 which barred the judiciary from
"issuing writs in the instance of a person who served in the armed forces of Pakistan, or who was for
the time being subject to any law relating to any of those Forces, or in respect of any action in relation
to him as a member of the armed forces or as a person subject to such law."
In 1975, by means of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, the power of the High Court under
Article 199 for the grant of bail to a person detained under any law providing for preventative
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detention was taken away. The High Court was also denuded of the power to make an order prohibiting
the detention of a person. Its power to grant a stay order against the government was confined to the
span of 60 days only in relation to public revenue and other specified cases. In 1976 there followed
notorious Fifth Amendment under which the grotesque provision was made that after a Chief Justice,
whether of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, had held office for a period of five years, then
notwithstanding the fact that he had not attained the age of retirement he was liable to be demoted to
the status of an ordinary judge of his court or else forced to leave office. Suspending the rules of
procedures, both these debilitating amendments were pushed through parliament, without discussion,
in a matter of hours. However, in 1985 both were deleted by succeeding dictator Ziaul Haq, who had his
own methods of dealing with the judges, for instance, the promulgation of the wicked PCO.
In 1981, the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) played untold havoc and inflicted misery not only
on the judiciary but also on the citizens of Pakistan. By this device the executive made wholesale
changes in the judiciary. Confirmed judges of the superior courts were relieved of their offices. Others
were given the option either to take a fresh oath under the PCO or to relinquish their office. These were
the days of martial law and like the rest of the country the judiciary too was held hostage.
President Zia's successor too violated his oath of office and manipulated the judiciary. Justice Qazi
Jamil was the only judge of the Peshawar High Court who was not confirmed by President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan apparently because of his verdict in the NWFP assembly dissolution case wherein the High
Court set aside the order of dissolution and restored the Assembly and the cabinet. Another GIK victim
was Justice Abdul Hafeez Memon of the Supreme Court, who was twice appointed during the PPP
governments and twice not confirmed by the President.
The practice in Pakistan, contrary to the constitutional provisions in this regard, has developed to
appoint 'Additional Judges' (under Article 197) and not 'Judges' (under Article 193). This is a device
apparently used with the motive of ensuring a degree of control over the judges and to curtail their
independence.
Article 193 of the constitution provides that a judge of the High Court is to be appointed by the
President, after consultations with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Governor of the province
concerned. Once appointed, he is to hold office till he attains the age of sixty-two years unless he sooner
resigns or is removed in accordance with the constitution. This is the norm. There is, however, an
exception to this rule, Article 197 provides that when the office of a judge is vacant or he is absent or
unable to perform the functions of his office or it is necessary to increase the number of judges in a high
Court, the President, following the Article 193 procedure, may appoint a person as an Additional Judge
for a fixed period.
The power under article 197, as is apparent from its language, is to be exercised in a limited set of
circumstances to meet a particular temporary need. It is not available for making appointments in the
normal course. As is, however the case with all such powers granted by the constitution, the exception
has become the norm. All governments in the recent past have made all appointments to the High Court
under Article 197 instead of Article 193. When the term of the Additional Judge so appointed is about
to expire, only then is he appointed as a judge of the High Court under Article 193.
Article 197 is used for purposes it was never meant to serve. The provision has been subverted by
successive governments to suit their ends. It has become an expedient device for keeping the judges on
probation during their formative years. The damage to the institution of the judiciary and its high
traditions which is caused by this expedient use of Article 197 is enormous.
In August 1994, the Benazir government filled several long-standing vacancies in the four provincial
High Courts. Of the 20 new judges appointed to the Lahore High Court, 13 were former activists in the
ruling Pakistan People's Party, one of them a former minister (Saeed Awan against whom a murder
case was pending). Three were supporters of the Muslim League faction which supports Miss Bhutto's
coalition government. In November 1994, Miss Bhutto threw tradition overboard when she by-passed
two senior judges and appointed Sajjad Ali Shah as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Mr. Shah was
Chapter11a
the lone dissenter in the 11-member bench whose decision restored Mr. Sharif to power in May 1993
after he had been booted out by the president a month earlier.[26]
The rulers generally kept vacancies in the higher judiciary in order to oblige favorites whenever an
occasion arose for it or expediency so demanded. When Benazir Bhutto took over in November 1993,
there were 34 vacancies in the superior courts: two in the Supreme Court, 17 in the Lahore High Court,
10 in the Sindh High Court, four in the Peshawar High Court and one in the Balochistan High Court.
While thousands of cases were pending, what justification was there to keep these vacancies
unfilled?[27]
The net effect of these policies, and the resultant performance of this organ has been that the entire
system of dispensation of justice has become beyond the reach of more than 80 per cent of the citizens of
this country. The conditions in the courts, the delays, the never-ending procedures, the costs involved,
all present a very discouraging and even heart-breaking picture for any prospective litigant.
The system of justice has also been brought into disrepute by the introduction of parallel judiciary (i.e.,
the Federal Shariat Court whose judges can be laymen and whose appointment is solely at the
discretion of the executive), and the establishment of courts that do not follow the procedure required
by due process of law. Another factor that has undermined the status of the judiciary is that it has too
often been called upon to adjudicate upon political issues, and its verdicts have not always been in
accord with public understanding of the norms of democracy.[28]
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT ON JUDGES APPOINTMENT
The constitutional provision enabling the government to appoint judges on an ad-hoc basis was
challenged in Supreme Court by Habib Wahabul-Khairi. The main burden of this case rested upon an
interpretation of Articles 177 and 193 of the constitution. These articles state that appointments to the
superior judiciary -- that is, to the Supreme Court and the four high courts -- are to be made by the
President of Pakistan "after consultation" with the chief justices concerned. The principal question
posed in this case was to what was the nature of the consultation envisaged by the constitution.: a
formality which the government had to observe or something more substantial? On March 20, 1996, the
Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment which leaves little room for doubt. The court held that the
consultation "should be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for
complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play."
The Supreme Court also directed the federal government to appoint permanent chief justices in higher
courts where at present constitutional functions are being performed by acting chief justices appointed
by the government. The Court ruled that the offices of chief justice and judges of the high courts
normally should be filled immediately -- not later than 30 days -- but a vacancy occurring before the
due date on account of death or for any other reasons should be filled in within 90 days on permanent
basis. The SC judgment also upheld the rule of seniority in respect of the appointment of high court
chief justices. The most senior judge has a legitimate expectancy to be considered for appointment as
the chief justice and is entitled to be so appointed in the absence of any concrete and valid reasons to be
recorded by the President/Executive, it said. The court observed that the posting of a sitting CJ of a
high court or a judge to the Federal Shariat Court without his consent "is violative of Article 209, which
guarantees the tenure of office."[29]
The major points of the Supreme Court judgment are:
● 1. The words "after consultation" employed inter alia in articles 177 and 193 of the constitution
connote that the consultation should be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented,
leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. The opinion of the chief justice of
Pakistan and the chief justice of a high court as to the fitness and suitability of a candidate for
judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the
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President/Executive.
● 2. That if the President/Executive appoints a candidate found to be unfit and unsuitable for
judgeship by the Chief Justice f Pakistan and the Chief Justice of the high court concerned, it will
not be proper exercise of power under the relevant article of the constitution.
● 3. That permanent vacancies accruing in the offices of Chief Justice and judges normally should
be filled in immediately, and not later than 30 days but a vacancy occurring before the due date
on account of death or for any other reasons, should be filled in within 90 days on permanent
basis.
● 4. That no ad hoc judge can be appointed in the Supreme Court while permanent vacancies exist.
● 5. That in view of the relevant provisions of the constitution and established conventions/practice,
the most senior judge of a high court has a legitimate expectancy to be considered for
appointment as the chief justice and in the absence of any concrete and valid reasons to be
recorded by the president/executive, he is entitled to appoint such in the court concerned.
● 6. An acting chief justice is not a consultee as envisaged by the relevant article of the constitution,
therefore, mandatory constitutional requirement of consultation is not fulfilled by consulting an
acting chief justice except in case the permanent chief justice concerned is unable to resume his
functions within 90 days from the date of commencement of his sick leave because of his
continuous sickness.
● 7. That an appointment of a sitting chief justice of a high court or a judge thereof in the Federal
Shariat Court under article 203-C of the constitution without his consent is violative of article
209, which guarantees the tenure of office. Since the former article was incorporated by the chief
martial law administrator and the later article was enacted by the framers of the constitution, the
same shall prevail and, hence, such an appointment will be void.
● 8. That transfer of a judge of one high court to another high court can only be made in the public
interest and not as a punishment.
The Supreme Court verdict, which has both short and long-term implications, touched on two
constitutional themes. First, the question of higher judicial appointments which has been used by
successive governments to tame the judiciary. The issue has been the subject of an intense debate for
over two decades. For many years, Bar Councils, Bar Associations, and human rights organizations
have been demanding discontinuance of the practice of running High Courts with the help of acting
Chief Justices. The ruling has the authority of law on the appointment of judges until the law is changed
or is interpreted differently by the superior judiciary itself.
Second, the judgment provides opening for a new constitutional order by redefining the amended
constitution in a manner conceived to promote a process of genuine democratization. The 1973
constitution, now in force, retains some features of the anti-democratic amendments which General Zia
incorporated at the gun point. The Court struck down Article 203-C, (which provided for the transfer
of judges to the Shariah Court) an amendment made by General Zia, on the ground of conflict with
Article 209. The apex court has sought to erase or reduce the rigors of some of the non-democratic
amendments, without parliament rescinding them. In a narrow sense, the Supreme Court has entered
uncharted terrain.
Several constitutional experts have disagreed with the Supreme Court ruling on the binding
recommendations of the Chief Justices for the appointment of judges. They argue that under any
normative scheme of a harmoniously constructed constitution, the Chief Justices of the Supreme and
High Courts cannot insist that the President record, in writing, his "very sound reasons" for not acting
upon their commendations in regard to the appointment of judges. In effect, the argument is that the
President, not the Chief Justices concerned, is the appointing authority. They also argue that, with the
exception of a very few countries in the world, the appointment of the judges of the superior courts is
always made by the Chief Executive. Some of the retired judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts
argued that the Supreme Court, in its judgment, has acted beyond its jurisdiction and has gone to the
extent of enacting the law rather than interpreting the relevant articles of the constitutions, whereas the
enactment or abrogation of any article of the constitution is the sole prerogative of the legislature.
On May 19, the Supreme Court returned a constitutional reference, filed by the president three days
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earlier, against the apex court decision, saying it had not been signed by the President as required by
the constitution. On the same day the federal government filed a review petition against the Supreme
Court decision. On May 26, Supreme Court Judge Mir Hazar Khan Khoso announces his dissenting
judgment which said that the President has the power under the constitution to appoint judges and that
no time-limit can be fixed for filling in the permanent vacancies for judges in the superior courts. He
also differed with the majority decision on the issue of consultation of the president with the acting chief
justice and justified the appointment of additional or ad hoc judges, which had been ruled
unconstitutional by the majority decision. On the transfer of judges to the Federal Shariah Court,
Justice Khoso was of the view that the president was empowered by the constitution to transfer any
judge to the Federal Shariah Court for a period of two years. The judge also supported the transfer of a
high court judge to another high court. Similarly, he said there was no harm in appointing people
having political affiliation provided he was a person of integrity.[30]
SEPARATION OF JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE
The constitutional separation of the judiciary from the executive should have been enforced long ago
but no government had been willing to do so since the executive was not willing to surrender its action
of judicial scrutiny. The Judiciary in Pakistan has willingly or unwillingly, always been under the
control of the executive. The framers of the 1973 constitution, fully cognizant of the fact that the liberty
of citizens cannot be ensured and effective running of the government cannot be dreamed of without a
judiciary free from all the pressures from the executive, made it incumbent upon the government to
separate the judiciary from the executive within five years of the commencing day of the constitution,
i.e. August 14, 1973. Before the act of separation could be completed, the civilian government of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by General Ziaul Haq in July 1977. The judiciary created to
protect each and every provision of the constitution could do nothing when General Zia abrogated it
and trod upon the powers of judiciary. It had to bow before the actions of an intruder and justify his
cruel treatment to the constitution because it was not independent of the executive control.
The period prescribed for the separation elapsed on August 14, 1978, and from that day onward all the
executive officers including the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Magistrates were
functioning unconstitutionally till March 2, 1985 when an amendment was made in the constitution to
enhance the period of separation of judiciary from the executive from five years to fourteen years by a
Presidential Order. In 1989 the High Court of Sindh directed the government to forthwith separate the
judiciary from the executive. The federal government filed an appeal in the Supreme Court that was
dismissed on March 31, 1993.
In October, 1993, the Supreme Court ordered to provinces to separate the two institutions by March 23,
1994 to fulfill this constitutional obligation. Instead of implementing the court order, the provinces in
April 1994 filed separate review petitions in the Supreme Court requesting the court to extend the
period. The provinces had been demanding extension on the plea that they were facing shortage of
magistrates to implement the constitutional requirement. The former chief justice Nasim Hasan Shah
took a serious view of the delaying tactics of the provinces and refused to give an extension. He said that
any order passed by a magistrate after April 23, 1994 would be void.
Eventually on January 24, 1996, the Supreme Court rejected the provincial governments' request for
extending the deadline and ordered them to separate the two institutions by March 23, 1996. While
fixing the final and irrevocable date enforcing Article 175(3) of the constitution the court made it clear
at the same time that there would be no further extension. The court also validated the judicial orders
passed by the magistrates from March 23, 1994 which were declared void by the Supreme Court in
April 1994.
However, though it was obvious that there would be no further escape from this decision, all the
provincial governments were still reluctant to enforce it. The reasons for this were two-fold. The
concentration of executive, judicial and revenue powers at the district level and below has been a
feature of administration in the sub-continent for over a hundred years. Pakistani governments are
therefore reluctant to part with a system which gives the administration a great deal of power.
Chapter11a
Secondly, there is resistance from the District Management Group cadre to this move because the loss
of judicial powers will weaken the offices of the assistant commissioner and the deputy commissioner.
Executive magistrates who exercise judicial powers, under the control and supervision of their deputy
commissioners, are also against this move because much of their glory will be stripped from them when
they lose the power to sit in judgment over criminal matters.
Powerful commissioners and district magistrates had a role to play and a purpose to fulfill in a colonial
set-up where exigencies of administration took precedence over the requirements of justice or the
demands of civil liberties. But a powerful district magistrate is an anomaly in present times when there
is a growing demand for the administration of criminal justice to be improved so that the rights of
citizens are not abused and, at the same time, the ends of justice are more swiftly and efficiently met.
Executive magistrates who exercise judicial powers are first of all susceptible to being influenced in
their judicial decisions by their executive superiors. What is equally reprehensible, the close working
relationship that exists between the magistracy and the police works against the interests of public
because in the matter of bail and remand magistrates lend a readier ear to the demands of the police
than to the ends of justice.
On March 21, 1996, an ordinance was issued to formally separate the judiciary from the executive. The
ordinance, however, created two types of magistrates - the judicial and the executive. The judicial
magistrates were placed under the control of the High Court while the administrative magistrates will
continue to work under District Magistrate. According to the ordinance, all crimes punishable with
sentences of up to three years or more will be dealt with exclusively by the judicial magistrates, while
executive magistrates will be allowed to entertain certain pre-defined crimes carrying a prison term of
up to three years. The executive magistrates have been authorized to take up cases mainly pertaining to
the law and order situations and certain local laws.
However, jurists have termed the logistics adopted by the government to separate the judiciary from
the executive through an ordinance as against the spirit of the constitution which prohibits legislation
through ordinance. On March 19, the National Assembly session was prorogued and called into session
on March 24 again after the Legal reforms ordinance was issued on March 21. The jurists say that it
was mala fide on the part of the government to prorogue the National Assembly session for the
promulgation of presidential ordinances.
Later, the government introduced the Legal Reforms Ordinance as the Legal Reforms Bill in the
National Assembly. Speaking on the bill, the former Law Minister, Syed Iftikhar Gilani, told the house
that the present document was only a separation of functions between the executive and the judiciary
and not really the separation of the two institutions. Pointing out the contradiction in the bill, Syed
Gilani, said that under the new framework, while the deputy commissioner had no "technical"
connection with an ongoing murder trial in a sessions court, he nevertheless had the power to declare
any of the accused in the case as a state witness and thus taking him out of the purview of judicial
prosecution. He said that despite the opposition's insistence, the government had not agreed to the
scrapping of this power. [31] The National Assembly passed the Legal Reforms Act on April 15, 1996
amid bitter opposition criticism that the bill did not ensure the separation of judiciary from the
executive as envisaged in the constitution.
POLITICS OF FEUDALISM
The course of politics since independence has been determined and dominated by a small segment of
society and nothing has happened during the half century of economic turbulence and social chaos to
alter the class composition of the leadership, which still comes from the feudal-army-bureaucracy
conglomerate. Feudal system in Pakistan continues to exist and flourish with all its evils and colonial
legacies which has virtually disfranchised the bulk of the population by its monopoly of power. This
system creates areas of oppressive influence for the feudal lords, particularly in the vast rural areas
constituting 70 per cent of country's population. With only two per cent of the population the feudal
lords are able to capture bulk of the assembly seats, thus denying the poor and middle class their
legitimate share in the government.
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From 1947 to 1970, 75 per cent of the members of our parliaments were feudals and the remaining 25
per cent who owed their parliamentary carrier to their place and position in the services and
professions, had also come from a feudal background. The feudal families which had been discarded by
the electorate in the impartial elections held in 1970 by General Yahya Khan returned to the assemblies
in the non-party basis elections held by General Zia in 1985. Landowners captured 117 seats out of 219
contested seats while 42 went to businessmen, (for details see page 130) Long military rule and the
prolonged suspension of political processes has enabled the Pakistani ruling elite to refine the art of
social engineering. The feudal lords in collaboration with the military-civilian bureaucratic system have
been able to determine whom to include and exclude from the development process.
Although our feudal lords are functioning within the framework of a democracy but the republican
form of government had been republican in a very narrow and restricted sense. That form persists to
this day even after we have had a series of elections, following the fall of Ayub Khan and the end of the
Zia regime. Soldiers by profession, they were nonetheless landowners by heredity or acquisition.[32]
The feudal lords have reinforced their power manifold by dominating industry, business and politics.
Once the stronghold of the feudals, the national and provincial assemblies are now the property of both
the landlords and the capitalists. Worse, the system has been consolidated by the induction of retired
personnel of the armed forces and civil service into its ranks. Thus, feudal individuals, higher-echelon
civil servants and the military establishment are tied into a single web. The system excludes the mass of
the people from the concerns of the state and depends upon the loyalties and manipulations of a
relatively small number of families and groupings. It breeds narrow relationships and discretionary
favors, rather open and transparent system.[33]
Genuine and effective land reforms[34] have always been resisted by the feudal lords irrespective of the
democratic or authoritarian nature of the regime. In times of army rule, feudals join the ruling junta to
protect their system from being discontinued. And the junta acquiesces because it badly needs the
feudal clout to keep the teeming millions in the rural areas from revolting against their dictatorial
practices. And in times of democratic dispensation, the fat cats of the system, using their feudal hold on
these very teeming millions return to the legislative assemblies where they see to it that no law is made
to loosen the hold of the feudal system on the national economy.[35]
The elected representatives on either side of the aisle would, while quarreling with great passion and
violence on non-issues, remain united on preserving the status quo. Sworn enemies share common
ground against reform of land, labor, and taxation; against liberation of laws and the independence of
judiciary; against devolution of power and distributive justice. The country's constitution was
dangerously deformed by seven amendments, then an eighth one. One does not hear any more of
abrogating even this last constitutional atrocity.[36] Worst of all, the feudals would not allow even a
census, for it would certainly change the political balance. The last census was held in 1981.
Nominally, we have a parliamentary system of government. In fact, because of the underlying power
structure, the system is anything but democratic. It takes a few million rupees to contest a seat in the
National Assembly, votes are bought and sold. For all practical purposes, the people are largely
disenfranchised. Parliamentary elections are a game of musical chairs among the rural and urban elite
and their hangers-on.[37] For the common man and Haris living in the villages, therefore, it hardly
amounts to any visible change in the operating conditions around them or any material difference in the
quality of their life after the creation of Pakistan. The gap between the propertied and propertiless
classes instead of narrowing, has widened still further

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Chapter XI
Page 3
EDUCATION
The feudal controllers of the government appear to have long-term strategy to maintain the status quo
by ignoring human resources development and keeping the masses illiterate. Even before independence,
the feudal lords blocked spread of education in their respective areas for selfish reasons. Since
independence, all governments have without exception, deliberately curbed the spread of literacy.
Education has never been a priority with any form of government whether it was a democratic or a
military one. Since all governments, including the martial law regimes, solely depended on feudal
support, they intentionally suppressed education, a potential threat to the status quo.
Our budget allocation of education as a percentage of GNP is one of the lowest in the world. The low
expenditure on human development is bound to drag Pakistan down from an unenviable 132nd position
to somewhere in 150s on the Human Development Index of 173 nations. Pakistan Human Rights
Commission report for 1995 highlights the alarming situation of the educational sector: There were
more than 57 million adult illiterates (According to the 1981 census since no census was held after that);
35,000 primary schools had no roof and four million children of school going age went to no school.
NOT TAX PAYERS
The lack of interest shown by the successive governments in the imposition and collection of
Agricultural Tax also bears testimony to their efforts to protect feudal interests. The NWFP collected
Rs. 4 million from the tax on agriculture incomes in 1994 and another Rs.5 million was collected from
Sindh. In the Budget of 1995-96, the agriculture sector was not brought into the income tax net as
demanded by the business and general public on the grounds that all segments of society should pay
equally to the national exchequer, irrespective whether they were industrialists, traders or big
landlords.
To remove the resource crunch, the caretaker prime minister Dr. Moeen Qureshi had urged levying of
taxes on agricultural incomes as well as wealth. For this purpose he had also got the required enabling
laws drafted for enactment, in accordance with the 1973 constitution, by the provincial governments for
taxes on income and by the federal government for agricultural wealth.
The enabling laws have been enacted by the federal government and the provincial governments of
NWFP and Sindh. The Pakistan Democratic Front coalition in Punjab, agriculturally the most
important province in the country, has so far refused to take any initiative in the matter. The feudal
lords and their hangers-on constitute only 5 per cent of our agricultural households and own 64 per
cent of our farm land. The rest of the 95 per cent house-holds are important for them only as a political

Chapter11b
vote-bank.
A wealth tax collection of about Rs. 2.9 million is reported to have been made from the agriculture
sector in 1994-95. Ten thousand agriculturists were expected to pay wealth tax, but only 1800 filed their
wealth tax returns and just 300 of them paid any wealth tax. What the agriculturists paid as wealth tax,
is a negligible amount relative to the total wealth tax collection of Rs. 900 million from 60,000 tax
payers.
In the ten years up to 1993-94, President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, former Prime Minister Balakh
Sher Mazari, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Sindh Chief Minister Abdullah Shah, former chief ministers of
Sindh Qaim Ali Shah and Muzaffar Hussain Shah, former Punjab Chief Minister Manzoor Watto,
former Chief Minister of NWFP, Sabir Shah, PML (N) turn-coat Nawaz Khokar, PML (N) MNA from
Murree Shahid Khakan Abbasi, Balochistan MNA Mehmood Khan Achakzai, former Balochistan
Chief Minister Zafrullah Khan Jamali, Federal Minister Ghulam Akber Lasee, PPP MNA from
Punjab, Faisal Saleh Hayat, Federal Minister Khalid Ahmed Kharal, PML(J) Chief Hamid Nasir
Chatta, to name a few, did not pay a single penny by way of taxes. All these people are filthy rich. But
since their incomes come from the agricultural sector, therefore they had remained outside the tax
net.[38] A report of the Income Tax Department in respect of income tax paid by MNAs, Senators and
MPAs from 1985 to 1993 showed that 70 per cent MNAs paid no tax at all, and only 32 paid less than
Rs. 5,000 and at least 13 ministers did not pay any tax.[39]
No doubt, the feudal system remains the main obstacle to the progress of the nation and must be
abolished forthwith. Like many other developing countries, in Pakistan too the feudal system keeps the
agricultural sector chained to an iniquitous land-tenure system and distinguishes itself only by an
unnaturally high degree of land concentration, absentee landlordism, insecurity of tenure for share-
croppers, extraction of excessive surplus as rent, and low agricultural productivity. This system
corrupts the entire society by propagating a false value system that degrades the cultivators of the land
while strengthening the claims of the non-cultivators, it also condones unproductive rent-seeking in all
kinds of economic activities. Such inhuman practices as slavery and bonded labor flourish under the
dark shadow of this cruel system.[40] According to the Pakistan Human Rights Commission report for
1995: a. Ten million children did labor in brick kilns, farms, carpet manufacturing workshops and
restaurants. b. Twenty million workers in agriculture and industry did bonded labor. Feudalism is a
pivotal problem and all other problems flow from it.
THE EIGHTH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Our constitution is fundamentally based on the principle of a parliamentary form of government in

which an elected Prime Minister is answerable to the people through the National Assembly. However,
General Zia's Eighth Amendment to the constitution had created two centers of power. While the Prime
Minister is the chief executive and the President has virtually no role in the day-to-day running of the
country, the Article 58 (2) empowered the indirectly elected president to dissolve the National Assembly
if "a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary." Our
political history of the last one decade has proved that this provision had in practice made the indirectly
elected President, who is not answerable to the people, more powerful than the elected prime minister.
The Eighth Amendment in practice was aimed at perpetuating a quasi-military rule by investing the
president with vast discretionary powers to override as well as dismiss the prime minister and dissolve
the parliament.
Since May, 1988, when General Ziaul Haq packed Junejo's government, this power was invoked four
times to dismiss elected governments and dissolution of parliaments. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan
dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government in August 1990 under this Article. He also invoked the same
provision to send Nawaz Sharif home in April, 1993. The Eighth Amendment was intended, so it was
claimed, to restore the balance of powers between the President and the Prime Minister but it created
two centers of power and the constant tension between the two had been a source of instability. It was
this tension which resulted in the removal of Prime Minister Junejo from office in a most
Chapter11b
unceremonious manner.
Taking the argument that the Amendment was an anti-martial law mechanism, it must be remembered
that Bonapartist ambitions are unlikely to be contained by a few written words in a document which
means little to those whose legitimacy flows from the barrel of the gun. It is the objective conditions,
both domestic and international, which tip the scale. In our constitutional history, neither the politicians
nor the military leaders respected the Basic Law. General Zia had once proudly proclaimed that he
could tear up the constitution and throw it into the dustbin whenever he liked. This he nearly did with
his wanton disfigurement of the constitution through the Eighth Amendment.
On April 1, 1997 both houses of parliament passed the 13th amendment to the constitution which
deleted Artricle 58(2)(b), the most disputed part of the 8th amendment. The 13th amendment not only
stripped the president and governors of their powers to dissolve the assemblies but also restored the
prime minister's mandatory advice in the appointment of armed services chiefs and governors. The 8th
amendment had made more than 40 changes in the constitution. However, Nawaz Sharif opted to
remove only those parts of the 8th amendment which were a potential threat to his government but has
failed to touch those parts which pose a threat to society, particularly the weaker and disadvantaged
sections like women and minorities.
GENERALS IN POLITICS
Professor Ziring says: "Military systems may or may not promote political development, and
modernization, nevertheless, their monopolization of coercive power generated their dominance in
Pakistan as in Bangladesh and so many other Third World countries."[41] The political power of the
armed forces of Pakistan is greater than the power of the elected representatives of the people as well as
of the judiciary. Time and again the former have provoked their supremacy. Since the days of the
speakership of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the legislature of Pakistan has been humbled on several
occasions. The Constituent Assembly could not be dissolved in 1954 without the backing and blessings
of the Army chief. The judiciary has also gone along with the armed forces in legitimizing the martial
law regimes, one would like to believe, not always willingly. The manner of the removal of some judges
of the superior courts and installation in their place of some others by General Ziaul Haq also shows the
supremacy of the army over the judiciary.[42]
One could quote extensively from the books of two distinguished soldiers - Air Marshal (retired)
Mohammad Asghar Khan's Generals in Politics and Lt-General (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti's Bhutto, Zia
Aur Mein for pointed and repeated references to the role the autocratic military rulers had played in
the past.[43] The former Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg's disclosure, in February 1993, that
he influenced Supreme Court's judgment which refused to restore the Junejo assembly is the latest
example of army's supremacy.[44]
After the death of General Zia the military establishment did not impose martial law inspite of the
insistence of some caretaker Chief ministers, particularly that of Punjab. However, this was not out of
the love for democracy and will to surrender itself to civilian control, but because it found the
international and national political climate hardly conducive for another martial law. The ruling elite,
who have ruled Pakistan in a series of shuffled combinations since the early 1950s, reached the lowest
ebb of their ability to govern sometime in the 1980s. By the beginning of the present decade their
pathetic inability was no more a state secret. Consequently, the major factions of the ruling elite who
have ceaselessly quarreled among themselves for about four decades, have now opted for a political
truce. This has happened because the accumulated consequences of the past misrule have so unhinged
the elements of society that no single faction of the ruling elite (the feudal aristocracy, generals,
bureaucrats and an assortment of influentials) can, by itself, even hope to put them all together again.
And this has happened at a time when the quiet anger of the people is about to turn into a rage, and
their frustration into violent protest. However, the truce, is not between equals as the army is not only
the first among equals, but also the sole arbiter.[45]
With the movement for restoration of democracy agitating for a political change, the army instead
Chapter11b
found it more practical to continue with the system of "shared power" with Muslim Leaguer Ghulam
Ishaq Khan as President guarding the established power structure and Ziaist political legacy. When
elections within 90 days became inevitable in 1988 and the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP experienced a new
populist upsurge, the military establishment with the support of the President created an alliance of anti-
PPP political groups and parties - the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Led by
an immensely rich industrialist, the establishment-supported IJI fully restored the traditional power
equilibrium accepting the supremacy of the military and the president-led bureaucracy in politics.
Under the constitution the chief of army staff has no executive powers whatsoever. The powers of the
president for running the day to day government are extremely limited. It is the prime minister who is
the chief executive of the state. But the reality of the exercise of power is quite different on the ground.
It is well known that, on vital matters, the part of the mind of the military carries a lot of weight with
the civilian authority.[46]
So long as the Prime Minister works in the framework of the system of "shared power" he/she can
continue. Any attempt to change the system would cost him his job as it happened to Junejo, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in his first stint. As long as the prime minister does not interfere in areas that
the army has come to regard as its own, he will have their full backing.
Although foreign and nuclear policies are key elements of every government's portfolio, but the ready
advice of the GHQ on all such matters has reduced the foreign office to a sophisticated front desk for
the decision-makers in the back room. Armed forces are in fact a means to foreign policy ends while
foreign policy does not exist to serve a military's needs.[47] However, an internationally, recognized
prime minister is far more able to pull off difficult deals abroad where the new political protocol favors
an exclusion of uniformed negotiators except in bilateral arms deals.
Defense spending is another important matter. The mushrooming defense budget has become not just a
sacred cow for every political government but also very often its economic nemesis. The present
economic crisis has been largely perpetuated by a bloated defense budget that the army would find
politically and internationally impossible to allocate to itself if it was ruling the country. The generals
need a civilian face to any government, if for no other reason than to ensure that the defense budget is
not too seriously questioned inside and outside the country.
What seems to have happened is that the army, conscious of the world antipathy to the overthrow of
civilian regimes, has become more sophisticated about its political role. Although the present chaos has
seriously undermined its faith in the present political system but the military realizes as never before
that the complexity of today's crisis in Pakistan's polity cannot be solved by the military.[48] At the
same time, even the most ambitious general no longer needs to take over power openly because he now
has a host of politicians to do his bidding without having to take the blame and responsibility of
wielding political power openly. The military's intervention in politics in the past has fundamentally
changed political attitudes of politicians. Instead of talking to each other to resolve their conflicts, both
the treasury and opposition benches looked towards the establishment which is perceived to be the real
source of power. Hence, the army high command's decision to rest content with dominance rather than
direct intervention has been based on a careful calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of
playing umpire in a highly polarized and increasingly violent political arena.
However, the army got an official role in the affairs of the government when President Farooq Ahmad
Khan Leghari, on January 6, 1997, formed the Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS). The
new council, first conceived by late General Ziaul Haq, will be headed by the president (who is also the
Supreme Commander of the armed forces) and will include chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Chiefs of the three armed forces, the prime minister, ministers for defence, foreign affairs, interior and
finance.
Literally speaking, the council is only an advisory body and its advice will not be mandatory or binding
on the government. According to the presidential order, that amended the Rules of Business, 1973, the
CDNS will aid and advice the government in:
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(a)Determination of national strategy and fixation of priorities in terms of over-all national security.
(b) Formulation of defence policy in accordance with national strategic objectives and securing of
assessments and plans for the fulfilment of the defence policy.
(c) Coordination of defence policy with external and domestic policies.
(d) Definition of the task of the armed forces of Pakistan in accordance with the national strategy.
(e) Economic and financial policies affecting defence and national security.
(f) Recommendations relating to internal security, proclaimations of emergency and any other matter of
national importance referred to the Council for defence and national security by the president or the
prime minister.
The creation of the CDNS is seen as a significant step to emasculate the office of the prime minister.
Call it a mere consultative body or give it any other innocuous name, the CDNS would, by virtue of its
membership profile, in reality to be a super cabinet under president. Obviously, a body that consists of
the highest civilian and military brass in the land is not about to take kindly to its 'advice' being turned
down. It goes also without saying that some of its members will be more equal than others. Even if the
civilian six stand together, it is unlikely that they will assert themselves against the military four, if the
past is any guid.
BUREAUCRACY
The German sociologist, Max Waber, says: "highly trained bureaucratic experts will prevail against the
less expert ministers who ostensibly run the administrative units, the cabinet which ostensibly guides
over any policy and the legislature which ostensibly make policy." The bureaucracy in Pakistan is not
an exception to such predictions. It is this group of bureaucracy who has been, along with the military
generals, formulating the policies and political as well as ideological framework of Pakistan. And being
permanently in office, unlike the politicians, who come and go at their behest, it is they who have the
power to actually govern the state as an administrative group.
In our society, bureaucracy is not a set of individuals who act according to their whims and fancies or
merely to promote their selfish interest. Pakistan has inherited the bureaucratic structure and
procedures from the British colonial master. It has grown up, with the needs of time, in a highly
developed "power complex", like a machine or a system of self-sustaining living organism. It exists on
the basis of rules, regulations, laws and constitutional provisions. It would be correct to say that
bureaucratic "power complex" was invented by British to rule their colonies. Britain itself did not have
a "power complex" to regulate its life as the one it created for India and other colonies. Its rule was
responsible to none but to the government in London through the governor-general.
The bureaucracy -- the Indian Civil Service -- was essentially a mercenary force in which the sons of the
local collaborating elite were inducted to do the dirty work for the colonizers, which they did with
extreme "efficiency." Its interests and orientations were, therefore, diametrically opposed to those of
the people and those of the post-colonial independent societies. The bureaucracy thus was the biggest
hurdle in the way of decolonization of our society and the creation of a truly democratic state in the post-
independence era.[49]
In the late forties and early fifties the political parties played different roles in the two wings of
Pakistan. While in the eastern wing the parties had a mass appeal and they could win elections on the
basis of their popularity, in the western wing such popular appeal was lacking and hence elections could
be managed at the bureaucratic level. It is this opportunity which pushed the position of bureaucracy to
greater heights and they could rise above the politicians in the western wing. With the passage of time

Chapter11b
the failure to produce a constitution in time further lowered the position of the politicians. The rise of
three bureaucrats, Ghulam Mohammad Malik, Choudhuri Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza gave
moral support to the strength of the bureaucrats and they could manipulate the Central government in
a manner that suited them.
This led to disenchantment between the two wings of Pakistan. The comparatively better position of the
bureaucracy and the politicians in the western wing of the country played a decisive role in making the
politicians weaker and weaker pushing up the bureaucrats to higher position of not only executive
control but also policy making. Governor General, later President, Iskandar Mirza could also
manipulate to form the Republican Party. Thus for all practical purposes the politicians in the western
wing came to play in the hands of the bureaucrats. Such a dual role of a government can be played
better by the army personnel than the civil bureaucracy since army commanders are more disciplined
and hard working. Thus the door was opened for military rule, not because the politicians failed but
because the bureaucrats would not give any chance to the politicians to play a genuine role by going to
the people for support. Democracy, which started well in Pakistan, was throttle by the bureaucrats.
The first public exposure that who was really in control of Pakistan political system, behind the facade
of nominal parliamentary institution, came with governor general's dismissal of the Prime Minister in
April 1953. Ghulam Mohammad, a bureaucrat by profession had taken over power as governor-general
after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. His dismissal of prime minister Khawaja Nazimuddin's
cabinet impugned the role of the legislature as the maker and sustainer of government. This showed
how in-effective was the link between the prime minister and the institutions of party and parliament.
Thus the establishment of a system of central executive rule, rather than of cabinet government based
on a representative legislature encouraged the concentration of power in a group of officials divorced
from mass politics.
Playing persistently over the wicket of "external security threat" from India, from the very inception of
Pakistan on the one hand and, negation to evolve strong, stable and genuine political institutions and
forces in the first decade of our independence on the other, paved the way to the emergence of new
political actors along with bureaucratic lineal decedents of ICS. In 1958 the Khaki did not only overtly
jumped in our politics but in fact it proved as a foundation stone for the subsequent martial laws of
1969 and 1977, which in turn facilitated the emergence of military bureaucracy and a group of people
composed of both rural feudals and urban corporate interest, could be rightly called "capitalist and
elite" force.
The bureaucracy and the police play an important role in the running of the system. The standards and
quality of life being apparently enjoyed by the majority of our bureaucrats today leave no room for
doubt that it has over the years become an extremely lucrative and comfortable business to be a
bureaucrat. The comforts and glamorous lifestyles reserved for the bureaucracy in this country are
with very few parallels in the contemporary world. The sizes of the Deputy Commissioner houses,
Superintendent of Police houses, Commissioner houses and so on, alone are sufficient to support and
corroborate this allegation.
According a retired bureaucrat, the present bureaucrats could be divided into three categories: the
obstinate uncompromising old type, the bewildered transient, and the accomplished ones. The self-
disciplined old type, still hanging on to his professional ethics, is treated by our society as a fossil. He is
today an insignificant residue, appearing as a mole, cyst or pimple on the 1995 muscular mass. His
normal abodes are the dark, dingy, desolate and unfrequented corners of the administrative world. The
rulers are happy to keep him in cold storage because he can say "no" to them. The bewildered transient
is in the evolutionary process of forced conversion from the old to the new. He is unable to withstand
the social compulsions around and the career ambitions within. Internal conflicts notwithstanding, he
goes along with the rulers unwillingly. The show, however, is stolen by the new bureaucrat who nods,
but he nods only to those who matter. All the antennae of his personality are attuned to the corridors of
power. He has perfected the art of extracting the full price for selling his soul. His creative genius pours
lyrical praise in royal ears. His Midas touch coverts don'ts into do's, because his dexterous dynamism is
not deterred by rules, regulations, procedures or systems. To sum up, he has been elevated from
Chapter11b
"government servant" to "government partner," eligible for a holy alliance with the politicians. For his
career prospects even the sky is not the limit.[50]
ECONOMY
Pakistan has received 49.86 billion dollar aid during the last five decades which exceeds the total of the
famous Marshal Aid for Europe. However, we do not have much to show for all that aid. Foreign debt is
mounting from $16.6 billion in 1990-91, to $24.4 billion in 1994-95, and the continuous rise in domestic
debt has been from Rs 445.1 billion in 1990-91 to Rs. 796.8 billion in 1994-95.[51] The defense budget
coupled with the costs of administration, expenditure on para-military forces as well as interest
payments on military debt accumulated over the years has greatly limited Pakistan's policy options with
disastrous effects on its development trajectory. The rate of growth of non-productive expenditure on
the military and the civil administration has been consistently out of all proportion with productive
expenditure.[52]
Successive governments of Pakistan, even before President Ayub Khan days, have been building a
military machine that could not be kept in good repair by the country's own resources. It has always
needed foreign aid. The greatest justification that General Zia used to give for his adventurist
Afghanistan policy was that it brought American military and economic aid to this country - an aid that
served its purpose while it lasted. Day-to-day needs of the armed forces have forced this country's rulers
to stand in a queue in Washington, hat-in-hand. Nothing could be more ridiculous. Defence forces are
intended to provide a means of being independent to a nation: in our case Pakistan's dependence on
outsiders has been enhanced by the growing size of its armed forces.[53]
In the budget estimates for 1995-96, debt servicing charges of Rs. 157 billion and defense cost of Rs. 115
billion accounted for 47 per cent and 34 per cent respectively out of the total non-development
expenditure of Rs. 335 billion. The two together have an overwhelming share of 81 per cent. The
remaining 19 per cent is shared in descending order by grants, general administration, social services,
law and order, community services, and subsidies. Social services, including essential items like
education, health and other vital welfare spendings, have a share of only 2.7 per cent.
Relevant international comparisons for recent years are none too edifying for Pakistan. Net present
value of external debt as proportion of the GNP is 39.1 per cent for Pakistan, 29.1 per cent for India
and 18 per cent for China. Pakistan's financial position in respect of external debt is much worse than
that of India and China. In domestic debt, Pakistan fares even worse. In the matter of the central
government expenditure, the share of education in GDP is 1.1 per cent in Pakistan and double of that at
2.2 per cent for India and China, and that of population with access to safe drinking water is 50 per cent
for Pakistan, 75 per cent for India and 71 per cent for China.[54]
Debt servicing burden in Pakistan over eight years from 1986-87 to 1994-95 has been going up at 18 per
cent per annum. For the same period the defense cost has been going up annually at the rate of 12 per
cent. For the first time the provision for debt servicing took a lead over defense expenditure in 1988-89,
when this lead was only of the order of 8.6 per cent. By 1994-95 this lead has acquired the staggering
magnitude of 14.1 per cent. In 1987-88, the total of provisions for defense and debt servicing exceeded
the total tax revenues collected in that year and since then this lead is continuing apace. It may be
pointed that the defense and other major items of expenditure are the causative factors of debt servicing
and not vice versa.[55]
PRIVILEGES
Our ruling elites have never been willing to shed their privileges and have in fact been constantly
anxious to expand them. The axe of economic land restructuring always falls on the most essential items
of public expenditure like education, health, supply of clean drinking water, poverty alleviation and
employment promotion programs and maintenance and development of physical infrastructure.[56]
Military regimes in Pakistan rewarded senior officers in the defense establishment with top positions in
Chapter11b
the state structure as well as semi-government and autonomous organizations. in addition, Pakistan's
military dominated state has at each step awarded its principal constituents with the land grants,
defense contracts, permits, licenses and ambassadorial appointments. Apart from the monetary perks
and comforts that come from being the trustees of a security conscious state, military personnel and
their families have enjoyed access to the best health and educational facilities Pakistan has to offer.
Service hospitals and garrison schools dignify the landscape of a country, especially in the province of
the Punjab, with a dismal record on providing basic educational and health facilities to the bulk of its
population.[57]
Military personnel, generally speaking, are better educated than most of the other segments of civil
society. Sharply deteriorating educational standards, suffocating curbs on the press and the deliberate
neglect of the arts, have done much to reduce the knowledge differentials between military personnel
and the small pockets of a civil intelligentsia Pakistan possesses.[58]
Yet most impressive result of more than forty years of dominance over the state apparatus has been the
military establishment's extensive tentacles throughout the economy. Each of the three defense services
in Pakistan have trusts and foundations with large investments in the national economy. The Fauji
Foundation, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation are operating in the country on
commercial basis and making high profits, but they do not pay taxes. The Fauji Foundation, run by the
army, has eight manufacturing units, including sugar, fertilizer, cereals, liquid gas, metals and a gas
field, as well as transportation companies, schools, hospitals and investments in defense production
industries. The largest private sector group in industry has assets worth 50 per cent of the just four
units of Fauji foundation. The incomes from these units are exempt from taxation and legislation
regarding the manufacturing sector. They do not, for instance, have to disclose their assets or make
their shares available for public subscription.[59]
So it is the entrenched interests of the non-elected institutions, the military in particular, within the
state structure and the opportunities this affords for legal and extra-legal privileges which justifies
labeling Pakistan and Bangladesh as the political economies of defense. A political economy of defense
by its very nature encumbers the state's development activities, especially when economic resources are
scarce and the appetites of the non-elected institutions insatiable.[60]

Chapter11b

Chapter11b

Chapter11c
Chapter XI
Page 4
EDUCATION
THE THIRD MOST CORRUPT COUNTRY IN THE WORLD
Absolute power has corrupted our rulers absolutely. They have had their way since the demise of the
Quaid-i-Azam. Corruption is a universal weakness and is hardly confined to Pakistan. But, whereas in
other countries it is abhorred and severely proscribed and punished, we have allowed corruption to
thrive and spread with total impunity. Today, it has pervaded the whole structure of our society, not
excluding politicians, bureaucrats and even some sections of the army.[61] Rampant corruption has
now reached its peak and has engulfed every segment of the society. Successive governments always
made vocal claims and hollow promises to weed it out. But it all sounds false, as all these people were
themselves involved in all types of corrupt practices. Pakistan's credit-rating has been lowered by
several foreign agencies, and it has been labeled as the third most corrupt country in the world by
Transparency International. However, our rulers believe that corruption is a necessary evil in the
developing countries that provides incentive for developments.[62]
Our history is replete with financial scandals such as Cooperatives scam, in which poor and middle
class people lost billions of rupees, and huge unpaid bank loans owed to the politicians as well as
businessmen. The "Mehrangate" affairs is the latest example of massive corruption that has become
part of our system. The arrest of the Mehran Bank chief executive, Yunus Habib, in April 1994, lifted
the curtain from one of the biggest financial scandals in Pakistan's history in which Yunus Habib
siphoned off a staggering five billion rupees and doled out millions of rupees to politicians in order to
cover up his crime. Yunus Habib was arrested on April 7, 1994 by the Federal Investigation Agency on
a complaint by the State Bank of Pakistan for committing misappropriation in the sale proceeds of the
Dollar Bearer Certificates to the tune of $36.7 million.
On April 20, 1994, giving details about the payments made by Yunus Habib to generals, politicians and
political parties, Interior Minister, General Nasirullah Babar, told the National Assembly that the main
beneficiary of his largesse was former army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg who received Rs. 140
million. Others who were named by the Interior Minister included: Jam Sadiq Ali (Rs. 70 million from
Habib Bank and Rs. 150 million from Mahran Bank); MQM's Altaf Hussein (Rs. 20 million); Yusuf
Memon for Ejaz-ul-Haq and Javed Hashmi (Rs. 50 million); Nawaz Sharif (Rs. 6 million); Chief
Minister of Sindh Muzaffar Hussain Shah through his secretary (Rs. 13 million); MQM Haqiqi (Rs. 5
million); former Sports Minister Ajmal Khan (Rs. 1.4 million); Jam Mashooq Ali (Rs. 3.5 million);
Liaquat Jatoi (Rs. 1 million); Dost Mohammad Faizi (Rs. 1 million) and Jam Haider (Rs. 2 million).[63]
Mehran Bank had been doing badly since its very inception in January 1992, and banking experts
unhesitatingly attributed this poor performance to Yunus Habib's penchant for "extra-curricular
banking activities." In fact, the only reason why the bank had managed to stay afloat was the protection

Chapter11c
and patronage enjoyed by Yunus Habib, whereby hefty government accounts were brought to Mehran
Bank.[64]
A mere after five months after its doors were opened to the public, however, the bank was in imminent
danger of being declared near insolvent. General Mirza Aslam Beg, who was chief of army staff at the
time, and the ISI chief, General Javed Nasir came to its rescue and, in the process, unwittingly sealed its
fate. Javed Nasir deposited his organization's foreign exchange reserves totaling to 39 million dollars
with Mehran Bank, which was in clear violation once again of government rules that such banking must
be conducted through state-owned financial institutions.[65]
The ISI account proved to be Yunus Habib's undoing. Habib started dipping into this huge deposit to
finance his customary dealings on the side. What he did not foresee, however, was that Javed Nasir's
successor at the ISI may prefer to do his banking elsewhere. Soon after Lt. General Javed Ashraf took
over in January 1993, the ISI decided to transfer this money to a safer bank. When it tried to withdraw
such a huge amount, however, Yunus Habib's bank was in no position to cough up. And it was precisely
for this reason that Yunus Habib was picked up by a law enforcement agency in late 1993. A deal was
reportedly struck, with Yunus Habib promising to return the money.[66]
Yunus Habib was arrested on April 7, 1994 for misappropriation in the sale proceeds of the Dollar
Bearer Certificates. He subsequently admitted that out of the 36.7 million dollars generated through the
sale of DBCs, a federal government paper that the State Bank sells through commercial banks, he used
20 million dollars to pay back a portion of the amount owed to the ISI and used the rest of the money to
meet some other pressing obligations. According to SBP rules, proceeds from the DBC's (Mehran Bank
was given 40 million dollar worth) have to be deposited within 72 hours of the sale. Yunus Habib did
not meet this deadline -- in fact, never deposited the money at all-- and as the State Bank governor
alleges, misappropriated the funds.[67]
General Aslam Beg, for his part, denies any personal gains in this connection. His organization
FRIENDS claims the money was "donated" by Yunus Habib and "his community" and that the
amount was deposited directly by Habib into the account of "a government agency." Accounts in the
name of an intelligence agency were opened in four separate banks -- Allied Bank, National Bank of
Pakistan, Muslim Commercial Bank and United Bank Limited -- and a total of 140 million rupees was
deposited in these accounts between September 16 and October 26, 1990. This money was withdrawn
almost immediately after it was deposited, and is said to have gone towards bankrolling the 1990
election campaigns of certain politicians. This was not done out of generosity, but allegedly only to
further the career designs of Mirza Aslam Beg, who wanted an extension in his tenure as army
chief.[68]
General Aslam Beg's admission that in 1990 he took Rs 14 crores from Yunus Habib, and that part of
this money was spent by the ISI during the elections that year, while the remaining amount was
deposited in a special ISI account, brings into limelight the political role of our intelligence agencies and
the right they have often arrogated to themselves through their considerable weight on this or that side
of the political scale.
It is no secret that our intelligence agencies, especially since General Zia's martial law, have dabbled in
politics. It is because of this sinister nexus that in Pakistan politics, events taking place behind the
scenes have often been more important than anything taking place on the surface. It is well known that
in the run-up to the 1988 elections, the ISI helped the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, the broad right-wing
alliance which entered the electoral lists against the PPP. Indeed, some senior ISI officials, now retired
recall, with a sense of pride, their role in this regard.[69]
PRESIDENT LEGHARI'S LAND SALES
The controversy over the sale of a 531-acre farm in Darkhwast Jamal Khan owned by President
Leghari and his family to six people from Karachi alleged to be fronting for jailed banker Yunus Habib,
gave a new and dramatic twist to the Mehran gate scandal. The president's integrity and his image, as
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an honest politician, came under question when Nawaz Sharif alleged that Farooq Leghari was involved
in the Mehran Bank scandal. Releasing photocopies of bank drafts worth 17 million rupees deposited in
Mr. Leghari's account in Mehran Bank, Sharif charged that the money was a pay off by Yunus Habib
in return for Leghari's bailing out Mehran bank.[70]
On June 4, 1994, President Leghari conceded that the documents produced by the opposition were
related to the sale of a farm that had been owned by him and several of his family members. He
defended the deal, saying that there was nothing illegal about it. After much delay, the government set
up two judicial commissions to enquire into the Mehran Bank affair and the 140 million rupees paid to
the ISI by Yunus Habib in 1990 while he was provincial chief of Habib Bank.
President Leghari told the Newsline, Karachi: "I did ask Mr. Yunus Habib to see if he could arrange
for any buyers for the land ... But I didn't know those six people (who eventually bought the land). I am
not aware of whether they were fronting for Mr. Yunus Habib or if the land was actually bought by Mr.
Yunus Habib and his family.... As a seller, my only interest was to make sure that I got the price of the
land." President Leghari, however, admitted, that he was approached by Yunus Habib in April, 1993,
when he was Finance Minister in the interim government (April/May 1993) to save Mehran Bank from
collapsing. Mr. Leghari referred Yunus Habib's request to the State Bank, but before getting any reply,
the interim government was dissolved and Mr. Sartaj Aziz, who became the Finance Minister in the
revived government of Nawaz Sharif in April, 1993, ordered the relief given to the Mehran Bank. "The
allegation of my having helped Yunus Habib and saved Mehran Bank is false. It was done by Mr. Sartaj
Aziz and Mr. Nawaz Sharif. But I have the moral courage to say that yes, I also wanted to do the same
and if I had a longer stay as finance minister I would have done the same."[71]
On Dec. 14, 1995 Younus Habib was awarded 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs 36.7 million
in a fraud case by the Special Court for Offenses in Banks in Sindh.[72] However, two years after the
appointment, the judicial commission did not complete its enquiry into the Mehran Bank scam. The
Mehran Bank scam exemplifies the increasingly corrupt political culture that has taken root in this
country. And Mehrangate is just the tip of the iceberg. There are hundreds of banking and financial
scams involving politicians that have yet to surface. It seems that all politicians -- whether they belong
to the ruling coalition or the opposition -- are part of this corrupt political culture. The charges and
counter-charges made by both seem to have only one aim: to cover-up their own crimes.[73]
In July 1994 a commission, comprising five judges, was formed to investigate the Mehran Bank scandal.
It took eight months to complete its inquiry in February 1995 but its report was never published.
However, parts of the reports were released on December 8, 1996, according to which the commission
exonerated President Leghari from any wrong doing in his so-called benami deal. But the commission
did not mention to whom the land was sold by the president for Rs. 15 million and from which account
the money was debited to make the payment. The Commission also cleared the former chief minister of
the North West Frontier Province, Aftab Sherpao and Senator Anwar Saifullah, who were accused of
being the main beneficiaries of the Mehran Bank, of all the allegations. (DAWN 9.12.1996) On May 13,
1997, the Commerce Minister, Ishaq Dar informed the Senate that the report was missing from the Law
Ministry. According to Dar, the Mehran Bank scandal cost a total of Rs. 9.92 billion to the national
exchequer.
ISLAM AND POLITICS
Islam has never been an issue in Pakistan. In fact, even those parties which talk of scientific socialism or
secular politics did not ignore the potential and popularity of the faith in electoral politics. What
however, is a matter of concern is the emergence of propagation of an idea that Islam is opposed to
progress and enlightenment.
The emergence of Pakistan on the world map left the ulema high and dry. While leaving their followers
in the lurch in post-independence India, the self-styled protagonists of the 'Law of Islam' fled to
'Islamize' Pakistan. Soon after independence, when the administration of the new state was coping with
huge problems arising out of the partition of the subcontinent, the ulema began arousing the religious
Chapter11c
passions of the people to get an "Islamic Constitution" passed by the Constituent Assembly.[74]
The cry of 'Islam in danger' was a powerful weapon in the struggle for Pakistan. Every contemporary
politician was aware of the risk that too adventurous policy would be greeted with the dangerous words,
'Islam betrayed.'[75] The politicians therefore wished at least to preserve a facade of harmony on
religious matters until the state should be more firmly established.[76] Therefore the post independence
period presented the political leadership with the problem of the role of Islam in the structure of the
new state. This however, was overshadowed by the need for political stability. Most political leaders and
the "moderates" among the men of religion wanted to see a new flexibility in the social and political
thinking in Islam. But to pursue this issue before the new constitution had been brought into operation,
would have been to invite confusion and conflict.
Politics is 'the art of the possible' and in the long run depends upon convincing the convincible and
politically active middle section of the population towards a particular course of action or way of life.
Each succeeding government in Pakistan hence thought it suitable to continue with the agencies
established to find out the methods for Islamization of the laws and the social structure. As a device to
appease the Ulema and illiterate mass of the people, the political leadership conceded that if the Quran
has clear guidance to offer on any matter, then that guidance must be followed.
Ironically, it was the socialist and secular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who started the process of Islamic
fundamentalism in the country.He was responsible to declare the Ahmadis constitutionally as non-
Muslims. To Islamize the society, he declared Friday as holiday instead of Sunday, and introduced the
subjects of Islamiyat as compulsory subject for the students. He invited the Imam of Ka'ba to Pakistan
to lead the prayers. However, these initiatives could not save him from the ultimate disaster and he
became the victim of his own acts and deeds when almost all the religious parties joined hand in
launching a campaign against him.
Bhutto's successor, General Ziaul Haq fully utilized the process of Islamization to achieve his political
ends and sought legitimacy by implementing Islam as an ideology of Pakistan. General Zia, with the
help of state institutions, weakened the secular and progressive forces and introduced the Hudood,
Qisas and Diyat in the legal system of the country. The Federal Shariat Court was established through
an amendment to the constitution with the powers to examine and decide the question whether or not
any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. (Article 203D of the constitution)
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) has proved as a law-demolishing agency in conflict with parliament as
the constitutionally sovereign legislative body. The Council of Islamic Ideology, another constitutional
body, has restricted itself to a negative role; to identify what is 'repugnant' to Islam without spelling out
the alternative which is 'in conformity' with Islam.[77]
The Islamization process, which was used as a political weapon, has caused severe damage to our
national life. Wrong interpretation of Islam has resulted in the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism
and retrogression. Since the death of General Zia, inconsistency and instability prevails in our laws.
Instability means that the law is frequently changing or is under threat of change because of differences
of opinion among the ruling factions. Three of the most obvious inconsistencies in our Islamic law are
(a) those between legal norms and socially observed norms; (b) those between statutory legal norms and
the norms applied in practice in the courts (e.g. Hadd is difficult to implement as confession, retraction
of confession and strict standards of proof make it difficult to execute); (c) those between different
formal legal norms (e.g. non-compliance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is compromised by
the courts but is strictly punished under the Zina Ordinance). Another example of this contradiction is
that the constitution assures women equal status on the one hand but, on the other hand, they are
greatly discriminated in criminal law.[78]
With the passing of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance in 1990, the victim (or heirs of the victim) of a crime
now have the right to inflict injuries on the offender identical to the ones sustained by the victim. The
law also allows offenders to absolve themselves of the crime by paying compensation to the victim or
their heirs. In the already existing system of bribery and corruption, it gives free hand to the people
with money.[79] The Human Rights activists rightly say that in effect this means, that rich people can
Chapter11c
get away even with willful murder.
The interpretation of the Shariah Act of 1991 has been challenged by the Federal Shariat Court.
Sections 3(2) and 19 of the Act, which safeguard the existing political system and the country's financial
obligations (including interest payments), have been declared un-Islamic by the FSC because of the riba
(interest) involved. In its ruling of January 1992, [ the FSC ruling was actually passed in November
1991, but the 50-page document giving court's opinion was circulated to bankers and government
officials in January 1992.] the Court held that rules and regulations relating to interest were repugnant
to the Quran and Sunnah and should be brought in accordance with Islam. This ruling was
embarrassing to the government, while on the one hand they wanted to satisfy the traditionalists, on the
other hand the ruling was not in accordance with the government's international obligations. A private
appeal was thus lodged with the Supreme Court against the FSC decision. Other rulings of the FSC in
1992 included one stating that the country's system of employment quotas was un-Islamic, as was the
charging of court fees.[80]
Women became the special victims of Islamization of law and its inconsistencies. The Zina Ordinances,
which have been particularly discriminatory against women, continued to be law despite all the
demands from women's organization. [See Chapter VIII for detailed discussion.) As always, the Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is continuously under challenge. In 1992, there was an interesting case in
the Supreme Court where the court declared Section 7 of the ordinance to be against Islam.[81]
The government of Benazir Bhutto is now promoting Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state. A booklet
published by the Ministry of Information -- entitled, Pakistan: a moderate Islamic state -- acknowledges
that "from late 1970s to mid-1980s, Pakistan often found itself specially featuring in (western media)
despatches about "Islamic Fundamentalism," an expression depicting religious intolerance. The
despatches brought out Pakistan as an irrational society suppressing minorities, contemptuous of
human rights, treating women as inferior and generally living inside a cocoon of faith debarring
contemporary compellings. Such negative references have not been totally abandoned but their
frequency has considerably declined in the last about ten years. Some recent developments recreated
misgivings vis-a-vis fundamentalism in Pakistan as blasphemy erupted as an issue. However, a superior
court restored the confidence of the people in the state's commitment to a learned approach. The court's
objective and dispassionate handling of the case has re-emphasized an enlightened approach which is
further sustained by the government's negotiations and consultations with leaders of religious political
parties and scholars to affect amendments in the existing laws on blasphemy to incorporate safeguards
against exploitation of any segment of the population.
In May 1995, the federal cabinet approved two amendments in the blasphemy law -- i.e. article 295-C of
Pakistan Penal Code. The amendments stipulate ten years' prison term for instituting a false blasphemy
charge against anyone and forbids registration of any First Information Report (FIR) on this count
without a preliminary investigation by a judicial officer, not below the rank of deputy commissioner, as
to the veracity of the allegation. However, the proposal met severe resistance from religious and other
groups. The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab passed a resolution against the proposal on May 4,
1995. This was the second resolution of the Punjab Assembly on the issue. On April 20, 1994, the
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution urging the federal government to maintain the blasphemy
law as such. On June 29, 1995, the Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan also passed unanimously a
similar resolution.
The government has now deferred its decision to bring the bill, to amend the blasphemy law, before
parliament since it was not in a position to pass the legislation. In the meantime, the government has
instituted administrative changes to the procedures for filing blasphemy charges. Formerly, individuals
could be charged with blasphemy if any individual filed an FIR with the police. Now, formal charges
cannot be levied until a magistrate has investigated the allegations and determined that they were
credible under the law.
The US Assistant Secretary of state, Robin Raphel, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations sub-
committee, on March 7, 1996, said that the United States recognize that the religious parties in Pakistan
Chapter11c
have "street power" and not "ballot power" and this is a major constraint for the Benazir Bhutto's
government to repeal blasphemy laws. She revealed that more than 150 blasphemy cases have been
lodged in Pakistan since 1986. Most of these have been brought against members of the Ahmadi
community. None of the cases against Ahmadis have resulted in convictions. During the same period, at
least nine cases have been brought against Christians and nine against Muslims. There have been
convictions in some of these cases, but no one has been executed under the law's mandatory death
penalty. Some convictions have been overturned and several individuals are currently appealing their
convictions.[82]
The Lahore High Court, on February 22, 1995, acquitted Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih from
blasphemy charges. They were sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge on February 9, 1995, for
allegedly writing blasphemous word on the wall of a mosque in 1993. The death sentence was quickly
overturned following an international uproar. During the appeal hearings there were almost daily
demonstrations by small religious groups demanding that the sentence should be carried out. After the
judgment, religious groups observed a protest day throughout Pakistan to protest against the acquittal.
The year 1995 also witnessed a ghastly incident of religious frenzy, when Dr. Sajjad Farooq, was beaten
to death by people outside a police station in Gujranwala. He was declared an apostate and accused of
having desecrated the Holy Quran. Dr. Farooq, who was later reported by the press to be a staunch
Muslim, was dragged out from the police station where he was lodged and stoned to death by frenzied
mobs. On the basis of a rumor, apparently circulated by someone out of personal enmity, through loud-
speakers of the mosques in his locality he was proclaimed to be a Christian. While religious fanaticism
of one sort or another has tended to manifest itself in Pakistan in occasional incidents from time to time,
many in the country are now beginning to regard it almost as sacrosanct. The so-called Islamization of
Pakistan during late General Ziaul Haq's regime has imbued the fanatics with a spirit of self-
righteousness which can only be regarded as alarming in any civilized society.[83]
Islam, which should have served to unite the people of Pakistan -- over 90 percent of them being
Muslims -- has been, and is being, misused to divide them into mutually hostile sectarian groups and to
divert their attention from basic social and economic problems.[84] The myth of popular support for
religious parties has repeatedly been exploded by the electorate. Yet, sectarian and religious hate
mongers have proliferated.[85] Major parties are courting leaders of religious parties, while latter's
militias continue fanning the flames of sectarianism.[86] The only all-Pakistan force that seems to be
growing uniformly is sectarianism.
LACK OF NATIONAL SPIRIT
We have not been successful at nation-building because we failed miserably at state-building. A

desperate people cannot be made into a solid and cohesive community if the governments which
supposedly represent their interests are themselves riddled with contradictions and ill intentions.
Consequently, in nearly half a century of our existence we could not create a Pakistani nation. Our
rulers are as much responsible for the suppression and distortion of the political process as for the loss
of that sense of belonging essential for the survival of a country. They divided the community. People no
longer belong to Pakistan but to a Biradari or a tribe. Their allegiance is to some religious sect and they
think only in terms of themselves and their families. We see greater benefits by being Pathans, Sindhis,
Balochis, Punjabis and Mohajirs, rather than being respectable Pakistanis.
Hatred has taken hold so much that those people who opted for Pakistan and fled their homes and who
by the stroke of destiny did not find their way to West Pakistan but, instead, found their way to East
Pakistan and who are unfortunately locked there, are not welcomed in their chosen country.[87] The
diplomacy of divide and rule is still the axis of our ruling elite's thinking. We have not learnt to be
Pakistani and only Pakistanis, to share our bread together as brothers with justice and fairness for the
good of our homeland.
Our governance has been reduced merely to privilege, self and propaganda, de-linking power from
responsibility and confusing opportunism with leadership. The major political parties, the PPP and
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PML(N), are merrily engaged in playing a game of musical chairs vying with each other in relentless
quest for political power, and more importantly, for access to the financial bonanza which goes with it.
The two parties represent narrow social and economic interests: the PPP has become the main
organization representing the interests of the landed aristocracy while the PML (N) represents mainly
the Punjab-and-Frontier-based big business and industry. None of them represent the aspirations of
our country's heterogeneous society. The criminalization of politics and the insatiable greed and
unscrupulous ambitions of our politicians has eroded public faith in not only the country's political
leadership but also in the democratic system itself. The present system of governance threatens to
remain so for a millennium if a revolution does not overtake it. According to Chief Justice Aziz Ahmadi
of India,[88] the citizen cannot be expected to wait for the system to correct itself; he will and can be
expected to take upon himself the task of enforcing the rights granted to him by the constitution.
There is a risk that Pakistan -- which typifies what Gunnar Myrdal [89] calls a soft state because it
lacks social discipline, it is high on promise and low on delivery -- will join the many countries in Africa
and soon become one of the failed states. This risk draws closer every day. According to Shahid Javed
Burki of the World Bank, the country is now left with no viable institutions, including that of the
judiciary and "we are in danger of losing Jinnah's legacy."[90] "Given the impact of change, Pakistan
could cease to exist in its sovereign nation-state form. With the approach of the twenty-first century,
Pakistanis may at last find their elusive commonwealth, only it may not be the one envisaged by the
nation's creators.[91]" It is time for our politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals to rise to the occasion
and ensure that the forecasts of Professor Ziring do not come true.[92] The real fear is that if things
slide as they are doing, sometime early in the next century there may not be a State of Pakistan.[93] The
Caretaker Prime Minister, Malik Meraj Khalid, referring to a UN report which stated that Pakistan
would break into pieces in two decades, said that Pakistan does no longer exists ideologically. [94]

Chapter11c

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter XI
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Some recent speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Published by Sheikh
Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1947, p. 380
2. Putting the record straight by Nisar Osmani - Dawn 14.12.1993
3. The Search for political stability by M. H. Askari - Dawn 14.8.1993
4. Nisar Osmani, op. cit.
5. Pakistan Times, October 10, 1958 cited by Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan.
6. Four decades of decadence by Dr. Afzal Iqbal - the Muslim 1.11.91
7. The search for political stability by M. H. Askari - Dawn 14.8.1994
8. Pakistan: The enigma of political development by Prof. Lawrence Ziring - pp-131
9. The search for political stability by M. H. Askari - Dawn 14.8.1994
10. Has the system broken down? by M.H.Askari - Dawn 21.2.1995
11. Ibid.
12. Masud Mufti, Democracy or feudocracy? - Dawn 16.9.1995
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Why save the system? by Bala A. Khawaja - Dawn Tuesday Review, Feb. 21 1995
16. Culture against democracy by Eqbal Ahmad - Dawn 25.6.95]
17. Ghani Eirabie, The Coup bid and its loud message, Dawn 21.11.1995
18. Out of the nine federal legislatures that have come into being in Pakistan since independence, only
two National Assemblies have been allowed to complete their normal term. Three were booted out by
men in uniform. On four occasions, the head of state claimed to have exercised his constitutional
authority while dissolving the assembly.
http://www.ghazali.net/book1/reference10.htm (1 of 7) [10/14/2004 3:45:36 AM]

Islamic Pakistan
19. In the case of Sharaf Faridi vs the State (1989), it was held by the High Court of Sindh that in a
setup where the constitution is based on trichotomy of power, judiciary enjoys a unique and supreme
position with the framework of the constitution as it creates balance amongst various organs of the
State and is the sentinel of the rights of the people and the custodian of the constitution. [PLD 1989
Karachi 404 at 444) The Supreme Court, while upholding this decision had held that "the independence
of judiciary means that every judge is free to decide matter before him in accordance with his
assessment of the facts and understanding of the law without improper influence, inducement of
pressures direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason: and that the judiciary is independent of
the executive and the judiciary has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a judicial
nature. [PLD 1994 SC 105]
20. Article 30 of the 1962 constitution provided that the President could, in case of emergency, issue
ordinance, whether or not the Assembly was in session, and the Assembly would have no authority to
disapprove of them.
21. Legislation without parliament by Munib Akhtar - Dawn 19.5.95
22. Making Constitution safer for democracy by Justice (retd) Dorab Patel - Dawn 22.5.1993
23. Contempt of Court - The Economist, London, 18.2.1995
24. This is not to say that all the people appointed to the Superior Courts by authoritarian rulers have
not performed their functions with dignity and impartiality. After all, those who delivered the
dissenting judgment in the ZAB case and those who refused to take oath under Zia's PCO were also
appointed by the same usurper rulers.
25. The slaying of judiciary by Ardeshir Cowasjee - Dawn 1.4.1994
26. Contempt of Court - The Economist 18.2.1995
27. The question of criteria by Ghayurul Islam - Dawn 17.8.1994
28. Not by law of contempt alone-II by I.A.Rehman - Dawn 26.4.1995
29. Dawn 20.3.1996
30. Dawn 27.5.9
Land reforms were introduced in East Pakistan in 1950 which destroyed the centuries old feudal
system. The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 embodied a series of radical reforms
in the land ownership and tenure system of East Pakistan. A ceiling of 100 bighas (about 33 acres) or 10
bighas per family member, whichever is greater, plus an additional 10 standard bighas for the
homestead were fixed under the act, while sub-letting was forbidden.
The major province East Pakistan was likely to urge enforcement of similar land reforms in West
Pakistan since this measure would have broken the political and economic stranglehold of the feudal
classes out of decision-making. To begin with, parity was introduced so that as a majority province East
Pakistan should not impose such radical measures as land reforms for the benefit of the landless
peasants of West Pakistan. This tacit understanding among the feudal class, headed by Kalabaghs,
Gardezis, Gilanis and Qureshis was to prove a major factor in the feeling of deprivation in decision-
making on the part of the East Pakistan and sowed the seeds of eventual separation between the two
wings of the country. {The unrealized dream by A.H.Kardar - Dawn 19.8.95 (See also page 82)}
Apart from the lack of geographical contiguity of the two wings, the people of the eastern wing were
sensitive and politically more conscious than those living in West Pakistan who were suffering under the
Islamic Pakistan
age old domination of feudal lords and serfdom of tribal sardars. Linguistic, racial and social
differences accentuated this situation and the military rulers could not, for long, ignore the feelings of
the people of the more populous part of the country. East Pakistan began to act as brake on
dictatorship and exercised a steady pull towards democracy. Indeed, the restraint that East Pakistan
exercised on unbridled dictatorship was a factor which led those who supported these regimes to feel
that they would be better off without the eastern half of the country. (Mohammad Asghar Khan,
Generals In Politics - pp 3,4)
35. M. Ziauddin, Tax: Those who rule do not pay - Dawn 23.9.1995
36. Eqbal Ahmed, Pakistan at forty-eight - Dawn 14.8.1994
37. National crisis in perspective by Syed Shahid Husain - Dawn 12.12.1995
38. M. Ziauddin, Tax: Those who rule do not pay - Dawn 23.9.1995
39. Dawn 9.5.1996
40. Dimensions of social change by Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Dawn - 19.4.1994
41. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development p-218
42. The rule of the troika by Dr. Mubashir Hasan - Dawn - 21.2.1993
43. Putting the record straight by Nisar Osmani - Dawn 14.12.1993
44. In reply to a question regarding Haji Saifullah's case (challenging the President's decision to
dissolve the National Assembly in August 1990), General Aslam Beg told the journalists in Lahore on
Feb. 4, 1993: "I did try to convey to the Honorable Supreme Court that, we had given a solemn
undertaking to the nation that elections to the National Assembly would be held according to the
schedule already announced and that, therefore, it would be in the best interest of the nation that we
stick to our promise and the said elections were allowed to be held accordingly."
When further asked whether his action did not constitute contempt of court, his answer was that "I
definitely did not think so as the information sought to be conveyed in good faith and in national
interest." [Statement of Aslam Beg filed in the Supreme Court - Dawn, March 2, 1993] On February 21,
the Court formally charged General Beg with contempt of court. When the trial started, General Beg
met with the Army Chief of Staff, General Waheed and through him assured President and the army
leadership that he will not damage their image. [Azhar Suhail, The government of agencies, p-106.]
On February 20, 1993, during the preliminary proceedings, the Chief Justice Dr. Naseem Shah
censured the respondent for giving an "irresponsible and careless" answer to the question asked by the
press on Feb. 4, and remarked: "we are very sorry to hand over the defense of the country to a person if
he was so careless." The honorable Chief Justice, in a moment of great anger also observed: "I do not
change my opinion, even if Allah the Almighty directed me to do so." Yet again, on 22 February 1993,
the Chief Justice in anger held out the threat to the reporters and the respondent that "if you fail to
produce the tapes, I shall blacken many faces" and "I shall ensure that I send some of you to your
graves and hell." [Statement of Aslam Beg in the Supreme Court - Dawn March 2, 1993]
On March 1, General Beg told the court that Chairman Senate Waseem Sajjad had carried his message
to the Supreme Court to block restoration of Junejo assembly. Waseem Sajjad denied Beg's statement.
At the end, General Beg was let off by a weary but thoroughly indignant Supreme Court with a
conviction without a sentence. On appeal, even that conviction was overturned by the same court. In a
majority judgment, the Supreme Court decided on January 9, 1994 to drop proceedings against
General Beg.
Islamic Pakistan
45. Time for a national agenda by Iqbal Jafar - Dawn 16.1.1994
46. Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, Anwar Saifullah, told newsmen on
29.4.1995 that the coalition government of Pakistan Democratic Front (PDF) was sharing power with
the army to bring stability to the democratic system. Though decisions are taken by the chief executive
(prime minister), there is a sharing of power, Saifullah told newsmen at the Face-the-Press program of
Rawalpindi-Islamabad Union of Journalists. He asserted that the Prime Minister had the final word on
any issue "but she consults the President and the army chief on matters of national interest,
particularly on foreign affair issues, security and defense." He argued that like judiciary, the military
was also a kind of check on the working of the government. Dawn 29.4.1995
47. M.B.Naqvi, Basic flaws in foreign policy, Dawn 1.4.1994
48. The Herald July 1992
49. In the lap of bureaucracy by Karamt Ali and B.M. Kutty, Dawn 14.2.1992
50. The new bureaucrat: Public servant or feudals' Munshi? by Masud Mufti, Dawn 5.5.1995
51. Dawn 30.3.1996
52. Defense Vs Human Development by Ayesha Jalal [Dawn - 17.2.1996]
53. M.B.Naqvi, Basic flaws in foreign policy, Dawn - 1.4.1994 ]
54. M. Ziauddin, Strategic role of defense, debt-servicing in budget - Dawn 8.7.1995
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ayesha Jalal, op. cit.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Corruption: stench is everywhere - Dawn - 4.7.1994
62. At a briefing of foreign press correspondents, the question was asked of Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto whether she was aware that her country had been rated the third most corrupt country of the
world. Rather than refuting the rating, the Prime Minister held that some economists maintain that in
developing countries corruption is a necessary evil that provides incentives for development. She must
have picked up this idea from a US official, Joseph Nye, who once wrote that he thought that perhaps a
little bit of corruption in developing countries, at a very low level, helped to push the file faster. By this,
he did not mean institutionalized corruption at the topmost level that seeps all the way down to the
bottom. [Bare bones - unrefuted, Dawn 6.10,1995]
63. Dawn 21.4.1994
64. The Herald, April, 1994

Islamic Pakistan
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. M.H.Askari, Aftermath of the MBL scam - Dawn 27.4.1994
70. Newsline June 1994
71. Ibid.
72. Dawn 15.12.1995
73. Newsline, June 1994
74. The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan by Zulfikar Khalid Maluka p-69
75. Keith Callard, Pakistan - A Political Study, P-208
76. Ibid. p-225-226
77. What have we made of our Islamý? Prof. Abdul Qayyum, Dawn - 12.6.1992
78. The Islamization of Laws in Pakistan by Rubya Mehdi - p-222
79. Ibid. p-225
80. Ibid. p-227
81. Ibid. p-227
82. Dawn 8.3.1996
83. Religious fanaticism at its worst by M.H. Askari - Dawn 4.5.1995
84. In the lap of bureaucracy by Karam Ali and B.M. Kutty - Dawn 14.2.1992
85. Eqbal Ahmad, Pakistan at forty-eight - Dawn 14.8.1994
86. Impervious to challenges by M.B. Naqvi - Dawn 16.1.1995
87. In a joint India-Bangladesh agreement signed at New Delhi in April 1973, the Bangladesh
government agreed to seek a solution to all "humanitarian problems" arising out of the war of
secession, including the repatriation of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh and Bangalies detained in
Pakistan. It was clear that all non-Bengalis who allegiance to Pakistan and opted for Pakistan would be
covered by this agreement. In a further meeting in 1974,( following Pakistan's recognition of
Bangladesh) attended by Pakistan's Minster of State, Mr. Aziz Ahmad, however, somewhat deviated
from the position originally stipulated and said that necessary authorization for movement to Pakistan
would be issued to all those non-Bengalis who were either domiciled in the western wing or were
employees of the federal government or were members of divided families. This excluded the large

Islamic Pakistan
number of non-Bengali Pakistanis, the bulk of whom are now living in the camps of Bangladesh and are
popularly described as Biharis. Their number is said to be about 250,000. Various governments in
Islamabad from time to time have declared their intention to repatriate these Pakistanis to Pakistan.
The Bangladesh authorities in the meantime have given them freedom to stress their identity as
Pakistanis and even enabled them to set up Urdu-medium schools for their children. With the passage
of time, the repatriation of the Biharis to Pakistan seems less and less likely to happen even though
morally and constitutionally Pakistan is committed to bringing them over.
88. Dawn 1.3.1996
89. Gunnar Myrdal - An Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations - New York: Pantheon
Books, 1968, Vol. 1, p-66 cited by Khalid Bin Sayeed in Western Dominance and Political Islam
90. Dawn 6.12.1995
91. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development - p-257
92. Humayun Akhtar - Politicians beware! Lest Prof. Ziring's predictions come true - Dawn 18.3.1994
93. The bare bones by Adreshir Cowasjee - Dawn 1.9.1995]
94. Dawn 5.1.1997

Islamic Pakistan

Chapter10a
Chapter X
Page 2
1997 Constitutional Crisis

The crisis with judiciary began in August 1997 when the chief justice recommended elevation of five
named judges to the Supreme Court. On Sept. 5, the Supreme Court suspended a government
notification to reduce the number of judges from 17 to 12. The federal government, on Sept. 16,
withdrew its notification. However, from around August 20 up to the middle of October there was
practically no other issue in contest -- publicly. And the resistance to the recommendation, in fact not-so
veiled refusal to comply with it, was coming from Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and not the parliament.
On October 10, the aggrieved judges took the opportunity of a brief absence of Justice Sajjad from the
country to call a full court review under the chairmanship of the acting chief justice. Justice Sajjad
returns home in haste on October 13, calls off the full court meeting and transfers all dissident judges to
the outposts of the apex court in Quetta, Karachi, Peshawar and Lahore.
The breach was now clearly in the open. The resentment of the dissident judges -- respected members of
the judiciary -- must have been intense. The Chief Justice was master of the house, but a bitterly
divided house. In an unprecedented move, on October 21, five honorable judges of the Supreme Court
sent a letter to the President of Pakistan, to complain about the behavior of the Chief Justice of
Pakistan and distance themselves from some of his actions. This letter was originally written to the chief
justice, and later sent to the president. Never before in Pakistan's history had such an incident
occurred.
On November 3, a petition of contempt of court is entertained by the CJ against the PM and his close
associates. A charged atmosphere was super-charged by summoning the PM to appear in the court on
November 17 and demanding the Speaker of the National Assembly to turn over the expunged record of
the assembly proceedings. Yet, another breach of the assembly's privilege.
A three-member Supreme Court bench, headed by the then chief justice "directed the president" on
Nov 20 not to give assent to the Contempt of Court (Amendment) Bill 1997, as under: "In the
circumstances we deem it fit and proper to direct respondent No. 1 (President of Pakistan) in
constitutional petition No. 4 43 of 1997 not to give assent, and if assent has already been given the
operation of the Contempt of Court (Amendment) Act of 1997 is hereby suspended until further
orders." There was no precedent, nor apparent ground in law, for the chief justice to prohibit the
president's assent to that bill, and even less to rule the bill suspended if the assent had already been
given.
The bill amending the law of contempt was innovative in that it provided for an appeal against a
Supreme Court conviction for contempt, for automatic stay of the conviction, and for that appeal to be
heard by another set of judges of the same court.
On Nov. 26, the Supreme Court, Quetta Bench, declared Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah's appointment in
abeyance and the Prime Minister sends to president the name of the new Chief Justice for approval.
Chapter10a
This case was the strangest of the strange, indeed, one in which not only the little-known petitioners but
even the federation stated that the appointment of Justice Shah by superseding three senior judges was
illegal. The next day, a five-member Supreme Court bench annuls Quetta bench's verdict over CJ's
suspension while; the Supreme Court Peshawar bench endorses Quetta bench's order.
The ruling political party was not far behind in ugliness when the party's rabble attacked the Supreme
Court premises on November 28. It was one of Pakistan's saddest days. There is no doubt the
disgraceful attack on the Supreme Court was completely premeditated.
On December 2, by suspending the 13th Amendment in a total arbitrary manner, the stage was set for
the dismissal of the government of Nawaz Sharif. The grant of temporary restoration of the presidential
power to dissolve the National Assembly (the repealed Article 58(2)b on the ground of a break-down of
the constitutional machinery was obviously an act of desperation to prevent a feared collapse. It was
virtually the last throw of the dice in a do-or-die game.
After weeks of machinations and Machiavellian scheming aimed at ousting Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif from power, the country's partisan president had finally to resign on Dec. 2. Mr. Leghari had
never relished the fact that Mr. Nawaz Sharif should have taken away his powers to dismiss the
government through the 13th Amendment. In fact, President Leghari and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
both used the Pakistani judiciary to establish their personal authority. In this power game, Chief
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was very much with Mr. Leghari. But this power struggle could not be carried
on because of the effective intervention of the Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat.
Mr. Leghari apparently had ruthless dictatorial ambitions and was never content with the ceremonial
role that he was constitutionally assigned. He dismissed the duly elected government of Ms Benazir
Bhutto and came very close to dislodging another. He engineered an unholy alliance with Chief Justice
Sajjad Ali Shah to carry out a constitutional coup and the Chief Justice was a willing ally in the
conspiracy to subvert the people's mandate. Chief Justice Shah relentlessly attempted to provide Mr.
Leghari the dictatorial powers under the Eighth Amendment to deliver the proverbial coup de grace to
the Sharif regime.
Mr. Leghari had never relished the fact that Mr. Nawaz Sharif should have taken away his powers to
dismiss the government through the 13th Amendment. In fact, the Pakistani judiciary was used both by
Mr. Leghari and Mr. Nawaz Sharif to establish their personal authority. In this power game, Chief
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was very much with Mr. Leghari. But this power struggle could not be carried
on because of the effective intervention of the Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat.
When Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was removed from the office, on Dec. 2, the crucial issues pending before
the Supreme Court were:
1. Contempt of court action against Nawaz Sharif and seven others.
2. Petition regarding the unlawful allotment of thousands of plots by him when chief minister of Punjab.
3. Petition regarding the unlawful ISI distribution of Rs. 140 million of the people's money to him and
others.
4. Petition regarding award of wheat transport contract by him to his crony Saeed Shaikh.
5. Petition regarding his misuse of power in pressurizing banks to settle loan cases out of court.
6. Petition challenging his Anti-terrorist Act 1997.
7. Petitions regarding suspension of 13th and 14th Amendments. ]

Chapter10a
Judiciary damaged
Victory of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been at the expense of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and
indeed superior judiciary as such. The SC judges have not held their image and prestige by becoming
controversial. It is a settled principle that no writ will be issued by one judge to another. It was a
pathetic spectacle to see two Supreme Court benches suspended the chief justice of their own court
while the chief justice retaliated by recommending disciplinary action against all four of five judges
involved. Repeatedly, order by one bench was overturned by another. Then political workers invaded
the Supreme Court several times and abused the judges and indulging in violence. This was the darkest
hour for the judiciary in the country. Gone were the days when it was universally respected as the
cleanest and the most upright institution. Both sets of judges have been accused by their detractors of
being motivated by personal and other extraneous considerations in their mutual bickering and tussle.
The irony of the crisis was that, eventually, it was not the executive that gave the final and, perhaps,
fatal blow to the chief justice. It was his own peers who let him down. The very institution they wished
to strengthen fell to the ground by their own actions. No one is left with any doubts that the judges are
far from impartial.
The law and its traditions have since long become a fiction in courtrooms. The only difference this time
was that the decay in the judiciary unfolded for all to see. The price paid by the superior judiciary is
certainly very high. The crisis with judiciary have only served to confirm that, irrespective of how
"stubborn" or "vindictive" a chief justice may be, he is no match against a government that excels in
the art of wheeling and dealing. (6)
Nawaz Sharif has succeeded in achieving what General Zia set out to do when he was cut short by
destiny. In fact, the late dictator could not have hoped for a more competent lieutenant. General Zia
had no patience for independent judges and thought nothing of replacing the ones who did not agree
with him. Sharif has demonstrated the same tendency and, as in everything else, has surpassed his
mentor in achieving his objectives. The judiciary today lies in ruins, devastated by the kind of power
politics that was once the domain of political parties. (7)
The repercussions of the rulings given in haste or in anger will long dog the course of justice. During the
crisis, the people have seen the Alice in Wonderland spectacle where the judges pass the judgment first
and hear the witnesses later. Inevitably the feeling has arisen that the superior courts exist only for the
seekers and brokers of power while the ordinary litigants languish into generations before their cases
appear on the "cause list" which appeared quickly and abundantly when political power was at stake.
(8)
Why the Army did not intervene?

It was apparently failure of the army to sustain the president's position -- the presidents have always
depended on the army for their actions against the government -- that President Leghari was forced to
resign. Theoretically, in a Westminster-style democracy that this country has tried to emulate, there are
four pillars of the state -- the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and the press. But our country
rests imbalanced on five. The fifth pillar, the most powerful, the richest, the most organized, is the army
which has governed Pakistan for half its 50-year existence. (9)
Fortunately, at present the chances of a direct take-over by the army seem remote because of economic
factors and the international environment. There is a renewed emphasis on democracy worldwide in the
aftermath of the Cold War and Pakistan cannot be immune to these global trends. Now it will be
difficult for the Pakistani armed forces to sell a coup to the world in general and to the United States in
particular.
Some political analysts believed that the army simply could not intervene for fear of a division within its
Chapter10a
own ranks. The army's involving itself in politics, at this stage, would have meant taking sides. Which
would have made the army controversial and opinion within the forces would have strongly differed.
That threat was all too real as numerous press stories had mentioned it. Therefore the fact that the
army did not participate in political matters by siding with the president or anyone else and that he in
fact refused to bail out the president and the CJP bespeaks the fear that the leadership had of the
consequences of upholding any of them.
Moreover, Mr. Nawaz Sharif was no pushover like Benazir Bhutto was. It could legitimately be foreseen
and feared that there would be a backlash in Punjab and the situation may not be easily controllable
even by the army. And of course, there was the danger of the army being divided within itself. In fact
the limits to army's political power have become visible even to ordinary citizens. (10) However, thanks
to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the turn of events - especially those in the third week of November -
have, by default, made the army establishment's dream come true: It now has a much greater say in the
affairs of the government without its concomitant responsibility.
According to the Washington Post, the army sided with Sharif today by making clear that it would not
back President Leghari if he dismissed the prime minister. The Post reported that Leghari had
informed the army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, that he intended to dismiss Nawaz Sharif and was
drafting an explanatory speech. But General Karamat delivered a message of his own: The army would
not back Sharif's ouster, in effect making any such order meaningless. (11)
Looming economic crises in Pakistan prevented the army from taking over control of the country
during the current political crisis, according to the Times, London. "In another era the army would
have taken over. This time, the looming economic crisis doubtless deterred it from dosing so, given the
certainty that international financial institutions would have shunned a nation led by military
dictators." The generals were bound to engineer the Prime Minister's survival because the only
alternative was martial law, a fact that emboldened Mr. Sharif to take on two such important
institutions. (12)
In a comment the New York Times said: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has won a constitutional battle
with the president and supreme court chief justice, but he had to get the army's support to prevail.
"The army behaved responsibly by insuring the continuation of an elected government. Still, it is
discouraging to see the army remains such a powerful arbiter." Mr. Nawaz Sharif had become the most
powerful Prime Minister since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (13)
According to the Financial Times, London, General Jehangir Karamat, the army chief, has intervened
twice in the growing constitutional crisis, apparently in both cases to save Nawaz Sharif from
premature downfall. On this occasion, Pakistan's military has chosen to side with an elected parliament
rather than bring the tanks on to the streets. But the very fact that it took the chief of staff's
interventions shows how qualified a victory it is for Pakistan's democracy and how politically important
the military remains. (14)
Senator Tarar elected as President

Senator Rafiq Ahmad Tarar, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, was elected president on December
31, 1997. Amid speculations that the presidency would go to a smaller province since the Prime Minister
and the Army Chief of Staff are from the Punjab province, the presidential race had narrowed down to
Senator Sartaj Aziz and Acting President Wasim Sajjad when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif dropped
his bombshell: "Justice (retd) Rafiq Ahmed Tarar was to be Pakistan's next president. " Over the next
two days, it became apparent that even Sharif's cabinet knew nothing about the decision while this
unexpected announcement left many Muslim Leaguers bewildered.
For his remarks in press interviews against the judiciary, Justice of the Supreme Court, Mukhtar
Ahmad Junejo, who also held the post of Acting Chief Election Commissioner, rejected Tarar's
nomination on December 18. A petition was filed against Junejo's order in the Lahore High Court.
Chapter10a
Justice Qayyum admitted the petition on December 19 and suspended Junejo's order, allowing Tarar to
"participate in the election provisionally subject to further orders." Justice Junejo was removed and
replaced by retired Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry as the Chief Election Commission.
It is no mere coincidence that he was on the Supreme Court bench that reinstated Nawaz Sharif as
Prime Minister on May 26, 1993. Also casting a dark shadow on him is the referendum of December
1994 when, as a member of Zia's election commission, he solemnly assured the people that 55 per cent
and not just five per cent of the electorate had turned out to confer legitimacy on Zia's dictatorial rule.
Mr. Tarar also has to dispel the widely insinuated impression that he was involved in the "Quetta
Shuttle" which divided the Supreme Court and wrote the saddest chapter in Pakistan's constitutional
history. (15)
The selection of Senator Tarar as a presidential candidate was a surprise to all and not too well received
by a broad section of society. The Prime Minister, of course, had his own reasons that he explained in
his interview with the BBC. He said Senator Tarar was a patriot and a man of integrity and belonged to
the middle class section of society. This could, of course, be said for millions of others as well. When
asked why the presidential candidate was not selected from a smaller province as was being expected by
the people, the Prime Minister said that such "petty matters" should not be given any consideration.
The full participation by all the provinces in the federal decision-making process in Islamabad is
essential for the unity and solidarity of the federation and is certainly not a "petty matter." (16)
LHC upholds Tarar's plea
The Lahore High Court accepted, on Feb. 9 1998, the constitutional petition filed by Rafiq Tarar
against his disqualification by the (former) Acting CEC and declared him qualified to contest for and
hold the office of President. The acting CEC, Justice Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo of the Supreme Court,
had found Tarar, a former Supreme Court Judge, guilty of propagating views prejudicial to the
integrity and independence of the judiciary at the time of his nomination as a presidential candidate
under Article 63(G) of the Constitution and debarred him from the December, 1997 contest.
The short verbal order did not deal with the question of fact involved in the case - whether Tarar in his
interview of the weekly Takbir of June 27, 1996, and statement to the daily Jang, Rawalpindi, of Dec 4,
1997, propagated views prejudicial to the judiciary. Neither before the acting CEC nor in the LHC did
Tarar or his counsel categorically denied the allegedly contemptuous statements in their entirety.
Tarar's counsel, Barrister Ijaz Hussein Batalvi told the LHC that the interview carried by Takbeer did
not fully convey the views of Tarar. In any case, Tarar was elected senator after the interview and was
not debarred from the senatorial contest. The Jang interview did not refer to any judge as no judge left
in disgrace on Dec 2. Besides, a penal action could not be based on newspaper reports. Again, a
presidential candidate who is also a sitting member of parliament cannot be disqualified under Article
63. Article 41(2) says that a candidate should be qualified to be elected a member of parliament under
Article 62 and disqualification under Article 63 cannot be read into it.

Chapter10a

Chapter10b
Chapter X
Page 3
Pakistan Human Rights situation criticized

The US State Department in its Annual 1997 Human Rights Report harshly criticized Pakistan's
general political and human rights situation, saying the government infringed on citizens' privacy
rights, extra-judicial killings in Karachi were still common, the judiciary was under political influence
and journalists were on payrolls of agencies. "The government's human rights record remained poor in
1997, with serious problems regarding police abuse, religious discrimination, and child labor."
The report released on Jan. 30, 1998, said:
* The government imposes limits on the freedom of assembly, movement, and-for the Ahmadis in
particular-religion. The extra-judicial killing of criminal suspects, often in the form of deaths in police
custody or staged encounters in which the police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Although
Karachi remained a hotbed of politically motivated violence, extra-judicial killings by security forces
there had diminished (as compared to the previous government).
* The authorities sometimes transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom
prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shielded their colleagues. The Amnesty
International estimated that up to 100 people died from police torture each year.
* The MQM contends that several thousand of its members are still in jail on politically motivated
charges that date from the 1992-96 period. The government is supposed to be reviewing the cases of
these imprisoned individuals (most of whom are awaiting trial) to see if they can be released. To date,
few of them have been released.
Although Pakistan's constitution provided for an independent judiciary, in practice, the judiciary was
subject to political influence. Journalists, routinely underpaid, are on the unofficial payrolls of many
competing interests, and the military (or elements within it) is presumed to be no exception.
The Human Rights Society of Pakistan described the US State Department's report on human rights
environment in Pakistan as a "fairly" objective document and said that it needed to be taken seriously.
In a statement issued on Feb. 2, HRSP chairman S. M. Zafar said:
* The society shared the concern of the US State Department with regard to the attitude of police
towards human rights and considered it to be failure of successive governments in Pakistan in
controlling the situation.
* The argument about the problem being a legacy of the past was untenable as "the 1997 record of the
government does not indicate any serious attempt by the government to punish the violators, some of
Chapter10b
whom resorted to extra judicial killings". Unless the government could exhibit an iron will, the bad
habit already formed would continue to persist, he pointed out.
* The US report correctly portrayed the damage suffered by the judiciary that required immediate
attention of all concerned. Code of conduct of judges for the superior court, he added, should be
followed in letter and spirit by the learned judges and the government should avoid in passing any law,
constitutional or otherwise that might erode the independence of judiciary.
MQM leader Altaf Hussein acquitted in Major Kaleem

kidnapping case
A division bench of the Sindh High Court on Feb. 5 1998 acquitted Muttahida Qaumi Movement chief
Altaf Hussain and 18 other top leaders in the Major Kaleem kidnapping case and overturned Altaf
Hussain's 27-year jail sentence ordered by a special Suppression of Terrorist Activities (STA) court.
The court ordered the release of three of the 18 acquitted leaders - Ashfaq Chief, Javed Kazmi and Haji
Jalal- who are serving their term in Karachi Central Prison. Ashfaq Chief, Javed Kazmi and Haji Jalal
were sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment while others, including Altaf Hussain, sentenced in absentia
and declared absconders, were awarded 27 years' imprisonment each. The 16 others acquitted in the
case included Altaf Hussain, Saleem Shahzad, Safdar Baqri, Dr Imran Farooq, Yousuf, Nadeem Ayubi,
Ayub Shah, Aftab Ahmed, Ismail alias Sitara, Ashraf Zaidi, Sajid Azad, Asghar Chacha and Rehan
Zaidi.
After A.Q. Halepota, one of the counsels for the Muttahida leaders, concluded his arguments, the court
asked Advocate-General Shaukat Zubedi to make his submissions. Zubedi said that a lot of omissions
amounting to contradictions had been made during the trial and that he would not support the
convictions of the accused by the STA court. The advocate-general said further that the proper course
would be to send the case for retrial before a competent court, but the court didn't agree with his
contention and acquitted the appellants.
According to the prosecution, Major Kaleem and three other army officers were patrolling the Landhi
area in civilian clothes in an army jeep when about 20-armed youths took them hostage after seizing
their weapons. The army men were taken to a place called White House in Landhi where they were
allegedly tortured and kept for seven hours. They were rescued when the police reached the place.
The incident had happened on June 20, 1991 and the FIR of the incident was lodged on June 24. The
accused in the case had been charged with kidnapping the army officers and torturing them. Trial
before STA Court No. 3, began before judge Ghazanfar Ali Shah in March 1993 and the judgment was
delivered on June 9, 1994 when Altaf Hussain was not in Pakistan.
The counsel for the Muttahida leaders pointed out a number of contradictions in the statements of the
state witnesses who had appeared before the STA court. They said the state witnesses had failed to
substantiate how army officers possessing automatic weapons could be overpowered by armed youths.
The counsel also submitted before the court that Major Kaleem and those with him should have been
court-martialled for surrendering to civilian youths instead of accusing the Muttahida leadership of
kidnapping and torturing the armymen. They were of the view that it was a fabricated case against the
Muttahida.
They argued that the names of top Muttahida leaders were not mentioned by the state witnesses, but
were later inserted in the challan by the investigation officer, and added that this suggested that the
party leadership had been named in the case with mala fide intention.
The Major Kaleem kidnapping case took a new turn on Feb. 4, when a prosecution witness confessed
that the name of MQM chief Altaf Hussain had been belatedly inserted in the FIR. Akbar Beg, the
officer who had conducted the initial investigation into the case, told the court that Altaf Hussain's
Chapter10b
name was included in the challan against him after the start of the army operation against the MQM.
SC issues detailed judgment in Sajjad's appointment case

The Supreme Court on Feb. 9, 1998 issued detailed judgment on the petitions challenging the
appointment of Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the chief justice of Pakistan. The ten-member bench headed
by Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui in its short order on Dec 23, 1997 had declared the appointment of
Justice Sajjad as the CJ, illegal and unconstitutional.
The court in its 391-page judgment rejected the argument that if the appointment of Justice Sajjad as
the chief justice was held unconstitutional; its application would be with retrospective effect. The court
held that doctrine of de facto would apply to the appointment of Justice Sajjad as the chief justice of
Pakistan till Nov 26, 1997, when a division bench of the Supreme Court restrained him from
performing his administrative and judicial functions.
Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, the counsel for the former chief justice, had argued that if the appointment of
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the chief justice was declared invalid, it would lead to serious consequences
as except three judges of the Supreme Court - Justice Ajmal Mian, Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui and
Justice Fazal Illahi Khan - the appointment of all the Supreme Court judges and a number of high
court judges would become invalid as all of them were appointed by the president in consultation with
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah who was then the Chief Justice of Pakistan.
The ten-member bench after discussing the doctrine of de facto observed: "the principle of de facto
exercise of power by a holder of the public office is based on sound principle of public policy to
maintain regularity in the conduct of the public business, to save the public from confusion and to
protect the private right which a person may acquire as a result of exercise of power by the de facto
holder of the office."
The court also dismissed the argument that the appointment of Justice Sajjad as the chief justice of
Pakistan was a past and closed chapter after the apex court judgment in Judges case. Responding to the
argument of Hafeez Pirzada that no judge affected by the appointment of Justice Sajjad as the CJ had
objected to his appointment and they continued to function, the court said it was incorrect.
The court maintained that three judges senior to Respondent No 2 (Justice Sajjad) in spite of invitation
by the president of Pakistan did not attend the oath-taking ceremony of Justice Shah as the CJ to
express their resentment. Justice Saad Saood Jan, the senior most judge of the apex court who had
legitimate expectancy to become the chief justice of Pakistan after the retirement of Justice Nasim
Hasan Shah, the court observed, proceeded on leave for three months and until his retirement on June
30, 1996, spent most of his time at the apex court branch registry at Lahore. The court also referred to
the speech of Justice Saad Saood Jan on the occasion of his retirement and a press statement issued by
him, to show that he had resented his supersession by a junior judge.
Justice Ajmal Mian, another judge who was affected due to the violation of the principle of seniority in
the appointment of the CJ, had also expressed his opinion on the appointment of a junior judge as the
chief justice. The court referred to the two judgments in Al Jehad Case 1, and Al Jehad Case II, in
which Justice Ajmal Mian had expressed his views on the subject.
Justice Ajmal Mian and Justice Saad Saood Jan did not surrender their right of legitimate expectancy
to the office of the chief justice of Pakistan in favor of respondent No. 2, the court observed. "It must be
borne in mind that judges of the superior courts by tradition maintain high degree of comity amongst
themselves. They are not expected to go public on their differences over any issue."
The court observed that it was not expected of the superior court judges to litigate in courts like
ordinary litigants in case of denial of a right connected with their offices as the code of conduct for the
superior court judges enjoined upon them to avoid as far as possible any litigation on their behalf or on
Chapter10b
behalf of others.
It held that the principle of seniority in the appointment of the CJ since the establishment of the
Supreme Court in 1956 was upheld. It was only violated in 1994 when the Respondent No 2 (Justice
Sajjad Ali Shah), fourth on the seniority list, was appointed the chief justice of Pakistan.
The court rejected the argument of Hafeez Pirzada that no writ could be issued against a judge, the
court held that judgments delivered by a judge or group of judges were the functions which were
covered under Article 199(5) of the Constitution. "The difference between a judge acting as court and a
judge acting in his personal and individual capacity is not only real but is necessary to preserve,
otherwise a judge will not be answerable for wrong done by him in his individual capacity."
Action taken or orders passed by him in his capacity as a judge of the court cannot be brought under
challenge under Article 199 of the Constitution but his action as ordinary individual would be subject to
ordinary law of the land including Article 199 of the Constitution, it was maintained. When the
appointment of a judge is challenged that he did not possess the qualification prescribed by the
Constitution, the relator was not asking the court to strike down any of his action which he had
performed or was performing as judge but was asking for examination of personal qualification. "We
are therefore of the view that such an attack on the validity of the appointment of a judge of superior
court through collateral proceeding is not proper remedy."
The court held that petitions challenging the appointment of Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the chief justice
were maintainable. The SC reacted to the objections raised by Justice Sajjad Ali Shah against six
judges on the bench, accusing them of bias. The court rejected the objections. The court also rejected
the objection to the presence of Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Justice Fazal Illahi Khan, Justice Irshad
Hasan Khan, Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid and Justice Khalilur Rehman Khan on the bench hearing the
petitions. The court also rejected the objection of bias against Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui that he was
prejudiced against Justice Sajjad for the reason that he had recommended to the president to refer his
(Justice Siddiqui's) case to the Supreme Judicial Council.
The Supreme Court converts 'charge sheet' against Nawaz

Sharif into notice
A supreme court bench headed by Chief Justice Ajmal Mian agreed on Feb. 17, 1998 to treat as a mere
"show cause notice" a "charge sheet" issued to Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif by a bench headed
by the former chief justice, Justice (retd) Sajjad Ali Shah, for alleged contempt of court. S.M. Zafar,
counsel for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, took 90 minutes to persuade the court that the charge sheet
issued to the prime minister was not a charge sheet as required under the law, and the court was still at
the stage of "show cause notice".
When the proceedings started, Chief Justice Ajmal Mian observed that the previous bench had charge
sheeted the prime minister, and the only question for the court to decide was what procedure to follow.
S.M. Zafar contended that no charge sheet had been "issued", but admitted that a charge sheet had
been "drafted". He said unless a charge sheet was read out to an accused asking him whether he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, there was no charge sheet. He said under rule 7 of the 1976 Contempt of
Court Act, the attorney general had to act as a prosecutor, and it was his duty to read out a charge to an
accused. He said no such thing had happened in this case, and the so-called charge sheet was handed
down to representatives of the respondents at the office of the deputy registrar.
When the chief justice observed that a mere formality of reading out a charge sheet to an alleged
contempt was not performed, the counsel for the prime minister stated that reading out the charge sheet
to the accused was not a "mere formality", but an "essential formality."

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Mr Zafar argued suspending the potency of the 14th Amendment through an interim order without
hearing the Federal Government or the attorney general, had upset parliamentarians who raised the
issue in the parliament and this necessitated an explanation by the respondent. He contended that by
virtue of section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act, Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, after having taken
cognizance, could not proceed with the case.
Pakhtoonkhwa: Renaming of the NWFP

The issue of renaming the North Western Frontier Province has sparked an acrimonious argument
between the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group). A
resolution on renaming of the province as Pakhtoonkhwa was passed by majority in the NWFP
assembly on Nov 13 1997. The resolution later became controversial due to a tough resistance by several
political parties of the province against the backdrop of an aggressive campaign launched in its favor by
the ANP and some other nationalist groups. By February 1998, the situation in the NWFP reached a
point of acute polarization between the pro-Pakhtoonkhwa campaigners, particularly those from the
ANP, and the opposing group led by veteran Muslim Leaguers.
The ANP leader, Khan Abdul Wali Khan says that (a) changing the name of the province was no longer
an issue as the matter was settled by the NWFP Assembly and (b) that they were discussing with Mian
Nawaz Sharif whether Punjab should accept the NWFP resolution. Wali Khan argues that the question
of Pakhtoonkhwa was not the question of change of name but of safeguarding the provincial autonomy.
The ANP President, Senator Ajmal Khattak has clarified that his party wanted that except for foreign
affairs, defense, currency and communications, which should remain with the center, all other subjects
should be handed over to the provinces.
The PML (N) parliamentary party of NWFP on Feb. 20, 1998 rejected the ANP demand for renaming
the province as Pakhtoonkhwa, but empowered the Prime Minister to suggest any other "non-
controversial" name. The PML (N) members stressed that Frontier (Sarhad) was a good name for the
province. But if at all, renaming the province was needed, then it should be named as Khyber or
Abasin. The NWFP Chief Minister, Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan, said that the will of the people
should be taken into account while resolving the Pakhtoonkhwa issue and referendum could be one way
of ascertaining what the people wanted.
However, the Awami National Party (ANP) leadership rejected the offer of holding referendum on the
issue. The ANP also disapproved "Khyber" to be the new name of the province and it had told the
government that it would get its demand accepted or would leave the coalition with the PML both in
Center and the province.
The fact of the matter is that there is an agreement between PML(N) and ANP that the name of NWFP
be changed. The ANP gave full support to Mian Nawaz in his confrontation with the judiciary and
supported each amendment without asking for a free and judicious debate. The ANP President, Senator
Ajmal Khattak, on Feb. 11, 1998 reaffirmed that the Prime Minister had given an undertaking to the
ANP that the NWFP would be renamed as Pakhtoonkhwa. He said it was because of this understanding
that his party had supported Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister and Sardar Mehtab Abbasi as NWFP
chief minister.
As the acrimonious debate continued, the former chief justice of Pakistan Dr Nasim Hasan Shah called
for the dissolution of the NWFP Assembly and fresh elections in the province on the issue of
Pakhtoonkhwa. The press in the Punjab reminded the ANP Rehbar, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the
negative role played by his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, during the struggle of Pakistan. One of
the newspapers from the Punjab suggested that the province should have all the say in the affairs of the
state because it provides wheat to smaller provinces.
On Feb. 15, 1998, speaking on the 10th death anniversary of his father, the Pakhtoon nationalist leader,
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Rehbar of the Awami National Party, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, warned the
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government of grave consequences if Pakhtoons were not given their due rights." If the demand for
Pakhtoonkhwa was not met it would amount to curbing provincial autonomy, on which there could be
no compromise."
"The provincial assembly has given its decision on renaming the NWFP by adopting a resolution in this
regard and as such the province has been renamed as Pakhtoonkhwa. Now it is a matter of provincial
autonomy and non-acceptance of the NWFP Assembly's resolution by the center would mean that
Islamabad has no respect for the demand voiced by the elected representatives of a province.
"The Prime Minister was trying to re-create One-Unit to establish the supremacy of a specific larger
province. However, the ANP would be the first one to resist such a move as we did in the past when Z.A.
Bhutto was the Prime Minister. If they try to re-impose One-Unit, then we will say goodbye to them. We
have good wishes for them; let them live there and we [Pakhtoons] here".
Wali Khan also warned prime minister Nawaz Sharif that his party would not bow down before the
government over the question of Pakhtoons' rights and reminded him the his party's 15 members had
resigned from the provincial assembly in protest when the prime minister [former] Bhutto dislodged the
Balochistan government. "The ANP which has a strength of over 30 members in the provincial
assembly would not hesitate to do so again if the center tried to curb provincial autonomy", he
remarked.
He argued that the ANP's stand over Pakhtoonkhawa was not just a matter of renaming the province
rather it was a struggle for the rights of Pakhtoons and the well being of their province. " Our forests,
waters and all other provincial resources are in the control of other people."
About the Afghan refugees settled in the NWFP, he said they were not refugees, they were living in their
own area because they were Pakhtoons. "The British rulers drew Durand Line just to divide the
Pakhtoon nation, it has no significance at all because the Pakhtoons are united. We did not recognize
the Pakhtoons' division neither at that time, nor do we accept it at present. The Pakhtoons living in
Pakistan and Afghanistan are the one and same nation, they cannot be divided".
On February 25, 1998, the talks between the ANP and the federal government, on renaming the
province as Pakhtoonkhwa, failed that led to the ending of a year-old ANP-PML(N)alliance.
According to Dr. Ahmad Hassan Dani, Northwest of the British has been a changing phenomenon in
history. In their westward advance over the decline of the Mughal Empire the British first created the
North West Province, which is now called Uttar Pradesh in India, and much later in 1901 they agreed to
the formation of the present North West Frontier Province and separated it from the province of
Punjab. To NWFP was added the Hazara division for administrative purposes, as Gulab Singh to whom
Kashmir was sold, could not pay the full amount and hence Hazara was taken away and added to this
newly created province. The Mughals had formed Suba-i-Lahore, Suba-i-Multan, to which Sindh was
attached, and Suba-i-Kabul, to which was attached more or less the present NWFP. Later the Mughals
conquered Kashmir and extended their sovereignty over Baltistan and Ladakh. (17)
Lord Curzon, in his Forward Policy, distinguished between the settled districts of NWFP and the newly
established tribal agencies and fixed the border between British India and Afghanistan at the western
end of the Khyber Pass for the first time in history and thus made a political division of the Pakhtoon
tribes. (18)
To the original British NWF Province the government of Pakistan, in 1970-71, after the abolition of the
states, added Swat, Dir and Chitral as new districts and also created the district of Kohistan, which was
practically no-man's land in the British period. Just before partition of the sub-continent, the idea of
Pakhtoonistan was floated by Congress for reasons not difficult to understand, but it fizzled out in the
referendum as the people voted to join Pakistan. (19)

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"As far as the British Indian Empire was concerned, the new colonial name of the province was fully
justified as this province lay to the north-west frontier of the Empire but in the present geographical
context of Pakistan it is neither the only region in the north-west nor the only part lying in the frontier
of the state," argues, Dr. Dani. (20)
No doubt, 'NWFP' is no name for a province. This name is a legacy from our colonial past. We must be
realistic in our approach and change the name of this province. A number of names have been
suggested as a substitute for the NWFP. These include:
ABASIN: Abasin is one of the historical names of the river Indus that flows through the province.
GANDHARA: This is the historic name of this region. It is the Aryans who first started the geographic
name of Gandhara in about the middle of the second millennium BC that extended on either side of the
river Indus, with two capitals, Pushkalavati (modern Charsadda) on the west and Taxila on the east.
Later the western capital was transferred to Peshawar (old Purushapura). The geographical name
Gandhara continued until AD10 century, i.e. for nearly twenty-five hundred years, when after the
overthrow of the Hindu Shahi dynasty by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, it was incorporated into his
Ghazni Empire and Gandhara was forgotten into the limbo of history. (21)
KHYBER: After the name of the historical Khyber Pass.
PAKHTOONKHWA: It literally means the side where the Pakhtoons live. Pakhtoonkhwa has been
used in Pushto literature to identify the region.
For many people the Pakhtoonkhwa issue is a regional matter, having no major consequences on the
country's politics but political analysts believe that, if not handled with care, the Pakhtoonkhwa issue
has the potential to turn into a major catastrophe for the country. The net result of the ruling elite being
led by the bureaucracy is unending polarization between the center and regional nationalism. It is the
rock on which the ship of state foundered in 1971. But the center-province bitterness and antagonism
have not changed since then. The unchanging ruling elite -- in terms of social and economic provenance
of a vast majority of the bureaucrats, generals and deputies of both the major parties -- refuse to be
accommodative and flexible to the demands of regional nationalists in Balochistan, Sindh and even the
NWFP. (Pushtoon nationalism has become an extremely complex issue with an international
dimension.) The all-powerful center looks upon regional identities with suspicion and tends to react
with vehe mence. The only means of dealing with them is through infiltration, subversion and division
with the help of intelligence agencies. This method works for a time, as it seems to have done in Sindh,
Balochistan or even in Karachi. But that resolves no problem. It merely buys time. (22)
Nawaz Sharif's Second Stint in Office - II

Nawaz Sharif's Second Stint in Office - III
Nawaz Sharif's Second Stint in Office - IV
Nawaz Sharif's Second Stint in Office - V

Chapter10b

Chapter10b

update10a
Chapter X
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in office - II

Nawaz Sharif government continued to tighten its grip over all levers of power, during 1998 and the first half of 1999, by using
the accountability process for political purposes by harassing and arresting a number of prominent politicians and
bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party; intimidating the press and forcing the Army Chief of Staff to seek
early retirement.
The government, in May 1998, imposed a state of emergency after Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests in response to
Indian nuclear blasts earlier that month. Fundamental rights were suspended in an apparent move aimed at freezing the
foreign currency accounts of the people that shook confidence of masses in government's credibility.
In a bid to assume absolute powers, the government introduced the 15th Constitutional Amendment in the name of making the
Quran and Sunnah as the Supreme law of the country. Imposed Governor rule on the Sindh province after Nawaz Sharif
himself held the MQM responsible for the murder of Hakeem Mohammad Saeed. He also named the killers that included a
sitting MPA.
The mental gulf between Punjab and the three smaller provinces widened and the nationalists from Sindh, the NWFP,
Balochistan and the Seraiki belt of Punjab formed an alliance, named Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM) to
wage a struggle to attain provincial autonomy.
Human rights situation remained critical with frequent extra-judicial killings and arbitrary arrests.
The Nawaz Sharif government increased the country's debt burden by a whopping 25 per cent in its tenure of two-and -a-half
years. The Finance Minister Ishaq Dar told the National Assembly on June 25 1999 that the total foreign and domestic debts in
December 1998 stood at Rs. 2.5 trillion. The figures of Rs. 25 trillion include foreign debt of $28.6 billion, which is equivalent
of Rs. 1.47 trillion at the current rate of exchange. In 1996-97, when Nawaz Sharif government assumed the powers, the
country owed a total of Rs. 2.15 trillion in domestic and foreign debts.
PAKISTAN CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TESTS
When the Bhartia Janta Party government of Atal Bihari Vajpai decided to press for the global status of a great power by
testing five devices on May 11 and 13 1998, Pakistan was compelled to demonstrate its own capability two weeks later, to
silence the threats that started emanating from the Indian side. With the pressure generated at home to match India's nuclear
tests, there was little choice left for a government, which in any case was hoping to bask in the glory of becoming a nuclear
power.
In May 28 1998, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests at Chagai, Balochistan in response to Indian nuclear tests. On the same
day President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar imposed a state of emergency under Article 232 and froze all foreign currency
accounts (FCAs). There were about 13 billion dollars in the FCAs, which included three billion dollars of the Overseas
Pakistanis. Some influential people were able to transfer millions of dollars abroad from their accounts despite the ban and no
action was taken against those bank officials who were involved in these illegal transfers. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz told a
joint sitting of parliament in June 1998 that 200 million-dollar had been withdrawn from private foreign currency accounts
despite a freeze announced by the government.
Two days later, Pakistan conducted its sixth nuclear test. The United States, Japan and European countries imposed economic
sanctions on Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests. US blacklisted Qadeer Khan's Kahuta laboratories.
When Pakistan carried out its own nuclear tests, there was a sense of euphoria across the country, which could have been
harnessed, had the right effort been made, to create a spirit of national defiance and self-sacrifice. But this mood soon
evaporated as the government made a series of ill-judged announcements which battered its credibility and dashed the hopes
that the Pakistani community across the globe would with its money come to the nation's rescue in its hour of need. Of these
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decisions the most fateful was the one taken to freeze domestic foreign currency accounts.
The declaration of a state of emergency was seen as another challenge to the autonomy of the provinces. The action gave to the
federal government powers of intervention in the provinces in respect of administration and law making, and of suspending
the justice-ability of fundamental right. On July 28, 1998, a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the imposition of emergency. However, it set aside the fundamental rights' suspension order of the same date but the other
powers remained.
But perhaps nothing provoked the nationalist sentiment in the smaller provinces more than the Prime Minister's sudden
decision to go ahead with the construction of the highly controversial Kalabagh Dam. Punjab saw the dam as the ultimate
source of bounty for it, while it was feared by at least two of the other three provinces as a certain harbinger of devastation.
NWFP believed that it would totally inundate parts of its inhabited area, and downstream Sindh thought that by heavily
uppercutting the Indus it would turn some of its fertile lands into veritable deserts.
The announcement brought the divided ranks of the nationalists together as perhaps nothing else could have. There were
massive public marches from both sides to the borders with Punjab, and expressions of anxiety and agitation continued until
finally the government shed its posture of immovability and the project was in effect shelved. It would await a consensus being
reached among all the provinces; it was finally conceded. It was a development of possible significance for the future that the
notable nationalistic parties joined together to form what they call the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM).
On Sept. 24, 1998, the National assembly passed Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restriction) Bill 1998 to provide legal cover to
the freezing of the foreign currency accounts following nuclear detonation. The Senate was by-passed as the bill was treated as
a money bill. The bill was passed in the absence of the PPP members who walked out in protest.
The foreign currency accounts foul-up has blown to pieces whatever credibility the ruling coalition even had. On Jan. 27,
1999, Lahore High Court declared void Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restriction) Act, 1998, freezing foreign
currency accounts and ordered their immediate restoration. The court was told that the federal government had consumed all
foreign currency deposits much before that May 28 nuclear explosions and the May 29 accounts freeze order, the fixation of an
arbitrary exchange rate, the issuance of dollar bonds and the liquidation of FCAs as loan security were all intended to provide
legal cover to its misappropriation and to evade its obligations. Lahore High Court Justice Mian Allah Nawaz observed that
any declaration in favor of foreign currency account holders would be futile if the government has already utilized the
deposits. The FCA were not restored and the government filed an appeal against the LHC verdict.
In an appeal filed by the State against the LHC judgment, Attorney General Chaudhry Mohammad Farooq told the Supreme
Court on June 8, 1999 that the government acted according to constitution in seizing the FCAs. He said that according to sub-
section 2 of Article 24 of the Constitution even landed property could be acquired for public purpose. In reply to a query by
the bench, he said that the government could not pay the account holders in foreign currency but it could pay in Pakistan
currency.
On June 18, 1999, the Supreme Court accepted the government's plea that the country is not in a position now to honor its
legal obligation of allowing free operation of FCAs. The Court held that Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary
Restriction) Act, 1998 was lawful of the constitution, subject to the declaration that the same did not confer any power on the
federation or the State Bank to compel FCA holders to convert their foreign exchange holdings into Pakistani rupees at the
officially notified rate of exchange, or to compel the said account holders to liquidate their FCA accounts in Pakistani rupees
which foreign exchange holdings had been accepted by the respective banks as security against any loan or other facilities
extended to them. The court expressed its concern on the improper utilization of foreign exchange deposits of the FCA holders
by the successive government in breach of the solemn commitment given by the legislature. The court also said that the State
Bank of Pakistan also failed to perform its statutory duty to protect the interests of the FCA holders. But the court said that in
order to restore confidence, the government should evolve a scheme within a 'reasonable period' to gradually lift all
restrictions on the operation of these accounts and make a reasonable provision for this purpose in annual budgets. The apex
court directed the federation to start payment of interest on the FCAs in foreign exchange. It also allowed the non-resident
Pakistanis and foreign FCA holders to remit the interest abroad.
15TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OR SHARIAT BILL
The government introduced the 15th Constitutional Amendment Bill in the National Assembly, on August 28, 1998, that was
immediately passed by the NA body concerned. The original version that was placed before the parliament in August was a

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virtual outline for establishment of theocratic fascism. It would have given the prime minister powers, first, to enforce what he
thought was right and to prohibit what he considered was wrong in Islam and Shariat, irrespective of what the constitution or
any judgment of the courts said; secondly, to make future amendments to the constitution with unprecedented ease, by a
simple parliamentary majority of those present and voting; and, thirdly, to punish any state official (which obviously included
any member of the judiciary or the armed forces) for what he regarded as dereliction of duty in that respect. A revised draft,
since passed by the Lower House by the requisite two-thirds majority, dropped the latter two provisions. But even the first one
that it retains provisions that would give the prime minister all the powers he needs to do his will.
The CA-15 adds a new Article 2B in the constitution: (1) The Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBH) shall be the
supreme law of Pakistan. Explanation: In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim set, the expression
"Quran and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect. (2) The Federal Government shall be
under an obligation to take steps to enforce the Shariat, to establish Salat, to administer Zakat, to promote amr bil ma'roof
and nahi anil munkar (to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong), to eradicate corruption at all levels and to
provide substantial socio-economic justice, in accordance with the principles of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah. (3) Nothing contained in the Article shall affect the personal law, religious freedom, traditions or customs of non-
Muslims and their status as citizens. (4) The provisions of this Article shall be effective notwithstanding anything contained in
the constitution, any law or judgment of any court.
The addition of Article 2B in the constitution which says that Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBH) shall be the
"supreme law" of Pakistan, overrides all law. The clause (2) will give the federal government wide executive powers. Under
clause (4) whatever the government wants to do, it will do in the grab of Shariat which cannot be challenged. What alarmed
wide sections of public opinion was the fear that with no consensus amongst even the religious parties as to what the
supremacy of the Shariat implied, the government was opening a Pandora's box which would lead to further schisms in a
society already reeling under the pressure of sectarian strife.
Nawaz Sharif flew to London from New York, on Sept. 26, 1998, to meet the MQM leader Altaf Hussain in a bid to muster
his support for the Shariat bill.. It was reported after a 90-minute meeting that the MQM will not support the government on
the bill and called for its withdrawal.(This was one of the reasons that Nawaz Sharif ended PML coalition government with the
MQM in Sindh.)
The National Assembly, on Oct. 9, 1998, passed the 15th Constitutional Amendment bill with 151 votes. 16 votes were cast
against it while the main ally of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), remained
absent from the session. Though the government managed to scuttle the dissent from within the ruling party by brining an
amended draft, it could not win over the support of independents, Jamiat-I-Ulema Islam and five minority members. The
house voted a revised draft, delivered to the opposition parties only one day before the vote, hence it was not properly debated
neither by the National Assembly nor by the people at large. The concession offered by the government, by deleting the
proposal to rewrite Article 239, regarding constitutional amendments through simple majority, is seen an eyewash. There will
be no need to go through the process of constitutional amendments when the new Article 2-B will place the entire constitution
at the mercy of religious courts and the judiciary will be bound to interpret it solely in the light of the new provision.
With its overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, it was not a problem for the government to have the amendment
passed there but it was another matter in the Senate where the ruling party lacks the requisite majority and where the bill is
still pending. The Senate resolved not to accord to the bill when presented for vote. The prime minister responded by going
about castigating that body, urging people to force the hands of the senators, and calling on mullahs to run all critics of the bill
to earth. Nawaz Sharif called at public forums that it was the duty of the public to force the erring members of the Senate to
pass the so-called Shariat Bill. The Prime Minister argued that the Senate, an indirectly elected house, had no justification for
opposing the Shariat bill and that the passage of the bill by the National Assembly, elected directly, reflected the national
aspirations.
RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPPOSE THE BILL
The Shariat Bill was even criticized by major religious parties. Jamat-e-Islami Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmad was of the view
that the government was not sincere in introducing the Islamic law and the Shariat bill was aimed at diverting people's
attention from its follies and anti-Pakistan actions at internal and external fronts. "The Shariat bill had been tabled to make
people forget government's complicity in the US attack on Afghanistan, its intentions to sign the CTBT and accept the World
Bank and the IMF conditions and the problems created by inflation and lawlessness in the country." He said Nawaz Sharif
wanted to make directives and actions of the federal government superior to the constitution and judgment of courts through

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the Shariat bill. [1]
Minhajul Quran chief, Dr. Tahirul Qadri opined that the 15th amendment had been moved to divert public attention from the
CTBT, which the government wanted to sign. He said the amendment gave all powers to the federal government to interpret,
determine and enforce good and bad according to Islam. This single provision of the bill meant suspension of the entire
constitution and the law. It also made the Council of the Islamic Ideology redundant. [2]
Senior most member of the Council of Islamic Ideology Syed Afzal Haider asserted that no existing civil and criminal laws are
in conflict with Islamic injunctions and the government's move to introduce a constitutional amendment bill to enforce Shariat
seems to be motivated by considerations other than bringing about a social order as ordained by Islam. Afzal Haider, a CII
member since 1989, said that the task of transforming all laws in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah
has been completed and the Council has since submitted its report to the government under Article 230 of the constitution
which is now available in book form. According to him, not only the CII has completed its task, the Federal Shariat Court has
been making a judicial examination of the laws for about 15 years, civil and criminal administration is already applicable
within the Shariat confines and the 1973 constitution itself stands guarantee to complete Islamization of all walks of life. The
PML government, too, has committed itself to the task by a National Assembly legislation in 1991 within similar provisions. [3]
Although the amendment was yet to become law, one part of the damage was already done. It made fundamentalism a central
issue of national polity. It gave to bigotry a seal of denunciatory authority. It set about unleashing sanctimoniousness on to the
streets and in the neighborhoods. Groups enforcing their own 'Shariat' threatened to gain momentum. With the first instant
'trial' and public execution early in December 1998, the Orakzai tribe blazed the trial of the Taliban-like system of justice that
the Prime Minister had said he yearned for. The clock seemed suddenly to have been put way back.
The Muttahida Shariat Mahaz (MSM), announced that it would institute cases of treachery and revolt with police stations
against those MNAs who had voted against the 15th Amendment Bill in the National Assembly. [Dawn - 26.12.1998] Senator
Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi holds the view that the members of the National Assembly who voted against the Shariat Bill
stand expelled from the pale of Islam. Action should be taken against them under article 2 and 30-A of the constitution. He
suggested that these MNAs should not be given a Muslim burial. The chief of the Jamiat Ahlehadith contended that the
Senators opposing the bill should be stoned to death. [4]
|
THE SHARIAT ENFORCEMENT ACT 1991
As the National Assembly passed the 15th constitutional amendment, or the so-called the Shariat Bill, an Act for the
enforcement of Shariat has already been in force in the country since June 18, 1991 with almost similar provisions except that
the Act does not amend the Constitution whereas the CA-15 seeks to amend the Constitution by adding Article 2B in it. The
Shariat Enforcement Act was introduced as a bill by the then government of Nawaz Sharif in 1991 in the two houses of
parliament and was passed with a simple majority.
Earlier, the Senate had passed another Shariat Bill called "The Enforcement of Shariat" as a private members bill on May 13,
1990 during the first government of Benazir Bhutto with two-thirds majority in the Upper House with the aim of maintaining
law and order and Islamic equality in the society. The Bill, as an ordinary bill, was moved by Qazi Abdul Latif and Maulana
Samiul Haq in the Senate. After its adoption by two-thirds majority in the Senate, the bill was transmitted to the National
Assembly for adoption. But President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the then National Assembly and the bill lapsed with the
dissolution of the assembly.
After the lapse of the Shariat Bill of Qazi Abdul Latif and Maulana Samiul Haq, the then government of Nawaz Sharif
introduced the Enforcement of Shariat Bill in the two houses of parliament in 1991. The bill was adopted by simple majority
and it duly became an Act after its assent by the president. The Shariat Act was notified in the Gazette of Pakistan on June 18,
1991 and since then it has been in force. Section 4 of the Act seeks interpretation of all laws in the light of Shariat. Section 5
puts parliament under obligation to formulate a code of conduct for the government. The Act also seeks establishment of
commissions for Islamization of educational and economic systems and media in addition to elimination of corruption, bribery
and obscenity and ensuring an order based on "Amr Bil Ma'roof and Nahi Anil Munkar."
CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES RELATED TO ISLAM
Besides the Shariat Act of 1991, the following articles of the constitution are related to the implementation of Islamic principles
in the country:

update10a
Preamble: "It is will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality,
tolerance, and social justice as enumerated by Islam shall be fully observed and wherein Muslims shall be enabled to order
their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah"'
Article 2: Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan.
Article 2A: The principles and provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution are made a substantive part of the Constitution
and shall have effect accordingly.
Article 31: Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order their lives in
accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled
to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
The State shall take steps to make teaching of the Holy Quran compulsory and to promote unity and observance of Islamic
moral standards and secure the proper organization of Zakat, Ushr, Auqaf and Mosques.
Article 227: Provides that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions of Islam.
Article 228: Provides for the constitution of the Council of Islamic Ideology while Article 230 prescribes the functions of the
Islamic Council. This council has been functioning since 1985.
The main objection against the 15th Amendment is that it is totally unnecessary. There is nothing in the constitution, which
forbids any government from enforcing true Islamic principles or spreading the true spirit of Islam. The so-called Shariat Bill
1998 has only deepened the religious divide and brought an already fragile federation under further strain.
ISLAMIZATION
The NWFP government, on Jan. 16, 1999, promulgated Islamic laws in the Malakand Division and Kohistan districts of
Hazara Division. Malakand Division consists of Swat, Buner, Chitral and Dir districts. The Islamic laws were introduced
through the Nifaz-i-Nizam-i-Shariat Regulation and Nizam-i-Adl Ordinance 1999 by Lt. Gen. Arif Bangash, the Governor of
NWFP. The new regulation will replace the Provincial Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations that were introduced
in the area at the time of these areas at the time of merger with Pakistan. The Ismaeli community of Chitral, that forms about
35 per cent of the total population, has vigorously protested against the introduction of Islamic regulations.
Tanzeem-I-Islam chief Dr. Israr Ahmad resigns (April 13, 1999) from the chairmanship of the Ulema Committee set up by
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to restore sectarian peace to the country. His resignation came in the wake of a rift in the
committee after its meetings. The 10-member committee suggested two bills to combat sectarian violence. On of the proposed
laws envisaged severe punishment to any person or sect, which publishes or propagates anything against the Khulfai Rshideen
and Ahle Bait.
The Council of Islamic Ideology declares (May 11, 1999) lucrative prize schemes launched by major nationalized and private
banks as un-Islamic and said these schemes fell into the category of Riba and gambling. The CII informed the Ministry of
Finance that the Crorepati Scheme of the Habib Bank and the Maala Maal Price Scheme of the Muslim Commercial Bank
were un-Islamic and instigated the people to become millionaires overnight.
Nineteen years after the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promulgated by General Ziaul Haq and nine years after the Sindh
High Court had struck down its Zakat provisions as manifestly discriminatory, the Supreme Court upheld (March 9, 1999)
the Sindh High Court judgement and rejected the appeal of the federal government. The Supreme Court ruled that members
of all "Fiqhs" were entitled to exemption from Zakat deduction from their holdings, and the government had no power to
reject the declaration on the ground that he/she did not belong to Fiqh-e-Jafria.
The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) decides (May 6, 1999) to submit a reference to the president to direct the Supreme
Judicial Council for removal of a Sindh High Court judge for passing remarks against a Quranic law of inheritance. In an
inheritance dispute case, Justice Shafiq Usmani remarked that law of inheritance as pronounced in verses No. 11-14 of Al Nisa
was mutable and liable to amendment. According to the judge, the reason behind the concept of immutability of these laws was
only male chauvinistic attitudes.

update10a
A man condemned to death for murder by an 'Islamic Court' in Orakzai Agency was publicly executed by his brother and
uncle on Dec. 13, 1998.
RIBA OR INTEREST
The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, on Feb. 24, 1999, dismissed the application of the government to withdraw
its appeal against the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) judgment on Riba. The government had filed an application in the
Supreme Court in June 1997 seeking withdrawal of its appeal against FSC judgment declaring interest-based banking as un-
Islamic.
The government informed the Shariat Appellate Bench that it had already approached the FSC for seeking its guidelines to
modify the existing banking system on the Islamic lines. The five-member bench, headed by Justice Khalilur Rehman Khan,
observed that the court could not delay the proceedings any more as the appeals were pending in the Supreme Court since
1992. Justice Khan said: "We have to see what is Riba. The matter of concern not only to Pakistan but to the whole of Muslim
Ummah." The court directed the Foreign Office to make arrangements for inviting six experts on Islamic banking from
different Islamic countries.
During the hearing, the SC was informed that even if it upheld the verdict of the FSC, declaring interest as Riba, it could not
eliminate interest-based transactions from the country as there were a number of laws, which were not considered by the
court. Dr. Waqar Masood, an economist, who was invited to assist the court on the complex economic issues, presented a list of
25 laws, which were not considered by the FSC judgment.
Justice Khaliflur Rehman Khan observed that time had come to change the system and those mere discussions on its failure
would not help. He said no body wanted to pay taxes and it was high time to change the system. "We cannot go on clamoring
that the system has failed; we have to change it."
GOVERNOR'S RULE IN SINDH
On October 28, 1998, it suddenly dawned upon Mian Nawaz Sharif that his erstwhile partners in power were terrorists. At his
press conference, he directly accused the MQM of involvement in the assassination of Hakeem Saeed. He even named certain
people, among them that of a sitting MPA. It was unprecedented by any account. Nobody holding the post of Prime Minister
had ever made such a flagrant indictment of a political party during the 50 years' history of Pakistan. Two days after the
Prime Minister's public indictment, governor's rule was imposed in Sindh, but the assembly was neither dissolved nor
suspended. [5]
The Sindh government was dismissed only because the MQM had distanced itself from the coalition. There was a genuine
belief that the PPP could form the government in Sindh. Only this fear motivated the dismissal of the coalition government of
which the PML was not the dominant partner. Muslim League depended on this party far more for ruling in Sindh than it did
on ANP for staying in power in NWFP. The League's political presence in Sindh, let alone its ability to form a government
there and keep the PPP out, would have been close to zilch but for the party's urban solid strength. Granted this wholly
unmerited pre-eminence in the province, the Prime Minister was ready to give whatever the other asked for in return. Thus,
for instance, after his meeting with Altaf Hussain in London in February 1998, the MP's spokesman Chaudhry Nisar Ali came
out and announced in absolute terms that a complete identity of views and consensus was found in all the matters raised and
discussed.. [6]
What all those matters were needed no guesswork: Altaf Hussain had been talking of them all the time. They included
withdrawal of all cases registered against him and other MQM leaders and workers; freedom for all his party men in jail,
including release on parole of those who were under trial for serious offences and speedy conclusion of their cases;
compensation to those or the families of those who had suffered under the army operation and afterwards; and end to the so-
called no-go areas held by MQM's break-away faction called the Haqiqis. [7]
The Prime Minister started delivering on each of these promises. But there apparently came a point were others in the
establishment put their foot down. The message was that those with several murder cases against their name could not be
freed even on parole and secondly, the Haqiqis had to survive even if they had demonstrated no popular support they could
not be allowed to be overwhelmed by the main party. A sort of cold war then ensued between the coalition partners and as
MQM's own men began increasingly to fall in the periodic terrorist mayhem the relations turned abrasively chilly with each
such episode. MQM also around this time decided that its political support should not always be taken for granted. It made

update10a
strong reservations on the population census, it boycotted the parliamentary vote on the declaration of the state of emergency
following the nuclear tests, and perhaps, most annoyingly of all, it refused to back Mian Nawaz Sharif's 15th Constitutional
Amendment. [8]
Hakeem Saeed's murder on Oct. 17, 1998 proved to be an opportunity for Mian Nawaz Sharif, on the one hand, to pacify
growing resentment in certain sections within his party over what they thought was his bending over backwards to appease
and pamper the MQM, and on the other hand, to control Sindh directly without any shaky intermediaries and with an iron
fist. [9]
After a couple of weeks later, the armed forces were given powers under section 245 of the Constitution with the avowed
objective of weeding out terrorism and restoring law and order in a city that had defied all previous attempts at doing so. The
forces were supposed to set up military courts soon afterwards, but the GHQ took up to December 7 to do so. The initial plan
had given just three days to decide a case, but the military authorities apparently felt the period was too short. Military courts
had sentenced seven people to death within a couple of weeks, among them a thirteen-year-old boy. Hundreds of other political
workers, supporters and even common men were arrested. Nearly all of them belong to Muttahida, two of whose top leaders,
Shoaib Bukhari and Wakil Jamali, were among the first to be picked up, beaten up and interrogated in an unbelievable
number of cases. Mr. Bokhari alone faces around 150 cases on an assortment of charges. [10]
One of the prime suspects arrested in connection with the Hakeem Saeed murder case in the first round, Fasih Ahmad alias
Fasih Jugnu, died in CIA custody apparently from police brutality, on Oct. 23, 1998. He was in his mid-20s and was believed to
have been taken into custody at least two days before the CIA confirmed the arrest. The police claimed that Jugnu had died of
poison he had taken while in custody. However, the medico-legal report identified as many as 27 injury marks on various parts
of his body. A month later, 35-year old Mubashir died in police custody. He too had been arrested in connection with the
Hakeem Saeed murder case. The police claimed that Mubashir had died of heart failure. [11]
After the army stepped in, there was an initial ebbing of the most common of the crimes that has plagued Karachi and other
cities of Sindh for years -- extortion of bhatta by the so-called activists of political parties. But the menace soon reappeared in
the form of roadside loot by the police and rangers. [12]
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had accused an MPA and seven other activists of his coalition partners, MQM, of being involved
in the murder of Hakeem Saeed, and gave them three days to hand over the accused, failing which there would be a parting of
ways. He told a news conference in Karachi, that he had "credible and incontrovertible evidence based on the statements of
Aamirullah and others. However, on Nov. 4, the Advocate General, M. Iqbal Raad, told the Sindh High Court that Sheikh
Mohammad Aamirullah, accused in the murder of Hakeem Mohammad Saeed, has not so far given his confessional statement
which is required to be given before a magistrate under Section 164 CrPC. He added that the accused has only confessed to
having had a part in the murder before the police and notables. Qazi Khalid, a former minister, told the court that there were
contradictory versions of Aamirullah's "confessional statement" given by the Prime Minister and the advocate general. He
said the Prime Minister had been on record as having told a countrywide audience that Aamirullah had confessed to
murdering Hakeem Saeed. He then observed that the prime minister has misled the nation on the television network by
claiming that Aamirullah had confessed to the whole thing, thus maligning the MQM in the eyes of the public throughout the
country through print and electronic media.
GOVERNOR REPLACED
President of Karachi Chmaber of Commerce & Industry, Mamnoon Hussain was appointed, on June 17, 1999, the Governor
of Sindh to replace Lt. General Moinuddin Haider. At the same time, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, the Federal Education Minister,
was appointed as adviser to the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Sindh affairs, with the powers of the chief minister. He has
been asked to muster support of the disgruntled elements in the PPP and independent MPAs in the Sindh Assembly in order to
establish a Muslim League government. The PML has only 15 seats in the 105-seat Sindh Assembly. General Haider was
replaced because of differences with the federal government on providing the PML an opportunity to set up its government in
the province.
The federal government, on June 23, 1999, suspended five articles ( 120, 122, 123, 124 and 125) of the constitution pertaining to
the presentation of a provincial budget so that the Sindh Province budget could be announced outside the Sindh Assembly.
This brought to 12 the number of articles suspended by the federation government after the imposition of the governor's rule
in Sindh. Earlier the government had suspended articles 130 and 136 regarding the powers of the speaker.

update10a
In a flagrant disregard of the principles of federalism, democracy and provincial autonomy that are explicitly enshrined in the
constitution, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, on June 23, 1999, announced the Sindh budget at a press conference and by passed the
Sindh Provincial Assembly. However, legal experts said that under this arrangement, when the budgeted expenditure will not
be sanctioned by the provincial assembly, effectively all expenditure that will be incurred from July 1, 1999, will be ultra vires
of the constitution. Interestingly, in 1996, while reviewing the accounts of the Government of Sindh for the year 1994-95, it
was discovered that a huge amount of expenditure of around Rs. 850 million was incurred beyond the expenditure sanctioned
by the provincial assembly in its original budget as well as supplementary budget. The federal government launched an
inquiry since this expenditure was unconstitutional, and the then Governor of Sindh, Kamaluddin Azfar used the ground to
dissolve the provincial assembly in November 1996. Now, under the present arrangement, the entire expenditure incurred in
excess of the budget of 98-99 and the entire expenditure that will be incurred from July 1, 1999, will be unconstitutional, as no
sanction was obtained from the National Assembly.
According to former the Sindh Chief Minister of Sindh, Syed Asad Ali Shah, General Ziaul Haq, the benefactor of the present
prime minister and his advisor on Sindh affairs once said that "constitution is nothing more than a piece of paper which he
can tear any time he wishes." For eleven years he ruled by keeping 1973 constitution suspended through Martial Law
Regulations, Martial Law Orders and the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981. Now, his proteges and the remnants of the
martial law again suspended as many as 14 articles of the constitution exactly in the same fashion the general did, nothing
more than a waste paper. It is no longer secret that all this is being done with the sole objective of perpetuating their
undemocratic rule over the province of Sindh, where their party enjoys the support of barely 15 members in the house of 109.
[13]
HAKEEM SAEED'S ASSASSINATION
The most distressing happening of the year 1998 was the assassination of Hakeem Mohammad Saeed, a person of unique
commitment to human and Islamic values, every moment of whose personal life was dedicated to the services of others, both at
the individual and collective level. He was murdered in a terrorist outrage just as he was going to his clinic after Fajr prayers
to see patients, whom he invariably treated free. That day, October 17, was marked by a similar outrage at Islamabad, where
Maulana Abdullah, the leading Muslim cleric of the nation's capital, was also shot dead by terrorists.
Hakeem Sahib stood for all the decent values and treated his personal resources as well as his knowledge as a trust to be
utilized for the service of humanity. The most outstanding memorial to his life of dedication to the cause of social progress and
welfare is the Madinat-ul-Hikmat, the city of learning he established almost all by himself, outside Karachi, to give practical
shape to his ideals in the fields of education and medicine.
After 50 years of unstinted service, Hakeem Saeed was becoming increasingly concerned about the negative role of many
prominent people, whose names he was supposed to be at the point of divulging. This could have been the reason why he was
eliminated. Another story making the rounds was that the terrorist gangs had demanded a sum of two crore rupees from him,
which he had refused to pay, so that he fell foul of the terrorists Mafia.
The assassination of Hakeem Saeed highlighted the extent to which institutions and values in Pakistan had deteriorated. The
state apparatus was neither successful in providing security of life and property which was its basic function, nor was it
effective in collecting taxes that furnished the means of running the administration and of maintaining the social services the
state was supposed to provide. Indeed, there was a tendency among foreign observers to describe Pakistan as being on the
verge of becoming a "failed state." [14]
The Anti-Terrorism Court, on June 4, 1999, sentenced all the nine accused in custody belonging to the Muttahida Qaumi
Movement to death in the Hakeem Mohammad Saeed murder case. According to prosecution, the accused riding in three
vehicles on Oct 17, 1998, morning opened fire on Hakeem Saeed in front of his Hamdard Matab at Arambagh Road. As a
result, Hakeem Saeed, Hakeem Abdul Qadir and a peon of the Matab Wali Mohammad, died while three other people were
injured.
The convicts were identified as Mohammad Amirullah Shaikh, Mohammad Asif, Ezazul Hasan alias Wazir, Mohammad
Zubair Hassan, Nadeem Ahmed alias Nadeem Mota, Mohammad Shakir alias Shakir Langra, Mohammad Faisal, Muqarrab
Ali alias Nazar and Mohammad Abu Imran Pasha. There were 13 more accused in the case who have been shown as
absconders. The absconders include MQM chief, Altaf Hussain, MPA Zulfiqar Haider.
The next day, seven of the nine convicts filed appeals in the High Court of Sindh, challenging the death sentences. In a single

update10a
appeal, the counsel of the seven submitted that the judgment of the ATC is based on misreading/non-reading of evidence and
in fact the judgement is palpably erroneous and is a glaring and classic example of miscarriage of justice wherein the trial
court failed to appreciate the law and facts in their true perspectives. It was further stated that the eyewitnesses, Hakim
Manzoor Ali, Wahid Bux and Sarwar Bai, failed to prove their presence at the time of incident on October 17, 1998, when the
murders of the three took place. The appeal said one of the appellants, Muqarrab Ai alias Nazar, was in central prison on the
date of incident and full evidence was produced before the court about that. From the perusal of the record and the suggestion
put up by the defense it is amply demonstrated that the present case against the appellants is a sinister conspiracy to blackmail
and to eliminate the MQM from the map of Pakistan. [15]
ONE SIDED ACCOUNTABILITY
The government of Nawaz Sharif has used the accountability process -- which supposedly was designed to expose previous
wrong-doing, recoup ill-gotten gains, and restore public confidence in government institutions -- for political purposes by
harassing and arresting a number of prominent politicians and bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party.
On April 15, 1999, an Ehtesab Bench of Lahore High Court convicted Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari and sentenced
them to undergo five years' imprisonment each, and to pay a fine of $8.6 million. The court also ordered their disqualification
as members of the parliament, as well as confiscation of their property. The Ehtesab Bench, comprising Justice Malik Qayyum
and Justice Najmul Hasan Kazmi, held that the pre-shipment contract to the Swiss company, SGS, was awarded by the former
Prime Minister "alone" at the behest of and in abatement with Zardari.
The prosecution case was that the pre-shipment inspection contract was awarded to SGS in consideration of 6 per cent
commission on the total amount received by the company from the government of Pakistan. The commission was paid to an
offshore company, Bomer Finance Inc. owned by Mr. Zardari through his fiduciary agent Jens Schlegelmilch. The ultimate
beneficiaries of the commission were Mr. Zardari and Ms Bhutto, the prosecution had contended.
The court accepted the prosecution's case and held: "The prosecution has proved its case against Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto
and Senator Asif Ali Zardari beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt. They are, therefore, guilty of having committed
corruption and corrupt practices within the meaning of section 3(1)(a), Section 3(1)(d) and section 4(2) of the Ehtesab Act
1997."
The court's order said: "Accordingly, Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto and Senator Asif Ali Zardari are convicted and sentenced
to undergo 5 years imprisonment each and to pay a fine of 8.6 million dollars or equivalent amount in Pakistani currency.
They are further disqualified under section 9 of the Ehtesab Act, 1997 from holding any public office. Their property shall also
be confiscated."
Under section 4 of the Ehtesab Act a person who is found guilty of acts of corruption could be sentenced to up to a term of
seven years or fine or both. The same section further provides that the property of the convict, in his name or in the name of
his dependent or benamidar, obtained through such offence during the tenure of his office, should be forfeited. [16] The
Supreme Court Deputy Registrar rejected the appeal of Benazir against her conviction on the plea that she should appear in
person to file the appeal. However, later a Supreme Court judge accepted the appeal on the plea that if she could be convicted
in her absence why could she not be permitted to file an appeal in her absence.
While the Ehtesab Bench of the High Court convicted Benazir and Zardari, Chief Ehtesab Commissioner Justice Ghulam
Mujaddi Mirza, on April 25, 1999, dropped three references against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif saying that they have either
no substance and merit or they don't pertain to the period with which the Ehtesab Act deals. In a fourth reference the CEC
excluded the Prime Minister as respondent but referred the matter for inquiry and investigation to the Ehtesab Bureau. The
other respondent in the case was NWFP Chief Minister Mehtab Ahmed Khan Abbasi.
The Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Justice Ghulam Mujaddad Mirza, on May 16, 1999, rejected two identical complaint made
jointly against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Ehtesab Bureau Chairman Senator Saifur Rehman on charges of causing the
exchequer a loss of Rs. 13.697 million by evading duties and taxes in import of BMW cars. It was alleged that the Estesab
Bureau Chairman Senator Seifur Rehman (whose company, REDCO Pakistan Ltd is the sole agents for BMW cars in
Pakistan), in connivance with the-then prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif had imported 25 BMW cars in September 1992 at a
lower value in a bid to evade customs duty amounting to Rs. 1.369 million.
Observer report on Nawaz Sharif

update10a
The British newspaper, Observer, on Sept. 27, 1998, published a report revealing that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has
amassed a personal fortune siphoning off millions of dollars from his country's coffers. The Pakistani Federal Investigation
Agency report, revealed to the paper by the FIA's suspended second in command Rahman Malik, was also sent to President
Rafiq Tarar. The Observer said that the 200-page report was begun while Sharif was out of power but effectively stifled after
he and his Islamic Democratic Alliance party returned to lead the country in February 1997. It said the investigation reveled
how Sharif's assets included four flats in London's exclusive Mayfair, worth more than $5 million. More than $70 million was
also said to have been traced to accounts and companies controlled by the family. The inquiry was focused on Sharif's Ittefaq
group of companies, which grew rapidly during his first term in power in 1990-93. It was alleged that the group received
billions of rupees in loans, which were not repaid. Around $8 million is said to be held offshore, and another $50 million in
Switzerland.
Explaining the modus operandi for money laundering by Sharif family, the report of Rehman Malik stated that Rs. 140
million were siphoned in collusion with Hawala group of Peshawar using the Bank of Oman. The money was repatriated in the
form of FEBCs in the name of 43 family members, which include the mother, brother, sister and other close relatives of Mr.
Nawaz Sharif. The report stated that a large amount in dollars, DBC and travellers cheques were transferred into three
accounts of fake persons namely Salman Zia, Mohammad Ramzan and Ashgar Ali (who never existed) by Mr. Javed Keyani,
an industrialist and business partner of Mr. Nawaz Sharif. The amount were transferred to three new accounts again opened
by Javed Keyani in the names of Kashif Masood Qazi, Nuzhat Gohar Qazi and Sikindra Masood Qazi -- relatives of Ishaq
Dar, the present Commerce Minister. These accounts were utilized as collateral security for setting up loans to Hudabiya
Engineering Ltd and Hudabiya Paper Mills Ltd by Sharif family, the report stated.
On Sept. 28, the government denies the Observer report and lodges complaint with Britain's Press watchdog over the report.
However, on Oct. 14, the management of the Observer says that it stood by its Sept 27 story about Nawaz Sharif. On Nov. 4,
1998, Britain rejected a request from Pakistan government for the arrest and extradition of former additional director general
of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Rehman Malik, who was living in self-imposed exile in London.
The London High Court, on March 19, 1999, orders Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, his brother Abbas Sharif and
father Mian Mohammad Sharif to jointly pay a sum of $32.5 million to Al Towfeek Company for Funds Ltd., the investment
Company from which they had taken a loan for Hudabiya Paper Mills Ltd. The Queen's Division Bench of the London High
Court passed the ex-parte order , as the defendants had not defended themselves in the court. The defendants were also
ordered to pay the costs of the case The court on Sept 7, 1998 had issued writ of summons to the defendants and given 23 days
after the service of writ to return the loan as claimed by the plaintiff company or give their intention to contest the case.
Al Towfeek Investment Funds Ltd., a company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman islands, which provides banking
facilities and finance for industrial development in Pakistan, had entered into a lease agreement with Hudabiya Paper Mills
Ltd, one of the companies owned by Sharif family, on February 15, 1995 under which the plaintiff leased certain machinery to
Hudabiya Mills for the manufacture of paper and paper board for six months. At the time of the lease contract, Mian
Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif, his father Mian Mohammad Sharif and his brother Abbas Sharif, had given written guarantees
to pay to Al Towfeek Investment all loans taken up to $10 million by Hudabiya Paper Mills together with all profits, charges
and other related expenses. While the actual loan was $12 million, almost $20 million was accrued as interest.
When the Sharif's company failed to return the loan, Al Towfeek served notices to the guarantors namely Punjab Chief
Minister Shahbaz Sharif, his brother Abbas Sharif and father Mohammad Sharif to repay the loan but they failed to honor
their guarantees and make payment to the plaintiff. Finally, the investment company went to the London high Court to
recover the loan from the Sharif family. Shahbaz Sharif, during a visit to London had tried to make an out of court
settlement but did not succeed. [17]
Home Page
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in office - I
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in office - III
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in office - IV
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in office - V
REFERENCES

update10a
1. Dawn 4.9.1998
2. Dawn 19.11.1998
3. Dawn 31.8.1998
4. Dawn 15.11.1998
5. Saleem Asemi, Theatre of the absurd, Dawn 1.1.1999
6. Aziz Siddiqi, Mashroom and the Meltdown, 1998 Overview, 1.1.1999
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Saleem Asemi, Op. Cite.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid
13. Syed Asad Ali Shah, Financial mess-up in Sindh, Dawn 29.6.1999
14. Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, Looking back at the old year, Dawn 5.1.999
15. Dawn 6.6.1999
16. Dawn 16.4.1999
17.Dawn 14.4.1999

update10b
Chapter X

MILITARIZATION OF CIVLIAN INSTITUTIONS
In a major departure from normal practice, Nawaz Sharif government deployed a large number of armed forces
personnel for running several civilian organizations and for discharging different duties and functions normally
taken care of by civilian staff.
The armed forces were employed in conducting the census in Feb-March 1998. Thousands of Pakistani troops were
deployed in January-April 1998 in unprecedented investigation into wide-spread corruption in the state education
system. 20,000 personnel of the military were pulled out of their training for three months just to find out about the
4,000 ghost schools in Punjab.
The provincial government in Punjab said it was considering using the army to teach as a short-term measure.
Already soldiers were used to build roads in Lahore and the army medical corps was likely to be called in to run
health centers in the province's rural areas.
On Jan. 21, 1999, about 35,000 troops were formally deployed at all WAPDA offices throughout the country except
Karachi to start a grand army operation against power thieves and defaulters. The federal government amended the
Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Power) Ordinance, 1998, providing that military courts can be
established in the whole of Pakistan. Six military courts were set up in Lahore division to try cases of power thefts on
Feb. 11, 1999.
Sindh Home Department had reportedly asked the defense ministry for deputing some army personnel for posting to
them to run the prison administration. Eight out of 15 jail chiefs were facing corruption charges. Nawaz Sharif
announced on Dec. 18, 1998 that the government has decided to hand over the development of water supply schemes
in Karachi to army.
Benazir Bhutto claimed in the National Assembly on Dec. 26 1998 that the government was working on a plan to
reduce the strength of the army by 100,000 personnel. This plan, she claimed, would be implemented in three phases.
In the first phase, 35,000 army men had already been accommodated in WAPDA; in the second phase, another
35,000 army men would be employed in railways; and in the third, 30,000 more would be withdrawn from the
defense services. [1]
The Director General of the Inter-Services Press Relations, Brig. Rashid Qureshi, on May 19, 1999, ruled out any
move to downsize the army. But confirmed that there are various options under consideration of the GHQ to engage
military in the economic uplift of the country. He said though he personally believes that the army should actively
take part in nation-building programs, there was a need to consider all aspects of such initiative.
ARMY DEPLOYED IN WAPDA
On Dec. 22, 1998, the government promulgated four ordinances including the one which allowed calling the Armed
Forces in aid of WAPDA to combat the menace of electricity theft in the country. The ordinances were promulgated
in less than 48 hours before the commencement of National Assembly session. The ordinance envisaged setting up of
military trial courts and courts of appeal to try offences punishable under the Electricity act 1910. The cases are to be
concluded within eight days. It also empowered an officer of the armed forces acting in aid of civil authority to
initiate or take over investigation of any case. It said that the officer would have the powers of an Officer-in-charge of
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a police station.
Making a case for the handing over WAPDA to military, Mr. Gohar Ayub, Minister of Water and Power, pointed
out that there were half-a-million kunda connections in Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Dir and different industrial
commercial and rural areas. They caused the organization losses of Rs. 20-24 billion. They couldn't have been there
without the knowledge of the WAPDA linesmen, he added. The army was given the three-fold task of collecting the
bills, preventing tampering with meters or stealing power through the open use of kundas and recovering the huge
arrears. Army has been given the task of recovering only Rs. 9 billion out of the accumulated losses of WAPDA of Rs.
72 billion, according to Gohar Ayub.
On Jan. 21, 1991, about 35,000 troops were formally deployed at all WAPDA offices throughout the country except
Karachi to start a grand army operation against power thieves and defaulters. The army was deployed at different
tiers of power distribution system at the sub-divisional, divisional levels, and at the office of superintending engineers
and chief engineers at the head offices of the power distribution companies. Besides eight brigadiers who were
appointed chief executives of the electricity distribution companies, 68 Lt. Colonels, 236 majors and 30,600 troops
were deployed, including junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Earlier on Dec. 24, 1998, Lt. Gen.
Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Major Gen. Sarfraz Iqbal were appointed chairman and vice-chairman of WAPDA
respectively. WAPDA would pay 50 per cent of the basic pay to the deployed army personnel as project allowance.
The estimated WAPDA expenditure would be Rs. 50 million per month or Rs. 1200 million in two years.
The National Assembly was told that different federal and provincial government departments owe almost Rs. 29
billion to WAPDA, with army topping the list of defaulters with Rs. 3.4 billion. [Army later said that it stopped
payment because WAPDA was over billing it.] The government placed before the Senate names of 49
parliamentarians, majority of them belonging to the ruling PML, against whom WAPDA had lodged cases of
electricity pilferage and defaults. The list of MNAs and Senators and MPAs included the names of Interior Minister
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Chaudhry Jaffar Iqbal and Syeda Abida
Hussain, who resigned from the cabinet after the power theft allegations.
Minister of Water and Power, Gohar Ayub Khan told the Senate on March 3, 1999, that a power theft case against
his son-in law was registered by an SDO of WAPDA under coercion. He said it was perhaps because over-
enthusiasm or inexperience that several people had been wrongly implicated in meter tempering and electricity theft
cases. Over 2,500 FIRs had already been registered, which mean that WAPDA officials for years to come should do
nothing but defend these cases in courts. [2]
On May 6, 1999, the government let the ordinance on punishment for electricity theft lapse. It evokes a widespread
condemnation by political parties. Some political leaders said the government's decision clearly shows that it wants to
protect the big thieves of electricity who belong to the Muslim League. At least 49 PML legislators were reportedly
among the major defaulters.
Government's plan to establish military courts in the country to try various crimes got a set back on Feb. 17, 1999
when a nine-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared the setting up of military courts for trial of
civilians in Karachi as unconstitutional. However, the court clarified that its decision would not affect the sentences
and punishment awarded and executed by the military courts as the cases would be treated as past and closed
transactions. Two people convicted by the Military Courts were executed. Two days later, Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, in a televised speech, said the government would respect the Supreme Court decision of setting aside the
military courts as it was binding on him under constitution. However, he indirectly accused the judiciary for delay in
the dispensation of justice to the common man. "Delay in justice had emboldened the terrorists to the extent that they
had killed a personality like Hakeem Saeed," he said.
The role of the armed forces has been defined in the Constitution under Article 245 which says that "the armed
forces shall, under the directions of the federal government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of
war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so." It is under this clause that the troops are
called upon to support the civil administration in maintaining law and order when the situation deteriorates. They
are also asked to help the civil administration during natural calamities and other national emergencies like floods,

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earthquakes, major train accidents, etc.
However, it was argued that a major factor that should inhibit the government from employing troops for purely civil
duties, is their exposure to an unscrupulous section of society. Such people may try to corrupt the troops. Within few
weeks of army deployment, three army officials were court martialled for their involvement in corrupt practices in
WAPDA. After all, no irregularity or corruption can take place without official patronage. It would be detrimental
to the morale of the armed forces if they are frequently asked to assist the civil administration in matters which an
efficient government can handle with determination and foresight.
In a comment on the deployment of troops, the daily Dawn said: " Phenomenon has profound implications for the
body politic, the army's professionalism and, last but not least, the future of the institutions which are to be redeemed
and restored to health. In terms of the plan which has unfolded itself in the past few weeks, army personnel are to
perform such variegated duties as the running of the terminally sick WAPDA, the discovering of ghost schools, the
maintenance of public order and the dispensing of justice in Sindh, the overseeing of the Karachi Water and
Sewerage Board and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. Most leading corporations and utilities dealing with
the public -- WADPA, the Pakistan Railways, Pakistan Steel, PIA, the Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation, and,
last but not least, the nationalized banks, are in a state of distress. In the ultimate analysis, all these institutions --
which once were efficiently-run, profit-making organizations -- fell victim to incompetence, neglect and financial
mismanagement. This slide into decay was not only tolerated for decades by the political leaderships they contributed
to the institutions' decay by a recruitment policy that ignored merit and integrity and threw open all jobs, from top to
bottom, to favorites and flunkeys". [3]
Defense expenditures have risen more than seven-fold from an annual average of Rs 16 billion in 1970s to Rs. 115
billion in 1995-96. Pakistan is spending about $27 per-capita on the country's armed forces compared with $8 per
capita by India on an annual basis.
Countries like Pakistan and Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia have been under great donor pressure to cut down
on their military expenditure. Thai Prime Minister Yongchaiyudh had cut down the strength of his generals, ordered
unprecedented audit of the military's secret funds and asked the armed forces to become more transparent and
accountable in their expenditures. Pakistan, even more subject to IMF wishes than most, apparently decided on an
alternative course: to set about demonstrating to all concerned that its armed forces were not idle, that they were
even busy being economically productive. Whether or not IMF will be convinced, the government here may feel that
the partnership serves its own purpose rather nicely. [4]
GENERAL KARAMAT RESIGNS
In an extraordinary development, on Oct. 7, 1998, General Jehangir Karamat resigned and Lt. Gen. Pervez
Musharraf was appointed the new chief of army staff. General Musharraf was superceded by two Lt. Generals,
Khalid Nawaz Quarter Master General of the army who resigned immediately after Gen. Musharraf was elevated.
The Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan also submitted his resignation after having been superseded by Lt.
Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
The dramatic events followed a speech by General Jahangir Karamat, at the Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore, in
which he said that political mandate needs to be translated into institutional strength, otherwise "we would have a
permanent election campaign environment in the country." The General said this could be done by establishing a
structurally-tiered system with clear responsibilities at each level. "A national security council or committee at the
apex would institutionalize decision making if it was backed by a team of credible advisers and a think-tank of
experts." The other tiers would be at the joint staff, ministry and services levels, he added. "We also need neutral,
competent and secure bureaucracy and administration at the federal and provincial levels."
General Karamat was of the view that Pakistan "could not afford political unrest or the destabilizing effect of
polarization, vendettas and insecurity-driven expedient policies." He also said he maintained, as he had repeatedly
stressed, that the need of the hour was total focus on the economy, the external linkages with China, Iran,
Afghanistan, India and the United States, the internal situation, specially Sindh, the sectarian aspect and finally the

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fears of the smaller provinces.
General Karamat's proposal about the formation of National Security Council to institutionalize decision making
evoked mixed reactions from political leaders. Some politicians termed it a supra-constitutional measure which will
mar the democratic process while others saw it a positive development to overcome the situation created due to the
failure of political leadership, leading the country economically and politically isolated.
He was summoned by Nawaz Sharif to account for his public and scathing attack on the government. According to
Observer London, for an hour, as the argument grew more and more heated, the country teetered on the brink of
martial law. Yet by the evening the general's resignation was on Sharif's desk. [5]
Ironically enough, the events that followed Gen Karamat's statement have confirmed what he had pointed out that in
the present constitutional arrangement the individuals had become powerful at the cost of the institutions. The chief
of the army staff, next in the power hierarchy to the chief executive, was summarily removed, his successor was
appointed but the cabinet later informed only to receive acclamation. Parliament or its committees came nowhere in
the picture. That could be said of most decisions of national importance made particularly since 1971. [6]
Commenting on General Karamat's ouster, Time magazine said: The prime minister feared that the proposed
council would impose itself over elected legislatures at both the federal and provincial levels. He ordered Karamat's
words to be deleted from reports on the state-run television and radio stations, the first time a Prime Minister has
dared to censor the Pakistani military. Two days after the speech, Nawaz Sharif forced Karamat to resign. No civilian
government had tossed out the military boss in 20 years. Usually, it's the generals who dispose of elected leaders. An
official press note issued by the government claimed that, due to the "political controversy" arising from his earlier
statements, Karamt had decided to take early retirement. Islamabad officials say Karamat was furious at having to
quit, but felt he had no choice because Nawaz Sharif had undercut his support among the country's other generals.
To succeed Karamt, the prime minister elevated Lt. General Parvez Musharraf, a corps commander who may be
more supportive than his predecessor. Last year, the Prime Minister altered the constitution, giving himself the
power to appoint the army chief (which is why he was able to get rid of Karamat). [7]
Following General Jahangir Karamat's resignation, Nawaz Sharif once boasted to the National Assembly that
whoever had opposed him was himself routed.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
There have been persistent calls for giving some kind of a formal constitutional role to the armed forces in Pakistan.
The concept was first codified as Article 152-A by General Ziaul Haq in his Revival of Constitution Order of March
1985. It was, however, dropped from the Eighth Amendment, which contained the RCO, in the course of bargaining
with the party-less but elected parliament later that year. However, Rule 20A of a federal government rules of
business, which was framed in pursuance of Article 152-A to regulate the working of the council, remained intact and
may still be there.
A national security council of sorts was set up by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan by an executive order on General
Zia's death in August 1988. It did not function and was probably meant to deal with some contingency that never
arose. It formally ceased to exist on transfer of power to the first Benazir government later in 1988.
A Council for defense and national security was set up by President Farooq Khan Leghari after the ouster of the
second Benazir government and dissolution of the National Assembly on November 5, 1996, by amending 20-A of the
federal government rules of business. It was upheld by a division bench of the Lahore High Court but only as an
advisory and temporary adjunct to the then caretaker set-up. The council became defunct on the revival of
parliament in February 1997.
The NSC proposal reminds one of the NSC that was set up in Turkey under Article 118 of the constitution. It reads as
follows: "The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the
Ministers of National Defenses, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air
Force and the General Commander of Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic… The

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National Security Council shall submit to the council of ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring
coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the
state. The council of ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council."
There is no such provision in Pakistan's constitution. In the context of Turkish politics, the army chief is the power
behind the throne and may veto the decisions of the elected government through the NSC.
PAKISTAN'S OPPRESSED NATIONS MOVEMENT
Like in the days of One Unit, a kind of suppressed political anger is simmering in the smaller provinces against
Punjab. The mental gulf between the big brother and the three younger brothers is widening. The nationalists argue
that it is not necessary for a person to renounce his national or ethnic identity in order to be a Muslim. In this climate
of mistrust and deprive-ness, two moves were initiated, almost simultaneously, with regard to provincial autonomy.
One was by the Awami National Party, which mustered support from important nationalist parties in the NWFP,
Sindh and Balochistan to form an alliance called Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement in October 1998. The
second was by the Jamhoori Watan Party of Nawab Akbar Bagti which introduced a bill in the Senate on provincial
autonomy in November 1998. Whatever the difference of opinion, the two moves assign minimum subjects to the
Center -- defense, currency and foreign affairs. The remaining are proposed to go to the provinces. They also plead
for a new social contact between the federating units and the Center with firm constitutional guarantees. The subjects
to be given to the Center, will be decided by the federating units under a formula more or less on the pattern of the
Lahore Resolution 1940.
Nationalists from Sindh, the NWFP, Balochistan and the Seraiki belt of Punjab on Oct 2, 1998 formed an alliance,
Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM), to wage a struggle to attain provincial autonomy. The
movement issued an eight-point agenda known as the Islamabad declaration:
- Pakistan is a multinational country consisting of five nations, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baloch, Pakhtoon and Seraiki, with
their respective five homelands dating back to 5,000;
- All the federating units, including "Seraikistan" is autonomous and sovereign and will be referred to as states in the
terms of the spirit of the 1940 resolution;
- These states shall be the fountainhead of all powers, including finance, and the federation shall be vested with only
those powers which the states confer on it by mutual agreement and consent;
- The Pashtoon federal unit shall be known as Pakhtoonkhawa and the Seraiki federal unit as "Seraikistan";
- Langauge: Pushto, Seraiki, Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi be declared national languages and each language and
culture of the federating units be given equal opportunity and resources for development and progress;
- Defense: Each federating unit should have proper and adequate representation in the defense forces roughly
commensurate with its population;
- The principle of parity and equal representation to the people of all federating states on federal bodies, services and
other institutions be made applicable with full force in the new order;
- Matters requiring settlement among the above nations (including Baloch and Pakhtoon) shall be amicably settled by
mutual negotiations on the principle of justice, fair play and historical background in the interest of the oppressed
nations concerned.
Rasool Bukh Paleejo, who read the declaration said: Myopic rulers, under the influence of the most populous and
most powerful province, have constantly used force and applied instruments, like martial law and the doctrine of
necessity and hypocritical slogans like "Pakistani Nation", "brotherhood", "Muslim Ummah", "Shariat" etc to deny
the masses of their political, economic and cultural rights. Explaining the background to the declaration, Paleejo said
the federation of Pakistan came into existence through the amalgamation of the historical national homelands of the
Bengalis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Pakhtoons, Seraikis and Baloch. The association of these nations with a single federal

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state was based on the social contract of 1940 Pakistan Resolution that recognized the historical and geographical
existence of the nations and homelands of the would-be constituents by the new state granting them the status of
autonomous and sovereign states. [8]
PONAM SUMMIT
A two-day summit of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM) was held in Islamabad on Dec 21 and 22,
1998, that adopted the following resolutions:
- The PONAM calls for making Pakistan a true federation by giving to the federation the portfolios of defense,
foreign affairs and currency only while making Seraikistan, Balochistan, Pakhtoonkhwa, Sindh and Punjab as the
federating units of the federation of Pakistan in its true term.
- The PONAM expressed its deep concern over the imposition of governor's rule in Sindh and establishment of
military courts in Karachi. It termed these acts as breach and negation of the principles of judiciary, democracy and
democratic institutions. It called this act of Nawaz Sharif as tantamount to martial law and authoritarianism.
-The PONAM condemned as nefarious attempts to fan disruption, disunity in the nations and groups through
national flag march. It denounced attempts made by those who organized the national flag march to use provocative
and unsavory words against the leaders of the nationalist and democratic parties.
- The PONAM termed the foreign policy of the Pakistan government vis-à-vis Afghanistan and other countries
running counter to the principles of peaceful co-existence. It stressed that Pakistan should resolve its problems with
neighboring countries through dialogue and friendly relations. It held that pursuit of the policy of interference in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan could affect the country's relations with Central Asia and Iran. Therefore, the
PONAM called for pursuing the policy of non-interference.
- The PONAM termed the prospective signing of the CTBT and FMTC as being against the interests of the masses.
- The PONAM called for ending the agreement signed between the US company FORBES and the government of
Pakistan regarding "Deep Sea Fishing." It termed the agreement as being against the fishing rights of coast of
Balochistan as well as against the interests of the country. [9]
PONAM SEEKS CONSTITUTIONAL AMDENMENTS
Chairman of constitutional committee of PONAM, Mohammad Yousuf Leghari on April 1, 1999 unveiled the salient
features of the draft constitutional amendments:
- Article one and two of the constitution should be amended to state that Pakistan shall be a multi-nation federal
democratic republic to be henceforth known as federal democratic Islamic Republic of Pakistan comprising five
federating nation states of Balochistan, Sindh, Seraikistan, Pukhtoonkhawa and Punjab.
- President of Pakistan being the symbol of Federation should be acceptable to all the federating states, therefore
Article 41 should be amended wherein the President shall be elected on rotational basis from all federating states
starting from the least populated federating state of Balochistan.
- Article 59 should be amended to make the Senate a real upper chamber of parliament. The Senate shall be directly
elected and in the joint sitting of parliament, the senate shall have the same weight-age of votes as that of National
Assembly) equal to the votes of National Assembly (217 votes). All bills, including money bills, shall be approved by
the senate, all major federal appointments, like the Chairman of Federal Public Service Commission, ambassadors,
Chief Election Commissioner, chiefs of staff of all services as well as appointments of the judges of the federal court
and supreme courts shall be approved by the Senate. The Council of Common Interests shall be answerable to the
Senate.
- The federal list part one in the 4th schedule of the constitution should be drastically curtailed and federal list part

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two and the concurrent list shall be delegated leaving only three departments with the Center, i.e. defense, foreign
affairs and currency and in the communications department, only sea and air navigation.
-By amending articles 175 to 203, a federal court should be established to deal with the problems between the
federation and the federating states and the number of judges from each federating state shall be equal. Each
federating state shall have a supreme court as the court of last appeal, the selection of judges of the federal court and
supreme courts of the federating states should be made by a committee comprising the President of Pakistan, leaders
of the house and opposition in the National Assembly, leaders of the house and opposition in the senate, and a
representative of the Pakistan Bar Council, these appointments should be subject to the confirmation by the Senate.
All parallel judiciary such as special courts, ATA courts and Shariat Court should be abolished.
- Separate electorate system should be abolished and joint electoral system should be restored.
- Article 232 should be amended taking curtailing powers of the President to impose emergency and to curtail the
basic rights of the people.
- All languages of the national states should be given the status of national languages by amending Article 251. The
Federation should be bound to use its resources for the development and progress of the national languages.
- The National Assembly should have 100 special seats (in addition to the present seats) for women to give more voice
to the 50 per cent of silent and un-represented population of the country. [10]
The package does not call for a change in the present undemocratic and elitist structure of the assemblies. In the
present large constituencies designed on the colonial pattern, a sort of guarantee has been provided that these shall
always be monopolized by the feudals and big business. Keeping in view of world average of one seat for a population
of 100,000, the PONAM in the interest of oppressed masses should have demanded appropriate increase in the
assembly seats. When the protagonists of PONAM talk of increasing provincial autonomy, they in fact demand more
enlarged and unbridled oppressive powers for the feudals and their partners, the colonial style bureaucrats, who are
already monopolizing political power as well as the administration in Pakistan. [11]
PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY BILL 1998
Jamhoori Watan Party Senator M. Zafar, on Nov. 10, 1998, introduced in the Senate the 16th Constitutional
Amendment Bill envisaging maximum provincial autonomy as provided in the 1973 constitution. It seeks amendment
in at least 45 articles of the constitution.
In its aims and object, the CA-16 stated that the steady erosion of the federal structure of the State of Pakistan and
the resultant crisis of confidence afflicting the nation are causing grave concern to all the patriotic citizens of
Pakistan. The tragedy of Pakistan is that hardly ever in its 51-year history has any government at the Center
addressed itself seriously to the task of evolving and maintaining a stable and balanced relationship between the
Federation and its constituent units. The result of this indifference, sometimes, bordering on utter callousness as was
demonstrated by the infamous One Unit experiment and the Parity Formula, has been terrible. East Pakistan became
Bangladesh, leaving behind a blood-soaked trail of traumatic memories.
Movers of the bill argued that time is running out for the federation of Pakistan. The future of our country lies in
granting to the Federating Units complete autonomy and iron-clad guarantees against its violation by the Central
authority.
The 54 clauses bill seeks amendment in at least 45 articles of the constitution. It seeks that "elected local bodies shall
function as autonomous institutions with the powers to frame and implement policies at local level in respect of the
matters enumerated in the Local Bodies List, over which they shall be the executive authority within the framework
of the Federating units."
Through another amendment, the bill seeks that the Senate shall consist of 119 members to be elected by direct and
free vote in accordance with the law. Each Federating Unit shall elect 27 members to the Senate while eight from the

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Federally Administrated Tribal areas and three from the Federal Capital. The senate would be a sovereign
democratic institution having complete powers, including the approval of appointments of chief justices of the
Supreme Court and High Courts and various other public offices.
The bill seeks to change the character of national Finance Commission and Council of Common Interest, giving equal
representation to all the federating units. In case of emergency the CCI would be supreme authority instead of
federal government and discretionary powers of the federal government would have to be approved by the Senate.
According to the bill, the federating units would be fully empowered, as the federation would retain only the subjects
of defense, currency and foreign affairs.
What Nawab Bugti had demanded through his bill, the other national forces of the country had been demanding too.
Prominent nationalist figures including Senator Ajmal Khattak, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Mehmood Khan
Achakzai, Rasool Bakhsh Palejo and Taj Mohammad Langah have also demanded constitutional amendment for this
purpose, in a meeting held in Islamabad in Oct. 1998 to form PONAM.. Late Mir Gous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khan Abdul
Wali Khan and Sardar Ataullah Mengal struggled for complete autonomy for the federating units for many years.
They were punished for it and jailed by the rulers who called them 'traitors' and 'enemies of the country'.
In the areas now forming Pakistan, there existed "independent sovereign nation states" which were not at all parts of
the Indian states before the British conquest. Sindh was an independent state ruled by the Mirs of Talpur,
Balochistan was an independent state ruled by the Khanate of Kalat, Punjab was an independent state ruled by the
Sikhs and the NWFP was part of the expanding kingdom of Ranjit Singh. The founding fathers of Pakistan in the
pursuit of a viable proposed new state did not ignore these realities. They knew that the basis of the new state would
be a voluntary union of these independent states in a federation through a covenant. And that is precisely what the
1940 Lahore resolution meant when it described the constituent units of the new state of Pakistan as "autonomous
and sovereign." [12]
Pakistan was not the successor state. India, as the successor state, retained the seat in the United Nations, whereas
Pakistan had to apply for admission afresh. The legal opinion of the assistant secretary-general for legal affairs of the
UN on August 8, 1947 in the following words clearly showed that Pakistan was a new state: "From the view-point of
international law, the situation is one in which a part of an existing state breaks off and becomes a new state. On this
analysis, there is no change in the international status of India. It continues to as a state with all treaty rights and
obligations of membership in the UN. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan will be a new state, it will not have the
treaty rights and obligations of the old state, and it will not of course, have a membership." [13]
Due to the consistent attempts by late Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo, the founder of the Pakistan National Party, the
demand for autonomy of the nationalities of Pakistan became an irresistible feature of the democratic struggle
against Zia's dictatorship in the 1980s. The MRD high command unanimously adopted a declaration on autonomy at
Lahore on August 2, 1986 in which the pivotal role was played by Mr. Bizenjo. The Lahore declaration of 1986 met
with the same fate as the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Those very people who had acclaimed the declaration in finding
a solution to the country's problems forgot all about it when they came to power. [14]
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The human rights situation in Pakistan further deteriorated with a systematic propaganda of the government in
favor of summary trials in the name of speedy justice, assaults on the press, one-sided accountability targeting only
the opposition, discrimination against minorities and women and persecution of NGOs, according to the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan report 1998:
One out of every five persons convicted in Pakistan is sentenced to death, ranking it among the countries with the
highest rates of award of death sentences in the world. A total of 433 persons including 49 child-convicts were
awarded the death penalty. The number of convicts hanged during 1998 was 21.
Resort to law-making by bypassing the parliament, although reduced, was still frequent. At federal level alone, 22
ordinances were issued in 1998. These included such controversial measures as according to police powers to the

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prime minister's accountability cell and seizing of citizens' foreign currency deposits in banks.
Military trial courts began being set up on Dec. 5 and lasted until the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional.
During the 10 weeks of their operation, these courts awarded death penalty to 13 persons, of whom two were hanged.
In Karachi, 1,178 persons were killed, 825 of them apparently for political and sectarian reasons. Of these, 110 were
killed at police hands. The death toll included 107 women and 37 children.
More than 150 persons were killed in sectarian violence, the bulk of them Shias. The worst single incident,
Mominpura graveyard in Lahore at a shia burial, took 25 lives, and the next one, at Hangu.
Cases were registered against 106 Ahmadis under various religious laws. Of these, 22 were referred to anti-terrorist
courts. One Ahmadi was given 10 years of rigorous imprisonment by an anti-terrorist court for writing, 'Ahmadiyat'
in the religious column of a census form he had been requested to fill for an unlettered person. Ayub Masih of
Sahiwal was sentenced to death by a sessions court on a charge of blasphemy. Bishop John Joseph of Faisalabad
committed suicide in protest against Ayub Masih's sentence and calling for efforts to get the blasphemy laws
repealed because of their abuse. [15]
EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS
The extra-judicial killing of alleged outlaws continued throughout 1998. In all, 566 persons were recorded killed in
police encounters, including 395 in Punjab . On average, one person being killed every fourth day in Punjab.
The Sindh government conceded on March 9, 1999, that at least two incidents of extra-judicial killings had taken
place in Karachi since the imposition of governor's rule. The Home Department said that it has been established in
two of the three judicial inquiry reports that the police had resorted to extra-judicial killings and in those cases two
people had been killed in cold blood. The inquiry report in which police was found as murders pertained to Israr,
who was shown by the Korangi police as killed in an encounter and to Abdul Salam, who was killed by four persons,
including a policeman.
Relatives of those killed in police custody since the imposition of governor's rule in Sindh on March 17, 1999 accused
the government of not doing justice by not apprehending those who had been nominated for the alleged excesses.
Some of them had no connection with the MQM. They alleged that the police were behaving like bandits who
kidnapped people and killed them, after subjecting them to severe torture, when their demand was not met.
Narrating the ordeal of his son's arrest by the SHO Liaquatabad on 23rd Ramazan, Sabih Ahmad alleged that when
he went to the police station he was asked to pay Rs. 100,000 for Arman's freedom. When he explained his inability to
do so because he was a poor man, the policemen told him that in case of failure to meet their demand, he would get
his son's dead body. The next day when Arman was produced in the court he could not sit and complained of severe
torture by the police. Later, police abandoned Arman in Abbasi Shaeed hospital after the police obtained his
signature on a blank paper. Arman succumbed to the injuries caused by police. [16]
In a police custody murder case, Justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudry of Lahore High Court observed : It is painful to
note that in a case like the instant one where a police officer is alleged to have killed an innocent man in extra-judicial
manner, it is almost impossible for the higher police officers to record an adverse finding against their subordinates.
It was absolutely unthinkable that police would submit a challan under Section 302 (culpable homicide or Qtal-i-
Amad) of the Pakistan Penal Code against an SHO. It is a tendency and common habit with higher police officers to
protect their thanedars (SHOs) and constables imprudently. This practice is highly deplorable and deserves the
severest condemnation. [17]
JUDGES MISHANDLED
Police high handedness against ordinary citizens is very common, often without any recourse to justice. The
government's use of police for silencing political opponents has so embolden the police that it feels free to manhandle
judges.

update10b
Two civil judges were manhandled by the Vehari (Punjab) police when they visited the police station to check
irregularities and misuse of powers. There had been reports of the illegal detention of some people at the police
station and the judges asked for the reasons for their detention and wanted to examine the daily register. The SHO
responded by resorting to violence. [18]
The Sargodha police took a special court judge, Javed Iqbal, hostage in the district jail after he convicted three
police officials and magistrate of "faulty investigations" in the murder case of a former commissioner, Tajammul
Abbas. When the judge asked the jail administration to handcuff the four, police personnel present in and outside the
jail warned him that they would not let the judge leave the premises if anybody tried to arrest the officials. They
snatched keys from the driver of the judge's car and parked official vehicles on the main gate. The siege was lifted
after the four officials safely left the jail. On Jan. 28, the Lahore Court suspended the judgment of the Sargodha
Special judge and released on bail the police officials and magistrate concerned. [19]
US HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
The annual US State Department human rights report for 1998 said: The government's human rights record
remained poor, with serious problems in several areas. The government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Despite
attempts to reform and to professionalize the police, police committed numerous extra-judicial killings and tortured,
abused and raped citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were transferred or suspended
for their actions, there is no evidence that any police officers were brought to justice. In general, police continued to
commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remained poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained
citizens. In Karachi, killings between rival political factions often were carried out with the assistance of criminal
gangs. However, many such killings also were believed to have been committed by or with the participation of
security forces. [20]
AMNESTRY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
Amnesty international, in its report on the state of human rights in Pakistan in 1998 said that scores of political
prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, were detained, some with out charge or trial. Torture and ill treatment
continued to be widespread, leading to at least 50 deaths in custody. Floggings continued to be carried out, and there
were at least 120 possible extra judicial executions, mainly in Punjab province. Authorities claimed that the victims
had died in exchanges of fire between police and hardened criminals. In at least 30 of these supposed "encounter
killings," the victims were reported to have been in police custody before being deliberately killed. In other cases,
police shot dead criminal suspects rather than attempting to arrest them.
At least 428 people were sentenced to death and four were executed. State officials colluded in abuses by private
individuals and armed religious and other groups were responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians.
Law and order problems persisted as sectarian violence led to more than 600 deaths. The government continued to
resort to mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, usually of short duration.
Abuses against judicial officers increased. In march 1998, two civil judges in Karampur, who had searched police
premises and questioned the arbitrary detention of several people found there, were reportedly severely beaten by
police. Several police officers were arrested, but the case remained pending. The judges of an anti-terrorism court in
Sargodha who had convicted senior police officials of dereliction of duty, including falsifying evidence and torture,
was held hostage in court by the local police in January 1998, until the convicted officials escaped. [21]
MILITARY COURTS
A nine-member bench of the Supreme Court, on Feb. 17, 1999, unanimously declared the setting up of military courts
for the trial of civilians as unconstitutional and without lawful authority. The apex court, however, provided a
mechanism for speedy trial of the cases relating to "terrorism". It set aside all the convictions of the military courts
which had not been executed. It held that all the cases in which sentence had been awarded but no execution had
taken place should be transferred to the anti-terrorist courts already in existence or which might be created in terms
of the guidelines provided by the bench.

update10b
The court clarified that its decisions would not affect the sentences and punishment already awarded and executed by
the military courts, and the cases would be treated as past and closed transactions.
The apex court said that an Anti-Terrorist special court should pronounce judgment within seven days, as already
provided in Anti-Terrorist Act. [Military courts were also required to dispose of cases within seven days.] The appeal
arising out of an order/judgment of the special court should be decided by the appellate forum within seven days
from the filing of such appeal. Under the amended ATA, an appeal is provided in a high court and subsequently, in
the Supreme Court.
The petitions challenging the establishment of military courts were filed by the MQM through its deputy convener
Senator Aftab Sheikh, MQM parliamentary leader in National Assembly, Sheikh Liaqat Ali, PPP leader from Sindh,
Nisar Khoro, Muslim Welfare Movement's Syed Iqbal Haider and Shahid Orakzai.
During the hearing, Chief Justice Ajmal Mian observed that the army could be asked to assist the civil power under
Article 245 of the constitution but could not be given judicial powers. He also observed that the hanging of even 200
people through military courts would not yield the desired results, and the Karachi problem might aggravate.
ANTI TERRORISM COURTS
The President promulgated an ordinance, on April 28, 1999, to make it possible for the Anti-Terrorist courts to
function in the light of the Supreme Court decision on military courts. The ordinance called as Anti-Terrorism
(Amendment) Ordinance 1999, was promulgated on the official holiday of Ashura (10th of Moharram). Three days
later, the government amended the schedule of the Anti Terrorism Act, expanding its application to the 'unnatural'
offences committed with a child under the age of 12 years.
The ordinance adopted the definition of terrorist act which was given in the Ordinance XII of 1998 (Establishment of
Military Courts). The government also created a new offence in the form of "civil commotion" that is defined as:
"Civil commotion means creation of internal disturbances in violation of law, or intended to violate law,
commencement or continuation of illegal strike, go slow, lock outs, vehicle snatching or lifting, damage to or
destruction of state or private property, random firing to create panic, charging bhatta, acts of criminal trespass
(illegal qbza), distributing, publishing or pasting of a handbill or making graffiti or wall chalking intended to create
unrest or fear or create a threat to the security of law and order or to incite the commission of an offence punishable
under Chapter VI of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV 1986)."
The ordinance allows more than ample scope for the government to target political dissidents in the name of
combating terrorism. Opposition leaders were of the view that the new law was not aimed at crushing terrorism but
political dissent. The new anti-terrorism ordinance virtually suspended civil liberties.
The ordinance violated the constitution as it was retrospectively effective from February 24, 1999. Article 12 (1-a) of
the constitution says "No law shall authorize the punishment of any person for an act or omission that was not
punishable by law at the time of the act or omission."
This ordinance had its roots in Martial Law Order 3 and 13, promulgated during General Zia's tenure and was now
finding light again in the tenure of his political heir. However, even under the Martial Law provisions the term of
strikes, lockouts, go-slow, distributing, publishing or pasting of a hand-bill or wall chalking or illegal assembly was
not as severe as provided in the new section 7B of the Ordinance, with a rigorous imprisonment for a term which
extended to seven years, or with fine or with both.
The ATA courts could not function for 72 days as the ordinance which was promulgated in the light of the Supreme
Court in Mehram Ali case, had lapsed, and the bill which was passed by the National Assembly was pending in the
Senate.
Syed Iqbal Haider of Muslim Welfare Movement (MWM), challenged the latest Anti-Terrorism Ordinance
(amendment) 1999 in the Supreme Court. The petitioner contended that the first Anti-Terrorism (amendment)
ordinance was promulgated by the President of Pakistan on Oct. 24, 1998, in accordance with the spirit of Mehram

update10b
Ali case. The ordinance was placed before the parliament for enactment which is still pending in the Senate.
However, in the meantime the ordinance lapsed. He further said that the number of sections of ATO 1999 were in-
consistent with the provisions of the constitution including Article 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17, 25, 189 and 190 of the
constitution.
The Supreme Court, on May 15, 1998, had declared 12 provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) as invalid, and
brought special courts on par with ordinary courts working within the existing judicial system. The court ruled that
the power to law enforcement agencies to open fire on suspicion of terrorism and accepting a confession before a DSP
as valid piece of evidence, were untenable and needed to be amended. The court also directed the government to
make an amendment in the ATA to vest the appellate power in a high court instead of an appellate tribunal.
During the hearings of constitutional petitions, the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ajmal Mian observed that the anti-
terrorism act (ATA) had given law enforcement agencies a license to kill. He also observed that to deal with the
menace of terrorism, it was not mandatory that special courts, bypassing the existing judicial system, should be set
up.
The ATA was enacted in August 1997 and was described by the opposition and human rights groups as an attempt by
the government to convert Pakistan into a police state. The then chief justice, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, had also
opposed the legislation and had advised the government not to create a parallel judicial system.
The government, on Oct. 24, 1998, promulgated the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance with substantial
changes in the controversial ATA and widened its application. Now cases of gang-rape, child molestation or robbery
coupled with rape could also be tried in the ATA courts. One of the most controversial sections of the ATA, regarding
confession before a police officer as valid piece of evidence was omitted totally. Under the amended ATA, the law
enforcers still enjoyed the power to shoot at person or persons who have committed or are committing act of
terrorism.
Home Page
REFERENCES
1. Dawn 27.12.98
2. Dawn 5.3.1999
3. Dawn 27.12.1998
4. Aziz Siddiqi, The spread of the soldiery, Dawn 27.12.1998
5. The Observer , London, Oct. 11, 1998
6. Kunwar Idris, Politics of national security, Dawn 12.10.1998
7. Time magazine Oct. 19, 1998
8. Dawn 3.10.1998
9. Dawn 22.12.1998
10. Dawn 2.4.1999
11. Feroz Shah Gilani ,PONAM's constitutional package,Dawn 17.4.1999
12. Yousuf Mustikhan Decentralization of the power structure, Dawn 13.4.1999
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Dawn 9.3.1999
16. Dawn 9.3.99
17. Dawn 23.10.98
18. Dawn 19.3.1998

update10b
19. Dawn 23.1.1998

20. Dawn 27.2.1999
21. Dawn 18.6.1999

update10c
Chapter X

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PRESS
A number of incidents during 1998-99 indicated a pattern of harassment and intimidation of individual journalists as
the government was increasingly becoming intolerant. Imtiaz Alam, a Lahore-based journalist, complains of threat
over the telephone and then of his car being set on fire in a mysterious manner the other day. Another Lahore
journalist, Mahmud Lodhi, is picked up and held in illegal custody for two days. He was questioned about his
involvement with a BBC team filming a documentary on the rise and wealth of the Sharif family. Hussain Haqqani is
picked up in a cloak-and-dagger fashion and interrogated at a FIA Center in connection with charges vaguely to do
with money embezzlement while he held government office.
The residence of Idrees Bakhtiar, a senior staff reporter of Herald monthly and BBC correspondent in Karachi was
raided by CIA police on Nov. 26,1998. The police harassed the family and also arrested his 28-year old son, Moonis,
who was later released. On Feb. 13, 1999, three persons, including Senator Abul Hayee Baloch and a lady worker
from Lahore, were injured when the police baton-charged, used water cannons and threw bricks on a peaceful
procession of the Pakistan Awami Ittehad in front of the parliament house in Islamabad. The march, organized by the
PAI for the freedom of the press, was led by PAI president Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, opposition leader Benazir
Bhutto and secretary general of the alliance Hamid Nasir Chatta, besides a number of sitting and former PPP MNAs
and senators.
The owner of the Frontier Post, Rehmat Shah Afridi, was arrested in Lahore on April 2, 1999, by the army-run Anti-
narcotics Force on charge of possessing 20 Kgs of charas and three guns. The Peshawar-based Frontier Post was
critical of government policies, particularly the paper opposed the construction of the Kalabagh Dam. Afridi's arrest
was seen by the journalists and others another official attempt to gag the Press.
On May 8, 1999, several dozen officials of ISI stormed into the house of Najam Sethi, Editor of The Friday Times,
Lahore and dragged him out of his room. Before leaving the house with Mr. Sethi, they tied his wife Jugnoo's hands
with a rope and locked her up in a dressing room. Later the federal government confirming the arrest said that Mr.
Sethi had been taken into custody for interrogation by ISI for his alleged connection with he Indian intelligence
agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing).
The Lahore High Court, on May12, declined to assume jurisdiction in the Najm Sethi case saying he was being
detained by a military agency (ISI) and the offence he was suspected of and was being investigated for fell within the
purview of the Army Act, 1952. Consequently, all three petitions filed by Sethi's sife, Jugnoo Mohsin, for his recovery
and production and miscellaneous reliefs like medical examination and registration of a case of kidnapping with
intent to torture and kill against two uniformed policemen and eight plainclothes personnel were dismissed in
'limeline' as not maintainable. The Deputy Attorney General told the court that Sethi "is presently in the custody of
Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) authorities for his suspected links with hostile intelligence agencies." The suspected
offence falls within the mischief of Section 123-A of the PPC (sedition) and finds mention in the Army Act schedule.
Advocate for Sethi, submitted that the ISI does not function under the Army Act and can be headed by a retired
officer and that the ISI reported to the prime minister and not to the army. One day later, the government agencies
seize all copies of The Friday Times in Lahore. The Web site of The Friday Times was hacked and the pages and
contents were erased.
The Attorney General Chaudhry Farooq on June 2, 1999 told the Supreme Court that the government had decided to
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set free Najm Sethi. In a short statement on behalf of the state, the AG said that Najam Aziz Sethi, who was detained
in the case initially by ISI and was later taken into custody by the police as a result of an order obtained from the
Special Court on June 1, in connection with the FIR registered with Kohsar police station, Islamabad, had been set
free. [On May 31, the Supreme Court was informed that a case had been registered against Mr. Sethi in Islamabad for
his alleged anti-state activities on the complaint of a ruling party MNA, Inamullah Niazi.] The AG further said that
the government reserved its right to initiate proceedings afresh. However, Justice Mamoon Kazi, a member of the
three-man bench which disposed Mr. Sethi's bail application, told the government that Mr. Sethi should not be
arrested in future with permission of the court.
NAJAM SETHI'S SPEECH
Mr. Najm Sethi, had gone to India to deliver a lecture on "Pakistan in the 21st Century" at India International
Center, New Delhi on April 30.He was invited by the organizers of Kewal Singh Memorial Lectures. Former Indian
Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral was the chairperson. Sethi, in his lecture said that Pakistan was afflicted with several
crises, a law and order and political and system crisis, an economic crisis, a foreign policy and national security crisis
and a civic society crisis. All these, Sethi said, added up to Pakistan being a failing state. He said Pakistan did not
know what it stood for, was it Jinnah's Pakistan or Iqbal's Pakistan? It did not know what was its relationship to the
sub-continent and whether it was Arab or Persian or Central/Asian or Afghan, it is a confused state. Sethi was of the
view that Pakistan was totally isolated and its foreign policy did not represent state interests. He said that Pakistan
was obsessed with India and merely complained that India had done an injustice to Pakistan by denying it an
honorable settlement on Kashmir.
What Sethi said in India was nothing new. He has been saying the same thing at various forums in Pakistan. It was
apparent that the government was looking for some excuse to frame Mr. Sethi, who had written a sharp editorial
commenting on a High Court judgment in London against Nawaz Sharif's father and two brothers in March 1999,
ordering them to repay $32.5 million in loans taken out from a Saudi finance house for a paper mill owned by the
family.
The Amnesty International described the arrest as part of a pattern of intimidation, threats and arbitrary
incarceration of journalists who have publicly criticized Pakistan government. The US State Department expressed
deep concern at the arrest of Najm Sethi. In a press release the US said that crackdown on Pakistani journalists is
unacceptable.
ATTACK ON JANG
The government of Nawaz Sharif started a campaign against the Jang group in July 1998 when it refused to sack a
number of journalists critical of the government policies. First, the government objected to the Jang group
newspapers' reporting about the law and order situation in the country and put a ban on its advertisement for the
Jang group. On Aug. 13, a report was published about non-payment of Rs. 700 million to farmers by the sugar mills
owned by the Nawaz Sharif family. Three days later, the government sent notices to Jang for non payment of taxes
and the case was shifted to the Ehtesab cell. On Sept. 27, 1998, the government asked the Jang group not to publish a
report of The Observer London that said that PM Nawaz Sharif has siphoned off millions. The report was not
published by the Jang but it was published by its sister English newspaper The News. On Nov. 5, bank accounts of the
Jang group were frozen and FIA raided the Jang and the News offices in Rawalpindi and customs authorities stop
delivery of newsprint to the Jang.
On Dec. 17, Sentaor Saifur Rehman said that another case is being prepared against the Jang group. On Jan 27,
1999, FIA encircles the Jang group office in Lahore and Karachi. And on Jan 28 1999, a sedition case was registered
against Mir Sahkilur Rehman for publishing an advertisement of Muttahida's Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation on
January 1, which according to the police, was aimed at inciting people against the state. Offices of the Jang group in
several cities were surrounded by security and taxation people; its godowns were sealed and newsprint was not
allowed to be delivered for its paper.

update10c
Mir Shakil-ur Rehman revealed that Senator Saifur Rehman asked him to sack a number of Jang employees who
should be replaced in consultation with the government. He released to the press audio-tapes of conversation with
Senator Seifur Rehman on this issue.
Senator Saifur Rehman, addressing a press conference in Islamabad on 25th Jan. 1999 acknowledged that he had
asked the Jang group to "avoid sensationalism and concentrate on objective reporting. He said the government has
asked the Jang group for support on the 15th amendment because it wanted enforcement of the Islamic order
according to the aspirations of the people. The Senator said he was asked to extend support to the government in what
he called strengthening of democratic institutions. He particularly referred to the tragic incidents in Karachi and
imposition of governor's rule in Sindh. He also said: Mir Shakilur Rehman evaded tax and customs duty to the tune
of Rs. 2.6 billion during the last two years. [1]
The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, a press freedom organization, said on June 1, 1999 that it was
conducting an investigation into a "hit list" prepared by the Pakistan government that contains 35 prominent
journalists of Pakistan. According to reports received by the CPJ, the federal government had decided to establish a
special media cell comprising officials from the police, Intelligence Bureau and the Federal Investigation Agency to
punish the journalists who have been writing against the government. Ehtesab Bureau Chairman, Senator Saifur
Rehman Khan would head this cell which would function simultaneously at Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and
Peshawar with its head office in Islamabad.
According to the CPJ, the names were: Irshad Ahmed Haqqani, Rehmat Ali Razi, Anjum Rasheed, Suhail Warraich,
Sohaib Marghoob and Roman Ehsan, (Jang Lahore), M. Ziauddin and Ansar Abbasi (Dawn Islamabad), Dr. Maleeha
Lodhi, Javed Jaidi, Nusrat Javed and Mariana Babar (The News, Islamabad), Rehana Hakeem and Zahid Hussain
(Newsline), Ejaz Haider, Khalid Ahmed, Jugnu Mohsin and Adnan Adil (The Friday Times, Lahore), Mahmood
Sham (Jang, Karachi), Rashed Rehman (The Nation, Lahore), Amir Ahmed Khan (Herald, Karachi), Imtiaz Aalam,
Beena Sarwar, Shafiq Awan, Kamila Hyat and Amir Mir (The News Lahore), Abbas Athar (Nawa-e-Waqt, Lahore),
Kamran Khan and Shehzad Amjad (The News Karachi), Azam Khalil (Pulse), Mohammad Malik (Tribune), Imtiaz
Ahmed (The Frontier Post, peshawar), Ilyas Chaudhry (Jang Rawalpindi), Naveed Meraj (The Frontier Post
Islamabad) and Syed Talat Hussain (The Nation, Islamabad).
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON PAKISTAN'S PRESS
Commenting on the government campaign against the press, the US Human Rights report for 1998 said: Although the
press largely publishes freely, the government uses its large advertising budget to influence content, journalists
practice self-censorship, and the broadcast media remains closely controlled by government monopoly.
Favorable press coverage of the prime minister's family compound/hospital/college south of Lahore was widely
understood to have been obtained for a price. Rumors of intimidation, heavy-handed surveillance, and even legal
action to quiet the unduly curious or non-deferential reporter are common.
The government has considerable leverage over the press through its substantial budget for advertising and public
interest campaigns, its control over newsprint, and its ability to enforce regulations.
The country's leading Urdu daily, Jang, and the English-language daily News, both owned by Shakilur Rehman, were
cut off for a time from critical government advertising revenue after publishing articles unflattering to the
government. The Jang group also was served with approximately $13 million in tax notices, harassed by government
inspectors, and pressured not to publish articles. There is credible evidence that Senator Saifur Rehman, a close
associate and head of the Accountability Bureau, demanded a number of journalists and editors be fired. Jang also
reportedly had difficulty in obtaining sufficient newsprint to publish.
Rehana Hakim, editor of the English-language monthly Newsline also has complained that her publication, which is
highly critical of the government does not receive government advertising revenue, has been raided and harassed by
tax inspectors and security agents. The editors of the weekly The Friday Times have alleged government harassment
of their staff as well. On March 19, Public of Karachi, a local Urdu-language daily, was banned by the local

update10c
magistrate and ceased publication on March 20. [2]
CONTROVERIAL JUDGMENTS
The judiciary has given Nawaz Sharif little trouble since he sacked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Sajjad Ali
Shah, who took the president's side in an argument with the primer minister in 1997. Since then, the higher courts
gave almost all decision on major issues in favor of the government that has shaken the public confidence in judiciary.
Here are some of the major decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts that reflected judiciary's leaning
towards the government:
The Lahore High Court accepts (Feb 9, 1998) the constitutional petition filed by Rafiq Tarar against his
disqualification by the (former) Acting CEC and declared him qualified to contest for and hold the office of President.
The acting CEC, Justice Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo of the Supreme Court, had found Mr Tarar, a former Supreme
Court Judge, guilty of propagating views prejudicial to the integrity and independence of the judiciary at the time of
his nomination as a presidential candidate under Article 63(G) of the Constitution and debarred him from the
December, 1997 contest.
Lahore High Court dismissed (March 2, 1998) a writ petition seeking a direction against the government for settling
along the motorway the Pakistanis residing in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Justice Khalilur Rehman Ramaday
also prescribed a cost of Rs. 5,000 to petitioner Advocate M.D. Tahir for indulging in frivolous litigation. The court
said what was the guarantee that agents of the Indian intelligence agency RAW had not entered the ranks of these
people. It also said that it required a lot of money for settling these people in Pakistan when there was already a lot of
poverty here.
The Supreme Court dismissed (March 19, 1998) as "frivolous" a constitutional petition challenging the 13th
Amendment and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 10,000 as court expenses. The 13th Amendment had stripped the
president of the power to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss a government.
Lahore High Court rules (April 1998) that Ehtesab Commissioner has unlimited powers.
May 18 1998: The Supreme Court, in a majority (6-1)decision, upheld the 14th Constitutional Amendment that bars
members of parliament to vote against their party's line or abstained from voting. The court held that Article 63(a)
would bring stability in the polity of the country as it would be instrumental in eradicating floor crossing. However,
the court ruled that an elected member should not be disqualified if he opposed the party's policies in public. In his
dissident judgment, Justice Abdul Mamoon Kazi held that Article 63(a) was in violation of fundamental rights and
thus was not enforceable.
A seven-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously (July 28, 1998) upholds the imposition of emergency on
May 28. However, it set aside the fundamental rights' suspension order of the same date.
The Supreme Court declines (Nov. 23, 1998) to take notice of the imposition of governor's rule on Sindh and observed
that the federal government had the powers to impose governor's rule under Article 232 of the Constitution.
"Restoration of peace in Karachi is of paramount importance and court cannot declare it (governor's rule) illegal as
some individual or a party wants to do so," observed Chief Justice Ajmal Mian.
A nine-member bench of the Supreme Court unanimously (Feb. 17, 1999) declared the setting up of military courts
for trial of civilians in Karachi as unconstitutional. However, the court clarified that its decision would not affect the
sentences and punishment awarded and executed by the military courts as the cases would be treated as past and
closed transactions. Two people convicted by the Military Courts were executed. The Supreme Court recommended
that the military court cases should be transferred to special Anti-Terrorist Courts.
The Supreme Court indicts (March 1, 1999) seven persons including six ruling party legislators on the charges of
contempt of court for storming the court building on November 28, 1997. The court however, withdrew show cause
notices issued to the executive and police officers of Islamabad.

update10c
The Supreme Court acquitted (May 14, 1999) all ruling party legislators who were indicted on the charges of
contempt of court for attacking the court building when proceedings against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were
underway in 1997. The three-member bench, which decided the case, observed that though flagrant contempt of court
was committed but showed its inability to convict the accused as the people had not given specific evidence against
them. Lahore Bar Council leaders expressed their disappointment at the outcome of the contempt of Court case
against the ruling party legislatures. They said that the contemners have admitted their guilt in their apologies. A
conviction could have been based on their admission and the video film of the Supreme Court's own cameras. They
said the SC verdict sets back the process of restoration of public confidence in the superior judiciary set in by the apex
court judgements on emergency and military courts. On June 14, 1999, the Supreme Court reopened the rowdy-ism
case and issued fresh notices to the Pakistan Muslim League, Attorney General and seven alleged contemners. A five-
member bench of the Supreme Court, headed by outgoing Chief Justice, Ajmal Mian, converted a criminal original
petition filed by Shahid Orakzai, a journalist, into an appeal against the decision of the three-member bench of the
SC. Appeal hearing began on June 28, 1999.
The Supreme Court reserves judgment (May 19, 1999) on the petition of Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan
regarding the distribution of funds by ISI among the political parties in 1990 elections. The case had originated from
the letter of Asghar Khan which he had sent to the then Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah for appropriate action after
reading the statements of General Naseerullah Khan Baber. Gen. Baber had informed the National Assembly that ISI
had collected Rs. 140 million from Habib Bank which were distributed among different politicians before 1990
elections. Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif is one of those politicians who received money from ISI in 1990 polls.
However, the Supreme Court observed that it would confine itself to laying guidelines for the operation of the political
cell of the ISI within the legal framework. About the distribution of the funds by the ISI, Justice Saiduzzaman
Siddiqui, head of a three-judge bench, observed that it was "history" and the court was not concerned with it.
Commenting on the role of judiciary in Pakistan, the US State Department Human Rights Report for 1998 said:
Judiciary is subject to executive influence, and suffers from inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption.
Despite concerns about damage to the judiciary due to the December 1997 confrontation between the prime minister
and the chief justice of the Supreme Court, there were several instances in which the Supreme Court showed a
continued degree of independence, striking down draconian laws favored by the government, including limits on
freedom of speech, elements of a controversial anti-terrorist law, and some restrictions on fundamental liberties
imposed by the state of emergency declared in the wake of Pakistan's nuclear tests in May.
The outgoing chief Justice of the High Court of Sindh and judge-designate of the Supreme Court told a full court
reference held in his honor on April 19, 1999, that confidence of the people in the judiciary had been shaken. He said
it was a matter of concern that with the continuing degeneration of the moral fabric of society, the malady of
corruption had afflicted the power judiciary too, which had been made the task of dispensation of justice all the more
difficult and "has shake the confidence of the people in the courts."
On June 18, 1999, The Supreme Court accepted the government's plea that the country is not in a position now to
honor its legal obligation of allowing free operation of FCAs. The Court held that Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange
(Temporary Restriction) Act, 1998 was lawful of the constitution, subject to the declaration that the same did not
confer any power on the federation or the State Bank to compel FCA holders to convert their foreign exchange
holdings into Pakistani rupees at the officially notified rate of exchange, or to compel the said account holders to
liquidate their FCA accounts in Pakistani rupees which foreign exchange holdings had been accepted by the
respective banks as security against any loan or other facilities extended to them. The court expressed its concern on
the improper utilization of foreign exchange deposits of the FCA holders by the successive government in breach of
the solemn commitment given by the legislature. The court also said that the State Bank of Pakistan also failed to
perform its statutory duty to protect the interests of the FCA holders.
CENSUS RESULTS REJECTED
The government announced provisional results of the fifth population census on July 8 1998, according to which
Pakistan's population rose to 130.5 million from 64.2 million, as recorded in 1981. The census figures show the

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population growth rate to have declined to 2.61 per cent per annum, as against 3.06 per cent in the 1981 census.
The census results also showed an increase in the proportion of Sindh's population to the country's from 22.6 per cent
to 23 per cent. Total population of Sindh was put at 29.9 million -- an increase of more than 50 per cent over the 19
million figure in 1981.
The population of Punjab rose from 47.2million in 1981 to 72.5 million this year, but as a proportion of national
population, it fell from 56.1 to 55.6 per cent.
The population of NWFP went up to 17.5 million from 11 million. The proportion of its population to the national
figure increased from 13.1 per cent in 1981 to 13.4 per cent.
Balochistan's population increased from 4.3 million (1981) to 6.5 million, but as a proportion of national population, it
fell from 5.1 to five per cent.
The population of FATA increased from 2.1 million to 3.1 million and its percentage of the country's population
increased from 2.4 to 2.6 per cent.
According to the census, 67.5 per cent Pakistanis live in rural areas down from 71.7 per cent in 1981. The proportion
of urban population increased from 28.3 per cent to 32.5 per cent.
The highest concentration in urban areas is in Islamabad -- 65.5%, followed by Sindh with an urban population of
48.9 per cent.
Three major cities -- Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur -- accounted for 73.1 per cent of urban population in Sindh and
35.7% of Sindh's total population.
There are now 23 towns having a population of 200,000 and above. The biggest city is Karachi with a population of
9.269 million. Lahore follows it, with 5.063 million souls and Faisalabad with 1.977 million. These three cities account
for 38.4 % of the country's urban population. [3]
NATIONALISTS' REACTION
The fact that the census was carried out under army supervision didn't do much to inspire confidence, partly because
the army itself happened mostly to belong to Punjab. There were announcements of the boycott of the count. In
Balochistan, the Pashtoon areas were said to have largely gone un-enumerated. Specific objections were raised about
certain parts of the census questionnaire and the proposed manner of its filling out. The forms were filled with pencil
rather than ink pen. The objections were mostly ignored. The doubters claimed afterwards that the interim results
announced had confirmed all their fears.
Sindh nationalist groups immediately rejected the census results, describing them as an attempt by Punjab to
maintain its hegemony over the smaller provinces. Sindh National Front (headed by Mumtaz Ali Bhutto), Sindh
Taraqi Pasand Party (headed by Dr. Qadir Magsi) and the Jeay Sindh Mahaz (headed by Abdul Khaliq Junejo), said
that the census results have been engineered to show a small decline in the population of Punjab since 1981 (0.5 per
cent) in proportion to the national average, even while they had failed to show the disproportionately high increase of
population in Sindh caused by the national birth rate and migration. [4]
The Sindhi groups argued that the exodus of population from Punjab had been much higher as compared to Sindh
over the last 17 years on account of Punjabis migrating abroad to the Middle East, the US and other countries, as well
as to the other provinces. In this corresponding period, they argued that Sindh's population had grown not only on
account of the national fertility rate of 2.7 per cent but because of the influx of Bengalis, Burmese, Afghans, Iranians,
Sri Lankans, Indians and migrations from other provinces.[5]
SNF spokesman, Abdul Aziz Bughio, maintained that prime minister Nawaz Sharif had halted the 1991 census during
his first tenure because the results would have demonstrated the huge influx of illegal immigrants into Sindh, "a result

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that would therefore have been unacceptable to the Punjab." According to him, the latest census had attempted to
overcome the problem by counting the Punjabi settlers in Sindh as Punjabis instead of Sindhis. He said that the
census staff had failed to account for the Sindhi population living in the far-flung areas of Tharparkar and Kohistan,
after arguing that the "dacoit factor" had prevented them from reaching these areas. [6]
Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party spokesman Muzaffar Kalhoro declared that the latest census results had been engineered
from Islamabad to prevent Punjab's national assembly seats from being affected, enable Punjab to obtain its share in
the national resources as well as satisfy the international pressures for carrying out the census. He recalled that 1991
house count had been halted by the then Nawaz Sharif government in the first phase after it had failed to yield proper
results for the Punjab. [7]
Chief of Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Altaf Hussain, declared that the census results had been manipulated with the
aim to retain the population ratio of the past 27 years. He said according to available statistics, 17 million forms were
distributed in Karachi during the 1998 population census so it was beyond comprehension that its population would
be 9.2 Million. [8]
Opposition leader in the Sindh Assembly, Nisar Khuro said that the two-stage housing census and headcount in 1991-
92 had not been taken into consideration. He said he was amazed to see that the population of Balochistan and Sindh
had been drastically reduced whereas in the case of Punjab and the NWFP it had increased. He said the current
report ignored the house count of 1995. [9]
Awami National party Sindh President, Mohammad Amin Khattak, said the Interior Minister, Chaudhry Shujaat
Hussain, was on record having said in March 1997 that whether one accepted or not the census report would be
submitted to the authority concerned. "By reducing the population of the three smaller provinces and increasing the
population of Punjab and showing no increase in the tribal population, as it had been the practice during the Ayub
regime, was a deep conspiracy to exploit the national resources for one province at the expense of three smaller units
of the federation," he added. [10]
The Secretary-General of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Mairaj Khan, said the census statistics did not reflect the the real
size of the population of Karachi which, according to all estimates made by international media, was more than 12.5
million for the last few years. "Karachi which generates almost 70 per cent revenue of the country is denied its due
share, resulting in the collapse of civic services, which added to the sufferings of the people of this city. Another reason
why they don't acknowledge the increased population is to deny additional seats in the National and provincial
assemblies that should become due to Karachi on the basis on an increase in population." [11]
The president of Karachi Division Markazi Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, Alhaj Mohammad Rafi, argued that in the city
where the number of national identity card-holders were over 10 million, showing its population 9.2 Million in the
fresh census is the biggest lie of the century. [12]
CENSUS POSTPONED IN OCT. 1997
The 1998 census was held in the backdrop of sudden postponement of the head count on Oct. 4, 1997. The Inter-
Provincial Coordinated Committee at a meeting in Lahore decided to postpone for six months the population census,
which was due to be held on October 18, 1997. This was the fourth time that the census was postponed.
According to a Dawn report (6.10.1997) the deepening rural-urban politico-economic divide in the country is stated to
be the main reason for the postponement of the long delayed census. Informed circles in the capital quoted educated
projections said that in the last 17 years, the population of the urban areas in the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and
Balochistan have far outstripped that of the rural areas of these provinces.
Not only this, the population of Sindh is said have galloped at a higher rate during this period than that of the Punjab
reducing to that extent the proportion of the Punjab population in the overall national count.
In NWFP, the Pathan areas are said to have become predominantly Mohmand reducing the former in the area to a
minority. And in Balochistan, the Pathan population is said to have overtaken the Balochs.

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In Sindh, the population of cities, like Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur are said to have outpaced those of the rural
Sindh, mostly because of a massive exodus of population from Punjab and NWFP into urban Sindh as a result of
which the Pathan and Punjabi populations are said to have increased in proportion reducing to that extent the
population of Mohajirs in the over all Sindh urban count.
If these educated projections had come true as a result of a formal census, the present political power balance would
get upset and even the economic power would change hands dramatically overnight.
In Punjab the rural areas will get lesser assembly seats than the urban areas while in the overall count the Punjab's
financial allocations would get reduced remarkably.
In Sindh too the urban population will get the political power while province's overall allocation under the NFC
award would get enhanced significantly, making it that much richer compared to the Punjab.
In urban Sindh, the Mohajirs will be sharing political power with Punjabi and Pathan settlers.
Sindh Graduate Association Chairman, Bakhsh Ali Lakho, told a seminar on "Census 1997" that the 1991 sampling
census figures were not acceptable to the rulers only because the people of Sindh have ensured that no one remains un-
listed. The results showed a two per cent increase in Sindh's population while the figures in Punjab declined by 2 per
cent, he added. [13]
The government of Benazir Bhutto abandoned the idea of holding population census in November 1995. The decision
was taken in the wake of startling figures obtained after house census carried out during September to November
1994. The government of Mian Nawaz Sharif had stopped the population census in 1991 after a house census which
had given almost the same figures as those produced by the operation completed in 1994. The house listing operation
of 1994 projected a population growth rate of around 4 per cent -- almost double the official claims of 2 per cent.
The first house listing operation which was carried out in November and December 1990 had shown an increase of
770 per cent in some districts of the province of Sindh. The increase in housing units recorded in Hyderabad and
Karachi was 112 per cent and 172 per cent respectively during the past one decade. In the rural areas, the highest
increase was registered in the district of Naushero Feroze where the population shot up by over one million in a span
of just ten years. [14]
STRANDED PAKISTANIS IN BANGLADESH
The Lahore High Court, on March 2, 1998, dismissed a writ petition seeking a direction against the government for
settling along the motorway the Pakistanis residing in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Justice Khalilur Rehman
Ramaday also prescribed a cost of Rs. 5,000 to petitioner Advocate M.D. Tahir for indulging in frivolous litigation.
The court said what was the guarantee that agents of the Indian intelligence agency RAW had not entered the ranks
of these people. It also said that it required a lot of money for settling these people in Pakistan when there was already
a lot of poverty here.
In her meeting with Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, made it plain that her
government could not go on supporting the Biharis indefinitely and that they should be shifted to Pakistan. To make
their plight even less enviable the stranded Pakistanis have not been recognized as refugees by the United Nations.
They have been living all these 28 years in makeshift camps in Bangladesh. A great deal of concern is expressed about
their plight by sections of Pakistanis and by people in many foreign countries. However the Pakistani authorities have
made it clear that even if they are at all settled in Pakistan, this would be done on humanitarian grounds and not
because they have a rightful claim to be regarded as Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh. [15] Foreign Minister, Sartaj
Azizi, said after his visit to Dhaka in 1998 that the so-called Biharis stranded in Bangladesh were not Pakistanis at all.
The bulk of the Biharis identified themselves with those who were in authority in Pakistan at the time and did not
share the separatist sentiments of the people of the eastern wing. One the contrary, they (perhaps misguidedly) felt it
was their patriotic duty to collaborate with the army which was used by General Yahya Khan and his cohorts to put

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down the separatist movement. Chronicles of the events of 1971 have gone on record to say that a large number of
those, now referred to as Biharis, served as mujahids and razakars in support of the regular army. The GHQ in
Rawalindi sanctioned the raising of an organized Razakar Force in the eastern wing towards the end of August 1971.
Giving details of this setup, Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi, who was in command of the troops in the then East Pakistan, says
that a separate Razakr Directorate was established by the GHQ and the Razakars started functioning under two
organizations - Al Badr and Al Shams. While Al Badr was assigned responsibility for 'specialized operations' while the
volunteers of Al Shams were responsible for the protection of bridges, vital points and other areas. [16]
Majority of those who happed to be in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh were not migrants but Central government
employees, mostly railway-men, from Eastern UP, Bihar and Orissa (even Madras). According to some estimates, they
numbered 50,000 employees. When these optees joined East Bengal Railway, they were central government
employees, but by an act of Ayub Khan, who made 'communications' a provincial subject, they became employees of
East Pakistan, which seceded in 1971 and became Bangladesh. The government of Pakistan found a lame excuse and
washed its hands clean of these victims of fate and is now disowning them as its nationals. So, is it on humanitarian
grounds, or by invoking the Quranic edict of 'Islamic fraternity', or on purely legalistic grounds that those who had
opted for Pakistan and their families that accompanied them, are entitled to Pakistani citizenship. [17]
The non-repatriation of Bihari Pakistanis by Pakistan since the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 is a negation of the so-
called two-nation theory which was and is the ideological basis for Pakistan; it is also a silent but solemn rebuttal of
our high-pitched claims of Islamization. One wonders, how and why Pakistan, which is the great champion of Muslim
causes from Kashmir to Kosovo, and from Pelestine to Afghanistan, had the resources and the space to give shelter to
millions of Afghans and even thousands of Bosnianas and now offers sanctuary to the Muslim Kosovars, is not
prepared to admit its own citizens stranded in Bangladesh. We have Kashmir days and other memorable days for
Palestinians, whose causes are in particular remembered vociferously by the right-wing political parties. But when it
comes to the Biharis, it is a conspiracy of silence. Islamic brotherhood somehow stops at their door. [18]
Most Pakistani leaders maintain that the reptariates could not be rehabilitated in Sindh even though they have links
of language and culture with the Mohajis living here. New colonies would, therefore, need to be set up elsewhere
perhaps, in Punjab to accommodate them. Most Sindhi nationalist parties are opposed to the Bharis' repatriation to
Pakistan as they are convinced that this would tilt the delicate population balance in favor of non-Sindhis in Sindh.
Activists of Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz have even threatened to go on hunger strike if the Biharis were brought to
Sindh. Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami has managed to raise a considerable amount of funds for the repatriation of the
Biharis. [19]
According to a report prepared by a former Inspector-General of Police, Afzal Shigri, there are 3.55 million illegal
immigrants in Pakistan -- over two million Afghans, 1.16 million Bangladeshis and over 200,000 Burmese, besides
Iranians and Iraqis. The largest number of illegal immigrants are in Karachi. Can we not settle 300,000 stranded
Pakistanis in Pakistan. [Dawn 7.4.1999] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in May 1999 visited Kosovo and donated $6
million in cash and relief goods. But no such gesture was made towards the Biharis when the Prime Minister was in
Bangaldesh in 1998.
INDIAN PRIME MINISTER VAJPAI VISITS PAKISTAN
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a historic visit to Pakistan when he arrived in Lahore, on Feb. 20,
1999, to a colorful and enthusiastic welcome for a summit meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Vajpayee
entered the Wagah check post aboard a Delhi Transport Corporation bus that he had boarded at Amritsar for a 51-
km journey.
This was the third visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Pakistan in early sixties.
Rajiv Gandhi attended a SAARC summit in Islamabad in July 1989 and held talks with Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto. However, it was not the first time that the leaders of India and Pakistan had made seemingly path-breaking
overtures towards each other. These gestures include: Simla agreement signed by Pakistan and India in 1972; "cricket
diplomacy" between Rajiv Gandhi and Ziaul Haq in the eighties and the dialogue between I.K. Gujral and Nawaz
Sharif in 1997 at a SAAR summit in Dhaka.

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Three documents were signed at the end of Vajpayee's two-day visit to Pakistan.
The Lahore Declaration, signed by the two Prime ministers, contained the resolve of the two countries to intensify
efforts for an early resolution of all issues, including the Kashmir issue, through bilateral talks in implementation of
the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit.
A joint statement, singed by the foreign secretaries of the two countries, spells out confidence building measures to
achieve a durable peace in the region.
The Memorandum of Understanding, also singed by the foreign secretaries of the two countries, spells out broader
principles of security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues
LAHORE DECLARATION
The two governments:
- shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
- shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
- shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed
liberal agenda.
- shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss
concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional
fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
- reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization
of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view of promoting the welfare of the people of South Asia
and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.
- reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this
menace.
- shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
JOINT STATEMENT
a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related
issues.
b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective
positions.
c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in information technology.
d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalizing the visa and travel regime.
e) The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to
civilian detainees and missing persons.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to
developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at avoidance of conflict.

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2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests
and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each
other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a
fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as
to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such accidents being misinterpreted by the
other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.
4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test
explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized
its supreme interests.
5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation
by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and
where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these
CBMs.
7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors
General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrade and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and
secure communications. [Already the two countries have signed agreements to minimize the risk of war, such as
establishment of a hotline between the Prime ministers, prevention of violation of airspace and prior notification of
military maneuvers.]
8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within
the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.
From the Pakistan's point of view, one of the most significant gains from the Vajpayee-Nawaz summit was the
inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir in the list of issues to be discussed and resolved. India has often resisted such a
reference to Kashmir. The fact that India now recognizes the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir as an issue to be
resolved is seen as the important step forward in Indo-Pakistan relations.
From India's point of view, the reciprocal gain is that Kashmir will be effectively put on the backburner, to be
negotiated slowly, even as substantial progress is registered on arrange of other matters first.
During his stay in Lahore, Vajpayee visited Minar-e-Pakistan, the spot where the All India Muslim League in March
1940, under the chairmanship of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, passed the Lahore resolution, which finally
led to the partition of the subcontinent and the establishment of Pakistan. "From this historic Minar-e-Pakistan, I
wish to assure the people of Pakistan of my country's deep desire for lasting peace and friendship. I have said this
before and I say it again. A stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. Let no one in Pakistan be in
doubt about this. India sincerely wishes the people of Pakistan well," wrote Vajpayee in the visitor's book.
At the Lahore summit, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and its Pakistani counterpart
launched an Indo-Pakistan chamber that would target impediments to the freer movement of businessmen and
commodities between the two countries. The removal of these impediments will raise bilateral trade, most of which is
currently unofficial and conducted via third countries from a meager $162 million annually to about $810 million.
While this was small compared to the total volume of each country, it was seen nonetheless a step in the right
direction.
Home Page

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REFERENCES
1. Dawn 26.1.1999
2. Dawn 27.2.1999
3. Dawn 9.7.1998
4. Dawn 10.7.1998
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Dawn 6.10.1997
14. Dawn 7.11.1995
15. M.H. Askari, Stranded or abandoned? Dawn 17.3.1999
16. Ibid.
17. Dawn 6.5.1999
18. M.P. Bhandara, Shame, Dawn 20.4.1999
19. A. H. Askari, Op. Cite.

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Chapter X

KARGIL MISADVENTURE
Indian fighter jets and helicopter gun-ships launched an operation against the Mujahideen in Kargil on May 26,
1999. Pakistan called the air strikes a "very very serious" provocation because the armies of both nations normally
limit their hostilities to regular cross-border exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire. After India lost two Russian-
built MiG fighters and a helicopter gunship, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee issued a stern warning that
unless the infiltrators withdraw India would give "a befitting reply." On June 12, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj
Aziz visited New Delhi to hold talks with his Indian counterpart, Jaswant Singh. The talks ended in a deadlock as
India refused to discuss the Kashimir issue and insisted on withdrawal of what it called Pakistani infiltrators from
Kargil.
President Clinton, in a telephone conversation on June 15, asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw Pakistani
troops from the Indian part of Kashmir. A day earlier, Clinton had telephoned the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
and praised him for the restraint shown by him in the current tense situation. Since the Kargil round of fighting
flared up, US officials had been explicitly urging Islamabad to pull back its forces from the rugged peaks on India's
side of the Line of Control in the disputed Kashmir. As a means of applying pressure, the Clinton administration had
also quietly floated the possibility of holding up a $100 million IMF loan due to be released to Islamabad soon. The
US House of Representatives' Foreign Relations Committee adopted a resolution calling for suspension of IMF,
World Bank and Asian Bank loans to Pakistan until the Mujahideen occupying Kargil withdraw across the LoC.
The Group of Eight industrial nations' summit in Cologne charged that the fighting in Kargil was the result of the
infiltration of armed intruders, which violated the Line of Control. The European Union also called for the
immediate withdrawal of the infiltrators. The US Commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM), General
Anthony Zinni, met in Islamabad with the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, to defuse the Kargil
situation. He warned that things could "get bad" for Pakistan if it does not withdraw infiltrators from Kargil.
The Clinton administration saw several objectives for the Pakistani operation, including enhancing Islamabad's
negotiating leverage with India over Kashmir, forcing international involvement in the dispute, and rekindling a
flagging insurgency against India by Kashmiris. US officials believed that another factor was a strong desire in the
Pakistani military to kill the direct India-Pakistan dialogue.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington on July 4 to hold talks with US President Bill Clinton on situation
in Kargil. In nearly three hours of talks in Washington on July 4, 1999, the two leaders agreed that "concrete steps
will be taken to restore the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement". A joint statement issued after
the talks said: "President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif share the view that the current fighting in the
Kargil region of Kashmir is dangerous and contains the seeds of a wider conflict." "The president urged an
immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps are taken," it added. Immediately after the talks, two senior US
Administration officials told reporters that the "concrete steps" meant a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil "at a
very early time". [1]
Clinton-Nawaz meeting took place at the initiative of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. President Clinton made two
phone calls to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee before he officially said 'yes' to meet Nawaz Sharif. President Clinton
made his second call to New Delhi and briefed Indian minister about his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.
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Political and religious parties immediately rejected the Clinton-Nawaz declaration and the decision to seek a pullout
of Mujahideen from Kargil, as they held massive rallies in Lahore. The rallies were organized by the Pakistan Awami
Ittehad, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistan Awami Tehrik, the Khaksar Tehrik and the Markazi Jamaat Ahal-i-
Hadith.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised address, on July 12, said that there was an imminent threat of war with
India, which was no more a secret, and that there were "diplomatic complications" which were getting extremely
difficult to be handled.
Giving details of his US visit, he said when the situation was becoming serious he decided to meet President Clinton.
The PM said: "I am happy to tell you that President Clinton has accepted that as long as Kashmir dispute is not
resolved, the clouds of war will continue to hover on the region. This was the background in which the Washington
Declaration was prepared in which it was very clearly stated that all the disputes between India and Pakistan would
be resolved though dialogue and the LoC should be respected by both the parties".
Nawaz Sharif's televised address to the nation was rejected by the opposition parties as nothing but acceptance of
government's complete failure on the diplomatic front. "The question arises as to why they had decided to launch the
Kargil operation," Deputy Opposition Leader Syed Khurshid Shah said in his reaction to the prime minister's
speech. "If they have to go back to the Lahore process then who had advised them to go for the Kargil heights, he
asked, adding that who was responsible for heavy loss of lives both to civilians and Pakistan army soldiers and
officers at the Line of Control. He recalled that it was the same PML who had taken the PPP government to task for
removing a board of Kashmir House during a visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Islamabad.
According to General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Nawaz Sharif's Washington visit had seven objectives to achieve: "One,
to avert a war at a time and place of India's choosing. Two, to emphasize that the Line of Control in Kashmir has
equal sanctity for both the countries and its violation can lead to serious consequences. Also, the people of Kashmir
have never accepted the CFL renamed LoC and they reject any attempt that divides them. Three, to bring the
Kashmir dispute and the UN Security Council's commitments on it under a sharp international focus. Four, to
request the US-led West to get seriously associated with a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Five, to muster international support for the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. Six, to bring the
massive human rights violations committed by the Indian occupation forces in Kashmir to world's attention. And,
seven, to emphasize Pakistan's peaceful approach in settling the Kashmir dispute." The restraint shown by it in the
face of threats, provocations and a war hysteria created by India has vindicated Pakistan's position as a mature,
peaceful and moderate country, concluded General Arif who served as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief during
General Zia's regime. [2]
However the people of Pakistan were not surprised but stunned by the Sharif-Clinton accord since this is not what
they had been led to expect. According to Ayaz Amir "The two surprised parties must be Clinton and Vajpayee.
When Nawaz Sharif telephoned Clinton and requested an urgent meeting, the American president, who is no one's
fool, must have realized in a flash that it was all up for the Pakistanis. But is it far-fetched to suppose that even he
must have been taken aback by the eager enthusiasm of the Pakistani leadership to cave in and put its signature to a
one-sided document. [3]
By the same token, Vajpayee too must have been taken by surprise. The Indian army, despite the successes it has
scored, was not having an easy time of it in Kargil and Drass. Dangerous terrain, an elusive enemy and heavy
casualties are not things an army likes. Imagine then the sense of relief in New Delhi when Clinton called to say that
the Pakistani leadership was about to execute a volte-face and all it demanded in return was that he (Clinton) should
give this turnaround his blessing. A bang turning to a whimper: to this timeworn phrase a fresh meaning has been
given. [4]
The Tashkent and Simla accords look like victory parchments by comparison. Ayub Khan did not suffer humiliation
at Tashkent. Even if the Tashkent agreement went down badly in Pakistan because official propaganda, always a
curse in this country, had raised popular expectations to fever pitch, it was a fair agreement between two countries,
which had fought each other to a standstill. At Simla on the other hand, Pakistan was at a grave disadvantage

update10d
because it had suffered a humiliating defeat at India's hands. Yet even in the shadow of that disaster Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, to his enduring credit, managed to preserve what remained of Pakistan's honour. The Washington statement
defies understanding. For such submission wherein lay the compelling necessity? "[5]
Ardeshir Cowasjee was blunt in his remarks that the world failed to see the logic in Pakistan's argument that India
escalated the situation in Kashmir. "The Line of Control was crossed by some 500 men. By sending in 30,000 men,
artillery, and military planes to dislodge them, Pakistan claims that India escalated the situation. The world has
failed to see the logic of this argument. [6]
Pakistan's line is that the uprising in Kashmir is "popular, spontaneous and indigenous." Its line, as voiced by its
foreign minister on the BBC, is that all that it provides to the freedom fighters is "moral, political, and diplomatic"
support. Does he know that the BBC news, just after his 'Hard Talk,' showed the Islamabad correspondent talking to
freedom fighters who had just descended from the hills of Kargil to their base depot at Muzaffarabad to rearm,
regroup and return? Why do our men mock us, and make a laughing-stock of us in the eyes of the world? [7]
The mission to China failed. A statement from the G-8 was frosty. With the intent of averting a major conflict, Nawaz
Sharif sought help from the president of the United States, 'rushed' to Washington to meet him on America's
Independence Day. Clinton met him, not in the White House, but in Blair House. During the meetings, Clinton, not
wishing to antagonize India, broke to ring Vajpayee and apprise him of the progress. A sop of sorts was thrown at us.
We accepted. Sharif and his family went shopping, then on their way home stopped over in London, where he shook
Tony Blair's apprehensive hand. [8]
Though the prime minister has pledged that hostilities will cease, noises are being made that the government is not
sure that the popular, spontaneous, indigenous freedom fighters will abide by the terms of Nawaz Sharif's pledge. We
know that the present localized hostilities will cease once the shot and shell stop raining from the skies. We have
heard the Indian prime minister boast over the airways that India will give us no quarter and will 'kick us out.' [9]
Neither India nor Pakistan is concerned about the desire of the seven million Kashmiris. Neither country talks of
allowing them to decide their fate for themselves. China for its own good reason is not keen on Kashmiri self-
determination as it has its own problems with the fundamentalists in a large track in the south-west of the country,
and in Tibet. Pakistan is unconcerned about the plight of the 150 million Muslims of India. It does not realize that
each time it embarks on a Kargil-type misadventure, these Muslims have to work overtime trying to prove their
loyalty to their country. [10]
India, with its size and weight, can afford to be, and is, intransigent. To get India to talk and see things our way, we
do need global support and sympathy. Does the government comprehend that so far all we have achieved and
established, relatively cheaply, is that we are globally isolated? Has a lesson been learnt?" [11]
The tailpiece of the Kargil fiasco is difficult to match in the annals of diplomatic humiliation. Certainly the worst
setback for us since the fall of united Pakistan in December 1971. How did it arise? What was the game plan? Was it
sanctioned by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet? Should an enquiry into the debacle be made by Parliament?
These are some of the questions that are agitating the minds of concerned citizens. [12]
CHRONOLOGY OF KARGIL DEBACLE
May 26: Indian fighter jets and helicopter gun ships launch operation against the Mujahideen in Kargil. Pakistan
calls the air strikes a "very very serious" provocation because the armies of both nations normally limit their
hostilities to regular
cross-border exchanges of artillery and small arms fire. After India lost two Russian-built MiG fighters and a
helicopter gunship, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee issued a stern warning. Unless the infiltrators withdraw, he
said, India would give "a befitting reply."
June 12: Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz visits New Delhi and holds talks with his Indian counterpart,

update10d
Jaswant Singh. The talks ended in a deadlock as India refused to discuss the Kashimir issue and insisted on
withdrawal of what it called Pakistani infiltrators from Kargil.
June 15: President Clinton, in a telephone conversation, asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw Pakistani
troops from the Indian part of Kashmir. Clinton called the prime minister as part of his continued efforts to reduce
tensions and prevent the situation from escalating into a full-fledged conflict between the two countries. On June 14,
Clinton had telephoned the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and praised him for the restraint shown by him in the
current tense situation.
June 16: The Stockholm-based International Peace Institute (SIPRI) says: "The risk of nuclear proliferation by
Pakistan and India in Kashmir is increasingly significant. The greatest risk of nuclear war in South Asia arises from
Pakistan's long-standing strategy of using the threat of early first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war."
June 20: Leaders of the Group of Eight industrial nations, in Cologne, Germany, call on Pakistan and India to end
hostilities immediately and resume talks. In a statement, the G8 leaders, including US President Bill Clinton and
Russian leader Boris Yeltsin, voiced "deep concern" over the continuing military confrontation in Kashmir,
repeating their earlier charge that the fighting was the result of "the infiltration of armed intruders which violated
the Line of Control." "We are deeply concerned about the continuing military confrontation is Kashmir following the
infiltration of armed intruders which violated the Line of Control in the disputed border region. We regard any
military action to change the status quo as irresponsible. We therefore call for the immediate end of these actions,
restoration of the Line of Control and for the parties to work for an immediate cessation of fighting."
June 24: The Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Anthony Zinni, meets the Chief of
the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, to defuse the Kargil situation. In Washington, the US state department
cautions that things could "get bad" for Pakistan. "That's for sure," a senior official said without denying that Gen
Anthony Zinni had extended some kind of an implied "warning" to withdraw from Kargil.
June 25: The European Union has called on both India and Pakistan to show maximum restraint and hold to their
assigned borders in the dispute over Kashmir while trying to resume diplomatic talks. Germany, which held the six-
month EU presidency until the end of June, released a statement in which it demanded the withdrawal of armed
infiltrators from Kashmir. "The EU calls for the immediate withdrawal of the infiltrators and urges both countries to
work for the immediate cessation of fighting, to fully respect the line of control and to prevent further cross border
infiltration," the statement said.
June 27: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sends a special envoy to New Delhi in an apparent effort to ease the tension in
Kashmir. The emissary, former foreign secretary Niaz Naik, met with Indian PM Atal Behari Vajpayee and his
National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. The Indian Foreign Ministry said Naik had come to follow up on the
telephone conversations between the Indian and Pakistani PMs over the past several weeks. Naik came with a secret
message from Sharif. The gist of it was that both sides should search for a diplomatic solution to the crisis along the
Line of Control (LOC) that divides the disputed region of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The same day that
Naik flew to India, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gibson Lanpher met Indian officials in New Delhi
following a visit to Pakistan.
Jun 28: Prime Minister Sharif visits Beijing and hold talks with his Chinese counterpart Zhu Rongji. The China
Daily reporting on the meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Premier Zhu Rongji said that China had sincerely hoped
that Pakistan and India would alleviate tensions in Kashmir through talks and return stability to the region soon.
"The Kashmir issue is a historical issue involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements. It can thus be solved only
through peaceful means; Zhu was quoted as saying by a Chinese foreign office spokesman.
- Pakistan and China signed four agreements following a meeting between the delegations of the two countries. These
agreements were about cooperation in the development of Super-7 aircraft, cooperation in the cultural sector,
cooperation in electronic media and counselor cooperation under which the counselor in Hong Kong would look after
Pakistan's interests in Macao when it returns to China in December.

update10d
June 29: China has called upon India and Pakistan to resolve all their disputes through dialogue, a Foreign Office
spokesman told newsmen after an hour-long meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chairman of the
Committee of the Chinese People's Congress, Li Peng, in Beijing at the Great Hall.
July 2: Pakistan suffered a setback in the US Congress when the House Foreign Relations Committee adopted a
resolution calling for suspension of IMF, World Bank and Asian Bank loans to Pakistan until the Mujahideen
occupying Kargil withdraw across the LoC. The resolution, passed by 22-5 votes, demanded immediate withdrawal of
Pakistani forces from Kargil/Drass/Batalik areas of Jammu and Kashmir and asked the Clinton administration to
consider opposing loans from international financial institutions to Islamabad unless Pakistan withdrew its forces.
July 4: President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reached an agreement under which the freedom
fighters that crossed into certain parts of occupied Kashmir would withdraw. Clinton and Sharif said in a joint
statement after three hours of talks: "It was agreed between the president and the prime minister that concrete steps
will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control".
July 6: British Prime Minister Tony Blair terms the joint statement issued after the meeting of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif and President Bill Clinton as a "real progress" in reducing tension between India and Pakistan. A spokesman
of 10-Downing Street said, at the conclusion of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's 30-minute meeting with Prime
Minister Tony Blair, that the two were of the opinion that the a quick beginning should be made in the actions
proposed in the joint statement.
July 9: Political and religious parties rejected the Clinton-Nawaz declaration and the decision to seek a pullout of
Mujahideen from Kargil as they held rallies in Lahore. The rallies were organized by the Pakistan Awami Ittehad,
the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistan Awami Tehrik, the Khaksar Tehrik and the Markazi Jamaat Ahal-i-Hadith.
July 10: All Mujahideen groups unanimously reject both the Washington accord and an appeal made by Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif regarding a pullout of the Mujahideen from the Kargil sector and pledged not only to
continue their occupation in Kargil and Drass but also invade other disputed areas near the Line of Control (LoC).
This was stated by Ahmed Hamza, the Amir of the Al-Badar Mujahideen, at a press conference in Islamabad. He was
accompanied by two commanders of the organization - Salahuddin and Nisar - who had recently returned from
Kargil and Drass sectors.
July 11: Pakistan announces the beginning of the "disengagement" of the Mujahideen and their withdrawal from the
heights of Kaksar and Mushkoh in Kargil sector, following an agreement on the modalities of de-escalation and
sector-wise cessation of ground and air operations between Pakistan and Indian directors-general military operations
(DGMOs). The directors-general of military operations of the two countries had held their first contact on hotline,
and then met at Wagah to decide the modalities for de-escalation.
July 12: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised address, said that there was an imminent threat of war with
India which was no more a secret and that there were "diplomatic complications" which were getting extremely
difficult to be handled.
Giving details of his US visit, he said when the situation was becoming serious he decided to meet President Clinton.
July 13: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's televised address to the nation was rejected by the opposition parties as
nothing but acceptance of government's complete failure on the diplomatic front. "The question arises as to why they
had decided to launch the Kargil operation," Deputy Opposition Leader Syed Khurshid Shah said in his reaction to
the prime minister's speech. "If they have to go back to the Lahore process then who had advised them to go for the
Kargil heights, he asked, adding that who was responsible for heavy loss of lives both to civilians and Pakistan army
soldiers and officers at the Line of Control.
July 16: The attorney general of Pakistan, justifying the Washington communique, says that Pakistan is completely
isolated and economically could not have sustained a full-fledged war. The country is already 50 years behind the
developed world and would have been thrown another 50 years back had there been a war.
Home Page

update10d

Chapter 11
REFERENCES
1. TEXT OF STATEMENT: The following is the text of the joint statement by President Bill Clinton and Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif issued by the White House after their talks on 4.7.1999: "President Clinton and Prime
Minister Sharif share the view that the current fighting in the Kargil region of Kashmir is dangerous and contains
the seeds of a wider conflict. They also agreed that it was vital for the peace of South Asia that the Line of Control in
Kashmir be respected by both parties, in accordance with their 1972 Simla Accord. It was agreed between the
President and the Prime Minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in
accordance with the Simla Agreement. The President urged an immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps
are taken. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the bilateral dialogue began in Lahore in February
provides the best forum for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. The President said
he would take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of those bilateral
efforts, once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been fully restored. The President reaffirmed his intent to pay an
early visit to South Asia."
2. General (retired) Khalid Mahmud Arif, Beyond Washington accord – Dawn 14.7.1999
3. Ayaz Amir, Victory in reverse: the great climb down - Dawn 9-7-1999
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ardeshir Cowasjee, Lesson learnt? – Dawn 11.7.1999
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. M.P. Bhandara, On the edge of the precipice – Dawn 21.7.1999

ch10r
Chapter X
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. Dawn 31.5.1997
2. Herald - October 1997
3. Dawn - 8.2.1998
4. Dawn - 13.2.1998
5. Ibid.
6. Herald - December 1997
7. Herald - January 1998
8. Saving judiciary from politics by Kunwar Idris - Dawn 28.12.1997
9. Fascism on the march by Ardeshir Cowasjee - Dawn - 7.12.1997
10. Prospects after the crisis by M.B.Naqvi - Dawn 15.12.1997
11. The Washington Post - 3.12.1997
12. The Times, London 3.12.1997
13. The New York Times - 7.12.1997
14. The Financial Times - London 7.12.1997
15. Kunwar Idris - Dawn 20.12.1997
16. Selecting the Head of State by Sardar F.S. Lodi - Dawn 25.12.1997
17. Colonial NWFP or Pakistani Pakhtoonkhwa? By Prof. Em. Dr Ahmad Hasan Dani [Frontier Post,
Peshawar - 15-2-1998]
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. New hopes, old fears by M.B.Naqvi - Dawn 12.1.1997

ch10r

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VIII
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. Address to a gathering of the notables of Baluchistan in Sibi, Feb. 23, 1978
2. Khurshid Hasan Meer, Hudood laws, perspective and implications, the daily News, Islamabad, July 2
& 5, 1991
3. On demand of Shia community a proviso has been added that no Zakat or Ushr shall be charged or
collected on compulsory basis from the assets or produce of a person who files a declaration on oath,
witnessed by two persons who identify him, to the effect that: "He is a Muslim and follower of one of the
recognized fiqahs (sects) which he shall specify in the declaration, and that his faith and the said fiqah
do not oblige him to pay the whole or any part of the Zakat or Ushr in the manner laid down in this
ordinance." This is a simple procedure followed by a large number of persons. An affidavit is filed
swearing the above fact, specifying the fiqah, and such person becomes completely exempt from the
compulsory levy and recovery of Zakat or Ushr. Rashida Patel, Islamization of Laws in Pakistan, Faiza
Publishers, Karachi, p-64
To avoid Zakat deduction, several Sunnis filed affidavits with the banks declaring themselves as
belonging to the Shia sect. On the basis of these affidavits, some Shia Ulema claim that the population of
the Shia community in the country has increased substantially.
4. PLD 1981 FSC 23
5. Mushtaq Ahmad, Zia's Concept of State, Dawn April 7, 1994
6. During her visit to the United States in June 1989 in her first stint as the Prime Minister, Benazir
Bhutto described the hanging of her father as a judicial murder.
7. General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, Oxford University
Press, Karachi, excerpts quoted in Dawn 23.4.1995
8. Article 15 of the PCO clearly stated that "all presidential orders of the CMLA, including other orders
amending the (1973) constitution made by the president or by the CMLA, martial law regulations,
martial law orders and all other orders made on or after the 5th day of July 1977 are hereby declared,
notwithstanding any judgment of any court, to have been validly made by competent authority and
shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever."
9. The Economist, London 2-4-1981
10. The Autocrat of Islamabad - The Times, London 23.3.82
11. AFP report 19.8.1988
12. December 18, 1984
13. The Economist, London 19.1.1985

Islamic Pakistan
14. The International Commission of Jurists report - UPI dated 9.7.1985
15. Dissolution and Democracy by M.P. Bhandra - The Daily Dawn 13.6.88
16. AP report 8.9.1985
17. Financial Times, London 5.3.1985
18. The Times, London 16.5.1978
19. The Economist, London 2.4.1981
20. AP report of 10.7.1985
21. AP report 19.11.1985
22. AP report 14.2.1985
23. AP report 8.9.1987
24. General Zia destablized the government and then used the deterioration in the law and order
situation as an excuse for the usurpation of political power. The daily Muslim, Islamabad 17.3.95
25. In autumn of 1981 a six year package of $3.2 billion economic and military aid was agreed making
Pakistan the third largest recipient of American aid after Israel and Egypt.
26. M.B.Naqvi, Basic flaws in foreign policy, DAWN 1.4.94
27. Statement of the Swiss National Bank for 1985.
28. The Far East Economics Review, March 5, 1987
29 The daily Newsday New York, Feb. 23, 1993
30. The Frontier Post, April 3, 1993
31. Ayaz Amir, The Bitter Legacy - The Herald, July 1992
32. S.M.A. Sayeed, Islam and Modernism, p-186
33. M.H.Askari, The Zia Legacy, Dawn Sept. 9, 1991
34. Dawn 9.6.1995
35. Rubya Mehdi, Islamisation of the Law in Pakistan, p-154
36. Ibid. p-154
37. Ibid. p-154
38. Ibid. p-155
39. Ibid. p-155

Islamic Pakistan
40. Safia Bibi v. The State, PLD 1985 FSC
41. NLR 1988 SC 188

Chapter9a
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Page 2
The Nawaz-Ishaq dyarchy worked till early 1993. Both had allegedly protected each other in their
corrupt practices, bungling public money and above all keeping Benazir Bhutto and her PPP at
bay.[11] The President lost all patience when Nawaz Sharif addressed the Senate in March 1993,
seeking the repeal of the 8th amendment. He decided that Nawaz Sharif must go, and to achieve this
goal, he prepared ground by encouraging pliable MPs to resign from the Assembly. His emissaries
contacted Benazir Bhutto, whom he kept on the run ever since he dismissed her government. Benazir's
government, which was brushed out as "corrupt" by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on Aug. 6, 1990,
was washed spotlessly clean. All pending court cases against her and her husband were suddenly
forgotten for making the ouster of Nawaz Sharif successful.
On the evening of 17th April 1993, Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation on TV and
radio. It was an emotional address wherein he alleged, inter-alia, that disgruntled political elements
were working against his government, hatching conspiracies to destablize it and trying to undo all the
good work he was trying to do. All this, he alleged, was being done under the patronage of the President
of Pakistan. He ended his speech with the following challenging words: "I will not resign; I will not
dissolve the National Assembly and I will not be dictated."
Barely 24 hours after this challenging address was delivered, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan called a
press conference on the evening of 18th April 1993, to declare that the speech of the Prime Minister and
other acts of his government had convinced him that the government of the federation could not be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The President also cited
"maladministration, corruption, and nepotism and espousal of political violence", in dismissing the
Sharif government. The President appointed Balakh Sher Mazari as the interim Prime Minister.
After the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif, for a brief period Benazir Bhutto became the most influential
person in determining the composition of the caretaker cabinet during April-May 1993. In the
caretaker government, not only Asif Zardari as Benazir's husband was included, but sons of some of the
Sindhi leaders as well as the son-in-law of the president were included. Even the supporters of Benazir
criticized her bitterly for unwholesome influence of her husband. Thus, a Pakistan People's Party
supporter complained bitterly, "This politics of husbands, sons, sons-in-laws and brothers is really
sickening." [12]
A week later Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal order of the
President. On May 26, 1993, a full bench of the Supreme Court gave an almost unanimous (10:1)
verdict, holding that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had acted unlawfully in dissolving the National
Assembly and dismissing the Nawaz government. The Supreme Court announced: "On merits by
majority (of 10 to 1) we hold that the order of the 18th April, 1993, passed by the President of Pakistan
is not within the ambit of the powers conferred on the President under Article 58(2)(b) of the
constitution and other enabling powers available to him in that behalf and has, therefore, been passed
without lawful authority and is of no legal effect." The chief justice of the supreme court took the view

Chapter9a
that the president and not the prime minister had been instrumental in subverting the spirit of the
constitution because "the president had ceased to be a neutral figure and started to align himself with
his opponents and was encouraging them in their efforts to destablize his government." The Supreme
Court decision itself, while open to criticism because throughout the proceedings it seemed as if the
judges had already made up their minds,[13] upheld the supremacy of the constitution besides
narrowing to such an extent the scope of the president's powers under the Eighth Amendment to
dissolve the National Assembly that in future a president impatient with an assembly will think hard
before taking any action against it.[14]
The judgment demolished the myth of the President's over lordship of the National Assembly and the
Prime Minister. The salient features of the Supreme Court's verdict can be summarized as under:[15]
a. The President, being a symbol of the unity of the country, is entitled to respect. It is contingent upon
the President to conduct himself with the utmost impartiality and neutrality. Their Lordships
concluded that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had ceased to be a neutral and had aligned himself with
the elements which were trying to destablize the Nawaz government.
b. The Prime Minister was neither answerable to the President nor subordinate to him.
c. The only way open to the President under the constitution for deciding whether the Prime Minister
does, or does not command the confidence of the majority of the member of the National Assembly is by
summoning the National Assembly and requiring the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of confidence
from the Assembly. Any other method adopted for achieving the object, for forming an opinion, and for
giving effect to it is impossible.
d. The allegations of corruption, maladministration, and incorrect policies being pursued in matters of
financial, administrative, and international affairs, are independently neither decisive nor within the
domain of the President for action under Article 58(2)(b) of the constitution. These are wholly
extraneous and cannot sustain the impugned order.
e. The advice of the Prime Minister is binding on the President.
f. In formulating the policies of his government the Prime Minister is answerable to the National
Assembly alone.
g. In the matter of appointing the services chiefs, the President is empowered to appoint in his
discretion only the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
However, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, the only Sindhi judge of the Supreme Court in his dissident verdict
pointed out that two Sindhi Prime Ministers, before this, were dismissed under the same article of the
constitution, but the Supreme Court upheld the decision. However, when it was the turn of a Prime
Minister from the Punjab then the tables were turned and the assembly as well as the government was
restored. The dissenting judge added, "indications were given that the decision of the court would be
such which would please the nation...In my humble opinion decision of the Court should be strictly in
accordance with law and not to please the nation."
The verdict of the Supreme Court was, indeed, an indictment of the President by the highest judicial
forum of Pakistan. In fact, this was the ultimate insult for a man who in all his life had never tasted
defeat, and certainly not at the hands of a person, who until yesterday, was regarded as his protégé. A
brief statement issued from the Presidency the same evening declared that the president was going to
honor the verdict of the court. However, the President had other plans. Instead of packing his bags and
putting a voluntary end to his long stint in public office, the president decided to strike back. Within
three days of the verdict, the president's men went into action in Lahore and succeeded in dissolving the
Punjab Assembly. A day later, the NWFP Assembly was also sent packing. And if this was not enough,
a vote of no-confidence was subsequently moved against the Chief Minister of Sindh.

Chapter9a
The Supreme Court verdict had clearly not resolved the political crisis in the country. The renewed
confrontation was assuming threatening proportions, with the newly inducted caretaker governments in
the Punjab and NWFP very serious in their attempts to restrict the writ of the central government to
the federal limits of Islamabad. Ironically, Nawaz Sharif himself had once attempted this gambit when,
as the Chief Minister of the Punjab, he had, tried to confine the authority of the then prime minister
Benazir Bhutto, to the federal capital. The continued confrontation between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam
Ishaq Khan polarized Pakistani politics and threatened to undermine government institutions.
After waiting in the wings through a political crisis of epic proportions, the army finally decided to
emerge from the shadows and take its traditional role in politics. Directly or from behind the scenes, the
country has been ruled by the army for most of its half a century history. On this occasion, however, the
military top brass had to decide the fate of a prime minister who, unlike his predecessors, stood on the
same power-base as the army, and had continued to derive his support from an extremely influential
section of the so-called establishment.[16] Corps Commanders met on July 1, 1993 to discuss three
options: the imposition of martial law; asking the president to again dissolve the assembly and call for
fresh elections; and requesting the prime minister to advise the president to dissolve the House and call
snap polls. The conference decided on the third option and General Abdul Waheed told Nawaz Sharif
the same day, that fresh elections were a possible answer to the prevailing crisis. Finally, under a
compromise brokered by the military, both the President and the Prime Minister resigned in July 1993.
Wasim Sajjad, who was serving as Senate Chairman was appointed interim President, in accordance
with the constitution. According to the U.S. State Department, the Pakistani political leaders and the
chief of army staff were kept under pressure during the negotiations to ensure that the country did not
come under martial law.[17]
The army's role in the 1993 crisis has been rather different from what it was at the time of the past two
dismissals. In May 1988, when Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo was removed, the then
President General Ziaul Haq was himself the army chief. Later when Benazir Bhutto's government was
removed in August 1990, General Aslam Beg and the rest of the army leadership was as much involved
in the act as the president. This time, however, the army's involvement has been limited to a passive
support for the president's action, who also happens to be the supreme commander of the armed forces.
It was not without reason that, on the night of the dismissal, Ishaq Khan made it a point to mention that
his real differences with Nawaz Sharif had started when the latter objected to the appointment of
General Abdul Waheed as the new army chief.[18]
Nawaz Sharif was the real loser in the power struggle, but for this he has to largely blame himself. It
was his ambition to acquire absolute and unchallenged political dominance which in the first instance,
led him to work towards the annulment of the Eighth Amendment and incidentally, make his first
conciliatory gesture towards the opposition and the PPP. He failed to realize that if the Eighth
Amendment provided unchecked discretionary powers to the President, something that was contrary to
the true democratic spirit, the opposition would not concede the Prime Minister's usurpation of the
same. He banked too much on his strength in the National Assembly and became oblivious to the fact
that this strength was not seen as entirely legitimate by the opposition.
Ghulam Ishaq Khan was also a major loser in the end-game. When he took over as the President in
August,1988 after the death of General Ziaul Haq, he was looked upon as something of a savior. People
even decided to ignore some of the proverbial skeletons in his cupboard -- e.g. his proximity to General
Zia, for instance. Yet, towards the last phase of his tenure he became a manipulative old man
encouraging palace intrigues, motivated by his own personal whims and fancies.
Like his predecessor, Nawaz Sharif's two and half years rule was marred by deteriorating law and
order situation, particularly in the Sindh province, economic mismanagement, financial scandals and
political vindictiveness. Sharif's ally in Sindh, Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali, launched a reign of terror
against his opponents. During Sharif's tenure, Asif Ali Zardari remained in jail for alleged involvement
in criminal and fraud cases. Six references were filed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan against Benazir
Bhutto in Special Courts regarding misuse of authority.

Chapter9a
The lack of transparency in his much-publicized privatization policy was glaringly obvious. The work
of Privatization Commission, headed by Lt. General Saeed Qadir, was a mixture of deviousness and
bullheadedness. Charges of favoritism and insider dealings made a mockery of the whole process. No
sooner was a deal concluded than it became mired in controversy. And yet privatization was being
hailed as the government's major accomplishment.
At every level, he continued to create illusions. The National Finance Commission Award and the Indus
Water Apportionment Treaty are two living proofs of these illusions. In the case of the former, he
promised the provinces more money than he could deliver and in the later, he gave the provinces more
water than could possibly be taken out from the Indus Basin system, given the existing irrigation
network.
After taking over the reigns of government, the Interim Prime Minister, Moeen Qureshi, roundly
criticized Nawaz Sharif for draining the country's foreign exchange reserves. He accused his
predecessor of wasting as much as five billion dollars in only 18 months. Breaking down this figure, he
revealed that the Sharif government had borrowed two billion dollars from foreign commercial banks
on high mark-up, consumed another two billion out of private foreign exchange accounts, and more or
less, threw away another one billion dollars in sponsoring his much-publicized yellow cab scheme. In
addition, the Nawaz Sharif government allegedly printed currency notes worth nearly 20 billion rupees
without obtaining prior clearance from the State Bank, or making any allowances for the country's gold
reserves level.[19]
On the economic front, all his decisions were taken by the dozen-odd committees operating directly
from the PM's house. The cabinet, and even parliament, were completely bypassed. A notification
reduced the duty on steel scrap from Rs. 1500 per ton to Rs 500 per ton. It was a blatant exercise of the
misuse of public office for private ends, whereby the state exchequer was deprived of approximately Rs.
500 million while saving the PM's family-owned business Ittefaq Foundries 378 million rupees.
His domestic politics revolved around high-profile visits to poor people's homes, but he would not touch
his friend General Abdul Majid Malik who owned the National Industrial Cooperative Finance
Corporation, the eight billion-rupee cooperative society whose collapse left more people destitute than
could even benefit from Sharif's transport scheme. He also allowed his personal business empire to
borrow money from the co-operative societies, knowing fully well that it was wholly illegal to do so.
The plundering of the cooperative societies by the IJI politicians, culminated in the Credit Loan
scandal, as a result of which some politicians robbed the national financial institutions over Rs 29
billion. The failure of the National Industrial Cooperative Credit Corporation and other cooperative
societies was probably the biggest financial debacle in the history of Pakistan, affecting as many as two
million depositors, many of them had their life savings in the cooperatives. Ittefaq Group was also
accused of being involved in the cooperatives scam scandal since it took a loan of 520 million rupees
from the co-ops. However, a Commission of inquiry -- headed by a judge, Afzal Lone who was elected
unopposed on PML ticket to the Senate in March 1997 elections -- absolved the group from any
responsibility in the co-op crash since the group had returned the money along with Rs 130 million
interest.
The case of the co-ops is not as simple as that and the terms of reference for the Lone Commission were
not sufficient to crack open the case in detail. The Lone Commission was only required to determine
whether the two business groups, Ittefaq and the Chaudhrys' were responsible for the co-op crash or
not. Of course they were not, but Mian Nawaz Sharif, along with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Ms
Benazir Bhutto, the Governor of the State Bank and all the federal and provincial finance ministers
between 1985 and 1990 are guilty of ignoring and even abetting a gross violation of the Co-operative
Society Act of 1925, under which most of the co-ops were registered. These cops were allowed to
conduct illegal banking business by all the governments which came to power between 1985 and 1990.
In the case of Mian Nawaz Sharif, the responsibility increases manifold because he allowed his own
Chapter9a
family concern to borrow from these co-ops while he was in power, when he was legally and morally
bound to check the activities of these co-ops. Ms Benazir Bhutto is no less guilty as her own finance
minister owned one of the five top co-ops while her government was in power.[20]
The government of Nawaz Sharif took exceptional pride in the enforcement of abstract concepts. The
enforcement of the Shariah Act of 1991 was very much publicized and conscious efforts were made to
induce the intellectuals to support this undertaking. The Shariah Bill was criticized by many thinkers,
jurists, lawyers, philosophers, academicians and nationalists as unconstitutional and un-Islamic. It was
a bill moved by fundamentalists, which was meant to strike at the roots of democracy. The passage of
the bill did not fulfill the needs of the people. It did provide Nawaz Sharif with a pretext to claim
"another promise fulfilled." [21]
However, Nawaz Sharif was not able to reconcile the different objectives of the IJI's constituent parties.
The largest religious party, Jamaat-i-Islami, abandoned the alliance because of its perception of PML
hegemony. The regime was weakened further by the military's suppression of the MQM which had
entered into a coalition with the IJI to contain the PPP influence.
By the middle of 1992, the situation in Sindh had reached a dangerous pass. Over the cities the MQM,
with the unique blend of terror and populism, ruled. The interior of the province was swept by an
unprecedented wave of crime with kidnappings and dacoities having become the order of the day. The
chief minister, Jam Sadiq Ali, was more interested in holding on to power and in hounding the PPP
than in anything else. But with the law and order situation on the verge of total collapse, the federal
government was left with no option but to call upon the army to help improve the situation. On June 19,
1992 General Asif Nawaz Janjua launched a "cleanup operation" to restore deteriorating law and
order situation in the interior of Sindh as well as crackdown against the MQM. To general acclaim, the
army did a splendid job. It restored peaceful conditions in the countryside and put an end to the
MQM's reign of terror in the cities. In General Ziaul Haq's time the army had become an object of
hatred in the eyes of many Sindhis -- firstly because of being tainted with the hanging of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, and secondly for its role in crushing the MRD movement in 1983. But with its new policy in
Sindh its battered image was rehabilitated.[22]
However, the prolongation of the army intervention and the way the army has taken sides in the
internal feuding of the MQM -- helping the Haqiqis against the Altaf Hussein loyalists -- unwittingly
helped the MQM by producing a sympathy wave in Altaf Hussain's favor and thus stemming the drop
in his popularity, of which there were unmistakable signs because of the corruption and terror tactics of
his cadres. From the very beginning the army gave signs that its intervention was not politically neutral.
There was General Asif Nawaz's famous interview to the BBC, during which he dubbed the MQM as a
terrorist organization. Whether this was true or not, it was no business of an army chief to pass this
judgment. Subsequently, the army played a far from passive role in helping the dissidents of the MQM
Haqiqi to take over the offices of the mainstream MQM. It was the army's partisan role in this
undertaking which not only created a feeling of ill-will against it even amongst those Mohajirs who may
not even have been MQM loyalists but it also demanded the Haqiqis as bunch of quislings. As a
corollary to this, the MQM proper has retained its support amongst the Mohajir community.[23]
INTERIM PRIME MINISTER MUEEN QURESHI
An interim government headed by Moeen Qureshi, a former World Bank vice president, took office in
July 1993 with a mandate to hold national and provincial parliamentary elections in October. Moeen
Qureshi went far beyond his mandate of holding free and fair polls. The 30 ordinances promulgated by
his government touched just about every aspect of government in Pakistan from making agricultural
income taxable to establishing the State Bank and Pakistan Television as independent bodies. However,
his measures were reversed by the elected government of Benazir Bhutto, as it allowed to lapse the
ordinances which were valid only for four months. Moeen Qureshi is more likely to be remembered for
his loan recovery schemes than for his short-lived reforms and holding of army-supervised fair
elections. He unveiled the faces that had eaten up billions of rupees from public money in the shape of
unreturned loans or unpaid taxes, and recovering over one billion rupees in unpaid utility bills.
Chapter9a
In December, 1987 a World Bank mission had advised the government of Pakistan to make public
disclosures of willful defaulters a regular feature, so as to allow the country's banks to finally recover
their loans. Since the presentation of that report Islamabad had seen two presidents and four prime
ministers who did not take any action. It was Moeen Qureshi's interim government which removed the
secrecy clause in the Banks Nationalization Act of 1974 to enable the banks to publish the list of
defaulters. Name any elite political, business or agricultural family and it is there, with millions of
rupees outstanding against one or more of its scions. Besides the defaulters, at least 245 persons have
managed, through influence or arm-twisting, to get their loans written off altogether to the tune of
roughly 1.56 billion. Some others have defaulted on payments amounting to more than 60 billion
rupees.
The prominent personalities in the list included: Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Siddiq Khan Kanju,
Gohar Ayub, Lt. General (retd) Majeed Ali Malik, the Saifullahs, Senator Basharat Elahi, Nusrat
Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, Khawaja Tariq Rahim, Liaquat Jatoi, Mir Nabi
Bakhsh Zehri, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, Ata Marri, Ali Khan Junejo
and former president of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Abdul Aziz Haji Yaqoob, who
was appointed by Nawaz Sharif as chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau with the status of a
federal minister of state.[24]
While the media had been quick to highlight the names of politicians who have defaulted on bank loans,
several leading business groups also owed millions of rupees in loans and had equally astronomical
sums written off by the country's banks. These included the Adamjees, Bawanys, Fancys, Abdul Khaliq
Allahwala, the Millwalas, Malik Khuda Bux Bucha, Lt General (retd) Habibullah Khan, Mir Javedur
Rehman, the Mazaris, Monoos, and Sheikhs (of the Colony group), Mians of all shapes and sizes, the
Dadabhoys and Kundis, Bayram Avari, the Hyesons group, the Zuberis, Rehamans, Hashwanis and
many others.[25] The most conspicuous of the lot was undoubtedly the ever controversial Mian
Mohammad Mansha, who benefited from a write-off amounting to more than seven million rupees.
However, this did not prevent him from later acquiring the Muslim Commercial Bank, the first
nationalized bank to be put up for sale through the much maligned privatization process, even though
one of the clauses in the terms of bidding clearly stated that anyone who is either a defaulter or has had
bank loans written off, will not be allowed to participate.[26]

Chapter9a

Chapter9b
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Page 3
BENAZIR'S SECOND STINT IN OFFICE

On October 6, 1993, the nation went to polls for the third time in five years. No political party secured
an absolute majority in the National Assembly. However, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) and Muslim League (Nawaz Group) emerged as the main players of the electoral game. The PPP
with 86 seats was the largest party followed by the PML/N with 73 seats. Religious parties, won just
nine seats in the 217-seat house. In the provincial assembly elections, the PPP got absolute majority only
in the Sindh province with 56 seats while the Mohajir Qaumi Movement was the second largest party
with 27 seats in the 100-member House. In Punjab, the PML/N got 106 against 98 of the PPP out of total
240 seats. In the North West Frontier Province, the PPP secured 22 seats while PML/N got 15 and
Awami National Party 21 in the 80-seat House. In the Baluchistan, the PPP got only three out of 40 total
seats, while PML/N got 6 seats. Ten seats went to independents, and the rest to other regional political
parties.
The October polls conclusively proved that if anyone can threaten the PPP's position, it is Nawaz
Sharif. Political observers pointed out that between 1988 and 1993, his vote bank was essentially
negative in character as it drew its strength from its hatred of the Benazir rather than love for Sharif.
People voted for Nawaz Sharif because he was the only alternative to her. But in the October 1993
elections, one could discern strong positive trends in the Sharif vote. The turnout during the election
campaign clearly indicated that the people who supported Sharif in the past, purely because of a hatred
for the House of Bhutto, may now prefer to vote against the PPP because they actively support Nawaz
Sharif. Nawaz Sharif now commands the confidence of some 40 per cent of the active voters in Pakistan
and can claim personal following as devout, even if not as large, as that of Benazir Bhutto.
Benazir Bhutto was sworn in on October 19, 1993, as Prime Minister for the second time in five years.
Less than one month later, on November 13, 1993, presidential elections were held, in which PPP's
candidate, Mr. Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, was elected by defeating Wasim Sajjad of the Muslim
League. With a party loyalist as head of state, the Punjab and Sindh governments in the bag, and the
military establishment more supportive than ever before, Ms Bhutto had few reasons not to enjoy
smoother sailing than in her troubled first stint in power between 1988 and 1990.[27]
However, the PPP was able to form its government in the Sindh province only, where it had an absolute
majority. In the Punjab, the PPP was forced to align with the Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo Group)
to form a government, in which the leader of the minor coalition party, Mian Manzoor Wattoo, (leading
only 16 MPAs out of 240) was the Chief Minister. In Baluchistan, Nawab Zulfikar Ali Magsi formed a
coalition government since no political party got majority seats. In the North West Frontier Province,
Pir Sabir Shah of the PML/N, with the support of the Awami National Party, formed a coalition
government.
In a bid to get hold of the provincial governments, the center first successfully tried to topple the
government of Sabir Shah in the NWFP through political maneuvering and horse-trading. Eqbal
Ahmed gives a graphic account of the overthrow of the NWFP government through undemocratic
Chapter9b
means on February 27, 1994: "Independent MPAs -- popularly known as Lotas -- were being kept
sequestered in Islamabad's WAPDA House by the party in power. They had defected from the NWFP
coalition obviously in return for the greater favors from those in power at the Center. Other MPAs
from NWFP in the federal government's hands were also held in the capital. When the day arrived for
them to drag democracy into the filth of their ambitions, the government ferried them from Islamabad
to Peshawar in three helicopters, reportedly belonging to the Cabinet Division. The Federal Minister of
Interior received them at Peshawar's Army Stadium. They were guarded and escorted by hundreds of
battle-ready soldiers. Later, when Day One's dismal business was done, they were flown back to
Islamabad away from their home province and their constituencies.[28]
One and a half year later, in September 1995, the Central government decided to replace Wattoo with a
PPP man but despite all the maneuvering and horse-trading, it failed to achieve the goal. Although,
Wattoo was sacked by the President but the PPP was forced to accept Sardar Arif Nakai of the PML/J
as a compromise candidate for the Chief Ministership since the PML/J chief, Hamid Nasir Chatha,
refused to accept a PPP nominee.
In both cases the central government relied on a presidential proclamation of emergency, under article
234 of the constitution, to sort out its opponents in the provinces. Means other than democratic were
used to dispose of political opponents in the NWFP and troublesome allies in the Punjab.
Benazir, for all her western education and secular background, had to make concessions to Islamic
populism and never more so than at the present time, when things were going badly in Kashmir,
Karachi is terrorized by rival gangs and ethnic tensions are rising.[29] It is a strange contradiction of
the Pakistani society that while on the one hand, it does not return a purely clerics-led religious political
party, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami to power, on the other, it cannot disregard the emotive appeal of
religion. In recent elections, the Jamaat lost on all but three seats and was virtually eliminated from
Punjab which was otherwise regarded as its strongest base. Yet, at the first opportunity after coming to
power Benazir felt the need to appoint Maulana Kausar Niazi, as chairman of the Council of Islamic
Ideology, who announced that within a matter of months, all laws would be brought in consonance with
Quran and Shariah.
The PPP cooperated with Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman. The Maulana,
while announcing his party's decision to work closely with the PPP, nevertheless, expressed the view
that he regarded the fact of a government being headed by a woman as "un-Islamic". Pragmatically,
however, his party decided to cooperate with the government and reconcile itself to the fact that the
head of the government happened to be a woman.[[30]
Benazir's government completed two and a half years in May, 1996 but during this period she faced a
strong-agitative opposition and a critic press. During Mian Nawaz Sharif's era, Benazir had been
following a single-point agenda that was toppling of the government by any means. Now, she faced more
strong opposition impatient to overthrow the government through agitation and intensive media
campaign. However, like its predecessor, the PPP government continued the policy of political
victimization, rampant corruption and political bribery. At the same time, judiciary was tamed through
political appointments. The government avoided to appoint the Public Accounts Committee of the
National Assembly to scrutinize the ever-rising expenditure of the government. In short, Benazir
successfully contrived to concentrate all powers: judicial, legislative and political as well as financial,
unto herself. This is a situation which she deemed "most dangerous" before the 1993 polls.
Federal Anti-corruption Committee, headed by Malik Qasim, who enjoyed the reputation of being a
man of integrity, proved sadly ineffective in respect of the very large number of corruption cases that
have occurred during the Benazir's second stint. Most of its energies were concentrated on corruption
cases pertaining to Nawaz Sharif's tenure as Prime Minister. There was, undoubtedly, a tremendous
amount of corruption in Nawaz Sharif's time but the same sizzling tempo of corruption appeared to
have fully maintained during the Benazir government's rule. Ad hocism has become the order of the
day for processing all major development projects. Nawaz Sharif curtailed the role of the Planning
Commission and short circuited long established project scrutiny and clearance procedures in order to
Chapter9b
ram through his ill conceived motor way and yellow cab projects. After initial severe criticism of Nawaz
Sharif's methods, the Benazir government adopted the same faulty line on the plea of cutting red tape
and saving valuable time.
JUDICIARY NOT INDEPENDENT
Vendetta and revenge has always been the part of Pakistan's politics. But this time, while launching a
systematic and ruthless campaign against its opponents, the PPP government succeeded magnificently
in politicizing the judiciary and to that extent curtailing its independence. Following normal practice,
when Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah retired as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Sa'ad Saud Jan
should have rightly taken his place. But he was superseded by Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, who ranked
third in seniority.
The United States 1995 Human Rights report on Pakistan[31] described the judiciary as "not
independent in reality." The part of the report on independence of judiciary was blunt and hard-hitting
as it gave details of how the courts were influenced. "The constitution provides for an independent
judiciary but in reality, however, the judiciary is not independent. Through the President's power to
transfer high court justices and appoint temporary and ad hoc justices, the executive branch is able to
influence the Supreme Court, the provincial high courts, and the lower levels of the judicial system."
"It has become a standard practice to appoint judges to the high courts and Supreme Court on
temporary basis for a period of one year and later confirm or terminate their appointments after an
evaluation of their performance. Legal experts say that temporary judges, eager to be confirmed
following their probationary, tend to favor the government's case in their deliberations. Judges in the
Special Terrorism Courts are retired jurists, who are hired on renewable contracts. The desire to
maintain their positions has the potential to influence their decisions.
"Despite the Government's promise to strengthen judicial independence, it took several measures to
influence the court for political reasons. The Supreme Court heard the bail application and denied bail
to an opposition Member of the National Assembly (MNA) in case where bail would routinely have been
granted by a lower court. Mian Qurban Sadiq Ikram, special judge for the Court of Banking Offenses,
was removed from the bench on July 31 (1994), a day after he granted interim bail to the father of
opposition leader Nawaz Sharif."[32]
In its International Narcotics Control report for 1994, the United States alleged that there is corruption
in various government departments of Pakistan, including the judiciary. The allegation was based on
the assumption drawn from judgments in various cases. The report cited the case of Rafi Munir for
tainting Pakistani judiciary as corrupt. "There were other incidents during the year as well, such as the
release of Rafi Munir, which would seem to indicate corruption in the judiciary," it said.[33] The
judicial system is on the verge of collapse and has come to the straits where it was ready to punish the
innocent but most reluctant to punish guilty. [34]
POLITICAL VICTIMIZATION
"The government brought additional criminal cases against the leader of the opposition, Nawaz Sharif.
The Punjab provincial government in June brought treason charges against Sharif and 17 others for
their alleged attempt to unseat the province's chief minister in 1995. The government dropped the
treason charges in September, following numerous public and editorial statements against them, but
other charges against the groups remain pending. At year's end these cases were still pending in the
court system.[35]
"The government selectively used criminal charges and arrest to harass political opponents. The
government continued to detain one senator from the Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif Group,
who was arrested in 1994. Three PML/N members of the National Assembly arrested in 1994 were
released on bail in 1995. The opposition alleged credibility that the government put political pressure on
the judiciary to deny or delay bail to the arrested politicians. Three MQM/A senators and 11 MQM/A
Chapter9b
members of the Sindh Provincial Assembly arrested in 1994 on criminal charges continued to be denied
bail and remained in custody. In December the courts released on bail one MQM/A Senator.[36]"
The report specially mentioned Rawalpindi MNA Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, who has been jailed for seven
years for keeping an assault rifle. At year's end he remained in custody pending legal appeals, the
report added. Only four days after the US report, on March 10, 1996 the Lahore High Court acquitted
Sheikh Rashid of charges of illegally possessing a Kalashinkov when the Punjab government did not
contest the case. However, Sheikh Rashid had to spend another week in jail before he was granted bail
by the apex court in the Lal Haveli firing case on March 18.
Ghulam Hussein Unnar's case symbolizes the height of "state terrorism."[37] The hereditary chieftain
of the Unnar tribe contested the 1985 partyless elections from Larkana and was elected. In 1988,
elections he stood on a PPP ticket and was again elected to the provincial assembly. During Benazir's
second stint he emerged as a popular politician on the wrong side of the fence. He contested the 1993
elections on a Pakistan Muslim League [Functional] ticket and lost by only 2,000 votes. Unnar claimed
it was due to rigging. Between November 1993 and February 1994, 17 anti-corruption cases were
brought against him, for 14 of which he managed to get bail before arrest from the Sindh High Court,
and for the remaining three bail from the special anti-corruption court in Larkana. Between February
and June 1994 he was detained four times under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. The
blind FIR cycle of arrests was brought into play against him in July 1994, and it kept him continuously
in custody until December 5, 1995. He was too sick to be flown abroad and was admitted to the Agha
Khan hospital where he expired on January 25, 1996. Chief Justice of Sindh High Court, Nasir Aslam
Zahid, on April 3, 1994, ordered that Unnar be examined by a medical board, which was done on April
4. The board recommended that he be hospitalized forthwith and the CJ ordered so on April 8. His
orders were disregarded, and a contempt application had to be filed on April 12. CJ Zahid
reprimanded the authorities and very ill Unnar was taken to the Larkana hospital on April 15. On
April 16, 1994, Justice Zahid was removed from his post as Chief Justice of the SHC and he took his
oath as a member of the Shariat Court. It is clear that Unnar was made to pay for his collaboration
with Jam Sadiq Ali's government, which persecuted several senior members of the PPP in Larkana,
Benazir's home district.
Ironically, it was Jam Sadiq's government which demonstrated that "blind FIRs" as the former Sindh
Chief Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid termed them, are a convenient tool to harass political opponents and
settle old score. The MQM has also alleged that its senior members and activists have been falsely
implicated in several such FIRs, and that no elected member of his party has less than 50 cases to their
name.
A blind First Information Report (FIR) is an FIR for which no case can possibly be made. It can be
used in the so-called 'blind' system to hold in remand those whom the 'authorities' wish to harass for
political or vengeful or other reasons. A cop whips out a dormant case file, asks his obliging magistrate
to remand the victim in his custody for 14 days (maximum permissible) for 'interrogation,' at the end of
which he pronounces his suspect to be innocent and releases him. But before the victim is freed, another
cop takes over and the cycle continues till the 'high-ups' feel that the victim has had enough. The blind
FIR system is operated by Station House Offices who have bought their police stations - the purchasing
having been acknowledged by none less than the President of the Republic.[38]
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION DIFFICULT
The US report described the overall human rights situation in Pakistan as "difficult" and mainly
blamed the government for the failure. Members of security forces committed numerous abuses in
1995. Although the government has publicly pledged to address human rights concerns, particularly
those involving women, child labor, and minority religions, the overall human rights situation remains
difficult.
"Police and prison officials routinely use force to elicit confessions and compel detainees to incriminate
others; the practice has become a standard procedure. Common torture methods included: beating,
Chapter9b
burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the feet, sexual assault, prolonged isolation, electric
shock, denial of food or sleep, handing upside down, forced spreading of the legs and public
humiliation. Some magistrates and doctors helped cover up the abuse by issuing investigation and
medical reports that the victims died of natural causes.
"The overall failure of successive governments to prosecute and punish the abusers, however, was the
single largest obstacle to ending or even reducing the incidence of abuse. The authorities sometimes
transferred, arrested, or suspended officers, but seldom prosecuted or punished them. Investigating
officers generally shielded their colleagues. Persons attempting to bring charges against police officers
were often threatened by other officers and dropped the charges."
In March 1995, a contingent of Rangers surrounded the City Courts in Karachi and searched the court
rooms. Sixty persons were taken into custody.[39]
| Page 1 of Chapter 9| | Page 2 of Chapter 9|| Page 4 of Chapter 9| | Page 5 of Chapter 9| |References of Chapter 9| | Chapter X:
Nawaz Sharif's second stint in Office

Chapter9b

Chapter9c
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Page 4
CONFESSION BEFORE POLICE
The Benazir government made even General Zia, the military dictator, look like a liberal by its decision
to consider deposition of an accused before the police as a valid evidence against him. The President
promulgated an ordinance in April 1995 that permits confessions or statements against third persons
obtained during police interrogations in parts of the country, declared to be terrorist affected areas, to
be used in court. Human rights monitors view this ordinance as an endorsement of police torture to
obtain evidence, while the government argues that the law is currently not applied, because no part of
the country has been declared a terrorist affected area.[40] The law authorizes the police and the civil
armed forces (Rangers, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, or any other forces designated by the
government) to use force against suspects. By allowing confessions to police as proven evidence the
policemen are being given a legally protected excuse to liquidate their quarry in the so-called
encounters.[41]
By Ordinance XXXIX of 1995, a new section 11A has been introduced in the Terrorist Affected Areas
(Special Courts) Acts, 1992. The material portion of the new section is as follows: "Notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, the confession made by a
person...before a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police may be proved
against him..." In other words, section 11A attempts, insofar as offenses triable under the Terrorist
Affected Areas Act are concerned, to do away with the protection contained in section 38 of the Qanun-
e-Shahadat. Section 38 provides with admirable brevity as follows: "No confession made to a police
officer shall be proved against any person accused of an offence."
It is ironic indeed that the government of Pakistan -- that is (as our leaders keep reminding us ad
nauseam) free and democratic -- has seen fit to do away with a protection against police brutality that in
fact antedates even the British Raj. The origins of section 38 can be traced to 1817, i.e. the days of East
India Company. More than a hundred years ago, in Queen-Empress vs Babu Lal (1884) 6 All 509, a
Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had the occasion to examine section 25 of the Evidence Act.
The observations of the learned judges as to the absolute need for protection provided by this section
(or its present form, section 38) still ring true and can, unfortunately, be readily appreciated by modern
day Pakistanis as representing the harsh realities on the ground here today. One of the judges, Justice
Mahmood (who, incidentally, was one of the first Muslims to be elevated to the High Court), observed:
"These legislative provisions leave no doubt in mind that the Legislature had in view the mal-practices
of police officers in extorting confessions from accused persons in order to gain credit by securing
convictions and that those malpractices went to the length of positive torture The object of the rules was
to put a stop to the extortion of confessions, by taking away from the police officers the advantage of
proving such extorted confessions during the trial of accused persons."[42]
Commenting on this retrogressive piece of legislation, the daily Dawn[43] said: Do we need to be
reminded how our police work and what sophisticated methods they use to carry out their
investigations? In the armory of our police force no tool of investigation is more frequently used than
what in the local lingo is called the chittar, a vicious piece of leather with a handle which no police
Chapter9c
station through the land is without and which is used indiscriminately not only on offenders but on
anyone else foolish enough to provoke the police's anger. Indeed, even a more reprehensible feature of
the ordinance than the threat to innocent detainees is the danger that it will further undermine public
faith in the system of justice.
RANGERS OPERATION IN KARACHI
On November 30, 1994, the Benazir government withdrew army from Karachi and other towns of
Sindh as it failed to restore lasting peace in its 29-month operation.[44] The army was replaced by the
Rangers force which launched ruthless operations of mass arrests, siege of Mohajir localities, and at
random killings of alleged terrorists in order to root out what the government called "the MQM
terrorists." According to the Pakistan Human Rights Commission report, 353 people were killed and
649 were injured between October 1993 and November 1994 while the army was operating in
Sindh.[45] But more than 850 people had been killed within seven months of the operation by June
1995, including 280 in June alone. By the year end, 1800 people had been killed by the official count.
Benazir enraged the Mohajirs when she called them as 'buzdil chuhas." While addressing a rally in
Kasur on May 25, 1995, she said "cowardly mice had come out to spread terror."[46] Sindh remained
disturbed with crime, terrorism, ethnic prejudices and gang warfare between MQM factions. The top
PPP leadership recognized only three aspects of trouble in Karachi and rest of Sindh: politically a
suspect MQM with which it is necessary to keep talking; terrorism that still stalks needs to be fought
tooth and nail; and there is subversion and sabotage by India. It does not suspect that there can be a
political dimension to terrorism or that negotiations with an opposition party, unless they are seriously
intended and are purposeful, can do more harm than good.[47]
On the situation in Karachi, the US Human Rights Report for 1995 pointed out: "The number of extra-
judicial killings, often in the form of deaths in police custody or staged encounters in which the police or
paramilitary forces shoot and kill the suspects, increased in 1995. Most of such killings occurred in
Sindh province in clashes between the government and factions of the MQM. In trying to restore order
in Karachi, the government regularly used excessive force, including torture and alleged encounter
killings, against MQM activists. The rate of politically motivated murders in Karachi reached an
average of 10 per day in July; by year's end, over 1,800 people had been killed. According to the
Karachi police, 500 police officers had been suspended for misbehavior as of September. None was
known to have been prosecuted for abuses.
"Many observers believe the government to have been responsible for the murders of Altaf Hussain's
brother and nephew in retaliation for the murder of the brother of the Sindh Chief Minister.
"Both main MQM factions, the MQM/A and the Haqiqi faction, resorted to extra-judicial killings and
torture of their opponents and targeted police and security officials. Although the MQM/A consistently
claims that its activists are innocent, unarmed victims of ethnic violence, disinterested observers believe
that cells of armed MQM/A activists are responsible for a considerable amount of Karachi's violence
and crime. This includes extortion of large sums of money from Mohajir businessmen as well asothers.
"The government uses mass arrests to quell civil unrest. During attempts to reduce crime and violence
in Karachi, the MQM/A claimed that police and Rangers arrested 7,000 Mohajirs in numerous police
sweeps. Many of those arrested were not suspected of committing a specific crime, and were allegedly
held until family members paid police officers a ransom for their release."
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its report on the state of human rights in 1995 noted that
several hundred persons in Karachi and around 180 in Punjab were killed in the so-called police
encounters or police custody.[48]
The Amnesty International, in its 1995 report on "Human Rights Crisis in Karachi,"[49] apportioned
blame for continued violence in Karachi to both the law enforcement agencies and the armed opposition
groups. It documented cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, deaths in custody, extra-judicial executions,
Chapter9c
"disappearances" allegedly committed by law enforcement personnel and the human rights abuses
allegedly perpetrated by armed opposition groups.
However, the AI emphasized that human rights abuses perpetrated by armed opposition groups may
never be used by law enforcement personnel as an excuse to ignore national and international human
rights safeguards and to commit human rights violations themselves; to torture, kill or "disappear"
people described by the government as "terrorists." The report criticized the government for failing to
protect political activists, journalists and ordinary residents of Karachi from human rights abuses. It
found that in some cases, those in authority appear to have condoned abuses by some armed opposition
groups.
"Killings have been taking place due to an ongoing struggle between the two factions of the MQM and a
government campaign to restore law and order implemented by the police and paramilitary Rangers.
The government holds the MQM responsible for most of the human rights abuses, while the MQM has
declared that the government is attempting to crush them as an organized political force by unlawfully
detaining its workers, torturing and extra-judicially killing them, forcing them to change their political
allegiance and perpetrating crimes for which the MQM is held responsible.
"The government in its determination to restore law and order has called upon the police to use
"ruthlessness," and they have been tempted to use harsher, and sometimes unlawful methods in dealing
with armed opposition groups who have targeted law enforcement personnel. The slowness of judicial
process has also led police officers to take law in their own hands. The government's heavy-handed
searches, the harassment to which Mohajirs and MQM members are subjected, and other human rights
violations, it is feared, may drive young Mohajirs to extremism. Some observers told the Amnesty
International that the MQM leadership may already have lost control over some of its militant youth
groups.
The report also looked at complaints of torture, ill-treatment and intimidation of prisoners, and
detainees in the police custody. The blind-folding of people during cordon-and-search was also
reported. The detained persons are known to have included boys as young as 12 and old men. There
have also been reports that torture of prisoners was carried out with intent to extract money from
concerned family members. "The frequency with which people believed to be MQM members, or to be
closely associated with MQM members are subjected to torture and extortion, suggests that the police
assume that they can do so with impunity," the report concluded.
When it suited successive governments in Islamabad, the MQM was accommodated, but when Altaf
Hussain was no longer required, he was unceremoniously dumped. However, all along, the MQM
remained an armed and very dangerous group: for this government to pretend that it has just
discovered the true nature of this ethnic party is a bit disingenuous.[50]
THREE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OF 1996
Three major developments in 1996 rocked the government of Benazir and eroded its popularity. In
March, the Supreme Court, in a land mark judgment, held that consultations with the Supreme Court
and the High Courts Chief Justices were "mandatory" in the appointment of judges to the higher
courts. The judgment led to open confrontation between the government and the higher judiciary when
Benazir alleged that an unnamed group was trying to use higher courts to remove her government. The
federal government first challenged the judgment in the Supreme Court but later withdrew the
references. The Supreme Court, on June 26, restored, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group)
dominated, local municipal councils in Punjab, which were disbanded in 1993 before completion of
their tenure. The next day, the Punjab Assembly passed, in less than three hours, a bill to offset the
Supreme Court order. The new legislation, which repealed the Punjab Local Government Ordinance,
1979, again dissolved the local bodies.
The government was still involved in acrimonious debate with the judiciary that the 1996-97 budget,

Chapter9c
envisaging staggering 40 billion rupees in new taxes, was announced on June 13, which angered the
businessman and ordinary man alike. There was strong objection to the General Sales Tax, imposed on
virtually all the consumers item, while feudal lords income remained un-taxed. Pakistan Muslim
League chief Nawaz Sharif called for a nationwide shutdown on June 23 in protest against the budget as
well as corruption within the government. The strike was successful. The following day, three
supporters of Jamaat-i-Islami were killed in clashes with the police in Rawalpindi. On July 2, Pakistan's
press staged a strike to protest against the imposition of a GST on newspapers and enhanced import
duty on newsprint. Later the press launched an intensive campaign against the government financial
policy but to no avail.
Benazir Bhutto's credibility was further eroded when the British newspaper, Sunday Express,
published on June 9 a report that Benazir and her husband Asif Ali Zardari had bought a 2.5 million
pound estate in the English county of Surrey -- complete with mansion, indoor swimming pool, 355
acres of garden and private landing strip. Benazir denied the report while, Zardari promised to sue the
newspaper. But the newspaper, vowing to vigorously defend itself against a libel case, followed its
original story by publishing two other items in subsequent weeks. A June 16 follow-up story in the
Sunday Express fueled a volatile debate in the National Assembly when opposition demanded creation
of an independent judicial commission on corruption. On September 15, the Sunday Express claimed
that Zardari has set up an offshore account to pay for luxury apartments at one of London's most
prestigious Belgravia area. The paper also reported that Hakim Ali Zardari, the father of Asif Ali
Zardari, also purchased an apartment in Belgravia.
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT ON JUDGES APPOINTMENT
On March 20, the Supreme Court, in a land mark judgment, held that the consultation with the Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in the appointment of judges to the Courts "should
be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness
or unfair play." The Supreme Court also directed the federal government to appoint permanent chief
justices in higher courts where at present constitutional functions are being performed by acting chief
justices appointed by the government. The SC judgment also upheld the rule of seniority in respect of
the appointment of high court chief justices. The Court struck down Article 203-C of the constitution,
(which provided for the transfer of judges to the Shariah Court) an amendment made by General Zia,
on the ground of conflict with Article 209.
On May 19, the Supreme Court returned a constitutional reference, filed by the president three days
earlier, against the apex court decision, saying it had not been signed by the President as required by
the constitution. On the same day the federal government filed a review petition against the Supreme
Court decision. May 26, Supreme Court Judge Mir Hazar Khan Khoso announced his dissenting
judgment which, inter alia, said that the President has the power under the constitution to appoint
judges and that no time-limit can be fixed for filling in the permanent vacancies for judges in the
superior courts. The Federal government withdrew its review petitions as the Supreme Court refused to
change the bench. In an unprecedented move on June 13, the chief justices of the Supreme Court and
four provincial High Courts ordered the sacking of 24 judges -- all of whom were appointed by the
government. Benazir had balked at implementing that judgment and had refused to sack the 24 judges.
As the deadlock continued between the Chief Justice Sajjad Hussain Shah and the Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto, over the appointment of judges to the superior courts, President Farooq Leghari, on
September 21, filed a reference in the Supreme Court asking whether or not he could appoint judges to
superior courts without the advice of the Prime Minister. In his reference, the president pointed out
that the Supreme Court judgment had been partially implemented by the government and observed
that some of the ad hoc judges of the high courts had resigned on the request or persuasion of the
government. "It is a moot point whether these resignations constitute compliance with the Supreme
Court judgment," the reference maintained.
President Farouq Ahmad Khan Leghari, on September 23, sent to the Speaker of the National
Assembly and Chairman of the Senate messages, proposing suitable amendments in the laws enabling
Chapter9c
the president to consult the leader of the opposition and the chief justice of the Supreme Court in
addition to the Prime Minister in appointing judges to the special courts adjucating corruption cases
involving holders of public offices. He has also proposed amendments in the relevant laws enabling the
Wafaqi Mohtasib to act as the prosecutor in the trial of these cases. The appointment of the Mohtasib
would be done in consultation with the prime minister, the leader of the opposition and chief justice of
Pakistan.

Chapter9c

Chapter9d
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Page 5
MURTUZA BHUTTO KILLED IN A POLICE ENCOUNTER
On September 20, Mir Murtaza Bhutto, 42, brother of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and head of the
Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto) was gunned down by the police near his 70 Clifton residence
in Karachi. Police said that Murtaza and six of his guards were killed in a shoot out when his guards
first opened fire at the police. However, the circumstantial evidence suggested that the security forces
were determined to eliminate him. One week before the police action, events were building up to some
kind of a showdown between Murtaza and his faction of the PPP and the security forces in Karachi.
Murtaza's followers were being rounded up and he was accused by the police of attacking two CIA
centers in the city. In his last press conference, Murtaza, had indicated that since his party has become
a great challenge to the ruling PPP in the Sindh province, therefore, the government machinery could
do anything to break his power. According to press reports, at least 40 vehicles of police, rangers and
Frontier Constabulary, were deployed to stop the convoy of Mir Murtaza near his residence while he
was returning after attending a public gathering. He was fired upon at a close range and was not taken
to hospital for at least one hour after the shooting. Only two police officers were reported injured in the
shoot out. According to the daily Muslim, Islamabad, the police forcibly took away the record of the
firing from Jinnah Hospital when doctors refused to add the name of an inspector of police, Haq Nawaz
Sail, in the list of injured. Later a medical report declared that the foot wound of the inspector was self-
inflicted. On Sept. 28, Sial died in mysterious circumstances. The operation against Mir Murtaza was
watched by the Deputy Inspector General of Police from his house, just 100 foot away from the scene of
shooting.
The spontaneous reaction of a common man was that if a member of the Sindh Assembly, chief of a
political party and brother of the Prime Minister could be killed in front of his house then how he could
feel safe from the hands of the security forces. The Sindh government ordered a judicial esquire into the
tragic incident but political leaders and media were unanimous in calling it as a cold-blooded murder
by the security forces which are given a free hand by the government to eliminate anybody in fake
police encounters. While some leaders described it as the height of "state terrorism" the Nation,
Lahore, pointed out "the Karachi police, a creation of the present government, has become a
Frankenstein. It is inevitable that some of the responsibility for this tragic outcome of the police action
would devolve on Benazir." The daily Dawn, Karachi, said there was a new priority in Karachi. "It is to
check the brutality and trigger-happiness of a police force which has imbibed one overriding lesson
from its drive against the MQM: to shoot first and ask questions later."
While the people speculated about the motives behind the killing of Mir Murtaza Bhutto, Dr. Mubashir
Hasan, a former Finance Minister and a founder member of the PPP, was very blunt in his remarks:
"For those who have removed Murtaza from our midst, the real problem has been and is Prime
Minister Benazir. As long as Murtaza was alive, removing Benazir carried unacceptable risks. Murtaza
could take over the mantle of the elder Bhutto's legend. Else Murtaza and Benazir would be striving for
a common cause, separately or jointly. That would have presented formidable political problems.
Murtaza gone, the way is clear. Benazir stands perilously weakened. She is the next to go. Such are the
brutal pathways of realpolitik." Dawn 25.9.1996.

Chapter9d
People were still mourning the death of Murtaza Bhutto when another tragic event rocked the country.
On September 23, four gunmen opened indiscriminate fire at a Fajr congregation at Al Khair mosque
in Multan, killing 23 worshippers and wounding 50 others. Ten of those killed were children between
the ages of 10 and 15, studying at the Madarsa attached to the mosque which belonged to Anjuman-e-
Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (ASSP) Sunni group. The shooting, which followed the murder, a day
earlier, of Qamar Haider, leader of Shia group Sipah-e-Mohammad of Pakistan (SMP), in Bahawalpur,
was the latest in a vicious feud between the Shia and Sunni militant groups. On August 14, gunmen
killed 12, wounded 11 in an attack on ASSP cavalcade in Karachi. On August 18, gunmen killed 18
people, wounded dozens, in an attack on a Shia community meeting near Mailsi, in Punjab. Gunmen
also killed Commissioner of Sargodha Division, Syed Tajjamal Abbas, a Shia, on August 5.
In the first week of August, Benazir expanded her cabinet by appointing 15 new ministers. Asif Zardari,
her husband and Nawaz Khokhar, a turncoat, joined the cabinet as the Minister of Investment and
Minister for Science and Technology. Commenting on the cabinet expansion, the Economist, London,
(August 10, 1996) said Mr. Zardari's reputation is not high in Pakistan. All major public-sector
institutions are headed by Mr. Zardari's friends and all are in financial distress. Pakistanis see his
influence behind every unsavory investment or privatization deal struck by the government. On
Benazir's selection of Khokhar, a former opposition politician, the Economist said it means that those
who desert the opposition can expect handsome rewards.
The Federal Cabinet decided, on August 19, to establish an inquiry commission to identify the big
defaulters of loans obtained from banks and development financial institutions. The commission will
inquire into the overdue loans of Rs 10 million and above, dating from January 1980. The commission is
to limit its investigations to 250 biggest defaulters and 250 cases of irregularities by bank and DFI
functionaries, and submit its report every three months to the government. However, in the National
Assembly, prominent opposition members opposed the idea of the commission and suggested that a
parliamentary committee be set up to examine the cases of defaulters. Insiders say that most of the
defaulters are either politicians, their relatives, or those recommended by the politicians. There has
been an enormous increase in the bad debts on nationalized banks which could not be recovered
because every government tried to protect the defaulters. Till 1984, bad debts totaled Rs 13 billion and
were partly rescheduled and party written off on account of the sick units. Later the outstanding
amount against the defaulters reached Rs. 82 billion in 1990, which has finally touched the
unprecedented figure of Rs. 130 billion in 1996. The State Bank of Pakistan, on September 6, released a
list of 250 loan defaulters. According to it, loans of Rs. 62.067 billion are over due while those of Rs.
51.958 billion are in default.
BENAZIR'S GOVERNMENT SACKED
As Benazir's third year in power came to close (on Oct. 19 1996) with the tragic end of his younger
brother, her alliance with President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, an old political supporter, has
shown signs of strain. The government of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed and the National Assembly was
dissolved by President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari on November 4, 1996. Exercising his powers
under Article 58-2(B) of the constitution, President Leghari sacked the Benazir government. This was
the fourth time since 1988 that the controversial article was used to dismiss an elected government and
the National Assembly. President Leghari gave the following reasons for his action:
● Thousands of people have been killed in security crackdowns in Karachi and elsewhere in
violation of the constitution. The government neither put an end to the extra-judicial killings nor
punished those guilty of such crimes.
● Widespread interference by members of the government and the ruling party in the
appointment, postings and transfer of officers and staff of security agencies destroyed public
faith in the integrity and impartiality of law enforcement agencies.
● Human and legal rights of the people were not respected and harassment of innocent people
continued in the fight against terrorism.
● The government deliberately violated, on a massive scale, the fundamental rights of privacy. The
phones and conversations of judges of the superior courts, leaders of political parties and high-
Chapter9d
ranking military and civil officers were tapped.
● The prime minister ridiculed the March 20 verdict of the Supreme Court which had curtailed
her authority to appoint judges to the superior courts.
● She inducted in her cabinet an MP against whom criminal cases were pending.
● Benazir maliciously insinuated, without any factual basis, that the presidency and other agencies
were involved in the killing of her estranged brother Murtaza Bhutto and seven others in a police
shoot-out in Karachi on September 20. The President noted that Murtaza's widow and friends
have accused Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and some government functionaries of being
involved in the murder conspiracy.
● Corruption, nepotism and violation of the rules have become so grave that in some cases national
security has been endangered.
● Despite a presidential directive the sale of shares of several important units including Burmah
Castrol and Qadirpur Gasfield, involving national assets worth billions of rupees, were not
reconsidered by the cabinet.
● Public faith in the integrity and honesty of the government has disappeared.
● A situation has arisen in which justice can not be ensured because powerful members of the
federal and provincial governments who are themselves accused of crime are influencing and
controlling the law enforcing agencies.
The President appointed Mr. Meraj Khalid, a veteran politician from the Pakistan People's Party, to
head an interim administration and to hold elections on February 3, 1997.
COUNCIL FOR DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The most controversial decision of the caretaker cabinet had been the formation of the Council for
Defence and National Security (CDNS) that provided a role to the army in the affairs of the
government. On Jan 6, 1997, President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari amended the Rules of Business,
1973, thereby establishing a "Council for Defence and National Security to aid and advise the
government of Pakistan in determination of national strategy, formation of defence policy, co-
ordination of defence policy with external and domestic policies, economic and financial policies
affecting defence and national security and recommendations relating to internal security (including
proclamation of emergency." The CDNS has been accused of being extra-parliamentary, supra-
government or even supra-constitutional.
MEHRAN BANK SCANDAL PROBE
Parts of the report of the Mehran Bank Scandal probe commission were released in December, 1996. In
July 1994 a commission, comprising five judges, was formed to investigate the Mehran Bank scandal. It
took eight months to complete its inquiry in February 1995 but its report was never published.
However, parts of the reports were released on December 8, 1996, according to which the commission
exonerated President Leghari from any wrong doing in his so-called benami deal. But the commission
did not mention to whom the land was sold by the president for Rs. 15 million and from which account
the money was debited to make the payment. The Commission also cleared the former chief minister of
the North West Frontier Province, Aftab Sherpao and Senator Anwar Saifullah, who were accused of
being the main beneficiaries of the Mehran Bank, of all the allegations. (DAWN 9.12.1996) On May 13,
1997, the Commerce Minister, Ishaq Dar informed the Senate that the report was missing from the Law
Ministry. According to Dar, the Mehran Bank scandal cost a total of Rs. 9.92 billion to the national
exchequer.
SUPREME COURT REJECTS BENAZIR'S PETITION
On November, 1996, Benazir Bhutto filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the dissolution
of the National Assembly and dismissal of her government. The apex court twice returned her petition
saying it is argumentative. On December 2, the court turned down Benazir's request for early hearing
of her petition and takes up a similar petition filed by the NA Speaker Yousaf Raza Gilani. On
December 14, the supreme court started hearing of several identical 8th constitutional amendment. On
Chapter9d
Jan 12, 1997, the court held that the 8th amendment was a valid part of the constitution and Article
58(2)b, giving power to the president to dissolve the National Assembly was a deterrent to the
imposition of martial law in the country. The seven-member bench, headed by Chief Justice Sajjad Ali
Shah, dismissed the petitions of Mehmood Khan Achankzai and five others challenging the validity of
the 8th amendment. One day after validating the 8th amendment, the Supreme Court began hearing of
Benazir Bhutto's case.
On January 29, 1997, only six days before the general elections, the Supreme Court rejected a petition
by Benazir Bhutto to revive her government and upheld President Leghari's November 5, 1996
proclamation dissolving the National Assembly and dismissing Benazir's government. The majority
decision of the apex court said "the presidential order contained enough substance and adequate
material had been provided to conclude that the government could not be run in accordance with the
provision of the constitution and that an appeal to the electorate had been necessary." Six of the seven
judges on the bench upheld all the charges leveled by the president excluding the murder of Mir
Murtaza Bhutto saying this issue was before a tribunal.
Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza was the only judge who said the presidential order was illegal and could
not be sustained and the National Assembly and the prime minister and the cabinet stood restored. The
seven-member bench was led by Chief Justice Syed Sajjad Ali Shah and included Justice Saleem
Akhtar, Justice Fazal Ilahi Khan, Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza, Justice Irshad Hasan Khan, Justice
Raja Aforesiab Khan and Justice Munawar Ali Mirza. Earlier the Supreme Court rejected Benazir's
request to form a full court to hear her petition. [51]
The short order of the court said:

* It was not necessary that all the material should be before the president to form his opinion before the
dissolution of the assembly as claimed by the defence lawyer Atizaz Ahsan. Partial evidence was enough
for forming the opinion and that there was no harm if corroborative and supportive material was
produced after the dissolution of the assembly.
* There was enough material in support of the president's charge that the government had failed to
implement the Supreme Court decision in the appointment of judges case. The belated implementation
of the apex court's judgment by the government was short of total compliance. There was adequate
material to establish that the former prime minister had ridiculed the judiciary during her speech in the
National Assembly.
* The government had moved a constitutional bill in parliament which sought to send a judge on forced
leave if 15 per cent of the members moved a motion against him. It was meant to harass the judges of
this court.
* The separation of judiciary from the executive was also delayed and executive magistrates were given
judicial powers in certain matters which was against the spirit of the judgment.
* There was enough evidence to establish that the telephones of the judges and politicians were tapped
and transcripts sent to the petitioner for reading.
* Adequate material had been produced in the court in support of the charges of corruption, nepotism
and violation of rules leveled by the president against the previous government.
* In Nawaz Sharif's case the attorney general had conceded that the dissolution order was mainly based
on the speech delivered by Nawaz Sharif on radio and television which was construed an act of
subversion and that the session of the National Assembly was convened and the president thought it was
meant to impeach him. It was in those circumstances that the dissolution order was not sustainable.
Commenting on the supreme court judgment, the former Chief Justice, Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, the
author of the only apex court judgment that revived a dissolved central legislature and restored a
sacked prime minister said" that the 1993 and 1996 dissolution cases stood on entirely different
footings. The attorney general's emphasis in the 1993 case was on the irreconcilable differences between
the president and the PM as evidenced by Nawaz Sharif's speech of April 17, 1993. The conflict,
according to the AG, created a constitutional deadlock that could only be resolved by the dissolution of
the NA and removal of the PM. The Supreme Court held that dissolution order was based on an
incorrect appreciation of the role assigned to the president and of the powers vested in him by the
constitution.
Chapter9d
"The Benazir Bhutto case was distinguishable because extra-judicial killings in Karachi had reached
the level of state terrorism and corruption a magnitude that threatened the very security of the state.
"The government acted in violation of Article 190 of the constitution, which says all executive and
judicial authorities in Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Instead of readily and honestly
complying with the Supreme Court verdict in the Judges' case, the prime minister castigated the
ridiculed it and implemented it reluctantly in phases. Then there was the allegation of wiretapping of
state functionaries, which is also a violation of a fundamental right." [52]

Chapter9d

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter IX
The Fourth Republic
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. The air-crash mystery, like the assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in
October 1952 remained unresolved since few seemed to care to know.
2. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, in active collusion with the openly politicized COAS, Mirza Aslam
Beg, had asked the then Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief, General Hamid Gul, to organize an
effective alliance of right wing parties to counter Ms Benazir Bhutto's seemingly bright prospects of
winning the 1988 general elections. Imtiaz Alam, Towards a government by the people, The Frontier
Post, Peshawar, July 23, 1993
3. Chaudhry Fazle-Ilahi became president when Zulkifar Ali Bhutto stepped down as President and
became the Prime Minister when parliamentary system was introduced under a new constitution in
1973. Under the original constitution of 1973, the President was bound to accept any recommendation
by the Prime Minister.
4. It may be recalled that during the anti-government demonstrations, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto amended the
constitution (through parliament) on May 16, 1977 under which, among other things, the government
was empowered to call army in aid of civil administration to "restore law and order" while the
fundamental rights remain suspended during the military operation.
5. Abdul Ghafoor Awan, Sacking of three prime ministers (in Urdu), p-451
6. The IJI captured 104 seats while the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto got only 45 seats in the
National Assembly. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement emerged as the third largest party in the house with
15 seats.
7. Altaf Gauhar, President Ishaq stands indicted for high treason, The Muslim Islamabad, June 25,
1993.
8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam, Oxford Press, 1995, p-113
9. Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constituionalism p 282-283
10. Saga of intrigue and deceit by Shaheen Shebai - Dawn - 27.5.1993
11. A Few questions to GIK, The Nation, Lahore 29.10 .1993
12. The Friday Times, May-6-12, 1993
13. Addressing a cheering crowd of several thousand people at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, Benazir said:
"We do not want to cast any doubts on the Supreme Court as we believe in the supremacy of the
constitution and the law. But the people of this country are confused and want to know the reason for
upholding the presidential order when the PPP government was removed in 1990, and striking it down
when the action was directed against Nawaz Sharif." She did not stop there: "We do not know what
Islamic Pakistan
glittering thing Nawaz Sharif has, as he is the ultimate beneficiary of whether a PPP government is
removed under the Eighth Amendment or his own." The Herald June 1993
14. The Herald, June 1993
15. PLD 1993 SC
16. The Herald, July 1993
17. M.H. Askari - The new political order - Dawn 21.7.93
18. The Herald May 1993
19. The Herald, Nov. 1993
20. The Herald June 1993
21. Politics of Self-Aggrandizement by Dr. S. M. Haider, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, 10.5.1993
22. Ayaz Amir, The army in Karachi - Dawn 21.3.1994
23. Ibid.
24. M. Sabhinuddin Ghausi, The Great Bank Robbery, The Herald, Sept. 1993
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. The Herald Nov. 1993
28. Parliamentary Hara-kiri by Eqbal Ahmad - Dawn 6.3.1994
29. Dawn 17.2.1995
30. Challenges before Benazir by M.H. Askari - Dawn 2.2.1994
31. Dawn 7.3.1996
32. Ibid.
33. Dawn 8.3.1995
34. Statement of the Chairperson of Pakistan Human Rights Commission, Asema Jehangir, Dawn
29.1.1995
35. Dawn 7.3.1996
36. Ibid.
37. State Terrorism-II, Ardshir Cowasjee - Dawn 2.2.1996
38. Ibid.

Islamic Pakistan
39. Dawn 6.3.1996
40. The US Human Rights Report for 1995.
41. A body-blow to Justice by I.A. Rehman - Dawn 11.4.1995
42. New Black Law by Munib Akhtar - Dawn 19.4.1995
43. Dawn 13.4.1995
44. Called to restore peace in Sindh, the army too fell between two stools. It behaved neither as a proper
military formation with a limited agenda, nor as a political arbiter which could mend fences and bring
about even partial relief to this afflicted land. Rather, it bequeathed us two MQMs where we had one.
The Haqiqi's creation has since been providing the cutting edge of Karachi's wound. Eqbal Ahmad,
Farooq Sumar's public FIR - Dawn 9.5.1995
45. Dawn 27.6.1995
46. Reuters news agency report dated June 27, 1995
47. Impervious to challenges by M.B. Naqvi - Dawn 16.1.1995
48. Dawn 2.3.1996
49. Dawn 12.3.1996
50. The State Under Siege by Mazdak - Dawn 15.7.1995
51. Dawn 30.1.1997
52. Dawn 30.1.1997

Chapter8a
Chapter VIII
Page 2
As the chief martial-law administrator, General Zia had been given authority in 1977 by the Supreme
Court to rule Pakistan, provided that an election was held as soon as possible. Numerous petitions had
been filed in the courts demanding a ruling on the regime's legality after the election had been
postponed. A number of constitutional challenges to General Zia's rule were pending before the
Supreme Court and Mr. Anwarul Haq was understood to have set them down for hearing shortly. The
PCO killed all such petitions.
The PCO restricted the civil courts, outlawed all political parties except a few rightist religious parties
like Jamaat-e-Islami, deemed the advocacy of any secular ideology or program to be a crime and
empowered General Zia to amend the constitution at will. Under the PCO, political activity was allowed
only with the President's permission, all court judgments invalidating his orders (including those which
amend the constitution) were retroactively over-ruled, [8] and the "Chief Martial Law Administrator"
(alias General Zia) was empowered "for the purpose of removing any difficulties, or for bringing the
provisions of this Order into effective operation", to "make such provisions as he may deem to be
necessary or expedient", including the appointment and dismissal of Supreme Court judges."
A nominated Federal Assembly was created under the PCO. Article 4 of the PCO declared: 1. There
shall be a Federal Council (Majlis-e-Shura) consisting of such persons as the President may, by Order,
determine. 2. The Federal Council (Majlis-e-Shura) shall perform such functions as may be specified in
an Order made by the President.
On March 25, 1981, General Zia fired 19 Supreme Court and provincial high court judges when they
refused to endorse his "Provisional Constitutional Order." Feeling that he had been badly used, the
chief justice of the Supreme Court, Anwarul Haq, who had headed the bench which approved Bhutto's
hanging, refused to take the oath. The former Chief Justice of the Lahore Court, Molvi Mushtaq
Ahmad, who had sentenced Bhutto to death in the first place, although willing to take the oath was not
asked to do so. While sacking the judges, General Zia explained: "We want the judiciary to mind their
own business and not to meddle in anything else. Power is an intoxicant. Please do not get me wrong. I
personally have not been intoxicated with this. I want to share power, but I refuse to share power with
those who do not entitle themselves [9]." Commenting on Zia's PCO, the Times London said: Pakistan
is at present governed by the "Provisional Constitutional Order" of March 1981, a document which has
few parallels anywhere in the frankness with which it institutionalizes the unfettered arbitrary power of
a single man [10]."
While General Zia was at the helm of affairs, tightening his grip on the levers of state power with each
passing day, he shared power and authority with a select band of army commanders. A general here
and there who did not fit into Zia's own scheme of things such as Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti and Lt.
General Ghulam Hassan Khan [at one time his adviser on the National Security) were conveniently
eased out.
THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER

Chapter8a
After more than five years of autocratic rule General Zia promised on August 14, 1982, that the
blueprints of a political system on Islamic principles would be announced within a year. In a speech on
the occasion of Pakistan's 34th independence day he said that "propelled by the Islamic spirit, the
government would evolve a political system becoming of a country created in the name of Islam." He
said his government was not, in any way, comparing its efforts with those of the Khulafa-e-Rashdeen
(the first four caliphs of Islam, but it really believed that it would continue to strive to attain the level of
social development which was prevailing in their times.
Contrary to the earlier leaders of Pakistan from Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to the executed
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who expressed their conviction that Islam stands for
democracy, General Ziaul Haq claimed that an Islamic political system does not envisage a majority
rule since Islam stood for national consensus on major issues confronting the people. It was also argued
that in a truly Islamic system political parties would be totally redundant. In a society where ideology
dissensions are allowed political parties may have some integral role in the formation of a consensus for
a particular economic or social program. In an Islamic society the social values are predetermined by
the dictates of the Quran and Sunnah. In the presence of the expressed injunctions of the Quran and
Sunnah there is no scope for ideological dissension or disagreement. The legislature as such can only
have a role and such powers as are not in conflict with the dictates of the Quran. "In Islam, there could
be only two parties -- the party of God and the party of Satan. My personal view is that political parties
are nothing but sources of divisiveness within the community," General Ziaul Haq told foreign
reporters in Rawalpindi on July 23, 1988. His specially appointed Islamic Ideology Council had
declared political parties as un-Islamic.
At the same time the official media claimed that in Pakistan more damage had been caused to the
national fabric by political parties than by any other organ of the state. Political parties help to polarize
people around a certain program even if it is against the national interests. The premier example of this
was cited the role played by the Awami League in order to secure Bangladesh. To justify the dissolution
of political parties in the country it was further argued that the efficacy of political parties is being
called into question even in highly developed western democracies. The conclusion drawn from this
argument was that the future political system should be based on institutions in which political parties
should be banned altogether from participating in national politics at all levels. But the authors of the so-
called new Islamic political system forgot that even the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was brought into
being through elections on party basis.
As a matter of fact, General Zia did not believe in any form of democracy which was confirmed from
what is said to be his last interview with Frankfurter Rundschau, a major West German daily,
published on 19.8.1988 - two days after his death in a plane crash. In a three hour conversation with the
newspaper's correspondent in Islamabad, General Zia said Pakistan was too under-developed to have a
democratic system. He cited 20th century Austrian-born Philosopher Karl Popper, whose theory he
said was that a political system cannot work with more than two or three political parties. In developing
countries, he continued, where some institutions do not exist yet "particular methods must be used" to
foster the development of a "positive" political system. "I'm not in a hurry. I don't believe in revolution,
but in evolution," General Zia concluded.[11]
REFERENDUM
In the mid-1983, General Zia realized that despite his extremely repressive and barbaric measures,
which included whipping the dissidents, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) had
not only survived but had also gained strength. Faced with the inevitability of a return to civilian rule,
the general tried to make his position secure by getting himself elected as the head of state through a
process, in which the people were asked to vote for their religion. On December 19, 1984, a referendum
was held on the Islamization policy of the martial law regime. Announcing the referendum plan,
General Zia said that if the people say yes to his Islamisation process he would consider it as an
endorsement of his rule for the next five years.
The people were asked a loaded question: "Do you endorse the process initiated by General
Chapter8a
Mohammed Ziaul Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with
the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be
upon him), and for the preservation of the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, the continuation and
consolidation of that process, and for smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected
representatives of the people."
Given that the country was created in 1947 specifically as a Muslim state, and that 95 per cent of the
population is of that faith, it is inconceivable that even a sizable minority, let alone an actual majority,
would dissent. And therein lies the General's strategy, said The Times, London on Dec. 20, 1984. The
Gazette, Ottawa [12] described the referendum exercise as an insult to the intelligence of the helpless
masses and said: "The referendum will not bestow upon Mr. Zia the aura of legitimacy --international
and domestic -- he so desperately is seeking." There was no criticism of the referendum in the Pakistani
press since any criticism of the political manoeuvring was outlawed.
The entire operation was planned with military thoroughness. Faced with an obviously one-sided
contest, the MRD called for a boycott. The opposition leaders were detained throughout the country a
week before the referendum. Troops patrolled the streets in Karachi. "Unauthorised persons" near
polling stations were banned, making an independent check of the turnout virtually impossible.
According to official results, out of the total 349,92,425 registered voters 217,501,901 had exercised their
right of franchise. The percentage of the 'yes' vote was 97.7 of the total polled votes. The voting figures
included a record 4 million postal ballots cast by the government employees and their families. Except
for a faction of the Muslim League led by Pir Pagara, and the Jamat-i-Islami, no political party in the
country accepted the official result of the referendum. The MRD leaders asserted that independent
accounts of voting showed not more than five per cent turnout.
The London weekly Economist described the referendum as an exercise so absurdly rigged that most
communist governments would have been ashamed to mount it.[13] International Commission of
Jurists said "Zia manipulated the referendum on his Islamisation policy in order to remain in power for
a further five years. His subsequent amendments to the constitution giving him sweeping powers, the
continuing use of martial law, charges of torture and increasing control of the media -- all cast severe
doubts on President Zia's claim to be working toward restoration of democracy."[14 ]
NON-PARTY ELECTIONS OF 1985
The referendum was the first step of General Zia's two-phase policy to curb the process of genuine
democracy in Pakistan and maintain his autocratic military rule under the cloak of a civilian
administration. In January 1985, the General announced a plan to hold elections on non-party basis.
The move was clearly aimed at not allowing the Pakistan People's Party to participate in the elections.
General Zia did not specify the powers of the new National Assembly and the provincial assemblies.
The elections were finally held on February 25, 1985 and polling for the provincial assemblies took
place three days later. More than eight hundred prominent politicians were arrested in a pre-election
crackdown; campaigning was forbidden by a ban on political parties, processions, rallies and even
loudspeakers. However, the voters took both the government and banned political parties by surprise.
They ignored the call of the MRD to boycott the polls. The verdict was a rebuff for the government, for
the opposition and for the religious parties which cooperated with the martial law regime. Apart from
six cabinet ministers, a presidential adviser, two provincial ministers and three city mayors were
defeated. Over half of the members of the nominated majlis-i-shura were not returned to the new house.
Virtually the entire leadership of the Jamaat-i-Islami was wiped out. The party won only eight of the 63
national seats contested. Karachi, the traditional stronghold of the party, turned it down.
However, with all these upsets, the feudal character of the new house remained unchanged. The
National Assembly continued to be dominated by the rural landlords. The only change was that the
younger generation of landlords had taken over from their elders. The social background of the new
members of parliament can be judged from the following figures: Landowners 117 Tribal leaders 17
Religious leaders 6 Urban professionals 8 Ex-army officers 7 Student leaders 2 Businessmen 42
Chapter8a
The feudal families which had been discarded by the electorate in 1970 have returned to the assemblies.
The National Assembly, the Senate and the four provincial assemblies were dominated by landowners.
Nearly 75 per cent of the 847 members of these bodies were big landlords. It is not surprising that none
of them raised a voice against the arbitrary amendments made by the General to the 1973 constitution,
to which most of them were signatories. The assembly approved a law to write off loans worth billions
of rupees owed by the politicians to the nationalized banks.
THE 8TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
In March 1985, General Zia picked up Mohammad Khan Junejo, a hitherto unknown landlord from
Sindh to become Prime Minister. Just three days before the first session of the newly elected National
Assembly, on March 17, General Ziaul Haq, decreed constitutional changes which gave him sweeping
powers to choose the Prime Minister, the armed forces chiefs and the four provincial governors. In
addition, he had absolute power to decide his powers under the constitution and indemnity clauses
ensured that he would not be questioned. His only concession to the elected assembly was not to give
himself a veto of legislation, but delay proceedings for 45 days. However, he had assumed power to
dissolve parliament whenever he thinks fit. He did dissolve the National Assembly and provincial
assemblies and disbanded central and provincial governments when he thought fit in May 1988. Article
8 of the constitutional amendments, which were called "The Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order,
1985," said that any laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are void, shall not apply to the
president's orders.
The Junejo government persuaded the National Assembly to pass the 8th Amendment to the
Constitution. The agenda for the amendment was President's Order No. 14 of 1985 which incorporated
severe constitutional changes for ratification by the Assembly. This finesse was necessary because
General Ziaul-Haq had agreed to support and defend the 1973 constitution in the Nusrat Bhutto case
(1977)."[15] The National Assembly passed the 8th amendment unanimously, under threat of martial
law, on 17 October 1985. Martial law remained in force while the National Assembly discussed the 8th
amendment and was lifted on December 31, 1985, two and half months after the house had approved
the amendment.
Criticizing the 8th constitutional amendment, International Commission of Jurists said "its foremost
purpose is to uphold the rule of the present President, Ziaul Haq. The constitution contains nothing to
prevent the President from reintroducing martial law."[16] Writing under the title "Zia moves to
consolidate power" the Financial Times London said: "The constitution has been personalized by
Zia."[17]
However, General Zia, who had nominated Mohammed Khan Junejo as Prime Minister for his obvious
weak political personality, found his protégé as an obstacle in his schemes. Gradually differences
between Zia and Junejo emerged as the Prime Minister tried to assert his authority as head of an
elected government over such issues as top military appointments and Afghanistan. First they clashed
over Zia's refusal to sign the Geneva accords that would pave the way for a withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan. Junejo had organized a round table conference of opposition leaders to get his way.
Junejo challenged the appointment of two generals and also demanded that General Zia should quit as
the army chief of staff - a position he held since 1976. The Ojheri camp disaster in which hundreds were
killed as thousands or rockets had been rained down over Islamabad. Junejo demanded punishment for
the army generals responsible for the catastrophe while General Zia - who kept the portfolio of the
Army Commander-in-Chief even after the lifting of martial law by extending his own term of office -
could not afford to antagonize his constituency. The report blamed General Akhtar Abdul Rehman,
Zia's most powerful ally and rumors were spread that the dump, which served as a store for US
supplied arms for the Afghan "mujahedeen", had been blown up deliberately just before the arrival of
a US defense audit team, to cover up the fact that some Stinger missiles had been sold off to neighboring
countries.
The Final showdown took place on 29 May 1988. President General Zia, under article 58 of the
Chapter8a
amended constitution, dismissed Prime Minister Junejo's government and dissolved the national and
provincial assemblies. In sacking Prime Minister Junejo, who had just returned from Manila after a
foreign tour, General Zia stressed the delay in furthering the process of Islamisation. The 9th
constitutional amendment bill - to declare the Shariah as the supreme law of the land - was passed by
the Senate but was pending in the National Assembly. General Zia made the following allegations
against the Junejo government:
● 1. Law and order in the country had broken down to an alarming extent resulting in tragic loss
of human lives.
● 2. Life, property, honor and security of the citizens was rendered totally unsafe.
● 3. The integrity and ideology of Pakistan have been seriously endangered and doubts generated
in this regard.
● 4. The president's conscience always pricked that he had not fulfilled his promises regarding the
enforcement of Islam made to the people in the referendum of 1984.
● 5. Public morality had deteriorated to an unprecedented level.
● 6. A situation had arisen in which the government of the federation cannot be carried on in
accordance with provisions of the constitution necessitating an appeal to the election.
SHARIAH ORDINANCE
On June 15, 1988, two weeks after dissolving the national and provincial assemblies (elected on non-
party basis) and disbanding ministries (formed on party basis), General Zia promulgated a new
Shariah Ordinanceto declare Shariah as the supreme law of the land with immediate effect. Article 3 of
the Act for the enforcement of the Shariah said "the Shariah that is to say, the injunctions of Islam as
laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, shall be the supreme law of Pakistan.
Explaining the reasons for taking this dramatic step, he said it was unfortunate that the enforcement of
Shariah could not attract due attention of the members of the National Assembly, which the nation
expected of them. Under the Shariah Ordinance, Ulema were eligible to be appointed as judges of the
court which were empowered to challenge almost all existing laws of the country.
However, it was apparent that the whole exercise was primarily meant to put extensive powers in his
own hands to be exercised through his nominees on various courts. The president was given powers to
make rules for the appointment of the Ulema judges to the courts. Even Ulema of different schools of
thought denounced the Shariah Ordinance and described it a move seeking cheap publicity. A Jamat-i-
Islami leader declared that the Shariah Ordinance does not conform to the Shariah and it has been
enforced by the rulers to save themselves from accountability. Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan expressed the
apprehension that leaving the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah to the Ulema will open a new
pandora's box.
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
General Zia's 11 years rule has a record of disloyalty, broken oaths, betrayed promises, illegal acts and
extreme violations of human rights. He abolished habeas corpus, extended civilian jurisdiction to
military courts and the judiciary was tamed to concur. For the first time in the history of Pakistan,
highly publicized public executions were carried out, and people were flogged publicly and in prisons.
Arbitrary arrests and imprisonments without trial had become the norm.
Unlike previous military governments, General Zia's regime deprived the judiciary of its power to
review the decisions of martial law courts. Citizens had no recourse against any violations of human
and legal rights by these military courts, which exercised wide civilian jurisdiction. Similarly, in a
development hitherto unknown in Pakistan, the army's field investigative units were responsible for
internal security; their powers, too, were unchecked by constitutional or legal provisions. Victims
reported that their interrogating techniques were harsher than those of their civilian counterparts.

Chapter8a

Chapter8a

Chapter8b
Chapter VIII
Page 3
On Sept. 27, 1982 General Zia decreed, by Martial Law Regulation 53, the death sentence for "any
offense liable to cause insecurity, fear or despondency amongst the public." Crimes punishable under
this measure, which superseded civil law, included "any act with intent to impair the efficiency or
impede the working" of, or cause damage to, public property or the smooth functioning of government.
Another was abetting "in any manner whatsoever" the commission of such an offence, or failure to
inform the police or army of the "whereabouts or any other information about such a person." Thus
one was liable not merely for what one said or did but also for what one did not do. As if this were not
enough jeopardy for citizens, Martial Law Order 53 reversed the most fundamental principle of justice -
in Pakistan you were guilty until proved innocent. The law provided that "a military court on the basis
of police or any other investigation alone may, unless the contrary is proved, presume that this accused
has committed the offence charged." The decree "shall be deemed to have taken effect on July 5, 1977" -
- the day General Zia broke his oath of allegiance to the constitution and overthrew his benefactor
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
During General Zia's 11 years regime international human rights groups repeatedly expressed concern
over army's ruthless measures to suppress dissent. The Amnesty International, in a report released on
15.5.1978 said: "We are very concerned at the use of flogging in Pakistan and are disturbed that this
unusual punishment is also being inflicted on political prisoners for committing acts which often appear
to be no more than exercise of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in the
constitution. The first public hanging took place in March, after death sentences were passed by a
military court on three civilians convicted for murder. At least 16 prisoners have so far been sentenced
to floggings for political activities."[18 ]
Commenting on General Zia regime's repression the Economist said the army has been ruthless in its
crackdown. "Relatives, many of them teenagers, have in some cases been held temporarily as hostages
until a wanted person was found. Bhutto's Attorney General, Yahya Bakhtiar was beaten up in his cell
in Quetta jail this month: his family was given his bloodstained clothes for cleaning."[19 ]
Citing a report by the Lahore Bar Association, a survey by the Geneva-based International Commission
of Jurists charged that "systematic torture" occurred in five Lahore prisons in 1984, particularly at a
jail where many political detainees were held. Military courts are used increasingly to clear the backlog
of cases in ordinary courts. The survey cited reports that the military courts decide cases in minutes and
refuse defendants the rights to lawyers. Special military courts that try serious offenses allow defense
counsel but the judges often obstruct the lawyers in their work," the survey said.[20 ]
The Amnesty International on 19.11.1985 also accused Pakistan of torturing and denying fair trials to
political prisoners tried by special military courts. "As of September, more than 130 prisoners were
serving sentences of between seven and 42 years after special military courts convicted them of political
offenses or politically motivated criminal offenses. The military courts regularly use as evidence
confessions extracted by torture while prisoners are hung upside down and beaten, given electric
shocks, strapped to blocks of ice, deprived of food and sleep for two or three days and burned with
cigarettes. Many prisoners are held in fetters and chains. People often are tried in courts held in closed
http://www.ghazali.net/book1/Chapter8b/page_3.html (1 of 6) [10/14/2004 3:56:04 AM]

Chapter8b
session and denied the right of appeal to a higher court."[21]
The U.S. State Department in its 1985 annual report on the state of human rights in Pakistan said:
"Human rights abuses have been common under both civilian and military rule during Pakistan's 37
years and, although the trend was generally toward improvement, abuses continued in 1985. The
authorities in 1985 on several occasions used preventive detention....and more frequently used
externment orders to curtail the activities of opposition leaders. During the year there were continuing
allegations of torture and traditionally harsh and abusive treatment of prisoners.... allegations of
torture have been heard in connection with all the major security-related trials completed during the
year...abuse of prisoners in common criminal cases also appears widespread. Pakistan's Islamisation
policy has reversed some of the social and legal gains made by women in past years. While minorities
are protected, Hindus, Christian and Parsis do not enjoy the same legal rights as Moslems."[22]
A report released on 7.9.1987 by the International Commission of Jurists said: "Some human rights
abuses continue in Pakistan, including alleged military attacks on villagers, despite the lifting of martial
law 20 months ago." The ICJ report cited reports by villagers who said their villages were raided and
looted by soldiers sometimes accompanied by local police. "Some male villagers were shot to death and
women beaten, in at least two cases pregnant women, who subsequently miscarried."[23] "Certainly, no
defender of democracy or human rights is going to shed tears over General Zia's death," wrote the
reputed Paris daily Le Monde on August 18, 1988.
ZIA'S LEGACY
General Ziaul Haq was a typical third world dictator who seized power in the wake of anti-Bhutto
demonstrations[24] in 1977 and showed little inclination to relinquish it till the last moment of his life.
But he also wanted respect from his western supporters, especially, the United States. Therefore he
attempted to clothe his regime in democratic grab through "shuracracy" and tried to legitimize his rule
by holding a referendum in the name of Islam.
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 proved a blessing in disguise for his military
regime as Pakistan emerged as an important actor on the international scene. It became a bastion of
western interests in south Asia because without it there would have been no reliable supply-line to the
Afghan rebels. Pakistan was seen as the only cogent barrier against further Soviet expansion
southwards to the Indian Ocean. It was the main regional counterweight to India, which has a
friendship treaty with Moscow. The collapse of General Zia's regime might have damaged the western
interests like the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran next door. With Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the
Americans saw to it that there would be no serious challenge to Zia's regime. Therefore, the democratic
world tolerated his autocratic rule and turned a blind eye to serious human rights violations committed
by his regime.
Within a week of the Soviet intervention, the US National Security Adviser of President Jimmy Carter,
Zebignev Brezinski, had publicly affirmed that Washington would support Pakistan with military force
if necessary. Carter administration had cut off Pakistan's aid because of its nuclear program. However,
the parameters of the US-Pakistan relationship changed after the Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
General Zia's Afghanistan policy brought badly needed American military as well as economic aid to
the country.[25] Pakistan has built a military machine that cannot be kept in good repair by its own
resources and always needed foreign aid. Defense forces are intended to provide a means of being
independent to a nation; in our case Pakistan's dependence on outsiders has been enhanced by the
growing size of its armed forces. Day-to-day needs of the armed forces have forced the rulers of
Pakistan to stand in queue in Washington, hat-in-hand. [26 ]
Zia's adventurist policy in Afghanistan resulted in multi-facet negative impacts on the social fabric of
our society. Massive supply of sophisticated weapons to the Afghan "mujahideen" led to the
proliferation of arms in the country from Peshawar to Karachi and produced the Kalashinkov culture.
Army and civil officers involved in the distribution of foreign aid to the Afghan rebels became rich
Chapter8b
overnight because the operation was covert and there was no paperwork involved. According to the
annual statement of the Swiss National Bank the total value of the deposits held by Pakistanis reached
to 1.141 billion Swiss Francs in 1985. Until 1980, the total value of Pakistanis deposits in numbered
accounts in Switzerland was so small that Pakistan never used to find a separate mention in the annual
statements of the Swiss National Bank.[27]
An American adviser to Afghan "mujahedeen" groups and an official of the Federation for American-
Afghan Action, Andrew Eiva, told the US Senate in 1987: "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, run
by Major General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, which oversees the transfer of money and arms to the rebels,
is responsible for the theft of millions of dollars in funds and military equipment." Eiva alleged that
$700 million out of $1.09 billion in aid earmarked by the US Congress for the Afghan rebels between
1980 and 1984 had disappeared.[28]
Another result of the 10-year long Afghan war was the drugs{XE "drugs"} smuggling in the country as
the principal conduit by which weapons reached the Afghan rebels in the north became one of the main
organized routes by which heroin reached Karachi for transshipment to Europe and the United States.
The monthly Herald, Karachi, wrote in January 1987: "If you control the poppy fields, Karachi and the
road which links the two: you will be so rich that you will control Pakistan." According to the Herald,
the National Logistic Cell - the army-run transport organization that has the monopoly of goods
movement across the country - trucks have been used repeatedly in the shipment of heroin from the
Frontier Province to Karachi port. In its September 1985 issue, the Herald reported: "The drug is
carried in the NLC trucks, which come sealed from the NWFP and are never checked by the police.
They come down from Peshawar where they deliver their cargo, sacks of grains to government godown.
Some of these sacks contain packets of heroin. This has been going on for about three and a half years."
The government in practice had exempted from customs all in-coming and out-going consignments for
the Afghan war.
The former Governor of the North West Frontier Province, Lt. General Fazlul Haq - described by the
western press as the Noriega of Pakistan - used to claim that during his tenure opium production
dropped dramatically. According to official statistics opium output had fallen from 800 metric tons in
1979 to 165 tons in 1987. But during precisely the same period the output of opium increased from an
estimated 270 tons to 800 tons across the border in Afghanistan that was easily smuggled into Pakistan.
According to a report published by a New York daily in February 1993, a study commissioned by the
Central Intelligence Agency concluded the heroin trade has penetrated "the highest political circles" of
Pakistan and "is becoming the lifeblood" of the economy and government in Pakistan. The intelligence
document asserted that heroin traffickers have financed Pakistan's ruling political party, bought
enough votes to win seats in the national assembly, and gained access to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The currently ruling political party, the conservative Islamic
Democratic Alliance, has routinely tapped narcotics traffickers to bankroll campaigns, the study said,
and so did the ruling parties of previous administrations. Two of General Zia's pilots used presidential
aircraft to smuggle heroin - one to the United States during a state visit.[29]
The war in Afghanistan not only prompted drugs smuggling on a large scale but also led to an
unprecedented addiction of drugs in Pakistan. Senate Chairman Waseem Sajjad told the first
International Conference on Drug Addiction held in Bhourbon, Murree in April 1993 that till 1979
number of drug addicts was very low, but at present the number of addicts has risen to millions.
According to a press release of the US Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was producing 70 metric tons
annually of heroin from its 100 laboratories in the frontier areas, out of which two-thirds was consumed
by Pakistanis and the rest was smuggled abroad.[30]
The most malignant legacy of Zia is the religious extremism which has taken firm roots in our society.
The virulent militancy, in the name of religion which we see all around us today, is a direct off-shoot of
his religious rhetoric.[31] General Zia had turned to Islam not for the purposes of deriving from it a
social or political program of a progressive nature but for evolving a penal code that makes the regime
and Pakistan look like a retrograde society.[32] Pakistan was transformed from a semi-liberal,
Chapter8b
struggling third world democracy into an obscurantist society, ruled by the rigid edits of an intolerant
regime on the strength of what was perceived as the dictates of Islam rather than as the truly dynamic,
forward-looking spirit of religion.[33]
After the 1971 debacle in East Pakistan, religion appeared to decline as a political issue in Pakistan.
Bhutto's government created the impression of being determined to secularize Islamic Pakistan.
However, by late 1970s this trend had been reversed and Islam and Islamic reform became central
issues in Pakistani political discourse. However, the object of the so-called Islamisation was not Islam
but rather that of invoking a claim to state power as an alternative to restoration of representative
government. From this perspective, Islamic reforms were a clever device to mobilize popular support,
especially among the mullahs and the bigots and to divert attention from issues of representative versus
authoritarian rule. Islamisation was used to increase the gap between rich and poor.
Like many near-bankrupt military regimes in Muslim countries, General Zia used the so-called
"Islamisation process" to legitimize and perpetuate his narrowly-based military rule marked by public
and political executions, flogging of people in the name of Islam and confusing the country's judicial
system by simultaneously operating the Shariah courts, the military tribunals and the common law civil
courts. Justice Shafi Mohammad, Judge of the High Court of Sindh, while allowing quashment of
criminal proceedings against two accused booked under the Hudood Ordinance remarked:
"It is the considered opinion of many religious scholars that Islamisation in 1980s as adopted by the
government of General Ziaul Haq was devoid of the real spirit of Islam and the same created
complication not only for the prevailing judicial system, but also ambiguity about Islam instead of
solving the problems of this country."[34]
Pakistani legal experts fully agree that Islamic criminal law thoroughly suited tribal Arab society. This
is especially so if we look at the Islamic law of murder. Murder is considered a private vengeance and in
tribal Arabian society the avenging of a murder fell on the victim's next-of-kin; so it was the right of the
family to demand satisfaction. Punishment was effected on the principle of retaliation, commuted to a
payment of blood money or compensation for the injury. Cutting of limbs, stoning to death and flogging
were also prevalent as punishments (in the tribal Arab society.[35] The position of women in tribal
society was also secondary to that of men. In the light of modern developments in criminology where the
insistence is on reform and rehabilitation of criminals, the claim of the Muslim traditionalist, however,
is that Islamic concepts are not contrary to the modern spirit of criminology.[36]
Pakistan is one of those Muslim countries (the first being Saudi Arabia) where Islamic criminal law has
partly been put into practice. Generally speaking, there has been a significant increase of crime in
Pakistan since the implementation of Islamic punishments in 1979. This is notably in crimes against
property, which include highway robbery, theft from petrol pumps, housebreaking and bank robbery,
cattle rustling, motor vehicle thefts etc. An increase of crime has also been noted in Zina, Qazf and
prohibition of alcohol cases.[37]
Modernists question whether the criminal policy adopted in Pakistan is compatible with the
requirements of a modern society. The modernist demand in this respect is that the codification of
Islamic criminal law should be done in the light of modern circumstances. There can be no return to the
past. Islamic law has to face the challenges of the modern world. Otherwise, Islamic law is just a
mockery, as we now know from the experience of Pakistan.[38]
Islamic criminal law is certainly not compatible with the status that women already have in Pakistani
society. It was a shock to the women of Pakistan to have to accept that they are not accepted as full
human beings, that in Hudood cases they are not considered capable of appearing as witnesses and that
in financial matters two women are considered equal to one man.[39]
The women became the special victims of Islamisation and its inconsistencies. The Zina Ordinance
carried grave injustices and untold miseries on women in the country and prompted bitter international
criticism. Women's rights groups helped in the production of a film titled "Who will cast the first
Chapter8b
stone?" to highlight the oppression and sufferings of women under the Hudood Ordinances. In
September 1981, the first conviction and sentence under the Zina Ordinance, of stoning to death for
Fehmida and Allah Bakhsh were set aside under national and international pressure.
In many cases, under the Zina Ordinance, a woman who made an allegation of rape was convicted for
adultery whilst the rapist was acquitted. This led to a growing demand by jurists and women activists
for repealing the Ordinance. In 1983, Safia Bibi, a 13-year-old blind girl, who alleged rape by her
employer and his son was convicted for adultery under the Zina Ordinance whilst, the rapists were
acquitted. The decision attracted so much publicity and condemnation from the public and the press
that the Federal Shariah Court [40] of its own motion, called for the records of the case and ordered
that she should be released from prison on her own bond. Subsequently, on appeal, the finding of the
trial court was reversed and the conviction was set aside.
In early 1988, another conviction for stoning to death of Shahida Parveen and Mohammed Sarwar [41]
sparked bitter public criticism that led to their retrial and acquittal by the Federal Shariah Court. In
this case the trial court took the view that notice of divorce by Shahida's former husband, Khushi
Mohammed should have been given to the Chairman of the local council, as stipulated under Section
7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. This section states that any man who divorces his
wife must register it with the Union Council. Otherwise, the court concluded that the divorce stood
invalidated and the couple became liable to conviction under the Zina ordinance.
The International Commission of Jurists mission to Pakistan in December 1986 called for repealing of
certain sections of the Hudood Ordinances relating to crimes and "Islamic" punishments which
discriminate against women and non-Muslims. The commission cited an example that a Muslim woman
can be convicted on the evidence of man, and a non-Muslim can be convicted on the evidence of a
Muslim, but not vice versa.
General Zia's most enduring legacy is the political system he left behind. After the partyless elections of
February 1985, the 1973 constitution was pulled out of cold storage, and on its back, a series of
amendments giving absolute powers to the president were grafted to dismantle any future democratic
set up at will. Since then the presidential powers have been used three times to disband elected
assemblies. In May 1988 he himself sacked Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo and dissolved the
elected assemblies while President Ghulam Ishaq Khan sacked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
disbanded the national and provincial assemblies twice in 1993.
General Zia also militarized the bureaucracy systematically. By his government's orders, 5 percent of
all new posts in the higher civil service were to be filled by army officers who, consequently, occupied
important civilian positions. No political government has yet the courage to rescind this order.
Economic planning in the Zia era left the country more indebted than ever, with a parallel black
economy being managed with impunity by smugglers and black marketers. Nationalized banks and
financial institutions were milked dry to please and retain his supporters. Despite the resumption of
American aid on an unprecedented scale, there were serious shortages of facilities for education, health
services and social development. University campuses remained closed for most of Zia era.

Chapter8b

Chapter7a
Chapter VII
Page 2
It was against this background of intra-party bickering that a young lawyer from Kasur in the Punjab,
Ahmad Raza Kasuri, fell out with Bhutto, and formed a one-man opposition within the PPP, turning
into a vehement critic of the government on the floor of the National Assembly. Due to his continuous
and loud criticism, Bhutto got fed up with him and is alleged to have instructed Masood Mahmood,
Director of the newly created para-military force known as the Federal Security Force, to eliminate this
opponent within his own party ranks. Several attempts were made on Kasuri's life. Ultimately, in one
such attempt, while Kasuri was returning by car from a marriage party in Lahore in the company of
his father and other members of his family, he was ambushed and shot at. His father, Nawab
Mohammad Ahmed Khan, was killed although he himself was the alleged target. Kasuri filed his first
information report with the police station and accused Bhutto of having plotted the whole incident. This
case became the origin of the subsequent Bhutto murder trial during General Zia's military regime.[20]
On March 18, 1978, the Lahore High Court, in a controversial judgment, sentenced Bhutto and his
"accomplices" to death by hanging in the murder trial of Nawab Mohammad Ahmed Khan. The High
Court judgment also declared that Bhutto was a 'Muslim in name only'. The High Court judgment
said: "His function as head of the executive was to eliminate law-breaking tendencies and used them for
eliminating a person whom he considered his enemy. There is no rule under which he can escape the
extreme penalty. " In its verdict upholding the High Court judgment, the Supreme Court expunged the
High Court remarks about 'Muslim in name' but declined a defense plea to apply the Shariah laws,
enforced on February 10, 1979, on the case.
On April 4, 1979 Bhutto was executed in Rawalpindi Jail and Pakistan became the second Muslim
country to execute its Prime Minister. Turkey executed former Prime Minister Adnan Mendres in 1961.
Bhutto won the 1970 elections on the clarion call of roti, kapra aur makan (food, clothing and shelter), a
slogan he picked up from the East Pakistani peasant leader Maulana Bhashani. [21] The four-fold
election motto of his party reflected the demands and aspirations of the various grunted groups in
Pakistan. The ringing declaration of the party was: "Islam is our faith. Democracy is our polity.
Socialism is our economy. All power to the people." This was populism par excellence that was
successful in defeating religious and traditional groups like the Muslim League and the Jamaat-i-Islami
in the national elections in Pakistan in 1970. [22] It also persuaded the urban and rural masses that
Islam had certain collectivist doctrines and traditions. Other political parties like the Muslim League
and the Jamaat-i-Islami, on the other hand, tried to propagate the idea that Islam and socialism were
antithetical.[23]
Bhutto remained in power for five years on the basis of the 1970 elections held under the second martial
law regime. Finally he had to hold general elections in 1977. On 7 January 1977, Bhutto announced a
schedule for holding national and provincial elections, the first since those in 1970 which tragically led
to the carnage in East Pakistan and the ultimate dismemberment of the country. With many of the top
opposition leaders in remote prisons, and with no inclination to release them, Bhutto had reason to be
confident about the results. The PPP chairman did not really expect a contest. What he wanted was a
Chapter7a
mandate to complete his consolidation of power. With an overwhelming vote in favor of the PPP,
Bhutto would conclude that the public supported his efforts to transform Pakistani society. In other
words, the election results were to provide Bhutto with the justification to destroy all his critics, once
and for all.[24]
In his anxiety to win the 1977 election by a landslide Bhutto had allowed some rigging,[25] by no means
a new feature in the national life of the country. He wanted a two third majority in the Assembly to
amend the constitution along presidential lines.[26] The results of the acrimonious elections surprised
all parties. The Pakistan National Alliance won majority seats in only one major city, Karachi. It was
roundly beaten elsewhere. The PPP won 93 per cent of the seats in the Punjab -- a surprise even to the
party's leadership. The opposition hit upon a powerful rallying cry against Islamic socialism. Their
slogan was Nizam-i-Mustafa - a powerful symbol in which the system of Islam came alive in the person
of the Prophet. Devotion to Islam coupled with infinite respect for the personality of the Prophet,
produced an electrifying effect.[27]
The Ulema who seemed to have suffered a defeat in 1953 and 1962, had obviously recovered their
strength by 1977 although it was not reflected in the National Assembly. Having failed to oust the PPP
in the House, the Ulema took to the streets.[28] When Ayub Khan was in serious difficulty and offered
to make concessions, it was Bhutto who refused to accept them, stating that it was all a trick, aimed at
keeping Ayub in power. Now it was Bhutto's turn to suffer the same agony. He offered concessions only
to find his opposition more intent on exploiting his weakness. Bhutto defended himself against
accusations that he was anti-Islam, that he indulged in intoxicants, behaved in a lewd and indecent
manner, and encouraged irreligious activity, by eventually ordering the closing of Pakistan's bars,
gambling houses, and night spots. But neither these actions, nor promised reforms satisfied his
opponents.[29]
On July 4, 1977, Bhutto was overthrown by his own Army Chief of Staff, a man he had carefully chosen
for his lack of political ambitions.[30] Later regretting his choice he told the Supreme Court which sent
him to the gallows: "I appointed a Chief of Army belonging to Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before
us."[31] Ziaul Haq was the Pakistan army's most junior Lt. General when Bhutto selected him to be
Chief of the Army Staff in 1976.[32] His appointment was prompted by a desire to retire those senior
officers who had a long and intimate knowledge of Bhutto's performance and who were perceived as
posing a threat to the government of the Pakistan People's Party.[33]
The hasty retreat to the barracks that the armed forces made after the tragedy of Bangladesh did not
signify a permanent condition. The maneuver was tactical, not strategic. Five years after Bangladesh,
men who were not tainted by the humiliating loss of East Pakistan were in charge of the armed forces.
Their perspective was quite different from that of Bhutto, the PPP, and their now retired superiors.
When the country was again faced with wide-spread disorder, with foreign and domestic forces
threatening to divide the nation, and with important military units verging on insurrection, it was time
for the armed forces to make their presence known. Bhutto's heavy handed tactics, his shift towards
absolute despotism, and his apparent anti-Islamic tendencies distressed some of the Army's elite cadres.
The intentions to overthrow Bhutto eventually became known to General Ziaul Haq. Zia was informed
that he would have to lead the coup against Bhutto or expected to be swept away with him.[34]
Even before the election campaign began, army officers were plotting to overthrow Bhutto. These men
no longer believed that he was the savior sent to restore Pakistan to a place in the constellation of
states.[35] On 5 July 1977 Bhutto was arrested by a force under Zia's command. His government was
dissolved and Pakistan passed into still another phase of martial law. Bhutto was Pakistan's first
civilian leader since the overthrow of the parliamentary experiment in 1958 but his rule was not a new
beginning, only an intermission in the protracted rule of the civil-military establishment. [36]
During his six and half years turbulent rule, Bhutto used both economic measures (such as wage and
fringe benefits and subsidies) and police power in order to keep his populist base under control. Bhutto
Chapter7a
was primarily motivated by anmus dominandi, that is, through the aggrandizement of his own power,
he wanted to control every major class or interest by weakening its power base and by making it
subservient to his will and policies. He nationalized a number of major industries with the purpose of
setting up not socialism but a kind of state capitalism. In this way he thought that he had weakened the
power base of the industrialists.[37] Explaining the objectives of the first major nationalization of basic
industries in 1972, Bhutto declared: "My government is committed to eliminate the concentration of
economic power in order that no single entrepreneur or a group of entrepreneurs should obtain control
of the strategic heights of the economy and use this dominant position against the public interest.[38] It
was significant that Bhutto's declaration was couched in negative terms, that is, he was thinking mainly
in terms of denying to the private sector the control of the strategic heights of the economy. He was not
thinking in terms of the public sector occupying the commanding heights of the economy along certain
developmental lines.[39]
Through labor reforms, he granted certain benefits to labor but virtually took away their right to strike
or any form of industrial action by setting up a police force like the Federal Security Force. He
introduced what he termed radical land reforms and conferred other benefits on the tenants and poorer
peasants so that all the agricultural interests like the landowners, the small peasants, the tenants and
landless laborers might look up to him as the source of all benefits.
On March 1, 1972, Bhutto introduced, through the Martial Law Regulation No. 115, his land reforms
with a bitter attack on Ayub khan's 1959 reforms which he described as "a subterfuge," designed" to
fool the people in the name of reform" with "all manner of concessions" to "buttress and pamper the
landed aristocracy and fatten the favored few." [40] In Bhutto's view, the 1959 reforms had eradicated
neither feudalism nor oppression because of the concessions made to landed elites.
Like the Ayub reforms which they so resemble, the Bhutto reforms did not either in theory or in
practice alter the character of the agrarian system of Pakistan. More land was seized and distributed,
more tenants were benefited, but the legislation merely nibbled at the margins of the rural distribution
of power and privilege. The tenancy provisions in particular were left without effective enforcement
mechanisms and were of importance mainly to those tenants already conscious enough and strong
enough to question landlord prerogatives. As the 1977 elections approached, Bhutto dusted off the anti-
feudal rhetoric and again promised to "flay" the privileged and powerful lords of the land. The result
was, predictably, yet another ceiling reform, with a lower ceiling.[41]
The "second round" of ceilings was announced by Bhutto on January 7, 1977. The ordinance
significantly reduced the ceiling by one-third to 100 acres of irrigated land or 200 acres of unirrigated
land. Unlike MLR 115, however, the new ceiling legislation provided for compensation at the rate of Rs.
30 per Produce Index Unit for land acquired by the state. The motive behind the second round was
clearly tactical and political. The reforms were pushed through the National Assembly on the final day
before dissolution for the elections. Bhutto's People Party had played on the symbolism of land
reformsas evidence of the party's commitment to "socialism."[42]
Agrarian reforms worthy of the name transform rural society through alternations in the property
structure and production relations, redistributing power and privilege. Such transformations have
never been the objectives of regimes in Pakistan, but only stirring rhetoric to the contrary.[43] The
power and influence of the big and medium-sized landlords did not undergo any drastic change because
of these land reforms. The limits were fixed in terms of the individual and not for family holdings, with
the result that many landlords managed to get around the limitations on ceilings by transferring land to
relatives.[44] According to one of the charges framed by General Zia's government against Bhutto, he
and his family owned 2,200 acres of agricultural land. This became possible because Bhutto transferred
part of his land to some trusted and dependable persons, making sure that the transfer remained no
more than a paper transaction.[45]
Under his land reforms, big and medium sized landowners had been allowed to get around the matter
of land ceilings in order to maintain their support. Bhutto was also shrewd enough to realize that
because a large number of small peasants and tenants, particularly in Sindh, continued to look up to
Chapter7a
their landlords as their political leaders, it was not in his interest to enforce the land reforms
rigorously.[46] The second land reforms were shelved by the military regime of General Zia and were
ignored by the subsequent governments.
Bhutto's attempts to exploit Islamic sentiment were scarcely different from those of his predecessors. As
with the previous constitutions, the 1973 document cites "all existing laws shall be brought in
conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah....and no law shall
be enacted which is repugnant to injunctions of Islam."[47] Article one of the 1973 constitution
describes Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. The same phrase was utilized in the 1956 document,
although initially Ayub omitted references to an Islamic Republic in his 1962 constitution and only
relented under great pressure to reconsider his position. Article Two of the 1973 constitution declares:
"Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan." The phrase did not appear in the 1956 or 1962
constitutions and the implications of its inclusion are only being realized since the removal and
execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[48]
Bhutto hosted the Second Islamic Summit in Lahore from February 22 to 24, 1974. The summit was
attended by thirty five member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference and Palestine
represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. The summit helped him the recognition of
Bangladesh when Sheikh Mujib was invited to attend the meeting. The Islamic summit was followed by
an invitation to the Imams of the mosques at Madina and Ka'aba to visit Pakistan. Later the
government sponsored an international conference on the life and work of the Prophet. International
Seerat Congress was held in Pakistan in March 1976. The Congress was attended among others by
Imam of Ka'aba and more than hundred prominent scholars and Ulema drawn from all over the
Muslim world, America and Europe. This catering to Islamic sentiments was expected to generate
support for the government.
On March 31, 1972 Bhutto asked his people to 'make this beautiful country an Islamic state, the biggest
Islamic state, the bravest Islamic state and the most solid Islamic state." More than 90,000 Pakistanis
performed Haj in 1972. The National Assembly passed an Act in July, 1973 to ensure "Error Free
Publication of the Holy Quran." Adequate steps were taken against the desecration of the torn pages of
the Holy Quran. A Ministry of Religious Affairs was set up for the first time. Religious education was
made compulsory from primary upto Matriculation.[49]
Bhutto's strategy was both to placate and outwit the religious and conservative opposition. He defeated
it handsomely in the general election in 1970 but by 1974, unlike Khawaja Nazimuddin, a weak man,
Bhutto, the strong man, was not able to meet the challenge posed by the anti-Ahmadi agitation. The
demonstrations in Lahore and Lyallpur in June 1974 resulted in widespread rioting, destruction of
property and army units being called to quell the disturbances. Bhutto surrendered to the opposition
demand to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim minority. The constitution was suitably amended [50] to
placate the Ulema. But that did not stop the Ulema to use the religious appeal against him. In 1970
election, religious and conservative parties like Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, the Muslim
League were divided but in March 1977 elections these parties had formed a common alliance --
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Bhutto did not see the danger in the Alliance for he called it a "cat
with nine tails."[51]
In the aftermath of violence erupted by the "fraudulent' election results, Bhutto announced a ban on
liquor, night clubs and horse races in May 1977. Friday was declared as a closed weekly holiday in lieu
of Sunday from 1st July, 1977 "in deference to the wishes of the Muslim community." These measures
were taken during the last days of Bhutto's regime. The motive behind these measures was not the
enforcement of the injunctions of Islam in the country but to out-wit the mounting opposition, which
gathered on a religious platform.
However, an important external factor in Bhutto's ultimate downfall is the known US concern at his
growing prestige in the Muslim world and his preoccupation with the nuclear program.[52] He told the
National Assembly that a conspiracy had been hatched, under American leadership to de-stabilize his
government. But his plea was rejected as an attempt "to find a scapegoat."
Chapter7a
It is interesting to observe that Bhutto assumed authority during a state of acute crisis after the tragic
dismemberment of Pakistan and was ultimately forced to quit the seat of power, leaving the country in
a still more acute crisis. Another common element in the dramatic appearance and still more grotesque
exit of Bhutto from the Pakistani political scene was the fact that he assumed power from one General
and finally lost to another.[53] Bhutto was the immediate beneficiary of the only two general elections
that Pakistan has yet experienced. But the one prompted a civil war and the other ultimately cost
Bhutto his life and plunged the country into deeper problems.[54] Bhutto did not live up to the
standards of his own constitution, nor could the document protect his administration, his policies or his
person.[55]

Chapter7a

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VII
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development, p-121
2. Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, p-96
3. Ahmad Saleem, Hamoudur Rehman Commission Report, General and Politicians, p-10
4. The Hamoudur Rehman Commission held six army generals - General Yahya Khan, General Abdul
Hameed Khan, Lt. General S.G. Peerzada, Lt. General Gul Hassan, Major General Umar and Major
General Mitha - responsible for conspiring to seize power from President Ayub Khan and creating such
circumstances in East Pakistan which led to the civil disobedience, armed revolt by the Awami League,
surrender of the army and breakup of Pakistan. The commission recommended that these generals
should be tried by an open court. Ahmad Saleem, op. cit., p-79
5. Ziring, op. cit., p-104
6. Ibid., p-191
7. G.W. Chawdhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, p-25
8. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, p-16
9. Munir, op. cit., p-86, 87
11. Khalid b. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p-107
12. The Budget 1976-77, pp 5, 215.
13. Planning Commission, Annual Plan 1976-77, p- 181,192
14. Sayeed, op. cit., p-107
15. Borrowed from President Abdul Nasser of Egypt, who used the term "Islamic socialism" to counter
his religious opponents.
17. Ibid. p-105

Islamic Pakistan
18. Ibid. p-121
19. Ibid. p-126
20. Manzooruddin Ahmad, op. cit., P-16, 17
21. During his speeches in 1969, the East Pakistani peasant leader Maulana Bhashani stated the basic
demands of the workers as food, clothing and shelter (roti, kapra aur makan). This slogan was later
picked up by Bhutto in his 1970 election campaign where he used it to his full advantage. Dawn March
23, 1969
23. Ibid. p-87
25. The allegations of rigging and official interference with elections in favour of candidates of the
ruling party were found to be established by judicial decisions in at least four cases, which displayed a
general pattern of official interference. Judgment of the Supreme Court on the Constitutional petition
of Begum Nusrat Bhutto. 10.11.1977
26. In January 1977 the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) advised Bhutto to rig the elections since he
would not otherwise be able to procure the two-thirds majority in parliament. The Herald, July 1992
27. Afzal Iqbal, Islamisation in Pakistan, p-105
28. Ibid. p-151
30. Bhutto seems to have developed confidence in Zia when they came in contact with each other during
the course of the 1973 conspiracy trial, presided over by the General.....Bhutto had felt personally
obliged to Zia for convicting the officers who had wanted to topple his government. General Khalid
Mahmud Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-88, Dawn 23.4.1995
31. Afzal, op. cit., p151
32. In the summer of 1976, General Zia, who had superseded seven senior lieutenant-generals, told
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: "Sir I am so grateful to you for appointing me Chief of Army Staff.
Not only myself, but may future generations will be eternally grateful to you for singling me out for
such a great honor, and this is a favour which I can never forget." The Herald, July 1992
33. In her memoirs, the Shah of Iran's elder sister Princess Ashraf Pahalavi, recalls her visit to Pakistan
in May 1977 during the height of the PNA agitation, when she expressed concern over the possible
reaction of the army. Bhutto assured her: "As far as the army is concerned you know that man
(pointing to General Zia who was sitting at a distance) - he heads the army. He is in my pocket." The
Herald, July 1992
34. Ziring, p-107-108
35. Ibid. p-131
36. Ibid. p-107, 108

Islamic Pakistan
38. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements. Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1973
39. Saeed op. cit., p-96
40. Address to the nation, March 1, 1972
41. Ronald J. Herring, The Policy Logic of Land Reforms in Pakistan, p-244
42. Ibid. p-244
43. Ibid. p-229
44. Syeed, p-91
45. Ibid. p-91-92
46. Ibid. p-92
47. Ibid. p-190
49. Afzal, op. cit., p-102,103
50. Through Second constitutional amendment in September 1974, the following clause was added to
the article 260: A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the
Prophethood of Mohammad (peace be upon him) the last of the prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in
any sense of the word or of any description, whatsoever, after Mohammad (peace be upon him), or
recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the
constitution or law."
51. Afzal, op.cit., p-104
52. M.H. Askarai, The Zia legacy, Dawn 6.11.1991
53. Manzooruddin Ahmad, op. cit., P-13
55. Ibid. p-37

Islamic Pakistan

Chapter6a
Chapter VI
Page 2
No wonder that after the war when the dust settled, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman came up with his six point
formula in the opposition leaders' meeting in Lahore in 1966. The Six-Point formula later became the
main plank of the Bangladesh movement, and eventually turned out to be the beginning to the end of
the relationship between the two wings of Pakistan.
According to Hasan Zaheer, the author of The Separation of East Pakistan, [10] given the degree of
alienation by the late 1960s, it was in the larger interest of both East and West Pakistan to resolve their
differences by either binding themselves in a loose confederation, or act as independent sovereign states.
Slogans raised by the leadership to use Islam as a catch-word, could not sustain the unity of Pakistan.
The issues were far too important to be resolved by a mediocre leadership. These issues were primarily
secular and not religious, and as such they merited resolution in a spirit of tolerance, justice, fair-play,
and mutual accommodation by the political leadership.
The second decade of independence (1958-1968) saw the beginning of the end of the united Pakistan.
Nothing contributed more to alienation between the two wings of Pakistan than the ten years of Ayub
Khan's regime. Effective political power was concentrated in the hands of the Generals and civil
bureaucrats, a class in which East Pakistan was poorly represented. The sense of disenchantment in the
eastern wing with the centralized system touched its peak under Ayub Khan's regime.[11]
Disparity in development increased during the second and third plan periods because the policies that
had created this disparity also continued unchanged. It is a strange but understandable commentary on
the irresponsiveness of policy makers to the demands and grievances of East Pakistanis that even
though the wave of resentment in East Pakistan against this disparity had been rising ever since the
1954 elections, there was no significant change in these policies. Thus, during the second plan, in terms
of actual implementation, the share of East Pakistan in the total public and private sector expenditure
was about 32 percent. During the third plan, the share was 36 percent. The figures of development and
non-development expenditure in per capita terms are even more graphic. During the third plan (1960-
65) the per capita development and revenue expenditures in West Pakistan were Rs. 521.05 and Rs.
390.35, respectively, whereas the expenditures for East Pakistan were as low as Rs. 240 and Rs. 70.29
respectively. [12] Regional economic disparity provoked bitter opposition and resentment in East
Pakistan towards the central government.
East Pakistan often bitterly complained that there were few East Pakistani officers at the highest levels
of the civil service. In some of the key ministries associated with economic policy making, particularly at
the secretary level, all the officers until 1969 were from West Pakistan or had emigrated from the
Muslim-minority provinces of India.[13] East Pakistan also continued to resent the fact that 60 per cent
of the Budget (sometimes even more) was allocated for defense in which the eastern wing had only a
nominal share.[14]
However, attempts were constantly made to deploy the rhetoric of the Ummah and Islamic statehood as
the unifying ideology and instrument of legitimization. As consistently, religion refused to serve the
political purpose even among the devout Bengalis. Eventually, official Islam in East Pakistan was
reduced to extremist factions -- Badr, Shams, and Jamat -- which were totally isolated from East
Chapter6a
Pakistan's Muslim majority.[15]
During President Ayub Khan's regime, there was a growing skepticism, both in East and West
Pakistan, as to whether the appeal to Islamic sentiments could continue to keep the two disparate wings
together. It was becoming apparent that Islam could neither be aroused to justify nor explain the
increasing in egalitarian society that had emerged in West Pakistan nor as the only cementing force
between the two disparate wings of the country. An appeal to religion had lost its strength, and it was
clear that Bengali aspirations would be satisfied within the existing political framework if the economy
had to satisfy the increasing expectations of West Pakistan as well.
Ayub Khan failed to satisfy the Bengali expectations that he had aroused through his constitutional
assurances to remove disparity. At one time President Ayub Khan's regime even suggested secession to
an East Pakistani leader. According to Justice Munir : "When in 1962, I joined Ayub's cabinet as a law
minister for a short time, I found that no constructive work was being done by the assembly. Everyday
was spent in listening to the long speeches of East Pakistan members of exploitation of East Pakistan....
I spoke to Ayub and suggested that there could be no fusion between, or common goal between the two
provinces and asked him whether it would not be better, to ask East Pakistan to take their affairs in
their own hands instead of putting up with this nonsense. He suggested to me that I should talk about it
to some influential leader from East Pakistan. One day while I was talking to Mr. Ramizuddin, who has
been a Minister in Bengal or East Pakistan, I broached the matter to him. His reply was prompt and
straight. He asked me whether I was suggesting secession. I said yes to something like it as
confederation or more autonomy. He said 'Look, here we are the majority province and it is for the
minority province to secede because we are Pakistan.' The matter ended there and complaints in the
Assembly continued as before."[16]
East Pakistan came to experience what seemed to them to be a colonialist domination by a remote alien
element, who neither understood nor sympathized with their aspirations and who as they believed,
deprived them of what they regard as their fair share of investment and economic development.
The essential differences between the two wings were further confirmed by the conflict between the Six
Points program of the Awami League and the principles and the procedure laid down in the Legal
Framework Order issued by President Yahya Khan on 28th March, 1970. Both agreed that Pakistan
should be a federal republic but the differences lay in the concept of the central government.
The Six Points declared that the federal government should be responsible only for defense and foreign
affairs; there should be two separate mutually convertible currencies or, if one currency, there should
be regional reserve banks to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to
the other. Fiscal policy was to be the responsibility of the federating units, who were to provide the
central government with the necessary resources for defense and foreign affairs. The regional
governments were to be responsible for foreign trade and aid, and were to be empowered to maintain
their own militia or para-military force.
The 'fundamental principles' in the Legal Framework Order proclaimed that 'Pakistan shall be so
united in a federation that the independence, the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of
Pakistan are ensured, and that the unity of the federation is not in any way impaired.'[17] The
provinces were to have maximum autonomy, that is to say maximum legislative, administrative and
financial powers, but the federal government was to have 'adequate powers, including legislative,
administrative and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal
affairs and to preserve the independence and integrity of the country.'
There was an obvious conflict here. The exclusion of foreign trade and aid from the purview of the
central government as proposed by Six Points, would deprive it of real control over foreign policy, and
its inability to levy by the provinces. The Awami League leaders never succeeded in showing
convincingly how the Six Points would give the central government any real control over foreign affairs
and defense.

Chapter6a
In spite of these implications of the Six Points, President Yahya Khan allowed the Awami League to
campaign on the basis of the Six Points. He could hardly have been expecting to foresee Sheikh Mujibur
Rehman's astonishing victory in the subsequent elections, giving the Awami League an absolute
majority in the Assembly. Perhaps, Yahya Khan did not choose to settle the Six Points issue because he
was led to believe by his intelligence agencies, as also by the political party supporting him, the Jamaat-i-
Islami in East Pakistan, that no single political party, including the Awami League, would win an
absolute majority. There would be a number of parties, splinter groups and individuals with a sizable
number of seats in the National Assembly and that as President, Yahya Khan would be able to bargain
from a position of strength and play off one against the other.
In short, General Yahya Khan held elections but refused to hand over power to the party which had
gained a clear majority. In this, the Generals around him as well as some West Pakistan-based
politicians, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, gave him due encouragement.
No doubt the secession of East Pakistan was the anti-climax of the long story of political maneuvering,
social injustices and economic deprivation. Available information and data suggests that this dissension
arose mainly because the power elites of West Pakistan formulated certain policies that provoked as
much opposition and bitterness from the East that the system was brought to the verge of collapse.
However, the dismemberment of Pakistan was also linked with a wider conflict involving the five most
populous countries in the world -- China, the Soviet Union, the United States and India and
Pakistan.[18] Thus the Indo-Pakistan war on Bangladesh in 1971 'was not only another phase in the
long religious conflict between Muslims and the Hindus, not merely a moral conflict between Pakistan's
vicious suppression of the Bangladeshi rebels and India's calculated military aggression to dismember
the Pakistani state. Back of all this, there was a power struggle between China and the Soviet Union and
a strategic struggle between Moscow and Washington.[19]
In the closing phase of the civil war in East Pakistan, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is
believed to have informed India of Pakistan's willingness to discuss a timetable for the grant of
complete provincial autonomy to the eastern wing and in mid-November 1971, a secret five-point peace
plan is said to have been given by Yahya Khan to the Indian Ambassador in Islamabad. The plan
included a provision for a referendum on the issue of East Pakistan's independence. Indian Prime
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi nevertheless declined it and her army, along with Mukti Bahni (the
irregulars supporting East Pakistan's bid for independence) pressed on until the Pakistani forces were
forced to surrender in Dhaka on December 16.[20]

Chapter6a

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter VI
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. The search for political stability by M. H. Askari, Dawn Aug. 14, 1993
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. What led to the break-up? by Dr. Aftab Ahmed - Dawn 17-4-1992
5. During the time when delicate negotiations were going on between the center and East Bengal, the new
Chief Minister, Fazlul Haq, created a stir by challenging the very logic that created the state of Pakistan. He
said that with the help of the people of India he hoped "to remove the artificial barriers that had been
created between the two Bengals" because the Bengalis were "bound by a common language and heritage
and they have had age-long traditions." In another interview he asserted, "Independence will be the first
thing to be taken up by my ministry," at negotiations between center and East Bengal. The prime minister,
Mohammad Ali Bogra, when dismissing Fazlul Haq as chief minister and placing East Bengal under central
control, called the chief minister as "self-confessed traitor." Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, P-41
6. Dr. Aftab Ahmed, What led to the break-up, Dawn 17.4.92
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. In memoriam: Dhaka 1971-1991 by Brig. A. R. Siddique (retd) - Dawn 16.12.1991
10. Hasan Zaheer, Separation of East Pakistan, the rise and realization of Bengali Muslim nationalism,
published by Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1994.
11. Askari, op. cit.,
12. Reports of the Advisory Penals for the Fourth Five year Plan 1970-75, Vol. 1, Islamabad, July 1970, pp-27-
28
13. Sayeed op. cit., p-66
14. The Pakistan army was almost entirely recruited from four districts of northern Punjab (Rawalpindi,
Campbellpur, Jhelum and Gujrat) and two districts of the Frontier Province (Peshawar and Kohat). Sixty
per cent of the army were Punjabi and 35 per cent were Pakhtuns. Generals, admirals or air marshals
occupying positions such as the presidency, the deputy commander-in-chief of the army, chief of the general
staff, the commanders-in-chief of the navy and air force, the director of inter-services intelligence, the
military governor of a province and the command of certain divisions constituted the military elite. Sayeed,
op. cit., p-71
15. Meanings of the disaster by Eqbal Ahmad - Dawn 17.4.1994
16. Muhammad Munir (Retired Chief Justice of Pakistan), From Jinnah to Zia, p-92,93,
Islamic Pakistan
17. Under Art. 20 (2) of the LFO the constitution to be made by the National Assembly had to preserve
"Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan." The provisions relating to the name of the
State, the Head of State, enabling Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam as
set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, directive principles so as to promote Islamic way of life and observe
Islamic moral standards, to provide facilities for the teaching of Holy Quran, enjoining that no law
repugnant to Holy Quran and Sunnah could be made, were the same as in the 1956 constitution or the
amended 1962 constitution.
18. G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, p-9
19. J. Raston, 'Who won in India?', The New York Times, December 4, 1971 cited by GW Choudhury, op.
cit., p-10
20. Askari, op. cit.

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter V
The Second Martial Law
Chapter 3
RE F E R E N C E S
1. The Supreme Court, in Asma Jilani's case (1973), declared the rule of General Yahya as illegal.
2. This was the system that had merged all the provinces of West Pakistan into one unit. General Yahya
restored autonomy of the old provinces of Sindh, the Punjab, and the North West Frontier Province
and created the new province of Baluchistan.
3. The Last Days of United Pakistan by G W Choudhury - Dawn 10.6.1994 (Review by Louis A. Delvoie)
4. According to G. W. Choudhury that it was quite evident from his discussion with Mujib that he was
not interested in becoming the prime minister or president of a united Pakistan. G. W. Choudhury,
Pakistan, p-9
5. Ibid. p-9
6. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, p-12
7. Ibid. p-13
8. Mohammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, p-85
http://www.ghazali.net/book1/reference4.htm [10/14/2004 3:59:21 AM]

Chapter4a
Chapter IV
Page 2
President Ayub Khan military regime's attention was mainly focused on its relationship with the
international capitalist system and gaining some degree of political legitimacy from the west. Ayub had
been instrumental in allying Pakistan with the Unite States. He made a deep impression on President
Eisenhower and even more so on Vice-President Richard Nixon and Secretary of state John Foster
Dulles. In 1954 the Eisenhower-Nixon administration signed its initial military assistance program with
Pakistan. The same year Pakistan joined SEATO and then the Baghdad Pact in 1955. the Pakistani
Army's first indigenous Commander- in- Chief, Ayub was committed to the modernization of the
armed forces and he had turned to the United States at a most opportune moment. The United States
government was eager to meet Ayub's request for assistance and thus began a long period of mutual
cooperation and goodwill between the two countries. When Ayub seized power in 1958, the United
states government did not necessarily approve, but neither was it very upset. [17] "His foreign policy
was one of vassalage to the United States which he believed would keep him in power."[18]
During his era one sees the first institutionalization of corruption in the country. He resorted to high
appointments in the army without consideration of merit. Instead of reorganizing the army to meet the
requirement of an independent and free country he retained its colonial structure and tradition. "The
British ethnicization of regiments was maintained, the mess tradition left untouched to the extent of the
display of old battle standards won on our soil. The army was kept tuned by him to serve the
adventurers like him, not the nation's interest."[19]
His era witnessed rapid industrial progress (mainly in the western wing of the country) with two five-
year economic development plans. However his so-called 1958-68 "development decade" actually
became a decade of exploitation and deliberate promotion of inequality between classes and regions
with the 22 big industrial families amassing most of the wealth. The record reveals that Pakistan's
Second Year Plan (1960-1965), the one that covered a good part of the martial law period, was a
substantial success from a statistical point of view. But there was little overall improvement in the life-
style of the general population.[20]
President Ayub Khan introduced industrial development program under the doctrine of "functional
inequality on the familiar plea that government should tolerate "some initial growth in income
inequalities to reach high levels of saving and investment." This growth was to be achieved through a
system under which income inequalities were to be permitted for a long time until the benefits of such a
system would trickle down to the disadvantaged groups at the later stage.
Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, probably the most influential adviser of his government and drafter of the Second
Five-Year Plan, was responsible for much of the thinking embodied in the Plan. He accepted the
proposition that "the route to equality lay through inequality" on the ground that during the earlier
phase of industrialization such inequality was inevitable. He argued that "the under-developed
countries must consciously accept a philosophy of growth and shelve for the distant future all ideas of
equitable distribution and welfare state. It should be recognized that these are luxuries which only
developed countries can afford."[22]
Chapter4a
The theory of "social utility of greed" was also championed by Pakistan's Harvard adviser to the
Planning Commission, Gustav F. Papanek, who advocated that income inequalities not only
contributed to the growth of the economy but also made possible a real improvement for the lower-
income groups.[23] In his work on Pakistan's economic development model pursued in the sixties,
Gustav Papanek defended the very high rates of profit allowed to the private sector on the plea that
since the bulk of these profits were being reinvested, they produced economic growth which was
essential for reducing poverty and thereby reducing inequality.
It was apparent that this system of "functional inequality" involving disparities among the various
classes and regions could operate with far fewer checks under an authoritarian system like that of
Pakistan.[24]
The policy of income inequality between classes was pursued simultaneously with a policy of regional
inequality in terms of East and West Pakistan and in terms of regions within West Pakistan. During the
decade 1959-60 to 1969-70, per capita gross domestic product in terms of 1959-60 constant prices grew
only by 17 percent in East Pakistan, but by 42 percent in West Pakistan. The central government also
conceded that disparity measured by the difference between per capita incomes in West and East
Pakistan expressed as a percentage of the per capita income of all Pakistan had increased from 38.1
percent in 1964-65 to 47.1 percent in 1969-70.[25]
President Ayub introduced land reforms in West Pakistan in 1959 [26] under which ceilings of 500
acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres for non- irrigated lands were fixed. However, the mere size of the
ceilings suggested that certainly the medium-sized landowners whose scions were heavily represented in
the army and civil services were not going to be adversely affected. In addition, there were so many
loopholes in Ayub's land reforms that landlords could still own and cultivate up to about 2,000 acres of
irrigated or 4,000 acres of non-irrigated land if they transferred some of their land to their legal heirs
and converted some into orchards, nurseries and game preserves. The big landlords did not suffer any
eclipse in the political power and they were able to transfer some of their wealth and savings to
investment in industries.[27]
At the time when the Ayub regime was facing urban militancy largely as a result of the decline in real
wages and the growing awareness among urban groups of industrial and economic concentration, the
Planning Commission reiterated in November 1968 the basic premise of the government's
developmental strategy: "We cannot distribute poverty. Growth is vital before income distribution can
improve."[28] However, the commission admitted that in spite of rapid growth, Pakistan continued to
be one of the poorest and most illiterate societies. It failed to admit that the strategy that it had followed
implied that because growth was vital before income distribution, the poor had to remain poor for a
long time so that growth might continue at an accelerating pace. This vicious circle of more and more
growth with poverty increasing or remaining the same or improving very little could only be broken if
the poorer groups were to acquire political power.[29]
It was in his regime that one saw a clear unfolding of certain trends and developments represented
what may be described as an ideological change in Pakistan. Under him there was economic change
through industrialization, improved agriculture and modest land reforms spreading to areas other than
Karachi, particularly to Punjab and a few urban centers in Sindh and the Frontier.
It may be suggested that as a result of these changes the masses in many parts of West Pakistan could
no longer be aroused by appeals to vague and emotional notions of Islamic unity. This explains why
during the 1970 elections Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party made such serious inroads in the semi-
prosperous areas of Punjab. It offered a new but vague ideological program under the name of Islamic
socialism or Musawat.[30]
Ayub, not being able to satisfy Bengaliexpectations that he had aroused through his constitutional
assurances that disparity would soon be removed and by his policies of coercion of urban elements in
East Pakistan, laid the foundations for the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. It was in Ayub's regime
Chapter4a
that in both East and West Pakistan there was a growing skepticism as to whether the appeal of Islam
could continue to keep the two disparate wings together.
This represents the other side of ideological change, that is to say, Islam could neither be used to justify
nor explain the increase in egalitarian society that had emerged in Pakistan, nor could the Islamic
factor serve any longer as the only cementing force between the two disparate wings of the country.[31]
President Ayub flouted his own constitution which stipulated that in the event of frailty or failure to
discharge his duties, the President would hand over to the Speaker of the National Assembly, which
was hand-picked and who would be only too glad to carry out orders. But Ayub took no chances, and
handed over to General Yahya Khan when he lost his nerve and could no longer face an agitation
conducted by people who had been disenfranchised.
To complete the narration, in the aftermath of the 1965 war and the Tashkent declaration, a mass
agitation had also started against the Ayub regime in West Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mobilized
the agitation to build up support for himself and later for the PPP. In 1968, Ayub Khan finally began to
lose his grip on power because of his serious illness.
By March 1969, he realized that he had to go. However, instead of handing over to the Speaker of the
national Assembly, as his own constitution provided, he decided to impose martial law once again.
Ayub's biographer Altaf Gauhar, says General Yahya Khan, had led Ayub to believe that the army
would put down the agitation, eliminate his political opponents and put him back in power in about
three months. However, Yahya Khan had his own agenda and abrogated the constitution. He thus
eliminated Ayub Khan much the same way as the latter had eliminated Iskandar Mirza, after seizing
power, on October 27, 1958.
General Yahya was indeed waiting in the wings for such an opportunity. He lost no time in assuming
new powers and ventured on the democratic path in order to publicly expose its inadequacies. He was
convinced that no political party would secure a working majority and that he could continue to play
the role of a benevolent arbiter who enjoyed the support of the most well-organized political party of
the country, i.e. the Pakistan Army. It was his misfortune, however that his own constituency was
decisively humiliated in Dacca and all the reassuring forecasts of the intelligence agencies proved
totally incorrect.[33]

Chapter4a

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter IV
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. A statement by Abdul Qadir, Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, so annoyed him that he sent a
strongly worded message to the Prime Minister on 24 Aug. 1958: "I see from the press that Mr. Abdul
Qadir, Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, is going about saying that the way to check inflation in the
country is to cut expenditure on the army and reduce America's military aid as it leads to inflation.....
the army is fed up to the teeth with this man's fulmination." Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First
Military Ruler - cited by Dawn 18.7.1993
2. Mohammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia - p-83
3. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters - p-106
4. It is not possible to derive from the text of the Quran the constitution of any state. CA debates March
1949.
5. Ayub Khan, op. cit., P-128
6 . Ayub Khan op. cit., P-199
7. The Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, p-174
8. Ibid. p-175
9. Ayub Khan, Op. Cit., p-199
10. Ibid. p-200
11. Ibid. p-203-204
12. Ibid. p-198
13. The Constitution Commission report p-125 cited by Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan - p-74
14. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p-76
15 Ibid. p-76
16. Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman advocated reformation of Islam on the basis of post-Prophetic formative
period of Islam. "The task of rethinking and reformulating Islam at the present juncture is much more
acute and radical than has faced the Muslim since the 3rd/9th century and the requisite performance is
equivalent to the performance of the first two centuries and a half. In other words, the thinking Muslim
has to go right behind the early post-Prophetic formative period itself and reconstruct it all over again."
{ Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, Islam, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1966 p-251} He also questioned the
practice of five prayers : The five daily prayers are not all mentioned in the Quran....It was in the post-
Islamic Pakistan
Prophetic period that the number of prayers was inexorably fixed without any alternative at five and
the fact of the fundamental three prayers was submerged under the rising tide of Hadith which was put
into circulation to support the idea that prayers were five. { op. cit p-36}
18. Comment on "Rise and Fall of Ayub Khan," Dr. Akbar Naqvi, DAWN 19.8.1994
19. Ibid
21. Mehbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning Karachi: Oxford, 1963, p-32
22. Ibid. p-113
23. Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge,
Mass.: Havard University Press, 1967, p-242 (cited by Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan)
24. The Report of the Committee on Islamization in 1980 rejected the economic philosophy embodied in
the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65), under which the government consciously let profits multiply while
increases in wages were restricted in order to maximize the flow of invisible surplus in the corporate
sector. "Such a strategy was based on an explicit acceptance of income and wealth differentials, which
were allowed to grow even further as a means of achieving rapid growth rates." The committee rejected
this approach; in the Islamic system, social betterment was not to be achieved through personal greed:
the path to ultimate quality must not lie through initial inequality. [An Agenda for Islamic Economic
Reforms: The Report of the Committee on Islamization 1980 p-14, 8]
25. Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p-57
26. In East Pakistan State Acquisition and Tenancy Act was promulgated in 1950 under which, all rent-
receiving interest between cultivating tenant and the state was abolished and a ceiling of 33 acres was
placed on individual ownership of land.
27. Khalid B. Sayeed op. cit., p-56
28. Planning Commission, Socio-Economic objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75-
Karachi,1968 p-17
29. Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p-61,62
30. Ibid. p-62
31.Ibid. p-63
32. General Yahya's military rule was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in Asma Jilani's case in
1973.
33. Afzal Iqbal, Democracy without dissent, Dawn Karachi 24.6.1994.

Islamic Pakistan

Chapter3a
Chapter III
Page 2
The Basic Principles Committee submitted two interim reports; one in September, 1950 and the other
in December 1952. Neither of them could be adopted. The first one was withdrawn in the wake of a
storm of protests in East Pakistan [31] while the second one was amended during the debates in the
Constituent Assembly. However, the second report proved more productive and was adopted on 6th
Oct. 1954.
The second report was widely criticized by the Ulema. A convention of Ulema was convened in Karachi
in January 1953 to discuss the report. The convention, attended by 33 Ulema of different schools of
thought, suggested more than two dozen amendments to accept the report.[32] Earlier in January 1951,
almost the same Ulema had agreed unanimously on 22 points on the fundamental principles of an
Islamic state.
The main features of the Committee's second report regarding the place of Islam in the future
constitution were: that the Objectives Resolution 1949 should form the Preamble of the future
constitution; that the Directives Principles of state should be the preservation of democracy within the
limits prescribed by the Quran and the Sunnah; that the state should take steps to bring the existing
laws in conformity with the Islamic principles_XE "Islamic principles"_; that no legislation be made
which was repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah: that the Islamic moral standards be promoted and
maintained.
In response to considerable pressure, the Report of the Basic Principles Committee contained a
proposal that no law passed by any legislature in Pakistan should be valid if it were repugnant to the
Holy Quran and the Sunnah. To prevent passage of legislation repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah,
the Committee recommended the appointment (by the head of state) of a board consisting of not more
than five persons well versed in Islamic law. This Board of Ulema should act in an advisory capacity
and determine whether the laws that the Assembly passed were in conformity with or repugnant to
Islam. The Committee also recommended that the Head of State should be a Muslim; and that separate
electorates should be maintained for Muslims and non-Muslims.
When the Committee's report was considered by the Constituent Assembly, the Islamic character of the
recommendations was severely criticized. There was not, however, much discussion on such matters as
making the Objectives Resolution 1949, as part of the Preamble, or including the Directive Principles of
State policy in the future constitution. It was argued that these provisions were not legally enforceable
and were merely 'pious hopes.' But recommendations - that the Head of the state should be a Muslim,
that separate electorates should be maintained, and that a Board of Ulema should be appointed to
supervise the legislative activity of the Assembly were opposed during the constitutent assembly
debates.
During the debate that the Head of state should be a Muslim, Sardar Shawkat Hayat Khan pointed out
that the provision was against the fundamental rights. He remarked: " I imagine that the population of
this country will be 85 percent Muslim. If a Muslim cannot be returned as Head of the State with 85
percent Muslims population and a Hindu is returned with a population of only 15 percent that Hindus
Chapter3a
must be saint......" [33]
The recommendation of the Basic Principles Committee that a board of five Ulema be appointed to
determine whether the laws passed by the Assembly were in conformity with or repugnant to Islam,
also came under sharp criticism. It was, therefore, argued that since the proposal to form a board of
Ulema had received support only from a section of the people, it should be dropped and the Supreme
Court of Pakistan should be given the necessary jurisdiction to judge whether the laws passed by the
Assembly were in conformity with or repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah. This was agreed to by
the first Constituent Assembly but later dropped by the second.
During the discussion in the first Constituent Assembly the report of the Basic Principles Committee
was substantially amended regarding the 'repugnancy clause.' Any law of a Pakistan legislature which
is in conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah was again declared to be invalid. But the later provision
was that Supreme court alone should have jurisdiction in such a case. Any objection on the ground of
repugnancy to Islam was to be filed within three months of the giving of assents to a bill. Furthermore,
it was provided that, for a period of at least twenty-five years, the repugnancy sections should not apply
to 'fiscal and monetary measures, laws relating to banking, insurance, provident funds, and credit
system.'
The East Pakistan Muslim League passed a resolution regretting that the repugnancy clause was not to
be enforceable in the courts. This criticism was more than countered by the attitude of the Awami
League. Mr. Hussein Shaheed Suharwardy asserted that his party wanted true Islam in the government
and policies of Pakistan, but that the existing state of affairs was so far from Islam that the title should
not be included in the name of the state. "I say that you are deluding the people here by calling this an
Islamic state." He argued that it was quite unnecessary to provide in the constitution that the President
was required to be a Muslim since 86 per cent of the electorate would be composed of Muslim voters.
[34]
In 1953, Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic, in spite of the opposition of a few Muslims and
many of the non-Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. The Report of the Basic Principles
Committee was eventually adopted by the assembly on September 21, 1954 with some amendments. The
proposal for a Board of Ulema had been dropped; the question of separate or joint electorates was left
to be determined by the Central and Provincial Assemblies formed under the constitution. They
adopted the principle of joint electorates.
After much debate, the Constituent Assembly was able to prepare a final draft of the constitution in
1954 which visualized an Islamic Republic of Pakistan with a parliamentary system and a federation of
five units, each with a bicameral legislature. It seems that the constitutional draft could have been
adopted in the Constituent Assembly but it was not approved by the ruling elites, that is to say,
members of the civil and military bureaucracy and feudalelements of West Pakistan. When the
Assembly passed a bill in September 1954 which made the Governor General subservient to the advice
of Prime Minister, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad, a senior member of the Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, backed by Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and
dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali. Perhaps this was the first step towards
ultimate bureaucratization and consequent militarization of Pakistan's political system.[35]
The second Constituent Assembly was inaugurated in July 1955 and on January 8, 1956 it presented a
draft constitution which was finally adopted on February 29, with certain changes. After nine years of
effort, Pakistan was successful in framing the constitution which was implemented on March 23, 1956.
Most of the West Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats dreaded the exercise of the will of the people
according to the majority principle since that could put the Bengalis (representing 56 per cent of the
population) in a commanding position. It took them nine years to devise the so-called parity formula
according to which East and West Pakistan would have equal representation in the federal parliament
and government.
The constitution provided for a federal structure composed of two units, East and West Pakistan. The
Chapter3a
parliamentary form of government was adopted and unicameral legislature was based on the principle
of 'parity' of representation between the two wings of the country. The merger of the provinces of West
Pakistan in 1955 was initiated (against the wishes of Baluchistan, Sindh and North Western Frontier
Province in order to transform a federation originally based on five units into a bipolar federal system.
This would ultimately imply perpetual confrontation between East and West Pakistan. No attempt was
made to abolish feudalism in the country while colonial-era system of civil administration was
maintained.
Islamic provisions in the 1956 constitution were contained in the Directives Principles of State Policy,
which were not enforceable in the courts. The directive principles reaffirmed the statement in the
preamble that "steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to
order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Further the state was to endeavor (a)
to provide facilities to the Muslims to enable them to understand the meaning of life according to the
Holy Quran and the Sunnah; (b) to promote unity and observance of Islamic moral standards; (c) to
secure the proper organization of Zakat and Awkaf.
Article 24 provided that the state should endeavor to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim
countries. The same article enjoined Pakistan to foster friendly relations among all nations.
There was no provision to make Islam the state religion in Pakistan. Article 21 provided that no person
should be compelled to pay any special tax, the proceeds of which were to be spent on the propagation
of any religion other than his own. The Head of State was to be a Muslim not younger than 40 years of
age. The constitution of 1956 represented a decision to transfer to the people and not the Ulema or
other religiously privileged class, the responsibility, if not for making the authoritative interpretation of
Islam, at least for choosing which interpretation shall become authoritative.
Insofar as Islam was given any practical legal significance in the 1956 Constitution, it was in two ways.
First, through Article 197 the president was obliged to set up an organization for Islamic research and
instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis;
and under article 198 the President expected to appoint a Commission of Experts to make
recommendations ' as to the measures for bringing existing laws in conformity with the injunctions of
Islam. ' The Commission was to submit its report to the President within five years of its appointment.
This report was to be placed before the National Assembly, and the Assembly after considering the
report was to enact laws in respect thereof. [36]
The constitution had something to offer to both sides; it gave grounds to the orthodox traditionalist that
his cause might be advanced, while there was nothing in the Islamic clauses to cause a liberal democrat
to feel that Pakistan was incapable of becoming the kind of a state he wishes to see. The constitution did
little to settle the fundamental issue of the desirable role of Islam in a modern state. Nor did its adoption
serve to bridge what one writer had called the ' wide gulf between the Ulema of the orthodox schools
and the intelligentsia." [37]
The 1956 constitution was accepted without widespread opposition from religious groups concerning its
Islamic provisions. Jamat-e-Islami described it as an "Islamic constitution." A statement issued by the
Majles-e-Shura of the Jamat on 18th March 1956 said: "The preamble of the constitution, its Directive
Principles and Article 198 of the constitution have finally and unequivocally settled the 8-year old
struggle between the Islamic and anti-Islamic trends in favor of the former. And the fact that the future
system of life in this country has to be shaped on the basis of Islam and that the Quran and the Sunnah
shall ever reign supreme here has been so firmly embodied in the constitution of the country that no
worldly power shall, Insha Allah, be able to obliterate it." [38]
The constitution of 1956, that took seven years to adopt, was abrogated only after two and half years of
its existence by the civilian-military coalition of power elites that brought about a military coup d'état
on October 7, 1958. President Iskandar Mirza (a retired Major General who later joined the civil
Chapter3a
service) imposed martial law and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General
Mohammad Ayub Khan, later to be named a Field Marshal, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Three weeks later General Ayub dismissed President Iskandar Mirza and assumed the presidency. This
act marked the transformation of the bureaucratic state system into military regime in which the
civilian bureaucrats came to play a sub-servient rather than a dominant role.
The fate of democracy was not allowed to improve even after the enforcement of the 1956 democratic
constitution. Political bickering and intrigues which began under the interim constitution after 1953, --
when Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, who had enjoyed the confidence of the legislature, was
arbitrarily dismissed by the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, and when a sovereign constituent
assembly was also dissolved by the same Governor-General in an undemocratic manner in 1954, --
continued to dominate the Pakistan political scene even after the adoption of the 1956 constitution. On
the political intrigues of President Iskandar Mirza, General Ayub wrote: "The President had
thoroughly exploited the weaknesses in the constitution and had got everyone connected with the
political life of the country utterly exposed and discredited." [39]
It was expected that general elections will take place in accordance with the provisions of the new
constitution but like the interim constitution (1947-56) no elections were held. There were seven prime
ministers in Pakistan during the era of parliamentary democracy from 1947 to 1958. With the exception
of the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, none of the remaining six prime ministers were elected as
a result of any election or even as a result of the vote of confidence in the legislature. They were the
products of "palace intrigues" by the two governor-generals -- Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar
Mirza (who later became the first president of Pakistan). There was a cabinet, there was a parliament,
but the real powers were exercised by the Governor-General with the help of a ruling elite, composed of
the top civil and military officials. The constitutional forms and trapping of democracy had only
provided a cloak for the ruling elite.
The political order in Pakistan had practically turned into an oligarchy under a democratic
constitution. Pakistan's political system was rightly described as a 'modernizingoligarchy,' in a study on
the politics of the developing areas. [40] The various government changes that took place in the country
from 1953 to 1958 could be traced to the inordinate desire of this ruling oligarchy to perpetuate its
power and position. It is no doubt true that this oligarchy was able to maintain its hold because of the
lack of cohesion and integrity among the political parties and their leaders. But this is also true that the
powerful oligarchy was determined to crush the democratic institutions in the country and it always
encouraged splits and disintegration of the parties whenever any of them constituted a threat to its hold
and dominance. It was therefore the role and policy of this particular group, which had actual control
of the governmental machinery, that was more responsible than any other factor in the unsatisfactory
working of the democratic institutions in the country.
A constitution commission appointed by Ayub Khan in 1960 enumerated the following reasons for the
failure of democracy in Pakistan: (i) lack of proper elections, (ii) undue interference by the heads of the
state with the ministers and political parties and by the central government with the functioning of the
government of the provinces, (iii) lack of leadership resulting in the absence of well-organized and
disciplined parties, lack of character of the politicians and their under interference in the
administration. However, the commission failed to mention the real threat and challenges to democracy
in Pakistan that came from an all-powerful and irresponsible executive which was aided and supported
by a powerful civil and military bureaucracy.

Chapter3a

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter III
REFERENCES
1. The Pakistan movement was an expression of Muslim India's firm desire to establish an Islamic
State. The movement was inspired by the ideology of Islam and the country was carved into existence
solely to demonstrate the efficacy of the Islamic way of life. [Abul A'la Maududi, The Islamic law and
Constitution, p-11] The leaders of the movement made this very promise with the people whose support
and unbounded enthusiasm for the demand was motivated by this very Islamic nature of the enterprise.
[Ibid. p-16]
2. Anita M. Weiss, Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan, p-35
3. Maududi, op. cit., p-6
4. Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, 14.8.76
5. Maududi, Muslims and Present Struggle, part three, p-37
6. Ibid. p-70
7. Ibid. p-131,132
9. Dawn 14.1.1948 cited by Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, p-38
11. Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p-141
12. Constituent Assembly Debates March 7, 1949
13. CA debates March 12, 1949
16. CA Debates cited by Supreme Court Judgment on Objectives Resolution dated July 19, 1993.
19. CA debates March 12,1949

Islamic Pakistan
23. Report on the enquiry into 1953 anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore is known as Munir Report after
Justice Mohammad Munir who chaired the enquiry committee.
24. Munir Report p-203
25. Ibid. p-203
26. Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, p-36
27. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia, Cambridge, Mass. 1951 cited by Sharif-ul-Mujahid
p-266
29. Munir, op. cit., p-36, 37
30. Ibid. p-xvi
31. At the East Pakistan Muslim League Council meeting, some members described the reports as
"terribly anti-Bengali."
33. CA Debates, October 13, 1953
34. Keith Callard, Pakistan - A Political Study, p-227,228
35. There have indeed been times -- such as that October night in 1954 -- when, with a General to the
right of him and a General to the left of him, a half-mad Governor General imposed upon a captured
Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a semi-
dictatorial executive. DAWN - August 11, 1957
36. An explanation at the end of Article 198 read: "In the application of the article to the personal law
of any Muslim sect, the expression Quran and Sunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted
by the sect." In effect of this explanation officially recognized sects in Pakistan.
37. Callard, op. cit., p-228
39. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p-58
40. Almand and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas, Princetone, 1960, p-572

Islamic Pakistan

Chapter2a
Chapter II
Page 2
The conflict between the educated Muslims and the Ulema was not new. It started in the early years of
British rule and reached its culmination during the struggle for Pakistan. Since the movement for
Pakistan was guided by the enlightened classes under the leadership of a man who was brought up with
western education, the prestige of the Ulema had been badly damaged.[26]
The Muslims Renaissance in the sub-continent began with Shah Waliullah (1702-63) who started
probing into the past and thinking in terms of the future. During the decline of Muslim power, Shah
Waliullah emerged as an outstanding scholar-reformer who predicted a return to the original purity of
Islam. He was not just a scholar of theology and law, but a social thinker with a keen sense for economic
reforms. Without economic justice, he asserted, the social purpose of Islam could not be fulfilled. He
emphasized the need for ijtihad, decrying the convention of closing the gates of ijtihad. He criticized the
contemporary Ulema for their elaborate rites and rituals, which he believed, were not part of the
Shariah, but un-Islamic innovations.[27]
Then came Sir Syed Ahmed Khan with his message that the Muslims could not progress without
acquiring knowledge of modern sciences and technology. He asserted the simple truth that knowledge is
not the exclusive preserve of any nation, it belongs to the whole mankind. Quickly he was dubbed a
kafir (non-believer) by a section of Ulema. But Sir Syed Ahmed, in spite of all the calumny that was
heaped on him, refused to be browbeaten. He maintained a valiant posture and succeeded in realizing
the intellectual energy of a nation. As more and more Muslims got educated in the western sciences the
hold of the Ulema over the Muslim community began to weaken.
The leadership of the Muslim community had passed out of the hands of the Ulema after the Rebellion
of 1857. The Ulema stood aloof, except for the issuance of a fatwa, supporting the entry of the Muslims
into the Congress, when Sir Syed Ahmed opposed it. The Muslim nation followed the political lead of
Sir Syed Ahmad, in the nineteenth century and rejected the Ulema. But in religion they followed the
Ulema and rejected Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Much the same happened in the 40's of the twentieth
century. The Indian Muslims followed the political lead given to them by Jinnah (who could have been a
knight like Sir Syed but he resolutely refused both title and office during the British rule) who had no
pretensions to leadership in the sphere of religion. [28] The Muslim community was wiser than the
ostensible defenders of its faith, culture and existence. It rejected their advice and followed others who
were more realistic, more wide awake, better informed and more in line with the history of the
community.[29]
After independence the conflict between the intellectuals with liberal orientation and the Ulema
manifested itself in a judicial enquiry conducted by Justice Mohammad Munir in Lahore anti-Qadiani
riots in 1953. The learned judge said something which the intellectuals and politicians had for long
refrained to say openly. The enquiry findings, known as the Munir Report, publicized the fact that the
Ulema were not only unfit to run a modern state but were deplorably unable under cross-questioning
even to give realistic guidance on elementary matters of Islam. The court of enquiry was presented with
the sorry spectacle that Muslim divines differed sharply on the definition of a Muslim yet each was
adamant that all who disagreed should be put to death.[30]

Chapter2a
At one point the report emphasized: " But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of
infinite regret to us that the Ulema whose first duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were
hopelessly disagreed amongst themselves." [31] The result of this part of the enquiry, however, has been
but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our Ulema on such a simple matter,
one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matter will be.
"Keeping in view the several definitions given by the Ulema, need we make any comment except that no
two divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has
done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of
Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the Ulema, we remain Muslims according to
the view of that Alim but Kafirs (unbelievers) according to the definition of every one else." [32]
"The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-e-Hadith nor Barelvis
are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic state with
the penalty of death if the government of the state is in the hands of the party which considers the other
party to be Kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge the consequences of this doctrine
when it is remembered that no two Ulema have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim."[33]
The creation of Pakistan was the greatest defeat of the "nationalist" Ulema. But soon after the
establishment of Pakistan power-monger Ulema raised their voice in the political field with new
modulations. They argued that Pakistan was created to establish an Islamic state based on traditional
Shariah law. However, the irony of the argument that Pakistan was founded on religious ideology lies in
the fact that practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was
specially religious -Islamic - was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the
Pakistan movement. [34] The claim of the Muslim League to be the sole representative of the entire
Muslim community in India was gravely weakened by the opposition of the most important group of
Indian Ulema. [35] A great deal of effort was devoted by Muslim League leaders to winning over the
Ulema. Eventually they succeeded in doing so, but only partially, and only when the creation of
Pakistan was just over the horizon.[36]
A claim that Pakistan was created to fulfill the millenarian religious aspirations of Indian Muslims is
therefore contradicted by the fact that the principal bearers of the Islamic religion in India were
alienated from the Pakistan movement. Conversely, the English-educated leaders of the Pakistan
movement, not least Jinnah himself, were committed to secular politics. [37]
Some zealous religious activists are now attempting to distort the role of Ulema in the struggle for
Pakistan. [38] As the old generation is gradually vanishing from the political scene of the country these
Ulema are now being projected as the co-founders of Pakistan. "In some cases even the name of Quaid-i-
Azamhas been eliminated and all the credit for the establishment of Pakistan is being bestowed upon
these Ulema." [39] In recent years, there has been a systematic attempt by Mullahs and the rightist
lobby to misrepresent Jinnah on Islam and they have tried hard to buildup an image of the father of the
nation as a religious bigot. He is being projected by Mullahs, who once branded him as Kafir, as an
Islamic fundamentalist.
In a TV discussion on Shariah bill in April 1991, two prominent Molvis of Lahore, Maulana Abdul
Qadir and Mufti Mohammad Hussain Naeemi, implied that the Shariat bill was "the will of the Quaid.
" They claimed that the rule of Quran and Sunnah was pledged by the Quaid and that Mullahs never
opposed Pakistan since it was to be a religious rather than a national state. One of them said "was it not
said that Pakistan ka matlab kia: La Ilahah Illallah." [40]
However, the fact is that this oft quoted statement is an election slogan coined by a Sialkot poet - Asghar
Saudai. But it was never raised by the platform of the Muslim League. First and the last meeting of All
Pakistan Muslim League was held under the chairmanship of the Quaid-i-Azam at Karachi's
Khaliqdina Hall. During the meeting a man, who called himself Bihari, put to the Quaid that "we have
been telling the people Pakistan ka matlab kia, La Ilaha Illallah." "Sit down, sit down," the Quaid
shouted back. "Neither I nor my working committee, nor the council of the All India Muslim League
Chapter2a
has ever passed such a resolution wherein I was committed to the people of Pakistan, Pakistan ka
matlab....., you might have done so to catch a few votes." This incident is quoted from Daghon ki Barat
written by Malik Ghulam Nabi, who was a member of the Muslim League Council. The same incident is
also quoted by the Raja of Mehmoudabad. [41]

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter II
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. After independence "some of the Ulema decided to stay in India, others hastened to Pakistan to lend
a helping hand. If they had not been able to save the Muslims from Pakistan they must now save
Pakistan from the Muslims. Among them was Maulana Abul Aala Maududi, head of the Jamat-i-
Islami, who had been bitterly opposed to Pakistan." Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, P-
202
2 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan, p-66
3. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, p79-80
4. Speech on Feb. 5, 1938
5 Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, p-28
6. Ibid. p-54
7. Alluding to Quadi-i-Azam's marriage to a Parsi girl.
8. Munir Report, p-256
9. Maulana Maududi, Nationalism and India, Pathankot, 1947, p-25
10. The Process of Islamic Revolution, 2nd edition, Lahore 1955, p-37
11. Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Tehrik-i-Adazi-e-Hind aur Mussalman (Indian Freedom Movement and
Muslims), pp 22-23
12. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, p-368
13. Ibid., p-368
14. Zamzam 17.7.1938 cited by Pakistan Struggle and Pervez, Tulu-e-Islam Trust, Lahore, p-614
15. Ibid. p-314
16. Hasan (rose) from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhaib from Rome, Deoband produced Husain
Ahmad, what monstrosity is this? He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by countries,
What an ignoramus regarding the position of Muhammad! Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is
the totality of Faith, And if thou does not reach him, all (thy knowledge) is Bu Lahaism.
17. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, in his biography, India Wins Freedom, fixes the responsibility for the
partition of India, at one place on Jawaharlal Nehru, and at another place on Vallabh-bhai Patel by
observing that "it would not perhaps be unfair to say that Vallabh-dhbai Patel was the founder of
Indian partition." H.M. Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality, p-162
Islamic Pakistan
18. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, op. cit., p-328
19. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, p-237
20. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics p-334
21. Justice Sayed Shameem Hussain Kadri - Creation of Pakistan - Army Book Club, Rawalpindi ,1983 -
- p-414
22. Ayub Khan, op. cit., p-200
23. According to Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, the present state of affairs of the Moslem world. Dr. Iqbal said:
"It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor
imperialism but a league of nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for
facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members." (Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam, p-159) Dr. Iqbal had apparently in mind the following verse from the Holy
Quran: O Mankind ! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into
nations and tribes, that ye may know each other. (49:13)
24. Qureshi, op. cit., p-378
25. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization in Pakistan, p-26
26. Ayub Khan, op. cit.,p-202
27. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963, p-173
29. Qureshi, op. cit., p-383
30. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in History, p-215
31. Munir Report, p-205
32. Ibid. p-218
33. Ibid. p-219
34. Anita M. Weiss, Reassertion of Islam in Pakistan, p-2
35. Leonard Binder, Islam and Politics in Pakistan, University of California Press, 1961, p-29
36. Anita M. Weiss, p-21
37. Ibid. p-21
38. When Pakistan appeared on the map, they (Ulema) found no place for themselves in India and they
all came to Pakistan and brought with them the curse of Takfir (calling one another infidel). Munir,
From Jinnah to Zia, p-38
39. Prof. Rafi-ullah Shehab - The Quaid-e-Azam and the Ulema - The Pakistan Times, Islamabad
25.12.1986.
Islamic Pakistan
40. Ahmad Bashir, Islam, Shariat and the Holy Ghost, Frontier Post, Peshawar, 9.5.1991
41. Ibid.

Chapter1a
Chapter I
Page 2
Immediately, after the emergence of Pakistan on the map of the world, efforts started in all earnest to
make it a democracy dedicated to create an environment compatible to the establishment and
promotion of an Islamic order of social justice and equality. The guide lines spelt out by the founder of
the country, Jinnah, were very clear: a democratic state where people of different religions will become
members of one nation, ceasing to stress their religious identity.
Jinnah visualized the national polity as a demand polity -- not a command polity -- drawing sustenance
from dynamism and creativity of free institutions. In this he differed from some Afro-Asian nation-
builders of his era, who opted for one-party system, suppression of dissent in the press and opposition
in the deliberative organs -- all this to meet the so-called post-independence strains and stresses.
The basic postulates of modern secular democracy are a polity based on the consent of the people and
on law and constitutions, a government responsible to and removable by people, no hereditary rule of
an individual or a family, and the conceptions of human dignity, liberty and justice. These fundamental
concepts of democracy are also the basic concepts of Islam which put an end to arbitrary and despotic
rule of princes and priests. This is what Jinnah meant when he said "Islam and its idealism have taught
us democracy. [21]
A firm believer in Islam and democracy, he was confident that Pakistan would work towards a
democratic order since Islam is inherently democratic in its content, tenor, and spirit. "Islam and its
ideals have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fair play to everybody."[22]
When he spoke about the future shape of Pakistan's constitution he envisaged a democratic system
based on social justice and fairplay as taught by Islam: "I do not know what the ultimate shape of our
constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential
principles of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago. Islam and
its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fairplay to everybody.
We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and
obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a
theocratic state -- to be ruled by priests with a divine mission" [23]
Jinnah often referred to Islam and its traditions but only to focus on Islamic values of social justice and
fair treatment to the minorities. An examination of his speeches will also show that they abound in
references to the preservation of the religion of Muslims, their culture, way of life, their economic
interests and their separateness from Hindus but references to an Islamic state are sparse.
Jinnah was of the view that the creation of Pakistan was means to an end and not the end in itself. That
end was the establishment of a just society based on the Islamic principles of social justice. "The idea
was that we should have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men and in which we could
develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could

Chapter1a
find fair play." [24]
However, Jinnah firmly believed that Islamic system of social can only be enforced in the country after
the elimination of the class differentiation from society. These classes, according to him, had disturbed
the peace of the society. He, in one of his longest presidential addresses delivered extempore at the 30th
session of the All India Muslim League in Delhi on April 24, 1943, declared:
"In Pakistan will be a people's government. Here I should like to give a warning to the landlords and
the capitalists who have flourished at our expense by a system which is so vicious, which is so wicked
and which makes them so selfish that it is difficult to reason with them. The exploitation of the masses
has gone into their blood. They have forgotten the lessons of Islam. Greed and selfishness have made
these people subordinate to the interests of others in order to fatten themselves. It is true we are not in
power today. You go anywhere in the countryside. I have visited villages. There are millions and
millions of our people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilization? Is this the aim of Pakistan?
Do you visualize that millions have been exploited and cannot get one meal a day? If this is the ideal of
Pakistan. I would not have it. "
Jinnah's speeches and writings undoubtedly point to the fact that he believed that Islam had taught to
humanity the lesson of equality of man and social justice. It eliminated class feelings and differentiation
from the society since brotherhood, equality and fraternity of man are basic points of "our religion and
civilization". It is also evident from his writings and speeches that, he believed, a parliamentary form of
democracy was not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. In the light of these principles he wanted to
establish a welfare state of Pakistan.
Jinnah was inspired by the Kamalist Revolution and perhaps aspired to make the same experiment in
Pakistan as Mustafa Kamal had done in Turkey. Welcoming the first Turkish ambassador to Pakistan
he said :"... the rise and career of the Great Ataturk, his revitalization of your nation by his great
statesmanship, courage and foresight -- all these stirring events are well known to the people of
Pakistan. In fact, right from the very birth of political consciousness amongst the Muslims of this great
sub-continent, the fortunes of your country were observed by us with deep sympathy and interests."
[25]
Like Jinnah, Dr. Mohammad Iqbal was also admirer of the Turkish experience. In his well-known
lectures on Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam, Dr. Iqbal says : "If the Renaissance of Islam
is a fact, and I believe it is a fact, we too one day, like Turks, will have to re-evaluate our intellectual
inheritance." [26]
"The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic
slumber, and attained to self- consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom;
she alone has passed from the ideal to real -- a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral
struggle. .... They (most of Muslim countries today) are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the
Turk is on the way to creating new values."[27]
Dr. Iqbal was also against a religious rule in a Muslim state of his conception. Addressing the Muslim
League session in Allahbad as its president in 1930, he said : " Nor should the Hindus fear that the
creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such
states".
He laid the foundations of a modern Islamic stateon three principles: Equality, Human Solidarity and
Freedom. He argued: "The essence of Tauhid (Unity of God) as a working idea is equality, solidarity
and freedom. The state from the Islamic standpoint is an endeavor to transform these ideal principles
into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization."[28]
In his Allahbad address, while talking about religious tolerance in the proposed Muslim state in the
light of the Quranic teachings, Dr. Iqbal declared: "A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-

Chapter1a
will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws,
religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teachings of
the Quran even to defend their places of worship, if need be."[29]
It is also clear from Iqbal's letters to Jinnah that in the proposed Muslim state, he wanted to see the
establishment of such a social democracy which had the approval of the Islamic Shariah. But he had
pleaded for the reinterpretation of the Shariah law through Ijtihad to suit the modern needs and
requirements of the Muslim community, and was of the view that if such a reinterpretation was
possible, the Muslims could benefit from the material blessings of Islam.
Dr. Iqbal says: "The Shariah values (ahkam) resulting from this application (for example, rules
referring to penalties for crimes) are in a sense specific to that people; and since their observance is not
an end itself they cannot be strictly enforced in future generations." [30] Iqbal argues that there are
two spheres of Islam; one is "ibadaat" which is based on the religious obligations (arkan-i- deen) - these
do not require any change; the other sphere is that of "muamelaat" (social dealings) which is subject to
the law of change.[31]
The claim of present generations of Muslim liberals to interpret the foundational legal principles, in the
light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is perfectly justified. The
teachings of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation,
guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.
[32] A false reverence of past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people's
decay. The verdict of history is that worn out ideas have never risen to power among a people who have
worn them out.
The primary source of the law of Islam is the Quran. The Quran however, is not the legal code. Its main
purpose is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his relation with God and the universe.[33]
The principle of movement in Islam is ijtihad - effort to form an independent opinion.[34] The transfer
of power of ijtihad to a Muslim legislative assembly [35 which, in view of the growth of the opposing
sects is the only possible form ijma can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal
discussions from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.[36] The closing of the door
of ijtihad is a pure fiction suggested partly by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam and partly by
intellectual laziness which, especially in the period of spiritual decay turns great thinkers into idols.[37]
Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakeem, the author of Islamic Ideology, comes to a similar conclusion. In the
chapter "Basic Concepts of an Islamic State" he says: "It is a matter of vital importance to understand
the attitude of Islam to legislation that must suit time and circumstances and must vary from nation to
nation and from epoch to epoch.[38]
"Islam originally had brought no extensive and comprehensive code of laws with it; it gave only the
fundamentals of civilized life which could secure for the individual and society total well- being. The
most authoritative, if not the only authoritative, book is Quran, but in the entire holy Book, the code of
laws would not cover more than ten pages. So Islam is really not burdened with a heavy code of which
by its immutability could stand in the way of any progressive legislation. [39]
"The theocratic basis of Islamic jurisprudence should not, therefore, scare away the progressive
rationalists who really hunger and thirst after social justice and the gradual creation of a classless
society. The Quran teaches only fundamentals of morality and social justice and ordains it as a duty to
wage war only against persecution or intolerance. The Quran is the real basis of Islamic life and its
actual legislation is very limited. Muslims are free to legislate as needs arise, in the spirit of social
justice. The few laws in the Quran are often permissive and give large latitudes to suit any change in
circumstances. Its theocratic basis grants equal civil liberties to the non-Muslims who live as loyal
subjects of a Muslim state; their personal laws are respected and even a Muslim judge must decide the
cases of non-Muslims according to their own laws, provided they do not violate the general principles of
social justice on which all laws and orders are based.[40]

Chapter1a
"A truly Muslim state would possess all the good qualities of a secular state without being secular in the
modern sense. It would be theocratic without having the narrowness of outlook generally associated
with theocracies. A truly Muslim state would synthesize theocracy with healthy secularism as Islam has
synthesized so many traits which were considered by the world to be contradictory and
irreconcilable.[41]
"Essentials of legislation shall be derived from the basic principles of the Quran and the practice
followed by the Prophet; otherwise almost the entire field of legislation shall be left unhampered, to be
molded as circumstances demand by men of knowledge who know and can evaluate the actualities of a
situation. Legislation shall proceed according to the principles of logical and analogical deduction and
the demands of public welfare and an assembly of the learned shall, by a practical consensus, legislate
for all changing situations.[42]
"Usages and customs of all communities shall have the force of law, if they not violate the fundamentals
of Islam and do not cause injury and injustice. All communities living in a Muslim state shall enjoy
equal civil rights. The reign of law shall not be a respecter of persons. All privileges shall be abolished;
there shall be no privileged classes or individuals; mankind shall not be cut up into castes and classes
with special rights or invidious distinctions. Such is the theocracy of Islam which is not to be identified
with any theocracy that ever existed. Call it a theocracy or call it a secular state as you please: it
synthesizes the virtues of both repudiating the evils with which they often get contaminated."[43]
Jinnah believed that the Islamic laws, which he described as precedences, could be amended or even
ignored to meet the requirement of times. His speech on the Special Marriage Bill in the Imperial
Legislative Council reflects his conviction that Islam is not the name of any static mode or pattern of
life. It is a spirit and not body.[44]
According to Dr. Javed Iqbal, it is self-evident that there is complete harmony in the views of Quaid-i-
Azam and Allama Iqbal regarding the establishment of a modern Islamic democratic welfare state in
Pakistan. The founders of Pakistan certainly had a very clear vision. They approved of a definite
interpretation of Islam on which they founded Pakistan, and according to them, it was only through
that interpretation that the Muslims could possibly realize their objectives in the newly created Muslim
state. [45]
If the ideological foundation of Pakistan is approached in the light of the teachings of Quaid-i-Azam
and Allama Iqbal, one is bound to arrive at the conclusion that the views held by both these eminent
founders of Pakistan regarding Islam were liberal, dynamic and forward-looking. They both were
misunderstood during their respective times and were declared renegades or apostates (kafir) by the
Ulema. Nevertheless, the Muslims of the subcontinent accepted their views, and under their guidance
and leadership, achieved Pakistan.[46
Dr. Iqbal and other giant Indo-Pakistan Muslim scholar-leaders were interested in finding out the
Islamic mechanism to achieve national cohesion in a modern, progressive, Islamic democratic federal
or unitary state. Contrariwise, the rigid, orthodox religious scholars desire to bask in the bygone
splendor of the good old days.[47]
In the final analysis, Jinnah was not an Islamicist per se, but one to promote secular goals. His
approach even as his definition of Muslim nationhood exemplifies, was not religious, but largely
sociological. While it is undoubtedly true that Jinnah was inspired by the Holy Quran and considered
the Messenger of Allah as the perfect man, he never even once in his life time, referred Sunnah as a
source of law.
Nobody has so far openly challenged Jinnah's status as the most authentic enunciator of Pakistan's
ideal, though quite a few who had bitterly opposed him and the demand for Pakistan, have tried to pose
as his legitimate heirs. The deliberate distortion of his ideal or the adoption of a course diametrically
opposed to the goal of a modern democratic state is not merely a question of disowning the father of the

Chapter1a
nation but embarking on a process which will lead to further fragmentation of the nation. It can be seen
that by discriminating against the minorities (through separate electorates and several other laws)
Pakistan governments have been violating the Quaid's testament.
In any case, Jinnah put all controversies about the role of religion in politics at rest by declaring that
religion was a private matter between man and his Creator, that it had nothing to do with business of
the state, and that Pakistan was not going to be a theocracy presided over by priests exercising some
divinely ordained authority. To the extent the religious lobby succeeds in theocratising the state,
Pakistan will have repudiated the vision of the father of nation.

Chapter1a

Islamic Pakistan
Chapter I
Chapter 3
REFERENCES
1. Address to the people of the United States.
2. However, Sharif Al Mujahid, an ideologue of the Zia regime claims that in his "controversial "
speech Jinnah was not really talking of the basis or bases of Pakistan's political and ideological
orientation, nor even of Pakistan's future constitution. Borrowing the words from Rosenthal (Islam in
the Modern National State) he describes the speech as "loose thinking and imprecise wording" that led
to more than one interpretations and caused confusion.
Sharif al-Mujahid - who once headed the Quad-i-Azam Academy - is hard put to find even some stray
remark in Jinnah's vast collection of speeches and writings to sustain the false image of the Father of
the Nation that the Zia regime wished to present, as an advocate of Islamic ideology and an Islamic
state. In desperation, al-Mujahid (Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah- 1981:230-231) concludes that: "Jinnah was a
political leader and not a systematic thinker... For a brilliant and accomplished lawyer as Jinnah was,
his academic grounding was rather inadequate... Jinnah could not work out a consistent theoretical
framework of Pakistan. For one thing his was not the role of a systematic theoretician nor was he
qualified for it." One need not say more after this ridiculous statement and unintended testimony.
Anita M. Weiss, Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan, p-42
3. M.H. Askari, Not a Theocratic state Dawn 19.8.1992
4. Ibid.
5. Sharif-ul-Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, p-267
6. Dr. Fazalur-Rehman, Internal Religious Developments in the Present Century Islam" p-863
7. India's Partition - Process Strategy and Mobilization - Memoirs of Raja of Mehmoudabad edited by
Mushirul Hasan - Oxford University Press, Karachi. Cited by Dawn 3.10.1993
8. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in History, p-212
9. Speech at Chittagong on 26th March, 1948.
10. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan said in 1862: "Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations - the
Mohammadans and Hindus - could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly
not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both
could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable." Quoted by Richard Symond, The
Making of Pakistan, London, 1951, p-31
11. Chief Justice (rtd) Qadeeruddin Ahmed, The Demand of a Muslim Homeland, Dawn 23.3.1992
13. H.M. Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality, p-105

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Islamic Pakistan
14. Ibid. p-137
15. Ibid. p-105
16. Anita M. Weiss - Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan, p-23
17. Unfortunately, in almost half a century of its existence, Pakistan has not managed to forge a
national identity to legitimize its own existence which led to speculations about the historic process
which brought Pakistan into existence.
A line of analysis which has found expression lately is the one which links the Pakistan movement with
the socio-economic aspirations of the Muslim middle-class, particularly in the Muslim-minority
provinces. It was felt that these groups found themselves disadvantaged in the face of strong
competition from the rising, newly-educated Hindu middle classes. As such they wanted their own turf
where they could be masters. The new class of Muslim entrepreneurs too, wanted a reserved field of
economic activity where they would be free of the competition of Hindu bania. .... In economic terms, a
splitting up of exploitable resources, markets, customers, jobs etc. between two competing groups.
According to P. Hardy the feeling of being a distinct nation developed among Indian Muslims only in
the 1940s, when it became clear that the British would soon leave India. Prior to that, the Muslim
nobility had little in common with the Muslim peasantry and artisan castes. [P. Hardy, The Muslims of
British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp1-2]
Another group has sought for a rationale and a national identity for Pakistan in the historical evolution
of the sub-continent. It has not formed a united whole at any period of history. Only for a short period
under Aurangzeb, and then under the British from 1857 onward, was India ever ruled by one
authority. Even at that time, the monolithic block of British India was inter-woven with the sprawl of
over 500 native states with disparate rules, customs and history.
Another line of explanation becoming popular nowadays is to see Pakistan as the end product of
imperial machinations and super-power real-politik. It is felt that during the closing period of the
Second World War, the twin factors of Soviet imperial and ideological expansion, and the growing
importance of the Gulf and Middle East oil led the strategic planners in Washington and London to
consider this unceremonious vivisection of Bharat Mata. According to this hypothesis, Pakistan was,
from the beginning, set up as part of Cordon Saintlier constructed to contain Soviet ambitions in Asia.
[Haroon Siddiqi, The Rationale for Pakistan, Dawn 23.3.1994]
18. Ziring, op. cit., p-33-34
19. Speech at a public meeting in Dacca held on 21st March 1948 quoted by Dr. Javed Iqbal in Ideology
of Pakistan, p 3 & 4.
20. Radio talk on 19th February, 1948
21. Secularism, Theocracy and Islam by Jamil Wasti Syed, Dawn 9.7.93
22. Quaid-i-Azam Speaks (Karachi 1950) p-92-93
23. Radio talk in February 1948, Speeches of Mr. Jinnah, p-67
24. Ibid. p-62
25. Ibid. p-71
26. Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p-153

Islamic Pakistan
27. Ibid. 162
28. Ibid. p-154
29. Iqbal's speeches and statements Edited by A.R.Tariq, p-10
30. Dr. Iqbal, op. cit., p-172
31. Dr Javed Iqbal's interview Frontier Post, Peshawar, 8.9.1991
33. Ibid. p-165
34. Ibid. p-145
35. Islam seeks to establish complete harmony among the real sovereign, the political sovereign and the
legal sovereign. The legal sovereign shall be the Muslim law; but its definition shall be in the hands of a
legislature, representing the people which will, by deliberation and discussion, decide how to apply the
principles of Islam to the needs of the community in varying circumstances... The political sovereign
shall be the people who will elect and dismiss their legislatures and their governments... the people are
the vehicle of the authority delegated by God to the State of Pakistan. The real sovereign will be
basically the principles of Islam which will influence the public mind only if the problems are brought
into the public forum and discussed at full length. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Pakistan: An Islamic
Democracy - Lahore 1951 - p-26-27 cited by Sharif al-Mujahid op. cit., p-260
37. Ibid. p-178
38. Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakeem, Islamic Ideology, p-212
39. Ibid. p-212
40. Ibid. p-221
41. Ibid. p-238
42. Ibid. p-242 43. Ibid. p-242-243
44. On Feb. 6, 1912, an amendment to the Special (civil) Marriages Act was moved by Bopender Nath
Basu in the Legislative Council. It sought to provide for the registration of civil marriages between
persons belonging to different religion denominations. Till then, both the parties to such marriages had
to declare that they belonged to no religion. The amendment was lost. But the 1912 amendment is
memorable for Jinnah's speech on this subject. When Jinnah rose to speak, the Law Minister, Sir Ali
Imam, drew his attention to Quranic injunctions prohibiting Muslim male from marrying women
outside the people of the Book (Ahl-i-Kitab) and a Muslim woman from marring any but a Muslim.
Jinnah, then, reminded the Law Minister that it was not the first occasion that the council had either
ignored or amended Islamic law in such a way as to make it suitable to meet the requirement of times.
He cited many examples. The Law of contract was not recognized any more. The Islamic Penal Law,
which had continued to be in force even after the establishment of British Rule in India, had been
completely abrogated. The Law of Evidence as set forth in the Islamic Law was nowhere prevalent in
the country. then there was the Cast Disabilities Removal Act 1845. Under Muslim Law, a person in the
event of apostasy lost all rights of inheritance. This, too, had been abrogated. "I submit that these laws
Islamic Pakistan
are the precedence which we should follow in order to meet the requirements of the times. For this
many precedence can be found in Islamic Law," Jinnah argued.
45. Dr. Javed Iqbal, How to legislate Islam in modern times, Pakistan Outlook quarterly, Karachi - Vol.
2, No. 1.
46. Ibid.
47. Nationality in Modern Muslim polity - A Study by Asian Research Centre Karachi. Pakistan
Outlook - Karachi Vol 1. No. 4.
48. Sharif-ul-Mujahid, op. cit., p-275

Intror
Intoduction
REFERENCES
1. The civil bureaucracy along with the military generals, has been formulating the policies and political and
ideological framework of Pakistan. And being permanently in office, unlike the politicians who come and go
at their behest, it is they who actually have the power to govern the state as an administrative group.
2. Pakistan ranks 132nd in the human development index among 173 countries, according to the UNDP report
1994. But its position is worse when many of the indicators are taken individually. For instance, among the
developing 97 countries, it is 70th in infant mortality, 90th in child malnutrition and 83rd in adult literacy.
(Dawn - Karachi 15.6.1994) The GNP per capita of Indonesia was recorded as 610 dollars and Sri Lanka at
500 dollars as compared to Pakistan's 400 dollars for the year 1991, according to the World Development
Report 1993. Dawn - Karachi 5.3.1994
3. In a contempt of court case against him, General Aslam Beg told the Supreme Court on 1.3.1993 that
Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad had carried his message to the Supreme Court on October 5, 1988, to block
restoration of the Junejo government. Dawn, Karachi 2.3.1993
4. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah never used the words "ideology of Pakistan." For fifteen years after
the establishment of Pakistan, the ideology of Pakistan was not known to anybody until in 1962 a solitary
member of Jamaat-i-Islami for the first time used the words when the Political Parties Bill was being
discussed. (Retired Chief Justice) Mohammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia - P-28
http://www.ghazali.net/book1/Intror/reference.html [10/14/2004 4:04:38 AM]

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Islamic Pakistan

Preface Chapter VII The Third Islamic Republic

Introduction Chapter VIII The Third Martial Law

Chapter I Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan Chapter IX The Fourth Republic

Chapter IV The First Martial Law Chronology of Pakistan

Chapter V The Second Martial Law Select bibliography

Chapter VI What led to the break-up? Links

Last updated: 14th August 1999

For more Information:

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On the Golden Jubilee

The author is a professional journalist, with Master's

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Proceed To The Table Of Contents

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Abdus Sattar Ghazali

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Ik Kafira Ke Waste Islam ko Chhora

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MURDER TRIAL OF BHUTTO [6]

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BENAZIR'S FIRST STINT IN OFFICE

● a. Rampant corruption and nepotism through the misuse of authority.

NAWAZ SHARIF'S FIRST STINT IN OFFICE

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Nawaz Sharif's first year in office

NEW LAW TO CURB PRESS FREEDOM