Lucas v.

Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226
January 31, 2000

Facts:

Complaintant Gloria Lucas charged respondent Judge Amelia Fabros of MTC of

Manila with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion. She alleged
that she was a defendant in an ejectment case pending before the sala of said judge.
Judge Fabros dismissed the ejectment case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear at the Preliminary Conference. However, she granted the plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Lucas averred that it Is elementary that
under Section 19 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure that a motion for
reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted
the motion for reconsideration.

Procedural History:

The office of the Court Administrator recommended that responded judge be fined
in the amount of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
reconsideration.

The Supreme Court found the recommendation without factual and legal basis. The
Court said that the motion prohibited by Section 15(c), later Sec. 19(c) of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment
rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. Here, the order of dismissal
issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
conference was obviously not a judgment on the merits of the case. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under
Sec. 19(c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed
no grave abuse of discretion, nor was she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving
due course to the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the complaint filed
against respondent was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Fabros erred in granting the motion for reconsideration

Held:
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,

"SECTION 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings,

motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of
trial;

xxx xxx xxx"

This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is
one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15
(c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this
Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court
after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent
judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for
the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under
Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros

is DISMISSED.
Francisca P. Pascual v. Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos, MCTC, Alcala, Pangasinan
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429
October 4, 2002

Facts:

Complainant Pascual alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry against a
certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for
being insufficient in some material allegations. She then filed a corrected complaint.

Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the
new allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed and no
answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant opposed the motion.

On 30 May 2000, defendant's motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.

Based on the foregoing, complainant accused respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty

anchored on the following grounds:

a. Defendant should have fled an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out.

Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing,
thus defeating the summary nature of the case;
b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact
because no hearing was conducted relative thereon;
c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant
in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out . . . that the
complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint in Civil Case No.
730 . . . . Complainant asserts that the same is to be expected because the
defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the
later one;
d. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.

Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the
construction of a one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest,
complainant filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000.
Acting thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9
May 2000 and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, complainant was able
to present evidence in support of her application while defendant chose not to present
controverting evidence and to just submit a memorandum.

On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000), complainant filed an
Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. On 7 June
2000 defendant filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent
Judge has not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.

Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the
building and even started with a new one, Hence, a contempt charge was filed by
herein complainant on 8 May 2000. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt
charge on the ground that it was filed in the same proceedings and the filing fee was
not paid. The court, however, motu propio docketed and other fees were paid by
defendant on 31 May 2000. On the same date, the court issued an Order furnishing
anew the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These,
complainant claims, cured the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion
to dismiss. However, respondent judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to
the prejudice of herein complainant.

Respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint and accused Atty. Alejandro
Pregrino, complainant’s counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a penchant for
filing administrative cases against him instead of appealing decisions before the
proper court.

Procedural History:

After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the
Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with,
because it was a common procedure in municipal courts. Accordingly, it
recommended that respondent "be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and warned
that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely."

The Supreme Court agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty,
taking note that this is respondent's second infraction.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Jovellanos failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure

Ruling:

Yes. In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant
provisions on ejectment. He has evidently remiss in resolving the forcible entry case,
pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
• Judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the
Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant
failed to file his answer after the lapse of 10 days from the service of the
summons
o Section 6 of the Rule allow the trial court to render judgment, even
motu propio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within
the reglementary period
• Under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound o render his
decision within 30days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers,
or the expiration of the period for filing them
o HOWEVER, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary
Judgement, filed in accordance with Section 6 on the Rule on Summary
Procedure
• Respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted the
defendant’s Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a
prohibited pleading
• In his Order dated May 30, 2000, he ruled that the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 740 was a mere rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil Case No. 730.
He cited Section 12 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis
for this ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious mistake showing gross
ignorance of the law. This is because the civil case assigned to him is for
forcible entry, which is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. In fact,
all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this Rule.
• It must likewise be underscored that respondent dismissed Civil Case No. 730
without prejudice, on the theory that the date of the dispossession had not been
initially indicated in the Complaint. Thus, it would reasonably be expected
that the allegations in that civil case would be reiterated in Civil Case No. 740.
Needless to state, what also contributed to the delay in the resolution of the
main case was the grant of the Motion to Strike Out based on misplaced
reasoning.
• Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious
degree of incompetence. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A member of the bench
must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing
in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the
correct dispensation of justice.
De Lima v. Gatdula

FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of
Manila, directed against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued
summons and ordered the petitioners to file an answer. He also set the case for
hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate
for Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
applied since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim
reliefs prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ
of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs
was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was
correct?

RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. Said

rule does not apply to proceedings in RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is
a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right
or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a
summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and
whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done
ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was
the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied."
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A
Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present
petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the
salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated.