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Greek perceptions of NATO during the

Cold War
a b
Dionysios Chourchoulis & Lykourgos Kourkouvelas
a
Department of History, Queen Mary University of London,
London, UK
b
Department of History, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2012, 497–514
Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War

Dionysios Chourchoulisa and Lykourgos Kourkouvelasb*
a
Department of History, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK; bDepartment of
History, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
Downloaded by [Nat and Kapodistran Univ of Athens ] at 05:26 26 November 2012
(Received 16 July 2012; final version received 17 October 2012)
Greek accession to NATO in February 1952 was hailed as a great accomplishment,

since NATO membership offered a shield against Soviet bloc aggression,
generated hopes for additional military and financial aid and tied Greece to the
west, thus providing for a new long-term orientation of the country. However,
soon problems emerged: the Greeks began to doubt NATO military credibility in
the Balkans, and were frustrated by the alliance’s neutrality in the infra-NATO
Greek–Turkish dispute. A major break in the Greek–NATO relationship involved
the Greek shock at the alliance’s inactivity during the Turkish invasions of Cyprus
in summer 1974. However, despite problems, NATO membership continued to be
a major manifestation of Greece’s Western identity, and a pivotal aspect of
contemporary Greek foreign policy.
Keywords: NATO; Greece; USA; Cold War
The two Cold War alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, have recently become the
subject of penetrating research. Especially regarding NATO, scholars have focused
not only on its military function and its threat perceptions, on the crucial transatlantic
relationship, but also on the alliance’s role as a major expression of a value-oriented
west. This article will examine Greek perceptions of NATO throughout the Cold War
era. It will be argued that membership of the Western alliance was one of the pillars
of post-war Greek policy, which aimed exactly at integration in the west. However,
the Greek–NATO relationship went through significant fluctuations, for many
reasons: the inadequacy of NATO military structure in the Southern Flank; the inflated
expectations of Athens (especially on the issue of economic aid from the alliance);
and also because of NATO’s reluctance to interfere in the Greek–Turkish dispute,
especially during the Turkish invasions into Cyprus in summer 1974, when Athens
protested by withdrawing from NATO military command. By the mid-1970s, Greek
threat perceptions needed to cover the eventuality of a conflict with a NATO ally, and
this significantly complicated the country’s relationship with the alliance. However, a
return to normalcy was effected gradually, as Greece was also acceding (and stabiliz-
ing its position) in the European Communities. Despite problems, NATO membership
remained one of the major foundations of Greek worldviews and foreign policy.
Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) was the first point of post-war friction and
antagonism between the west and the Soviet Union. It became the first battlefield in
a struggle of pro-Western and pro-Communist forces as early as December 1944,
*Corresponding author. Email: lykourgos.kourkouvelas@ouc.ac.cy
ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online

Ó 2012 Taylor & Francis
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498 D. Chourchoulis and L. Kourkouvelas
when British intervention ensured that the country would remain in the Western
world. Early in 1947, after the escalation of the Greek civil war, the USA
intervened actively, proclaimed the Truman Doctrine, sent US military advisors to
reorganize the Greek armed forces, and offered generous economic aid, thus
contributing decisively to the victory of the non-communist camp. Still, what
Greece (as well as Turkey) wanted was a permanent security guarantee (or at least
commitment) on behalf of the west – and particularly the USA – and a long-term
programme of military and economic aid; indeed, the Truman Doctrine did not
constitute an alliance, and the duration of US aid to Greece and Turkey remained
uncertain.
Integration in Western defence: the first phase, 1950–1954

At the time of the alliance’s creation in April 1949, the non-inclusion of the eastern
Mediterranean in the initial NATO area was a severe disappointment for Greece and
Turkey. Athens was eager to participate in the alliance not only to secure a
guarantee for its territorial integrity, but also to consolidate its position in the west,
which had been a major long-term aim of the Greek state. The outbreak of the
Korean War gave a decisive impetus to the notion of Greek and Turkish accession
to NATO. Both countries sent ground troops to Korea, and Turkey resumed its
pressure towards Washington and London for accession to NATO, or at least for
another formal security guarantee (Athanassopoulou 1999, 163–9). Greece adopted
a ‘wait-and-see’ policy and did not press actively for admission: it was obvious that
if Turkey was accepted into NATO, Greece would also have to join, for political
and geostrategic reasons.1 Eventually, as the US position evolved and finally opted
for the full membership of Greece and Turkey, the two states were associated with
NATO military planning in October 1950; in September 1951, they were invited to
join NATO, and became full members in February 1952 (Stefanidis 1999, 76, 82,
88). This was a major Greek political and diplomatic accomplishment, since never
before had Greece managed to secure a clear security guarantee and become a full
member of a great alliance – something it did not enjoy even during the two world
wars. The architect of this success was the leader of the Liberal Party, Sophocles
Venizelos, who handled this issue in 1950–1952 either as the prime minister or
foreign minister during the tenure of the centre coalition governments.
Moreover, Venizelos placed great emphasis on the coordination of Greek and
Turkish policy within the Western context. Greece strongly supported Turkey’s
claim to join NATO (rather than a Middle East defence organization, which was
Britain’s preference), because Athens did not wish to be left alone at the end of
NATO’s southern flank (Stefanidis 1999, 85). Greece was also greatly concerned to
cover its right flank in Thrace, on the Greek–Turkish frontier, and hoped that if
Turkey were integrated into a European, instead of a Middle East, command, the
Turks would put more emphasis on the European theatre. Last but not the least,
both Athens and Ankara feared that if Turkey were formally included in Middle
Eastern defence, Greek and Turkish membership of NATO might fall behind or
even be put off, because of the probable revival of some member-states’ fears that
they might be drawn into Middle Eastern affairs.2
Accession, however, did not automatically solve practical problems, behind
which lay allied perceptions of the region. The establishment of an appropriate
command set up to include Greek and Turkish forces proved a thorny issue. The
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 499
Greek military insisted that Greek and Turkish armed forces become part of
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) command, claiming that Greece,
Yugoslavia and Italy constituted SACEUR’s right flank.3 They also emphasized the
need for close cooperation not only between Athens and Belgrade, but also between
NATO and Yugoslavia, even to the extent of admitting Yugoslavia into NATO.4
Yet, a fundamental difference continued to exist between the British, who were
trying to place Greece, and particularly Turkey, in a Middle Eastern context and
include the Greek and Turkish forces to the proposed separate Mediterranean or
Middle East Command, and the Americans, who were thinking purely on terms of
the European theatre and the NATO area. Until September 1952, the reorganization
of the southern flank command set-up was finalized; the Greek and Turkish land
and air forces were fully integrated in the NATO area and the European command;
in late 1952, the Americans and the British also reached a compromise settlement
on the naval command set up in the Mediterranean (Chourchoulis 2009).
Despite the significant success that accession to NATO represented on the level
of grand strategy, operationally things continued to be very difficult. The Greek
armed forces were insufficient to repel a Bulgarian attack, while the country did not
have the economic capabilities to expand its defence effort, and was fully dependent
on foreign military aid, at least until the late 1960s. The strong right-wing govern-
ment under Alexandros Papagos, which took over after its landslide victory in the
November 1952 elections, tried from late 1952 to late 1954 to establish a deeper
defence relationship with the USA – mainly through the establishment of US bases
on Greek territory – and to counterbalance Bulgarian military superiority through a
tripartite Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav pact. Therefore, on 12 October 1953, a bilateral
US–Greek agreement on the installation of US bases was signed. Greece wanted to
make sure that the US forces and personnel would be committed in case of a Soviet
bloc attack against Greece, since the presence of US forces on Greek soil would act
as a trip-wire mechanism. This effort to complement NATO accession with a
practical bilateral US–Greek arrangement was very interesting; it seemed to show
that, despite the importance attached to the alliance politically and strategically, in
practical operational terms, Athens regarded the Americans as much more
dependable than the cumbersome NATO processes. Papagos also believed that the
construction of the bases would produce economic benefits, as the Americans would
have to pour additional funds into Greece to develop the relevant infrastructure
(Stefanidis 2002, 88–92, 214–5; Miller 2009, 42).
In an attempt to coordinate their defence plans, negotiations between Greece
and Turkey had been in progress since early 1952, while during the spring of 1952,
Greek–Yugoslav, and then tripartite, military talks were held. Yugoslavia’s indirect
association with NATO military planning in the Balkans was deemed necessary to
both the Greeks and the Turks, for the defence of their common frontier in Thrace.
The main reason was that in the 1950s, Greece and Turkey did not have the
potential to repel a Soviet bloc invasion in this area, which furthermore lacked
strategic depth and, thus, was even more vulnerable. Most importantly, NATO itself
could not do much either by direct intervention or by supplying its new members
with such war material and financial aid to enable them to adequately strengthen
their defence capabilities. The tripartite Balkan Pacts of February 1953 and August
1954 redressed the regional balance of power, and to some extent offset the lack of
a NATO forward defence in north-eastern Greece and north-western Turkey; how-
ever, such relatively favourable situation would not last for long (Iatrides 1968).
Hopes, demands and complaints, 1955–1967

Late 1954 and 1955 constituted a watershed as regards Greece’s security position,
and a turning point in Greek perceptions of NATO and the USA. First of all, late in
1954, Yugoslavia downgraded the military aspects of the Balkan alliance and in
mid-1955, the Soviet ‘peace offensive’ towards Belgrade eventually succeeded. This
meant that Tito was reluctant to provoke the Soviets further, and the 1954 Balkan
alliance was effectively neutralized. Without the shield of the Balkan alliance,
Greece’s defence problem was exacerbated (Chourchoulis 2011, 201–2, and 225–6).
Even more significant was the outbreak of the Cyprus question which had serious
repercussions for Greece. During 1954, the Papagos Government decided to appeal
to the United Nations (UN) over Cyprus, asking for the application of the principle
of self-determination and Enosis (union of the island with Greece) but did not take
into account international realities and infra-NATO balance of power: Greece
decided to confront Britain, and to ignore the Turkish reactions and US objections.
The outcome was disastrous, as in December 1954, Greece was defeated in the UN,
and all NATO members (except Iceland) failed to support the Greek case. The other
severe blow came in September 1955. Following the violent disturbances in Istan-
bul and Izmir – against the Greek minority, and the Greek officers serving in NATO
headquarters, respectively – Greek–Turkish relations deteriorated dramatically. In
protest, Greece temporarily withdrew its officers from the Izmir Headquarters. As
the Cyprus crisis escalated, the rupture soon slid into an open dispute between the
Greeks, the Turks and the British (Hatzivassiliou 1997, 14–18, 37–38).
The events of September 1955 marked the end of ‘the golden era’ of US–Greek
relations. The seeds of anti-Americanism in Greece were sown exactly during this
period. On 18 September, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sent
identical letters to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Papagos and Adnan
Menderes, urging restraint, and thus putting in the same position the culprit and the
victim. A few days later, Greece was once more defeated at the UN, as the Western
powers, including the USA, voted against the inscription of the Cyprus issue at the
agenda of the General Assembly. These caused the outcry of the Greek opposition,
the press and the public. Vicious attacks were launched against the faltering Greek
Government, NATO, the USA, and the west in general (Couloumbis 1966, 95–97).
Several other episodes that took place in the following years fuelled the anti-NATO
and anti-American sentiments of the Greek public (Stefanidis 2007).
Moreover, the Greek–Turkish rupture of the mid-1950s severely complicated the
Greek security position: old distrust and enmity was revived and military coopera-
tion between the Greeks and the Turks was suspended, thus dramatically weakening
NATO defences in the region. The threat of a Greek–Turkish conflict was looming
on the horizon each time the situation in Cyprus reached a crisis point. Indeed, in
1956, and again in the following year, Turkey threatened Greece with war (Iatrides
1968, 172, 2008a).
The new Greek Government, by October 1955 under Constantinos Karamanlis
(Papagos died on 4 October 1955), sought to bolster the country’s position.
Karamanlis and the foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff, the two architects of Greek
security policy after 1955–1956, considered that the non-negotiable ultimate aim of
Greek foreign policy should be full integration in the west and its major
organizations, such as NATO: ‘the history and geography of Greece have
determined its place in the side of the western democracies’. This aim should be
pursued despite the tensions of the Cyprus problem and the persistent anti-Ameri-
canism of the Greek public. Indeed, in 1956–1957, Greece supported the notion that
NATO should evolve to undertake the economic coordination of its members, thus
becoming a vehicle of Western supranationalism. Addressing the December 1957
NATO summit in Paris, Karamanlis insisted that, apart from its crucial military
roles, the alliance also was a value-oriented union of the Western nations, and thus
had to develop non-military cooperation, including aid to its less developed
members. However, the alliance rejected these bold ideas: NATO refused to enter
the field of economic cooperation, which was the subject of other Western
organizations (Hatzivassiliou 2006, 62–8).
Apart from NATO’s importance in Greek strategies of integration in the west,
Athens continued to place great emphasis on the alliance’s military preparedness.

On the military level, NATO was still unable to raise sufficient conventional
ground forces in order to enhance the credibility of military deterrence against a
Soviet invasion in the southern flank. By that time, it was becoming apparent that
the flow of US hardware and funds was not sufficient to enable Greece to
modernize its obsolete equipment and at the same time expand its forces to reach
the NATO-approved force levels; the country simply lacked the necessary
resources to sustain effectively its defence establishment. By the late 1950s, the
Greek defence effort was supported, in approximately equal measure, by national
resources and by external aid (Chourchoulis 2011, 340–1). In any case, the Greek
declaration in 1957–1958 that it intended to build up forces additional to the
approved NATO force goals, in an effort to implement a forward defence and to
retain a relative balance with the Turkish forces, proved chimerical.5 Moreover,
after 1962, the US defence support aid to Greece (though not to Turkey) was ter-
minated. American and NATO officials considered that Greece was economically
successful and that it could sustain its defence effort by the provision of long-
term loans, rather than economic aid.6 Although, the US aid in hardware
continued, this could not enable Greece to attain NATO-approved force goals and
qualitative standards. In subsequent years, the Americans and NATO contemplated
other measures to channel economic aid to Greece.7 Ultimately, no substitute for
the US aid was found.
Still, in 1955–1959 Cyprus continued to create additional strain on
Greek–NATO relations. The situation became critical during 1958 because extensive
violence flared throughout Cyprus, while Greece once more decided to withdraw its
officers from the NATO headquarters in Izmir. Karamanlis warned that the crisis
could even cause a drift of Greece from the alliance; this was not a threat, but a
fear of the Greek leadership. Trying to help Athens, the Secretary General,
Paul-Henri Spaak, tried to mediate, but his initiative collapsed in late October 1958.
But in early 1959, when everyone feared the worst (like a possible Greek drift out
of NATO with unforeseeable repercussions), Greece and Turkey managed to reach
a compromise solution, providing for Cypriot independence; then, Britain also had
to follow suit (Hatzivassiliou 1997, 153–66; Holland 1998, 263–89). The Cyprus
settlement restored Greek–NATO bonds. However, the strains in Greek–NATO and
US–Greek relations had several consequences. For instance, in 1958–1959, facing
pressure from the left but also the neutralist trends of a large part of the public, the
Greek Government felt unable to accept the US offer for the installation of
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (Couloumbis 1966, 111; Stefanidis, 2002,
137–88; Kourkouvelas, 2011).
After 1959, despite the fresh Greek–Turkish rapprochement and the revival of
the US–Greek and the UK–Greek relations, Greece continued to face serious
security challenges. The Soviet Union exerted increasing pressure on Greece, which
was perceived by Athens as an attempt to divide the country from NATO. These
developments, in conjunction with the still inadequate firepower, armor, mobility,
air defence and early-warning systems of Greek armed forces meant that the threat
facing the Balkan frontier grew during the 1960s. This is why Athens had been
suspicious over the prospects of détente. Karamanlis argued that ‘it is not possible
to have détente in Washington, in Paris, in Rome, in Ankara, but aggressive tension
towards Athens’.8
NATO’s regional military inferiority troubled the Greeks. In late 1960, the Greek
political and military leadership stressed the need for an adjustment of NATO strat-
egy on the Balkan frontier. They argued that the NATO strategic concept relied dis-
proportionately on nuclear forces; the conventional forces were given an extremely
passive role for the maintenance of allied territorial integrity. The Greeks believed
that a more balanced (conventional-nuclear) counteroffensive capability of CINC-
SOUTH would add significantly to NATO’s deterrence in the region. Indeed, the
Greeks greatly feared the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact –
particularly Bulgaria – in the Balkans.9 Throughout the early and mid-1960s, the
Greek political and military leadership remained anxious to increase the army’s
armor, firepower and mobility to counterbalance Bulgarian superiority, which could
prove the decisive factor in a sudden, short local conflict. Fearing that NATO might
abandon Greece in such an event, Greek policy-makers (including the Prime
Ministers Karamanlis and Georgios Papandreou) sought to convince NATO and the
US military authorities that the implementation of a forward defence strategy in
Greek western Thrace and eastern Macedonia was necessary; otherwise Bulgaria
might attack these regions and create a fait accompli before NATO or the USA
could assume any action. For that reason, the Greeks tried to achieve an additional
US or NATO aid to strengthen the Greek army, or to secure an immediate
intervention of allied forces in the area.10
In 1963–1965, Greece was ruled by the Centre Union Government under
George Papandreou, which in 1965–1966 was replaced by a break-away centre
group, the ‘apostates’. The new leaders shared Karamanlis’ threat perceptions. They
were alarmed at the ‘menace from the north’, and equally feared the possibility of a
local Bulgarian attack against northern Greece. Papandreou repeatedly declared his
devotion to NATO: in December 1963 he stated that ‘History and Geography have
placed Greece in the Free World’, and in November 1964, he told NATO’s
Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, that ‘both history and geography place us in
NATO, at the front of the defense of the free world’ (Hatzivassiliou 2006, 127).
However, Greece continued to face serious difficulties in improving its defence
capabilities and NATO assistance was not forthcoming, thus frustrating Athens. The
Americans decided on their strategy of ‘Flexible Response’ in the early 1960s, and
the new strategic concept was formally adopted by NATO in December 1967
(Duffield 1995, 151; Wenger 2006, 176–83). However, in effect, it remained
inapplicable in the southern flank of the alliance, exactly because both Greece and
Turkey lacked the economic means to meet the high technological standards that
the new strategy required. Once more, thus, NATO value lay for Greece in its
deterrent effect, rather than in building up an effective military defence, capable of
repelling a possible Soviet bloc invasion.
Meanwhile, the new Cyprus crisis, after 1963–1964, exerted new strains on the
Greek–NATO and US–Greek relations, and caused a significant overstretch of
Greek defence capabilities. The significant deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations
undermined bilateral coordination of planning along the common frontier in Thrace.
As the crisis brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, it forced Athens to
move modest forces to western Thrace to cover the region against possible Turkish
attack, thus weakening further the Greek defence position in the north. Furthermore,
the US and NATO attitude led to the revival of anti-American feelings of the Greek
public, while the Greek policy-makers understood that despite President Lyndon
Johnson’s blunt intervention in June 1964 to avert a Turkish invasion, they could
not count on NATO support in case of Greek–Turkish war. Indeed, NATO’s
decision that Article five of the Washington Treaty was not applicable in a war
between members, greatly disturbed Athens. Center Union politicians with
undisputable conservative credentials, such as Defence Minister Petros Garoufalias
and Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos, as well as senior diplomats and officers,
also expressed their dissatisfaction with NATO and the USA. In 1964–1965, there
was a general feeling among the Greek policy-makers and the public that NATO
was ‘pro-Turkish’ (Rizas 2000, 108–9; Hatzivassiliou, 2006, 146–7 and 156–7). In
1966, the alliance strongly encouraged a Greek–Turkish attempt to reach a Cyprus
settlement, but this was not accomplished in the midst of a deepening Greek
internal crisis.11
The combined pressures of Cyprus and of the fierce internal Greek political con-
flict of the mid-1960s caused the radicalization of centre and centre-left opinion, and
raised new questions. After late 1963, and particularly from mid-1965 and until the
Colonel’s coup in April 1967, Andreas Papandreou, son of Georgios, became an
increasingly influential political figure in the centre-left. Despite their initially
excellent relations with Andreas (he had served as a University Professor in the
USA), American officials soon began to allege that he could turn against Greece’s
alliance with the west. This was part of the US mismanagement of the Greek crisis
of that time: in 1965–1967 Andreas Papandreou did not claim that Greece should
leave NATO; he evidently wished a more balanced relationship, where NATO would
reciprocate Greece’s contribution to the alliance by supporting Greek interests else-
where – namely in Cyprus, where ‘justice’ lay with the Greek side. Of course, Greek
interests could be promoted only at the expense of Turkey, another NATO member,
and this embarrassed the Americans. However, the USA arguably exacerbated the
problem by not realizing the impetus of Andreas’ ascent (Keeley 2010, 30, 50).
The junta years: countdown to disaster, 1967–1974

On 21 April 1967, a clique of middle-rank military officers launched a successful
coup in Athens. During the following months, the USA, along with other NATO
countries, adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy to grasp the intentions of the regime.
Although, the Johnson administration did not intervene or even condemn the coup,
it suspended the delivery of military hardware from the mutual aid program (MAP)
appropriations until the end of its tenure in late 1968. Despite this, as the
conspirators had easily and immediately prevailed without any resistance by the
King and the loyalist military, Washington accepted the fait accompli and decided
to carry on normal relations with the junta (Maragkou 2009; Miller 2009, 147–9,
151–4; Keeley 2010, 97, 104, 108, 118).
Less than a couple of months after the imposition of the Greek dictatorship,
regional tension was significantly aggravated in the eastern Mediterranean due to
the escalation of the Arab–Israeli crisis which led to the outbreak of the six-day
war. When the six-day war broke out, Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos called the US
Ambassador, Phillips Talbot, and offered Greek assistance to the USA in whichever
way the latter needed (Maragkou 2009). It was during this conflict that the USSR
transferred a powerful naval force in the Mediterranean, while in subsequent years,
Soviet political penetration in the Middle East and naval presence in the eastern
Mediterranean increased significantly (Vego 2000, 164). Therefore, the greater the
escalation of superpower antagonism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the
higher importance was attributed to Greece’s position and cooperation, regardless of
its dictatorial regime. The dictators understood that the rising tension in the eastern
Mediterranean would increase Greece’s geostrategic value, and grew confident that
the USA and the west, in general, would take no further action against them
(Maragkou 2009; Keeley 2010, 130; Pedaliu 2011). Of course, the regional volatil-
ity and the increase of Soviet military presence in the eastern Mediterranean posed
new challenges to Greek security: by late 1960s, Greek military planners feared that
Soviet naval and air forces could outflank Greek defence and strike in Crete and
southern Greece.12
Meanwhile, in November 1967, another serious Greek–Turkish crisis over
Cyprus broke out which briefly brought the two states on the brink of war. This
was averted due to mediation of Cyrus Vance, President Johnson’s special envoy,
and the efforts of NATO’s Secretary General Manlio Brosio. The fragile stability of
the southern flank was restored, at least temporarily, when the crisis was defused by
considerable Greek concessions to Turkey.13 Another source of allied and Greek
apprehension for the position of the west in the region was the exacerbation of fears
for an infra-NATO rift in the Mediterranean due to French policy in
1968–1970.14 Greece strongly opposed any reduction of allied naval presence in the
Mediterranean, and rejected Spanish proposals for a possible mutual withdrawal of
US and Soviet naval forces. As the previous governments, the regime counted on
the Sixth Fleet for a timely US intervention in case of Soviet bloc aggression.15
Until 1970, Athens continued to press (along with Ankara) in NATO forums
for additional Western military and economic aid, and reacted strongly when
Denmark, Norway and Holland tried to thwart the adoption of such a policy from
the alliance. Greek officials stated that they considered such objections as hostile
actions.16 Greece also threatened that if the arms embargo was not lifted, it would
leave NATO, as it had walked out of the Council of Europe in 1969 (Pedaliu
2011). Indeed, the junta, and particularly many of its most ‘revolutionary’
members or supporters who showed ‘Nasserite’ or ‘Qaddafist’ tendencies, did not
share the enthusiasm of their civilian predecessors for full Greek integration with
the west; they, therefore, considered NATO just as a possible supplier of military
hardware.
The US arms embargo was officially lifted in September 1970. In 1970–1972
US–Greek cooperation increased, as the Nixon administration was eager to fully
cooperate with the junta, and the latter purchased advanced weapons, such F-4E
Phantoms (Pedaliu 2011). Furthermore, in March 1970, Bonn decided to sell four
modern Type 209/1100 submarines to Greece.17 The Greek Navy was the first user
of that sophisticated German weapon, and this purchase initiated the long
Greek–German partnership in the field of arms trade.
Encouraged by increased US military aid, the full support of the new NATO
Secretary General Joseph Luns, and what they perceived to be ‘Greece’s growing
stature within the Alliance’, Greek officials completely ignored foreign criticism.
The junta’s greatest asset was the Americans’ agonizing effort to conclude with the
Colonels a home-porting facility agreement for the Sixth Fleet in Attica. This was
signed only in January 1973 (Pedaliu 2011). By that time, however, the regime
started to face increasing difficulties, such as inflationary pressures, deadlock in
Cyprus, political stagnation, the 1973 Navy mutiny, and student agitation. On 25
November 1973, radical junior officers under the leadership of hard-liner Brigadier
Dimitrios Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos (Rizas 2012, 52–53). It was the
Ioannides junta which, in July 1974, tried to overthrow the president of Cyprus,
Archbishop Makarios, thus giving the pretext for the Turkish invasion of the island.
Unable to meet the challenge, the dictators called the politicians to power. On 23
July, Karamanlis returned from self-imposed exile in Paris to head a National Unity
government. However, the pressures on the Greek–NATO relationship were now
immense.
Greek perceptions of NATO, 1974–1981: between the Cold War necessities and
regional pressures
The fall of the Colonels’ dictatorship posed new problems and challenges to the
National Unity and New Democracy governments that proved long-standing.
The most immediate problem was the deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations after
the two Turkish invasions of Cyprus (in July and in August 1974), and the
emergence of the dispute over the Aegean Sea Bed. The Greek–Turkish conflict
dramatically complicated Greek security dilemmas since Turkey was a NATO ally
and an essential Western footing in the Cold War. Greece’s threat perceptions
altered significantly, since the old defence dogma of resisting a ‘menace from the
north’ now needed readjustment to take into account a ‘threat from the east’ that
was coming from within the Western alliance (Svolopoulos 2000, 324).
The west’s inactivity in the summer of 1974 during the Turkish invasions of
Cyprus made things even more complicated, and dramatically strengthened anti-
Westernism and anti-Americanism in the country. However, on top of that the
inactivity of the statesmen of the NATO member states produced, for the first time, a
shock on Greek political leaders who had been prominent in defending Greece’s
Western identity: on 14 August, as the Turks were launching their second invasion,
Karamanlis and his Ministers appealed to their Western/NATO counterparts, and were
dismayed to receive the answer that most of them were on vacation and could not be
disturbed. The Greek leaders of August 1975 – the people who were effecting
the transition to democracy, which the west had been demanding for years, and who
were facing severe dangers of a return of the enraged military – felt that their allies
were letting them down at the time of the country’s greatest need. Thus, on 15 August
1974, in protest for US and Western indifference, the Karamanlis’ government
announced the withdrawal of the Greek armed forces from NATO command. This
Greek decision was based on certain perceptions of NATO that involved defencive/
strategic, diplomatic, political and even moral considerations.
Strategically, the Greeks realized that NATO could not guarantee the security of
the country if an attack was coming from within the alliance. NATO authorities
throughout this period kept reiterating that the alliance was formed in order to defend
the ‘free world’ against the Soviet bloc, and thus it could not take action against any
of its members. The NATO Secretary General, Joseph Luns, in a conversation with
Karamanlis in May 1975 noted that ‘NATO was a military alliance and not a Court
that could judge which side was right or wrong … The alliance is not, of course,
indifferent, though it is incapable of acting’.18 NATO’s incapability or unwillingness
to act led Greece to withdraw from the military command of the alliance in order to
resume control of its national forces and deal with the emergency (Bitsios 1983).
Diplomatically, Greece’s withdrawal from NATO military command aimed at forcing
the alliance to put some pressure on Turkey for a solution to the Cyprus issue, while
in terms of internal politics, Karamanlis was ‘forced’ to take such an action in order
to ease public anti-Western reactions.19
In this context, it is interesting to note that during the second half of 1974,
when memories of the Turkish invasions of Cyprus were still fresh, Greek authori-
ties perceived NATO’s stance towards Greece and Cyprus not only in strategic/
defencive and political but in moral terms as well. Hence, in a conversation with
the American Ambassador in Athens, Henry Tasca, Karamanlis expressed his
disillusionment by informing him that the Greek public, as well as himself, felt
‘betrayed’ by American and NATO inaction.20 Furthermore, Panagiotis Lamprias, a
close associate of Karamanlis, and Undersecretary of the prime minister’s Office,
lamented the thesis that NATO could guarantee its member states only from
‘external enemies’, as an ‘absurd and unethical interpretation that contradicts the
professed aims and principles of the alliance’.21 Therefore, Greek disappointment
and even disenchantment over NATO was evident and unprecedented, even in
people who in the previous years had placed themselves on the line of fire,
defending Greece’s Western policies.
On the other hand, the decision to withdraw from NATO’s military command
did not entail the search for a different international orientation within the Cold
War context. Karamanlis as well as a large part of Greek political leadership had
been staunch supporters of the west and its values, and since the end of the Second
World War had played an essential role in the ‘battle’ against communism. Thus, in
many instances the Greek prime minister privately and publicly confirmed Greece’s
adherence to the ideals of the Western world, despite the fact that ‘the west had
abandoned it’.22 In addition, except for ideological reasons and the paramount aim
of being integrated in the west, there were pressing practical necessities that
prohibited a reorientation of Greece’s international position: possible dissociation
from the west would prove catastrophic since it would cut the country off from the
European Communities (the major goal and ideal of Karamanlis’ foreign policy),
while it would also lead to isolation with grave consequences on the level of
defence as well.23 Non-alignment in the minds of the leaders of the Karamanlis
government also amounted to isolation (Karamanlis 1992–1997, Vol. 9, 202). The
Greek leaders knew that if the country followed such a road, its military capabilities
would be severely reduced at the expense of Turkey.24
Therefore, ideology as well as diplomatic and strategic pressures gradually
modified and also perplexed Greece’s perceptions of the Atlantic alliance: on the
one hand, the Greek Government had to adhere to its decision to withdraw from
NATO’s military command; on the other hand, Greece belonged to the west (and
wanted to continue to belong to it), and this was more than ever necessary, since
the country’s security was being threatened both by ‘the north’ and ‘the east’.25
This complex and, to a certain extent, ambiguous perception of NATO influenced
Greece’s policy towards the alliance until 1981. This ambiguity towards NATO was
expressed both by the Prime Minister Karamanlis and by leading diplomats. In his
discussions and contacts with Western leaders, Karamanlis, pointing to Western
conduct in Cyprus in 1974, constantly emphasized the fact that his government was
forced to withdraw from NATO military command. At the same time, he indirectly
reminded his interlocutors that he was resisting the rampant anti-Westernism which
now prevailed in the country. Moreover, the Greek Government’s adherence to the
alliance was evident, according to Karamanlis, by the fact that Greece remained
within NATO’s political branch because it supported its ideals and its ideological
and political cause against the Warsaw Pact.26 Still, Karamanlis’ position was
somehow aided by the fact that he was, at the end of the day, following the French
precedent: France had also withdrew from the military command in 1966, but had
remained a member of NATO.
Still, Athens soon realized that withdrawal had failed to put effective pressure on
the US and NATO statesmen (Iatrides 2008b). Already by late 1974, the NATO mem-
bers were getting used to the idea of Greece’s withdrawal; Vyron Theodoropoulos,
the permanent representative to NATO, suggested that under those circumstances,
Greece could only hope to put ‘new’ pressure on the alliance only through the
projection of conditions for its return to NATO command.27 As early as November
1974, the Greek leaders evidently started thinking about returning to the alliance’s
military structure; in other words, withdrawal was not planned as a permanent
measure.28 A proposal for a ‘special relationship’ with NATO was in the mind of
Greek officials by the beginning of 1975, but at that stage, Greek tactics were focused
on delaying any negotiations on the status of Greek–NATO relations (Karamanlis
1992–1997). Officially, the Greek proposal for a ‘special relationship’ with NATO
was put forward in the beginning of 1977 (Svolopoulos 2000, 324).29
The turning point in Greek–NATO relations was the termination, in September
1978, of the American embargo to Turkey which had been imposed by the US
Congress in February 1975. This meant that the withdrawal policy had reached a
dead end.30 Hence, the Greek proposal for a ‘special relationship’ gradually turned
into negotiations for a ‘return’ of the Greek armed forces under NATO command.
The first step was the Davos-Haig agreement that led, after Turkish objections, to
the Rogers Proposal of 1980 and the final agreement of 18 October 1980 that called
for Greece’s full membership in NATO (Svolopoulos 2004). Evidently, the New
Democracy governments wanted to effect a return to full NATO membership before
the next elections, when the rise of a new political force would be recorded.
PASOK and NATO, 1981–1989: rhetoric and pragmatism

The foreign policy of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s (PASOK) governments
cannot be understood without taking into account its heavy interconnection with the
party’s ideological premises. PASOK came to power in 1981, largely, due to its
radical ‘leftist’ rhetoric that distinguished it not only from domestic political forces
but from most of the social-democratic parties of Europe as well (Schaffer 1988). Its
ideology was formed exclusively by its leader, Andreas Papandreou (Couloumbis
1992), who had spent his formative intellectual years in distinguished American
Universities (Harvard, Minnesota and Berkeley). Papandreou’s political and social
ideology was vastly influenced by neo-Marxist31 intellectual circles that played an
important role in American academia in the 1950s and 1960s. What Papandreou took
up from neo-Marxism was the division of the world into a powerful and exploitative
centre (or metropolis) and a weak and exploited periphery. According to this ‘depen-
dence’ theory, the world is divided between rich-powerful countries that control the
means of production, and the poor countries of the periphery, which ‘possess but do
not control the raw materials needed by the industrial centres’ (Stavrou 1988, 14).
The division between exploitative centres and exploited periphery undermined, to a
large extent, the Marxist interpretation of class alienation. In Papandreou’s view, the
working class in developed countries cannot identify themselves with their
counterparts in the developing nations (Papandreou 1972, 59–60). In this context,
the analogies with Greece were obvious: the country was a part of the periphery,
exploited by the American metropolis. What was central in Papandreou’s views was
that the dependence from the metropolis penetrated all aspects of life in the exploited
periphery, especially in Greece. This narrative was instrumental in allowing
Papandreou to appeal to large parts of the Greek public (Miller 2009, 136–56).
Therefore, the most important concept in Papandreou’s thought was national
independence; only through Greece’s independence from American exploitation
could the country attain the goals of socialism. In other words, it was not socialism
that would lead to Greece’s independence but rather independence from the USA
(and, consequently, NATO) that would lead to socialism. Hence, Papandreou rejected
social-democracy and euro-communism because their analysis lacked the quintes-
sence of social and political injustice, which was the exploitative nature of the
relationship between a metropolitan centre and its periphery (Mitsotakis 2006, 117).
Throughout 1974–1981, when PASOK was in opposition, its rhetoric enhanced
and ‘politicized’ those views: in order to be independent, Greece should cut its
bonds with the west by not participating into its two basic multilateral organizations,
EEC and NATO.32 In terms of the Cold War context, PASOK perceived NATO as a
tool of the US policy of dominating the globe, and thus the USA and NATO could
not be distinguished. In other words, PASOK expressed the undercurrents of dissatis-
faction with NATO, which were evident in Greek society since the 1950s, but had
not found political expression beyond the Communist Left. Now, a new force was
rising, and could steer things either towards Greece’s disengagement from NATO, or
towards the integration of such tendencies into mainstream political thinking, by
making a ‘pragmatic turn’ once in office.
When PASOK assumed power in 1981, it had to confront the realities of power
politics, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. Indeed, by 1981, a new
international environment was ascending, characterized by the revival of the Cold
War tensions. In terms of regional challenges, Andreas Papandreou’s nationalist
discourse pointed to the pressing threat of Turkey from the east. In this context, the
differences between ideology and political action were made evident. During the
lifetime of the first PASOK Government (1981–1985), words and deeds moved into
completely different directions: contrary to its pre-electoral rhetoric, PASOK never
doubted Greece’s position in the Western camp, and kept the country within the
EEC and NATO (Iatrides 1992, 1993). To be sure, the Greek Government attempted
some modifications in foreign policy, with minimal results: attempts to improve
relations with the Communist world and especially the Soviet Union and, most
importantly, an ‘opening’ to the Third World. Those alterations did not have much
success because the international system was moving towards different directions:
the revival of the Cold War in the first half of the 1980s left little room for
manoeuvre, while the Third World appeared to lack much of the appeal that it had
enjoyed during the previous decades (McCaskill 1988; Westad 2007).
However, it is interesting to note that PASOK’s rhetoric did not lose any of its
radical features in those first years of its governance. In attempting to combine
ideology with political realities and prove itself reliable to its internal constituency,
the Greek Government used a new tactic by projecting its objections within the Wes-
tern world (Pranger 1988; Rozakis 2000). Thus, to point to a few examples, in the
beginning of 1982, Greece objected to NATO’s decision to install US Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles (Cruise and Pershing) in Europe. Athens also refused to con-
demn the destruction of the South Korean jumbo-jet by the Soviet air force in Sep-
tember 1983. This was the ‘policy of the asterisk’, referring to the Greek tactic of
recording its disagreement for major NATO decisions. Moreover, Papandreou visited
Poland in 1984. Athens also promoted the old Romanian idea for the denuclearization
of the Balkans, and Papandreou participated in an international initiative for disarma-
ment, along with such statesmen as Sweden’s neutralist Olof Palme.
Things were more complicated regarding Greek security and especially the
Turkish threat. The threat ‘from the east’ led Papandreou to realize (as did Karamanlis)
that the Western alliance was the only means through which Turkey could be deterred,
although this could only be done indirectly. Therefore, Papandreou tried to use NATO
in order to strengthen his diplomatic position vis-à-vis Turkey (Tsoumis 1988). In the
NATO conference of December 1981, Papandreou demanded that the alliance
officially recognizes the need to guarantee the borders of its member states from every
threat, either from within or from without the NATO area. When Turkey objected to
the Greek proposal, Greece blocked the common communiqué. Until 1989, PASOK
adhered to this position (Mitsotakis 2006).
Another point of contention was the military use of the island of Lemnos. The
Greek Government demanded that Lemnos be included in NATO’s military plans
and attempted to cancel the alliance’s decision to abstain from any interference that
would determine the militarized or demilitarized character of the island (Turkey
claimed that Lemnos should be demilitarized). NATO’s adherence to its position led
Greece to decide not to participate in the alliance’s military manoeuvres in the
Aegean and to forbid the use of its airspace and territorial waters for those
purposes. The Greek Government, though, did not raise the prospect of withdrawal
from NATO, but rather, in the first years of its governance, claimed that the Greek
participation in NATO’s military command was ‘passive’ (Veremis 2000, 346). In
1983, the Papandreou Government also signed a new agreement with the
Americans, providing for the continued presence of the US bases (Mitsotakis 2006).
These meant that, even with serious public hiccups, PASOK tended to represent
continuity, rather than a break in post-war Greek foreign policy (Couloumbis 1993).
PASOK’s rhetoric about NATO can only be understood through its general
ideological framework. NATO, as one of the most important Western organizations,
was viewed as a part of the weaponry of the USA, which was seen by PASOK as
the prime, and often as the only cause for all international problems (Stavrou 1988,
18–20).33 However, beyond rhetoric, things proved very different. International as
well as regional necessities led the PASOK Governments to avoid questioning the
country’s attachment to the west. The employment of the tactic of ‘objections within
the western world’ evidently was directed towards the internal constituency and in
an indirect way finally aided the effort to retain the country in the west. However,
the results of this tactic were minimal in terms of PASOK’s bid for ‘national
independence’ while in many cases caused unnecessary contentions with Greece’s

Western allies. Actually, after 1985, Greece’s economic problems, the 1987 Greek–
Turkish war crisis in the Aegean, the relaxation of tensions in east–west relations
and the political experience of its first period of governance led PASOK to adopt a
friendlier stance towards the west not only in terms of political action but of
rhetoric as well (Rozakis 2000, 391).
Conclusion
Greece’s perceptions of NATO during the Cold War were shaped by the interplay of
international necessities and the country’s national interests. In terms of the wider
picture of the Cold War context, the importance of NATO for the country was
self-evident: the alliance was the best security guarantee against the formidable
military power of the Warsaw Pact, threateningly represented in the Balkans by the
highly mechanized Bulgarian army. It also was a source of potential economic and/or
military aid, and a forum for diplomatic activity. Mostly, however, it was one of the
most important Western institutions through which Greece could materialize its para-
mount aim to become integrated in the west. This picture of the alliance – involving
the grand strategy aiming at integration in the west – was never doubted despite the
fact that NATO’s credibility on guaranteeing the security of the country in practical
military terms was, in many instances, questioned by Greek officials. However, even
on the level of defence against the Soviet bloc, NATO provided for deterrence, and
this was something irreplaceable: Greece could never hope to achieve this deterrence
through the mobilization of its national resources alone. Athens fully and constantly
accepted the notion of the interdependence of the Western countries in the face of a
Soviet challenge which was military, political, economic and psychological.
On the other hand, the Cyprus issue from the mid-1950s onwards, perplexed the
strategic necessities posed by the Cold War. The fact that the Cyprus issue was, to a
large extent, perceived in moral terms that involved the principle of self-determination
(a core value that had been projected by the west since the world wars) complicated
things even further. The July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the resulting deep
disappointment of the Greek leaders with Western responses was a turning point.
Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s military command for strategic, diplomatic and
internal reasons intensified dramatically the Karamanlis government’s dilemmas. At
the end, the Cold War necessities, but mostly the overriding prerequisite to integrate
in the west prevailed, and Greece returned to the military command of NATO in
1980. Despite aggressive rhetoric, during the PASOK era of 1981–1989 Greek
national interest, as well as worldviews, confirmed that membership of the Western
alliance remained a pillar of the country’s foreign policy.
Notes
1. Diplomatiko kai Istoriko Archeio Ypourgeiou Exorerikon [Diplomatic and Historical
Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry] (hereafter: DIAYE), Ioannis Politis Archive, File
228/57, Xanthopoulos-Palamas to Ioannis Politis, 29 September 1950 and Rafail to
Greek delegation in New York, 11 October 1950.
2. DIAYE, 1951 File 118/5, Ankara to Greek Foreign Ministry, 28 September 1951;
DIAYE, 1951 File 118/6, Second Political Department to First and Second Political
Department, 11 October 1951.
3. The National Archives (hereafter: TNA), WO216/795, Rose to Lt. Col. Harrington, 24
October 1951.
4. NATO Archives (hereafter: NATO), S.G.97th Meeting, 30 October 1951; NATO/M.

C.38, Report on Command Arrangements for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 17
November 1951.
5. NATO/C-M(58141), Part II, Report on the 1958 Annual Review – Greece, 6 December
1958; NATO/C-M(59)94, Part II, Report on the 1959 Annual Review – Greece, 3
December 1958; See also Stefanidis (2002, 267).
6. Memorandum of Conversation on Outstanding Problems Affecting Greece at NATO
Twenty-Ninth Ministerial Meeting, 3 May 1962, in FRUS (1994, 639–44).
7. NATO/PO/62/298, Implementation of the Resolution on the Defense Problems of
Greece, 18 May 1962.
8. Karamanlis memorandum to Christian Herter, 4 May 1960, in Karamanlis (1992–1997,
Vol. 4, 298).
9. NATO/MCM-196-60, General Frontistis’ Memorandum on the Defense of the Balkans
in accordance with the Forward Strategy Principles, 27 December 1960.

10. NATO/CVR(63)74, NAC Ministerial Records, 16 December 1963; Record of
conversation with Roswell Gilpatric, Paul Nitze and General Dekker, 19 April 1961,
in Karamanlis (1992–1997, Vol. 5, 45); and Karamanlis’ meetings with SACEUR
General Lyman Lemnitzer and with Chairman of the JCS, General Maxwell Taylor,
ibid., 5: 617–20.
11. NATO/PO/65/593, Greek–Turkish Relations. Secretary General’s Watching Brief,
December 1965; also, Rizas (2000, 198–212).
12. DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1968 File 1/2, Foreign Ministry to Greek Embassies
No. N2324-45, General Staff of National Defence’s Study on the Strategic Situation in
the Mediterranean due to Increased Presence of Soviet Fleet, Athens, 13 February 1968.
13. NATO/PO/67/873, Greek–Turkish Relations. Secretary General’s Watching Brief, 8
December 1967; for a personal account of the Greek–Turkish crisis based on documentary
evidence, see also Hart (1990).
14. DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1969 File 2/9, Panagiotis Pipinelis to Georgios
Papadopoulos, No. 3696/ΣN/K, 27 June 1968.
15. DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1969 File 2/9, Pipinelis to Embassies in Paris,
London, Washington, Rome and NATO, No. 807/ΣN/K, 18 February 1970; also Greek
Foreign Ministry to Greek Embassies, No. 1457/ΣN/K, 4 March 1969.
16. DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1970 File 1/1, Greek Foreign Ministry to Embassies in
Ankara, Bohn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Ottawa, Washington, Paris,
Rome, the Hague, No. N3322-74, 20 April 1970, ‘Reinforcement of Greek Armed
Forces’; DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1970 File 1/3, London Embassy to Greek
Foreign Ministry, 717/ΣN/K, 12 February 1970.
17. DIAYE, London Embassy Series, 1970 File 1/1: Greek Foreign Ministry to Bonn
Embassy No. N380-82, Grant of military hardware to Greece, 4 July 1970.
18. Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation, Athens, Karamanlis Archive (hereafter: KA),
File 50B, Memorandum of conversation between Karamanlis and NATO Secretary
General Mr. Luns, 28 May 1975.
19. KA, File 35B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Re-entry of Greece in the military command
of the North Atlantic Treaty’, 13 August 1982; TNA/FCO 9/2005, McLaren to Lever,
‘Greece and NATO’, 14 October 1974.
20. KA, File 2B, Memorandum, 16 August 1974.
21. Panagiotis Lamprias, ‘Chronicle, 1974–77’, in Karamanlis (1992–1997, Vol. 8, 89).
Emphasis by the author.
22. KA, File 20B, Memorandum, Diplomatic Office of the Prime Minister, 19 September
1974. The memorandum is about a conversation between Karamanlis and the west
German Ambassador in Athens. See also Karamanlis’ statement in Parliament ‘Greece
geographically, politically and ideologically belongs to the west’ in Karamanlis
(1992–1997, Vol. 8, 258).
23. Telegram from the Department of State (Ingersoll) to the Mission to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, ‘Greece and NATO’, 30 August 1974, in FRUS (2007, 90–93);
Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Rumsfeld) to the Departments of
State and Defense, ‘Greece and NATO’, 16 September 1974, in FRUS (2007, 96–97).
See also Svolopoulos (2000, 324); Rozakis (1978, 40–41).
24. This view was expressed candidly by Karamanlis in a speech before the Greek Parlia-
ment: ‘the worst policy … is the one that is proposed by the Left: Greece should face
external dangers through non-aligned policy. This policy is extremely dangerous, because
in an era when violence prevails in the world, those countries that do not have any mutual
support from anyone, become much easier victims of external attack, especially in
‘sensitive’ geographical areas such as ours’. In Karamanlis (1992–1997, Vol. 9, 202).
25. Despite détente, the Greek Governments of the period still considered that there was
every likelihood that this situation could change and thus the ‘threat from the north’
could not be overlooked. See Karamanlis’ speech before the North Atlantic Council in
May 1978 in Karamanlis (1992–1997, Vol. 10, 239).
26. KA, File, 50B, Memorandum on the discussions between Mr. Prime Minister with
Chancellor Schmidt, Bonn, 16 May 1975.
27. KA, File, 50B, Vyron Theodoropoulos (NATO) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18
November 1974.
28. TNA/FCO 9/2227, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, ‘Military
Consequences of Greek Withdrawal from the NATO Integrated Military Structure’, 21
April 1975.
29. TNA/PREM 16/1783, Cartledge (FCO), ‘Greece and NATO’, 3 March 1978. The Greek
proposal was based on four basic points: (1) in periods of international peace Greek
armed forces would be under national control, because of the Turkish threat, (2) in
periods of war Greece would fully participate in NATO and its armed forces would be
under NATO command, (3) establishment of a regional Allied Headquarters in Larissa
and (4) return of the pre-1974 status regarding the operational control of the Aegean.
See, KA, File 7B, Minutes of conversation between Clifford (Special delegate of
President Carter) with Karamanlis, 18 February 1977.
30. KA, File 35B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Re-entry of Greece in the military command
of the North Atlantic Treaty’, 13 August 1982; also Bitsios (1983).
31. The word ‘neo-Marxism’ is being used here due to a lack of a better term. The term has
been so heavily used that its meaning is very broad and confusing. However, in the
1950s and 1960s neo-Marxism was used to describe political and social ideas that were
based on Marxist thought but simultaneously, in many ways, drifted apart from Marxism.
32. See among others, Letter to Prime Minister Karamanlis, ‘The USA and NATO are
responsible for national calamity’, October 1975, and declaration by Papandreou,
‘Imperative necessity the disengagement from NATO’, 8 March 1975, in Papandreou
(1976, 432–438 and 450, 451), respectively.
33. Papandreou in his address to the first PASOK congress stated: ‘A condition for the
survival of capital is incessant pursuit of the greatest profit, the subjugation of every
other goal on the altar of the investment, unbridled expansionism. This key characteristic
does not correspond to the Soviet reality. For exactly this reason, it is not possible for
one to term the Soviet Union an imperialist power’ (cited in Stavrou 1988, 19).
Notes on contributors
Dionysios Chourchoulis currently writes the biography of former Greek Prime Minister
Themistocles Sofoulis. He also participates in an EU-funded research programme on Greece
during the early Cold War period, 1945–1961. His academic interests include political,
diplomatic and military history during the inter-war, Second World War and Cold War
periods particularly in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. He has
published various articles in academic journals including: ‘High hopes, bold aims, limited
results: Britain and the establishment of the NATO mediterranean command, 1951–53’,
Diplomacy & Statecraft (2009) and ‘A nominal defence? NATO threat perception and
responses in the Balkan area, 1951–1967’, Cold War History (2012).
Lykourgos Kourkouvelas is a lecturer at the Open University of Cyprus. His research

interests include the history of international relations in the Cold War and Greece’s foreign
policy in the twentieth century. He has published a book under the title Greece and the
Issue of Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1963 (Athens, 2011).
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This article was downloaded by: [Nat and Kapodistran Univ of Athens ]

On: 26 November 2012, At: 05:26

Southeast European and Black Sea

Greek perceptions of NATO during the

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.741848

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Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War

(Received 16 July 2012; ﬁnal version received 17 October 2012)

Greek accession to NATO in February 1952 was hailed as a great accomplishment,

*Corresponding author. Email: lykourgos.kourkouvelas@ouc.ac.cy

ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online

Integration in Western defence: the ﬁrst phase, 1950–1954

Hopes, demands and complaints, 1955–1967

Athens continued to place great emphasis on the alliance’s military preparedness.

The junta years: countdown to disaster, 1967–1974

PASOK and NATO, 1981–1989: rhetoric and pragmatism

independence’ while in many cases caused unnecessary contentions with Greece’s

4. NATO Archives (hereafter: NATO), S.G.97th Meeting, 30 October 1951; NATO/M.

in accordance with the Forward Strategy Principles, 27 December 1960.

Lykourgos Kourkouvelas is a lecturer at the Open University of Cyprus. His research

Greek socialist experiment: Papandreou’s Greece, 1981–1989, ed. T. Kariotis, 85–95.

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