Appellants: Renu Tandon Vs.

Respondent: Union of India (UOI)

"Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where
statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extra-ordinary situations as
for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public
wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication
of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But
then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy
provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are
available are not such matters."
It is true, ordinarily, the High Court in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, should not interfere
in such matters and the parties should be left to deal the matter as provided under the Act
itself but all the same, there is no bar to interfere in such matters when the court feels that it is
not necessary to insist upon a party that it should first suffer and submit itself to the
jurisdiction which is being wrongly exercised without any basis or material. There are
numerous cases both of High Courts and the Supreme Court wherein such matters have been
interfered and found that the petitioner is being harassed for no fault of his or her and without
any substance and material in possession of the Department, in spite of the fact that an
alternative remedy was available to the petitioner. These are all self imposed restrictions by
the court itself and there is no legal bar provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, particularly in the present case when the petitioner is a lady entrepreneur and has taken
the courage of establishing a small scale unit and merely because she happens to be daughter-
in-law of Shri S.K. Tandon who owns the other factory M/s. Tandon Brothers, situated
nearby and also engaged in manufacture of similar product, should not be taxed so as to
discourage her.
PETITIONER: GUJARAT STEEL TUBES LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: GUJARAT
STEEL TUBES MAZDOOR SABHA
Article 226 of the Constitution, however restrictive in practice Is a power wide enough in all
conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of
injustice; and more importantly this extra-ordinary reserve power is unsheathed to grant final
relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may in its discretion do the
High Court too under Article 226, can, if facts compel so. [211 D-E] (vi) The Award, in the
instant case, suffers from a fundamental flaw that it equates an illegal and unjustified strike
with brozen misconduct by every workman without so much as identification of the charge
against each, after adverting to the gravamen of his misconduct meriting dismissal. Passive
participation in a strike which is both illegal and unjustified does not ipso facto invite
dismissal or punitive discharge.

Labour and Industrial Disputes

Large number of cases come to the High Court in the writ petition
challenging the violation of provisions of Industrial Disputes, Act, 1947 and other
statutory enactment. The Apex Court laid down the principle that whenever a writ
petition is filed for enforcement of right flowing from any statutory enactment,
forum of which is provided to be a specific forum, the High Court should decline
to entertain the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
Some important cases of the Apex Court are:
(2004) 4 SCC 268., U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd And Others. Vs. U.P.
Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh.
Facts:
The Corporation had undertaken a work at Betwa Bridge Jhansi. Certain workmen did
not report for duty. A notice was published by the Corporation that those workmen who
continuously absents for more than 10 days of their service be terminated according to
certified Standing Orders of the Corporation. Services of one workman was terminated. He
filed writ petition in this High Court. The writ petition was dismissed that the workman could
raise an industrial dispute if he so desired.
Another writ petition was filed by the Union of the workman which was
allowed by the High Court against which order the Corporation went to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the said judgement again reiterated and laid
down principle. It is relevant to refer to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said
judgement.
11.       “We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the
writ petition of the respondent Union at all. The dispute was an industrial
dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well
as U.P. IDA, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the
respondent Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial
Disputes Act. In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke
[(1976) 1 SCC 496] it was held that when the dispute relates to the
enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only
remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under the Act. This
was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide
“a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes
arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to
ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil
courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the
elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The
procedurers followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not
facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against
this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act
are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to
any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen
and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their
cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think
just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in
many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements,
wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they  are extraordinary
remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore,
 always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them
are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil
court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of
enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and
intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting
these enactments and the disputes arising under them.”[Ed.: So held
in Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 at p. 91 to 92b
in para 28 after quoting the principles enunciated in Premier
Automobiles; as explained in (2002) 2 SCC 542 at 547]
12.       Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of
the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute
and may not be read as a limitation on the Court’s powers under Article 226,
nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to
deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the
statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as
provided in that statute and in no other manner.”
(2005) 6 SCC, 725., Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. And Another
Vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Employees Union.
Facts:
Appeal was filed by the Company challenging the judgement of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court by which the writ petition was allowed challenging the
withdrawal of construction allowances to the workmen. The employer raised
objection that the writ petition could not have been entertained, since remedy of
the workmen was to raise an industrial dispute.
Following was said in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgement:
8.         “In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari
Sangh [(2004) 4 SCC 268: 2004 SCC (L & S) 637] it was held that when the
dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and
specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court
should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226
except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The
person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided
under the statute. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles
Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496: 1976 SCC (L & S)
70], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75: 1995 SCC ( L &
S) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110], Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal
Corpn. of Ahmedabad [(2002) 2 SCC 542: 2002 SCC (L & S) 317 and in
Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred [(1998) 6 SCC 549: 1998 SCC (L & S)
1611].
9.         In Rajasthan SRTC case [(1995) 5 SCC 75: 1995 SCC ( L & S) 1207:
(1995) 31 ATC 110] it was observed as follows:
“[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of
disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has
 been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of
civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and
the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill afford. The
procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not
facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against
this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act
are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to
any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen
and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their
cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think
just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in
many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements,
wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amendable
to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary
remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore,
always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them
are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil
court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of
enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and
intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting
these enactments and the disputes arising under them.”

Roshina T VERSUS Abdul Azeez K.T. & Ors. 

 It is held that the   High   Court   cannot   allow   its   constitutional jurisdiction to  

be used for deciding disputes, for which   remedies   under   the   general   law,   civil   or

criminal are available. This Court has held that it isnot intended to replace the ordinary

remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved

person. The jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it   should   not   be exercised casually  

or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. 

In our view, the writ petition to claim such relief   was   not,   therefore,   legally  

permissible.   It, therefore,   deserved   dismissal   in limine  on   the

ground of availability of an alternative remedy of filing   a   civil   suit   by   respondent   No.

1   (writ petitioner) in the Civil Court. 17. We   cannot,   therefore,   concur   with   the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court   when   it   unnecessarily   went  

into   all   the 8 questions of fact arising in the case on the basis of

factual pleadings in detail (43 pages) and recorded a

factual finding that it was the respondent No. 1 (writ

petitioner) who was in possession of the flat and,

therefore, he be restored with his possession of the flat by the appellant.  18.

In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while

so directing exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred   under   Article   226   of   the  

Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had

virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a Civil Court. 

PETITIONER:
MOHAN PANDEY AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. USHA RANI RAJGARIA AND ORS.

The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to

be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the
general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not
intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit
application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is
special and extra-ordinary and should not be exercised
casually or lightly

ILO COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

287. In the particular circumstances now prevailing in Algeria it is difficult to determine with

certainty whether the demonstrations which took place were essentially occupational or

political in character. In fact, it may happen that in the course of the same demonstration both
occupational and political demands are made together. In the present case, the complainants

do not allege that the strikes to which they refer were occupational or economic in character,

while the Government formally denies that they bore any character of this kind. The

Government maintains that the strikes were of an insurrectional nature, intended to provoke

disturbances and to interfere with public order, and affirms that all the measures which were

taken—and subsequently suspended—were taken not in consequence of a normal strike but

because of the subversive character Twenty-seventh Report 175 of the strike movement.

While the Committee has always regarded the right to strike as constituting a

fundamental right of workers and of their organisations, it has regarded it as such only

in so far as it is utilised as a means of defending their economic interests.

 The Committee recalls that the right to strike is a fundamental right of workers and of

their organizations as a means of defending their economic interests [see Digest, op.

cit., para. 473] and that ferry services do not constitute essential services in the strict

sense of the term. However, in view of the difficulties and inconveniences that the

population living on islands along the coast could be subjected to following a

stoppage in ferry services, an agreement may be concluded on minimum services to

be maintained in the event of a strike [see Digest, op. cit., para. 563]. This is

particularly so in view of the circumstances at hand as described by the complainant:

a legal strike that had barely lasted 48 hours; a partial suspension of the strike by the

union; and negotiations under way. The Committee concludes that the Government's

intervention in such circumstances constituted a violation of freedom of association

principles. The Committee considers that it would be more conducive to a harmonious

industrial relations climate if the Government would establish a voluntary and

effective mechanism which could avoid and resolve labour disputes to the satisfaction

of all parties concerned; if despite the existence of such a mechanism, the workers
 decide to take industrial action, a minimum service could be maintained with the

agreement of the parties concerned. The Committee therefore urges the Government

to consider establishing a voluntary and effective mechanism for the prevention and

resolution of disputes, including the provision of voluntarily agreed minimum

services, rather than having recourse to back-to-work legislation. The Committee

requests to be kept informed of developments in this respect

 As regards the central issue of the legality of the strike on which the justification of

the dismissals depends, the Committee recalls that, while the Committee has always

regarded the right to strike as constituting a fundamental right of workers and of their

organizations, it has considered it as such only in so far as it is utilized as a means of

defending their economic and social interests [see Digest of decisions and principles

of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th edition, 1996, paras. 473 and 474].

Noting that the litigation regarding the legality or otherwise of the strike has been

referred to the court of first instance, the Committee requests the Government to

communicate to it the text of any ruling handed down in the matter.