Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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No. 3D09-294
Lower Tribunal No. 07-41735
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Dian Lewis, a/k/a Diane Lewis, a/k/a Diane Lewis, a/k/a Judith L.
Bourne, a/k/a J. Dian Bourne Lewis,
Appellant,
vs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria Espinosa
Dennis, Judge.
Brett Feinstein and Alicia Almansa, for appellee BVK Investments, Ltd.
SUAREZ, J.
Dian Lewis (“Lewis”) appeals an order denying her Motion to Vacate
Default Judgment and Relief from Final Judgment of Foreclosure. We affirm the
trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate after an evidentiary hearing finding
that the process server’s affidavit of diligent search was facially sufficient to
uphold the service of process by publication and that there was sufficient
During the five years preceding the final judgment of foreclosure on her
Miami post office box to receive her mail, and never provided her address to her
mortgage company or even to the Florida Bar.1 Lewis admittedly was aware that
she had been in arrears on her mortgage payments for some time. She was mailed
a series of letters from her mortgage company advising her that her account was in
default, including a letter, dated November 16, 2007, from a collection law firm
notifying her that it was in the process of filing a complaint to foreclose on her
was unable to locate and personally serve Lewis. The process server indicated on
1
Rule 1-3.3 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar requires that an attorney
provide the physical location or street address of her principal place of
employment to the Florida Bar.
2
his return of service, and in testimony at the hearing on the motion to vacate, that
service at an old address of Lewis. He never found her there but, on one occasion,
spoke with a tenant who told him that she did not know Lewis’s whereabouts. At
the property address, the process server found a Dorothy Sharpe living there who
informed him that Lewis was residing in the Bahamas. The process server asked
Ms. Sharpe for the address of Lewis in the Bahamas, but was told that Ms. Sharpe
did not know the address. The process server indicated on the back of the return of
service shows that no other address for Lewis could be found as a result of other
searches which were made, including with the post office, credit, social security,
2
One of Lewis’s claims on appeal is that the process server did not conduct a
diligent search as there was a real estate “for sale” sign in front of the house, and
the process server failed to contact the realtor. We reject this argument as there is
no evidence in the record that the process server ever saw the sign.
3
All that is required under section 49.041, for service by publication, is a sworn
statement that diligent search and inquiry has been made to discover the address of
the person to be served, whether the person is over 18 years-of-age and that the
whereabouts of the person is unknown. The affidavit of diligent search satisfies
these requirements.
3
records. Approximately twelve days after Lewis was notified by letter addressed
to her P.O. Box number, that her property was in the process of foreclosure, a
foreclosure complaint was filed on November 28, 2007. Lewis was mailed notice
of the application for default at the same post office box where she had received all
property was foreclosed upon and sold to Appellee, BVK Investments, Ltd.
(“BVK”), a bona fide purchaser. Lewis claimed that she never received notice of
the impending foreclosure or the sale and moved to set aside the final judgment of
foreclosure. Lewis filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Relief from
Final Judgment of Foreclosure claiming that the affidavit of service was defective
facts raised before the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to
vacate: The attorney for BVK proffered to the Court that Lewis was a member of
the Florida Bar and that she admitted at her deposition that, because she worked on
contracts and did closings, she did not want to be found. He further proffered that,
at her deposition, she testified that she used her P.O. Box number for her tax
returns for the Internal Revenue Service. Evidence was presented that her property
4
insurance carrier had only her P.O. box number, her credit card companies had
only her P.O. Box number, the roofer that she hired to put on a new roof on her the
property had only her P.O. Box number and the Florida Bar listed Ms. Lewis in its
attorney directory under only her P.O. Box number, although she was required by
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to provide her physical address of
employment. Deposition testimony of prior tenants was proffered that they sent
their rent to the P.O. Box number. The deposition testimony of Lewis’s tenant,
Dorothy Sharpe, was proffered to the court that she did not know the address of
Lewis in the Bahamas and that she received mail for Lewis at the property address.
It was also proffered that Lewis’s neighbor testified at her deposition that she
thought Lewis lived in New York. The trial judge listened to all of the proffers
and evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to vacate and to Ms. Lewis’s
claim of no notice of the impending foreclosure suit, and denied her motion to
Cellular, LLC, 957 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). The first issue on appeal is
whether the trial court grossly abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate
by finding that the affidavit of diligent search was sufficient on its face to hold that
constructive service was effective as to the bona fide purchaser. If the trial judge
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were to find the affidavit to be defective on its face, service would be void as to the
bona fide purchaser. If the trial judge finds the affidavit sufficient on its face, but
were to determine that a diligent search was not performed, the foreclosure would
be voidable, not void, as to the bona fide purchaser. See generally 33 Fla. Jur. 2d
Judicial Sales § 13 (2009). On the face of the affidavit of diligent search before us,
we find that the affidavit is sufficient for purposes of service by publication and
that the trial court did not grossly abuse its discretion in so holding. In light of
the necessary reliance on the public record by a bona fide purchaser, the affidavit
of diligent search was sufficient on its face to establish that an adequate search had
been made to locate an address for service upon Lewis prior to effecting
constructive service. The resultant foreclosure sale to the bona fide purchaser
cannot be set aside. First Home View Corp. v. Guggino, 10 So. 3d 164 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2009) (holding that trial court errs in vacating final judgment of foreclosure
establish that an adequate search has been made prior to constructive service);
Southeast & Assoc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass’n, 704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA
search is facially sufficient and foreclosure sale to bona fide purchaser is merely
voidable, and not void, and cannot be set aside); cf. Godsell v. United Guar.
6
Residential Ins., 923 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that an affidavit of
The trial court did not end its inquiry there. The second issue raised on
appeal is whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial
court’s decision finding that a diligent search was conducted to locate an address
for Ms. Lewis.5 We find there was substantial competent evidence. Giron v. Ugly
Mortgage, 935 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The process server’s testimony
along with his affidavit and return of service substantiate that Lewis did not reside
at the addresses of her property where service was attempted and that she did
reside at an undisclosed and unknown address in the Bahamas. Ms. Lewis never
provided any of her tenants, the mortgage company, the IRS, other interested
parties or business contacts, including the Florida Bar, with her current physical
4
Contra Redfield Invs. v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 990 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
(reversing denial of a motion to quash service where affidavit of diligent search
deficient and no bona fide purchaser involved); Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Trust
Co., 922 So 2d 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), upon which the dissent relies and which
does not apply because the facts are totally different from this case: the rights of a
bona fide purchaser were not involved as they are in this case; the mortgage
servicing company possessed the correct address of the property owners unlike this
case; and only one attempt at personal service was made and returned “seasonal
vacant,” unlike all of the evidence in this case that Lewis lived in the Bahamas at
an undisclosed and undiscoverable address.
5
Although we chose to address the argument raised by Lewis on appeal, we note
that this second step of analysis is not relevant or necessary when the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale is a bona fide purchaser. If the affidavit of diligent search is
legally sufficient, the final judgment of foreclosure is merely voidable as to the
BFP and cannot be set aside.
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address.6 The evidence shows that Lewis received numerous letters from her
mortgage company advising her of her default status and was notified, as of
November 16, 2007, before the foreclosure was filed, that a collection attorney was
very letter provided substantial competent evidence from which the trial judge
could correctly conclude that Lewis had notification that she was being foreclosed
upon. She even admits in the affidavit she filed in support of her motion to vacate
that she received the letter, yet she proceeded to negotiate with her mortgagor
through email and P.O. Box number, contending now that, although no one had her
Bahamian address, she would have given it to her mortgage company and
collection firm had they asked for it. This evidence, in conjunction with the search
of the records as outlined in the affidavit of diligent search, the testimony and
proffers of deposition testimony presented before the trial judge at the evidentiary
hearing on the motion to vacate and other facts raised at the hearing constitute
substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that a diligent
6
See Rosado v. Vosilla, 909 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Kidder v.
Cirelli, 821 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which holds that a property owner
who fails to provide his correct address change has no right to complain of lack of
notice of the sale of his property for nonpayment of taxes), aff’d, 944 So. 2d 289
(Fla. 2006).
8
There was substantial competent evidence to support the decision of the trial
judge. No gross abuse of discretion in the denial of Lewis’s motion to vacate the
final judgment of foreclosure has been demonstrated. We therefore affirm the order
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We also affirm the order discharging lis pendens.
9
Dian Lewis v. Fifth Third Mortgage Company
Case No. 3D09-294
ROTHENBERG, J. (dissenting).
Because the record clearly establishes that a diligent search for service of
process was not conducted by Fifth Third Mortgage Company, the default and final
I respectfully dissent.
As the following record evidence was not provided in the majority opinion
and it is essential to the legal analysis establishing why the judgment must be
vacated, that evidence will be briefly addressed. Ms. Lewis, who purchased her
home in 1996, faithfully and timely made all of her mortgage payments. In the
submitting a claim to her insurer, Ms. Lewis learned that her hurricane coverage
had been eliminated by her insurer and her claim was denied. As a result, and with
no notice to Ms. Lewis, the Fifth Third Mortgage Company forced placed
In January 2007, when Ms. Lewis received her Escrow Account Statement
from Fifth Third Bank,8 showing a charge of $14,289, she immediately contacted
the mortgage company and was informed about the forced placed insurance. Ms.
8
Fifth Third Bank is the servicing agent of Fifth Third Mortgage Company. Thus,
for simplicity, Fifth Third Mortgage Company and Fifth Third Bank will be
collectively referred to as “mortgage company.”
10
Lewis communicated with the mortgage company via telephone, U.S. mail, and
email on several occasions in an effort to pay the arrearages caused by the forced
placed insurance. Based on the forced placed insurance, Ms. Lewis’ monthly
the mortgage company reduced her monthly payments to $2,667.63. Ms. Lewis,
charges.
lodging her objections. She explained that after her insurer denied her property
consultation with her, covering fire, theft, and property damage but providing for
actions when she received an escrow statement from the mortgage company and
discovered that her escrow account, which was used to pay her property taxes and
result of the forced placed insurance. Ms. Lewis explained that she had obtained
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of $4,337.64, due in large part to the insurance it had purchased, and the mortgage
company was refusing to accept payments unless they were in that amount. On
April 5, 2007, the Florida Department of Financial Services notified Ms. Lewis
that the mortgage company is an Ohio financial institution not within its
jurisdiction, and thus, the Department had forwarded her communication to the
mortgage company. On April 2, 2007, she received a default letter from the
mortgage company stating that she owed $8,602.45, however, two weeks later, she
received a statement from the mortgage company stating that she owed only
$2,667.63. Ms. Lewis continued to submit her mortgage payments to the mortgage
On November 16, 2007, Ms. Lewis received a letter from Florida Default
Law Group, P.I. (“the law firm”), a law firm retained by the mortgage company to
collect the debt by foreclosing the lien on the property. Ms. Lewis immediately
responded and requested a breakdown of the moneys owed. She explained to the
law firm that, while the mortgage company claimed she owed $22,901.96, she
believed the amount owed was $15,199.35; she wanted a breakdown so she could
pay the arrearages; and she wanted to resolve the situation as quickly as possible.
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The law firm and Ms. Lewis continued to communicate through emails. On
February 1, 2008, the law firm notified Ms. Lewis that it was “processing an
updated reinstatement letter for [her].” On March 4, 2008, the mortgage company
finally sent Ms. Lewis a letter indicating a reinstatement amount of $27,207, but
without the breakdown Ms. Lewis had been requesting for months. Although the
mortgage company and the law firm were in communication with Ms. Lewis
throughout 2007 and from January 2008 through April 2008, neither the
mortgage company nor the law firm told Ms. Lewis that they were attempting to
serve her to foreclose on the property. The Verified Return of Service reflects that
the law firm retained the process server on November 29, 2007, to serve Ms.
Lewis. On December 22, 2007, when the process server attempted to serve Ms.
Lewis at the property address, he was informed by the tenant residing there that
Ms. Lewis was residing in the Bahamas. Despite being told by Ms. Lewis’ tenant
that Ms. Lewis was residing in the Bahamas, the process server did not attempt to
locate Ms. Lewis in the Bahamas and failed to disclose this information to the trial
court in his Affidavit of Due and Diligent Search, dated March 24, 2008, stating
Although the mortgage company had been communicating with Ms. Lewis
by sending correspondence to her Miami post office box, by email, and directly by
phone, the mortgage company never told Ms. Lewis they were foreclosing on the
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property. Further, when the process server was unable to serve Ms. Lewis at the
property address and learned that she resided in the Bahamas, the mortgage
company did not simply ask Ms. Lewis during their many communications for her
disclose to the trial court that it believed that Ms. Lewis lived in the Bahamas, or
that it had her phone number, post office box address and email and had been in
constant communication with her; and submitted an Affidavit of Due and Diligent
Search, stating that the mortgage company was unable to serve Ms. Lewis because
that defendants are notified of the proceedings and have the opportunity to protect
their rights. Shurman v. Atl. Mortgage & Inv. Corp., 795 So. 2d 952, 953-54 (Fla.
2001); Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 922 So. 2d 340, 343 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2006); see also Redfield Invs. A.V.V. v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 990 So. 2d 1135,
1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that because lack of personal service implicates
due process concerns, the plaintiff must strictly comply with the statutory
requirements); Floyd v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 704 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla.
5th DCA 1998) (holding that constructive service statutes require strict
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requirements deprives the court of jurisdiction over the defendant improperly
permitted, see § 49.011, Fla. Stat. (2007), a mortgage holder may only resort to
service of process under s. 48.194 cannot be had.” § 49.021, Fla. Stat. (2007)
(emphasis added); see Taylor v. Lopez, 358 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
(holding that section 49.021 only authorizes service by publication when the
search, this does not end the inquiry. Shepheard, 922 So. 2d at 343. The trial court
must still determine whether the mortgage holder actually conducted a diligent
search. Redfield, 990 So. 2d at 1188; Giron v. Ugly Mortgage, Inc., 935 So. 2d
580, 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Demars v. Vill. of Sandalwood Lakes Homeowners
Ass’n, 625 So. 2d 1219, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). “[W]hen a plaintiff seeks
Sunflower Homeowners Ass’n, 593 So. 2d 549, 551-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
(quoting Klinger v. Milton Holding Co., 186 So. 526, 534 (Fla. 1938)).
15
The test to determine whether the plaintiff conducted a diligent search is
made diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate
803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Although this Court in Redfield noted that the case law
has not drawn a bright line between efforts that demonstrate due diligence and
those that do not, this Court concluded that the failure to inquire of the most likely
It is clear from the record evidence that the mortgage company failed to
acquire . . . personal service on” Ms. Lewis. Canzoniero, 305 So. 2d at 803. The
mortgage company was in possession of Ms. Lewis’ Miami post office box
number, telephone number, and email address. The process server was told that
Ms. Lewis was living in the Bahamas. Despite being in possession of this
information, and despite the fact that the mortgage company had been in constant
communication with Ms. Lewis during the entire time it was attempting to notify
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her of the foreclosure proceedings, the mortgage company inexplicably failed to
inform her of the foreclosure proceedings, ask her for her current address, or
attempt to obtain her Bahamian address through any other means. Thus, while the
diligent search was made, the instant record demonstrates that the mortgage
company did not conduct a diligent search. Therefore, the trial court reversibly
erred by denying Ms. Lewis’ motion to vacate the default and the final summary
judgment of foreclosure. See Shepheard, 922 So. 2d at 345 (finding that the
default judgment entered against Ms. Shepheard was void due to defective service
of process where the mortgage holder failed to follow leads likely to reveal her
residence).
By simply asking Ms. Lewis to provide her current address, the mortgage
company potentially could have properly served her in the Bahamas either by
mail, in strict compliance with section 48.194, Florida Statutes (2007). If upon
inquiry, Ms. Lewis refused to provide her current address, the mortgage company
could have attempted to locate her Bahamian address by other means. The
search, Ms. Lewis’ whereabouts were unknown, and it had no recourse but to serve
her by publication.
17
A judgment against a defendant based upon improper service by publication
lacks authority of law. Shepheard, 922 So. 2d at 345; Batchin v. Barnett Bank of
Sw. Fla., 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). “Such improper service
renders the judgment either void or voidable.” Shepheard, 922 So. 2d at 345; see
also Decker v. Kaplus, 763 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Reina v.
Barnett Bank, N.A., 766 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). If the service is
763 So. 2d at 1230. However, where the service of process is so defective that it
void judgment is a nullity. M.L. Builders, Inc. v. Reserve Developers, LLP, 769
So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121
I would find, as the Fourth District found in Gans and the Fifth District
found in Shepheard, that the record establishes that the mortgage company’s
the order of sale will defeat the title of the non-party who purchased the property in
good faith at the judicial sale. Gans, 593 So. 2d at 553; Citibank, N.A. v. Data
Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Garvin v. Watkins, 10
18
In summary, the mortgage company failed to conduct a diligent search in
strict compliance with the Florida statutes governing service of process. Because
the mortgage company has the burden of proof when invoking jurisdiction of the
court and it failed to establish that Ms. Lewis had notice of the legal proceedings
against her, the judgment against her is void and must be vacated.
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