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WOMEN ON BOARDS AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE:

A META-ANALYSIS

CORINNE POST

Lehigh University

College of Business and Economics

621 Taylor Street

Bethlehem, PA 18015

Tel: +1.610.758.5882

Fax: +1.610.758.6941

Email: cgp208@lehigh.edu

KRIS BYRON

Syracuse University

Whitman School of Management

Syracuse University

Tel: +1.315.443.4821

Email: klbyron@syr.edu

Accepted for publication at Academy of Management Journal

Nov 5, 2014

Both authors contributed equally to this article. We are indebted to Ann Buchholtz, Dan Dalton,
and Andrew Ward for advice and feedback on drafts of this work. Additionally, we are
extremely grateful to Gerry McNamara and three anonymous reviewers for invaluable feedback
throughout the review process. We also appreciate the comments received from presentations at
the 2014 annual meeting of the Academy of Management and the 2013 "Diversity in Boards"
Conference organized by De Nederlandsche Bank and the University of Groningen.
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ABSTRACT

Despite a large literature examining the relationship between women on boards and firm

financial performance, the evidence is mixed. To reconcile the conflicting results, we statistically

combined the results from 140 studies and examined whether results vary by firms’

legal/regulatory and socio-cultural contexts. We found that female board representation is

positively related to accounting returns and that this relationship is more positive in countries

with stronger shareholder protections -- perhaps because shareholder protections motivate boards

to use the different knowledge, experience, and values that each member brings to the board.

Although the relationship between female board representation and market performance is near-

zero, the relationship is positive in countries with greater gender parity (and negative in countries

with low gender parity) -- perhaps because societal gender differences in human capital may

influence investors’ evaluations of the future earning potential of firms that have more female

directors. Lastly, we found that female board representation is positively related to boards’ two

primary responsibilities, monitoring and strategy involvement. For both firm financial

performance and board activities, we found mean effect sizes comparable to those found in meta-

analyses of other aspects of board composition. We discuss the theoretical and practical

implications of our findings.

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Although business and government leaders have argued for increasing the presence of

women on boards – and some have supported regulations to compel companies to do so (Credit

Suisse, 2012), whether this improves firm performance is unclear. Despite a relatively large

literature examining the relationship between female board representation and firm performance,

the empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. Some studies suggest that female directors add value,

finding that firms with more female directors tend to generate higher returns on assets (Nguyen

& Faff, 2012; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson, 2001) and elicit positive stock market reactions

(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010). In contrast, other studies suggest that female directors

decrease firm performance, finding that firms with more female directors experience lower

accounting returns (Darmadi, 2011; Minguez-Vera & Martin, 2011) and an overall loss of value

for stockholders (Bøhren & Strøm, 2010). Further muddying the waters, several studies have

concluded that female board representation is unrelated to firm performance (Carter, D'Souza,

Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Rose, 2007; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997).

The present meta-analysis aims to reconcile these disparate findings by addressing

several shortcomings in the existing literature. Namely, we examine not just if female board

representation affects firm performance but what conditions may alter this relationship. More

specifically, by capitalizing on the fact that the existing literature on this topic spans firms in 35

countries and five continents, we examine whether firms’ legal/regulatory and socio-cultural

context explain the mixed results. Moreover, we also examine whether female board

representation relates to more proximal factors (i.e., board activities) that may partially mediate

the relationship between board composition and firm financial performance. Specifically, we

examine the relationship between female board representation and board activities that represent

boards’ primary responsibilities (i.e., monitoring and strategy involvement activities).

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This meta-analysis offers three contributions to theory and research on women on boards

(Burke & Mattis, 2010; Vinnicombe, Singh, Burke, Bilimoria, & Huse, 2008) and to the broader

literatures on corporate governance (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Daily, Dalton, &

Cannella Jr., 2003) and board composition (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998b;

Deutsch, 2005; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). First, we develop and test a contingency

model of female representation on boards and firm financial performance that considers country-

level factors that may enhance or diminish the influence of female board representation on firm

performance. Previous research typically fails to consider the role of national context when

modeling the board diversity–firm performance relationship (Johnson et al., 2013; Pye &

Pettigrew, 2005), despite the considerable promise of macro-contextual explanations for

reconciling mixed evidence from individual studies. Second, we contribute to the literature on

women on boards by considering how female board representation may contribute to firm

financial performance. Previous research neglects to account for intermediary mechanisms

linking board diversity and firm financial performance -- thus leaving unanswered why board

diversity may be related to firm performance (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts, McNulty,

& Stiles, 2005; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010b). Specifically, we examine whether,

and under what conditions, boards with more female directors differ in the extent to which they

engage in monitoring activities and are involved with strategy.

Lastly, the results of our quantitative research synthesis offer theoretical and practical

implications by summarizing extant empirical research on the relationship between female board

representation and firm financial performance. By aggregating individual studies, we can detect

robust effects that may hold practical and theoretical significance. Further, by conducting a

thorough summary of the literature, we can identify gaps in the existing literature -- and suggest
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research topics that are ripe for discovery. Moreover, we would argue that such an investigation

is timely given that a growing number of countries have passed or are considering legislation

mandating gender quotas on boards (Credit Suisse, 2012).

FEMALE BOARD REPRESENTATION’S RELATIONSHIP TO FIRM OUTCOMES

Definitions of Key Terms

Here we define our primary constructs of this meta-analysis. We define female board

representation as the number, proportion, or presence of women on boards of directors.

Consistent with the vast majority of research on this topic, we focus on female directors in

general (rather than restricting our analysis to independent or executive female directors).

Guided by research on the multi-dimensionality of organizational performance (Combs, Crook,

& Shook, 2005; Miller, Washburn, & Glick, 2013), we consider two dimensions of firm financial

performance, accounting returns and market performance. Accounting returns, sometimes

referred to as firm profitability, refers to how well a firm utilizes its assets and investments to

generate earnings and represents past or short-term financial performance (Combs et al., 2005;

Gentry & Shen, 2010). The second dimension, market performance, refers to the behavior of a

security or asset in the marketplace, reflecting external perceptions and expectations of a firm’s

future or long-term value (Thaler, 2004). Lastly, we also consider two different board activities,

board monitoring and board strategy involvement activities, as possible intermediary variables

linking female board representation and firm performance. Board monitoring refers to the extent

to which boards engage in activities that provide oversight of the firm and seek to control

managerial opportunism. (Mirroring the extant literature, we focus on how much monitoring

occurs rather than how effectively boards monitor.) Board strategy involvement refers to the

extent to which boards engage in activities related to their strategic advising role and engage in
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decision-making about how the firm should compete in the marketplace. Although firm financial

performance includes other dimensions (e.g., growth) (e.g., Combs et al., 2005) and boards

engage in other activities (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), these dimensions of firm

financial performance and board activities are the only ones that have been examined with some

regularity in this literature, a necessary precondition for inclusion in a meta-analysis.

Theoretical Framework

Although other theories such as agency theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer &

Salancik, 1978), social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), and social categorization theory

(Tajfel, 1981) have been invoked to link female board representation and firm performance,

upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) serves as the framework

underlying this meta-analysis because it provides a clear theoretical foundation for linking board

diversity with firm outcomes. Although originally a theory focused on top management teams,

research has applied upper echelons theory (UET) to boards of directors by likening boards to

“supra top management teams” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 11). According to UET, directors differ

in their cognitive frames, and these cognitive frames, in turn, influence firm outcomes

(Hambrick, 2007). Because directors’ cognitive frames are difficult to capture, much research

applying UET to board directors has used observable characteristics of directors such as their

race or gender as proxies for cognitive frames (Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Krishnan & Park, 2005).

Female Representation on Boards and Firm Financial Performance

According to UET, directors’ cognitive frames, that is, their information-seeking and

information evaluation processes (Hambrick, 2007), are contingent on their experiences,

knowledge and values. And, because these experiences, knowledge, and values shape how

directors seek and interpret information, directors’ cognitive frames shape board decisions,
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decision-making processes, and, ultimately, firm outcomes. In this study, we argue that, because,

in general, female and male directors may differ in their cognitive frames, director heterogeneity

in terms of gender is likely to influence firm performance (e.g., Carpenter, 2002).

First, female directors are likely to bring different cognitive frames to a board due to

differences in experiences and knowledge, thus expanding the available pool of knowledge in

consideration. For example, compared to male directors, female directors tend to have more

university degrees and are more likely to hold advanced degrees (Carter et al., 2010; Hillman,

Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). They are also more likely to

report having strengths in marketing and sales (Groysberg & Bell, 2013). In a study of new

director appointments of UK firms, Singh and her colleagues (2008) found that, as compared to

new male directors, new female directors were more likely to be non-nationals. Moreover,

female directors bring different experiences and knowledge to the board by virtue of their path to

directorships: they are less likely to have been CEOs or COOs and are more likely to come from

non-business backgrounds (Hillman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008).

Female directors may also bring different experiences to the board by virtue of their roles

and experiences outside of work. As the gender gap in earnings has narrowed (Kopczuk, Saez, &

Song, 2010), women yield more influence and control in household purchasing decisions (Phipps

& Burton, 1998). As a result, female directors may bring new and different understandings of

consumer markets to a board (Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008;

Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Additionally, research examining differences between

female and male directors found that female directors report having a more diverse set of non-

work interests and to have greater interest in philanthropy and community service (Groysberg &

Bell, 2013). These differences in the interests and social networks of female directors seem likely
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to translate to insights relevant to firms’ multiple stakeholders.

Second, due to differences in values, we argue that women directors’ cognitive frames

may also influence decision-making processes on the board. That is, we contend that, an

increased representation of female directors on boards may influence not only what information

is brought to bear in decision-making but may also influence how decisions are made. Consistent

with research suggesting that diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups due to their

tendency to engage in deep discussions of disparate knowledge and information and to integrate

this knowledge and information (Loyd, Wang, Phillips, & Lount Jr., 2013; Van Ginkel & Van

Knippenberg, 2008), gender diverse boards may be more stimulated to deeply and extensively

consider, discuss, and integrate the information it holds. Namely, female directors are more

likely to value interdependence, benevolence, and tolerance (Adams & Funk, 2012), which may

help elicit information and perspectives from and stimulate collaboration among all board

members. Moreover, in a study in which board directors completed a test of moral reasoning,

Bart and McQueen (2013) found that female directors were more likely to use a cooperative

decision-making approach that results in fair decisions when competing interests are at stake; in

contrast, male directors were more likely to make “decisions using rules, regulations and

traditional ways of doing business or getting along” (p. 97).

Diverse perspectives provide access to critical -- and potentially performance-enhancing

-- information in the environment (Peterson & Philpot, 2007). Therefore, because female

directors contribute to diversifying the perspectives available to a board (due to their unique

experiences and knowledge), female directors may help improve firms’ ability to generate profit

from its assets and investments (Miller & Triana, 2009). Moreover, a more gender diverse board

means that the firm is likely to have a broader and perhaps more complete understanding of the
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marketplace and of the firms’ multiple stakeholders (e.g., Carter et al., 2003). In addition,

because female directors help elicit multiple viewpoints and cultivate deliberativeness in

decision-making (due to their values), female directors may help improve a firm’s ability to

make decisions that improve financial performance because the consideration of multiple

perspective and deliberativeness tends to improve decision quality (Loyd et al., 2013; Van

Ginkel & Van Knippenberg, 2008). For these reasons, we hypothesize that female board

representation is likely to be positively related to both dimensions of firm financial performance

examined here, accounting returns and market performance.

Hypothesis 1: Female board representation is positively related to firm financial

performance. More specifically, female board representation is positively related
to (a) accounting returns and (b) market performance.

Moderators of the Female Board Representation–Firm Performance Relationship

The extent to which female board representation can positively contribute to firm

financial performance depends on the extent to which boards are motivated to leverage the

diverse knowledge, experience, and values of their members. That is, it seems unlikely that

boards can consistently and uniformly leverage the diversity of experience, knowledge, and

values among board members for positive outcomes given the documented difficulties for groups

to leverage diversity for higher performance: extensive research on the social psychology of

groups has shown that diverse groups vary in their ability to elicit and systematically process the

unique knowledge and values of individual members (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003; Stasser &

Titus, 2003). According to social psychological research on minority voice, when dissenting

information is introduced to a group, it creates a tension that is resolved either by pressures

towards consistency or increased efforts at information processing (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003;

Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). Groups choose information
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processing (rather than conformity pressures) when there exists a motivation to do so (van

Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). These patterns may also exist on boards. For example,

demographic minority directors tend not to speak up as much as others in board meetings

(Westphal & Milton, 2000).

The idea that contextual factors will determine the extent to which boards of directors can

influence firm financial performance is consistent with UET. According to UET, diversity of

cognitive frames on teams will only yield more favorable organizational outcomes when such

teams “engage in mutual and collective interaction [and] share information, resources, and

decisions” (Hambrick, 2007: 336). Research drawing on UET has shown that characteristics of a

firm’s environment (e.g., industry dynamism, environmental turbulence) moderate the

relationship between upper echelons and firm performance (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).

Extending this work, we argue that the national context in which firms reside moderates the

relationship between board gender diversity and firm outcomes. In particular, the degree of

shareholder protections and the extent of gender parity afforded in a particular national context

are contextual factors that are likely conditions that determine how board gender diversity

influences firm outcomes.

Specifically, we argue that female board representation will be more positively related to

firm financial performance in contexts with stronger shareholder protections. Stronger

shareholder protections tend to strengthen corporate governance while weaker protections

undermine governance mechanisms (La Porta, López de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). When

shareholder protections are weak, there is less motivation for board directors to optimize their

decisions because directors cannot easily be held liable for failures of fiduciary responsibility.

Hence, in countries with weaker shareholder protections, directors may be less likely to solicit
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and consider the unique experience, knowledge, and values of female board members, reducing

the likelihood that female directors’ cognitive frames may be leveraged in board decision-

making. In contrast, when shareholders benefit from high legal protections and can sue or

attempt to replace board directors who do not uphold their fiduciary responsibility, directors have

a stronger incentive to share and to draw on the experience, knowledge, and values brought to

the board by each director, which would enhance the positive effects of female board

representation on board decision-making. We expect the relationship between female

representation on boards and firm financial performance to be more positive in countries with

stronger shareholder protections because such protections motivate boards to improve their

decision-making. Therefore, we hypothesize that the extent to which a country offers shareholder

protections will positively moderate the relationship between female board representation and

both dimensions of firm financial performance, accounting returns and market performance.

Hypothesis 2: The relationship between female board representation and firm

financial performance is moderated by shareholder protection strength.
Specifically, the relationships between female board representation and a)
accounting returns and (b) market performance are more positive in countries
with stronger shareholder protections.

Because women on corporate boards are still relatively rare -- with many added only

recently (e.g., Burke & Mattis, 2010), the legitimacy of female directors may be more under

question in some contexts. We argue that female board representation will be more positively

related to firm financial performance in contexts with greater gender parity, that is, in countries

where women have more equal access to resources and opportunities in terms of education,

economic participation, employment, and political empowerment (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi,

2012). Because women in countries with greater gender parity are more likely to possess the

types of human capital appropriate for board positions (Wright, Baxter, & Birkelund, 1995),
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boards in these countries may be more likely to leverage the knowledge, experience and values

female directors bring to decision-making. Female directors in countries with greater gender

parity are more likely to have experiences and knowledge (i.e., work experiences and education)

that allow them to make greater contributions to and have more influence on boards. Female

directors’ greater human capital and the legitimacy such human capital provides are apt to

enhance the potential positive influence of women directors on board processes and outcomes.

In addition to influencing female directors’ legitimacy within the board, gender parity

may also influence the extent to which female directors confer legitimacy to the firm and

otherwise influence external assessments of firms with female directors. The idea that female

board representation can have reputational effects on firms come from research suggesting that

institutional investors pressure firms to increase board gender diversity and favor firms that do so

(e.g., Byoun, Chang, & Kim, 2011). For these reasons, we hypothesize that the extent to which a

nation’s women have more equal access to resources and opportunities will positively moderate

the relationship between female board representation and both dimensions of firm financial

performance, accounting returns and market performance.

Hypothesis 3: The relationship between female board representation and firm

financial performance is moderated by gender parity. Specifically, the
relationship between female board representation and a) accounting returns and
(b) market performance is more positive in countries with greater gender parity.

Female Board Representation and Board Responsibility Activities

Previous models linking female board representation directly to firm performance may be

overly simplistic in that they overlook mediating factors that possibly link board composition to

firm performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Johnson et al., 2013; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Zahra

& Pearce, 1989). Hambrick (2007: 337), for example, laments the paucity of theory development

about the relationship between boards’ profiles (e.g., female board representation) and firm
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performance and refers to it as a “proverbial black box.” We propose two board activities that

constitute boards’ primary responsibilities (American Law Institute, 1994; Zahra & Pearce,

1989), monitoring and involvement in strategy formulation, as mediators that may partially

account for the relationship between female board representation and the dimensions of firm

financial performance under consideration in our model. More specifically, we argue that female

board representation may be associated with more board monitoring and strategy involvement.

Monitoring activities. Here we briefly review agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) because

it provides the theoretical foundation for the monitoring function of boards (Hillman, Nicholson,

& Shropshire, 2008). Then, we come back to the upper echelons theory (UET) framework

because UET helps to explain how boards may contribute to monitoring (in terms of cognitive

frames). According to agency theory, boards are “information systems” that principals use to

verify agent behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Directors’ cognitive frames, derived from their values

and experiences, are likely to enhance the “information systems” that boards represent for

principals (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).

More specifically, due to gender differences in cognitive frames in terms of ethical

reasoning, risk aversion, and concerns about legitimacy, we argue that female directors’ values

and experiences are likely to be especially relevant to influencing how much boards monitor.

First, women tend to make stricter ethical judgments. Meta-analytic evidence suggests that,

compared to men, women tend to apply stricter ethical standards (e.g., Pan & Sparks, 2012) and

are more likely to judge questionable business practices as unethical (Franke, Crown, & Spake,

1997). These value differences may come to bear in the boardroom, as research suggests that

female directors tend to embrace their fiduciary responsibility more strongly than do male

directors, for example, by showing greater propensity than men for sitting on boards’ audit and
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monitoring committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Zhu, Small, & Flaherty, 2010). Second, some

research suggests that women tend to be more risk-averse, and this aversion to risk may manifest

in an increased motivation to fulfill the boards’ obligatory role to provide fiduciary oversight to

avoid the legal, ethical, and reputational risks of not doing so (Chapple, Kent, & Routledge,

2012). Third, and relatedly, women’s experiences with having difficulty establishing credibility

and influencing others means that they tend to be vigilant about preparing for meetings. To

preempt difficulties that they experience in establishing their credibility and influencing others,

women tend to prepare more thoroughly for meetings (Carli, 1999; Foschi, 2000; Singh, Kumra,

& Vinnicombe, 2002). Moreover, these gender differences in behaviors extend to the boardroom:

compared to male directors, female directors tend to be better prepared for board meetings (Huse

& Solberg, 2006), which, in turn, seems likely to be associated with increased monitoring.

Whereas the above arguments pertain to both female inside and outside directors, we note

that women directors are more likely than men to be outside directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;

Adams & Funk, 2012; Simpson, Carter, & D'Souza, 2010; Singh et al., 2008). This is

particularly relevant here because outside directors, in contrast to inside directors, experience

less conflict of interests and are expected to play a greater role in monitoring efforts. Thus to the

extent that female directors are also outside directors, this relative independence also seems

likely to contribute to increased monitoring for boards with greater female board representation.

Strategy involvement. In addition to monitoring, board directors often become involved

in strategy in carrying out their responsibilities to protect shareholder interests (Zahra & Pearce,

1989). Strategy involvement refers to boards’ provision of advice and counsel in shaping strategy

and dealing with the complexity and uncertainty surrounding business decisions (Finkelstein et

al., 2009). Such consultation may occur within or outside the boardroom (Westphal, 1999).
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More specifically, parallel to our arguments regarding female directors’ influence on firm

financial performance in terms of cognitive frames related to market decisions and stakeholder

considerations, we argue that boards with more female directors will exhibit higher levels of

strategy involvement. That is, as mentioned previously, female directors are likely to bring

different cognitive frames to a board due to gender differences in experiences and knowledge,

thus expanding the available pool of knowledge in consideration. For example, compared to

male directors, female directors are more likely to report having strengths in marketing and sales

and tend to have a more diverse set of non-work interests that more often include philanthropy

and community service (Groysberg & Bell, 2013). This knowledge and experience combined

with life experiences that afford unique perspectives on purchasing decisions suggests that

female directors may provide additional considerations that are useful in strategy deliberations

(Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003). Thus,

because a more gender diverse board means that the board is likely to consider a greater and

broader variety of perspectives, female directors’ knowledge and experiences may result in

boards becoming more involved in providing counsel and shaping strategy, especially as boards

are increasingly able to deal with the complexity and uncertainty surrounding business decisions

and to help firms reduce uncertainty surrounding strategic decisions.

Hypothesis 4: Female board representation is positively related to board

responsibility activities. More specifically, female board representation is
positively related to (a) board monitoring activities and (b) board strategy
involvement.

Moderators of the Female Board Representation-Board Activities Relationships

Above we argued that female board representation is likely to be positively related to the

two board activities that comprise the primary responsibilities of boards of directors, monitoring

and strategy involvement. It is, however, unlikely that the effects of board composition on board
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activities are uniform across a variety of contexts (Johnson et al., 2013; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005).

As we argued earlier, strong shareholder protections and gender parity may serve as important

motivators for directors to more actively elicit and systematically process information from all

board members. Hence, the relationships between female representation on boards and both

board monitoring activities and board strategy involvement are expected to be more positive in

countries with stronger shareholder protections and in countries with greater gender parity

because these contexts may motivate boards to consider diverse perspectives.

This perspective is consistent with other research and theory that supports the notion that

a board’s attention to monitoring and strategy involvement is context dependent (Tuggle,

Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010a; Tuggle et al., 2010b). Furthermore, as surmised by agency

theorists, boards’ motivation to monitor (e.g., when shareholder protections are strong and

gender parity is greater) plays a large role in the leveraging of board information richness for

monitoring (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) suggest, for example, that the

extent to which board human capital improves board activities may depend on directors’

motivation to monitor and be involved in firm strategy. For these reasons, we argue that the

board’s motivation to consider multiple perspectives may account for differences in the

relationship between female board representation and board monitoring and between female

board representation and board strategy involvement. As we hypothesized above, the extent to

which the legal/regulatory context enforces shareholder protections and the extent to which the

socio-cultural context affords gender parity likely moderate the strength of these relationships.

Hypothesis 5: The relationship between female board representation and board

responsibility activities is moderated by shareholder protection strength.
Specifically, the relationship between female board representation and a) board
monitoring activities and (b) board strategy involvement is more positive in
countries with stronger shareholder protections.
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Hypothesis 6: The relationship between female board representation and board

responsibility activities is moderated by gender parity. Specifically, the
relationship between female board representation and a) board monitoring
activities and (b) board strategy involvement is more positive in countries with
greater gender parity.

Lastly, consistent with others, we propose that these two board activities -- board

monitoring and board strategy involvement -- are likely to generally improve firm financial

performance. Board monitoring may curb inefficient spending and increase firm efficiency by

reducing agency costs (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996). In addition, when board

monitoring leads to actions such as CEO replacement, it may also send positive signals to the

market. However, we also acknowledge that too much board monitoring can decrease

shareholder value (Adams & Ferreira, 2007): because monitoring is costly, too much monitoring

-- especially in light of other governance mechanisms -- is redundant and inefficient (Rediker &

Seth, 1995). It is possible that board gender diversity only contributes to firm financial

performance when monitoring activities are both effective and nonredundant. For example, the

quality of board monitoring and the context in which the monitoring occurs both influence the

effect of monitoring on firm performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009).

Additionally, board strategy involvement may influence firm performance because it

informs strategic choices such as acquisitions, reorganizations, or takeover bids (Bhagat &

Black, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) that influence firm performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).

Strategy involvement may result in actions such as strategic alliances, international expansions,

and mergers or acquisitions that may increase revenue and allow economies of scope or scale

(Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997). Moreover, such actions may serve as positive

signals to the market about the firm’s future prospects by suggesting the firms’ growth potential

(Park & Mezias, 2005). Yet, we also acknowledge that strategy involvement may negatively
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influence firm financial performance such as when boards have undue influence without

requisite knowledge, and thus make poor decisions that both decrease revenue, increase costs,

and send negative signals to the market (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001).

In summary, although we anticipate that board monitoring and strategy involvement are

both like to have generally positively relationships to accounting returns and market

performance, we do not present formal hypotheses here or offer tests of these relationships. Too

few of the studies in our sample included data that would enable us to assess the mediating role

of board monitoring or strategy involvement in the relationship between female board

representation and either dimension of firm performance. Moreover, given the complex, and

inevitably indirect relationships of board monitoring and strategy involvement with firm

performance, we are not able to do give sufficient attention to these relationships here -- and so

focus instead on whether female board representation is related to these two board activities.

METHOD

Criteria for Inclusion

The primary focus of this research synthesis is the relationship between female board

representation and two dimensions of firm financial performance. We supplemented these

analyses with analyses that considered the relationship between female board representation and

potentially more proximal outcomes, the extent to which boards engage in activities to fulfill

their two primary responsibilities (i.e., monitoring and strategy involvement).

All included studies were conducted at the firm-level (as opposed to director-level or

country-level) and some studies included multiple firm years. To be included, studies had to be

published or, if unpublished, completed by May 2014, and written in the English language.

Additionally, studies had to include an effect size or include data that could be used to calculate
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an effect size that could be used in this meta-analysis. We contacted the corresponding authors of

studies that did not include an effect size and included the study when the authors provided the

necessary information upon request. We excluded studies that did not report enough information

to calculate an effect size and did not respond to or were unable to fulfill our request for data that

we could use to calculate an effect size. We also excluded a small number of studies that

measured female board representation after the factors we proposed as outcomes (e.g.,

Moeykens, 2011), used measures of board diversity that combined gender with other aspects of

diversity such as race (e.g., Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Westphal & Khanna, 2003), or

employed samples of non-profit organizations (e.g., Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin, 1996).

Search Strategy

To locate studies for potential inclusion in our meta-analysis, we conducted several

searches. First, we searched two databases, ABI Inform Global and JSTOR, for studies published

through May 2014 using the search terms, gender, female, women, diversity, heterogeneity, or

composition combined with the terms board, directors, or governance. Through these searches,

we retrieved 3,027 citations (although there was some overlap between the studies retrieved in

the two databases). Second, we reviewed the reference lists of 20 review articles that covered the

topic of board governance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998b; Deutsch, 2005; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter,

2012; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). Third, we sent emails to 12 prominent authors in this

field and sent emails using listservs for four divisions of the Academy of Management (i.e.,

GDO, BPS, SIM, and OB) requesting unpublished or published studies on this topic. Lastly, after

completing all of these searches, we manually searched the reference lists of studies that met the

inclusion criteria to locate studies that we may not have located in our other searches.

Because we were able to locate relatively few studies that had examined more proximal
 20

board activities, we took additional efforts to locate these studies (and others that fit our

inclusion criteria). First, we conducted an additional database search of ABI Inform Global using

the search terms, strategy, strategic, monitoring, meetings, or attendance combined with the

terms board or directors for study abstracts. Through this search, we retrieved 1,269 scholarly

citations published by May 2014 in the English language. Second, we conducted searches with

the search terms female or women combined with directors on the Social Science Research

Network (SSRN), which includes both published and unpublished papers. Lastly, we manually

searched the tables of contents of four journals that regularly publish research on boards of

directors, Strategic Management Journal, Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance: An

International Review, and the Journal of Business Ethics, for the years that the respective journal

was published between January1989 and May 2014.

For all studies considered in our searches, we reviewed them by reading the title, abstract

(when available), and any other study information available. We eliminated duplicates and

studies clearly not related to this topic or not containing quantitative data (e.g., case studies). We

retrieved the remaining studies to determine whether they met the inclusion criteria. We should

note that we took several steps to address the potential for meta-analytic results to be biased due

to the fact that statistically significant results are more likely to be published. Namely, we were

able to include many studies in which the relationships of interest to us may not have been the

focus of the study because we employed broad search terms (without reference to any

hypothesized outcomes) and because we manually searched several journals. We also considered

and included studies that were not published (e.g., unpublished conference papers, dissertations).

One hundred forty (140) studies met the criteria for inclusion; these studies, listed in the

appendix, include 92 journal articles, 8 theses or dissertations (doctoral, master’s, or bachelor’s),

 21

35 conference or working papers, 4 technical reports, and 1 book chapter. Because some of the

studies had multiple independent samples, the 140 studies included 144 independent samples,

which represent separate effect sizes by industry sector or by country. These studies’ combined

sample size consists of 90,070 firms (although this number may include some duplicate firms as

several studies drew firms from common, yet ever-changing, populations such as the Fortune

500). Table 1 summarizes the number of studies by country.

---------------------------------

Insert Table 1 about here

---------------------------------

Study Coding

We applied a number of decision rules when coding study characteristics and any

potential moderators. Our philosophy in developing and applying these rules was to make

conservative and consistent decisions. When a study gave a range or approximate value for the

sample size, we recorded the lowest number. When an effect size represented x number of firms

over multiple years, we coded the sample size as the x number of unique firms associated with

each effect size (rather than by firm-year observations). The first author served as the primary

coder; the second author coded a sample of 25% of the studies to assess interrater agreement or

reliability. Before proceeding with the meta-analysis, we ensured that we coded consistently and

resolved any disagreements through discussion until we reached consensus.

Primary Study Variables

Reflecting the broad and diverse literature that has examined the role of women on

boards of directors, the studies included in this meta-analysis examined the study variables in

varied ways. Although some have criticized meta-analyses for combining “apples” with
 22

“oranges,” including studies that are diverse in terms of sample and measurement allows for

more generalizable results and for the exploration of whether these differences explain variation

in observed results. Here we describe how each of the variables included in this meta-analysis

were measured in their respective primary studies.

Female board representation. Studies considered female board representation in a

variety of ways including the number or percent of women, the presence of x number of women,

and gender diversity measures (e.g., Blau index). For most studies, female directors refers to

female executive and non-executive directors. Some countries have a dual-board structure, and,

for studies of firms in these countries, the measure nearly always considered female supervisory

board members only. Two studies (i.e., Honeine & Swan, 2011) included separate measures for

female executive directors and female non-executive directors, and our analysis includes both.

Two studies included in this meta-analysis (i.e., Hahn, 2007) only included a measure of female

non-executive directors.

Firm financial performance. We used Combs et al.’s (2005) coding system to categorize

each measure of firm financial performance. Accounting returns included accounting-based

measures of firm performance such as ROA, ROE, employee productivity, and ROIC. Market

performance included market-based measures of firm performance such as market-to-book ratio,

Tobin’s Q, stock performance, and shareholder returns.

Board activities. We used a coding system based on Eisenhardt (1989) to categorize each

measure of board activities. Board monitoring activities included board activities that provide

oversight of the firm and seek to control managerial opportunism. Because boards’ monitoring

mechanisms (i.e., the specific processes through which boards keep managers aligned with

shareholders) remain elusive in the strategic leadership literature (Finkelstein et al., 2009), we
 23

conform to the existing literature that has often relied on proxies for monitoring (e.g., number of

board meetings). Specifically, board monitoring included measures of time spent devoted to

board activities or tasks (e.g., length of board meetings, number of board meetings, or attendance

problems (reverse-coded)), board’s demand for audit effort, and the extent to which boards

control or influence activities such as CEO compensation. In contrast to board monitoring, which

is concerned with mitigating managerial opportunism, strategy involvement is concerned with the

extent of board involvement in the strategic decision-making process. Again, we relied on the

existing literature to guide our decisions about which measures gauge board strategy

involvement. More specifically, we only coded measures as strategy involvement when the

author(s) of the study referred to them as being concerned with strategy involvement. As such,

strategy involvement included measures of the extent to which boards influence strategy (e.g.,

strategic control, strategic tasks, directors’ concern for strategy). One study (i.e., Fondas &

Sassalos, 2000) had a single measure of board activities that included both monitoring and

strategy involvement, and we included it as monitoring because the measure is comprised of

more monitoring activities than strategy involvement activities.

Moderators

We coded the studies for several potential moderators to determine if they explained

variation in the effect sizes -- including many more potential moderators than indicated here.

Unfortunately, a lack of variation at the study-level or insufficient data reporting precluded us

from analyzing other potential moderators (e.g., quotas or regulations regarding female board

representation, tokenism or a critical mass of female directors, the existence of other minorities

on the board, CEO duality, board size).

Shareholder protection strength. Countries vary in the extent to which they afford, have
 24

codified, and tend to enforce shareholder protections (e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,

& Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). We coded each study or

independent sample within a study using The World Bank’s (2014) strength of investor

protection index, which consists of three dimensions of shareholder protections: (1) the extent to

which there is transparency of related-party transactions, (2) the extent to which directors are

held liable for self-dealing, and (3) the ease with which shareholder can sue for director

misconduct. Based on Djankov et al.’s (2008) methodology, this index includes all countries

unlike other similar indices that include only a sub-set of countries (Djankov et al., 2008; La

Porta et al., 1998; Spamann, 2010). For studies that drew samples from a single country, we

entered the index associated with that country. When studies drew samples from five or fewer

countries, we entered the average index for those countries. We were not able to code a relatively

small number of studies with large multi-country firm populations or samples such as the Forbes

Global 2000. As shown in Table 1, the range is 3.3 (i.e., Vietnam) to 9.7 (i.e., New Zealand) for

the studies in our meta-analysis.

Gender parity. Countries vary in the extent to which they offer women equal access to

resources and opportunities (Hausmann et al., 2012). We relied on The World Economic

Forum’s Global Gender Gap score (Hausmann et al., 2012), a measure of each country’s gender

equality in terms of economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and

political empowerment. We coded studies in terms of the gender parity score of the country in

which the firms are located, entering the average score for samples drawn from five or fewer

countries. We were not able to code a relatively small number of studies with large multi-country

firm populations or samples (e.g., the 24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development countries) and one country for which there was no score (i.e., Bosnia-
 25

Herzegovina). As shown in Table 1, the range for the studies in this meta-analysis is .5478 (i.e.,

Pakistan) to .8403 (i.e., Norway), such that larger scores indicate greater equality.

Calculating the Effect Size

We computed the correlation for each study from correlations, t values, means and

standard deviations, or events for different conditions. When a correlation was not provided, we

calculated an effect size by comparing two conditions that varied in terms of female board

representation (e.g., no women on the board and at least one woman on the board).

Because the formulae used in this meta-analysis require that the studies used are

statistically independent, we took several steps to avoid violating the assumption of

independence. First, when multiple studies reported on the same dataset, we included the results

from the dataset only once. For example, we located some dissertations or conference papers that

were subsequently published as journal articles (e.g., Strøm, 2008; Tacheva & Huse, 2006), and

we excluded any effect sizes that overlapped between the two studies. To identify possible

duplicate datasets, we used the technique outlined by Wood (2008) and also scrutinized the data

by examining the studies by the source (e.g., database, list, or stock exchange) of the data. In

general, we found that this was rarely the case; we located no studies that completely overlapped

in terms of sample, year, and variables. Second, because some studies used multiple measures of

female board representation, multiple measures of a particular hypothesized outcome, or

included multiple time periods, we combined all measures or time periods from the same study

to avoid losing information or violating the assumption of independence. (We should note that

many studies reported only one measure or reported the average across measures or aspects thus

eliminating the need for us to combine them.)

We used a shifting unit of analysis approach to further avoid violating the assumption of
 26

independence (Cooper, 1998). Such an approach allows for the retention of as much data as

possible from each study while avoiding any independence assumptions regarding effect sizes.

Following this approach, we combined effect sizes within a sample to the extent possible for

each analysis. For example, when calculating the overall mean effect size associated with

accounting returns, we combined all relevant effect sizes within a sample. However, if the effect

sizes within a sample differed in terms of a moderator, then they were kept separate and entered

into each sub-group analysis in later analyses. For example, when analyzing whether the study

design lagged performance or measured it cross-sectionally, we separated effect sizes within a

sample when they used different types of measures and analyzed each type of measure in its

respective sub-group analysis.

Analysis Strategy

For the meta-analyses, we calculated random-effects analyses using Wilson’s meta-

analysis macros for SPSS (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2005). For each analysis, each effect

size is weighted by its inverse within-study variance and the between-studies variance (τ2). We

chose a random-effects model because our analyses suggest that the studies included in our

analysis are not homogenous, and because we wanted to make inferences that can be extended

beyond the studies included in the analysis (Field, 2001; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). For each

analysis, we calculated the mean effect size across studies, its 95% confidence interval, and a Qw,

a within-group homogeneity statistic that has an approximate chi-square distribution with k - 1

degrees of freedom. A Qw that is statistically significant indicates that the effect sizes underlying

the analysis have significant variability; a Qw that is not statistically significant indicates that the

variability of the underlying effect sizes is sufficiently explained by sampling error variance.

We also examined several continuous moderators. To do so, we fitted weighted least

 27

squares regression models, regressing the effect size on the continuous moderator(s) -- a

procedure also referred to as meta-regression. In these analyses, we are examining whether

variation (heterogeneity) in effect sizes is explained by the moderator variable(s). That is, does

the direction and strength of the effect sizes vary based on the moderator variable(s)? For each

hypothesis involving a potential continuous moderator, we inspected the regression coefficient to

determine the potential direction of the moderating effect and inspected the associated z-score to

determine whether the regression model explains significant between-study variance.

RESULTS

Female Board Representation and Firm Financial Performance

Hypothesis 1 predicted that female board representation is positively related to (a)

accounting returns and (b) market performance. Our results suggest that firms with greater

female board representation tend to have higher accounting returns (r = +0.047), as shown in

Table 2. Although this relationship is relatively small, the 95% confidence interval does not

include zero (+0.033, +0.061), thus supporting Hypothesis 1a. Based on the results from more

than 100 studies, it appears that firms with more women on the board have higher accounting

returns, however, the heterogeneity statistic suggests that there is significant unaccounted for

variation in the studies that underlie the mean effect size, suggesting that a search for moderators

is warranted (Qw(108)= 170.64, p < .001). Our results failed to support Hypothesis 1b, as the

95% confidence interval includes zero (r = +0.014; 95% CI: -0.002, +0.031). Based on the

results from more than 70 studies, it appears that, in general, female board representation is not

significantly related to market performance. In fact, we find that the mean effect size associated

with female board representation and market performance is significantly lower than the mean

effect size associated with female board representation and accounting returns, Qb(1) = 8.80, p
 28

< .01. However, the heterogeneity statistic associated with female board representation and

market performance suggests that a search for moderators is warranted (Qw(77) = 167.53, p < .

001).

---------------------------------

Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here

---------------------------------

Hypotheses 2a and 3a predicted that shareholder protections strength and gender parity,

respectively, in the country where firms are located will moderate the relationship between

female board representation and accounting returns. To examine these hypotheses, we fitted a

weighted least squares regression model, regressing the effect size on the continuous moderators,

the shareholder protection index and the gender parity score for each effect size based on where

the study’s firms were located. As shown in Table 3, we found that the relationship between

female board representation and accounting returns is more positive for firms in countries with

stronger shareholder protections (b = .009, SEb = .004, p < .05), supporting Hypothesis 2a. We

then calculated the predicted values for the range of shareholder protections values in the sub-

sample of studies comprising this analysis. We found that, when shareholder protections at their

lowest (i.e., 4.7 in the Netherlands and 5.0 in Germany or China), female board representation

has a near-zero relationship to accounting returns (r < +0.02); when shareholder protections are

highest (i.e., 9.7 in New Zealand, 8.7 in Malaysia, and 8.3 in Israel), female board representation

is more positively related to accounting returns (r > +0.06). Next, failing to find support for

Hypothesis 3a, we found that gender parity is not a significant moderator of the female board

representation-accounting returns relationship, (b = .007, SEb = .138, n.s.).

Hypotheses 2b and 3b predicted that shareholder protections strength and gender parity,
 29

respectively, in the country where the study’s firms were located will moderate the relationship

between female board representation and market performance. To examine these hypotheses, we

fitted a weighted least squares regression model, regressing the effect size on the continuous

moderators, the shareholder protection index and gender parity scores associated with each effect

size. As shown in Table 3, failing to find support for Hypothesis 2b, we found that shareholder

protections is not a significant moderator of the female board representation-market performance

relationship, (b = -0.002, SEb = .006, n.s.). Next, we found that the relationship between female

board representation and market performance is more positive for firms in countries with greater

gender parity (b = 0.461, SEb = .184, p < .05), thus supporting Hypothesis 3b. We calculated the

predicted values for the range of gender parity scores among studies in this analysis. We found

that, when gender parity is lowest (i.e., .5478 in Pakistan, .6320 in Kuwait, and .6442 in India),

female board representation is near-zero or negatively related to market performance (r < -0.03);

when gender parity is highest (i.e., in Nordic countries such as .8403 in Norway and .8159 in

Sweden), female board representation is positively related to market performance (r > +0.05).

Exploratory Analyses for Firm Financial Performance

We conducted two analyses to address the concern that these results are due to reverse

causality or to an omitted variable. Following the model of Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes (2003),

we explored whether study design moderated the relationship between female board

representation and accounting returns and between female board representation and market

performance, comparing effect sizes derived from firm performance lagged by one or more years

with effect sizes derived from cross-sectional or time-series data with no time lag for firm

performance. We found that study design was not a significant moderator of the relationship

between female board representation and either accounting returns or market performance (Qb(1)
 30

= 1.75, n.s.; and Qb(1)= 0.90, n.s.; respectively). Although for both accounting returns and

market performance, time-lagged studies had more positive mean effect sizes than did non-

lagged studies, they were not significantly different (for accounting returns, r = +0.065 and r =

+0.041, respectively; and, for market performance, r = +0.031 and r = +0.011, respectively). We

also investigated board independence as a possible moderator because female directors are more

likely to be independent directors. We found that board independence does not significantly

account for variation in the observed effect sizes, b = -.016, SEb = .034, n.s., k = 49, for

accounting returns; and b = -.030, SEb = .096, n.s., k = 18, for market performance.

Female Board Representation and Board Activities

Next, we examined whether there is a positive relationship between female board

representation and the extent to which boards engage in activities related to their board

responsibilities, and, more specifically, the extent to which boards engage in monitoring

activities (Hypothesis 4a) and the extent to which they engage in strategy involvement activities

(Hypothesis 4b). As shown in Table 2, we found that female board representation is positively

related to board monitoring (r = +0.054; 95%CI: +0.011, +0.096), thus supporting Hypothesis

4a. We should note that the heterogeneity statistic associated with this mean effect size suggests

that significant variation is unaccounted for (Qw(26) = 136.35, p < .001), thus, we examine our

hypothesized moderators below (i.e., shareholder protection strength and gender parity). As

shown in Table 2, we also found that female board representation is positively related to board

strategy involvement (r = +0.093; 95%CI: +0.012, +0.172), thus supporting Hypothesis 4b.

Moreover, the heterogeneity statistic associated with this mean effect size indicates that

moderators are unlikely to be present (Qw(3)= 5.55, n.s.). Because this statistic suggests that a

search for moderators is not warranted and because this analysis consists of only four studies
 31

representing only two countries, we do not proceed to investigate Hypotheses 5b and 6b, which

predicted that shareholder protection strength and gender parity, respectively, will moderate the

female board representation-board strategy involvement relationship.

Finally, whereas we cannot examine potential moderators of the female board

representation-board strategy involvement relationship, we can examine whether the relationship

between female board representation and monitoring activities is moderated by the extent to

which the country has stronger shareholder protections and greater gender parity (Hypotheses 5a

and 6a, respectively). As shown in Table 3, we found that the relationship between female board

representation and monitoring is more positive for firms in countries with stronger shareholder

protections (b = .024, SEb = .007, p < .01), thus supporting Hypothesis 5a. In calculating the

predicted values for this sub-sample of studies, we found that, when shareholder protections are

lowest (i.e., 5.0 in China and Spain), female board representation has a near-zero relationship to

board monitoring activities (r < 0.01); when shareholder protections are highest (i.e., index

greater than 8 in Israel, US, and Malaysia), female board representation is more positively

related to monitoring activities (r > +0.08). Lastly, failing to find support for Hypothesis 6b, we

found that gender parity does not significantly moderate the female board representation-

monitoring relationship, (b = .237, SEb = .225, n.s.).

DISCUSSION

This meta-analysis considers not just if female board members affect firm performance

but also examines what conditions alter this relationship and how female board representation

may affect firm financial performance. Drawing on UET, we proposed that women on boards of

directors – due to their differences in terms of knowledge, experience, and values -- shape both

the content and process of board decision-making and board activities that ultimately affect firm
 32

performance. Results from our meta-analysis of 144 independent samples show that firms with

more female directors tend to have higher accounting returns but not necessarily stronger market

performance. In support of our novel contingency model of female representation on boards of

directors and firm financial performance, we found that the relationship between women on

boards and accounting returns is more positive in countries with stronger stakeholder protections.

We also found that firms with more female directors have better market performance in countries

with greater gender parity. Lastly, in examining how female directors may be related to what

boards do, we found that firms whose boards have more female directors tend to be more

engaged in activities central to boards’ responsibilities: monitoring and strategy involvement.

Again, in support of our contextual model, we found that the female board representation-

monitoring relationship is more positive in countries with stronger shareholder protections.

Theoretical Implications and Future Research Directions

An important innovation in our model is the identification and testing of contextual

factors that condition the relationship between female board representation and firm financial

performance. We found support for our theoretical contention that female directors’ cognitive

frames positively contribute to board decision-making: perhaps because female directors bring

experiences, knowledge, and values that increase the pool of information considered in decision-

making and cultivate deliberativeness in decision-making, female board representation improves

firms’ ability to generate profits from its assets and investments. In contrast, we found that

female board representation does not uniformly influence market performance, perhaps because

the behavior of a security in the market place reflects not only a firm’s ability to generate profits,

but also external perceptions and expectations of the firm’s future or long term value. A

complementary explanation for the finding that board gender composition is positively related to
 33

accounting returns but unrelated to market performance is that boards may have more control

over accounting returns than over market performance (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).

Further, we found the positive relationship between women on boards and accounting

returns to be even stronger when boards experience an information-processing stimulus that

motivates them to leverage the decision-making resources (i.e., knowledge, experience and

values) that women bring to the board (i.e., when shareholder protections are stronger). We

interpret our finding that gender parity does not moderate the female board representation-

accounting returns relationship to suggest that factors more directly relevant to the board (e.g.,

laws governing board behavior such as shareholder protections laws and regulations) may

provide more motivation for board directors to optimize their decisions than socio-cultural

factors (e.g., gender equality in access to resources and opportunities in a society at large),

which, being more diffuse, have less of a direct impact on board processes.

While we find no evidence of a direct relationship between women on boards and market

performance, our results suggest that the relationship is conditioned by the context. It is more

positive in contexts where there is more gender parity, presumably because the presence of

women on boards confers more legitimacy to firms in contexts where men and women have

similar human capital as compared to in contexts where women, on average, have less human

capital than men. Because gender parity influences the relationship with market performance but

not with accounting returns, we interpret this to suggest that human capital differences among

men and women in a society at large may influence investors’ evaluations of the future earnings

of firms that have a higher representation of female directors more so than they may influence

board dynamics. At the same time, we find no evidence that the relationship between female

board representation and market performance is contingent on shareholder protections,

 34

suggesting that any performance information that female board representation conveys to

investors is independent of shareholder protection laws or regulation.

Our study also contributes to the literature on women on boards by showing how and

under what conditions female board representation shapes activities that constitute the boards’

primary responsibilities. We found support for our contention that the cognitive frames female

directors bring to boards promote monitoring activities and board strategic involvement --

perhaps because female directors’ values and experiences may bring perspectives that require the

board to discuss issues in more depth and to consider a wider variety of stakeholders. For

example, gender differences in risk aversion and ethical sensitivity may heighten board attention

to monitoring activities. Moreover, we found the influence of female board representation on

monitoring to be even stronger in contexts of stronger shareholder protections – presumably

because the shareholder protections act as a stimulus to motivate boards to solicit and consider

the perspectives of each director, which would enhance the positive effects of female board

representation on decision-making inputs and processes.

In addition to informing theory, our study also informs future research. First, our results

raise the question of why women on boards affect some, but not other, performance indicators.

Since varied performance indicators are likely to capture distinct dimensions of performance

(Combs et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2013), perhaps different theoretical mechanisms underline the

relationship between women on boards and alternate performance indicators. Relatedly, we note

that some dimensions of firm performance such as operational performance indicators across the

value chain (e.g., customer service, delivery time in outbound logistics, new product

development time) and growth (e.g., in market share or sales) have received very limited

attention in this literature despite that theory may link them to board diversity. This should
 35

encourage researchers examining board diversity to develop arguments that are theoretically

relevant to the firm outcome(s) of interest. In doing so, researchers will be better positioned to

articulate theoretically-derived boundaries of these relationships.

Second, by illustrating how different theoretical mechanisms (motivation to consider

diverse perspectives and director legitimacy) enhance or restrict the influence of organizational

elites on firm outcomes, our study may encourage the search for and identification of novel

moderators of the relationship between upper echelons and firm outcomes. As an example,

whereas our study identified a stimulus that may motivate boards to consider diverse

perspectives (i.e., shareholder protections), researchers should continue to investigate other

information-processing stimuli (e.g., environmental uncertainty, environmental munificence,

ownership) that may also motivate boards to leverage the knowledge, experience and values that

female directors bring to the firm. Third and similarly, whereas our study identified one socio-

cultural factor that may affect the extent to which female directors influence market evaluations

of firms’ future earnings (i.e., gender parity), researchers should continue to investigate other

factors that may likewise moderate the relationship between board diversity and firm

performance. For example, the relationship between female board representation and market

performance may be more positive in industries that primarily serve final customers (as

compared to business customers) because, in customer-proximal industries, female directors may

be seen as more capable and legitimate, thus potentially strengthening the market’s interpretation

of female board representation as it relates to firm future performance.

Lastly, our results suggest that researchers should attempt to account for the mechanisms

through which board composition may affect firm performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pye &

Pettigrew, 2005; van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009). Because monitoring and strategy
 36

involvement are considered key responsibilities of a board (American Law Institute, 1994; Zahra

& Pearce, 1989), we proposed these two board activities as theoretically grounded intermediary

mechanisms that may link two otherwise distal constructs (i.e., board composition and firm

performance) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Our results suggest that

researchers should continue to examine to examine how board composition influences the extent

to which boards fulfill their responsibilities and whether any additional factors motivate boards

to heighten their attention to these responsibilities. Given the small of number of studies that

have examined the relationship between female board representation and board strategy

involvement, future research should continue to examine this link especially in light of a recent

studies suggesting that female directors positively influence firm performance through their

involvement in corporate strategy (Levi, Lia, & Zhang, in press; Post, Rahman, & McQuillen, in

press). In addition, future research could explore complementary mechanisms through which

female board representation may affect firm performance, including advice and counsel to the

CEO (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and linkages to critical information and resources in the

environment (Peterson & Philpot, 2007). Lastly, we would be remiss to not acknowledge again

the possibility that monitoring and strategy involvement activities by the board are unlikely to be

linearly related to firm performance as too much monitoring and perhaps too much strategy

involvement by the board may be costly and unproductive (e.g., Rediker & Seth, 1995).

Although the primary studies did not provide sufficient data allowing us to examine

whether these board activities (i.e., board monitoring and strategy involvement) mediate the

relationship between female board representation and firm financial performance, it seems likely

that the influence of board directors on firm performance would operate -- at least, in part --

through board activities that represent directors’ often legally mandated responsibilities. We
 37

hope that this meta-analysis spurs additional research examining the influence of female board

representation on proximal governance mechanisms. Additionally, we hope that future research

examines the extent to which board activities explain various dimensions of firm performance –

and, importantly, considers the role of contextual factors that may alter these relationships.

Limitations

Meta-analyses are always constrained by the population of studies available for a given

research question. In this meta-analysis, we relied on country-level variables (i.e., shareholder

protections, gender parity) to test our theoretical model, because none of the board, firm, or

industry characteristics we considered to operate through our proposed theoretical mechanisms

were adequately reported by a large enough number in the primary studies in our sample. Indeed,

we consider the theoretical mechanisms in our model to be broadly applicable to other potential

moderators, and we gave serious consideration to board, firm, and industry characteristics that

might motivate boards to consider diverse perspectives or that might increase the legitimacy of

female directors. For example, in searching among the studies in our sample for additional

stimuli that may motivate boards to consider diverse perspectives, board size was a likely

candidate, as larger boards may limit the influence of any individual director and may constrain

the extent to which the board in general has influence over firm-level decisions (Carpenter &

Westphal, 2001; Tuggle et al., 2010b; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Similarly, in searching for

additional indicators of female director legitimacy, we considered industry characteristics, such

as proximity to consumer or environmental uncertainty. More research examining other factors

that may determine whether and how female directors influence firm performance is needed.

We were particularly interested in considering the role of critical mass as a stimulus that

would motivate boards to consider diverse perspectives. Theory suggests that minority group
 38

members are more likely to contribute unique experiences, knowledge, and values when their

numbers reach a critical mass rather than when they are in a token position (Ely, 1994). Drawing

on past research finding that groups’ derision and disdain of a dissenting minority opinion turned

to seriousness and respect when the number of dissenting minority is increased to three (Asch,

1961), some research has begun to evaluate whether boards require a critical mass of three

female directors before they can effectively leverage the knowledge, experience and values these

women bring to the board (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008; Kramer, Konrad, & Erkut, 2006;

Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011). Because less than a handful of studies measure female

representation as a critical mass (three or more female directors) and because, for most studies,

the vast majority of firms had either no or one female director, we were not able to evaluate this

question in our meta-analysis. Still, our finding that firms’ accounting returns are more positive

when women are better represented on boards supports the main contention underlying critical

mass studies – and we hope that researchers continue to examine whether female directors have a

greater influence in conditions when their appointments do not represent tokenism.

Lastly, another limitation of our meta-analysis of the relationship between female

representation on boards and firm performance lies in the difficulty of accounting for

endogeneity caused by reverse causality or omitted variables (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;

Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). Researchers of primary studies may employ

strategies for alleviating endogeneity that are not available to meta-analysts such as lagging

dependent variables (Carter et al., 2010) and two-stage least squares modeling (Gujarati &

Porter, 2009). We made two attempts at elucidating the issues of possible endogeneity in our

meta-analyses of female board representation and firm financial performance (as described in our

exploratory analyses). First, we explored whether study design (i.e., cross-sectional or lagged)
 39

moderated the female board representation–firm performance relationships and found no

significant difference by research design. Second, we explored whether we could eliminate the

possibility that an omitted variable (i.e., board independence) was a source of endogeneity, and

found that our findings cannot be accounted for by the effects of board independence. (We

should note that the relationship between female board representation and board monitoring

activities do not change when board independence was added as covariate to our model,

suggesting that board independence does not substitute for other governance mechanisms such as

shareholder regulations (Rediker & Seth, 1995).) However, we cannot -- nor do we -- claim

causality; we can merely claim that we have taken a few extra steps to rule out some plausible

alternative explanations for our results. Among the studies in our sample, almost none addressed

possible endogeneity; we are therefore left to join others in calling for studies that attempt to

elucidate potential endogeneity. In this regard, the consideration of board selection processes

(Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012) may be a fruitful avenue for future analysis. For example,

consistent with the glass cliff phenomenon (Ryan & Haslam, 2007), it is conceivable that when

firm performance is in need of improvement, women are more likely to be appointed to a board

and, simultaneously, boards monitor managerial activities more extensively (Mace, 1971), and

boards become more involved in board strategy (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). All these

activities may be correlated, yet independently affect performance gains. We hope that further

researchers explore this issue and seek to evaluate alternate explanations for this finding.

Practical Implications

Our overarching findings that boards and firms seem to derive a benefit from female

board representation and that the presence of women on a board can be leveraged for higher

accounting returns have practical implications. For boards and firms, our findings suggest that
 40

board gender diversity is not a simple “numbers game.” For the presence of female directors to

yield higher accounting returns, our findings suggest the importance of developing a board

culture in which dissenting voices are heard and considered. Furthermore, for firms operating in

industries with a short supply of potential female directors, efforts should be made to diversify

boards in ways that may capture some of the particular experiences, knowledge, and values that

women may be more likely to bring to the board. In addition, the ability of more gender-

diversified boards to yield higher firm market performance is likely to depend on the socio-

cultural context in which board gender diversification occurs.

As a point of reference, the mean effect sizes from this meta-analysis are comparable to

mean effect sizes from published meta-analyses linking firm performance to inside director

representation (Dalton et al., 1998b) and to CEO duality (Dalton et al., 1998b; Rhoades,

Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2001), and are about half as large as the mean effect sizes for board

size (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). The mean effect sizes associated with the

relationship between female board representation and board activities (i.e., monitoring and

strategy involvement) also compare favorably to those found in other meta-analyses linking

board composition to more proximal factors (i.e., firms’ critical decisions) (e.g., Deutsch, 2005).

Unfortunately, determining the practical significance of these mean effect sizes is impossible.

Yet, as has been noted elsewhere (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 1998a), for firms with

sizable assets or market values, small effect sizes may translate into real differences in earnings.

For example, in 2013, the Global 2000 companies held a total of $161 trillion in assets (Forbes,

2014). For such firms, even a seemingly trivial increase in accounting returns (e.g., ROA) may

represent many millions of dollars in additional earnings. Nevertheless, we note that the amount

of variance in firm performance explained by board composition (e.g., independent directors,

 41

size) suggests that many other factors besides board characteristics explain firm performance.

Conclusion

In summary, although we recognize that much remains to be learned about board

composition, the results of this meta-analysis help to explain when and how board gender

composition may improve firm financial performance. Specifically, our results suggest that

board diversity is neither wholly detrimental nor wholly beneficial to firm financial performance.

In contrast, our results suggest that diversity on boards promotes activities related to boards’

primary responsibilities. Supporting a more complex view of board composition, our findings

highlight the conditions in which board diversity may be leveraged to improve firm performance.
 42

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 51

TABLE 1

Number of Studies of Firms by Country or Countries and their Associated Shareholder

Protection Index and Gender Parity Scores

Shareholder
Protection Gender
Country(ies) k Index Parity Score
Australia 9 5.7 0.7294
Brazil 1 5.3 0.6909
China 4 5.0 0.6853
Denmark 1 6.3 0.7777
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, & Sweden 1 6.2 0.8286
Denmark, Finland, Norway & Sweden 2 6.3 0.8198
Denmark & Netherlands 1 5.5 0.7718
Denmark & Norway 1 6.5 0.8090
France 3 5.3 0.6984
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, & Spain 1 5.5 0.6953
Germany 3 5.0 0.7629
India 1 6.3 0.6442
Indonesia 2 6.0 0.6591
Israel 1 8.3 0.6989
Italy 4 6.0 0.6729
Japan 3 7.0 0.6530
Kenya 2 5.0 0.6768
Kuwait 1 5.3 0.6320
Macedonia 1 7.0 0.6968
Malaysia 6 8.7 0.6539
Mauritius 1 7.7 0.6547
Netherlands 2 4.7 0.7659
New Zealand 1 9.7 0.7805
Nigeria 3 5.7 0.6315
Norway 7 6.7 0.8403
Pakistan 3 6.3 0.5478
Poland 1 6.0 0.7015
Singapore 1 9.3 0.6989
South Africa 3 8.0 0.7496
Spain 2 5.0 0.7266
Sri Lanka 2 6.0 0.7122
Sweden 1 6.3 0.8159
Tunisia 3 6.0 0.6255
UK 9 8.0 0.7433
US 45 8.3 0.7373
Vietnam 1 3.3 0.6867

Note. k is the number of independent effect sizes.

 52

TABLE 2

Mean Effect Sizes for Female Board Representation and Firm Financial Performance Measures

and for Female Board Representation and Board Activities

Effect
k size 95% CI τ2 Qw(df)
Firm financial performance 131 +0.034 +0.022,+0.045 .001 182.70(130)**
Accounting returns 109 +0.047 +0.033,+0.061 .002 170.77(108)***
Market performance 78 +0.014 -0.002,+0.031 .002 167.53(77)***

Board activities 28 +0.053 +0.012,+0.094 .008 136.87(27)***

Board monitoring 27 +0.054 +0.011,+0.096 .008 136.35(26)***
Board strategy involvement 4 +0.093 +0.012,+0.172 .003 5.55(3)

Note. For each analysis, k is the number of independent effect sizes included in each analysis.
 53

TABLE 3

Weighted Least Squares Regression Models for Proposed Moderators of Accounting Returns, Market Performance, and Board

Monitoring Activities

Accounting Returns Market Performance Board Monitoring

Activities
Variable b SEb z b SEb z b SEb z
Constant -0.028 -0.318 -0.283
Shareholder protection index 0.009 .004 2.445* -0.002 .006 -0.294 0.024 .007 3.382**
Gender parity score 0.007 .138 0.053 0.461 .184 2.510* 0.237 .225 1.053

Note. For accounting returns, the number of independent effect sizes (k) is 100; for market performance, k = 69; and, for board

monitoring activities, k = 22. b is the unstandardized regression coefficient, SEb is the standard error, and z is the associated

significance test.

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
 54

APPENDIX
Studies Included in the Meta-analysis

Author(s) Year Publication

Adams & Ferreira 2009 Journal of Financial Economics
Adams & Ragunathan 2013 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Ahern & Dittmar 2012 Quarterly Journal of Economics
Ahmad-Zaluki 2012 Gender in Management: An International Journal
Akpan & Amran 2014 Journal of Finance and Accounting
Al-Mamun, Yasser, Entebang, & Nathan 2013 Journal of Economic Development, Management,
IT, Finance and Marketing
Al-Shammari & Al-Saidi 2014 International Journal of Business Management
Ali, Ng, & Kulik in press Journal of Business Ethics
Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao 2011 Financial Management
Bear, Rahman, & Post 2010 Journal of Business Ethics
Berger, Kick, & Schaeck 2012 Working Paper, Bangor Business School, Bangor
University
Bermig & Frick 2010 Working Paper, Department of Management,
University of Paderborn
Bilimoria 2006 Journal of Managerial Issues
Bøhren & Strøm 2010 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
Bonn 2004 Journal of the Australian and New Zealand
Academy of Management
Bonn, Yoshikawa, & Phan 2004 Asian Business & Management
Bouaziz & Triki 2012 Universal Journal of Marketing and Business
Research
Boulouta 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin 2009 British Journal of Management
Cai, Keasey, & Short 2006 European Financial Management
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson 2003 The Financial Review
Catalyst 2004 Report, Catalyst
Chapple, Kent, & Routledge 2012 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Chen, Crossland, & Huang in press Strategic Management Journal
Cook & Glass 2014 Presented at the Academy of Management Annual
Meeting. Philadelphia, PA
Crutchley & Vahamaa 2013 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Cumming, Leung, & Rui 2012 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Dale-Olsen, Schone, & Verner 2014 Feminist Economics
Darmadi 2011 Corporate Ownership and Control
Darmadi 2013 Corporate Governance
de Coo 2012 Bachelor's thesis, Tilburg University
Deng & Nguyen 2014 Working Paper, IPAG Business School
Dickman 2004 Report, Milwaukee Women Inc.
Dimovski, Lombardi, & Cooper 2013 Journal of Property Investment and Finance
Dobbin & Jung 2011 North Carolina Law Review
Dong, Nguyen, & Vo 2013 30th International French Finance Association
Conference. Lyon, France
Dowling & Aribi 2013 International Review of Financial Analysis
Erhardt 2005 Master's Thesis, Rutgers University
 APPENDIX
(Continued)

Author(s) Year Publication

Farrell & Hersch 2005 Journal of Corporate Finance
Fauzi & Locke 2012 Asian Academy of Management Journal of
Accounting and Finance
Fidanoski, Mateska, & Simeonovski 2013 Working Paper, Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fidanoski, Mateska, & Simeonovski in press Corporate Governance in the US and Global
Settings
Fister 2003 Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Fondas & Sassalos 2000 Global Focus
Frias-Aceituno, García-Sánchez, & 2013 36th Annual Congress European Accounting
Rodríguez-Domínguez Association Conference. Paris, France
Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & 2013 Corporate Social Responsibility and
García-Sánchez Environmental Management
Galbreath 2011 Journal of Management & Organization
Gallego-Álvarez, García-Sánchez, & 2010 Spanish Accounting Review
Rodríguez-Domínguez
Gonzalez & Smith 2012 Prepared for 16th World Congress of the ILERA.
Philadelphia, PA
Gregoric, Oxelheim, Randøy, & 2009 Report, Nordic Innovation Centre
Thomsen
Gregoric, Oxelheim, Randoy, & 2013 Working Paper, Research Institute of Industrial
Thomsen Economics
Gregory-Smith, Main, & O'Reilly 2013 The Economic Journal
Gul, Srinidhi, & Tsui 2008 Working Paper, The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University
Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng 2011 Journal of Accounting & Economics
Gulamhussen & Santa 2010 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Gulzar & Wang 2011 International Journal of Accounting and
Financial Reporting
Hafsi & Turgut 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Hagendorff & Keasey 2012 European Journal of Finance
Hahn 2007 The European Financial Management
Association. Milan, Italy
Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee in press Journal of Business Ethics
Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & 2010 British Journal of Management
Atkins
Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella 2007 Academy of Management Journal
Honeine & Swan 2011 24th Australasian Banking & Finance Conference.
Sydney, Australia
Hoque & Muradoglu 2014 Presented at the Behavioral Finance Working
Group Conference. London, UK
Horváth & Spirollari 2012 Prague Economic Papers
Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen 2009 Journal of Business Ethics
Hussein & Kiwia 2012 Working Paper, Institute of Finance Management,
Tanzania
 APPENDIX
(Continued)

Author(s) Year Publication

Isidro & Sobral in press Journal of Business Ethics
Jackowicz & Kowalewski 2012 Emerging Markets Review
Joecks, Pull, & Vetter 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Julizaerma & Sori 2012 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences
Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye 2012a Corporate Governance: An International Review
Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye 2012b Journal of Management Governance
Kang, Ding, & Charoenwong 2010 Journal of Business Research
Kim, Roden, & S.R. 2013 Accounting and Finance Research
Ku Ismail, Abdullah, & Nachum 2012 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Kuang 2011 International Conference on Management Science
and Industrial Engineering (MSIE). Harbin, China
Larkin, Bernardi, & Bosco 2012 International Journal of Banking and Finance
Lazzeretti, Godoi, Camilo, & Marcon 2013 Gender in Management: An International Journal
Lehobo 2011 Master's Thesis, University of Johannesburg
Levi, Li, & Zhang 2011 Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy
of Behavioral Finance & Economics. Los
Angeles, CA
Lidemar & Falk 2012 Bachelor’s Thesis, Jönköping University
Liu, Wei, & Xie in press Journal of Corporate Finance
Loukil & Yousif 2013 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Lückerath-Rovers 2013 Journal of Management & Governance
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman 2012 Journal of Business Ethics
Mallin & Michelon 2011 Accounting and Business Research
Mallin, Michelon, & Raggi 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009 Journal of Sustainable Development
Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery 2010 Working Paper, Utrecht School of Economics
Martini, Corvino, & Rigolini 2012 Presented at the International Conference on
Corporate Governance and Regulation. Pisa, Italy
Miller & Triana 2009 Journal of Management Studies
Mohamad, Abdullah, Mokhtar, & Kamil 2011 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Nekhili & Gatfaoui 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Nguyen & Faff 2006 Corporate Ownership and Control
Nguyen, Locke, & Reddley 2013 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Ngwenya 2014 Corporate Ownership and Control
Nielsen & Huse 2010 Corporate Governance: An International Review
O'Reilly & Main 2012 Working Paper, Stanford Graduate School of
Business
Oba & Fodio 2013 International Journal of Economics and Finance
Oyieke 2014 Report, African Economic Research Consortium
Pathan & Faff 2013 Journal of Banking and Finance
Pedersen 2013 Working Paper, Graduate School of Public
Policy, The University of Tokyo
Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez 2010 Journal of Business Ethics
Puthenpurackal & Upadhyay 2013 Presented at University of Bath Journal of
Empirical Finance Conference. Bath, UK
 APPENDIX
(Continued)

Author(s) Year Publication

Rajput, Kaur, & Arora 2013 International Journal of Business and Economic
Research
Rambo 2013 The International Journal of Business and
Finance Research
Ranasinghe 2012 DSM Business Review
Rao, Tilt, & Lester 2012 Corporate Governance
Romano, Ferritti, & Rigolini 2012 Presented at the Corporate Governance &
Regulation: Outlining New Horizons for Theory
and Practice International Conference. Pisa, Italy
Schellen 2012 Master's Thesis, Tilburg University
Schmid & Urban 2014 Working Paper, Social Science Research Network
Schnake, Williams, & Fredenberger 2006 Journal of Applied Business Research
Schwartz-Ziv 2011 Working Paper, Harvard University
Schwizer, Soana, & Cucinelli 2012 Bancaria
Shafique, Idress, & Yousaf 2014 European Journal of Business and Management
Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles 1997 Journal of Managerial Issues
Shukeri, Shin, & Shaari 2012 International Business Research
Singh, Vinnecombe, & Johnson 2001 Corporate Governance
Smith, Smith, & Verner 2006 International Journal of Productivity and
Performance Management
Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui 2011 Contemporary Accounting Research
Stanwick & Stanwick 1998 American Business Review
Stefanelli & Cotugno 2012 Academy of Banking Studies Journal
Strom, D'Espallier, & Mersland 2014 Journal of Banking and Finance
Tacheva & Huse 2006 Presented at the European Academy of
Management Conference. Oslo, Norway
Tanaka 2014 Applied Financial Economics
Tinsley, Wade, Man, & O'Reilly 2014 Working Paper, Georgetown University
Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse 2011 Journal of Business Ethics
Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski 2013 Organization Science
Ujunwa 2012 Corporate Governance
Upadhyay 2007 Doctoral Dissertation, Temple University
Van Der Zahn 2004 International Journal of Corporate Governance
and Ethics
van Overveld 2012 Master's Thesis, University of Twente
Wellalage & Locke 2013 International Journal of Business Governance
and Ethics
Westphal & Bednar 2005 Administrative Science Quarterly
Williams 2003 Journal of Business Ethics
Yasser 2012 Modern Economy
Zemzem & Kacem 2014 International Journal of Finance and Banking
Studies
Zhang 2012 Corporate Governance
Zhang, Zhu, & Ding 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Corinne Post (corinne.post@lehigh.edu) is associate professor of management at the College of

Business and Economics, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. She has a Ph.D. from Rutgers
University. Her research interests include mechanisms underlying gender/racial/ethnic
differences in careers and diversity as enabler or impediment to group and organizational
performance.

Kris Byron (klbyron@syr.edu) is an associate professor of management at the Whitman School

of Management, Syracuse University. She received her Ph.D. from Georgia State University. Her
primary research interests are emotion, creativity, stress, and gender.