MICHIEF RULE

INDEX

1. Introduction……………………………………………….…5
2. Mischief Rule …………………………………………….…8
3. Scope of Mischief Rule ………………………………….…10
4. Application of Mischief Rule ………………………………11
5. Mischief And Purposive Construction …………………….14
6. Use of Mischief Rule …………………………………….…16
7. Advantages and Disadvantages of Mischief Rule ……..….18
8. Case Laws……………………………………………….…..19
9. Conclusion ……………………………………………….…21
10.References…………………………………………………...22

1
 Table Of Cases

1. Kanailal Sur v Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan

2. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar
3. CIT Patiala v. Shahzada Nand & Sons
4. Swantraj v. State of Maharashtra
5. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana
6. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur,
7. Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt.) v. K. Devi
8. Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar
9. Goodycar India Ltd. v. State of Haryana
10. Sussex Peerage Case
11. Sneh Enterprises (M/s.) v. Commr. of Customs, New Delhi
12. Smith v. Hughes
13. K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala,
14. D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa
15. Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. I.C.D.S Ltd.,
16. Royal College of Nursing of the U.K. v. Dept. of Health and Social Security
17. Corkery v. Carpenter
18. Pickstone v. Freeman Plc.
19. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bull
20. Shri Ram Saha v. State
21. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bhagwan
22. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia.
23. , Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof Ascheffenbirg
24. Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana
25. Anderton v. Ryan
26. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India
27. Thomson v. Lord Clan Morris
28. CIT vs. Sundaradevi
29. The Commissioner of Income-Tax,Madhya Pradesh And Bhopal v Sodra Devi
30. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar
31. Elliot v Grey
32. Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra
33. Glaxo Laboratories v. Presiding Officer

2
 Introduction

The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the
legislator's intention. Originating from a 16th century case (Heydon’s case) in the United
Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When the
material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established
rule or construction of such words “of all statutes in general be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law is the rule of Heydon’s case. The rules laid down
in this case are also known as Purposive Construction or Mischief Rule.1

The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in
order to discover Parliament's intention.2

One result of applying the "mischief rule (which permits history of the legislation to
be taken into account for ascertaining the "mischief that was intended to be remedied) is, that
the courts have started noting the reports of Committees (outside Parliament) on whose report
the statute under construction may have been based. A Tennessee statute imposed duties on
railroad engineers. If a railroad engineer found an animal or obstruction on the tracks, the
statute required “the alarm whistle to be sounded, and brakes put down, and every possible
means employed to stop the train and prevent an accident.” But what counted as an “animal”
on the tracks? Cows and horses, yes. But what else? Did all the trains in Tennessee have to
stop for squirrels? The stop-the-train case poses difficult questions for some interpretive
theories, especially textualism. The text does not identify a stopping point in what counts as
an animal. Nor is there a dictionary definition that will include cows but exclude squirrels. Is
a textualist interpreter duty-bound to say that trains have to stop for squirrels? 3
There is a legal rule that allows the interpreter to escape this impasse. The mischief
rule instructs an interpreter to consider the problem to which the statute was addressed, and

1
Rajkumar S. Adukia, Interpretation of Statute,
available at (http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf) last visited on 30 Nov. 2019
2
Id.
3
Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19912, Draft
of September 10, 2019. Available at: http://www.ssrn.com/link/notre-dame-legal-studies.html (Last Visited 30
Nov 2019)

3
also the way in which the statute is a remedy for that problem. Put another way, the
generating problem is taken as part of the context for reading the statute. In the real stop-the-
train case, the court found the mischief to be especially train derailments; the court
accordingly held that three domesticated geese were not “animals” within the meaning of the
statute. In the court’s view, failing to consider the mischief would have meant that trains had
to stop even for “snakes, frogs, and fishing worms.” 4

The mischief rule can help an interpreter give a better account of what the legislature
has actually decided. The reason is inherent in how language works: bare words are not
always enough, for there may be facts an interpreter needs to know to make sense of those
words. In technical terms, the interpreter needs not only semantics but pragmatics.
It directs attention to the generating problem, which is public and external to the legislature,
something that can be considered observable in the world. The mischief might be indicated in
the statute itself or be established by judicial notice, evidence of public debate preceding
enactment, or legislative history. Nevertheless, there is no necessary relationship between (a)
considering the mischief and (b) consulting legislative history.5

The mischief rule serves two functions. First, a stopping-point function: it offers a
rationale for an interpreter’s choice about how broadly to read a term or provision in a legal
text. Second, a clever-evasion function: it allows an interpreter to read a legal text a little
more broadly to prevent a clever evasion that would perpetuate the mischief.
The stopping-point function is useful because any, or at least almost any, legal text is
susceptible of being read with different degrees of breadth. The famous hypothetical statute
of medieval Bologna prohibited shedding blood in the municipal palace. It could be read to
prohibit all shedding of blood, including when a barber accidentally cut someone while
shaving his face; or it could be read more narrowly as prohibiting violent shedding of blood.
If the mischief were a recent spate of violence in the palace, the interpreter has a reason to
choose the narrower interpretation. Conversely, if the mischief lay in a popular belief that the
presence of any shed blood would make the palace, and thus the city, ritually unclean, the
mischief rule would suggest a different scope; the case of the maladroit barber would be
covered. This is the stopping-point function of the mischief rule: it gives the interpreter a
reason to stop here instead of going further (or stopping short).6
4
Supra Note 3
5
Id.
6
Supra Note 3 at

4
 The mischief rule might lead an interpreter to choose a broader or narrower scope.
But as time passes, and as a statute is pressed into service to answer questions never dreamed
of at the time of its enacting, the mischief rule will tend to serve this stopping-point function
by offering a narrower reading of the statute. In other words, it will encourage the court not to
update the statute, and to leave to the legislature the task of passing a new bill to address a
new situation. By contrast, the clever-evasions function is typically served by choosing a
modestly broader scope.

In a search for real legislative intent, the court have developed a number of
convention as a mean. Those convention are grammatical rule, such as ejusdem generis, and
various presumptions, such as those restricting the construction of statutes which interfere
with existing rights affecting the liberty of the subject, or which are penal in effect. But such
conventions are apt to dissolve away like chaff before the wind whenever the court feels at all
strongly that another interpretation is to be preferred. In such cases the court may invoke the
so-called rule in Heydon’s case.7
This rule is most helpful in the interpretation of statutes when the language of the
statutes is capable of more than one meaning. 8 This rule is popularly known as the ‘mischief
rule’. In a broader sense, this may be understood as the purposive construction of statutes.

7
M N Rao & Amita Dhanda, N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes 669, (10 th Edn., 2010, LexisNexis,
Lucknow)
8
Kanailal Sur v Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, AIR 1957 SC 907

5
 Mischief Rule

Mischief rule becomes important when the question of interpretation of legislation arises. It
says that court has the duty to ascertain ‘the intent of them that make it’, and that can be
collected from the words and phrases used in the legislation. It does not mean that the
judiciary’s decision should be based on a principle of literal interpretation by neglecting all
the other materials.

Heydon’s Case
The canonical authority for the mischief rule is Heydon’s Case, a decision of the Court of
Exchequer in 1584. That case is not the origin of the mischief in statutory interpretation, for
the idea is certainly older and had long been a staple of English legal education. Nevertheless,
many interpreters have been drawn to the crisply stated propositions that are attributed to
Chief Baron Manwood in Sir Edward Coke’s printed report:
For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and considered:
—
1. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
4. The true reason of the remedy;9
Then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo [for private benefit], and to add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro
bono publico [for the public good].10
Heydon’s Case is a product of its time. The judges and lawyers of 1584 were familiar with
the idea of the “true intent of the makers,” but they did not understand this to require a search

9
Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, Also see, CIT Patiala v. Shahzada Nand & Sons,
AIR 1966 SC 1342, Swantraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 517, Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana,
AIR 1998 SC 958, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, AIR 2004 SC 1340
10
Justice G. P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation 138, (14th Edn., 2016, LexisNexis, Gurgaon)

6
for the subjective intent of members of Parliament. Rather, they recognized it could be “a
kind of fiction, a constructive intention to be gathered from the wording.” 11

In 1898, Lindley M.R. said: “In order properly to interpret any statute it is as
necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon’s case to consider how the law
stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old
law did not provide and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief”. Although
judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgment the our questions in Heydon’s
case, consideration of the “mischief” or object of the enactment is common, and will often
provide the solution to a problem of interpretation.12

Seen in this light, the four enumerated points in Heydon’s Case are more modest than
they are often read to be by modern interpreters. Collectively, these points suggest the
interpreter should consider four things:
(1) the old law;
(2) the defect in the old law;
(3) the new law; and
(4) how the new law connects to the defect in the old law.
In itself, this is not a manifesto for purposivism. It is, rather, an insistence that statutes not be
read “in abstract, in vacuo.” Faced with options and ambiguities, judges have guidance on
how to resolve them: read the statute in light of the mischief, and as a remedy for the
mischief.13
Heydon’s Rule has been applied by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases in order to
suppress the mischief which was intended to be remedied as against the literal rule which
could have otherwise covered the field.14

11
Id. At 16
12
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes 40 (12th Edn., 1969, LexisNexis, Gurgaon)
13
Supra Note 3
14
See, Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt.) v. K. Devi, AIR 1996 SC 1963, Bengal
Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, Goodycar India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC
781

7
 Scope of Mischief Rule

For an application of the mischief rule ‘firstly’ it must be possible to determine from a
consideration of the provision of the act read as a whole what the mischief was that was the
purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly it must be apparent that the draftsman and Parliament
had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to
be dealt with if the purpose o the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it must be possible to
state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the
draftsman and approved by parliament had their intention been drawn to the omission before
the Bill passed in to law. Unless these three conditions are fulfilled any attempt by a court of
justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of it jurisdiction to
determine what is the meaning of a written law, which Parliament has passed. Such an
attempt cross the boundary between interpretation and legislation. It becomes a usurpation of
the function, which under the Constitution of this county is vested in the legislature to the
exclusion of the court.15
The growth o Parliamentary supremacy and the articulation of the separation of power
doctrine, led to the development in the early part of the 19th century of what became known as
‘literal rule’. Giving effect to the equity of statute was considered dangerous and it was felt
better and safer to rely on and abide by the plain words of the statute. The mischief rule came
to be largely, though not entirely, suppressed by the ‘literal’ or, as it come to be called in
America, the ‘plain meaning rule’. One of the most frequently quoted of the numerous
statements of this later rule is that of Tindal CJ when advancing the House of Lords on the
Sussex Peerage Case16:
The only rule for the construction of the Acts of Parliament is that they
should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which
passed the Act. If the word of the statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their natural and ordinary meaning. The words themselves
alone do, in such case, best declares the intention of the lawgiver. But if
any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has
always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid
the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the
preamble, which according to Chief Justice Dyer,’is a key to open the
minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischief’s which they intent to
redress.’

15
Supra Note 7 at 670
16
(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85

8
 Application Of Mischief Rule

The court when faced with the interpretation of a provision must ascertain what was
the law before making of the Act, what ere the mischief or defect in such law and how the
parliament intended to resolve or cure it. Any legislation specially a legislation enacted to
mitigate social mischief is normally construed to serve the public good. Principle of
interpretation are only the guidelines, they are not conclusive. The sure and safest way is to
interpret the provision on the necessity and requirement as appears from the objective of the
Act and words used by the Legislature.17
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the Court must adopt that construction which
suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. This is a rule laid down in Heydon’s case18,
also known as the rule of purposive construction or mischief rule.19
In case of Sneh Enterprises (M/s.) v. Commr. of Customs, New Delhi20, it was observed that,
‘it is a trite law while interpreting the statute, the Court not only may take into consideration
the purpose for which the same has been enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress.
It is well established rule that a provision must be construed in a manner which would give
effect to its purpose and to cure the mischief in the light of which it was enacted21.

Smith v. Hughes22
FACT

The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street, London and used
the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, between 8.50 p.m. and
9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the purposes of prostitution,
from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being some 8–10 feet above
street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was

( I )  To attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object
and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and

17
P M Baskhi , Interpretation of Statute 180, (2nd Edn., 2016, Thomson Reuters South Asia Pvt. Ltd., New
Delhi); Also see, K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012
18
(1584) 76 ER 637, Referred in D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, AIR 2006 SCW 2757
19
Id.
20
2006 AIR SCW 4684
21
Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. I.C.D.S Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 168 at 180
22
(1960) 2 All ER 859

9
( ii ) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the
premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same
time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a
Street’ within the meaning of Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that
accordingly no offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those
circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of Sec. 1(1)
of the Act are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit
in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.23

Lord Parker CJ said Case that she ‘being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the
purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was
found that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the
solicitation was in a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the
street but were in a house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of
men in the street by tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in
ground-floor windows, either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those
circumstances each defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section
1(1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to
loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’24

It was observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the
soliciting must be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who
receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. “For my part, I approach
the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that
this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter
little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a
balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her
solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am
content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.” The court held that they

23
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-interpretation/ (visited on 30 Nov 2019)
24
Id.

10
were guilty because the mischief aimed at was people being molested or solicited by
prostitute.25
In Royal College of Nursing of the U.K. v. Dept. of Health and Social Security 26, it was
observed that the Abortion Act, 1967 allows abortion by “a registered medical practitioner”.
Doctors carried out the first part of the procedure and the second was performed by nurses
but without a doctor being present. The House of Lords held by majority of 3 to 2 that the
procedure was lawful because the mischief parliament was trying to remedy was back street
abortions performed by unqualified people.
In Corkery v. Carpenter27, a person could be arrested if found drunk while in charge of a
“carriage” on the highway. The defendant had been arrested fo being drunk while in charge
of a bicycle on the highway. The Court held that a bicycle was a “carriage” for the purpose of
the Act because the mischief aimed at was drunken persons on the highway in charge of some
form of transport, and so the defendant was properly arrested.
In Pickstone v. Freeman Plc.28, it is observed :
“Application of mischief rule or purposive construction may also enable
reading of words by implication when there is any doubt about the purpose
which the Parliament intended to achieve. But before any words are read to
repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty
that these words should have been inserted by the Draftsman and approved
by the Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the
Act passed into law”.

In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bull29, a man had been charged with loitering or
soliciting in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. The Court held that the
term “prostitute” was limited to female prostitutes. The mischief which the Street Offences
Act, 1959 was intended to remedy was a mischief created by women.

25
Supra Note 22
26
(1981) 1 All ER 545 (HL)
27
(1951) 1 KB 102
28
(1989) AC 66, referred in N. Sarada Mani v. G. Alexander, AIR 1998 AP 157.
29
(1994) 4 All ER 411

11
 Mischief And Purposive Construction

In the words of Lord Griffith, “The Court now adopt a purposive approach which
seeks to give effect to the true purpose of the legislation and are prepared to look at much
extraneous material that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted.”
In applying a purposive construction a word of caution is necessary that the text of the statute
is not to be sacrificed and the court cannot rewrite the statute on the assumption that whatever
furthers the purpose of the Act must have been sanctioned. 30 Therefore the Court cannot add
to the means enacted by the legislature for achieving the object of the Act.31
In the context of purposive construction Sinha J. recommends: “To interpret a statute
in a reasonable manner the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable manner the
court mut place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done the rules o
purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act
in such a manner as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled.”32

In the formulation of the Mischief rule, as pointed out by Lord Reid, “The word
‘mischief’ is traditional”. He expanded it to include the facts presumed to be known to
Parliament at the time when the Bill (which became the Act in question) was before it and
‘the unsatisfactory state of affairs’ disclosed by those facts ‘which Parliament could properly
be supposed to have intended to remedy, by the Act.’33
The rule as to purposive construction is more briefly stated by Lord Roskill, as:
“Statute should be given what has been known as a purposive construction,
that is to say, that the Courts should identify the ‘mischief’ which existed
before passing of the statute and then, if more than one construction is
possible, favor that (construction) which will eliminate the mischief so
identified”.34
An illustration to the application of the rule as to purposive construction is also
furnished in the construction of Section 2 (d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1952. This
section defines ‘prize competition’ as meaning “any competition in which prizes are offered

30
Shri Ram Saha v. State, AIR 2004 SC 5080.
31
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bhagwan, (1970) 3 All ER 97 (HL)
32
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia, AIR 2008 SC 876.
33
Supra Note 7 at 181; Also see, Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof Ascheffenbirg,
(1975) 1 All ER 810 (HL); Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781.
34
Anderton v. Ryan, (1985) 2 All ER 355 (HL)

12
for the solution of any puzzle, based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or
permutation of letters, words or figures.” The question was whether, in view of this
definition, the Act applies to competitions which involve substantial skill (and which are not
in the nature of gambling). The Supreme Court of India, after referring to the previous statute
of the law and, to the mischief that continued under the law and also to the resolution of
various States under Article 252(1) of the Constitution authorizing Parliament to pass the Act,
stated: “Having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the
wording of the statute, we are of opinion that the competition which are ought to be
controlled and regulated by the Act, are only those competition, in which success does not
depend on any substantial degree of kill.”35

In the formation of the mischief rule, as pointed out by Lord Reid, “the word
‘mischief’ is traditional”. He expanded it to include the facts presumed to be known to
Parliament at the time when the Bill (which became the Act in question) was before it and
“the unsatisfactory state of affairs” disclosed by these facts “which Parliament can properly
be supposed to have intended to remedy, by the Act.36

Purposive construction has often been employed in construction of laws passed to

implement international agreements or convention and regulations made to give effect to the
directions of the Council of European Commission. Purposive construction has also been
applied to penal statute to avoid a lacuna and to suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy.37 The Supreme Court in Sodra Devi’s38 case expressed the view that the rule in
Heydon’s case is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are
reasonably capable of more than one meaning.

35
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628
36
Supra Note 30
37
Supra Note 10 at 143
38
AIR 1957 SC 832

13
 Use of Mischief Rule

This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain
meaning rule, in that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only
when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent is
determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review
articles and corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in
cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.

In the case of Thomson v. Lord Clan Morris, Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in
interpreting any statutory enactment regard must be had not only to the words used, but also
to the history of the Act and the reasons which lead to its being passed.

In the case of CIT vs. Sundaradevi39 , it was held by the Apex Court that unless there
is an ambiguity, it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of
construction which is that the intention of the legislature should be primarily to gather from
the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would
stand to be examined and considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally
proposed practices.

The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar40, applied the mischief
rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to the state of
law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that
was brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing
powers by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus,
Chief Justice S.R.Das, stated “It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve
the free flow of interstate trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic
unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the
constitution”.
In various Supreme Court cases it has been held that, ‘legislation both statutory and
constitutional is enacted, it is true, from experience of evils. But its general language should
not, therefore, necessarily be confined to the form that evil had taken. Time works changes,
39
(1957) (32 ITR 615) (SC),
40
AIR 1995 SC 661

14
brings into existence new conditions and purposes and new awareness of limitations. A
principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
existence. This is particularly true of the constitutional constructions which are not ephermal
enactments designed to meet passing occasions. These are designed to approach immortality
as nearly as human institutions can approach it’. Mischief Rule is applicable where language
is capable of more than one meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of
a statue which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.41

Advantages and Disadvantages of Mischief Rule

41
Supra Note 1 at 17

15
Advantages:

1)      The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to
the Golden or Literal rules.

2)      It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

3)      Closes loopholes

4)      Allows the law to develop and adapt to changing needs.

Disadvantages:

1)      It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was
the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.

2)      It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.

3)      Creates a crime after the event, thus infringing the rule of law.

4)     Gives judges a law making role infringing the separation of powers and Judges can bring their
own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case. 42

CASE LAWS

42
Supra Note 22.

16
 Elliot v Grey43

The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He was
charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on the road.
The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it was not driveable. It was
held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on the road as it
represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The statute
was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.

Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar44

The Appellant, a dealer registered under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, had neither
office nor a manager or an agent in Bihar. The Biha Sales Tax authorities maintained that all
sales in Wet Bengal or any other state under which the delivery of goods took place in the
State of Bihar, as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in that state, were
liable to Bihar Sale Tax under Article 286 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed
that to arrive at the true intention of the legislature, an enactment should be interpreted in the
light of the history of the legislation, the mischief it intended to suppress and the provision of
the statute.45

Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra46

The constitutionality of section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which punishes the sale
of obscene books, was upheld in this case involving the DH Lawrence novel, Lady
Chatterley’s Lover. The Hicklin test, as articulated in a case from the United Kingdom,
Queen v. Hicklin, was found to be a valid test for determining what constitutes obscenity.
Under this standard, Lady Chatterley’s Lover was determined to be obscene, and persons
selling the book could be punished under section 292. Petitioner contended that the
prosecution has a duty to prove a guilty mind against him which in this case is the knowledge
that the book contain obscene material. Further he argued that, when there is very large
number books in a book shop, the shopkeeper is not expected to go through each book to see
as to whether some book contain some obscene literature. Rejecting the contention, Supreme
Court held that the meaning of the Section 292 is clear and precise. Further, the mischief of

43
[1960] 1 QB 367
44
AIR 1955 SC 661
45
Prof. T. Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statute 34, (10th edn., 2017, Central Law Agency, Allahabad)
46
AIR 1965 SC 881

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sale of obscene literature was sought to be remedied by the provision and, therefore, the
interpretation given by the appellant was unacceptable.

Glaxo Laboratories v. Presiding Officer47

It was observed by the Supreme Court that the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to
the intention underlying the statute, and therefore, unless the grammatical construction leads
to absurdity, it has to be given effect to. If two constructions are possible, that construction
which advances the intention of the legislature and remedies the mischief should be accepted.
The Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 was enacted or ameliorating the
conditions of the workers and therefore, condition of service prescribed there under must
receive such interpretation as to advance the intention underlying the Act and defect the
mischief.

Conclusion

47
AIR 1984 SC 505

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Mischief rule is a principle used for the interpretation of a statute. This principle is used by
the courts to determine the intention of the legislators. This principle aims at finding out the
mischief and defect in a statute and to implement a remedy for the same. This principle was
first applied in an English case in the early 16th century. The courts while applying the
principle tries to find out the real intention behind the enactment. This rule thus assists the
court in identifying the proper construction of statutory wording according to the original
intention of the legislators. As it can be seen from the case, mischief rule can be applied
differently by different judges. It is mainly about the discretion and understanding of the
person applying it. Though, it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to
the Golden or Literal rules. It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing but it also
seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was the
primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.

This is not often the case in modern legal systems. The rule can make the law uncertain,
susceptible to the slippery slope. Therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form
of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine
cases. The purposive approach is an approach to statutory and constitutional
interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a statute, a part
of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it was enacted.
Mischief rule provide guidance in case of conflict between the words of the statute and the
underlying parliamentary intention.

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 References

Websites & Articles

 Rajkumar S. Adukia, Interpretation of Statute, available at

(http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf)
 Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 19912, Draft of September 10, 2019. Available at:
http://www.ssrn.com/link/notre-dame-legal-studies.html
 https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-interpretation/

Books

 M N Rao & Amita Dhanda, N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, (10th Edn., 2010,
LexisNexis, Lucknow)
 Justice G. P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, (14th Edn., 2016,
LexisNexis, Gurgaon)
 P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, (12 th Edn., 1969,
LexisNexis, Gurgaon)

 P M Baskhi , Interpretation of Statute, (2nd Edn., 2016, Thomson Reuters South Asia
Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi);
 Prof. T. Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statute, (10th edn., 2017, Central Law
Agency, Allahabad)
 D N Mathur, Interpretation of Statutes, (5th Edn., 2018, Central Law Agency,
Allahabad)

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