Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
LIBRARY
95U9
Call Number
U5750
y2J25i
;2"~
FL Form 887 (Rev) 22 Oct 52
USACGSC—P2-4277—15 June 62—5M
OPERATIONS
IN
KOREA
on
OPERATIONS
IN
KOREA
1953
NOV 5 1951;
RESTRICTED
U. S. M. A. A. G. PRINTING OFFICE
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
Strategic Importance of Korea . 1
Political Background of the War 2
Theater of Operations 3
Plans and Opposing Forces 3
North Korea 3
South Korea 4
OPERATIONS 5
The United Nations Defensive, 27 June-15 September 1950 . . . 5
Reaction of the United Nations 6
The Delaying Action . 7
Defense of the Pusan Perimeter 12
The United Nations Offensive, 16 September-2 November 1950 . . 16
The Amphibious Landing at Inchon . 16
Breakout From the Pusan Beachhead 18
The Advance to the Manchurian Border 20
The Chinese Communist Intervention,
3 November 1950-24 January 1951 21
Operations on the X Corps Front 24
Operations on the Eighth Army Front 26
The Second Invasion' of South Korea 29
The First United Nations Counter offensive, 25 January-21 April 1951 31
Operation Thunderbolt 3i
The Communist Counterattack 32
Operation Ripper .33
The Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel 34
The Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive,
22 April-8 July 1951 35
The First Impulse of the Offensive 36
The Lull Between Impulses . . .37
The Second Impulse of the Offensive 38
CONTENTS
—•—
PAGE
The Counterattack .40
The Advance to the "Iron Triangle" 41
The Period of Armistice Talks 43
COMMENTS .47
Tactics 47
Enemy . 47
American 47
Air( Power 48
Naval Support 49
Reason for American Participation 50
Security Information
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
INTRODUCTION
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA (Map 1).
After World War II the western strategic frontier of the Americas
was established along the great arc extending from Alaska through
the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, and the
Marianas.
During the postwar period Russian influence was extended east
ward to include domination of China, Manchuria, and the northern
half of Korea. As a result of agreements reached at the Yalta Con
ference early in 1945, Russia acquired the southern half of Sakhalin
Island, making that island Soviet territory in its entirety. The Ku
rile Islands, just northeast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, were
occupied by Russian forces between 8 August and 1 September 1945.
With the Japanese link in our chain of defense already threatened
from the north, the strategic importance of Korea increased mate
rially. With the Communists already in the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Si
beria, and Manchuria, their possession of South Korea would leave
Japan open only to the east. Thus the integrity of our defensive
arc would be threatened, and Russia's strategic position in north
eastern Asia would be further strengthened. "The Korean peninsula
would provide a buffer for richly endowed Manchuria and the port
city of Vladivostok, eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Rail
road and important Soviet air and naval base. Possession of the
entire peninsula would seal off the Sea of Japan and would provide
air bases and ice-free naval bases that would facilitate military op
erations against Japan.1
Conversely, the Korean peninsula in neutral or friendly hands
would constitute a shield between Manchuria and our island frontier
and would secure Tsushima Strait and the southern portion of the
1
The distance across the Tsushima Strait between Pusan and Kyushu or south
ern Honshu is about the same as that from southern England to the
beaches of Normandy.
1
RESTRICTED
Sea of Japan. In case of necessity it could furnish convenient bases
for air and naval operations against Vladivostok and against Man
churia and the other northern provinces of China.
*
POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR
In the Cairo Declaration, December 1943, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and China pledged that "mindful of the enslave
ment of the people of Korea . . . in due course they shall become
free and independent." The pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam
Declaration of July 1945 and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union
when she entered the war against Japan.
At the end of World War II the 38th parallel was designated as a
temporary line of demarcation to facilitate the surrender of Japa
nese troops in Korea. Japanese forces north of the parallel surren
dered to the Soviet troops, and those south capitulated to .United
States forces. At no time did the United States contemplate that
the 38th parallel would permanently divide the country. 0W*>;!r< ;
On the other handr the Russian occupation authorities soon estab
lished frontier outposts and patrols and halted passage across the
parallel. Repeated efforts by our representatives failed to eliminate
' this artificial obstacle to the political and economic unity of the na
tion.
The next development was the Moscow Agreement2 of December
1945, which aimed at establishing a provisional Korean democratic
government; however, every attempt to implement this agreement
was thwarted by the Soviet Union./ Thereupon the United States
laid the problem of Korean unity and independence before the United
Nations. A temporary commission was established by this world
body to supervise the election of Korean representatives who would
draft a democratic constitution and establish a national government.
But Russia, busily engaged in sovietizing the Korean people north
of the 38th parallel, refused entry to the United Nations Commis
sion. Nevertheless, free elections were held in South Korea on 10
May 1948; and the Republic of Korea was founded on 15 August
1948.
Communist rule above the parallel was formalized on 9 September
1948 by the inauguration of the People's Democratic Republic of
Korea. Thus the 38th parallel, "a fortuitous line resulting from the
exigencies of the war", had become a politicalfrontier.
2
The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom participated; China sub
sequently subscribed.
From this time until the invasion of June 1950 the Communist-
sponsored North Korean Government tried every means short of
full-scale war to foster disunity and disorder in the new republic
south of the parallel. Border raids, guerrilla action, sabotage, propa
ganda, and economic strangulation all failed to achieve these ends.
OPERATIONS
THE UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE,
27 JUNE-15 SEPTEMBER 1950 (Map 3)
At 0400 on' Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's
Army, commanded by Marshal Choi Yung Kun, invaded the Repub
* The ROK division was patterned in general after the American division, even
though its strength was only about 9,500,
6
•
lie of South Korea. The main effort, conducted with precision, pro
ceeded down the Pochon-Uijongbu and Yonchon-Uijongbu corri
dors toward Seoul. This drive was covered on the right by an at
tack through Kaesong on Munsan and on the left by a strong move
ment against Chunchon. On the western extremity of the invasion
front the Ongjin peninsula was quickly captured, and on the east
coast' a column advancing on Kangnung linked up with small sea-
borne detachments. (By 30 June landings had been made at points
on the east coast as far south as Yongdok.) Supported by ample
artillery and some 100 Russian-built combat planes, and spearheaded
by T34 tanks, the North Korean attacking force of six divisions plus
several brigades was too strong for the four South Korean divisions
that opposed it. With a small amount of light artillery, a few ar
mored cars, and no air support, the ROK troops were not yet ready
to cope with anything more than guerrilla bands or raids across the
border. In addition, surprise was on the side of the invaders.
By 28 June the North Koreans had taken the capital city of Seoul,
had closed up along the Han River from its mouth to a point about
twenty miles east of Seoul, and had advanced as far as Samchok on
the east coast. ROK troops suffered serious losses in withdrawing
south of the Han River; and their attempts to regroup and retain
some degree of cohesion availed little as the enemy forces continued
their movement, which put them along the line Suwon-Wonju-Sam
chok on 4 July.
Reaction of the United Nations.—-Faced with its most significant
test to date, the United Nations acted both quickly and firmly. On
25 June the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the ces
sation of hostilities and requesting member nations to refrain from
giving aid to the aggressors. When this failed to stop the fighting,
President Truman announced, on 27 June, that he had ordered Amer
ican air and sea forces to give the South Korean Army cover and
support.5
Later that day the Security Council passed another resolution,
which recommended that the members of the United Nations furn
ish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary
to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and se
curity in that area. Responses to this request for help included
pledges of raw materials, food and medicinal supplies, and direct
5
Prior to this date General MacArthur's Far East Command had no responsibil
ity toward Korea other than the evacuation in an emergency of United
States nationals. Some 2,000 of these were evacuated by 28 June, about
870 of them being flown to Japan.
military support. Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Aus
tralia, and the United Kingdom placed naval forces at the disposal
of the United Nations.6
On 30 June the President announced that General MacArthur had
been authorized to use American ground troops in Korea. At this
time the Eighth Army, stationed in Japan since the end of World
War II, consisted of four woefully under-strength occupation diviz_
sions. These divisions had less than 70 per cent of their full com
plement of personnel and were organized with only two battalions
per infantry regiment. jSerjpus shortages existed in mortars and re
coilless rifles; and, because of the poor roads and weak bridges in
Japan, divisional tank units were equipped with M24 light tanks
rather than thp heavier tanks normally prescl'llmd. Musi Of Ihe
equipment in the hands of troops had been used in World War
was worn to a degree, and in some instances was unserviceable be
cause of a lack of maintenance parts and trained technical personnel.
The troops in Japan had been undergoing intensive training for
some months; but, hampered by the duties of occupation and by a
scarcity of maneuver areas in Japan for units larger than a battalion,
their combat readiness was far from complete. However, a series of
command-post exercises had been conducted for division and higher
headquarters. These headquarters were able to act quickly and ef
fectively when orders were received for the commitment of ground
forces in Korea.
In order to make the most effective use of the various United Na
tions forces, the Security Council adopted a resolution on 7 July
which provided for unified command in Korea. The United States
was requested to designate a commander in chief. The following
day the President appointed General MacArthur.7
The Delaying Action.—The problem which confronted General
MacArthur at the end of June was to employ the ground, sea, and
air forces available to him in a delaying action so as to provide the
time required to build up in South Korea a force capable of ejecting
the aggressors.
One of the initial steps was the dispatch to Korea of a group known
as the GHQ Advanced Command Group (ADCOM), headed by Briga
6
In addition, the Australian Government made available a RAAF fighter squad
ron; and Canada provided some air transports for use between the west
coast of the United States and Japan.
7
Throughout this period the Soviet delegate to the Security Council was absent,
the Soviet Union having boycotted meetings of the council since 10 Janu
ary 1950.
8
Kunwi toward Taegu forced the ROK 1st Division to withdraw, ex
posing the valley road from Tabu to Taegu. Seeing this as the most
serious threat to Taegu, General Walker on 18 August committed
the 27th and 23d RCT's from army reserve to reinforce the ROK 1st
Division in this area. Much bitter back-and-forth fighting took place
along the north-south valley road from Soi to Tabu. This stretch of
road, known to our troops as the "Bowling Alley", was the scene of
some much publicized and excellent work by the famed 27th Infan
try Regiment. Finally the enemy was halted.
An analysis of the North Korean attacks during this period shows
that none was made in overwhelming strength and that the enemy
was incapable of exploiting his successes. No single assault lasted
more than three days, as communications and supply could not fur
ther support it. The peak of every attack was reached on the sec
ond day; the power was gone on the third. As this phase ended, air
and ground reconnaissance clearly indicated that the enemy was
making every effort to gather sufficient strength for further major
operations.
During the second phase (27 August-15 September) of this period
heavy enemy assaults took place around almost the entire perimeter
(Map 4b). Apparently Marshal Choi's strategy aimed at prevent
ing General Walker from rushing his reserves from one threatened
point to another, as the latter had done during the earlier phase.
The North Korean offensive began on 26 August with a strong
secondary attack in the Pohang area. Extensive enemy gains neces
sitated some reinforcement of the ROK I Corps. Then at 2400 on 31
August, along the western perimeter of the beachhead, six enemy
divisions plus several tank regiments launched a major effort against
the forty-five-mile front held by the 2d and 25th Divisions. In the
25th Division sector the enemy was halted after much heavy fight
ing in which he gained considerable ground. By 5 September, how
ever, the original front had been restored. On its wide front the 2d
Division had to cope with strong enemy forces that succeeded in
crossing the Naktong at seventeen different places and in advancing
four to six miles. But within a week the bridgeheads had been con
tained by the employment of local reserves and the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade. From 3 to 10 September, in some of the bitterest
fighting to date, the North Koreans registered gains of six to eight
thousand yards against the 1st Cavalry Division and ROK tropps
15
' ligence estimates indicated that the area was comparatively lightly
defended.
Despite the grave risk, General MacArthur, with the approval of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided that the amphibious assault would
be made at Inchon. He also insisted that the operation should take
place on 15 September, the earliest date on which the tides would be
suitable. The necessary directive was issued on 12 August, leaving
only a month for detailed plans and preparations that usually take
five or six months.
The X Corps, designated to conduct the operation, was activated
on 16 August, with General Almond as its commander. The corps
consisted of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and
supporting troops. The 7th Division (Major General David G. Barr),
tye last of the four divisions on occupation duty in Japan when the
conflict began, was drawn from GHQ reserve. It contained 8,000
ROK troops that had trained very briefly with the division in Japan.
The 1st Marine Division (Major General Oliver P. Smith)'was as
sembled in Japan by moving the 1st Marine Brigade from Korea and
uniting it with six Marine battalions drawn from the United States
and the Mediterranean.
The air preparation for this operation can be considered as having
begun on 3 August with the initiation of the B-29 interdiction cam
paign in North Korea and the shifting in mid-August of a portion of
the short-range air effort to similar attacks in South Korea. This
air offensive served a double purpose: restriction of the enemy's ef
forts against the Pusan perimeter and preparation for the coming
offensive by disrupting his transportation facilities. The results
Later became evident when the North Koreans were unable either to
shift large units to the defense of Seoul or to regroup effectively
the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan perimeter,
purposes of deception ROK marines made a minor landing at
Mokpo on the southwest coast and ex,ecuted feints at Kunsan on the
west coast and near Pohang and Yongdok on the east coast. Naval
forces conducted a demonstration off Samchok.
APrior to the landings naval aircraft from four carriers and fire
from four cruisers (two American and two British), six destroyers,
and three rocket-firing landing craft pounded enemy defenses and
Ideal transportation facilities for two days while the offshore area
va.s being swept clear of mines. These naval forces, increased by
the arrival of another aircraft carrier, remained offshore and pro
vide-1 air and gunfire support on call from the ground troops after
the initial landings.
18
The plan for the first phase of the operation required the seizure
of Wolmi, a tiny island which dominates Inchon harbor and which
is connected to the port of Inchon by a causeway (Map 6a). At dawn
on 15 September, about one hour before high tide, a reinforced batr
talion of the 1st Marine Division landed and captured Wolmi against
light resistance in less than thirty minutes.
The plan for the second phase contemplated the seizure of the
Inchon peninsula. During the next high tide, at 1730 hours, other
elements of the 1st Marine Division assaulted the nine-foot sea wall
in the port area. North Korean garrison and security forces offered
little opposition; and by the afternoon of the next day, 16 Septem
ber, the marines were several miles east and northeast of Inchon.
Kimpo airfield fell on the 17th, and on the following day it was serv
ing as the terminus of an airlift operation that landed\400 tons of
cargo daily.
The 7th Infantry Division came ashore on 18 September and as
sumed responsibility on the south flank. It fanned out quickly to
the south and east.
The plan for the third phase contemplated the liberation of Seoul
and the denial to the enemy of the railroads and highways in the
vicinity, vital link's in his lines of communication to the south. Ma
rine troops crossed the Han River below Seoul on 19 September and
advanced rapidly on the city. Meanwhile, having secured Suwon,
7th Division troops late on 26 September linked up with advance ele
jments of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was leading the breakout
from the Pusan beachhead. Other elements of the 7th Division
crossed the Han south of Seoul and entered the outskirts of the capi
tal city. The columns advancing from north, south, and west en
countered strong resistance; but Seoul fell on 26 September.
Breakout from the Pusan Beachhead (Map 5).—On the eve of the
Eighth Army's own offensive the enemy began another attack east
from Waegwan, and on the night of 15 September he was threaten
ing the northern approach to Taegu. But despite this enemy threat,
and the rainy weather that almost eliminated air support, the Eighth
Army began its general offensive on 16 September. :
The landing at Inchon, deep in the enemy rear, had no immediate
effect on Marshal Choi's army in South Korea; and the Eighth Army
scored no appreciable gains Until 20 September. At this time it was
confirmed that there was little depth to the enemy defenses. When
the "hard shell" was broken, there was nothing behind it to impede
the advance of the Eighth Army.
19
The drive of the 25th Division down the Masan-Chinju road, sup
ported by gunfire from naval vessels off the south coast, experienced
heavy going for the first few days; but it soon gained momentum,
and on 26 September the division was several miles west of Chinju.
The 2d Division,19 after several days of stubborn fighting, found a
soft spot and pushed forward rapidly toward Kochang.
On the north face of the perimeter, where ROK divisions attacked,
the pattern of resistance was much the same. After resisting
strongly for four days, the enemy defense collapsed; and he with
drew in haste. The ROK troops followed as rapidly as their trans
port could carry them.
The I Corps, made up of the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Division,
ROK 1st Division, and the United Kingdom 27th Brigade, made the
most sweeping advance. The 24th Division, initially in corps re
serve, was committed on the left of the 1st Cavalry Division. After
breaking the enemy defenses, both divisions established bridgeheads
across the Naktong and drove rapidly northwest. In one day, 26
September, leading elements of the 1st Cavalry Division sped more
than 100 miles behind enemy lines to form a juncture with troops of
the 7th Division in the vicinity of Osan.
Although all or part of eight North Korean divisions were isolated
in southwestern Korea, there was ample opportunity for individuals
or small groups to escape to the north. Large numbers threw away
their arms and donned civilian clothing, which made it extremely
difficult to identify them. But despite this, during the period 15-30
September United Nations forces took 23,600 prisoners.
In southwestern Korea the 2d and 25th Divisions (IX Corps) con
tinued to advance rapidly against the scattered but often formidable
counteraction of disorganized groups. Before the end of the month
the west-coast port of Kunsan was seized by the 25th Division. De
struction of by-passed enemy concentrations constituted a major
problem. A difficult task assigned to the I Corps was to clear and
make secure the Taegu-Taejon main supply route.
In the vast mountainous area east of the line Taegu-Seoul the
ROK divisions advanced rapidly against practically no opposition.
On the east coast ROK troops reached the 38th parallel by 1 Octo
ber.20
19
The IX Corps (Major General John B. Coulter) became operational on 23 Sep
tember. Its major units were the 2d and 25th Divisions.
20
As of this date approximately 21,000 ROK troops were attached to or inte
grated with American ground units. The ROK corps, frequently referred
to in this narrative, were made up entirely of ROK units.
20
Division, the relentless drive up the Yesong River of the ROK 1st
Division, and the northwesterly sweep of the ROK 7th Division fore
told the fall of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, which was
completely occupied on 21 October. On the previous day two bat
talions of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team had been
dropped by parachute at Sukchon and Sunchon. With so little re
sistance actually being met at Pyongyang, the effect of this airborne
operation appears to have been slight. Of interest, however, was
the drop from C-119's of considerable heavy equipment, including
four %-ton weapons carriers, twenty-eight 14-ton vehicles, twelve
105-mm. howitzers, and four 90-mm. guns. While equipment had
been dropped in World War II, this was probably the first operational
drop of the heavier weapons and artillery pieces. With enemy re
sistance in a state of disintegration, troops advancing overland con
tacted the airborne forces on the 21st.
As the United Nations forces swept into the northern reaches of
Korea, the front broadened considerably. On 26 October the ROK
6th Division reached Chosan, on the Manchurian border. At the
same time, to the east, the ROK Capital Division approached the
area south of the Choshin and Fusen reservoirs.
Still operating as a separate command, the X Corps moved to the
east coast, where the 1st Marine Division disembarked at Wonsan on
26 October21 and commenced clearing pockets of resistance which
had been by-passed in the drive by ROK troops up the east coast.
After their annihilating defeats, in which they had lost 135,000
men as prisoners since mid-September, the North Korean forces
showed little aggressiveness. By the end of the month the 24th Di
vision had advanced to within a few miles of the temporary North
Korean capital of Sinuiju (Map 8).
The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met power
ful enemy resistance along the entire line—resistance which un
masked the fiction of "volunteer" 23 participation and disclosed the
rear.
The main blow fell on the right wing of the Eighth Army and
quickly severed the very tenuous contact existing between it and
the X Corps across the rugged terrain in the center of the peninsula.
Although the ensuing operations were concurrent, they will be de
scribed separately, as they took place on two distinct parts of the
front.
Operations on the X Corps Front.—Along the greatly extended
front of the X Corps the heaviest enemy blow was directed at the
Choshin reservoir area, where the 1st Marine Division (less the 1st
Marine Regiment) had just started its attack toward the west. A
Chinese Communist force struck both east and west of the Choshin
22
A Chinese division is triangular in organization and varies in strength from
5,000 to 10,000.
23
The Peiping Government had persistently maintained that all Chinese partici
pants in the Korean war were volunteers.
25
of the 7th and 3d Divisions who were defending the port and the
nearby Yonpo airfield.
After the evacuation of the 1st Marine Division from Hungnam
the defensive perimeter was gradually contracted as the remaining
units embarked in succession. The troops of the 7th Division fol
lowed the marines, and then the regiments of the 3d Division were
embarked. The evacuation was completed on 24 December.
The enemy attempts to sweep the Hungnam defenders into the sea
had been numerous and often in considerable strength; yet on no oc
casion was he able to mount a coordinated mass attack with adequate
artillery support. The defending forces, on the other hand, were
• ably supported by artillery that was effectively reinforced by naval
gunfire. Carrier-based aircraft contributed greatly to the success
ful evacuation by flying thousands of close-support and interdic
tion missions. Naval vessels evacuated 203,000 persons (of whom
105,000 were troops), 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons
of other cargo. In addition, air transports took out 3,600 troops, 200
vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo. Needless to say, this operation
could have been carried out successfully only by the closely inte
grated efforts of the Army, Navy^ and Air Force.
By 27 December the X Corps had completed the landing and as
sembling of its troops in the Pusan area. On the previous day the
corps had been placed under the Eighth Army.
Operations on the Eighth Army Front.—Employing a force of
eighteen divisions, the Chinese Communists dealt the Eighth Army
a stunning blow on 26 November] ' The main effort, directed at and
around the army's east flank, quickly smashed the divisions of the
ROK II Corps in that sector and exposed the right flank of the 2d
Division, in the IX Corps sector. Savage blows were struck at the
remainder of the army front, but it was the primary threat of en
velopment from the east that necessitated a withdrawal all along
the line.
The 1st Cavalry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and the British
Commonwealth 27th Brigade were committed against the onrushing
enemy on the Eighth Army's right flank. The combined efforts of
these and other units made the withdrawal possible. Although
losses in men and equipment had been heavy,24 by 30 November the
Eighth Army was intact south of the Chongchon River.
24
The 2d Division was particularly hard hit, suffering 4,163 casualties and the
loss of much equipment. One artillery battalion lost all but nine of its
howitzers; two other battalions either lost or were forced to destroy all of
their pieces.
27
forces were falling back under the pressure of our ground and air
attacks.
Operation Ripper.—During the last two weeks in February the
western sector of the front had been relatively quiet, with the United
Nations forces holding a line just south of and overlooking the Han
River. There was no indication that either Seoul or the line south
of the Han was heavily defended. However, to avoid a possible costly
frontal assault on the city, it was decided to by-pass it in the next
operation. This attack, known as Operation Ripper, began on 7
March. The purpose, like that of the preceding attacks, was to in
flict the maximum casualties and at the same time to outflank Seoul
and thus force its abandonment by the enemy. One of the primary
terrain objectives was the town of Chunchon, where the enemy was
believed to be concentrating his troops and supplies.
In the zones of the IX and X Corps, where the terrain was most
difficult, the advance progressed slowly against strong resistance.
Tank operations and the forward movement of supplies were particu
larly affected by the combination of precipitous mountains, deep val
leys, rivers, and rice paddies. Nonetheless, Hongchon was taken by
the middle of the month; and Chunchon was captured on the 22d.
Meanwhile, on the first day of the offensive, the 25th Division,
which had heen moved to the east flank of the I Corps sector, crossed
the Han River fifteen miles east of Seoul, at the confluence of the
Han and Pukhan Rivers. The enemy counterattacked this bridge
head, but after three days of hard fighting he retired in disorder.
The division's advance up the Pukhan Valley caused the Commu
nists to evacuate Seoul on the night of 14-15 March, patrols of the
ROK 1st Division entering before daylight. This was the fourth
time that the city had changed hands.
Resistance along the entire front quickly dwindled, and advancing
units began losing contact with the enemy. In an effort to block his
withdrawal route, from Seoul to Kaesong, the second and largest
airborne operation of the conflict was launched on 23 March. At
0900 on that date the 187th Regimental Combat Team and two com
panies of Rangers were dropped in the vicinity of Munsan, together
with such heavy equipment as 14-ton trucks, weapons carriers, and
howitzers. Resistance was slight, and in a matter of hours an ar
mored column had made contact with the airborne troops. While it
had been hoped that many of the enemy would be trapped, the actual
number was negligible. They had retired too rapidly.
34
Meanwhile the ROK I and III Corps advanced in their zones, cap
turing Yangyang, north of the 38th parallel, on 27 March. By the
end of the month the United Nations front ran generally from Mun
san east to Chunchon and thence to Yangyang.
The Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel.—Although Operation Rip
per had completed the liberation of most of South Korea, the enemy's
obvious build-up for still another counteroffensive made it impera
tive that he be kept off balance. To this end it was decided to estab
lish a strong defensive line from which punishing sorties could be
made. The Eighth Army was therefore ordered to advance to the
commanding terrain north of the parallel. This would establish a
line, about 115 miles long, extending from the tidal land in the west
through the twelve-mile expanse of the Hwachon reservoir and
thence to the east coast through the almost impassible terrain east
of the reservoir. The great natural strength of the line would per
mit a reduction of troops in forward positions and therefore an in
crease in the depth of the defense.
The army continued its slow, steady advance, unspectacular but
with the maximum punishment being inflicted on the enemy. The
south bank of Hwachon reservoir was reached on 3 April. The en
emy opened the gates of the dam in an attempt to slow the advance;
but the delay was slight, and on the 18th the dam and the town of
Hwachon were taken. The units on the right and left reached the
new line about the same time.
Meanwhile a limited offensive known as Operation Dauntless was
launched on 11 April in the zone just west of the reservoir. The ob
jective was the disruption of enemy build-up in the Chorwon
Kumhwa-Pyonggang area, commonly known as the "Iron Triangle".
That the enemy fought tenaciously to retain this area is easy to un
derstand. For months it had been an assembly and storage area;
and, in addition, it was an all-important link in his communications
system. Once the triangle was lost, the Communists would no longer
be able to shift troops and supplies from north to south or across
the front; without it their ability to launch another general offen
sive would be seriously limited.
As the I Corps slowly advanced toward this area, in almost hand
to-hand combat, the enemy reaction became more violent; and all
along the front it became increasingly apparent that a new Commu
nist counteroffensive was soon to be launched.
On 11 April, General MacArthur was relieved of his command by
the President, General Ridgway stepping up to take his place. Lieu
35
tenant General James A. Van Fleet was sent from the United States
to take command of the Eighth Army.
While the critical operations of the period from November through
March were being fought on the ground, air and naval forces did
much to support our successful withdrawal and subsequent counter
offensive. That the winter drive of the Communists was not more
successful may well be due to the close support and interdiction mis
sions flown by the Air Force and by the air arms of the Navy and
Marine Corps. Units that were cut off were supplied by air, as well
as others fighting in terrain so difficult that normal means of supply
could not be used. The importance of evacuation by air and water
has already been indicated. Nor were the naval surface' elements
lacking in means of assistance to the ground forces. Enemy supply
routes near the coast were torn by naval gunfire; amphibious dem
onstrations, such as the one at Kansong on 31 January, kept him
off balance.
At the end of the period we were still supreme, in the air, but there
were signs that the Communists intended to challenge that suprem
acy. The number of MIG-15's that opposed our F-84's and F-86's in
creased steadily. At 'the end of April it was estimated that the en
emy had a total of 860 combat aircraft, including 260 jet fighters.
on Seoul. Uijongbu was taken on the 27th, and by the 29th Eighth
Army units had been drawn back to previously prepared positions
about four miles north of the capital. The enemy, moving up in
small groups, probed these defenses; but here, as in the central sec
tor, the momentum of the attack had been dissipated. Attempts
to outflank the Seoul defenses by ferrying troops across the Han
River to Kumpo peninsula were undertaken by the Communists, but
these threats were quickly eliminated.
In the east, North Korean units attacked ROK troops, capturing
Inje on 24 April. A limited advance was continued through the 29th.
On the 30th the front was stabilized by the X Corps and the ROK I
and III Corps.
By the end of the month the Communist offensive had been
stopped on the line Seoul-Sabangu-Taepo. They had advanced
thirty-five miles on a forty-mile front (from Seoul to Hongchon) in
west and central Korea, with lesser gains in the east. The price was
high, an estimated 70,000 casualties. On the other hand, the Eighth
Army, held intact by a well-executed retirement, had suffered only a
tenth that number of casualties.
There are a number of reasons why this huge Communist assault
failed. While, in spite of air interdiction, the enemy was able to
gradually build up a sufficient force to launch the attack, he was un
able to maintain the power necessary to overcome the determined
defenders and exploit the penetration. This was largely due to air
interdiction and his basic lack of mobility. Another factor was that
he lacked the surprise which he had attained in the drives of June
and November 1950. Still another, and possibly the most important
factor, was the coordinated effort of the three services. All ground
forces in Korea (including the X Corps) were now under the Eighth
Army, which had become a hardened, seasoned fighting team. The
Navy provided aircraft for close support, and its warships denied the
Communists the use of the east-coast road. The Air Forceflew7,240
sorties during the period, over 50 per cent of which were either close-
support or armed-reconnaissance sorties; the remainder were rear-
area interdiction sorties.
The Lull Between Impulses.—As was his custom, the enemy, after
the force of his assault had been spent, broke contact and withdrew
beyond artillery range to regroup his units and,bring up supplies.
To regain contact and at the same time to maintain a strong defen
sive line, each corps was ordered on 3 May to establish a patrol base
six miles north of the main line. For the next week strong tank
38
infantry patrols ranged ten or twelve miles beyond the patrol bases,
but contact with the enemy remained light and scattered,
In addition to the need to re-establish contact with the enemy, it
was equally important that a usable lateral road be- secured in order
that the ROK divisions in the east could be supplied.29 To secure
such a road, the ROK forces and the X Corps attacked to seize a line
north of and parallel to the Hongchon-Kansong road. With this
road in our possession, these units could then be supplied across the
peninsula from Kansong. The attack, supported by naval gunfire
on the east coast, followed the usual pattern of steady, methodical
advance. On 9 May, ROK patrols entered Kansong. These were
withdrawn, however, on the 11th to permit naval fire on a Commu
nist counterattack force. (Subsequent events were to prevent an
early re-entry.) By 10 May, X Corps units had almost reached their
objectives; but units in the ROK center were still some ten miles
from theirs.
On the western half of the line the Eighth Army also forged
ahead. Uijongbu, eleven miles north of the capital, was captured by
United Nations forces on 6 May, as was also the critical communica
tions center of Chunchon.
Beginning 10 May, enemy resistance stiffened; and gains by the
United Nations Forces were slight. Still, in the first fifteen days of
May the enemy had been driven.back five to ten miles in all sectors
and had suffered heavy casualties. It was now evident that a second
impulse of the spring offensive could be expected in the proximate
future. Increasing resistance, heavier than normal artillery and
mortar fire, prisoner-of-war reports, and air reconnaissance reports
• all pointed to a coming assault. All along the line Allied units began
laying mines, stringing barbed wire, and computing firing data in
preparation for the next Communist attack.
The Second Impulse of the Offensive (Map 13).—By 15 May the
enemy had moved men and materiel down from the Pyonggang
Kumhwa-Chorwon triangle, and he was ready for a new drive.
Striking through the fog and rain of the night of 15-16 May, the
Communists committed twenty-one divisions on a seventy-five-mile
front extending from Tokchong, north of Uijongbu, to Nodong, east
of Inje. While a secondary effort to outflank Seoul was launched.in
the Kapyong area, down the Pukhan River and along the road to
Seoul, the Chinese struck hardest in the Naepyong-Inje-Nodong
29
At this time the terrain in which these units were located was so inaccessible
that supply was dependent on hand-carry or air drop.
39
area. The objective of this drive appears to have been the outflank
ing of Seoul and an advance of the front to the 37th parallel (Map
11), At this time Communist strength south of the Yalu was es
timated at 760,000 men. It was further estimated that the enemy
had 1,000 planes at his disposal, operating from bases in Manchuria
and in North Korea.
Early on 16 May the main effort, with 125,000 to 150,000 troops,
struck the ROK III Corps (Map 13) and the two ROK divisions on
the right of the X Corps.30 Bearing the brunt of the assault, the
ROK 5th and 7th Divisions were forced to withdraw, thus exposing
the right flank of the 2d Division and the left flank of the ROK III'
Corps. Communist troops swung behind the III Corps and estab
lished a road block across its main supply route, forcing its with
drawal. Continued heavy pressure forced the further withdrawal
of the two ROK divisions of the X Corps, and by the 22d they had
pulled back deep into friendly territory. Meanwhile the 1st Marine
Division and the 2d Division extended their fronts and battled des
perately to stem the Communist drives down the Chunchon-Hong
chon and'Inje-Hongchon roads. The 15th Regimental Combat Team
of the 3d Division was moved to the right flank of the 2d Division,
and the 187th Regimental Combat Team was moved to a blocking
position near Hoengsong. The remainder of the 3d Division was
moved from reserve near Seoul to fill the gap between the 2d Divi
sion and the ROK III Corps. After an all-night, 70-mile ride these
3d Division troops contacted the enemy near Soksa on 21 May and
recaptured that town after a sharp fight. This action marked the
turning point of the second phase of the Communist spring offensive.
To the east the ROK III Corps, under heavy pressure and its sup
,ply route severed, commenced its withdrawal on the 18th, its units
in some disorder. Heavily attacked again on 21 and 22 May, the
corps became so disorganized that it was inactivated on the 23d. Its
divisions were then taken over by the two corps on its flanks.
Farther to the east the ROK I Corps, under less pressure, with
drew in good order to conform to the movements on its left.
In the west the secondary attack in the IX Corps sector was halted
aboutfivemiles south of Kapyong, although some enemy forces had
advanced as far south as Masogu. In the sector of the I Corps ac-
Jivity was relatively light. In the eastern part of the corps zone the
30
In one place the Communists were reported to have driven South Korean refu
gees through the mine fields in front of the advancing troops so as to set
off the mines.
40
front was moved back nearly to Uijongbu, but to the west Allied ar
mored spearheads advanced and took Munsan by 21 May.
By 22 May the offensive came to an end as exhaustion, heavy casu
alties, and supply difficulties forced the enemy to admit failure. He
had gained less than in the first phase and yet had suffered an es
timated 90,000 casualties in killed, wounded, and captured. Lacking
a good supply system and dependable communications, he had not
been able to exploit his initial tactical success. It was now clear that
he did not have the power to defeat the Eighth Army, much less to
drive it into the sea. The most he could hope for was a stalemate.
The Counterattack (Map 14).—While the enemy was exhausted,
the Eighth Army seized the opportunity to strike back in a major
counterattack, the first to be launched immediately after a Chinese
Communist offensive. The I, IX, and X Corps were ordered to ad
vance on 23 May and seize important roads and key communications
centers. The main purpose, however, was to inflict as much punish
ment on the enemy as possible.
In the eastern half of the peninsula the initial advance was rapid
in spite of the strong resistance put up by the Communists to protect
their withdrawing units. In the sector of the X Corps the 2d Divi
sion and 187th Regimental Combat Team took Inje on the 27th, and
the 1st Marine Division seized the high ground east of Yanggu on 31
May. Farther to the east ROK troops, heavily supported by naval
gunfire, raced up the coastal road to take the wrecked port of Kan
song on the 30th. These rapid advances left some 60,000 enemy
troops (who had advanced toward Soksa during the Communist of
fensive) in a pocket with their escape routes cut. Here they were
decimated by the combined efforts of the 3d Division and the ROK
units of the X and ROK I Corps. Large numbers were captured; the
rest, abandoning weapons and equipment, filtered back northward
through the heavily wooded mountain terrain.
In the western half of the peninsula the 24th and 7th Divisions of
the IX Corps met considerable resistance as they advanced into the
area north of Chunchon. In spite of this, however, Hwachon was
seized by the 7th Division on 28 May. The advance in the zone of
the I Corps kept pace as the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Divi
sion moved up the two main roads from Uijongbu toward Chorwon
and Kumwha and patrols of the ROK I Division operated across the
Imjin River north of Munsan.
By the end of May the United Nations held the general line Imjin
River-Munsan-Yonchon-Hwachon-Inje-Sorim-Kansong. But by
41
this time enemy resistance had become intense all along the line; and
the Allied offensive was further slowed as rain turned the poor Ko
rean roads into quagmires. Henceforth Operation Piledriver, as this
counteroffensive was called, would have to face a determined enemy
in well-prepared positions. Casualties inflicted by the counteroff en
sive thus far were estimated at 43,000. In addition, the Communists
had lost 11,000 rifles, 1,000 machine guns, 310 mortars, 120 pieces
of artillery, 400 horses, and huge stocks of ammunition and supplies.
The Advance to the "Iron Triangle".—Although General Van Fleet
realized that the Eighth Army could force the Chinese to retreat
well north of the 38th parallel, it was evident that he did not have
sufficient men and equipment to destroy the enemy armies. There
fore, it was decided that while reserve elements constructed a strong
defensive line running from Munsan through Yanggu to the east
coast31 the remainder of the Eighth Army would continue advanc
ing, using the same tactics that had been employed since January.
The immediate purpose of this advance was to push forward in the
east to a strong Communist area north of Inje, known as the "Punch
bowl", and in the west to the vital Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumwha
triangle. No large advance was planned at the extreme western end
of the front, as it was known that the Communists were building
strong defenses in that sector and as an advance there would
lengthen the front.
In the zone of the I Corps the ROK division on the left established
a bridgehead over the Imjin River north of Munsan and engaged in
patrol activities along the river line. The bulk of the corps, the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 3d and 25th Divisions, made the main ef
fort.32 Against heavy resistance and in rains that limited air sup
port and made roads nearly impassible, these three divisions slowly
fought through the deep defenses before the "Iron Triangle". On
12 June the two southern anchors of the triangle, Chorwon and Kum
hwa, were taken. Tank-infantry teams drove the fleeing Chinese
toward Pyonggang and Kumsong. Two task forces raced northward
from Chorwon and Kumhwa and on 13 June linked up inside Pyong
gang. After a brief reconnaissance these two forces evacuated the
city and returned to the Allied lines. Pyonggang was reoccupied by
the Chinese on the 17th.
The IX Corps, just east of the I Corps, advanced slowly. The ef
fects of mobility andfirepower were minimized in the rough terrain
31
Known as the Kansas Line.
32
The 3d Division had been transferred back to this corps from the X Corps on
31 May.
42
move, which are the only important targets we have left in North
Korea, it is essential to keep hitting around the clock, every day, to
prevent the concentrated movements during periods when the en
emy is not under attack. When used in this manner, air power is
able to exert constant and destructive pressure on the enemy all the
way back to his sources of supply. This destructive pressure from
the air can be as relentless as the pressure exerted by our ground
forces against his front-line troops.
The enemy reaction to Operation Strangle was an accelerated build
up of the Chinese Air Force and an increased commitment of
MIG-15's in North Korea. Sightings of MIG's, which ran from 300
to 400 a month in the summer of 1951, jumped to 3,000 in October.
Battles between jet planes of both sides became almost daily occur
rences. Outfought by Allied planes, the MIG's did not greatly re
duce the effectiveness of the interdiction program.34 One other ef
fort of the enemy to protect himself against Operation Strangle was
a sizable increase in the number and quality of antiaircraft weapons
for the defense of important points. These antiaircraft guns ac
counted for 111 planes of the Air Force in the four-month period be
ginning 1 October 1951. But in spite of Communist defensive meas
ures, in the first six months of the operation our aircraft made 16,000
"rail cuts", killed 16,000 enemy troops, destroyed 200 locomotives
and damaged 240, knocked out 210 bridges and damaged another
775, destroyed 25,000 vehicles, and struck 265 supply, ammunition,
and fuel dumps.
The Navy continued its effective support during the long period
of negotiations. The blockade of the Korean coast was maintained,
and there was no letup in mine-sweeping activities. Naval gunfire
support was provided units operating near the coast, and the coastal
railroads and highways and ports occupied by the Communists were
blasted time and again by surface bombardment. Navy and Marine
Corps air units continued their support of the ground forces and par
ticipated in the program of interdiction.
The rotation of troops continued during this period. So effective
was the system of replacements that by the end of 1951 very few
members of divisional units remained in Korea who had been there
at the beginning of the year. The major change in units was the
transfer of the 40th and 45th Divisions to Korea and the return of
the veteran 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Japan.
In February it was estimated that since the beginning of the war
the enemy had suffered a total of 1,635,000 casualties. During the
34
By 13 February 1952 the air forces in Korea had shot down 186 MIG-15's while
losing only 39 jet fighters and 4 propellor-driven planes.
47
AIR POWER
Although most of the burden of the conflict has fallen on the
ground forces, the vital contribution of the air forces must.not be
49
ftAVAL SUPPORT
Without the Navy, operations in Korea, halfway around the world
from the United States, would have been impossible. During the
first year it transported nearly 14,000;000 measurement tons of sup
plies, over 45,000,000 barrels of petroleum products, and 1,230,000
troops and other passengers. In the combat zone naval gunfire sup
port was of great value. The blockade of the Korean coast and the
50
RESTRICTED
S E A
®
0 F
J A P A N
M-^/y/"':^^:;;:;-;>:;
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
COMMUNIST SPRING OFFENSIVE
( FIRST IMPULSE )
S i t u a t i o n 3 0 A p r i l 1951 a n d Operations
Since 2 2 April
•1 T e r r i t o r y R e g a i n e d by United N a t i o n s
by 16 M a y
0 5 10 15 20
SCALE OF MILES
OPERATiONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS CQUNTERGfPENSIVE
C JANUARY- 21 APRIL 1951 )
S E A ®
Y L o
E A
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
SECOND INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA
SCALE OF MILES
CHONGJIN
Voluntary w i t h d r a w a l a l o n g
the east c o a s t f o l l o w e d up
by l i g h t enemy f o r c e s .
1st M a r i n e D i v i s i o n c o m p l e t e d
d e b a r k a t i o n f r o m H u n g n o m on
15 D e c e m b e r .
A P A ~N
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE
IN NORTH KOREA
Situation 5 December 1950 and
Operations From 26 November
to 15 December
C / I O 20 30 40 50 60
SCALE OF MILES
w
24 Nov
CHONGJIN
Ncvembe
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
20 30 40
SCALE OF MILES
J A P A N
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE
PUSAN
I n i t i a l light r e s i s t a n c e by
ROK Army units south of
the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l .
of th« S t o u l - T o t j o n axis
furnished solely by ROK units
until 2 3 July.
Y E L L
S E A
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE
H \3
Y E L L O W Y E L L O W *
p IP 20 3D 40 y> 60 70 8P 9 0 100
SEA OF JAPAN
HAINAN
P H I L I P P I N E OPERATIONS IN KOREA
S O U T H
GENERAL MAP
'•i C H I N A
THE FAR EAST
T H A I L A N D
SEA PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
/ FRENCH
INDO-CHINA
DATE DUEfDA Pamp 12-23)
n
APR 197D.IPR 1 0 i m 5 (g^AR 1991
Operations In Korea.
N.Y., 1954.
Fort Leavenworth, KS
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P-2728—C&GSS—4 Apr 45—10M