Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Steven Spadt
Marketing 421-001
Suzanne Diamond
The Wharton School
April 3, 2006
BACKGROUND
Apple has clearly had their ups and downs. In the 1990s, they
grew success from embracing their status as the “alternative” to the
mainstream PC option, the so-called “Wintel” machine, by offering
the stylish, rebellious iMac. After a couple of years of success,
though, they started to lose their grip on their niche markets as their
big-money competitors swarmed to minimize their impact by
offering lower-priced, higher-powered options. In 2005, the tables
have turned and with their ubiquitous iPod portable music player,
Apple finds themselves in the position of dominant market leader,
seeking to maintain their dominance and build upon the iPod’s
success and put an end to their cyclical corporate strength. Apple
once again has a winner. The task before them now is to find a
way to simultaneously sustain their success in the portable
electronic device market while also leveraging it to gain ground in
their core marketplace, personal computing.
Since its early days on the personal computer (PC) scene, Apple
has embraced and capitalized on its rebellious image. Apple
created, controlled, and to the joy of their loyal following,
successfully marketed their alternative to the conglomerate of the
Microsoft™ Operating System, Intel processors, and big business
hardware manufacturer’s like IBM (the so-called “Wintel”
machines). The alternative that Apple offered—based on the
Macintosh Operating System (MacOS)—was a bundle of software
applications and hardware that was and continues to be
unparalleled in style and substance. While Wintel machines were
positioned as efficient, cost-effective tools, Apple’s were positioned
more as expressions of their creative owners’ personalities. While
the detailed technical differences in the PC systems were known
largely only to the application developers, consumers knew that a
purchase of an Apple product was a contribution to the
alternative—an investment in a company that did things the right
way, if only because they did things differently than the big
companies like IBM, Microsoft, and Intel.
The iPod product is more than a portable music player. The iPod is
actually a bundle of product components that consist primarily of
the pocket-sized iPod player device, the iTunes digital music
delivery service, and the client player (software) that runs on the
“host” computer, allowing users to play back music on their PC as
well as facilitating transfer of
downloaded music to their iPod device.
During the early portions of the iPod life cycle, Apple successfully
overlayed new benefits (some, legitimate innovations of their own)
to prolong the peaks and create opportunities for new adopters.
Offering new innovations increases the total potential market for the
new devices since both late adopters of the iPod who have not yet
adopted and early adopters (who will become early adopters of the
latest models) may be targeted. Especially considering that
adopters may be included on any number of the curves (innovators,
for example, may be on all of the curves), Apple has begun a
pattern of delivering cyclical innovations to maximize adoption
potential. As long as the new models continue to be true
innovations, rather than model tweaks like greater song capacity,
new colors, etc., this approach may be sustainable.
PDA
Cell Music
Phone Player
On the personal computing side, the Mac Mini hits the right price
point ($499) and is targeted directly and unabashedly at the
coveted “Windows switchers.” The idea is to allow Wintel users to
keep their existing displays, keyboards, and mouse devices while
converting to the MacOS platform for almost half the cost of
upgrading to the latest Wintel system. The missing ingredient in
the Mac Mini, though, despite its miniature size, is portability. Even
though the box itself can fit in the palm of a hand, when the display,
keyboard, and mouse devices are added, the result is a decidedly
non-portable system. So the Mac Mini, despite its name and size,
is firmly entrenched as an alternative desktop solution, not a
solution to increase the mobility of personal computing consumers.
Going Mobile
2900
2700
2500 Mobile
(PowerBook/iBook)
2300
Desktops
2100 (PowerMac/iMac)
1900
1700
1500
2002 2003 2004
CONCLUSIONS
Apple competes in several different markets, dominating in one,
and playing a financially minor, though market-significant, niche
role in another. The challenge before them is to effectively
lengthen their iPod tail and use its strength to wag the rest of the
Apple dog. The answer is to connect iPod’s benefits (brilliant user
interface, simplicity of design, stylish and expressive presentation)
to the host machine and embrace today’s cult following of the iPod
as tomorrow’s Apple customer base.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1:
Develop the mobile equivalent of the Mac Mini, priced low
enough to compete with other sub-notebooks, and bundle it
with the latest iPod device (see Recommendation 2 below),
iTunes service, and wireless connectivity. This product,
potentially called the “iMob,” (from iMobile) would be positioned as
the total solution for mobile computing. The machine itself would
compete directly with Wintel equivalents termed “sub-notebooks”
and small TabletPCs, but the all-in-one solution for portable
computing coupled with wireless Internet access would position the
product uniquely in the market, while capitalizing on the popularity
and usability advances of the iPod. More importantly, it could serve
as the trigger for transitioning iPod adoptees still on the Wintel
platform to adopt the MacOS for the benefits learned from their
iPod experience.
Recommendation 2:
Develop a premium iPod (iPod “UNO” – indicating an all-in-one
device) that meets the market’s demand for device and service
convergence. Follow the lead of PDA makers like Palm and RIM
and partner with wireless carriers to offer an iPod that offers basic
cell phone and basic PDA features, all in one iPod-branded
package. Keep the cell phone and PDA features very basic, to
avoid adding too much complexity, but position the product as an
Recommendation 3:
As a lower priced alternative to the iPod “UNO”, consider
partnering with cell phone manufacturers and/or carriers to
enable local wireless communication between cell phones and
specially configured iPods to allow wireless downloads of
songs via cell phones. Local wireless networking technologies
like BlueTooth® enable devices to communicate with each other.
Utilizing this or a related technology, iPods could receive
downloaded songs from cell phones (that would be configured to
run a special mobile version of iTunes), eliminating the need to
connect the iPod to a host to receive new songs. Market the device
to Wintel users, who would not initially be able to synch the “UNO”
to their computers, and to more price-sensitive consumers.
Recommendation 4:
Continue to pace additional iPod innovations to lure late-
adopters and encourage existing iPod customers to additional
purchases at a wide variety of price points. Possible
innovations include:
- a digital camera add-on that would connect to the iPod Photo
edition and all subsequent iPod versions with color displays
- digital video playback capabilities
- additional partnerships with music artists (Iike the U2
partnership) to produce and deliver customized, branded
content
Recommendation 5:
Partner with one or more home music system manufacturers,
license the iTunes song format, and position the iPod as a
“personal music collection” hub for their home music
systems. Invite consumers to “carry their personal music
collection with them wherever they go, and plug it in when they get
home.” To further guard against Microsoft’s moves to position
competitive song file formats as cheaper alternatives, consider
bundling packages of iTunes song downloads with the home music
systems. Even if per song profits drop below zero, as long as
iTunes songs can only be played on Apple devices and partners’
home music systems, profits made on device sales would
overcome expenses.