FACTS:

1. Two (2) parcels of land are in

dispute for allegedly being covered by
certificates of title and registration
decrees under three (3) different
entities, namely Morris Carpo,
Quezon City Dev’t. and Financing
Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. (Realty).
QUIETING OF TITLE CASE DIGEST

1) REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONRDAY FARMS, INC. v. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. (1987)

Petitioner/Appellant: Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc.

Respondent/Appellee: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil Cases Division),

HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, MORRIS G.
CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF
LAND REGISTRATION

DOCTRINE(S): Jurisdiction, Reconstitution, Innocent purchaser for value, Nature of Proceedings

Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347 (1914),
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in court
of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a
decree of registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as such, does not
constitute a separate proceeding.

"Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It
contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court
records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to
ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages
 provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the stage when the records were
destroyed).

An innocent purchaser for value is one who bought the property relying on the certificate of title of
the registered owner without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property and pays a full price for the same.

It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on the certificate
of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time
of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA
351.) He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule
v. De Legare supra.).

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive registrations,
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA, Nos.
L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)

x x x [I]t must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an
action to remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in
question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-
party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its
own title. Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies, Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking,  in personam, but
being against the person in respect of the res,  these proceedings are characterized as quasi in
rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).

FACTS:

1. Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by certificates of title and
registration decrees under three (3) different entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Dev’t.
and Financing Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty). Thus, Carpo instituted a
complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms,
Inc. (Macondray) for the declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the ground
that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land registration court but one of ordinary
jurisdiction, and that the judge had no authority since the records which was made basis of the
title was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution;
2. In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes Court which issued its title
was performing a purely ministerial duty, and that it was Carpo’s title that was null for having been
issued despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded through a third-party
complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title covering the same subject properties;
3. In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al. being the source of its own
title, praying therefor for the reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties.
However, the same was dismissed for QCDF’s lack of interest in prosecuting the case;
 4. On January 20, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment annulling Realty’s and QCDF’s titles to
the property in favor of Carpo. The same was appealed before the High Court by Realty, but the
latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of the merits; and
5. The CA in turn set aside the trial court’s decision and issued a new one in favor of Realty.
However, the case was subjected to the reorganization of the Judiciary, from which resulted a re-
raffling of the case and later on, a reversal of the prior decision through Carpo’s MR. Further, the
change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices assigned to the case.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with jurisdiction to try and render a
decision of final resolution for the Court;
2. WON a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the case;
3. WON Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s, since Realty’s title was issued when
the records relative thereto was undergoing reconstitution;
4. WON Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value; and
5. WON QCDF was properly impleaded to the case.

PROVISION(S): Secs. 4 & 8, BP 129; Art. 527, New Civil Code; Sec. 4, Rule 74, Rule 65, and Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; Act No. 3110; Act No. 496; Act No. 2347;

RULING + RATIO:

1. WON the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with jurisdiction to try and
render a decision of final resolution for the Court
Yes. “A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from
one class  of divisions to another class. For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases
Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions. Justice Bidin was reassigned from the
Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil  Cases
Division. The two therefore come from the same class of divisions to which they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third Civil Cases
Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal
bounds. x x x”

2. WON a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the case

Yes. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in their
original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the
Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter category
belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have
different procedural requirements. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this
Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking that
it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. However, this
Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal." It may thus be observed that even this Court treated
the petition first filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a
petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22,
1969, 69 SCRA 35). x x x Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court
"cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal,
albeit by way of certiorari;

3. WON Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s, since Realty’s title was issued
when the records relative thereto was undergoing reconstitution
 No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not
have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records
are available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the Court of First Instance of
Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. The records were destroyed at that stage of the case
when an that remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to
issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate
of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil.
996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies
of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-
47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of this Court
affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the
issuance of a decree of registration.”;

4. WON Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value

No. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value.
He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. x x x Carpo
bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a
deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9,
1970. However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of
the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an
Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed
evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property,
and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in
the name of Carpo was issued. x x x Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title
which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value.
Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his
predecessors-in-interest;

5. WON QCDF was properly impleaded to the case

Yes. Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed against
it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former
is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances of the case
compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.  ** To rule on
QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims over
the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its
claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even
permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed since it failed to
prosecute its case.

DISPOSITION: Decision upholding the title of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. was AFFIRMED.
2) Iglesia Ni Kristo vs Ponferrada
G.R. NO. 168943 10/27/2006

FACTS:
On October 24, 2001, Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and Sonia
Santos-Wallin, represented by Enrique G. Santos, filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion
Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC),
defendant therein.

Plaintiffs alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-square-meter
parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City.

He had been in possession of the owner’s duplicate of said title and had been in continuous, open,
adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his
wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and
adverse possession of the property, and of the owner’s duplicate of said title.

When the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was burned on June 11, 1988, the original copy
of said title was burned as well. The Register of Deeds had the title reconstituted based on the owner’s
duplicate.

Sometime in February 1996, plaintiffs learned that defendant was claiming ownership over the property
based on a TCT issued on September 18, 1984 under the name of the Philippine National Bank, which
allegedly cancelled TCT No. 252070 in the names of the spouses Marcos and Romana dela Cruz. They
insisted that TCT Nos. 321744, 320898 and 252070 were not among the titles issued by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and even if the Register of Deeds issued said titles, it was contrary to law. Enrique
Santos, during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered or disposed the property. In
1996, plaintiffs had the property fenced but defendant deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of
their property.
As gleaned from the caption of the complaint, plaintiffs appear to be the heirs of Enrique Santos,
represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping alone. (i.e. only his name and signature appeared on the verification and certificate.)

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs failed to faithfully
comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had prescribed, the same
having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year period therefor; and (3) that the
complaint is defective in many respects.

Defendant asserted that the case involved more than one plaintiff but the verification and certification
against forum shopping incorporated in the complaint was signed only by Enrique Santos. Although the
complaint alleges that plaintiffs are represented by Enrique Santos, there is no showing that he was,
indeed, authorized to so represent the other plaintiffs to file the complaint and to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. Thus, plaintiffs failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. Defendant cited the ruling of this Court in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.

Defendant maintained that the complaint is defective in that, although there is an allegation that Enrique
Santos represents the other heirs, there is nothing in the pleading to show the latter’s authority to that
effect; the complaint fails to aver with particularity the facts showing the capacity of defendant corporation
to sue and be sued; and the pleading does not state the address of plaintiffs.

In their Comment on the motion, plaintiffs averred that the relationship of a co-owner to the other co-
owners is fiduciary in character; thus, anyone of them could effectively act for another for the benefit of
the property without need for an authorization. Consequently, Enrique Santos had the authority to
represent the other heirs as plaintiffs and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. 

In its reply, defendant averred that absent any authority from his co-heirs, Enrique Santos must implead
them as plaintiffs as they are indispensable parties. In response, plaintiffs aver that a co-owner of a
property can execute an action for quieting of title without impleading the other co-owners.

The trial court issued an Order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. It declared that since Enrique
Santos was one of the heirs, his signature in the verification and certification constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules. The court cited the ruling of this Court in Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto. The court,
likewise, held that prescription had not set in and that failure to state the address of plaintiffs in the
complaint does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.

Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court likewise denied in an Order dated July 10,
2002. Unsatisfied, defendant, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: W/N a verification issued by only one of the plaintiffs is sufficient enough to render the same valid

HELD: DENIED.

The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or
complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement.

This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,  that the verification requirement is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has
sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed
the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The general
rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them
is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum
shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The
rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.

It is noteworthy that the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance because of the commonality of
interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the controversy in many past similar cases.

The CA did not err in affirming the application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case,
the property involved is a 936-square-meter real property. Both parties have their respective TCTs over
the property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case below have a common interest over the
property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered owner of the subject property
as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered co-owners pro indiviso of the whole
property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any of the heirs. Consequently, as one of
the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is
sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G.
Santos the authority to inform the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not
commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no
other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC
correctly denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
Considering that at stake in the present case is the ownership and possession over a prime property in
Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a special
circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice.
Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they may be used to achieve such
end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping
and verification will result in a patent denial of substantial justice, these may be liberally construed. 28 The
ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits – after all parties are given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses – rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections.

Indeed, this Court strictly applied the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping in
cases where the commonality of interest between or among the parties is wanting.

Anent the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent his co-heirs/co-plaintiffs, we find no
necessity to show such authority. Respondents herein are co-owners of the subject property. As such co-
owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any
kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such
an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.

We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances: (1) the caption of the
instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni Cristo; (2) the opening statement of the complaint
states that plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique Santos and likewise names the particular heirs of the latter
who instituted the complaint below; (3) the case involves a property owned by the predecessor-in-interest
of plaintiffs therein; and (4) the verification signed by Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one of the
children of the late Enrique Santos and that he represents the heirs of said Enrique Santos.
3) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Abella
G.R. No. 143510, 23 November 2005, 476 SCRA 1

FACTS:
 The property in dispute is a parcel of land covered by tax declaration in the name of herein
respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella. According to herein petitioner said parcel of land had
been donated to him by respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to be offered once a
month in perpetuity for the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I. Abella. Respondents, on the other
hand, deny such allegation and counter that petitioner encroached and fenced off the subject parcel of
land without their consent.
 Hence, the Heirs of Abella filed a forcible entry case before the MTC of Naga against the
petitioner.
 The judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the MTC’S Decision was
affirmed by the RTC (Branch 22). Thus, the Decision was appealed by the respondent to CA. The CA
affirmed the decision of RTC (Branch 22) by denying Abella’s petition for review.
 While the case was pending before the CA, ABELLA filed another case before RTC (Branch 24)
against the petitioner, for Quieting of Title involving the same property subject matter of MTC (Forcible
Entry). RTC branch 24 rendered decision in favor of Heirs of Abella declaring them as the rightful owner
of the subject property and that the herein defendant has no rightful claim of ownership over the same.
 The Decision was appealed by petitioner to CA, which later affirmed the RTC’s decision. Thus,
the petitioner appealed the CA’s decision before the Supreme Court, said appeal was dismissed holding
that there was no reversible error committed by the appellate court.
 Both Decisions in the Forcible Entry case and in the Quieting of Title case are now final and
executor.
 The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, MTC denied the
motion for execution.
ISSUE: WON the decision in Quieting of Title case was supervening event in the Forcible Entry case?

HELD: YES. The finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate the
property or to allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the forcible entry
case.
 The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioners belated claim that even if title over the property
remained with respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to possession thereof. Since respondents never
made the alleged donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual basis for petitioner to claim the right of
possession over it.
 Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision of the quieting of title
constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry.
 In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Court explained thus: ... The jurisdiction of the court to
amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment.
 One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of
supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final
and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time.
 In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the
forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained finality and
conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of
possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work
injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the
disputed land.
4) Anastacia Vda De Aviles vs CA G.R. NO. 95748

FACTS:
Petitioners: Anastacia Vda. De Aviles et. al.
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Camilo Aviles

 Eduardo Aviles’ family has been in actual possession of a parcel of land described as a fishpond,
cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land, situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan since
1957.

 This property is his share in the estate of his deceased parents. The respective areas allotted to
them had been agreed upon and were measured before the execution of the agreement.
Because he had several children to support, Eduardo asked for a bigger share and Camilo
agreed to have a smaller area.

 Eduardo mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank and Phil. National Bank branch in Lingayen.
When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo, in the presence of the
 boundary owners (defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin)
pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and
nobody objected.

 The real estate mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold at public auction, but it was
redeemed by plaintiff’s mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her
name.

 In 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles moved the earthen dikes and constructed a bamboo fence on
the northern portion of Eduardo’s property, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

 Petitioners filed this special civil action for quieting of title

 TC: dismissed the complaint

 CA: affirmed TC decision, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper
remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment
suit instead.

ISSUE/HELD: WON a complaint for quieting of title is not the proper remedy but rather it should be a
case for ejectment - YES

 The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not
cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

 To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. In this case, the only controversy is whether
these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant which
constitutes a cloud thereon.

 Documents (those executed by private respondent and his brothers, as well as the Deed of Sale
evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia of the subject property in a foreclosure sale) in
no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty
arises from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

Petition DENIED and decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

5) RUMARATE vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 168222. April 18, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Teodulo and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/or
quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta. Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather,
Santiago, who used to live with the Rumarate family in San Pablo City. Santiago and the Rumarate family
transferred residence to avail of the land distribution in Quezon. Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating
five hectares thereof. Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted to
him a copy of a Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, recognizing his Santiago rights over Lot No. 379. Their
family thereafter cleared the land, built a house and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables
thereon. Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" ratifying the transfer of his rights over Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo. From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and
declared the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, respondents’
predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a case
against respondents because he was advised to just remain on the land and pay the corresponding taxes
thereon.

Respondents claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. Respondents alleged that the CFI rendered a Decision,
declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant thereof in the Cadastral
Proceeding. However, no title was issued to Santiago because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open the Cadastral Proceeding. The CFI
rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name an OCT was issued.
Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the help of a certain Fredo who was
instituted as caretaker. Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land
because there are people instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.

After the death of the spouses, respondents executed a deed of partition over the subject lot

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
trial court. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners who possessed and
cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of title over the property, or to
respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in possession of the controverted lot?

RULING:
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the parties so that
the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim.
Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or
any interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the suit.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy

A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No.
379 in the concept of an owner. After his demise, all his 11 children, the youngest being 28 years old,
continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged Teodulo’s possession of Lot No.
379 nor demanded or received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act
of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting any
right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.

The oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-
compliance with the formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his family’s long years
of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their possession thereof.

It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot
in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private
property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership over
Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are void.

In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not vest him
title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the same since 1928. He
abandoned the property and allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. Hence, spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not acquire any right over the questioned lot and
the title issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than
the source.

The land was awarded to the petitioners.