The Future Destiny!

Sardar Taimur Hyat-Khan

October 25, 2020

 "We do have a government, at present, whose methods are a mimicry of Trump’s and whose willingness to

use falsehood, even spoken from the sacred center of power, to achieve its aims, is apparent for all to see. You
could say ‘mendacity’ is its middle name. Thus, any abrogation of the usual conventions might simply
embolden our “masters of the universe”. But, perhaps most important is the will to autocratic power that is
fuelling the ambitions of the Great Leader. *
* MindReadings Femi Oyebode's Musings
https://femioyebode.com/2020/09/24/be-afraid-be-very-afraid/
They say History repeats itself but they seldom say that Smaller Governments with pretensions to Grandeur
tend to mimic those Governments they perceive to be 'The Ultimate' Power! While the above quote is intended
towards the UK it is horribly true for Pakistan and India as well as Allah Pak alone knows whichever other 3rd
World Country!
This question of participation in the Central Government on the basis of Lord Linlithgow's offer of August
1940 was considered by the Working Committee of the Muslim League. A minority of about 5 were against
co-operation with the Government and Jinnah himself stood with this group. The late Sir Sikander Hayat
Khan opposed further haggling and said that the offer should be accepted in principle, details being settled
personally. Jinnah said that he was prepared to abide by the advice of the majority but warned the members of
the consequences of full co-operation; the entire burden of responsibility for protecting the Indian Empire,
crushing the Congress, suppressing internal strife, supplying men and money, and running the administration,
would fall on the League; and at the same time, they would have to work under the constant fear that Congress
might decide to co-operate, and that Government might refuse to consider the Pakistan scheme. Jinnah's
adroitness was proved by the sequel. Though in this meeting he was in a minority on the main question, he
prevented any outright decision in favor of accepting the Government's offer and subsequently obtained a
verdict of rejection.
Lord Ismay to Mr. Gandhi
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Interim Government of India, Part I

6 April 1946 
Enclosure to No. 85
OUTLINE OF A SCHEME FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT PENDING TRANSFER OF POWER

1. Mr. Jinnah to be given the option of forming a Cabinet.

2. The selection of the Cabinet is left entirely to Mr. Jinnah. The members may be all Moslems, or all non-
Moslems, or they may be representatives of all classes and creeds of the Indian people.
3. If Mr. Jinnah accepted this offer, the Congress would guarantee to cooperate freely and sincerely, so long as
all the measures that Mr. Jinnah's Cabinet bring forward are in the interest of the Indian people as a whole.
4. The sole referee for what is or what is not in the interests of India as a whole will be Lord Mountbatten, in
his personal capacity.
5. Mr. Jinnah must stipulate, on behalf of the League or of any other parties represented in the Cabinet formed
by him that, so far as he or they are concerned, they will do their utmost to preserve peace throughout India.
6. There shall be no National Guards or any other form of private army.
7. Within the framework hereof Mr. Jinnah will be perfectly free to present for acceptance a scheme of
Pakistan, even before the transfer of power, provided, however, that he is successful in his appeal to reason
and not to the force of arms which he abjures for all time for this purpose. Thus, there will be no compulsion
in this matter over a Province or part thereof.
8. In the Assembly the Congress has a decisive majority. But the Congress shall never use that majority
against the League policy simply because of its identification with the League but will give its hearty support
to every measure brought forward by the League Government, provided that it is in the interest of the whole
of India. Whether it is in such interest or not shall be decided by Lord Mountbatten as a man and not in his
representative capacity.
9. If Mr. Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer to be made mutatis mutandis to the Congress.

3 and 4 are marked 'There are now redundant owing to new para. 8.

7 and 8 are marked 'Mr. Gandhi's draft'.

The demands made upon Indian resources during World War I created a new tension in the country’s
relationship with its colonial rulers, and ended what is sometimes referred to as the ‘high noon’ of the Raj. 
The new atmosphere necessitated real moves toward a negotiated end to British rule and R. J. Moore indicates
the start of this process, writing The earliest official statement on India’s eventual status was the declaration of
Edwin Montagu (Secretary of State, 1917-1922) on 20th August 1917 that Britain’s policy was ‘the
progressive realization of responsible government’. It was incorporated in the preamble to the India Act of
1919, with the condition that parliament was to decide the time and nature of each successive advance.
Moore adds, Devolution by stages would enable the elements of modern politics, in particular parties based
upon principles and interests, to supplant the divisions of caste and creed. The difficulty with such a policy
was the time-scale that it assumed. Before India secured self-government it must pass through the stages of
evolution that Britain had experienced since the Middle Ages.
In the Punjab, the decade after 1919 had seen a gradual process of Indianization and acceptance of the concept
of preparing for a transfer of power, but the pace had been reassuringly slow and much of the working routine
remained consistent.
As Ayesha Jalal suggests, MacDonald’s communal award of 16th August 1932 left the Muslims of Punjab and
Bengal in a strong position. In these two provinces they retained not only their separate electorates but they
were also given more seats than any other community in the provincial assemblies. Provincial autonomy was
now a pleasing prospect for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 12-13. 
Within the stability of Unionist Punjab can be seen the seeds of Muslim League discontent and strategy in
turning the situation around. Moore suggests how the all-India picture created by the 1937 elections critically
weakened the Muslim position, creating danger for the future of any independence settlement: The 1935 Act
provided for the introduction of provincial autonomy prior to the creation of federation. In consequence, when
provincial elections were held in 1937 Muslim parties were able to consolidate their control over the Punjab,
Bengal, and Sind. Moreover, Congress was able to secure control of the Muslim minority provinces and to
deny the Muslim population any say in their government. A sense of exclusion and even persecution drove the
Muslims into hostility against the Act for the scope that it afforded to Hindu Raj. The experience of the Hindu
provincial government stimulated the growth of Muslim separatism.
The Ministry sustained a staggering and wholly unexpected blow when Sir Sikander Hyat Khan died on the
night of December 26th. To him must be given the chief credit for the success with which the experiment of
provincial autonomy has worked in the Punjab.
London, BL, APAC, ‘Quarterly Surveys of the Political and Constitutional Position in British India, 1942-1946’,
IOR/L/PJ/7/1816, report dated 1st November 1942-31st January 1943. 

Punjab is the province that counts in war-time, and the Punjab (except for a small but vocal minority of
Congressites) is solid behind Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Unionist.
In many developing countries this power is effectively shared (or usurped by) the "big three": the military
establishment, the corporate elite, and the civil service (commonly known as the bureaucracy). The elite
members of these three classes dominate the regiments of military and establishment and become the
kingmakers in due course, ultimately deciding the fashion in which a state function.  
It was only the charismatic leadership of Jinnah that the Muslim masses were brought on to one platform and
goal. Once the goal of Pakistan was achieved and subsequently the Quaid-i-Azam was gone, the downfall of
the Muslim League accelerated rapidly; its character degenerated and its spirit disintegrated. Its leadership
continued to be assumed by the landowning and Western-educated elite, but they generally lacked political
experience, knowledge, and skills necessary for the extraordinary challenges of governing a newly established
state. Put simply, they lacked the necessary competence to formulate a nascent state, due to which the Muslim
League failed to function as a conventional post-colonial national party, in contrast to the Indian National
Congress.
The roots of this impasse can be traced back to the divergence between the Indian National Congress (INC)
and the Muslim League already apparent by the early 20th century when Allama Shibli Nu'mani (1857-1914)
criticized the relatively limited ambitions and vision of the latter. During the late British Raj, the Muslim
League became a single-issue party, consumed with the goal of creating Pakistan, without a commensurate
program of national political and socioeconomic reform for the betterment, stability, and prosperity of the new
state and nation, unlike the INC. Its attempts to curtail opposition within Pakistan caused further frustration
and divisions, and its leaders could not win the confidence of the nation, and in-fighting and opportunism
among leading party figures damaged the party as well as the political system.
The leaders lacked commitment to the development of the best suitable system for the interest of a free and
independent/prosperous nation where people could realize a free, independent, and dignified life after colonial
rule.
The Failure of the Muslim League in Post-Colonial Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal. Irfan Ahmed Shaikh, Arshad Islam, 
Bashir Ahmed Jatoi, Shafique Ahmad Khan.

The Future Destiny: Towards Independence from Great Britain.*

*PAKISTAN’S FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: A CASE STUDY OF SIKANDER HYAT-KHAN Jeanne M.
Sheehan Iona College, New Rochelle, USA 
The tendency to narrowcast a nation’s framers is a global phenomenon. In the USA, George Washington, and
Thomas Jefferson reign supreme. In the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin is popularly defined as the father of the
modern state. In Venezuela, Simón Bolívar is often credited not just with the founding of that nation but
other countries in the region. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela is widely credited with the founding of post-
Apartheid South Africa, while other notable figures involved in this struggle are neglected. One of the most
intriguing examples of this global phenomenon is found in Pakistan, where the dominant tendency has been to
attribute the nation’s founding to just one man, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. To suggest that he was
the sole creator, however, does a disservice to both his legacy and the nation’s history. As important  as Jinnah
was, his role and contributions should not completely overshadow those of his contemporaries.
According to Dreisbach (2012: 17), narrowly focusing on only a few great men produces a distorted view of
history, a view that reflects a significant revision of historical methods to include a wider spectrum (Robb,
2002: xi-xii).
The quintessential ‘Pakistan’s Forgotten Founder’ (Pakistan Ka Bhula Basra Bani) Premier of the Punjab,
Sikander Hyat-Khan. His contributions, on each of the grounds described in the definition proffered above, are
unmistakable. Hyat-Khan may have been forgotten and overshadowed by Jinnah, but notably Patrick French
mentions Hyat-Khan on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Pakistan’s independence. In a review of
Ahmed (1997), titled ‘Father of His Nation’ and published in The Sunday Times of 8 October 1997, French
argues that ‘Jinnah is the most undervalued world statesman of the 20th century’. But he also picks up that
Hyat-Khan was not at all unimportant when he observes: ‘Yet as leader of the powerful Unionist party of
the Punjab he was for a decade India’s most powerful Muslim politician’. However, due to a variety of factors,
including his untimely death, the fact that he left only a minimal paper trail, and that he was critical of a two-
state solution, Hyat-Khan was largely and unfortunately forgotten by historians.
Sir Sikandar Hyat-Khan’s work towards separation began early in his political career when he was chosen to
lead the Reforms Committee. The most salient examples of his efforts at achieving lasting independence,
however, are the pamphlet, which he authored to address the constitutional problem and his stance towards the
War effort. In 1939, Hyat-Khan published The Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation, a document that
offered a framework for governance transition and cemented his commitment to an evolutionary path towards
self-rule. As Sir Reginald Coupland (1943: 204) indicated, Sir Sikandar Hyat-Khan was only the second
Moslem politician of any standing to take part in the constitutional discussion. The pamphlet contained, as
Coupland reported: The sober and concise analysis of the existing situation with which he prefaced his
proposals was in marked contrast with most previous Moslem publications. There is no reference to Hindu
‘atrocities’, no emotional appeals to Moslem sentiment, nothing about the Islamic world at large, no attacks on
‘British imperialism’. The constitutional problem is treated as a purely Indian problem that Indians can and
must solve themselves. (Coupland, 1943: 204–5) Coupland (1943: 204–5) also reports Sir Sikandar Hyat-
Khan’s fervent belief that a Federation was not only desirable but indispensable, along with his commitment
to achieving administrative control over the affairs of British India as quickly as possible following the end of
World War II. According to his Zonal Scheme, an Indian Federation was to be comprised of seven zones with
separate legislatures. These would then make up an envisaged unicameral Federal Assembly of 375 members.
In a letter written to Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary of the Viceroy, on 29 June 1939, Hyat-Khan
described his Federal scheme and his belief that working with the British was in the best interest of the
subcontinent, as documented in Carter:
The political salvation and safety of India depend on the British connection. If, God forbid, the link between
Great Britain and India is severed or materially weakened, the country will go to bits and revert to the chaotic
conditions which it has witnessed in the past and eventually be enslaved by some other power. It is for this
reason that, while I have suggested an immediate declaration regarding the grant of Dominion Status, I have at
the same time provided in my scheme a 20 years’ period of apprenticeship in such vital matters of Defense
and External Affairs. (Carter, 2004: 425–6) This is remarkably clear-cut evidence of the perceived need among
Indian leaders at the time to educate themselves to become competent managers of their own affairs in due
course (see Srivastava, 2018: 232). An evolutionary peaceful transition of this sort may, however, not have
been popular at the time and unfairly contributed to suspicions that Sir Sikandar Hyat-Khan was a British
loyalist. However, from a historical perspective, his concerns were warranted and prescient. Sir Sikandar
Hyat-Khan’s scheme was widely publicized and he advocated it until his death. During a meeting with Gandhi
in July 1939, for instance, Hyat-Khan shared his Scheme. 
Gandhi’s confidence in Hyat-Khan’s approach is reflected in his response, mentioned by Pirzada:
“Dominion status is a bitter pill for Congressmen to swallow and although the scheme is too
complicated to form an opinion, yours is the ONLY solution of a constructive character…I am glad that
you have decided to publish it in full. I must thank you for taking me into confidence and asking me to
give my opinion on it.” (Pirzada, 1995 [1962]: 179–80) 
Hyat-Khan also pushed for this plan during a meeting with Winston Churchill in Cairo two years later. At the
height of the War, while meeting with troops, Hyat-Khan pressed Churchill on the need for greater autonomy
and constitutional reform of the kind he described in his Outlines. According to Hyat-Khan’s family, during
the meeting, Churchill proposed a monarchic governance model to post-War independent India, not unlike
those proposed and instituted by Britain in the Middle East, Hyat-Khan declined, reaffirming his commitment
to democracy and to the Federation model of governance detailed in his Outlines. As Malik (1985: 97) noted,
this conversation with Churchill had a real impact. Perhaps nothing underscores Hyat-Khan’s commitment to
independence more than the reasons he broke with so many of his contemporaries and pushed for Indian
support of the allies during World War II. Hyat-Khan stood almost alone among notable Indian leaders at the
time in believing that India should enter the war against the Axis powers for a combination of philosophical,
strategic, and pragmatic reasons. Whereas most others, including Jinnah, and especially Gandhi and Nehru,
saw it as the ‘white man’s war’, viewed Great Britain as an oppressor and for that reason opposed
involvement in the War, Hyat-Khan’s strategy was different (Coupland, 1943: 239–41). He, too, saw Britain as
an occupying force but opposed staying neutral, or siding with the Russians, Japanese, or Germans, as some
Indian leaders had suggested, for several reasons. These included his philosophical commitment to stamping
out the evil and oppression that was being pursued against a vulnerable religious minority by the Nazis. This
was something that as a devout Muslim and someone who devoted his life to fighting sectarianism made
Hyat-Khan empathetic to the plight of the Jews. 
He also had strategic reasons for supporting the War. 
He was convinced that if India helped Britain, they would reward the subcontinent with independence. His
conviction had historical precedence since he himself had fought in World War I and following the War,
Britain had taken steps to grant the subcontinent more autonomy. As Basu (2016) has shown, during World
War I, 1.2 million Indian soldiers fought alongside the Allied powers, and 72,000 lost their lives. In
comparison, during World War II, two million Indian soldiers fought on behalf of Britain, with 89,000
casualties (Khan, 2015).
Hyat-Khan stated at the time: ‘I believe that valor and sacrifices of our fighting men alone can win India
freedom just as they won [the] 1921 reforms by their sacrifices during last war’.*
* Hyat-Khan Statement to Press at Simla, October 1, 1942, India Office Records and Library L/I/1/1427 

Hyat-Khan was also concerned that if Britain lost the War, British India would be open to invasion from
forces in the East, West, and Northwest, as well as chaos at home. 
In a letter to Jinnah, dated 25 December 1941, Hyat-Khan wrote: I have from the very outset of this war
pleaded for a policy of wholehearted and unconditional support, because it is my fixed conviction that
bringing this war to a successful conclusion is of vital importance to India and the Muslims throughout the
world… by withholding our support at this critical juncture we will be jeopardizing the safety of our
country…If, God forbid, the Nazis and Japanese succeed in this war all our political aspirations, and
ambitions of a free and equal partnership will be frustrated for good. Hyat-Khan went on to critique Nehru’s
approach, writing that while Nehru demands immediate declaration of complete independence, he has not
addressed how this will be achieved if the British lose this war. According to Hyat-Khan, in the same letter,
Nehru was ‘banking on a victory of anti-Axis powers but without any help from the political party to which he
belongs since it is wedded to a policy of non-violence’. Ultimately, Hyat-Khan was successful in convincing a
reluctant Jinnah and the Muslim League to support the War effort. In 1939, at the start of the war, the Indian
Army had just over 200,000 troops. Under Hyat-Khan’s leadership by 1940, the army’s size was increased to a
million. In total, India supplied more than two million army, navy, and air force combatants (Khan, 2015). The
vast majority came from Hyat-Khan’s province, Punjab, and the force quickly became the largest volunteer
force in the world at the time. A combination of Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Christian soldiers fought primarily
in West Asia and North Africa on behalf of the allies and against Nazism. It is a story not often told in the
West that 89,000 of the more than 2 million Indian soldiers were killed in battle (Khan, 2015). 
Hyat-Khan’s commitment to the War also reflected his understanding that once achieved, independence
must be sustained. This meant that the subcontinent must not break away from Britain completely until
it had developed a robust economy and the capacity to defend itself from internal and external threats.
In a speech in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March, 1941,6 Hyat-Khan said: ‘We want
independence and freedom…but we cannot become independent merely by declaring that we are free
… Unless we have strong, efficient and up-to-date defense forces our independence will not be worth a
day’s life’. Hyat-Khan saw the War effort as an opportunity to help Greater India develop industry,
skills, and expertise, particularly in building an economy and a fighting force capable of defending the
subcontinent. 
His point was well taken, as during the War a reported 14 million Indian laborers worked to keep the war
factories and farms running. India provided 196.7 million tons of coal, 6 million tons of iron ore, 1.12 million
tons of steel, and 50 kinds of arms and ammunition. In addition, 35 percent of India’s annual cotton textile
production, amounting to about 5 billion yards, went into creating war material. 
The fact that Hyat-Khan’s commitment to the War was intimately tied to his commitment to
independence partly explains why he reacted so strongly to Churchill’s statement regarding the Atlantic
Charter.7 On 9 September 1941, Churchill stated that the Charter, in particular its third principle of
self-determination, did not apply to India. In a statement to the press in Simla on 1 October 1942, Hyat-
Khan took Churchill to task for what he described as an ‘embarrassment’:8 [The] vast majority of my
countrymen certainly share my belief that [the] future destiny and safety of India lie in securing [the]
status of free and equal partnership in [the] British Commonwealth. I am equally confident that if the
Prime Minister could see his way to make [a] fresh declaration that India shall attain that status within
a reasonable time after [the] War, say two or three years, all patriotic elements in [the] country will
welcome it with enthusiasm. A few days later, the Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery, spoke
before the House of Commons in an effort to remedy the situation:9 I can only repeat, in order to
remove any possible ground for misunderstanding, that the Prime Minister’s statement of September 9
with reference to the Atlantic Charter expressly made it clear that the Government’s previous
declaration with regard to the goal of India’s attainment of free and equal partnership in the British
Commonwealth and with regard to our desire to see that goal attained with the least possible delay after
the war, under a constitution framed by agreement among Indians themselves, hold good and are in no
way qualified. Whether such a retraction could be fully trusted is of course a different matter, as Hyat-
Khan’s above-cited comment about ‘embarrassment’ indicates. 
Equal Voice and Founding of Pakistan.
India already contributed significantly to the war effort by sending over 2.5 million men, the largest volunteer
force in the world, to fight for the Allies, mostly in West Asia and North Africa. The financial, industrial and
military assistance of India formed a crucial component of the British campaign against Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan. ... The Indian Army during World War II was one of the largest Allied forces
contingents which took part in the North and East African Campaign, Western Desert Campaign.
The numbers are staggering: up to three million Bengalis were killed by famine, more than half a
million South Asian refugees fled Myanmar (formerly Burma), 2.3 million soldiers manned the Indian
army and 89,000 of them died in military service.
Thirty Indians won Victoria Crosses in the 1940s.
Punjabi Soldiers.

Punjabi Pilot in the UK During WWII

There were non-combatants like cooks, tailors, mechanics, and washermen, such as a boot-maker to the
Indian army named simply as Ghafur who died at the battle of Keren in present-day Eritrea and whose
grave can still be seen there today.
What do we know about the thousands of women who mined coal for wartime in Bihar and central
India, working right up until childbirth? Or the gangs of plantation laborers from southern India who
traveled up into the mountains of the northeast to hack out roads towards Myanmar and China? Or the
lascars (merchant seamen) such as Mubarak Ali, remembered simply as "a baker" who died in the
Atlantic when the SS City of Benares was torpedoed?
It wasn't glamorous work: "coolies" loading and unloading cargo at imperial ports or clearing land for
aerodromes did not share the prestige of fighter-pilots.
But their work could be very dangerous.
Thousands of Asian laborers died building treacherous roads at high altitude, including the Ledo Road
between China and India, working with basic pickaxes and falling prey to malaria and other tropical diseases.
The people who made up the war effort soon had their lives shaped again by the Partition of 1947 and the
carving up of new countries.
This wartime history belongs to Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan as much as India.
In the rush to write new histories of Nation-States after 1947, much of the history of the 1940s was locked out
from official memory. Tales of the freedom struggle took precedence. And in Britain and the US, the emphasis
was placed on remembering military contributions to major battles, not on the everyday lives of anonymous
workers.
As one report put it at the time, this was not the "forgotten army", but the "unknown army".*
*  Has India's contribution to WW2 been ignored? By Yasmin Khan
Thus the entire Free World has a debt of Gratitude to Sir Sikandar Hyat-Khan for contributing significantly
towards the War Effort in Men and Material. A debt that is unacknowledged to this day including the yearly
commemoration of WWII to the lasting shame of theLeaders of the so-called Free World.

The Atlantic Charter:

President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill seated on the quarterdeck of HMS PRINCE OF WALES for a
Sunday service during the Atlantic Conference, 10 August 1941. President Franklin D Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill after Divine Service onboard HMS PRINCE OF WALES.
The Atlantic Charter was a statement issued on 14 August 1941 that set out American and British goals for
the world after the end of World War II.
The joint statement later dubbed the Atlantic Charter, outlined the aims of the United States and the United
Kingdom for the postwar world as follows: no territorial aggrandizement, no territorial changes made against
the wishes of the people (self-determination), restoration of self-government to those deprived of it, reduction
of trade restrictions, global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for all, freedom from
fear and want, freedom of the seas, and abandonment of the use of force, and disarmament of aggressor
nations. The adherents to the Atlantic Charter signed the Declaration by United Nations on 1 January 1942,
which was the basis for the modern United Nations.
 The Atlantic Charter:
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His
Majesties Government in the United Kingdom, having met together, deem it right to make known
certain common Principles in the National Policies of their respective Countries in which they base
their hopes for a better future for the world.
1, Their countries seek no aggrandizement, in safety within their own boundaries, and which
territorial or other; will afford assurance that all the men in all the
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do lands may live-out their lives in freedom from
not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the fear and want;
peoples concerned; 7. Such a peace should enable all men to traverse
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
the form of government under which they will 8. They believe that all of the nations of the
live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons,
self-government restored to those who have been must come to the abandonment of the use of
forcibly deprived of them; force. Since no future peace can be maintained if
5. They will endeavor, with due respect for their land, sea, or air armaments continue to be
existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by employed by nations which threaten, or may
all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they
access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw believe, pending the establishment of a wider and
materials of the world which are needed for their permanent system of general security, that the
economic prosperity; disarmament of such nations is essential. They
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest will likewise aid and encourage all other
collaboration between all nations in the economic practicable measures which will lighten for peace-
field with the object of securing, for all, improved loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
labor standards, economic advancement, and
social security; FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
6. After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL."
they hope to see established a peace which will
afford to all nations the means of dwelling 

August 14, 1941

The Atlantic Charter inspired several other international agreements and events that followed the end of
the war. The dismantling of the British Empire, the formation of NATO, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) all derived from the Atlantic Charter.
The Atlantic Charter made clear that the United States supported the British in the war. Both wanted to
present their unity regarding their mutual principles and hopes for a peaceful postwar world and the
policies that they agreed to follow once the Germans had been defeated. A fundamental aim was to
focus on the peace that would follow, not specific American involvement and war strategy, although
American involvement appeared increasingly likely.
There were eight principal clauses of the charter:
1. No territorial gains were to be sought by the United States or the United Kingdom.
2. Territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of the peoples concerned.
3. All people had a right to self-determination.
4. Trade barriers were to be lowered.
5. There was to be global economic co-operation and advancement of social welfare.
6. The participants would work for a world free of want and fear.
7. The participants would work for freedom of the seas.
8. There was to be disarmament of aggressor nations and a common disarmament after the war.
The third clause clearly stated that all peoples have the right to decide their form of government but
failed to say what changes are necessary in both social and economic terms to achieve freedom and
peace.
The fourth clause, with respect to international trade, consciously emphasized that both "victor [and]
vanquished" would be given market access "on equal terms." That was a repudiation of the punitive
trade relations that had been established within Europe after World War I, as exemplified by the Paris
Economy Pact.
Only two clauses expressly discuss national, social, and economic conditions that would be necessary
after the war, despite their significance.
Churchill rejected its universal applicability when it came to the self-determination of subject nations
such as British India. Mahatma Gandhi in 1942 wrote to Roosevelt: "I venture to think that the Allied
declaration that the Allies are fighting to make the world safe for the freedom of the individual and for
democracy sounds hollow so long as India and for that matter, Africa are exploited by Great
Britain...." Self-determination was Roosevelt's guiding principle, but he was reluctant to place pressure
on the British in regard to India and other colonial possessions, as they were fighting for their lives in a
war that the United States was not officially participating. Gandhi (and most other Indian Leaders
including Jinnah) had refused to help the British or the American war effort against Germany and Japan
in any way, and Roosevelt chose to back Churchill.*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_Charter#:~:text=The%20joint%20statement%2C%20later%20dubbed,to%20those
%20deprived%20of%20it%2C

It was Sir Sikandar's uncompromising stand that eventually forced the UK Parliament to
disavow Churchill's statement and agree to Sir Sikandar's stance in view of the invaluable
assistance that he was providing to the War Effort and was the sole contributor to this Provision.
In view of President Roosevelt backing Churchill, we owe NO Gratitude to the United States for
our Freedom.
In addition to working towards securing independence, Hyat-Khan, himself a devout Muslim, also
worked to ensure an equal voice for Muslims and played a substantive role in founding the new nation
of Pakistan. This is seen most clearly in the pact which he signed with Jinnah at Lucknow and the fact
that he authored the first draft of the Lahore Resolution. After the Muslim League’s poor show in the
election of 1936–1937, Jinnah called Muslim leaders to a conference in Lucknow. In these elections, in
Punjab, Hyat-Khan’s Unionist party had captured 98 seats, Congress 18 and the Muslim League just 2,
with the remainder split between various other factions (Yadav, 1981: 133–4). Jinnah’s goal was to
discuss how to strengthen his party as well as how to ensure an equal voice for Muslims. Hyat-Khan
was, in addition to the Aga Khan III, the first Muslim leader who agreed to come to Lucknow.
Convinced that Muslims needed to unite in order to gain an equal voice, he also used his political
capital as the leader of one of only two majority Muslim provinces to convince other leaders to attend
(Wolpert, 1993: 150–1). During the meeting, Hyat-Khan and Jinnah negotiated an agreement which,
according to Wolpert (1993: 151), ‘made Pakistan possible’. The ‘Sikander-Jinnah Pact’ stipulated that
on his return to Punjab, Hyat-Khan would ‘convene a special meeting of his party and advise all
Muslim members of the Party who are not members of the Muslim League already, to sign its creed
and join it’ (Carter, 2004: 421–2). The impact of this agreement, pertaining to both an equal voice for
Muslims and the establishment of Pakistan, cannot be understated. With Muslims across the
subcontinent now united, the Muslim League was finally able to push its agenda forward. Just three
years after the Pact was signed, the party adopted the Lahore Resolution and seven years later Pakistan
was created. Syed Amjad Ali (1981) wrote in his memoirs that thanks to the agreement reached
between Jinnah and Sikandar Hyat-Khan in Lucknow, the dream of Pakistan became real, 
and he asserts that all Pakistanis today should be thankful to these two great Muslim leaders and their
wisdom. However, recent books on Pakistan (Durrani, 2018; Shaikh, 2018) do not even list Hyat-Khan
in their indexes. Yet it is not a coincidence that Pakistan’s founding document was adopted at a League
meeting in Hyat-Khan’s province a few years later. Nor is it a coincidence that Hyat-Khan was tapped
to author the first draft. When Jinnah arrived at the historic League meeting in Lahore on 21 March
1940, his first stop was Mamdot House for a meeting with Hyat-Khan. That evening the Working
Committee of the League met and appointed Hyat-Khan and Jinnah to draft the historic resolution.
When Jinnah became consumed with other League business, however, the task fell to Hyat-Khan, who
worked around the clock to author the initial draft. That draft, still in Muslim League records, was in
many respects similar to his earlier calls for a Zonal Scheme with dominion status for the provinces and
the creation of a limited Federal government, among other things (Dar, 2015). The plan reflected his
continued belief that a loose Federation with a central government was essential. The zones would not
be based on the pre-existing provinces or states but would be redrawn. The draft was discussed by the
Working Committee the following day and ultimately revised significantly enough that in the Punjab
Legislative Assembly Debates of 11 March 1941, Hyat-Khan stated: ‘I have no hesitation in admitting
that I was responsible for drafting the original resolution. But let me make it clear that the resolution
which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee’.10 While Hyat-Khan supported
what he described as the ‘League Resolution’, in large part because he was committed to Muslim
solidarity, he continued to have reservations about it for three reasons. First, at the time, the idea of
Pakistan was still ill-defined and under-conceived. As a pragmatist, Hyat-Khan was concerned about
the absence of any discussion on self-governance, the fact that the new nation would lack the economic
prowess, military might, or infrastructure to survive and in particular, the rushed nature of partition
being considered at the time. Second, as a Punjabi, he understood that partition would result in the
division of the province he was sworn to govern and protect. This fear, of course, was realized shortly
after his passing. Third, given his commitment to work towards the general good, he opposed a two-
state solution on the ground that it would result in carnage of unprecedented proportions. Sir Penderel
Moon (1961: 20) wrote that in a conversation he had with Hyat-Khan in October 1938, the Premier
noted that ‘Pakistan would mean a massacre’. Hyat-Khan reiterated this in a further statement before
the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941: “We want freedom for our country, freedom in the
sense that we shall have full control of our own affairs…We do not ask for freedom that there may be
Muslim Raj here and Hindu Raj elsewhere… we should examine this problem, not from any petty
communal or sectarian point of view… Whatever our differences… Let us strive togeth’er for a
freedom which will ensure liberty and freedom for all and which will enable us to live together.” Once
again, sadly, on this point, he was prescient as well. Partition resulted in the largest and deadliest forced
migration in history, with the displacement of over 14 million and the death of more than a million
people, a traumatic episode whose multiple implications still reverberate (Hajari, 2016; Zamindar,
2011).