Republic of the Philippines This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, admitted to probate in the Court

, admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of

from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila Manila on September 15, 1958.
SUPREME COURT dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition
filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
Manila
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
EN BANC
The facts of the case are as follows: Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
which it released from time to time according as the lower
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
court approved and allowed the various motions or
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
advances on account of their respective legacies.
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
oppositors-appellants, three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina administration, the executor submitted and filed its
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
vs.
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
appellants. his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
E. A. Bellis, et al. illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
marriages.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
shares.1äwphï1.ñët project of partition on the ground that they were deprived
of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
BENGZON, J.P., J.: compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a

resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and
other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art.
16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16
in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent
executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the 2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
Civil Code states said national law should govern.

3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby

affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be

included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants;
to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project
of partition; to submit his brief after paying his
proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the
printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt
the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to
deny the motion.