I

1 Sha11a D. Weir
WEIR LAW GROUP LLC
2 Nevada Bar No. 94G8'
6220 Steve11son Way
3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
(702) 509-4567
4 E1nail: swei1-@weirlawgroup.com
Attorneys for the Contestants
5
Jesse R. Binnall (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
6 HARVEY & BINNALL, PLLC
717 IGng Street, Suite 200
7 Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 888-1943
8 (703) 888-1930 (facsimile)
Email: jbinnall@ha1·veybinnall.com
9 Attorneys for the Contestants
10
IN THE FIRSTJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURT
11 CARSONCITY,NEVADA
12 Jesse Law, an individual; Michael
McDonald; an individual; James
13 DeGraffenreid III, an individual; Case No.
Durward James Hindle III, an Dept.
14 individual; Eileen Rice, an individual;
Shawn Meehan, an individual, as
15 candidates for p1·esidential electors on STATEMENT OF CONTEST OF THE
behalf of Donald J. Trump. NOVEMBER 3, 2020 PRESIDENTIAL
16 ELECTION PURSUANT TO NRS
Contestants, 293.407 AND 293.410
17
vs.
18
Judith Whitmer, an individual; Sarah
19 Mahler, an individual; Joseph
Throneber1-y, an individual; Artemesia
20 Blanco, an individual; Gabrielle D'Ayr,
an individual; and Yvanna Cancela, an
21 individual, as candidates for
presidential electors on behalf of Joseph
22 R. Eiden, Jr ..

23 Defendants.

24
25 STATEMENTOF CONTEST
26 This election contest arises from the substantial irregula1·ities, imp1·oprieties,

27 and fraud that occurred in Nevada's 2020 general election for the office of P1·esident

28 of the United States. Nevada election officials developed and implemented an election
 1 system that was highly susceptible to fraud and abuse. lndee~ Registrar Joe Gloria

2 acknowledged to the Clark County Commission his staff "discovered discrepancies

3 that we cannot explain'' and cannot be remedied with a recount. 1

4 Even though election officials were warned about these dangers, they persisted
5 in implementing an election plan devoid of protections that could have prevented or

6 discouraged malfeasance from third parties. Consequently, the fraud and abuse came
7 with the election. This contest is the natural result, as evidence will show that the
8 nature and scale of that fraud and abuse renders the purported results of the Nevada
9 election illegitimate.

10 The contestants, Michael McDonald, an individual; James DeGra.ffenreid, an

11 individual; Jim Hindle, an individual; Jesse Law, an individual; Eileen Rice, an
12 individual; Shawn Meehan, an individual (hereinafter collectively, "Contestants")
13 state and allege the following for their election contest against Judith Whitmer, an
14 individual; Sarah Mahler, an individual; Joseph Throneberry, an individual;
15 Artemesia Blanco, an individual; Gabrielle D'Ayr, an individual; and Yvanna. Cancela,
16 an individual, as candidates for presidential electors on behalf of Joseph R. Biden, Jr,
17 (hereinafter collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to NRS 293.407:

18 JURISDICTIONAND PARTIES
19 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to NRS 293.407(2).
20 2. Donald J. Trump is the President of the United States of America and
21 candidate for reelection to that office in the general election of November 3, 2020 (the
22 "Election").
23 3. Contestant Michael McDonald is a resident and registered voter in the
24 State of Nevada, and a candidate Presidential Elector for Donald J. Trump.
25 4. Contestant James DeGraffenreid is a resident and registered voter in the
26 State of Nevada, and a candidate presidential elector for Donald J. Trump.
27
1
28 Clark County Commission ~Ieeting, November 16, 2020.
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1 5. Co11te~tf\t1t. Ji1u 1-lindlo is 11 1·osi(lo11t.1,r1cl1·egisto1·o(l Vl>lo1·i11t.110Stralo of

2 Novi\da, a11d tl c1\11did1\to p1·csi(lc11ti111e locto1· f(>rD0111\lclJ. T1·t11np.

3 6. Co11testi1nt Jesso Lfl\V is fl 1·08idcnt n11cl1·cgisto1·ccl voto1· in tl10 Stnto of

4 Nev11cla, n11d a cn11did11te p1·esidentinl olecto1· fo1·Donnlcl J. T1·u1np.

5 7. Co11testant Eilee11 Rice is a 1·esident and 1·ogiste1·ed vote1· in tho Stnte of

6 Nevnda, and a candidate p1·esidential elector fo1· D011alcl J. T1·t11np.

7 8. Co11test1111tShawn Meehan is a resident and 1·egiste1·ed vote1· in tl10 State

8 of Nevada, and a candidate presidential electo1· fo1· Donald J. T1·ump.

9 9. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. is a ca11didate for the P1·esident of the United Stntes

10 of Ame1·ica in the Nevada general election of November 3, 2020.

11 10. Defendants Judith Whitmer, an individual; Sa1·ah Mahle1·, an individt1t1l;

12 Joseph Throneberry, an individual; A1·temesia Blanco, an individual; Gnb1·iello D'Ay1·,

13 an individual; and Yvanna Cancela are the candidates fo1·p1·esidential electo1· chosen

14 by Joseph R. Bidon, Jr ..

15 11. Subsequent to the Election, the news n1edia decla1·ed tl1at Joseph Bide11

16 won the Election in Nevada and wot1ld be the 1·ecipient of Nevt1da's six (6) electo1·al

17 votes for the office of President of the United States of Ame1·ica. The Nevada Soc1·eta1·y

18 of State has yet to make a certification of the election.

19 BACKGROUND
20 12. Contestants repeat and 1·eallege all fo1·egoi11gallegatio11s a11d i11co1·po1·ate

21 the same by reference as if fully set forth ho1·ein.

22 13. Citing the widespread effects of the COVID 19 pandemic, and concc1·11s
23 over community sp1·ead, and 1·ecommendations fo1· individuals to socially distance
24 from one another, after the state p1·i1nary election, the Gove1·1101·called a speciill
25 session of the State Legislatu1·e fo1· the exp1·ess pu1·pose of cl1a11ging Nevacla's voti11g
26 p1·ocedt11·es.

27 14. As a 1·est1lt, du1·ing the 32 nd SJlecial Sessio11 of the Nevacla Lobrislatt11·0,

28 the Legislatt11·e passed Assembly Bill ("AB") 4, wl1ich fo1· tl1e fi1·st ti111e i11tl1c l1ist()l")'
-3-
1 ()f t,hf18tf1t.~ <,f N<1VF1<lft,
r~r,1,itr<I t.h~t. lfOi:t(,l1r:1f1-
1 (I ~)~Jllt;t~r~ ffiffJIPrJfir ~11 f/\~F(f~t~tl
2 v,,t.erR in th~ Rtntf>fln<I(>Rtflhli~hP<lt'I prr><~<lltrPf,,.,.
v<,tPl'~t1,r:ft~t thP1·r r,~,Jlt;t~hy m~1l.

3 J\n <•verw h<•Im i r,~ n tl m hAr <>fv<>t-Ar~rA('.J3ivA<I

m l1 It.,p IA t-.~
llt,f.~ fr,r t.hPmR~lv~q fi "'J
4 ()t.hf~TR.Dt1ring t.h~ ~~lP.c~ti<>n, ~ t/,mhin~f,r,n
~t.~f..Ael~cti<>n h<,~rrl~ r~t..AivA<I r,f h~llr,f~

5 fr<>mv<►ters wh<, ch<•se to v<>tehy mf>il, th<>AAto vr>t.ein·pe-r~,n ,lurin~ varir,u~ ·'~ITT"ly

6 voting· peri<><I~.<>rch<,se f,() v<>tein per~on (>n elect.i,,n ,Jay - N(>vemher 3, zt,2().

7 15. The State <>f Nevada receive<) 8.5 time~ more m~il· jn ballt,fA in the

8 Electi<>n (l,71,89~)) AA it clid in the 2()16 election (78,572). Clark Cr,unty, NevacJa

9 received mc>rethan 10 time~ mc,re ball<Jt~ in the 2()20 election (403,248) than it cli<Ijn

10 the 2016 election (44,387).

11 16. Clark County election officiallil and election pe1'sonnel we-re n(>t p-repared

12 to acctlrately and efficiently verify the signatures on the mail·in hal](>ts with electjon

13 personnel as requirecl by Nevada law. AccordingJy, Clark County unilateral1y

14 decided to use a signature verification machine to· verify mail·in ballot signatures in

15 lieu of election personnel.

16 17. Mail·in ballots cast in Clark County, Nevada we-re processed through a

17 machine manufactured by Runbeck Election Services referred to as the Agilis Ballot

18 Sorting System ("Agilis''), which processed and scanned the ballots for the purpoRes

19 of (a) ree<>rding the fact that the voter cast a vote; (b) sorting the ballots by precinct;

20 ancl (c) matching voters' ballot envelc,pe signatures to exemplars maintained by the

21 Clark County Registrar of Voters.

22 18. The reliahility of signature verification machines to analyze mail·in

23 b,1ll<>tAha~ n<>tbeen eBtahlished through scientific study and testing to a degree tha·t

24 w,1rrants their use in elections. There is very little scientific literature to consult to

25 verify the accural-y of signature verification voting machines or to suggest that it is

26 prudent. to use them in elections. Election experts and computer scientists fine) that

27 Aign,1ture verificati<Jn machines are pc,tentially problematic for use in elections even

28 if they are oper,1wcl flawlessly ancl in strict conformance with the manufacturer's
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 1 specifications. Further. there appears to be little or no regulation and certification
2 of signature verification machines in elections as compared to the longstanding.
3 robust, and unparalleled regulation and certification of gambling machines in
4 Nevada.
5 19. It appears that there have been insufficient or non-existent post·elecrion
6 audits of signature verification voting machines that have been used in elections.
7 Election officials were warned not to use signature verification machines in the
8 Election to evaluate mail-in ballot signatures and to instead increase staff to handle
9 the expected surge.
10 20. In light of the stated intention of Nevada election officials to ignore the
11 concerns with signature verification machines and to proceed with the use of the
12 Agilis machine, lawsuits were filed prior to the Nevada election in an attempt to

13 enjoin the use of the Agilis signature verification machines for evaluating mail-in
14 ballot signatures. Nevada election officials opposed the lawsuits. In response to the

15 concerns, Nevada election officials did nothing to safeguard and ensure that mail-in
16 ballots were properly distributed, verified or counted.

17 21. Clark County was the only county in the State of Nevada t,0 utilize the

18 Agilis machine during the Election. Nevada utilized the Agilis machine to verify over

19 130,000 mail·in ballot signatures in Clark County. The Agilis machine was not

20 operated in conformance with the manufacturer's recommendations in at least two

21 respects. First, the signature images on file with the State, which were used by the

22 Agilis machine to compare to the signatures on the outside of the mail-in ballots, were

23 of a lower image quality than suggested by the manufacturer in order to allow the

24 machine to operate properly. Second, the setting of the Agilis machine was altered

25 or adjusted by Nevada election officials in a manner that was lower than the

26 manufacturer's recommendations and therefore unreliable.

27 22. The Agilis machine was not used by Clark Cow1t) to si111ply flag
1

28 questionable signatures for further review by electio11 person11el. It was used to

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 1

2 18(),()()() 1111,il·i11
l,1,ll<•t{}ttvt,l(>I>()
sign1,tt1rt,H. Otl1t)r st1,to8 tl11,t. 11tilizo tho 1\giliH
3 1111tl~l1i110
ft>t·t-1i~111,t cl<>n<>t,,ll<>Wt }1um1,c·l1i110
\tro vorific1,tic,111n1,cl1i110 to n11,ko t.ho
4 \tlti1111,tt.,
clocisi<>11
on ,vl1ich 111t1il·i11
h11llc>t.s
tih<lttlclbo f<>r,v1,rclocl
for co1111ti11g.
R1,thor.
5 t l1oso clthot· st 11tos llHO tho Agiliti 1111,chi
no to fltlg tho most c>l>v
io11s signn t taro
6 vo1·ific1,tio11
clisc1·01J1,11cios
so th1,t tr1,inocl oloct.ion pe1·8onnol c1,11roviow th<1som1,il·in
7 b,, llots 11101·0
ci-1rcf\llly.
8 23. Nc_>t
s111·prisingly.tho Agilis 1n1,chi11eperfor1ned er1·11ticnllyand tho f,1lso
9 nog1,tives 011 sig1111tt11·0
111utcl1es(insta11cos whon the Agilis m11chi11einco1·1·ect.ly
10 1·ejoctecla signi:1tu1·e)we1·eat st1ch a high 1·ute tl1at it wns not ronsoni,ble fo1·the Stnte
11 of Nevadi1 01·Cla1·k County to 1·elyon it fo1·sig11ntt11·eve1·ific1,tio11
co11cl11sio11s
in any
12 meaningful way, espoci11llysince the1·e Wfts no methocl or means to tost 01·co1·1·octfo1·
13 falso positives (instances when the Agilis machine inco1·1·ectlymatched a signatt11·e).
14 In sho1·t, the machi11e's mulft111ctionmade it i11he1·entlyt1111·eliablof1·01na scientific
15 pe1·spective fo1· unili1terally approving or rejecting sig11,1t111·es
11si11gits a1·tifici,1l
16 intelligence p1·otocols. Nevada election officials, howeve1·, evidently 1·elied excl\tsivoly
17 on the machine to verify over 130,000 mail-in b,1llot signatt11·es without any ft11·the1·

18 1·eview of those mail ·in ballots by trained election pe1·son11el.

19 24. Election Depa1·tment p1·ocedu1·es we1·e poo1·ly expl,1ined a11d

20 inconsistently applied leaving the p1·ocess t1n1·eliable, st1sce1)tible to fail111·e,and

21 potential m,tlfoasance. Wo1·ke1·swho Q\testionod deviations we1·e igno1·ed 01·b1·t1shed

22 off by other st,,ff. Fo1· example, initii1lly, same·day 1·egist1·ants we1·e 1·eqt1i1·edto

23 p1·ovido a Nevada J)hotog1·,1phicidentification at e,11·lyvote1· polling loc11tio11s.Li1te1·,

24 poll wo1·ke1·sat son1e ea1·ly vote1· Jlf)lli11glocations u11il,1te1·i1lly

decidocl to allo\v sa111e·

25 clay 1·cgist1·ants to p1·ovicle p1·oof of a DMV appoi11t.111enti11 pl,1ce of 11 Nevadt1

26 photog1·apl1ic ide11tificatio11.Co11soq11011tly,
voto1·s we1·e t1·e,1ted diffe1·e11tlybased 011

27 when ancl w 1101·0tl1ey votod. Aclclit.io11a

lly, vote1·s wl10 insist.eel the~, did 11ot111aili11

28 thci1· b,1llot a11dw1,ntecl to vote i11·1)01·so11

wore t1·e,1tocldifforo11t.lyclope11tli11g
<)11
\\ hicl1 1

-6-
 1 wl1on. 8(>1novot.()1'8woro ,,11(,wo<lt,,v<,IJ•f)r,,vii;i,,111111.v
11ollloc1,tio11tlto)' viHilo<l1111<l
2 ,vl1ilo otl1or8 wo1·0tttr11otl 1,w11y.
3 26. Dt1ri111-:
i11·1)01·Hon
vot.i11g- wl1otl101·tlt1ri11g01\rly vol i11g ptlrl<)<IM,,r ,,n
4 oloction dt1y, tl10 co111J)t1to1·
syHte1u ttHo<l by ki<>Hlcw<>rkorH to cl1,,ck v,,torH in
5 co11sisto11tly1n1,lfunctionod.
6 26. Dt11·ingin·porso11 voti11g - wl1otho1· dt11·ing v11ri<>t1H
o,,rly voting poric,,IH
7 01·on election day - all in·po1·so11voters in Novnd11c11Htthoir l)ttll<Jts<>ncomJ>taterizecl
8 voting machinos, which we1·e also utilizod in otho1· jt11·iH<licti<>11s
tl11·ot1ghout tho
9 U11ited States. The voti11gm11cl1inesuncl p1·i11to1·s
co11siHtently mnlftanctionocl.
10 27. Du1·ing the Election, muny ballots in tho Stitto of Nev,.,,la we1·0 en Ht (or
11 categorized by election pe1·sonnel) as "p1·ovisional ballots." Voto1·s wor·o nllowod to
12 cust provisional ballots in·person if they cot1ld not satisfy acl<l1·oss01· signntu1·0
13 ve1·ification requi1·ements ttpon ar1·ival at the polling place. Thoy wore 1·oqui1·odto
14 cast provisional ballots if they made in·pe1·son chungos to thoir name, uclcl1·oss,d11to
15 of bi1·th or party affiliation. Provisional ballots were supposed to be seg1·ogatocl f1·om
16 tho other ballots pending 1·esolt1tion of whatever particula1· isstte 1:1ffoctod tl10
17 particular ballot. Provisional ballots that could not be cured we1·e sttpposed to ho
18 "spoiled" or not counted; provisional ballots that wore cured wo1·0subsequently cust
1
19 und those votes officially countod towt1rds ca11didates vote totals.

20 28. Dui·ing the Election, vu1·iot1sg1·ot1psin tho State of Novi1da condttcto<l

21 "voting d1·ivcs" to encourage tl10 momllo1·s of Native Amo1·icun co1n1nu11itios to voto.

22 These voting drives we1·0p1·on1otodvia vn1·iot1ssocit1l n1oclia ot1tlots, and voters woi·o

23 p1·ovidod witl1 vu1·il>us"incentives" to cust thoi1· vote.

24 29. As of Nove1nbo1· lG, 2020, tho pt1blisl1od vote 1nn1·gin in tl10 St11to of

25 Nevadu between Vice· Presiclent Biclen a11d P1·osido11t Trt11np was 33,596. Tllo

26 disc1·ep;111ciesa11<1i1·1·ogt1l111·itios
in tl1is election will eclipse tl10 difforo11ce in vote 8

27 bctwoo11 the ci1ncli<l11tos.

28
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 1 30. The evidence presented by Contest,ants in this matter will show that
2 significant problems plagued the Election in the State of Nevada, showing that the
3 purported election results lacked integrity and demonstrat.e that the reported
4 election results are inherently unreliable.
5 31. Upon the grounds for contest pleaded below, Cont.estants are entitled to
6 the relief afforded in NRS 293.417.
7 GROUNDS FOR CONTEST
8 CLARKCOUNTY'SUSE OF THE AGll,IS MACillNE
9
32. Contestants repeat and reallege all foregoing allegations and incorporate
10
the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.
11
33. As alleged above, election personnel used the Agilis machine during the
12
Election in Clark County, Nevada for the purposes of processing and scanning mail-
13
in ballots.
14
34. In addition to other functions, the Agilis machine was utilized to
15
compare, through artificial intelligence ("AI"), voter signatures on the mail-in ballot
16
envelopes to the corresponding voter signature exemplar maintained by the Clark
17
County Registrar of Vot.ers.
18
35. As of November 16, 2020, Clark County reported receipt of 453,248 mail-
19
in ballots for the Election. Each and every mail·in ballot received by the Clark
20
County Election Department was processed and scanned by the Agilis machine. The
21
Agilis machine rejected approximately 70% of the voter signatures and verified
22
approximately 30% of the voter signatures accompanying those ballots. These highly
23
unusual results should have caused the State of Nevada and Clark County to declare
24
that the machine had malfunctioned and to abandon any reliance on the Agilis
25
machine for signature verification. It did not.
26
36. The Agilis machine is designed to signature match with a tolerance
27
setting between 50 and 100. Prior to use during the Election, Election personnel
28
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 1 adjt1stcd the tolcr11ncc level of tl1e Agilis a1i,chinc clo\vn,vard, t1ltim,, te ly sett ling on
2 "10. \\'hen tl1ey lowered the tolera11ce level to 40, the)' fi1ile(1to do sufficient testing
3 i,nd calibration to valiclate the accuracy of the machine at that tolerance level so as
4 to avoid any false positives on matched signatures.
5 37. The Agilis mi1chine factory specifications reqt1ires that signatures be

6 scanned at a minimum of 200 dots per inch ("dpi") to meet the minimum standards
7 for the machine's signatt1re matching artificial intelligence technology. l\lost of the

8 voter signature exemplars in Clark County against ,vhich the ..-\gilis machine

9 compared the mail·in ballot signatures originated from signatt1res maintained b)' the

10 Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (''Dl\1V'). The Nevada Dl\fV does not have the

11 technological capacity to scan signatures at a minimum of 200 dpi and instead scans

12 signatures at a lower resolution. Therefore, the signature exemplars obtained from

13 the Nevada DMV are below the minimum resolution required by the Agilis machine

14 to properly function.
15 38. NRS 293.887 4(1), as enacted in Assembly Bill 4, Sec. 4, 32d Special

16 Session (Nev. 2020), requires "the clerk or an employee in the office of the county

17 clerk shall check the signature used for the mail ballot in accordance ,vith" detailed

18 procedures.2 Those procedures do not include relying on artificial intelligence

19 software to verify matching signatures. Moreover, neither the Election Ordinance of

20 Clark County, nor the Nevada State Constitution, make any provision for the

21 electronic verification of signatures. Rather, ht1man ve1·ification is required in every

22 instance.

23 39. In violation of Nevada law, the Clark County Election Department

24 allo,ved the Agilis machine to solely verify 30% of the signatt1res accompanying the

25 mail·in ballots without ever having human eyes inspect those signatt1res.

26
2 The use of the \\'Ord ''shall" in a statt1te imposes a mandatory dt1ty. (Kingdon1,vare Technologies,
27 Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1969, 195 L.Ed 2d 33-l (:l016). See Unitecl States e.\"rel. Siegel v. 1'hon1an. 156 lT.S.
353. 359-360, 15 S.Ct. 378, 39 L.Ed. 450 (1895) "\\'hen a statt1te distingt1ishes bet,veen 'may' and
28 ·shall,' it is generally clear that 'shall' imposes a mandatory dut)•.")
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 1 40. ~,Jtting c,f th,! Au,J;,. m,1,:hine v1,;$-J11,fJtJ.~f.1!,J
Evu,1 ,,ftur thu urr,,r t<1J,..,r,1n,:,,
2 ,l(>Wnw11rcl, 1(J'¼,,,rth,~ rn,,iJ·in
HtiJJ''-'Jf~<:U?d
ftH ,,llug,,cJ ,,bovo, thu AgiliH m11(;hin'-' .,,,JJ,Jt
3 Hi~nr, t.tl rcH. teMths1t th,.,Agi J,,,.m,,,;hin~ iHC11rn
A 7()'¾,rojucti,,n r,1tc cJcmc,nHtr11 i,l1tt..1~ly
4 unruli,,l1lu un<l th,,t no confi,J'-'ncc Hh<,ulcJht? mRinti1incd with rer4pec:ttu th~ ~(t¼ r1(

5 Hignlalurus th11t the AgiliH m11chine 11llcgedly vcrifi,!d,

6 41. With rcHpect to tho eHtimE1tcd 3()% of mail·in bF1ll,,t Hignaturf:~ verifi1_:d
7 by tho Agili8 machine, those estimated 130,(JOOvotcH Hhould be invalidated aff illegal
8 votes, since they were verified in violation of NRS 293.8874(1), as enacted in AB 4.
9 42. The signatures rejected by the Agilis machine were then paK.'3ed to
10 human election personnel to inspect and verify the signatureH.
11 43. Upon information and belief, among the mail·in ballots 8ubject to human

12 signature inspection, approximately 1% of those were ultimately rejected.

13 44. The evidence in this matter will show that Clark County election

14 personnel were under immense pressure to "push the votes through" and were

15 instructed to verify a signature match so long as at least one letter between the ballot

16 envelope signature and the maintained exemplar appeared to match. Indeed, often

17 the signature approved by the election officials bore little to no resemblance to the

18 signature on file Clark County. This method of signature verification is objectively

19 unreasonable.

20 45. The evidence in this matter will show that the expected rejection rate

21 during the course of signature comparisons is well in excess of 1%. Therefore, among

22 the human inspected signatures, far more than 3,188 should have been rejected and

23 not counted in the vote totals.

24 46. Therefore, incorporating the expected number of signature rejections

25 through human inspection, as well as invalidation of the ballots whose signatures

26 were unlawfully verified through the Agilis machine alone, the illegally counted votes

27 far exceed the difference in the vote counts between Vice· President Biden and

28 President Trump.
- 10 -
1 4 7. Clark Cot1nty's ttse of the .-\gilis machine also violated the equal
2 protection rights of the citizens of Nevada:
3 a. Clark County mail·in voters were treated different!)· than mail·in
4 voters in the rest of the state, as Clark County was the only county to utilize the
5 .~gilis machine.
6 b. In·person voters in Clark County were not treated in the same
7 manner as mail-in voters in that they were not subject to the same system of
8 signature verification.
9 c. Even among mail·in voters in Clark County, two classes were
10 created as between those whose signatures were verified by the Agilis machine versus
11 those who were rejected when, in fact, under AB 4 each and every voter signature in
12 the State of Nevada was required to be checked and verified by human eyes, with no

13 provision for electronic or AI verification.

14 48. The issues with the use of the Agilis machine in Clark County, as alleged

15 above, demonstrate that the election board or members thereof were guilty of

16 malfeasance under NRS 293.410(2)(a) by:

17 a. Violating Nevada law in using the Agilis machine, rather than

18 human beings, to verify signature matches for mail-in ballots.

19 b. Utilizing the Agilis machine in a manner inconsistent with its

20 factory specifications - i.e. altering the er1or tolerance level and utilizing signature

21 exemplars at lower than the minimum resolution required for the Agilis machine's

22 AI function.

23 c. Violating the equal protection rights afforded to the citizens of

24 Nevada by the Nevada and United States Constit\1tions.

25 49. The issues with the use of the Agilis machine in Clark County, as alleged

26 above, demonstrate that illegal or improper votes were cast and counted (NRS

27 293.410(2)(c)) in an amount that is equal to or greater than the ma1·gin bet,veen

28
- 11 -
1 P1·0Hiclo11tT1·\11111l
n11clVico· Prosi<lo11t Ui<lon, 01· in 011 ,1m<>t1ntBt1fficie11tto r11it-Je

2 1·oi1so11i1l>lo
dt>l1bt11s to tho ot1tct>1110
of tl10 election.
3 50. Tl10 isH\108witl1 tl1e ttse of the Agilis 1nuchi110in Clnrk County, ns nlloge(J
4 i1bovo, constitt1te a mnlft1nction of tho 1nnchine sufficient to raiso 1·e11:.;onr1ble
doubt ns

5 to the ot1tco1ne of tho olection (NRS 293.410(2)(0), in that even after lowering the

6 cnlib1·i1tion fo1·e1·1·ortolerance, the Agilis machine still 1·ejoctod 70% of mnil·in ballot

7 envelopes fo1·failu1·e of the signature mutch.

8 ELECTRONICVOTINGMACHINES
9 51. Contestu11ts repeat and reallege all fo1·egoing allegations and incorporate

10 the same by 1·eference as if fully set forth herein.

11 52. During the Election, in-person votes in Nevada were cast on electronic

12 voting machines.

13 53. The machines used in Nevada we1·e inhe1·ently un1·eliable and

14 susceptible to being electronically compromised by malicious parties, dt1e to a

15 shocking lack of physical security and cybe1·secu1·ity.

16 54. The evidence in this matter will show that du1·ing in·pe1·son voting in

17 Nevada, the voting machines regularly "froze," forcing voters to inte1·1·upt their voting
18 process to have the machines rebooted or tended to by election pe1·son11eland to have

19 their individual voter ca1·ds reactivated. Some machines had to be 1·emoved and

20 replaced enti1·ely.

21 55. The evidence in this matter will show that du1·ing in·pe1·son voting, the

22 printers of the voting machines failed in several different ways: the ther1nal p1·i11t

23 head would fail causing blank sheets where there should have been a record of the

24 vote cast; the scanner would fail to read tl1e QR codes in 01·der to ver·ify the macl1ine

25 had cast the votes correctly; and the gears within the p1·inter wottld fail. P1·inte1·s ofte11

26 1·an out of paper, which required 1·eplacing tl1e whole machine becattse the pape1· wi1s

27 locked inside the machine du1·ing the Electio11. If a p1·inte1·b1·oke down while }Jt·i11ti11g

28 a 1·eceipt, that 1·eceipt would not be p1·inted and that vote co1111tinfo1·111atio11
wot1ld not
- 12 -
 1 be captured for recording and audit purposes. Ripped and torn paper receiptA were
2 delivered to the election departments.
3 56. The evidence in this matter will show the voting machines used in the
4 State of Nevada also suffer from a lack of adequate password protection and no data
5 encryption. The voting data from each voting machine is stored on a removable USB
6 drive which, without adequate password protection or data encryption, can be altered
7 with minimal computer and/or hacking skills.
8 57. The evidence in this matter will show that during in-person early voting,
9 team leaders were required to remove USB drives from machines each night and log
10 the machine's vote totals (hand write) on a sheet of paper that was turned into the
11 election department. There were multiple days where the total vote counts provided
12 on the pre-printed log sheet in the morning did not match the vote counts provided to
13 the election department the night before. On some days, the vote totaled more than
14 the machine had logged; and on some days, the vote total was less. In other words,
15 votes appear to have been added to or deleted from these drives overnight during the
16 early voting period.
17 58. The issues with the use of the voting machine, as alleged above,
18 demonstrate that the election board or members thereof were guilty of malfeasance
19 under NRS 293.410(2)(a) by:

20 a. Failing to adequately update and/or maintain the voting machines

21 prior to the election.

22 b. Failing to ensure continuous and proper operation of the voting

23 machines.
24 C. Failure to protect the integrity of voting information through
25 adequate password and data encryption measures.

26 d. Failure to ensure the integrity of voting information such that vote

27 hand-tallies matched voting machine logs throughout the voting process.
28 e. Failure to count legal and proper votes.
- 13 -
1 59. The issues ,,·itl1 the u~ of the ,·oting m}1chi11e.a5 nlleg-ed abo,-e.
2 de111011stratetl1i1t illegal or improper ,·otcs \\·ere C<lBta11dcounted (~RS 293.-l 10(2)(c))

3 i11an amot1nt sufficient to raise renso11tlble d<.1t1btas to the outcome oft he election.
4 Tl1e e,·ide11ce ,vill show th:1t there were no less tl1an 1.000 illegal or improper \~otes
5 cast and com1ted through the use of the ,,.ot.ingmachine.
6 60. The iSBues with the voting machine and printers. as alleged above.
7 demonstrate that all legal and proper votes were not cast and counted (~lIB

8 293.410(2)(c) in an amount sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to the outcome of

9 the election. The evidence will show that there were no less than 1,000 legal and
10 proper votes that were not cast and counted through the use of the votu1g machine.
11 61. The issues with the use of the voting machine, as alleged abo,,e,
12 constitute a malfunction of the machine sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to the
13 outcome of the Election (NRS 293.410(2)(0).
14 OTHER TTJ.EGAL OR IMPROPER VOTES
15 62. Contestant.s repeat and reallege all foregoing allegat,ions and incorporate
16 the same b)· reference as if fully set forth herein.
17 63. The evidence in this matter will show that throughout the ballot countu1g
18 process commencing on November 3, 2020, Clark County election perso1111el\\rere
19 under constant pressure from the Clark County Registrar of \ 1oters to aut he11ticate.
20 process, and count ballots that prese11ted problems and irregularities.

21 64. Upon information and belief, there are sigi1ificant numbers of mail·u1
22 ballots received in Nevada from voters who a1·e also k110,vn to llllVe voted i11otl1er
23 states. The evidence will sl1ow that there ,vere no less tl1an 15,000 of tl1ese illegftl t111d
24 improper votes.
25 65. The evidence in tl1is matter \viii sho\v tl1at Nevad:1 ftliled to cure its voter
26 lists to reflect returned ballots during the 2020 p1·imary election. Tl1is failm--e1·esulted
27 in ballots bci.J1gdelivered to add1·esscs wl1e1·eno kno\v11vote1· lives.

28
- 14 -
 1

2 Senice letter carriers were ciiroct~d to nolate t.he l-SPS policy by dt.=>Li,erin_g
mail-in

3 ballots t.o addre~ses where the ad~~ee of tbe hallot: ~ knn~n ro ~ d~~d..
4 l-no~ n to have mo,~ed from that addres.., or bad n-0affiliation "i1.h that ad,(lre!-.~at all
5 67. Upon inform ..i.tion and belie( there were significa.n~ ournhe~ o(\"'Ot"e5>ca.~

6 by vot.ers who did not meet the residency requirement t.o vote in ~vad.a.. The e'ridenoe

7 will show that there were n-0less than 1.000 of the..~ ille~g.aland improper vores...
8 68. Upon information and belief. there have been mail-in ballots rei.ren-e-d
9 from deceased persons. The evidence will show that there were no less than -500 of
10 the__~illegal and improper votes.
11 69. On information and belief, statew·ide election departments continued ro
12 receive and process mail-in ballots that were submitted aft.er dMdlines.
13 70. Upon information and belief, mail-in ballots were oomplere.d and
14 submitt.ed at polling places by those other than voters. The evidence will show th:at
15 there were no less than 500 of these illegal and improper votes..
16 71_ These illegal or improper vot,es cast and counted are in :an amount
17 sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as t.o the ,outcome of the Election (29&.410(2)(c)(l))~
18 PROVISIONALB..-\LLOTS
19 72. Contestants repeat and reallege all foregoing allegations and inc.o.rporat,e
20 the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.
21 73. The procedure for accepting provisional ballots in the Election was rife
22 with significant problems and irregularities~

23 74- Workers arbitrarily impose~ and ~·st.ematically failed to clarify the

24 consequences of provisional voting. These failures both increased the likelihood of

25 ineligible vat.es being cast and wrongfully disenfranchised properly registered vot.ers.
26 Proper!~- regist.ered voters were oft.en not even notified that their ballots
27 were cast pro\7.Sionally or that they were required t,0 take further action to cure a
28 defect ~-ith their identification or registration.
- 15 -
 1

2 Vl>te 11t tl1ei1· reRpc1 etivo ,,,,llir1K1,l,1t:o,,r,ly t(, t,t, ittf,,r,nrrf tt,nt. n ,11,,if·in t,1,ll,,t J,,,,I
3 t1l1·et1clyIJeen rt~ecive(l on tll(:?irt,,,l1,1lfwl1et1, i11fnt:f., tt1~ v,,tor t,,,,I n,,t ~t1J,,,1iffptf n

4 mnil·in bnll(Jt.

5 77. 'l 110 uvido11ce in thiR rnntt.or will Al1(1W t,}1ntn<, leAAtJ111nr,(J(J,,r,,viA;,,nnJ
1

6 whi(!IJ rer1,IPretff.~1Pm
lJnllots were countetl in the (>fficirtlvc1te tc1lnlRwith,,ut t.he i~AtJfJA

7 proviEiionttl in the first pince ever hein~ rest,lvecl, therelJy renclering them iJJp~nf11r1,I

8 improper votes.

9 78. The eviclonce in this mntter will show th£1t mnny Nevn,JA v(,t.erA were

10 mnde to cost a provisional b£1llot on election doy and then not given the opp<1rtunit.y

11 to cure their luck of identification, as the Depnrtment of Motor Vehicles ("OMV'') cJitl

12 not have appointments available for those people to obtain their identjficnti<,nA JJef<ne

13 the statt1tory cure date of November 6, 2020. Voters that were made to cast pro11isic,naJ

14 ballots in the early voting period, however, were given the opporlttnit,y to hAve

15 specially set appointments at the DMV to cure their ballots. 'The resu)t is that

16 provisional voters who cast votes during the early voting period were preferred over

17 provisional voters who cast their votes on election day.

18 79. These illegal or improper votes cast and counted are in an amount

19 sufficient to raise reasonable dottbt as to the outcome of the Election (2fJ3.4l(J(2)(c)(l))

20 and were also a violation of ec1ual protection un(ler the Fourteenth Amendment of the

21 United States Constitution.

22 NEVADA'SFAILURETO ALLOWMEANINGFULOBSERVATION
23 80. Contestants repeat an<l reallege all foregoing allegations and incorporate

24 the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.

25 81. NRS 293B.353(1) affords members of the general pttblic the right to

26 observe the counting of the ballots.

27 82. Section 25 of AB 4 clarified that the public's right to obRerve ball<Jt

28 counting is ec1ui11lyapplicable to the processing and counting of mi1il·in ballots, which

- 16 -
 1 1)111yt,,t~i,1 J f) ,J11yt,t,,,f,,rctt.J1,j,J,,f~, ,,ftJJ11J;l,1t'.t.j,,,,,'''l'J)J1,~,1,11f.)1Jg l''''>''J.t,j1,r«,,,,,~l
1 I,~
2 J>t1t,tjc,"Ali 1, § ~(),
3

4 ,,t)ti<trv,1tj,,,l,,,,,,,,,,,.u,1jtj,1r;u, tJl.tt~111lt1r1,J ,,ut,Jµ~ witl,

gr1111t,,1,t1111i11&-(ful ft(~1,c1(tt VJ tl,~1
6 J)11t j I ·j fl t)1J I1()lti,
6 H4, CJ,11·k(~t>LJnly'H ,,,.,,,~1<f
(,t,~<irv11ti,,,1 ur,113ft,;J,,,J'-'>
c1fJ~urtJ trtjlJ:SfJSjfltll.l~Y 1•1l1f

7 ,ti,,,;,ll! ,k,,y 1>1Ji11t~,,flt)tiiJ

i11togrity itt; it ,titl nt>l ttll,,w thti f)Ut>Jicu, Htftt tJJ.ut!ti,,n,,f'fi.cistJij
8 l>11llotf)fOCCHa;i11g. Fc,rine:,t11n,co, ttt·riVIJbJ fit tlut (;J,,,·k(~t)J.JlllY f)jyj~;,,,1,,r
It m11jJ t,,1JJ,,t

9 ~ig11,t,Jt,y th« vc>Wr, Jt

Electi,,ns in 11ne11voltJpc,~o,1Jed1111d w11t; tl).(1tlJ:U!tjn,u1,f
:$.ttvi1fsjl

10 hy an Agilie:, m11chino, aJ:ido.iscriJJod,Jl><>vo,

ti111ct-i U1J<>nttll.ttg(~<t
1t11tl1.ttnt~Hlll>nt>f thJ:
11 signatu,·e, t<,another Cl,trk C,,unty f';"~iJity,kw,wn
tho b,1Jl()t was tra11H1101·tfJd st~

12 lJy elc,~tit,n ,,ffi1!i1•l~,

Gt·ey:;tono, where it was removed f1·omits 011vc~lc>po
13 86. Once tho enveloJJo was OJJoned, tho bal1tJt would then t>o~'Jf)Ot'JttecJ fr(>tn

14 the enveloJJO and inspecwd to detc1·1nine if any dofwiencioH would <>t)~truct it fr,1,11
15 being fed th1·ougl1 it tabulriti.c.)n machine, If any defwiencie~ exiswd, tho t)itllt,t w;J:;

16 hand dupJicatcd hy being placed in a green envelope for a ''ru11,1.er''t-0 titlw inu, tl Ht}1:tJl

17 rt)o1n kn.own as the "MB Vault" and matched witl1 fl bL:ink b;1ll<>tfro,n tJw voter';;
18 precinct.

19 80, The evidence in tJ1is matter will sl1ow tJ1at runner8 often wont into thn

20 MD Vault al,,nc, sometimcR even witl1 a w1·iting intilrumont, 11ndclo8ed the door, Tl1e
21 run11er w,,uJd t}1en le11votho MB Vault witl1 the vow1.,Hb,illt>t and a bl[ink lJallot and

22 w h<>all<Jgcdly d UJ)lic,1
t11ke them tc> d urJJi,~;1u,1·H tcd the vote1-'s ch<,i~8 011 tl1e cler111

23 IJ;1JJot,so it couJ,J l>efc~dth1·,>ugJ111

t11l>ulationm,1cl1ine,

24 87. 1'he p,·,,cedut·e deH<:1·il)ed11l1ovoPJ'<>videH

an OJJJ)OJ·tunityfor· a careless 01·

25 ,,fl'icial or w<>rke1·to mt1rk c}1c,icesfor·any unfilled electit>11sor que 8 ti 011:-;

u11:-;c1·upulr,uR

26 on the l>:1JJ,Jt,l)<>t<J11tially
1,ul>Ht,1ntinllyi1f'fecti11gdown l)allot races where tl1e,·e ai·e

27 <>fl(Jn Hignjfjc;jnt ,,,. cs1uHi11gtJ1e lJ:1Jl,,tHtc>l)e t}11·ow11out due to ,,ve 1·votes.

u11tle1·v,JteH,

28
.. 17 -
 1 88. The evidence in this matter will show that members of the public who
2 attempted to observe the processing and tabulation of mail ·in ballots, as is their right
3 under Nevada law, were routinely confined to small spaces or corners too far away
4 from the locations where the mail-in ballots were being processed to afford meaningful
5 observation.
6 89. The evidence in this matter will show that those locations where
7 observers were permitted often allowed only obstructed and distant views of the
8 locations where the mail-in ballots were being processed.
9 90. The evidence in this matter will show that at times during mail-in ballot
10 processing, public observers were simply ordered out of the processing areas with no
11 explanation.
12 91. The evidence in this matter will show that observers were provided with
13 no opportunity at all to observe the processes by which Election personnel addressed
14 issues with rejected mail-in ballots and determined whether those ballots would be
15 spoiled, or their issues cured.
16 92. Clark County's failure to provide the general public with meaningful
17 opportunities to observe the processing and tabulation of mail ·in ballots was a

18 violation of Nevada law and, therefore, a malfeasance of which the election board or

19 members thereof are guilty under NRS 293.410(2)(a).

20 93. Poll watchers were constantly denied the ability to meaningfully observe

21 operations at the in-person voting locations.

22 VOTINGDRIVES
23 94. Contestants repeat and reallege all foregoing allegations and incorporate

24 the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.

25 95. In conjunction with the Election, the Nevada Native Vote Project

26 (''NNvt>'') coordinated a voting drive campaign among the Native American

27 community in Nevada.
28
- 18 -
1 96. To incentivize voters within the Native American Community, the NNVP
2 offered gift cards, gas cards, raffle entries, and t ·shirts in exchange for voters coming
3 to the polli11gplace and casting their votes.
4 97. The provision of incentives in exchange for votes occurred during the
5 early voting period and on election day in communities including, but not limited to,
6 the Lovelock Paiute Tribe community; the Elko Indian Colony; the Moapa Paiute
7 community; the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony; the Duck Valley Indian Reservation; and
8 the Battle Mountain Band Indian Colony.
9 98. The NNVP voting drives among these comm unities, and the incentives
10 offered in exchange for voting, were heavily advertised on online social media,
11 depicting voting drive info1·mation; photos and video of voters receiving gift cards, gas
12 cards, t·shirts, and raffle tickets; and video of NNVP personnel promoting these
13 efforts.
14 99. At least one of the social media videos in which NNVP promoted the
15 voting drives and the incentives depicted NNVP personnel wearing a "Biden · Harris"
16 face covering and standing in front of a van bearing a "Biden· Harris" logo and openly
17 encouraged people to vote for Joseph Biden.
18 100. Offering something of value to a voter in exchange for his/her vote is a
19 violation of Federal and Nevada law. All such votes cast in exchange for the above
20 described incentives are, therefore, illegal and improper votes. The evidence will show
21 that there were no less than 500 of these illegal and improper votes.
22 101. These illegal or improper votes cast and counted are in an amount
23 sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to the outcome of the Election (293.410(2)(c)(I)).
24 102. The fact that the voting drives were officially promoted by NNVP
25 organizing personnel displaying "Biden·Har1·is'' promotional mate1·ial and logos
26 reflects that value was being offered to voters under these circumstances in an effort
27 to manipulate or alter the outcome of the Election (NRS 293.407(2)(e)).

28 III
- 19 -
 1 TOTALITY OF CIRmISTANCES
2 103. Contestants repeat and reallege all foregoing allegations and incorporate

3 the same b~.. reference as if full,· set forth herein.

-
4 104. The statutory violations and voting irregularities alleged above. when

5 considered in total, invalidate sigr1ificant numbers of ballots and thereby reduce the

6 vote totals of both candidates in large numbers. The evidence will show that the

7 reduction in votes for Defendant, however, is 40,000 or more than the reduction in

8 votes for the Contestant or, at the very least, in an amount sufficient to raise

9 reasonable doubt as to the outcome of the Election.

10 105. The Boards of County Commissioners completed the canvass of returns

11 on November 16, 2020. The Election results are due to be certified by the Nevada

12 Secretary of State on November 24, 2020.

13 \VHEREFORE, Contestants, reserving the right to amend this Statement of 1

14 Contest, pray that, by virtue of Defendant's failure to comply with the law:

15 1. President Trump be declared the victor of the Election in Nevada and

16 that Contestants l\tlcDonald, DeGraffenreid, Hindle, Law, Rice, and Meehan be

17 certified as the duly elected electors for the State of Nevada; or, in the alternative,

18 2. That Defendants' election to the office of elector be declared null and

19 void, that the Election in Nevada of November 3, 2020, be annulled and that no

20 candidate for elector for the office of President of the United States of America be

21 certified from the State of Nevada.

22 3. For any such additional relief as the Court deems proper in the

23 circumstances.

24 III

25 III

26 III

27 III

28 III
- 20 -
 5

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9 La~ \ 10~~~-\lc,·R<l~801 :20
'
(702) !10fl·4:1()"i
10 Em r-ti l: ~"~eir@~·ei1·lRv,;gi:Otfil~_m

11

12
13

14

15

16

17

18

19
20
21
22

23

24
25
26
27
28
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