DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.

PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO (PAMAO-NFL)

G.R. No. 146650, January 13, 2003

FACTS:

February 22, 1996, a new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period starting February
1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and private respondent
Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Among the provisions of the new CBA is the
disputed section on meal allowance under Section 3 of Article XVIII on Bonuses and
Allowances. Some departments of Dole reverted to the previous practice of granting free meals after
exactly three hours of actual overtime work. However, other departments continued the practice of
granting free meals only after more than three hours of overtime work. Thus, private respondent filed
a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole
refused to comply with the provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to
those who rendered overtime work for more than three hours and not to those who rendered exactly
three hours overtime work.
The parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Thereafter, the voluntary arbitrator,
deciding in favor of the respondent, issued an order directing petitioner Dole to extend the free meal
benefit to those employees who actually did overtime work even for exactly three hours only.
Petitioner Dole asserts that the phrase after three hours of actual overtime work should be
interpreted to mean after more than three hours of actual overtime work. On the other hand, private
respondent union and the voluntary arbitrator see it as meaning after exactly three hours of actual
overtime work.
Petitioner asserts that the phrase after three (3) hours of actual overtime work does not mean after
exactly three hours of actual overtime work; it means after more than three hours of actual overtime
work. Petitioner insists that this has been the interpretation and practice of Dole for the past thirteen
years. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that after three (3) hours of actual overtime work
simply means after rendering exactly, or no less than, three hours of actual overtime work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the phrase more than between after and three hours in the present
CBA spells a big difference.

HELD:

No. No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that after more than means the same as
after. The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the
language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning of free
meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which is simply that an employee shall be
entitled to a free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime work, not
after more than or in excess of three hours overtime work.

Petitioner also invokes the well-entrenched principle of management prerogative that "the power to
grant benefits over and beyond the minimum standards of law, or the Labor Code for that matter,
belongs to the employer x x x". According to this principle, even if the law is solicitous of the welfare
of the employees, it must also protect the right of the employer to exercise what clearly are
management prerogatives.8 Petitioner claims that, being the employer, it has the right to determine
whether it will grant a "free meal" benefit to its employees and, if so, under what conditions. To see it
otherwise would amount to an impairment of its rights as an employer.

We do not think so.

The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations found in law,
a collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and justice. 9 This situation
constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private
respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. 10

Petitioner Dole cannot assail the voluntary arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA for the supposed
impairment of its management prerogatives just because the same interpretation is contrary to its
own.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied.

GANDARA MILL SUPPLY and MILAGROS SY vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND SILVESTRE GERMANO

G.R. No. 126703. December 29, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their
first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the
latter. When the respondent returned to work, he was surprised upon knowing that someone
has been hired to take his place.

 
ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was a case of illegal dismissal.

HELD:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that, findings of fact by quasi-
judicial agencies like the NLRC are conclusive upon the court in the absence of proof of grave error
in the appreciation of facts. Petitioner's bare allegation that it was denied the right to be heard is
negated by the Labor Arbiter's extension of much leniency to petitioner by allowing the latter to
submit a position paper on April 28, 1995, then on May 5, 1995, and finally, seven (7) days from
receipt of the Order dated May 9, 1995. Generally, reglementary periods are strictly observed to the
end that orderly administration of justice be safeguarded. In the case under consideration, the public
respondent had been quite liberal in observing and enforcing the rules. Consequently, petitioner's
protestation of denial of opportunity to be heard is barren of any factual basis. The principle
of laches finds a wide room for application here. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect for
an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to raise it. The
doctrine of laches or "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which require for the
peace of society, discouragement of stale claims. And unlike the statute of limitations, it is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness or permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29). So also, in the Order, dated
May 9, 1995, respondent Commission declared in clear and unequivocal terms that "failure to file a
position paper is deemed a waiver of the right to be heard and that decisions will be based on the
position paper submitted." Evidently, for making good his said Order, the Labor Arbiter cannot be
faulted for acting arbitrarily.

Neither can grave error be ascribed to respondent NLRC for handing down its decision without
petitioner's Position Paper. By its inaction, petitioner was properly considered to have waived or
forfeited the right to refute private respondent's stance. Indeed, petitioner cannot now be permitted to
belatedly complain of a denial of due process.

That petitioner was not represented by a lawyer in all the aforesaid proceedings was solely
attributable to its own negligence or inattention to the case. While the court has held that
representation by a lawyer is a fundamental right of litigants, petitioner has nobody to blame but
itself for its failure to secure the services of counsel resulting to the dismissal of its case. In the case
under scrutiny, petitioner was represented by a non-lawyer, Ramon Flores, who was present from
the beginning of the case but failed to efficiently follow-up the case until the promulgation of
judgment. While the right to due process is available to all the parties, it does not countenance self-
serving excuses devised to undermine orderly administration of justice.

After a careful study, and a thorough examination of the pleadings and supporting documents, it
appears decisively clear that private respondent Silvestre Germane was illegally dismissed. While a
prolonged absence without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems
from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where
dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the
dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.

IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORP., vs. RAMONCHITO T. ALCON and JOANN S.

PAPA

G.R. No. 194884, October 22, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the

manufacture of auto seat-recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents as manual welders
in 2001.

On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift – from 8:00 pm to 5:00
am of the following day. At around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen’s security guard on duty,
went to patrol and inspect the production plant’s premises. When Altiche reached Imasen’s Press
Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan off, he followed the
sound that led him to the plant’s “Tool and Die” section.

At the “Tool and Die” section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse on the floor,
using a piece of carton as mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard  house and relayed
what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana, another security guard on duty.

Respondent’s defense: they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the “Tool and Die” section at
the time of the incident. They also claimed that other employees were near the area, making the
commission of the act charged impossible.

Both LA and NLRC held that the dismissal was valid. CA however nullified NLRC’s decision and held
that sexual intercourse inside company premises is not serious misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents’ infraction – engaging in sexual intercourse inside company premises
during work hours – amounts to serious misconduct justifying their dismissal.

HELD:

The law and jurisprudence guarantee to every employee security of tenure. This textual and the
ensuing jurisprudential commitment to the cause and welfare of the working class proceed from the
social justice principles of the Constitution that the Court zealously implements out of its concern for
those with less in life. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to strike down as invalid any employer act that
attempts to undermine workers’ tenurial security. All these the State undertakes under Article 279
(now Article 293)22 of the Labor Code which bar an employer from terminating the services of an
employee, except for just or authorized cause and upon observance of due process.

In protecting the rights of the workers, the law, however, does not authorize the oppression or self-
destruction of the employer. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be
understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. The
constitutional and legal protection equally recognize the employer’s right and prerogative to manage
its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.

Accordingly, except as limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
judgment and discretion, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, worker supervision, layoff of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. As a general proposition, an employer has free reign over
every aspect of its business, including the dismissal of his employees as long as the exercise of its
management prerogative is done reasonably, in good faith, and in a manner not otherwise intended
to defeat or circumvent the rights of workers.
In these lights, the Court’s task in the present petition is to balance the conflicting rights of the
respondents to security of tenure, on one hand, and of Imasen to dismiss erring employees pursuant
to the legitimate exercise of its management prerogative, on the other.

After due consideration, we find the NLRC legally correct and well within its jurisdiction when it
affirmed the validity of the respondents’ dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct.

Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled ideal, to the realm
of purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts
should be carried out at such place, time and circumstance that, by the generally accepted norms of
conduct, will not offend public decency nor disturb the generally held or accepted social morals.
Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults do not have a place in the work
environment.

Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during
work hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to
these considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only disregard
company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on the status of
ethics and morality in the company.

Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-employees or other
company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents likewise committed their act
at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact, been at their respective posts,
and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees had in fact been, working.

Under these factual premises and in the context of legal parameters we discussed, we cannot help
but consider the respondents’ misconduct to be of grave and aggravated character so that the
company was justified in imposing the highest penalty available ― dismissal. Their infraction
transgressed the bounds of socially and morally accepted human public behavior, and at the same
time showed brazen disregard for the respect that their employer expected of them as employees.
By their misconduct, the respondents, in effect, issued an open invitation for others to commit the
same infraction, with like disregard for their employer’s rules, for the respect owed to their employer,
and for their co-employees’ sensitivities. Taken together, these considerations reveal a depraved
disposition that the Court cannot but consider as a valid cause for dismissal. In ruling as we do now,
we considered the balancing between the respondents’ tenurial rights and the petitioner’s interests –
the need to defend their management prerogative and to maintain as well a high standard of ethics
and morality in the workplace. Unfortunately for the respondents, in this balancing under the
circumstances of the case, we have to rule against their tenurial rights in favor of the employer’s
management rights.

FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA vs. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in PT&T’s Shipping
Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous
transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the
matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods
shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering,
alteration and superimposition.

Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the
anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum, petitioners
were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on November
8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.
LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA.  CA affirmed
the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause
were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process. Petitioners
now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that there was no just cause for
their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for
30 days.
 

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.
 

RULING:

Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the
loss of confidence resulted.  Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents
came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of
petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of
shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. The
alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it
was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents.

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be simulated.
It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of
confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It
must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the
security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The employer’s
evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the
employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence.
Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due
process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer
must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another
written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend
themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of termination
in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents failed to comply
with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the
Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must provide the
employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires.

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. 

In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.  The authority
to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself.  To be valid, a rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As such, it cannot amend
the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee
must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the opportunity to be
heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which ordinarily means
“considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase “ample opportunity to be
heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or conference. To
this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in
conformity with Article 277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should
not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition  sine qua non for
compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair
procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity to be
heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language
revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing
will defeat its spirit.

Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the
so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not strictly.
This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute,
mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of
the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the
controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be
heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while the
phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a
formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although preferred, is not
absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard.

Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In
fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was
given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements
of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the
natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:

(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense,
whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in
writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when
similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided
by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee shall either
be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279
of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of
time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14 years have transpired from
the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer
serve any prudent or practical purpose. So petitioners will just be paid their separation pay. Petition
is hereby GRANTED.