Ryder Holmes Wilson

PHI 1 / Sennet

2/3/11

The Gettier Condition of Knowledge

As infatuated as man is with knowledge, philosophers have had great difficulty truly defining

it. Until recently, the justified true belief theory of knowledge was widely accepted as sufficient for

defining knowledge. However, in 1963 Edmund Gettier proved that the justified true belief theory is

insufficient, embarrassingly so, with a three page paper. He posited there are 'Gettier situations',

where one appears to have knowledge according to the true justified belief theory of knowledge, but

intuitively, one does not really have knowledge of the situation. This forced epistemological

philosophers to re-evaluate knowledge. The justified true belief theory of knowledge had to be

qualified with one more condition: one is not being tricked by a Gettier situation.

Concepts are defined in terms of conditions, which are either necessary, sufficient, or both.

Sisterhood, for example, is defined by the necessary condition of the trait of being female, and the

necessary condition of having a sibling. Those two conditions together are sufficient. The original

theory of knowledge had three conditions: a person believes something to be true, and that

something is true, and that person is justified in believing that. All conditions are necessary, and

insufficient without all three present. More formally, to have knowledge,

1. P is true.

2. S believes that P is true.

3. S is justified in believing that P is true.

Truth is imperative to knowledge. One, by definition, cannot know something false. It is

simply not how the word 'know' is used. 'I know the sky is green' is semantic gibberish because the

sky is not green. The necessary condition of truth is not upheld.

 What exactly is truth, though? Truth is a concept, so it is comprised of a set of its own

conditions distinct from knowledge. One truth is an objective, logically consistent fact without

counterexample. 2 + 2 = 4 is objectively based in reality, there is no subjective way to interpret

the symbols: 2, +, =. Math follows rules of logic, rooted in certain axioms. Axioms cannot be

proven, alas, but they are the pragmatic basis of our lives and logic. Truth occurs only in relation

to axioms, or what is assumed to be so, hence it being such a tricky concept to define. But because

of these axioms, 2 + 2 = 4 is impervious to counterexample. Despite the difficulties presented by

axioms, and the counterarguments of skepticism, truth is a condition of knowledge.

The second condition of knowledge, justification, is more concrete than truth. Justification is

a reason for the believer to believe in the knowledge at hand. This reason can be physical evidence,

significant authoritative backing, and logical derivation, often in conjunction with each other. An

example will illustrate: Kazia notices smudged lipstick and the scent of perfume on her Gregory, her

husband, who just returned from a business trip. She is justified in believing that her husband is

having an affair with her from these pieces of evidence, and the fact that she did not know Gregory's

whereabouts for several days. She would not be justified if Gregory had returned appearing perfectly

normal, without any signs of foul play. A hunch is typically not sufficient for justification.

Justification is required to prevent knowledge from appearing, in a sense, at random. Kazia could

believe Gregory is having an affair with her, and that could be true, but if Kazia had no reason to

believe Gregory is being unfaithful, than she does not truly know that Gregory is having an affair. It

is even more apparent with gambling; gamblers believe their prediction will occur. Otherwise, they

wouldn't bet any money! And even if their prediction is true, they never actually knew what the

outcome would be because they could just have easily been wrong. The gambler has no justification,

even though the case may be true and they believed it was going to be so.

Belief, the third necessary condition, ties into justification. While typically one has beliefs

because of at least a marginal amount of justification, they can be mutually exclusive as well. Often
people believe things for no reason at all. Or they believe something that is false. Belief is a

psychological state of intention, or awareness, and an attitude towards an idea. Belief is often

synonymous with 'opinion,' but in the context of knowledge, they are exclusive. One cannot have

knowledge that vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream because that is subjective; it is an opinion. But

belief must be applied to all knowledge as well

For centuries, these conditions were thought to be all necessary, and sufficient together. It

seemed that if you believed something that's true, and you were justified, you had knowledge. The

Gettier case invalidates this. A Gettier situation is one where a person appears to 'accidentally'

acquire knowledge, despite fulfilling all the conditions. Imagine Troy sees a person and he thinks it

is his friend Patricia, because the person looks like his friend Patricia. Thus he believes that person's

name is Patricia. By chance, that person is named Patricia, but she is not actually Troy's friend. Does

Troy really have knowledge that her name is Patricia? He is justified in believing she is named

Patricia, because they look very similar. It is true that her name is Patricia. Troy believes it.

According to the true justified belief theory of knowledge, Troy has knowledge of Patricia's name.

A fourth condition is necessary for knowledge. Gettier situations must be excluded from

knowledge. The difficulty lies in knowing what is a Gettier situation and what isn't. Every situation

could be potentially dressed up as one, where you don't actually know anything. Perhaps everything

we 'know' is just a series of Gettier cases! Regardless, these cases do not count as true knowledge, so

the condition 'S is not in a Gettier situation' must be added to the justified true belief theory.

If we are ever to have knowledge, we must first know exactly what it is. It is somewhat

disconcerting that only recently has the foundation of epistemology been fixed to account for Gettier

situations. To have such a significant revision to the justified true belief theory of knowledge speaks

great immaturity of philosophy. Are there even more necessary conditions for knowledge? Do we

ever truly know anything?