May 27, 2004
PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA BEJARASCO vs.
ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO
Administrative Law; Requirements for a Valid
Judgment
We agree that the respondent judge is
administratively liable. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure defines and sets forth the
requirements for a valid judgment:
SECTION 1. Judgment; definition and form. –
Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the
imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if
any. It must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
and law upon which it is based.
Thus, a judgment, to be valid, must have been
personally and directly prepared by the judge, and duly
signed by him. Corollarily, a decision or resolution of the
court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only
from the moment of its promulgation. Promulgation of
judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made,
the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to
support it. If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or
member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office,
his vote is automatically withdrawn. In criminal cases,
promulgation of judgment is made by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which
it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk
of court only when the judge is absent or outside the
province or city.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala
of another judge who died during office cannot validly
promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In fact,
decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the
same had been appointed to and qualified in another office
are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge
whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the
regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision
may no longer be promulgated after the ponente has
vacated his office.
The respondent judge cannot, likewise, claim that his
only participation in the promulgation of the questioned
decision was "merely an exercise of a ministerial duty to
enforce the said decision which was already long rendered
by the judge who actually and completely heard the above-
mentioned criminal cases on the merits." It must be
stressed that the respondent judge had earlier inhibited
himself from the cases in question, and that Judge Calderon
was designated to hear and try the cases in his stead. The
mere fact that the respondent judge was designated as
Presiding Judge of Branch 26 following the death of Judge
Calderon does not necessarily mean that his previous
inhibition in relation to the criminal cases in question has
been lifted. That would be an absurdity, as a valid
designation presupposes that the judge so designated has
not inhibited himself from the cases assigned/raffled to the
said branch.
October 19, 2004
GUADALUPE DE LINA DIOMAMPO vs. VIRGILIO C.
ALPAJORA
Administrative Law; Duty of the Court in case an
Administrative Complaint is filed
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 It must be stressed that any administrative complaint
leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their
nature highly penal, such that the respondent stands to face
the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. Thus, the Court
cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion
and speculation. As champion – at other times tormentor –
of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting
in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must
also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which
serve no other purpose than to harass them. While it is our
duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every
matter in complaints against judges and other court
personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are
protected and exonerated from baseless administrative
charges. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. When the complainant, as in the case at bar, relies
on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to
substantiate her claim, the administrative complaint must
be dismissed for lack of merit.
March 12, 2004
INOCENCIO D. EBERO, ET AL. vs. MAKATI CITY
SHERIFFS RAUL T. CAMPOSANO, ET AL.
Administrative Law; Sheriff’s Duty to Execute a
Judgment
This Court has consistently held that "the sheriff’s
duty to execute a judgment is ministerial." A purely
ministerial act is one "which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of the legal authority, without
regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety of the act done.”
February 6, 2004
INOCENCIO M. MONTES vs. EFREN B. MALLARE
Administrative Law; Burden of Proving the
Allegations in the Complaint
It must be stressed that in administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that
the respondent has regularly performed his duties will
prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a respondent judge
should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived
from direct knowledge. In this case, the complainant failed
to substantiate the charges he made against the respondent
judge, let alone appear before the investigating magistrate
to prove his allegations. Although it is a settled rule that
even the desistance of witnesses themselves does not
operate to divest this Court from investigating a matter
involving its personnel, it is equally true that reliance on
mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an
administrative complaint with no leg to stand on. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.
September 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUANG ZHEN HUA,
ET AL.
Constitutional Law; Guarantee Against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure Applies to Aliens
We agree with the contention of the appellant that
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search
and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens
temporarily residing in the country. The rule against
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unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that
is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or known to
be offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as
important and imperative as the guarantee of the other
fundamental rights of the citizens.
Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect
search. – The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant
notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be
allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if,
after such notice and demand, such officers are refused
entry to the place of directed search. This is known as the
"knock and announce" principle which is embodied in Anglo-
American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a
dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as
important considerations in assessing whether subsequent
entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
In Gouled v. The United States, it was held that a lawful
entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search.
A search would violate the Constitution if the entry were
illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or
mere show of force.
The principle may be traced to a statute in England
way back in 1275 providing that "if a person takes the
beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a castle
or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the
deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause
the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall cause
the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without
recovery." Common law courts appended an important
qualification:
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause
of his coming, and to make request to open doors …,
for the law without a default in the owner abhors the
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the
habitation and safety of man) by which great
damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party,
when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not
know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is
to be presumed that he would obey it…
Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff
may justify breaking open doors if the possession be not
quietly delivered. The principle was woven quickly into the
fabric of early American law and in the Fourth Amendment
in the United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment as
held in Wilson v. Arkansas.
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant
must announce their presence, identify themselves to the
accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession
of the premises to be searched, and show to them the
search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to
them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and
understood by them. The requirement is not a mere
procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial
provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise
form of words is required. It is sufficient that the accused
has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of
the search and the object to be seized. It must be
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emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not
only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be
searched or of his property but also the safety and well-
being of the officers serving and implementing the search
warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is
addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified
of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the
person serving the warrant, he may consider the
unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful
aggression on his property which he will be justified in
resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the
life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he
would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real
possibility that the police serving and implementing the
search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or
address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame
or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced
intrusion. Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable
predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by
force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by stealth, or
coercion.
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is
permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled
to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it;
(b) when such person in the premises already knew of the
identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c)
when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there
is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the
premises, aware of the presence of someone outside
(because, for example, there has been a knock at the door),
are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to
believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to
destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the
exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times,
without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of
the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make
an unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a
search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally
defective, if the police officers’ entry was without prior
announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish
the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Indeed, there
is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each
case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In
determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the
existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only
with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of
the entry. In Richards v. Wisconsin, it was held that:
[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police
must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence. This standard—as opposed to a probable-
cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance
between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at
issue in the execution of search warrants and the
individual privacy interest affected by no-knock
entries.
As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida, what
constitutes breaking includes the lifting of a latch, turning a
door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or
pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even a
closed screen door. However, entry obtained through the
use of deception, accomplished without force is not a
"breaking" requiring officers to first announce their authority
and purpose because the reasons behind the rule are
satisfied – there was no real likelihood of violence, no
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unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the
residence of the accused.
As to how long an officer implementing a search
warrant must wait before breaking open any door cannot be
distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be
decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an examination of
all the circumstances.80 The proper trigger point in
determining, under the "knock and announce" rule, whether
the police waited long enough before entering the residence
to execute a warrant, is when those inside should have been
alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant.
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied
with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant
Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers
were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who
informed her that his companions were police officers and
had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained
to her that the officers were going to search the
condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of
the authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms,
to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover, Anciro,
Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with
her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters.
Without such request being interpreted to the appellant, the
latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from
the cabinet atop the headboard.
July 11, 2003
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO
Civil Law; Aliens Prohibited from Acquiring Lands
of Public Domain
Lands of the public domain, which include private
lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of
the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified
from acquiring private lands.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question
were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said
transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are
null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective
carried out. The rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO
ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO
DEFENDENTIS.
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se
but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the
law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he
may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which
are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private interests. It
does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of three
parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is
illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because
they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus,
to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the
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money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy.

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