Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1982, Vol. 43, No. 1,89-99 0022-3514/82/4301 -0089100.75

Self-Relevant Scenarios as Mediators of Likelihood Estimates

and Compliance: Does Imagining Make It So?
W. Larry Gregory Robert B. Cialdini
New Mexico State University Arizona State University
Kathleen M. Carpenter
Claremont Graduate School
A series of studies was conducted to determine the viability of a scenario pro-
cedure as a compliance technique. In four experiments, subjects who, through
the use of a structured scenario, were led to imagine themselves experiencing
certain events came to believe more strongly that the events would befall them.
This promotive effect of the scenario procedure on probability or likelihood es-
timates occurred for both positive events (e.g., winning a contest) and negative
events (e.g., being arrested for a crime) and occurred in both laboratory and
field contexts. Furthermore, and crucial to its relevance for compliance, the
scenario procedure was shown to influence not bnly probability judgments but
also behavior. Homeowners who imagined themselves utilizing a cable television
service were subsequently more likely to subscribe to such a service when re-
quested to do so weeks later. Finally, it was determined that the effect of struc-
tured scenarios on compliance is not due to additional information provided by
the scenario. Instead, an interpretation based on the availability heuristic is
favored.

Evidence from a study by Carroll (1978) nitively available (i.e., it springs to mind eas-
suggests that subjects who are made to imag- ily), it will be perceived as likely. Carroll
ine the occurrence of a social event (e.g., the (1978) argued that having subjects imagine
election of a political candidate) through the the occurrence of an event, via a scripted
use of elaborate scenarios come to believe scenario, makes images of the event subse-
more strongly that the event will take place. quently more available and, consequently,
Carroll (1978) explained this finding in makes the event appear more probable.
terms of the availability heuristic identified Although not specifically implicated by
by Tversky and Kahneman (1973). Avail- the Carroll (1978) data, the power of a
ability is a heuristic strategy sometimes em- scripted scenario (i.e., a series of events
ployed by persons who are called upon to linked together in narrative form) to influ-
make frequency or probability judgments. ence probability judgments may have im-
To the extent that an idea or event is cog- portant ramifications for behavioral compli-
ance; that is, a requester may be more
successful in gaining compliance with a re-
Preparation of this manuscript was facilitated by New quest if the target person has first imagined
Mexico State University College of Arts and Sciences a scenario of himself or herself performing
Minigrant 1-3-43545 to the first author.
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are taken from the first two the requested behavior. Such an enhance-
studies of the first author's dissertation submitted to ment of compliance could occur for at least
Arizona State University in partial fulfillment of the two reasons. First, the elevated expectancy
requirements for the PhD, and Experiment 4 comprises that an event will take place resulting from
a portion of the third author's senior honors thesis in
psychology. Both were supervised by the second author. a scenario procedure (Carroll, 1978) could
The authors would like to express their appreciation work directly on behavior: Because people
to Billie Allison and Janice Gregory, who served as the are reluctant to abandon or disconfirm their
female experimenters in Experiment 3.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Larry Gregory, expectancies (e.g., Aronson & Carlsmith,
Department of Psychology, New Mexico State Univer- 1962; Sherman, 1980; Weaver & Brickman,
sity, Las Cruces, New Mexico 88003-3452. 1974), especially those for which they have
89
90 L. GREGORY, R. CIALDINI, AND K. CARPENTER

imagined an account (e.g., Anderson, Lep- action pattern, the scenario structure itself
per, & Ross, 1980; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, provides information about how the action
& Stock, 1981), these newly heightened ex- pattern could be accomplished in a way that
pectancies could stimulate consistent behav- the subjects would not have generated them-
ior. Second, and not incompatible with the selves. In this case, it would not be the cog-
first possibility, if subjects are made via the nitive availability of these actions that would
scenario procedure to believe that they are make them seem more likely but, rather, the
more likely to perform an act, they may raw information about how they might be
develop a more favorable attitude toward the performed. Accordingly, it would be impor-
act to maintain a consistent self-perception tant to remove the raw-information alter-
(Bern, 1972). This changed attitude, then, native/artifact as a likely mediator of the
could spur behavior. scenario effect.
Thus, there is reason to believe that a sce- This article reports the outcome of a re-
nario procedure could be employed as an search program designed to meet the pre-
effective compliance technique. Before one viously mentioned conditions. Experiments
can have much confidence in such a possi- 1 and 2 were intended to assess the ability
bility, however, several conditions must be of the scenario procedure to reliably affect
met. First, greater evidence should be gen- subjects' likelihood estimates for self-rele-
erated for the ability of scenarios to affect vant events. Experiment 3 sought to replicate
probability judgments. At present, the rel- those findings in a context that minimized
evant evidence is weak. For example, in Car- a demand-characteristics interpretation of
roll's (1978) studies, the scenario procedure the basic effect. Experiment 4 investigated
produced significant effects for certain ex- the effectiveness of the scenario procedure
pectancies but not for others. Second, if a as a compliance technique able to influence
scenario approach is to be germane to per- rather costly overt actions. Experiment 4
sonal-compliance behavior, it must be shown also provided evidence for the explanatory
to affect likelihood estimates for self-rele- power of raw information as a mediator of
vant acts; that is, the perceived probability the enhanced compliance.
that one will perform an action must rise
after one has imagined oneself so acting in Experiment 1
a scenario. To date, no such data exist.
Third, the possibility of a demand-charac- Method
teristics (Orne, 1962) explanation for the Subjects. Forty-eight male introductory psychology
general phenomenon must be largely re- students from Arizona State University participated as
duced. The Carroll (1978) findings could be subjects in exchange for experimental credit toward the
fulfillment of a departmental methodology requirement.
interpreted as stemming from experimental- Students were led to believe that they were participating
demand pressures. Therefore, it is necessary in a study of the plea-bargaining process.
to demonstrate the promotive effects of sce- Procedure. Subjects in the experimental condition
narios on likelihood estimates in contexts not heard a tape-recorded scenario (adapted from Gregory,
readily susceptible to demand effects. Fourth, Mowen, & Linder, 1978) that described either (a) how
they were arrested for but had not committed armed
a significant effect of the scenario procedure robbery or (b) how they actually committed an armed
on overt compliance with a request should robbery and were subsequently arrested.1 These record-
be demonstrated. Furthermore, this compli- ings began with instructions requesting the subjects to
ance action should be relatively extreme to wererelax and imagine that the events described in the tape
actually happening to them. References to the sub-
provide some evidence of the power of the ject within the tape were in the second person (e.g.,
technique. Finally, an investigation of fac- "you are forced hard against a car and searched"). Fol-
tors that could mediate the technique's ef- lowing the tape, to lend credibility to the cover story,
fectiveness should be undertaken. For in- these subjects completed a booklet requesting them to
stance, it would be possible to interpret the recall various details of the scenario and make various
ratings (e.g., whether their defense attorney believed
technique's success in a more straightfor-
ward way than via the availability heuristic. 1
A copy of the script used in this experiment, and in
Perhaps in the course of instructing subjects all subsequent experiments described herein, can be ob-
to imagine themselves performing a specific tained from either the first or second author.
 SELF-RELEVANT SCENARIOS
that they were guilty or innocent, estimates concerning
the amount of evidence for and against them). The de-
pendent variable was assessed in a final question that
required subjects to make an estimate of how probable
it was that they could someday be arrested for armed
robbery: "How likely is it that you might someday be
arrested for armed robbery, regardless of whether you
are innocent or guilty?" Their responses were made on
an interval probability scale, beginning with 0% and
incrementing by 5% up to an endpoint of 100%. The
endpoints were labeled, respectively, "absolutely no
chance" or "absolutely will be arrested."
Subjects in the control condition heard no scenario
and only completed the dependent measure concerning
how probable it was that they could someday be arrested
for armed robbery.
All subjects were debriefed following completion of
the experiment.
Results and Discussion
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) per-
formed on subjects' probability estimates
revealed that experimental-condition sub-
jects were significantly more likely to believe
that they could someday be arrested for
armed robbery (M = 17.50%, SD = 17.04,
n = 32) than were control-condition subjects
(M = 9.06%, SD = 7.12, n = 16), F(l, 46) =
3.58, p < .032 (one-tailed).
Although it appears that subjective prob-
ability estimates for a personally relevant
event are elevated as a function of an avail-
able scenario, a potential flaw exists in Ex-
periment 1. Only the subjects in the exper-
imental condition heard a scenario for which
they were to imagine that the events were
actually happening to them. It is conceivable
that the act of imagining any event makes
it easier to imagine subsequent events. Thus,
it is possible that the obtained difference
between the experimental-condition subjects
and the control-condition subjects could
have been obtained using any scenario, an
artifact unrelated to the concept of available
instances. Thus, a subsequent study was con- Results and Discussion
ducted in which both conditions were ex-
posed to scenarios.
Experiment 2
Method
Subjects. Sixty-two females, 32 males, and 6 stu- they were more likely to win a vacation (M =
dents who failed to indicate their sex served as subjects. 37.94%, SD = 26.63, n = 52) than were con-
All were juniors enrolled in a psychology course in a
Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area high school. Sub-
jects participated in the experiment by completing a 21.87, n = 48).
questionnaire in their class.
91
Procedure. Subjects were led to believe they were
participating in a pilot study for a future memory ex-
periment. A cover sheet on the experimental question-
naire informed them that the researcher would even-
tually be investigating some of the factors that affect
human memory. We explained that the current ques-
tionnaire contained one of several scripts developed for
possible future use as a stimulus script in memory ex-
periments. The cover sheet explained that the scripts
had to be evaluated as to whether they were too difficult
(few people could remember many details of them ac-
curately) or too easy (too many people could remember
everything about them). Thus, the subjects' task was to
read the script carefully and imagine that the events
described were actually happening to them (purportedly
to make the subjects' classroom evaluation situation
more similar to the ultimate situation in which the
scripts would be utilized). Only two scripts were actually
used. The experimental script consisted of a two-page,
single-spaced account of the subject traveling with a
companion to a shopping mall and, while shopping, en-
tering a contest and winning the second prize.—a free
vacation trip to Hawaii. The control-condition script
described a similar trip to a shopping mall but made no
mention of a contest and terminated with the subject
traveling to a local library to borrow some books for a
term paper. Both scripts were in the second person, pres-
ent tense (e.g., "you pass by a booth selling pastries,
and your friend buys one and splits it with you").
Dependent measures. After reading the scripts, sub-
jects completed 10 brief questions concerning the con-
tents of the script, indicated how believable they found
the script to be on a 7-point scale (with 1 labeled "ex-
tremely believable," 4 labeled "neither," and 7 labeled
"extremely unbelievable"), and indicated their mood on
a 7-point scale (with 1 labeled "extremely good mood,"
4 labeled "neither," and 7 labeled "extremely bad
mood"). The dependent variable of interest, the per-
ceived probability of winning a vacation, was assessed
by informing subjects that the possibility existed that
their beliefs about certain events could affect their mem-
ory for the script; therefore they were requested to com-
plete six items that required them to indicate how prob-
able they felt certain events were to occur. The probability
of winning a vacation was one of these six items, and
its position was varied randomly across the six possible
positions. Probability was assessed with an interval scale
similar to that used in the previous experiment. Subjects
were debriefed after completing the questionnaire.
An ANOVA performed on the subjects
subjective probability estimates of winning
a vacation was significant, F(l, 98) = 9.28,
p < .002 (one-tailed). Subjects who had read
the experimental-condition scenario believed
trol-condition subjects (M = 23.02%, SD =
Although no specific predictions were
92 L. GREGORY, R. CIALDINI, AND K. CARPENTER
made for any other variables assessed, ex-
ploratory analyses were performed on each
of them. A significant difference was ob-
tained for the subjects' memory scores for
the two scenarios, F(l, 98) = 5.49, p < .02.
Subjects in the experimental condition (M =
7.65, SD = 1.25), answered more items cor-
rectly than did control-condition subjects
(M = 6.96, SD = 1.70). However, it must
be acknowledged that due to the differences
in the scenarios, the memory questions con-
cerning them were comparable, but not all
were identical. They were included in the
experimental booklets as filler items to fur-
ther convince subjects of the validity of the
cover story. Additionally, the correlation
between total number of memory items an-
swered correctly and the probability esti-
mates for winning a vacation was computed
for the experimental-condition subjects and
was nonsignificant, r(50) = -.02. Although
it appears that the actual mertiory for the
specific details of the scenarios is unrelated
to probability estimates, it should be noted
that memory scores were uniformly high,
which could preclude the possibility of ob-
taining a significant correlation between
memory scores and probability estimates.
Also significant was the analysis of the
subjects' ratings of the believability of the
scenarios, F(l, 98) = 8.82, p < .004. Sub-
jects' ratings of the experimental-condition
scenario (M = 2.94, SD = .85) indicate that
it was less believable than the control-con-
dition scenario (M = 2.44, SD = .85). Al-
though a significant difference between the
two conditions was found on the believability
measure, the scores for the experimental
condition were on the "believable" end of
the scale. Moreover, the effect does not ap-
pear to have mediated the subjects' proba-
bility estimates. The correlation between the
estimates of the probability of winning a
vacation and believability ratings (computed
for the experimental-condition subjects only)
was nonsignificant, r(50) = -.20.
Finally, there was a significant difference
in the subjects' ratings of mood as a function
of the scenario that they read, F(l, 98) =
20.32, p < .001. The ratings of subjects in
the experimental condition (M = 2.88, SD =
.90) indicated that they were in a signifi-
cantly better mood than subjects in the con-
trol condition (M = 3.69, SD = .88). Thus,
the possibility exists that mood was mediat-
ing the subjects' estimates of probability.
Suggestive evidence against this possibility
is the lack of a significant correlation be-
tween mood and probability estimates of
winning a vacation for the experimental-con-
dition subjects, r(50) = .08.
In this experiment, subjective probability
estimates of winning a vacation appear to
have been increased by providing subjects
with an available scenario depicting that
event. Since both experimental- and control-
condition subjects were required to imagine
that the events in a scenario were happening
to them, it appears that the act of imagining
by itself does not serve to increase proba-
bility estimates for events other than the one
imagined.
Experiment 3
A more thorough examination of the pro-
cesses that generated these results must be
attempted, but a prior question concerns the
validity of the procedures for examining the
effects of scenarios on estimated probability.
In the two experiments presented thus far,
subjects either heard or read scenarios de-
scribing the occurrence of an event. Subjects
then responded to questions about the sce-
narios and were required to judge the prob-
ability that the event described could happen
to them. It is conceivable that the present
data, and Carroll's (1978) data, could be the
simple result of demand characteristics.
Subjects in the experimental conditions may
be making their probability estimates after
inferring that the researcher wants them to
believe that the event described in the sce-
nario could happen to them. Thus, before
undertaking further research concerning the
effects of scenarios on the probability esti-
mates of individuals, it is imperative that we
establish that these effects are not solely the
result of demand characteristics.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-nine female and 19 male introduc-
tory psychology students from Arizona State University
participated as subjects in exchange for experimental
credit toward the fulfillment of a departmental meth-
odology requirement.
 SELF-RELEVANT SCENARIOS
Procedure. As in Experiment 2, students were led
to believe they were aiding with the evaluation of scripts
for possible use in future experiments on memory. Sub-
jects in the experimental condition read two scripts
(counterbalanced across subjects in their order of pre-
sentation). One script described their arrest for petty
theft, while the other described their arrest for shoplift-
ing. In the former scenario, the subject is described as
deliberately stealing a cassette recorder from a liquor
store and being apprehended by the owner and turned
over to the police, who book the subject. In the latter
scenario the subject is described as placing a box of
Band-Aids in a coat pocket while continuing to shop in
a drug store, with the intention of paying for them. The
subject is described as being detained by the store man-
ager and picked up by a police officer. Each scenario
was followed by 10 questions about its contents and by
2 questions concerning its credibility and the mood in
which it left the subject. These latter 2 questions were
identical to those described in the previous study.
Control-condition subjects read two counterbalanced
scenarios. One was the same scenario used in the control
condition of Experiment 2, while the other described the
subject applying for and interviewing for a part-time
job with an investment company. As with the experi-
mental condition, each scenario was followed by 10
questions concerning its contents and 2 questions as-
sessing its believability' and mood. All scripts were in
the second person, present tense.
The experiment was conducted in the early evening
hours, and it was assumed that most students would go
home after participating. Thus, after subjects had read
either the control- or experimental-condition scenarios
and had completed the questions concerning the con-
tents and believability and their mood, they were dis-
missed. At that time, the male experimenter gave the
names and telephone numbers of the participants* to a
female experimenter who was blind to each subject's
experimental condition. At Arizona State University,
the telephone numbers of students are collected rou-
tinely as they register in advance to participate in ex-
periments. Thus, it was not necessary to obtain tele-
phone numbers from subjects during the course of the
experiment.
After waiting 30 minutes from the time that the sub-
jects completed the experiment, the female experi-
menter telephoned the subject. When someone answered
the telephone, the experimenter gave a fictitious name
and asked for the subject by name. After ascertaining
that she was speaking to the subject, she explained that
she was pooling selected individuals on certain issues for
the Tri-City Consumer Advocacy Project (CAP, a fic-
titious organization). She asked subjects if they would
be willing to take 2 minutes to answer a few questions
and if they would allow their opinions and ideas to be
represented in recommendations that would be made on
the basis of the survey. A standard set of responses was
employed if subjects had any questions about the or-
ganization, how their names had been obtained, the
purpose of the poll, and so forth. If a subject was re-
luctant to participate, the experimenter explained that
her or his particular responses were invaluable, given
the way CAP researchers selected their samples. She
also offered to send her or him a copy of the results
when available and assured the subject of the confiden-
93
tiality of her or his responses. Once a subject had agreed
to participate, the experimenter asked the subject her
or his age. She then explained that the topic of the poll
was judicial reform and that the CAP was interested
in the penalities the subject considered appropriate for
various crimes. The experimenter explained that she
would name in random order various crimes for which
individuals are arrested and that the subject was to re-
spond with her or his opinion on how many years or
months in prison the sentence should be for that crime.
Subjects were told that they could also indicate that no
time should be served or that the death penalty should
be imposed.
Probability assessment. After working through a list
of 19 crimes, which included shoplifting and petty theft
(separated in the list by 8 other crimes), the experi-
menter explained that she would go through the list
again, with the subject indicating whether he or she
personally knew anyone who had been arrested for that
particular crime. After completing this task, the exper-
imenter went through the list one final time asking the
subject how probable it was that he or she could some-
day be arrested for that crime, explaining the meaning
of 0 and 100% probability and requesting subjects to
round their answers off to the nearest 5%. Subjects were
reminded that they were not being asked how likely it
was that they would actually commit the crime, nor how
likely it was that they would be convicted.
Suspicion probe. After collecting this information,
the experimenter completed a probe for suspicion, mov-
ing from general questions to a specific question. This
portion of the script read,
One more thing before I'm through. Recently, we
have had some trouble getting individuals to assist us
with our surveys. We think this is in part due to the
ever increasing number of sales organizations that are
conducting their business by telephone. Since we are
continually interested in improving our image with
the public and in improving the quality of our work,
I'd like to get your response to just three more ques-
tions. First, do you have anything to add or do you
have any comments? Second, do you have any idea
why we called you? Third, at any time during the
call, did you feel that the reason that I called was
anything other than what I described?
After recording the subject's responses, the experi-
menter thanked the subject for her or his time and ter-
minated the call. The experimenter then recorded the
time. Subjects were debriefed by mail.
Results and Discussion
Of the 58 subjects who read the scenarios,
6 males and 8 females could not be contacted
by telephone, and 4 females refused to par-
ticipate in the telephone survey. This left 13
males and 27 females with complete data.
One female was deleted from this sample.
She had indicated a 40% probability for
being arrested for sexual assault. None of
the other females in the study indicated any
94 L. GREGORY, R. CIALDINI, AND K. CARPENTER
probability greater than 0% for this crime.
This fact suggests that the subject was not
responding to the survey in a valid mariner.
None of the subjects indicated any sus-
picion that the telephone survey was any-
thing other than it was represented as being.
A few subjects were curious as to where the
CAP had obtained their names, for which
the experimenter gave a standard reply con-
cerning the various lists used by CAP re-
searchers to derive samples (church mem-
berships, service organizations, college en-
rollments, voter registration lists). Still others
volunteered that they originally had thought
they were to be targets of some sales or
marketing pitch but had quickly realized
they were wrong.
For the major dependent variable of in-
terest, an average score was derived by sum-
ming each subject's probability estimates for
being arrested for shoplifting and petty theft
and dividing by two. An ANOVA on this score
yielded a significant result, F(l, 37) = 5.22,
/x.015 (one-tailed). Inspection of the
means revealed that the experimental-con-
dition subjects estimated higher probabilities
for someday being arrested for the two
crimes (M = 16.37%, SD = 25.45, n = 20)
than did control-condition subjects (M =
2.50%, SD = 7.45, n = 19). These data were
obtained outside the laboratory in a context
seemingly devoid of experimental cues for
the desired response. Thus, the results of the
first two experiments apparently cannot be
accounted for by relying exclusively on the
effects of experimental demand character-
istics.
No significant differences were obtained
for the subjects' memory scores for the sce-
narios, averaged across the two scenarios
that each group of subjects read (F < 1, ns).
Nor were there any significant differences
between the two conditions for the subjects'
ratings of the believability of the scenarios,
averaged across the two scenarios that each
group of subjects read (F < 1).
For the experimental condition, Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficients were
computed to examine the relationship be-
tween average memory scores for the two
scenarios and the average probability rating
for being arrested for petty theft and shop-
lifting. A similar correlation was computed
for believability and probability. No signif-
icant relationships were obtained in either
of these analyses, both rs(18) < .21,p > .39.
A significant difference was obtained for
subjects' mood scores (averaged across the
two scenarios that each group of subjects
read), F(l, 37) = 10.52, p< .003. Subjects
in the experimental condition were in a sig-
nificantly worse mood after reading their
scenarios (M = 4.30, SD = .68) than were
the control-condition subjects (M = 3.55,
SD = .76).
A correlational analysis relating average
mood scores for the two experimental^con-
dition scenarios to the average probability
rating for being arrested for petty theft and
shoplifting was not significant, K18) = .22,
p > .35. Thus, a linear relationship between
mood and probability does not appear to
exist in this study.
Additional analysis revealed that no sig-
nificant differences existed between the two
groups in the amount of time that elapsed
between the reading of the scenarios and the
telephone contact, r(37) = 1.31,/j > .20 (ex-
perimental-condition M = 96.33 minutes,
SD = 57.09; control-condition M = 133.22
minutes, SD = 114.06). For the experimen-
tal .condition only, a correlation was com-
puted between elapsed time and the average
probability-estimate score for being arrested
for shoplifting and petty theft. This, too, was
nonsignificant, K18) = .17, suggesting that
the effects on probability of the scenarios did
not diminish as a function of the limited time
that elapsed between reading the scenarios
and the assessment of the probability esti-
mates.
One final analysis revealed that subjects
did not differ in their recommended sen-
tences for the various crimes as a function
of experimental condition.
Experiment 4
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) argued
that "the plausibility of the scenarios that
come to mind, or the difficulty of producing
them, then serve as a clue to the likelihood
of an event" (p. 229). Since, in our studies,
subjects did not construct the original see-
 SELF-RELEVANT SCENARIOS
narios (also true of the Carroll, 1978, ex-
periments), the subjects' perceptions con-
cerning the difficulty of producing a scenario
were bypassed and should not have served
as a cue in making probability estimates.
Thus, we argue that the crucial elements of
our studies were the plausible scenarios that
we made available to our subjects. These sce-
narios served as readily available instances
and resulted in the biased probability esti-
mates obtained.
However, another possible explanation
exists. Although demand characteristics have
been minimized as an alternative explana-
tion for the reported effects in these exper-
iments, it is possible that simple information
differences between the control and experi-
mental conditions could account for the re-
sults. In the experiments presented thus far,
the experimental scenarios depicted situa-
tions that subjects are unlikely to have ever
considered; hence it is possible that this in-
formation alone, and not availability, led to
upward biases of subjects' probability esti-
mates for the events described. A similar
explanation could account for the results of
Carroll's experiments.
Therefore, it was necessary to design an
experiment in which identical information
was presented to subjects in both the exper-
imental and control conditions, with the
scripts differing only in the self-relevance of
the information presented. Thus, in Exper-
iment 4, the control-condition subjects were
provided with information concerning an
event, whereas the experimental-condition
subjects received the same information in the
form of a scenario requiring them to imagine
the event as though it were happening to
them.
In this experiment, in addition to proba-
bility beliefs, behavioral measures were in-
cluded to explore the possibility that imag-
ining a scenario could influence subsequent
behavior. Were this demonstrated to be the
case, the scenario procedure might have
newfound status as a compliance technique.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were residents of two middle-
class neighborhoods contacted by a door-to-door can-
95
vasser in Tempe, Arizona, a city in the Phoenix met-
ropolitan area. Thirty-one of the subjects were male, 47
were female, and there was one "subject" whose re-
sponses were the mutually-agreed-upon responses of the
male-female couple residing in the home.
Stimulus materials. The experiment was done in
conjunction with a local cable television company. Lit-
erature pertaining to cable television (CATV) was ob-
tained from the company and was used to create the
stimulus materials for the "information" (control) con-
dition. For the "imagination" (experimental) condition,
a scenario was constructed utilizing the same infor-
mation as the control condition but emphasizing that
subjects were to imagine themselves experiencing the
benefits and features of the service. A few sample para-
graphs will elucidate the differences between the two
conditions. The following is an excerpt from the infor-
mation condition.
CATV will provide a broader entertainment and in-
formational service to its subscribers. Used properly,
a person can plan in advance to enjoy events offered.
Instead of spending money on the babysitter and gas,
and putting up with the hassles of "going out," more
time can be spent at home with family, alone, or with
friends.
The parallel passage from the imagination condition
follows:
Take a moment and imagine how CATV will provide
you with a broader entertainment and informational
service. When you use it properly, you will be able
to plan in advance which of the events offered you
wish to enjoy. Take a moment and think of how, in-
stead of spending money on the babysitter and gas,
and then having to put up with the hassles of "going
out," you will be able to spend your time at home,
with your family, alone, or with your friends.
Procedure. Subjects were contacted at the door of
their residence by a female experimenter, who indicated
that she was doing a survey of attitudes toward cable
television for a class project. The experimenter displayed
her student identification card and a badge stating,
"Student Researcher, Cable TV Survey, Arizona State
University." After the subject had agreed to the survey,
she explained that to insure that everyone who answered
the questionnaire had equal information about CATV,
she would read the subject a short description of some
of the aspects of CATV taken from literature supplied
by the local cable company. The script appropriate to
the experimental condition to which the subject had
been assigned randomly prior to contact was then read
to the subject.
Dependent measures: Questionnaire. After the sub-
ject had heard the script, he or she was asked a series
of questions. The first question required subjects to in-
dicate how likely they felt that CATV would be as pop-
ular as regular television. Responses were collected on
a 7-point scale ranging from "very likely" (7) to "very
unlikely" (1). Using an identical scale, the second ques-
tion asked subjects how likely they thought CATV
would be something they wanted. The third question,
96 L. GREGORY, R. CIALDINI, AND K. CARPENTER

Table 1
Significance Tests, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Interview Questions
Information Imagination
condition condition

Question F(\, 77) M SD M SD

1. Likely CATV will be as popular as regular

television <1 ns 5.90 1.50 5.95 1.43
2. Likely subject will want CATV 8.19 .01 3.83 2.47 5.26 1.93
3. Positive-negative attitude toward CATV 6.42 .02 4.59 2.00 5.55 1.29
4. Likely subject will obtain further information 5.25 .03 3.46 2.43 4.63 2.07
5. Likely subject will subscribe to CATV 4.74 .04 3.37 2.41 4.53 2.32
6. Prior information about CATV <1 ns 3.51 .84 3.68 .93
7. Prior information left subject with favorable
or unfavorable view of CATV <1 ns 4.95 1.60 5.24 1.48

Note. All probability levels are two-tailed. All questions except Question 6 utilized 7-point scales, with high values
implying more of that attribute or more of the attribute listed first. A 5-point scale was used for Question 6, with
high values implying more information about cable television (CATV).

utilizing a 7-point scale ranging from "very positive"
(7) to "very negative" (1), concerned the subject's at-
titude toward CATV. The fourth question, which used
the previously described likelihood scale, asked subjects
how likely they felt that they would obtain more infor-
mation about CATV if given the opportunity. The fifth
question, the major dependent variable of interest, used
the 7-point likelihood scale to ask subjects how likely
they felt it was that they would subscribe to CATV. The
sixth question inquired as to how much information the
subject had heard about CATV prior to the interview,
and the responses were recorded on a 5-point scale rang-
ing from "well versed" (5) to "none" (1). The seventh
question requested subjects to indicate on the positive-
negative scale of Question 3 how favorable or unfavor-
able an impression of CATV they had as a result of any
prior information.
Dependent measures: Behavioral. At the conclusion
of the interview, all subjects were given a stamped post-
card that could be used to request further information
about CATV. Two to 6 weeks later, all subjects were
contacted by company salespeople (blind to the exper-
imental manipulations) during the course of their stan-
dard door-to-door marketing of CATV in the neigh-
borhoods. All subjects were offered a free week of service
to CATV and the opportunity to subscribe. Approxi-
mately 2 to 3 months after the interview contact, the
following behavioral information was obtained from
company records: (a) whether subjects requested more
information via the postcard, (b) whether subjects
agreed to take the free week of CATV service, and (c)
whether subjects actually subscribed to the CATV ser-
vice.2
Results and Discussion
Questionnaire results. Separate ANOVAS
were conducted on the responses to the seven
interview questions, since each question dealt
with a different variable. The results are
summarized in Table 1, which provides the
F statistics, probability levels, means, and
standard deviations for each question.'
The first item was designed to measure the
subject's perception that other people would
be interested in CATV. Since the experi-
mental manipulation was designed to affect
how subjects would perceive their own be-
havior concerning CATV, and not the be-
havior of others, we did not expect any sig-
nificant differences on this variable. Indeed,
mean scores for subjects in the information
condition did not differ significantly from
subjects in the imagination condition.
For the next four questions, significant
differences between the two groups were
found. Imagination-condition subjects re-
ported that they were significantly more
likely to want CATV, had significantly more
positive attitudes toward CATV, were sig-
nificantly more likely to request additional
information about CATV, and were signif-
icantly more likely to subscribe to CATV
than information-condition subjects.
2
A third neighborhood was included in the original
design. However, the CATV company changed its mar-
keting procedure in this neighborhood by offering a free
month's service, contingent on a later subscription. Since
this change rendered the data from this neighborhood
noncomparable to the other two, their data were deleted.
However, the deletion of this neighborhood does not
alter the results of the questionnaire data or the behav-
ioral data reported.
 SELF-RELEVANT SCENARIOS
Table 2
Persons per Condition Engaging in the Compliance Behaviors
Information
Behavior condition
Returned postcard 4/41
Accepted free week 17/41
Subscribed to cable television 8/41
' p < .03. ** p < .01.
Relative to providing subjects with non-
personal event information only, it is appar-
ent that casting the information in a context
that requires subjects to imagine themselves
in the events results in significantly higher
self-relevant probability estimates (hereirep-
resented by Question 5) concerning the oc-
currence of the event. Additionally, imag-
ining affects subjects' attitudes toward the
event (Question 3), subject's perceived de-
sirability of the event (Question 2), and sub-
ject's intentions to seek further information
(Question 4). These data strongly suggest
that with information differences minimized
between the experimental conditions, the
effects of scenarios on probability estimates
observed in the previous studies can be rep-
licated.
Behavioral results. The number of sub.-
jects per condition who engaged in the var-
ious compliance behaviors, along with the
chi-square tests of significance, are displayed
in Table 2. As can be seen, no differences
were found between the two groups for their
return rate of the postcard. In the infor-
mation condition, 9.8% of the subjects re-
turned the postcard, while 5.3% of the sub-
jects returned the card in the imagination
condition. These postcard data are not con-
sistent with the data from the interview in
which subjects in the imagination condition
( indicated a significantly greater intention to
request further CATV information than did
subjects in the information condition. One
conceivable explanation of the discrepancy
is that after providing such positive re-
sponses regarding CATV in the interview,
subjects in the imagination condition self-
perceived their favorability toward CATV
as sufficiently strong that no additional in-
formation was necessary for a decision;
therefore, they did not mail the postcards
97
Imagination
condition X 2 (D
2/38
25/38 4.69*
18/38 6.93**
that would bring such information. What-
ever the explanation, we did not find a sig-
nificant effect on the first of our behavioral
measures.
However, analyses of the remaining be-
havioral data revealed striking significant
differences between the experimental con-
ditions. Imagination-condition subjects were
significantly more likely to accept the free
week of service than the information-con-
dition subjects. Whereas only 41.5% of the
information-condition subjects accepted the
free week, 65.8% of the imagination-condi-
tion subjects accepted the free week.
Imagination-condition subjects were also
significantly more likely to subscribe to the
CATV service. In the information condition,
19.5% of the subjects subscribed to the ser-
vice, but 47.4% of the imagination-condition
subjects did so.
Thus, imagining had a powerful effect on
subsequent behavior. Because we did a sat-
uration sample of the residents in our con-
tacted neighborhoods, it is not possible to
know how residents of those neighborhoods
may have responded on the behavioral mea-
sures had no interview been conducted.
However, as a rough approximation of such
control data, we obtained estimates from the
CATV company's sales manager of the nor-
mal percentages of compliance on these
measures in neighborhoods demographically
comparable to the present sample. His es-
timates on both the free week (40%) and the
subscription rate (23%) were strikingly sim-
ilar to the obtained percentages in the in-
formation condition (41.5% and 19.5%) but
substantially lower than those of the imag-
ination condition (65.8% and 47.4%). Al-
though we cannot place high confidence in
such comparisons, to the extent that we can
trust the sales manager's estimates, the
98 L. GREGORY, R. CIALDINI, AND K. CARPENTER
Table 3
Correlations Between Experimental Condition, Likelihood, Attitude, and Subscribing
Variable
Experimental Condition
(Information = 1 Imagination = 2)
Likelihood (Question 5)
Attitude (Question 3)
Note. N = 79. The correlation between attitude and subscribing with the effect of likelihood partialed out is r(16)
.05, ns, while the correlation between likelihood and subscribing with the effect of attitude partialed out is r(16)
.5\,p< .001.
* p< .02. **p < .01. ***/> < .001.
imagination procedure appears to have had
a marked positive effect on compliance rates.
Since the data reveal that both the sub-
jects' likelihood estimates concerning sub-
scribing to CATV and their attitudes toward
CATV were enhanced by the imagination
procedure, the question arises as to which
of the two (if not both) plays a more prom-
inent role in mediating the subsequent be-
havior of subscribing to CATV. Since the
experiment was designed to rule out infor-
mation differences as an alternative expla-
nation for the effects of imagining on prob-
ability estimation, we can only speculate on
the processes influencing the behavioral data.
Pearson product-moment correlations were
computed between experimental condition,
the likelihood of subscribing, positive-neg-
ative attitude, and actual subscriptions
(point-biserial correlations were computed
where appropriate, but they yielded results
identical to the Pearson product-moment
correlations). Table 3 displays the results of
these correlations. As would be expected,
experimental condition correlates signifi-
cantly with subscribing. However, subjects'
estimates of the likelihood that they would
subscribe correlate much higher with actual
subscriptions. Attitude toward CATV cor-
relates significantly with subscribing as well,
but to a significantly lesser extent than like-
lihood, t(76) = 3.10, p < .002. In fact, the
correlation between attitude and subscribing
with the effects of likelihood partialed out
is r(76) = .05, ns, while the correlation be-
tween likelihood and subscribing with the
effects of attitude partialed out is r(76) =
.51, p < .001. It is clear that likelihood plays
a bigger role in these data. This is not to say
that attitude does not play a role. If attitude
Likelihood Attitude Subscribing
.24* .28** .30**
.65*** .59***
.35**
toward subscribing had been assessed (Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975),
these correlations might have been different.
However, the data do suggest that expec-
tancies for behavior did play a large role in
mediating the behavior (Aronson & Carl-
smith, 1962; Sherman, 1980; Weaver &
Brickman, 1974).
General Discussion
The recurring pattern of results in the ser-
ies of experiments reported herein supports
the predictions derived from the Tversky and
Kahneman (1973) notion of cognitive avail-
ability. Subjects were provided with highly
detailed scenarios describing events that
they imagined were happening to them. Rel-
ative to control subjects, subjects who imag-
ined scenarios rendered elevated subjective
probability estimates for the occurrence of
those events that were the subject of the
scenarios.
Although conceptually replicating Car-
roll's (1978) findings, the present studies
have gone beyond the early data in extending
the literature concerning available instances
generated by scenarios. In our studies, the
events that were manipulated in the scena-
rios were of a personal nature and described
events that could happen to subjects them-
selves.
Further, Experiment 3 diminished exper-
imental demand characteristics as an alter-
native explanation of the findings. This find-
ing is especially crucial because the ex-
perimental results produced by both the
methodology employed in our first two
experiments and Carroll's two experiments
are readily susceptible to the demand-char-
 SELF-RELEVANT SCENARIOS
acteristics explanation. Although experi-
mental demands may have contributed to the
effects of these experiments, the methodol-
ogy of the third experiment, wherein the
dependent variables were assessed outside an
experimental context in the absence of sus-
picion in any subjects, minimizes the like-
lihood of demand characteristics as the
prime mediator of the observed findings.
Experiment 4 provides clear evidence that
differences in the information provided to
subjects in the scenarios cannot account for
the effects on probability estimates. Even
when subjects are provided with identical
information, the presentation of the infor-
mation in scenario form and the require-
ment that subjects imagine the personal
occurrence of the events cause significant
differences in self-relevant probability esti-
mates between the experimental and control
conditions. We speculate that there are two
plausible means by which scenario proce-
dures like those of Carroll (1978) or of this
study could lead to the heightened avail-
ability of an event and to a consequently
biased probability estimate for it. First, a
subject who has imagined an event's occur-
rence by following a highly structured sce-
nario has been made to construct mental im-
ages of the event taking place. Because such
images will thus become already formed,
upon any subsequent consideration they may
be more readily pictured than before. Sec-
ond, an initial construction of an event as
happening in a given fashion may create a
cognitive "set" that impairs the ability to see
the event in competing ways. A consequence
may be a reduced capacity to picture the
rival possibilities, making the first construc-
tion appear more true upon reflection. Fur-
ther research designed to understand these
processes must be undertaken.
The final study also provides evidence that
imagining a scenario can ultimately influ-
ence behavior, although intervening vari-
ables such as probability beliefs and atti-
tudes (which are themselves influenced by
the scenarios) undoubtedly play a mediating
role. An additional question concerns the
generality of the effects of scenarios on be-
haviors. For example, would people who
have just been exposed to a scenario describ-
ing an automobile accident (and hence pre-
99
sumably believe that they are more likely to
have an automobile accident) be more likely
to engage in behaviors not specifically men-
tioned in the scenario but related to auto-
mobile safety, such as wearing seat belts?
Certainly, situations exist for which behavior
will not prove susceptible to influence through
the use of scenarios, but Experiment 4 pro-
vides evidence that the scenario procedure
can be a powerful behavioral-compliance
technique.
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Received September 21, 1981