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Understanding Nationalism and Its Critiques

Nationalism often gets a derogatory connotation. Generally speaking, there are two
sorts of criticisms of nationalism. Nationalism is depicted either as a deteriorating
force or as a hazardous one. In this way, a few experts battle that nationalism no
longersignifies a noteworthy consideration in world affairs. Such criticism might be
founded on the case that the world-historical mission of nationalism has been
finished on the grounds that the vast majority of the planet has already been divided
into states that are roughly coterminous with the "nations" or peoples that inhabit
them.1

More often, nationalism is acknowledged to be anon-going force, but presented as a


riskyand violenceprone one, likely toleadtoethnicconflict,civilorinternational war, or
evengenocide.

Even on the most superficial view, there is a clear difference between the kinds of
nationalism expressed by a crowd at a baseball game in Wrigley Field rising to sing
the national anthem and by another crowd at a Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg
chanting its loyalty to Hitler. And if the Serbian nationalism of the 1990s was
damaging, even genocidal, what is one to make of a rising Scottish nationalism that
promises a "just" society, more social democracy, more generous public health care,
and a stronger welfare state than are found in England 2 ? In light of such tangible
differences, some writers have drawn distinctions, both logical and normative,
between "civic" nationalism and "ethnic" nationalism. The former, symbolizedby
nation-states such as the United States and France, is conventionally judged to be
altogether superior to the latter, which was concomitant, at least originally, with the
states of Central and Eastern Europe.3

"Civic" nationalism is frequently named as voluntaristic, universalist, liberal and


inclusive. Along these lines being "American" is viewed as a matter of being
partnered to a political network whose enrolment rules allow non-members to join
(or leave) without regard to lineage.4
1
See Kwame Anthony Appiah,CosmopolitanPatriotism,in Joshua Cohen (ed.),For Love of Country: Debatingthe
Limits ofPatriotism21,26 (1996).

2
See Neal Ascherson, Will Scotland Go Its Own Way?, in The New York Times (Feb. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/opinion/independencefor-scotland.

3
Credit for introducing the civic/ethnic distinction is usually given to the historian Hans Kohn, who explained it in
terms of "Western" and "Eastern" European patterns of state-formation. See Hans Kohn, The Ideal of Nationalism:
A Study in its Origins and Background (1944); see also TarasKuzio, The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey
ofHans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism, 25 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 20 (2002); Ken Wolf, Hans
Kohn's Liberal Nationalism: The Historian as Prophet, 37 J. Hist. Ideas 651, 666 (1976); see generally Anthony W.
Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism 115-17 (2003). Even before Kohn, writers such as the
nineteenth century Jewish Russian historian Simon Dubnow had posited a distinction between "defensive or
liberating" nationalism and "aggressive nationalism or national striving for forced assimilation." Simon Dubnow,
Nationalism and History: Essays on Old and New Judaism 127 (Koppel S. Pinson ed. 1958). In one formulation or
another, Kohn's distinction has been a persisting one. See, e.g., Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: Centre
formation, system building, and political structuring between the nation state and the European Union 86-7 (2005);
John Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 World Pol. 157, 160-61 (1950) (distinguishing
between "integral" and more accommodating forms of nationalism); Mosse, Can Nationalism Be Saved?, supra, at
159 ("Nationalism from its beginning contained both the promise of a true community and the seeds of territorial
aggrandizement, war, and destruction."); id. at 162 noting the "Janus-faced nature of nationalism").
4
for such accounts, see, e.g., F.H. Buckley, Liberal Nationalism,48UCLAL. Rev. 221, 237-39 (2000/01); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Bonds of American Nationhood,21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1141, 1144 (1999/2000) ("Americans have been
"Ethnic" nationalism by contrast is described as ascriptive, particularist, illiberal and
exclusionary, a "community of fate" 5 in view of blood and ancestry, a typical semantic
structure, history, and culture, and not a community of choice that one may enter or leave
freely.

However when driven, the difference among "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism, which
started amid the Second World War and was utilized for the benefit of the Allied cause,
has tended to break down.6 Further to the degree that the "civic versus ethnic" qualification
is reasonable, it is questionable whether civic nationalism alone is adequate bind a nation
together and sustain democratic practices.7Finally, civic nationalism experiences its very
own characteristic normative inadequacies, particularly in connection to the protection of
minorities.8 Notwithstanding drawing a distinction among civic and ethnic patriotism, in
this way, will be inadequate to silence the most vehement critics of nationalism.

answering the question, 'Who is an American?' since the colonial era. The answer, for most commentators, has
centered on one or another version of a national ideology.")..

5
The characterization of the nation as a "community of fate" originated with theAustrian Social Democrat Otto Bauer.
See Walter Laqueur, AHistory of Zionism from theFrench Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel
422(1972).Yael Tamirexplains the idea as follows: "Members of such a community [of "common descent and fate"] see
themselves sharing a common destinyand view their individual success and well-being as closely dependent on the
prosperity of the group as a whole. They relate their self-esteem and their accomplishments to the achievements of other
group members and take pride in the group's distinctive contributions.Consequently, they develop feelings of caring and
duty toward one another. These feelings are exclusive and apply to members only."Tamir, Enigma of Nationalism,
supra, at 425.

6
This is demonstrated in a superb essaybyRogers Brubacker.SeeRogersBrubacker, The Manichean Myth: Rethinking
the Distinction Between "Civic" and"Ethnic" Nationalism, in HanspeterKriesl, Klaus Armingeon, Hannes Siegrist
andAndreas Wimmer (eds.), Nation and National Identity: The European Experience inPerspective

7
Binder, Case for Self-Determination, supra, at 266 (arguing that "democracy requires solidarity... [The realization that
democracy requires solidarity is a genuine contribution of nationalist political theory"). Consider American nationalism.
This has usually presented something of a puzzle to scholars, in part because we are understood to be a "civic," not an
"ethnic," nation. See,e.g., Craig Calhoun, The Class ConsciousnessofFrequent Travellers: Toward a Critique ofActually
Existing Cosmopolitanism, 101So.Atlantic Q.869, 878 (2002)("[F]or polities not constructed as ethnic nations, what
makes membership compelling? This is a question for the European Union, certainly, but also arguably for the United
States itself, and for most projects of cosmopolitan citizenship. Democracy requires a sense of mutual commitment
among citizens that goes beyond mere legal classification"). But the question may rest on a mistake. See, e.g., Eric
Kaufmann, Ethnicor Civic Nation? Theorizing the American Case,--27 Canadian Rev. of Stud. on Nationalism 133
(2000) (viewing United States as an ethnic nation, characterized by non-conformist Protestantism and Anglo-Saxon
genealogy, for most of its history).

8
"The classic example from the 'home' of civic nationalism was the French Republic's treatment of the Jews in [its] midst.
'To the Jew as individual we give everything, to the Jew as Jew nothing,' declared Clermont-Tonnerre in the French
Assembly in 1790. Civic nationalism's failure to endorse minority group rights may be consonant with liberal
individualism and individual human rights, but only by conveniently overlooking the group rights accorded to the
majority (host) nation. These rights or duties included the necessity for citizens to learn and conduct affairs in the
dominant (French) language, to learn and recite the majority (French) history and literature, to observe French customs,
to recognize French political symbols and institutions, and so on. For the Jews, this meant splitting their unitary self-
concept and their ethno-religious community into a religious confession and an ethnic affiliation, stripping them of the
latter, and assimilating them into the host nation - a procedure applied by liberal civic nationalism to minorities in many
national states to this day."
Anthony D. smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History 44-5 ( 2d ed. 2010)
If German nationalism under Adolf Hitler released unparalleled revulsions on the planet, 9
the forces of British patriotism assembled by Winston Churchill, French nationalism
encouraged by Charles De Gaulle, and Russian nationalism revived by Josef Stalin, were
needed to defeat it. What drove the Western alliance to its inevitable triumph over
Communism in the Cold War was the desire of countries like the United States, France,
Japan, and West Germany to preserve their freedom and of countries like Poland, Hungary
and the Baltic states to recapture theirs. Patriotism drove requests for greater political
freedom and the resurrection of civil society in Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics, and all
through the previous Soviet coalition during the 1980s and 1990s.

To shape a more balanced judgment, we have to examine the prevailing criticisms of


nationalism all the more cautiously. In the first place, we may recognize at least two
general kinds of criticism of nationalism. The primary we can call "statism." This position
is common in the psyches of political pioneers, policymakers, and diplomats, and still
appears to be to be the default position of international law. The second we can call
"cosmopolitanism." The latter view, or cluster of perspectives 10, is naturally connected
with philosophers, ethicists, political scholars, and legal scholars, although political
pioneers can likewise express such a view. 11 Let us quickly survey these two primary lines
of assault on nationalism;

A. Statism

Statist objections to nationalism inform and pervade policymaking 12. Statism perceives
nationalism from a conservative, power-political attitude, often that of a great power.
Certainly, statism often appears to be little more than a particular solicitation of the
acquainted theory of "realism" in international relations 13. From the statist perspective,
nationalism is dangerous as it threatens to disrupt sensitive balances between states and
demands that existing boundaries be redrawn. Statists may additionally, however,
opportunistically choose particular nationalist actions if the activities of these moves might
weaken a rival or enemy nation.

B. Cosmopolitanism

Talmon raises the interesting question whether Nazism was truly a nationalistmovement, or instead aimed at the creation
of "an artificially reared international Nordic elite of the racially fittest and purest." Talmon, Unique and Universal,
supra, at63.Likewise, Robert Fine and Will Smith (following Hannah Arendt) argue that Nazism "is best conceived not
as an extreme form of nationalism but as a movement opposed to the parochialism of nationalist politics in the name of
global ambitions."Robert Fine & Will Smith, JurgenHaberman’s Theory of Cosmopolitan 469, 480 (2003)

10
There are several different contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism. For an account of two of them, see Noah
Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law 116 Yale L.J 1022 (2007)
11

A prominent example of such a political figure was the late Czech President, Vdclav Havel. See, e.g., AddressbyVaclav
Havel, President of the Czech Republic, to theSenate and the House of Commons of the Parliament of Canada
(April29,1999),available at http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat-projevy&val= I05_ajprojvy.html.

12
A prominent example of such a political figure was the late Czech President, Vdclav Havel. See, e.g., Address by
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, to the Senate and the House of Commons of the Parliament of Canada
(April 29, 1999), available at http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat-projevy&val= I 05_ajprojvy.html.
13

For a brief but penetrating critique of statism - the viewpoint of what he calls "stabilitarians" - see Michael Lind, In
Defense of Liberal Nationalism, 73 Foreign Aff. 87, 89-92 (1994)
Cosmopolitanism is a diffused, multi-sided, and sophisticated body of thought, and it is
correspondingly harder to encapsulate than statism. Cosmopolitanism has an ancient
lineage that can be followed back through figures such as Kant, Grotius, the Roman
philosopher ruler Marcus Aurelius, Cicero, and other Roman and Greek Stoics to the
Greek mastermind Diogenes of Sinope.14 The modern restoration of cosmopolitan idea
rises up out of and islaced with the wide social patterns we subsume under the heading of
"post-modernism;" with the political movements that have happened since the fall of
bipolarity toward the end of the Cold War, and, from that point, of uni-polarity after the
Second Gulf War; and with the financial changes we call "globalization." The amazing
impact of cosmopolitanism can be estimated by the degree of its hold on contemporary
transnational elites.15

In general, "cosmopolitanism" can be utilized to assign a style, a viewpoint, a portrayal of


certain global trends, or a normative program. Regardless of whether as depiction or
prescription, cosmopolitan thought is exceptionally unsympathetic to both nationalism and
the nation state. Descriptively, cosmopolitans discounts the staying power ofnationalism,
limits its potential as a force for good, and accentuates on the risk that it might prompt
violence within and between states. Prescriptively, cosmopolitans prescribes an assortment
of fundamental changes in the present worldwide framework, up to and including the
disaggregation or even evaporation of national sovereignty, the formation of more robust
international organizations, and the creation of some form of world citizenship.

Cosmopolitan opposition to nationalism and the nation-state draws on at least three


different kinds of arguments. Very roughly, the first emphasizes post-modernist culture;
the second, the politics of democratization; and the third, the consequences of a globalizing
economy

14
SeeKwame Anthony Appiah,Global Citizenship,75Ford. L. Rev. 2375, 2375-77(2006/7) (outlining intellectual origins
of contemporary cosmopolitanism); Feldman,Cosmopolitan Law?, supra, at1026-28(same). For accounts of
cosmopolitan (and other)political ideas in ancient Stoic thought, seeA.A. Long. The conceptof the cosmopolitanin Greek
& Roman thought, 137Daedalus50 (2008)(surveying classical conceptions of"world citizenship"); Thomas L. Pangle,
Socratic Cosmopolitanism: Cicero's Critiqueand Transformation of the Stoic Ideal, 31Can.J.Pol. Sci.235, 261 (1998)
(finding thatCicero's critique of Stoic cosmopolitanism led him to conclude that "the strongest natural human attachment,
and therefore obligation, is to one's own city and to one's true kin; [and] that whatever we owe to all other human beings,
simply on account of our common humanity, is dwarfed in significance and substance by what we owe to our fellow
citizens and true kin, on account of the richer common good and hence far closer ties that bind us to them"); Francis
Edward Devine, Stoicism on the BestRegime,31 J. Hist. Ideas 323(1970). Roman cosmopolitan thought is plainly shaped
by the actualities of the "high"Roman Empire. See Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How HyperpowersRise to
GlobalDominance - And Why They Fall 29-58 (2007).On Diogenes of Sinope, see Grundy Steiner, Diogenes' Mouse and
the Royal Dog: Conformity in Nonconformity, 72Class.J.36, 37 (1976) (ancient sources depict Diogenes "as a man
strongly alienated fromsociety," owing not only to "his personal experience of exile" but also to "a kind of decision to
seek alienation"); Farrand Sayre, Greek Cynicism,6 J. Hist. Ideas 113 (1945) (relating Cynicism to decline of Greek city-
state). For the influence of Stoic cosmopolitan ideas on Kant, see Martha Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in
James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace:Essays on Kant'sCosmopolitan Ideal 25, 36-50
(1997);Klaus Reich, Kant and Greek Ethics (II), 48 Mind446 (1939). Kant's thought has in turn inspired much of the
contemporary revival of interest in cosmopolitanism. Compare Louis P. Pojman, Kant's Perpetual
PeaceandCosmopolitanism, 36 J.Social Phil.62 (2005)(arguing that Kantian cosmopolitanismrequires unitary global
government) with Robert J.Delahunty& John C.Yoo, Kant,Habermas and Democratic Peace, 10Chi.J.Int'l L. 437 (2010)
15

For analyses of the causes of cosmopolitanism's prevalence among contemporarytransnational 61ites, seeCraig Calhoun,
Cosmopolitanism and nationalism, 14 Nations and Nationalism 427 (2008); Samuel Huntingdon, DeadSouls: The
Denationalizationofthe American Elite, --75The National Interest5 -(Spring 2004). For earlier debates
on"cosmopolitanism," see John Pizer, The German Response to Kant's Essay on PerpetualPeace: Herder Contra the
Romantics, 82Germanic Review 343(2007).
J
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To start with, cosmopolitanism mirrors a viewpoint, characteristic for a transnational elite,
that the contemporary, globalizing world bears "us" the chance to assume and combine a
wide range of different personal identities and to acknowledge a wide range of loyalties;
that it is just past the point where it is possible to appoint national character and reliability
to the nation state as the overriding priority that they once had; and that we should rejoice
and grasp this new freedom.16 Second, cosmopolitanism may depend on the standard
premise that "people have a right to [a global] institutional order under which those
essentially and truly influenced by political choices have a generally equivalent chance to
impact the creation of this choice specifically or through chosen agents or representatives."
Third, cosmopolitan scholars may trust that states are no longer capable to unravel a
considerable lot of the most pressingcollective action issues that the contemporary world
faces eminently, the ecological crisis, environmental change, terrorism, global poverty, and
the risk of atomic weapons-and likewise that all the more powerful transnational
establishments are imperative. 17. "The metaphors 'spaceship Earth' and 'global village'
capture the essence of this critique and arrive at a normative conclusion: Only by
transcending the artificial obstacles posed by statehood can modernity's global problems be
managed in accordance with their true character.'

16
THE JOURNEY OF INDIA FROM

Pogge, CosmopolitanismandSovereignty,supra,at 64;seealsoDavid Held,Models of Democracy


(2ded.1999);RobertE.Goodin, What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98Ethics663 (1988);Paul Gomberg,

Futureof Statehood,32Harv. Int'l L. J. 397, 401-02 (1991).Thus, impoverished commodity producers in the "global
338

Patriotism is Like Racism, 101Ethics 144, 148(1990).Koskenniemi refers to this style of critique as "an ethical view that
regards statehood as morally indefensible egotism [and that] sees allpeople united in a Kantian community of
independent individuals equally entitled to human rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of which passport they
happen to carry." Koskenniemi, Wonderful Artificiality of States, supra, at 23; ;see alsoMartiiKoskenniemi, The

South" should, from this standpoint, have as much say in making the trade decisions of affluent "First World" states as
the citizens of those states themselves, because those decisions have a decisive economic impact on those producers'
lives.
17

See Habermas, Europe: The FalteringProject, supra at93;Habermas,European Nation-State, supra, at398-99;Craig
Campbell,The Resurgent Idea of World Government, 22 Ethics&Int'lAff. 133 (2008).
The meaning of secularism is dependent by majoritarianism whether it's far based on the
model of equal treatment of all religions or nation neutrality. Not handiest does religion
remain found in both fashions, the unstated norms of the dominant faith also remain gift.
Scholars have established how state neutrality has served to boost majority practices and
the energy of most of the people to outline the norms.206 State neutrality does not
comfortably acknowledge the Presence of religion since its very premise is ready the
prohibition of faith in politics. It is as a result unable to clear up the trouble of
majoritarianism.18
In assessment, the version based totally on identical remedy, although it's also complicit in
majoritarian politics, is higher capable of renowned the presence of religion in politics. The
quantity to which this version has been used to increase the motive of the Hindutva events
and the position of the courts in permitting the advance of Hindu majoritarianism calls for
serious attention in light of the Ayodhya selection. In this segment, I complicated on how
the right to spiritual liberty has served as a large area for the improvement of Hindu
majoritarianism. This effort has been enacted partially via the Supreme Court in its
elaboration of the "critical practices of the religion" test and partially thru the competitive
engagement of the Hindu Right in fleshing out the content and which means of the proper
to freedom of faith.

Freedom of religion via the Indian Supreme Court has been addressed thru the "essential
practices of the religion" test devised by means of it a good way to allegedly shield the
right to freedom of faith. As the research work displays, in applying this take a look at, the
Court has continually engage in determining the middle of religious notion for a given
religious network. I argue that via the crucial practices take a look at the Supreme Court
has been actively involved inside the creation of the religion this is to be diagnosed and
within the method enacted a chain of erasures as well as a tended to homogenize spiritual
classes. In Shirur Mutt, the Supreme Court posed itself the question "What is the line to be
drawn between what are subjects of religion and what are not?"

In the au courant scenerio, fundamental spiritual practices have come to be identified in


Supreme Court decisions as based totally on foundational files and the construction of a
common Hindu belief and subculture. While the prior instances tended to provide a much
broader know-how of religion as which includes rituals and superstitious practices, the
Supreme Court regularly whittled down the scope of what constitutes religion by using
introducing a demand that the exercise should have a scriptural or textual foundation. 19In
the method a juridically built "rational Hinduism" has come to outline the parameters of
legitimate religion.20

18
WINNIFRED SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 154 (2005) (discussing the
problems with legally enforced religious freedom requirements in the U.S. context).
19
See generally MRINALINI SINHA, COLONIAL MASCULINITY: THE "MANLY ENGLISHMAN" AND
THE "EFFEMINATE BENGALI" IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 138-80 (1995).
233. See SEN, supra note 7, at 14-18.
234. Id. at 18-25.
20
Id. at 18-25.
232. See generally MRINALINI SINHA, COLONIAL MASCULINITY: THE "MANLY
ENGLISHMAN" AND THE "EFFEMINATE BENGALI" IN THE LATE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 138-80 (1995).
233. See SEN, supra note 7, at 14-18.
234.

In articulating a not unusual Hindu lifestyle and belief, the Court has forged Hinduism in the
equal framework as Semitic traditions-that is, as a monolithic faith primarily based on
foundational documents.21 It is also a role that finally ends up converging with the placement
of the Hindu nationalists.22 The doctrine of critical practices is reflective of a "secular
rationality" that has emerged with the modem country and inside the procedure it has
rearticulated religion and its content material. In other words, in place of being opposing
ideologies or understood as unalterable essential ideas, secularism and religion have each
been at the same time
constitutive.

The unique approaches in which the Supreme Court has determined the contours of religion in
India also converges with the singular, monotheistic, and institutionalized construction of
Hinduism being pursued by using the Hindu Right. As discussed at some point of this article,
in the present day moment, the Hindu Right has increasingly more emerged as a big player in
figuring out the contours and parameters of the proper to freedom of faith and in flip how
Hinduism itself is to be described. Initially, noticeably little emphasis turned into placed on
the proper to freedom of faith inside the Hindu Rights war to pursue its expertise of Indian
secularism. The BJP, the political wing of the Hindu Right, refers to "liberty of religion" in its
celebration constitution as a primary goal, however the time period isn't synonymous with the
Indian constitutional ensures of freedom of faith.23 And this time period is used in three
notably confined and precise approaches. Firstly, the idea of "liberty of religion" or "freedom
of worship" is forged in individualistic phrases: it's far the individual's proper to pursue his or
her very own religious path; it isn't the collective rights of a religious community to any shape
of self-willpower.24In reality, collective rights, along with the
right of spiritual and linguistic minorities assured below Article 30 of the Constitution to
installation and administer their own schools and schools using country subsidies and for the
cause of maintaining their community identity, were challenged via the BJP as violating the
Constitutional precept of equality.25

21
In contrast to the endless efforts by the Supreme Court to construct an essential or authentic faith,
Balagangadhara argues that Hinduism is neither a religion nor collection of religions, but a construction of
Europeans and their Christian theology, which compelled them to look for and see religion in India. It is an
entity that exists in the western experience of India and writings of scholars, and tells us more about the west
than about India and Indians. Balagangadhara thus argues that the construction of Hinduism had little to do with
the demands of colonialism or the goals and motives of Indian/Hindu nationalists. See S.N
BALAGANGADHARA, "THE HEATHEN IN HIS BLINDNESS": ASIA, THE WEST AND THE DYNAMIC
OF RELIGION 507 (2005). See also S. N. Balagangadhara & Jakob
De Roover, The Secular State and Religious Conflict: Liberal Neutrality and the Indian Case of Pluralism, 15 J.
POL. PHIL. 67, 83 (2007).
22
See SEN, supra note 7, at viii.
23
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY, CONSTITUTION AND RULES ART. II, (Sept.2012),
http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf 2012 h/constitution_engjan_10_2013.pdf.
24
. Cossman & Kapur, supra note 22, at 149
25
Id. See, e.g., BJP ELECTION MANIFESTO 1998, supra note 95, at 36("Amend Article 30 of theConstitution
suitably to remove any scope of discrimination against any religious community in matters of education.").
A 2nd circulate at the part of the Hindu Right parties is to convey the right to freedom of
faith underneath the rubric of Hinduism. Hinduism on my own is argued by using the Hindu
Right to offer the toleration that is required for individuals that allows you to pursue their
personal religion or religious course. The Hindu Right's argument that26

26
Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT'L LAW 663, 747 (2011).

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