Collision and Grounding

16th INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES CONGRESS

20-25 AUGUST 2006
SOUTHAMPTON, UK
VOLUME 2
COMMITTEE V.1
COLLISION AND GROUNDING
COMMITTEE MANDATE
Concern for structural arrangements on ships and floating structures with regard to their
integrity and adequacy in the events of collision and grounding, with the view towards
risk assessment and management. Consideration shall be given to the frequency of
occurrence, the probabilistic and physical nature of such accidents, and consequences on
watertight integrity, structural integrity and environment.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Chairman: G. Wang
C. Ji
P. Kujala
S.-Gab Lee
A. Marino
J. Sirkar
K. Suzuki
P. Terndrup Pedersen
A. W. Vredeveldt
V. Yuriy
KEYWORDS
Collision, grounding, risk assessment, limit state design, accident scenarios, incident
probability, acceptance criteria, internal mechanics, external mechanics.
1
ISSC Committee V.1: Collision and Grounding 3
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 5
2. PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGY OF COLLISION AND

GROUNDING DESIGN STANDARDS ..................................................................... 5
2.1 Accidental limit state design ............................................................................ 6
2.2 Existing design standards................................................................................. 7
2.3 Current trends in design standard development related to accident limits ...... 8
2.4 Recent national and international projects....................................................... 8
2.5 Recommendations .......................................................................................... 10
3. APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY .............................. 11

3.1 Risk assessment methodology........................................................................ 11
3.2 Application to collision and grounding problems.......................................... 12
3.3 Application to waterway designs ................................................................... 13
3.4 Safety measures and risk control options....................................................... 15
4. LIKELIHOOD OF INCIDENTS, PROBABILISTIC ENERGY DISTRIBUTION 16

4.1 Available approaches ..................................................................................... 16
4.2 Statistics of incidents...................................................................................... 16
4.3 Predictive calculations and energy reference values ..................................... 18
5. MECHANICS OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING ............................................. 20

5.1 General ........................................................................................................... 20
5.2 Internal mechanisms....................................................................................... 20
5.3 Rupture criteria............................................................................................... 22
5.4 External mechanics ........................................................................................ 24
5.5 Influences of fluid in tanks............................................................................. 26
5.6 Coupled internal and external mechanics ...................................................... 26
6. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING..................................... 30

6.1 Oil outflow ..................................................................................................... 31
6.2 Damage stability............................................................................................. 31
6.3 Ship evacuation .............................................................................................. 32
6.4 Residual strength ............................................................................................ 33
6.5 Post-accidental loads...................................................................................... 34
6.6 Other consequences........................................................................................ 34
7. ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.............................................. 36

4 ISSC Committee V.1: Collision and Grounding
7.1 Principles........................................................................................................ 36
7.2 Comparative risk assessment ......................................................................... 36
7.3 Absolute risk assessment................................................................................ 37
8. DESIGNS AGAINST COLLISION AND GROUNDING ....................................... 39

8.1 Buffer bow...................................................................................................... 40
8.2 Innovative double hull designs and steel sandwich panels............................ 40
8.3 Double hulls ................................................................................................... 42
8.4 Composite and sandwich panels .................................................................... 43
8.5 Aluminum panels ........................................................................................... 43
8.6 Economic considerations ............................................................................... 43
9. OFFSHORE STRUCTURE COLLISION ................................................................. 44

9.1 Existing criteria in offshore design codes ...................................................... 44
9.2 FPSO collision ............................................................................................... 45
9.3 FPSO collision scenarios ............................................................................... 46
9.4 Design events for FPSO collision .................................................................. 47
9.5 Ship - Bridge collision ................................................................................... 47
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................... 49
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................... 50
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................... 50
1. INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth time since 1990 that the ISSC has established a special committee to
address the issue of ships’ collisions and groundings. The current 2006 Committee V.1 on
Collision and Grounding is sequential to the 2003 Committee V.3 on Collision and
Grounding, 1997 Committee V.4 on Structural Design against Collision and Grounding,
and 1994 Committee V.6 on Structural Design for Pollution Control.
This report intends to be both a handbook, which covers past and current research
achievements, and a compass, directing us towards further research and development.
Research and development in 1990s were characterized by:

• Several national and international large model testing projects and pilot simulation
studies using nonlinear analysis tools,
• Theoretical development of the structural crashworthiness concept and
methodology, and
• Development of environmentally friendly tank arrangements and structural
designs.
As of the late 1990s, the foci have been:

• The integration of key research achievements into risk-based methodology,
• Improved application of advanced simulation tools (FEM),
• Concepts to develop relevant rules and regulations, and
• Continued development of innovative crashworthy structures.
These latest developments are the main topic of the current committee report.
This report also provides an overview of the latest research, aiming at key risk assessment
components for collisions and groundings. In addition to the traditional focus on oil
tankers, this report also addresses collisions that occur with offshore structures, high speed
crafts, and innovative double hull designs. Finally, the report looks at the crushing behavior
of composite and aluminum panels.
2. PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGY OF COLLISION AND

GROUNDING DESIGN STANDARDS
There are no generally accepted collision and grounding design standards. While principles
may be based on design objectives (i.e.: oil outflow standards or survivability standards),
none are universally accepted.
Essentially, the principles of collision and grounding design standards would be composed
of the following elements:
• How and why accidents occur: navigation, accident scenarios, probability of
occurrence of certain types of accidents.
• What happens (structurally) when a collision, grounding, stranding, or allision
occurs: structural mechanics in collisions and groundings.
• What are the consequences of structural damage: property damages,
environmental damages, and loss of life.
• How can each of the above be addressed: accident prevention, minimization of
structural damage, mitigation of damage consequence, response to damage and
loss of life.
The risks of collisions and groundings accompany the shipping industry. Traditionally,
these risks are addressed in damage stability and compartment requirements. These rules
and regulations are mostly prescriptive in nature, and often address individual events
separately. Over the past decades, the structural engineering design community has
increasingly applied limit state and risk assessment methodology.
2.1 Accidental limit state design
In ship designs, four accidental limit states are often considered: serviceability, ultimate,
fatigue, and accidental limit states. The limit states are conditions that will cause a
particular structural member or a system to experience performance failure (Paik and
Thayamballi 2003, ISO 2005b). The limit state designs are considered improvements over
the traditional allowable stress designs. This is because the limit state designs explicitly
consider various conditions under which a structure may fail to function, and account for the
uncertainties associated with determining the safety margins. One of the most lucid
explanations of the advantages of limited state methods over allowable stress methods was
published by the Institute for Research in Construction, National Research Council of
Canada (NRC 1982).
The accidental limit state represents excessive structural damage due to accidents that affect
the safety of a human being, the integrity of structures and the environment.
The accident limit state designs may be based on safety (including security for some
situations) and environmental objectives. There could be many combinations of these
objectives, such as loss of life prevention, injury or loss prevention, property damage
prevention and/or mitigation, environmental pollution prevention and/or mitigation.
Structural design criteria have been based on meeting these defined objectives. There may
be many different methodologies for defining accident limit states, depending on the nature
of the range of accident types, which create different loading scenarios. Accident types can
range from explosive scenarios like fires, explosions, or blasts, to relatively lower loading
rates such as low-speed groundings and collisions.
2.2 Existing design standards
Traditionally, ship collisions and groundings have been regarded as most relevant to
damage stability or cargo spill from damaged hulls. Recently, more attention has been
given to a vessel’s structural resistance to an accident. Similarly, there is more focus on the
impact that structural designs have on the extent of resulting damage and the consequential
loss of stability, oil outflow, and residual strength.
As early as the 1960s, Japan established a regulation for safely transporting nuclear waste.
This regulation clearly specified that the cargo area of carried nuclear waste could not to be
breached in a collision with a T-2 tanker; and energy absorption in crashed hull structures
could be calculated using Minorsky’s formula.
The Germanischer Lloyd (GL) has a class notation COLL that ranks the collision resistance
of ships (GL 2004). To date, GL has assigned the COLL notation to about 60 ships. The
collision resistance is measured by comparing a vessel’s strengthened side to another
vessel’s non-strengthened single hull. Analyses of a struck ship’s energy absorption are
based on two different striking bows (with and without a bulb), four draught differences of
both striking and struck vessels, and assumed probability of these draft differences.
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) has a class notation RES for SafeHull vessels that
demonstrate adequate residual hull girder strength after a collision or grounding accident.
Dozens of tankers have been built with this RES notation. The ABS “Guide for assessing
hull-girder residual strength” (ABS 1995) provides guidelines and assumptions for
facilitating an assessment of structural redundancy and hull-girder residual strength. This
notation requires a ship to maintain a minimum hull girder residual strength after sustaining
structural damages in the prescribed most un-favorable condition. This minimum strength
will help to prevent or substantially reduce the risk of a major oil spill, ship loss due to a
post-accident collapse, or disintegration of the hull during a tow or rescue operation.
The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has developed a series of

Unified Requirements for bulk carriers that directly require adequate structural strength in
flooded conditions. Structures of various levels (hull girders, double bottoms, and
corrugated bulkheads) are required to prove their capability in flooded conditions. Though
events that lead to flooding of holds are not defined, some of these IACS Unified
Requirements are intended to design against accidents, including collision or grounding
prevention as possible accident scenarios. See also Committee IV.1.
There is one set of regulations, ADNR (2003), that are required for anyone navigating on
the Rhine River. Side structures must absorb minimum collision energy of 22 MJ in gas
tankers’ side structures, when the scantlings are deviated from those prescribed in the rules.
2.3 Current trends in design standard development related to accident limits
With limited exceptions (GL and ABS), structural designs do not consider collisions and
groundings.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is developing “Goal Based Standards”

(GBS) for new ship construction. Traditionally, IMO and various maritime administrations
have not developed structural standards. Instead, they have relied on classification societies
to develop such standards. However, through GBS, IMO is attempting to define certain
“high level” goals that must be met. While this effort is in its early stages, the current
discussions at IMO do not include structural performance of ship structures in collisions and
groundings. See also Committees IV.1, IV.2.
The IMO is developing a procedural concept for approving alternative tank arrangement
(IMO 2003b). Submitted by Germany, this IMO document has a basic philosophy of
comparing the critical deformation energy from the case of a side collision with a
strengthened design to that of a double hull design, complying with the damage stability
calculations. IMO (2002) explicitly requires minimum structural crashworthiness for
transporting nuclear fuel and nuclear waste on international waters.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is developing standards for ships
and marine technology, and has drafted general requirements for a limit state assessment
(ISO 2005b). Currently, there are two standards under development – one for general
requirements, and one for ultimate strength. While the ISO is not currently developing an
accidental limit state, it is reasonable to expect that the ISO will develop one at a later time.
The recent IACS Common Scantling Rules projects involve re-vamping structural design
codes for tankers and bulk carriers. The development clearly shows the tendency of moving
towards limit state design, even though collisions and groundings are not yet considered in
structural designs. Certain IACS requirements indirectly take into account strength of bulk
carriers with flooded compartment.
2.4 Recent national and international projects
Tankers must have double hulls. However, even a struck double hull tanker can sometimes
spill oil in some situations. The Japanese national project in the 1990s (see previous ISSC
reports) suggested that striking buffer bows would be advantageous in reducing damages to
struck vessels. The effectiveness of buffer bow design was investigated in the Shipbuilding
Research Association of Japan’s RR76 panel, and Kitamura (2000) showed the
effectiveness quantitatively using FEM analysis. In 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Land
Infrastructure and Transport launched a national project, the Buffer Bow Project. This
multi-year national project includes large-scale model tests (Endo 2004), numerical
simulations (Yamada et al, 2005), and trial structural designs.
Discussions held at IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee, within various technical and
research panels of SNAME, and at the Ship Structure Committee, have drawn attention to
the need to explore survivability of modern cruise liners in flooded conditions. Historical
casualties have shown that a passenger ship may survive a flooding from a stability
perspective, but fail structurally. Tagg and Akbar (2004) and Iversen (2005) reported
studies on the ultimate sagging capacity of a flooded passenger ship with various assumed
grounding and collision damages. Increased still-water loads and wave loads of up to sea-
state 4 were calculated. The Smith method was used in calculating the residual ultimate
sagging capacity, which was then compared with the total hull girder bending moment.
These studies indicate that most modern passenger ships should be stable, and structurally
capable of surviving the damage that is assumed by the typical range of scenarios.
The EU-funded research project HARDER was launched in March 2000 and concluded in
May 2003. The HARDER project developed a concept of probabilistic damage stability for
all types of ships covered by SOLAS. This project (Rusås and Skjong 2004) has updated
damage statistics used in probabilistic damage stability assessments. It has addressed the
total risk associated with collision and grounding of passenger ships. Some valuable data
became available on collision energy distribution functions for various areas of navigation.
The concept has been extensively validated, and different proposals for the Required
Subdivision Index R have been worked out to ensure equivalency with the current
regulations. These proposals were submitted to IMO-SLF for consideration. The draft
revision of SOLAS chapter II-1, parts A, B and B1, is, to a large extent, based on the
extensive work carried out by the HARDER project (HARDER 2003).
The EU-funded CRASHCOASTER project (Vredeveldt 2001) has established a

relationship between the crashworthiness of a ship’s side structure and survivability, with
respect to damage stability. The developed method can be used within the current SOLAS
regulations. There is a new outlined approach on how to incorporate crashworthiness into
damage stability assessment methods in a more rigorous fashion.
The EU-funded project “Advanced Composite Steel Sandwich Structures” was initiated in
2000 and continued until the summer of 2003. The project aimed to further improve the
sandwich panel properties by implementing local filling, developing and testing reliable
design formulations, and designing tools as well as promoting applications of metallic
sandwich panels into new areas of the transportation industry (Kujala and Roland 2002).
The project included laboratory experiments and numerical analyses.
A joint industry project called “Decision Support of System for Ships in Degraded
Condition” was launched and is being funded by the EU under Framework Programme 6
(Alsos and Amdahl 2005). One of its objectives is to establish tools for consequence
assessment of intentional grounding. The final product of this project will be prototype
installations of a Decision Support System and a Man Machine Interface onboard one
passenger vessel and one cargo vessel. The purpose of the installations will be to provide
guidance to the ship’s master and other decision makers on how to operate the ship once
critical damage (such as collision or grounding) has occurred.
SAFEDOR is a EU-funded project responding to the need for more innovative solutions for
better, cleaner, and safer transportation (www.safedor.org, IMC 2005). This entails
development of a holistic approach that links risk prevention / reduction to ship
performance and cost, treating safety as a lifecycle issue and design objective (Bainbridge
et al 2004). The project also implies a focus on risk-based operations and the need for risk
based regulations within an integrated risk-based design framework, routinely utilizing first
principles tools. SAFEDOR includes several R&D tasks to develop methods and tools to
assess accidental and catastrophic scenarios, and to integrate them into the design
environment.
In China, a research project supported by the National High Technology Research and
Development Program was initiated in 2002, and finished in 2005. It focused on
researching a series of Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Units (FPSO). One of
the project’s sub-projects was researching the crashworthiness of a FPSO side structure. In
addition, the Y-shaped side structure was introduced, and its crashworthiness analyzed (Hu
and Gu 2005).
In the U.S., the Ship Structure Committee (www.shipstructure.org) recently sponsored a

series of studies on ship collisions and groundings, including Brown (2002), Brown et al
(2004), Sajdak and Brown (2005), and Tikka (2001). These studies developed analytical
models for predicting structural damage in collisions and groundings. The U.S. Marine
Board of the National Academy of Sciences convened a Committee for Evaluating Double
Hull Tanker Design Alternatives, and published a report (Marine Board 2001) that
documents the methodology to analyze structural damage in collisions and groundings, and
the consequences of these incidents.
In Europe, a new Network of Excellence on Marine Structures (MARSTRUCT) was

launched in 2004. The network, including collaborators from 17 countries, will work for
five years to improve comfort, effectiveness, safety, reliability and environmental
performance of ship structures (www.mar.ist.utl.pt/marstruct). The MARSTRUCT work
packages include accidental loads, crashworthiness and impact strength, and collision tests
that spread in different technical areas.
2.5 Recommendations
The committee recommends that risk assessment methodology be more widely and
frequently applied in analyses, and that structural crashworthiness be explicitly taken into
account.
The committee recommends that performance-based design standards be developed by the

community. The “community” should consist of classification societies, international
organizations (such as the ISO and IMO), leading researchers in the field, representatives
from the ship design and shipbuilding communities, ship owners and operators, professional
societies (such as SNAME), governments, and regulators.
The Committee recognizes that this recommendation cannot be achieved in the near future –
at least not in a manner that can be universally embraced as a design standard. However,
the Committee believes that this is a technologically feasible goal that should be embraced
by the “community” in the long term.
3. APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Risk assessment methodology has been widely recognized and more applied in dealing with
collision and grounding issues. While the general concept and methodology for risk
assessment was covered in ISSC 2003 V.1, this committee is focusing on the recent
applications to various aspects of collision and grounding studies and projects.
3.1 Risk assessment methodology
Risk is often defined as the product of the probability/frequency of unwanted events with
the associated consequences. Risk can be measured as loss of life, loss of property (ships
and cargoes), environmental pollution, costs of retrieving spilled cargoes, etc. Mitigating
risks can be achieved through reducing the probability of accident occurrence and/or
minimizing the consequences of such accidents.
The Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology helps to identify and evaluate risks, and
provides the basis for appropriate rules, regulations, designs, or decisions. However, there
is a lack of uniformity in FSA applications. A common methodology application should be
defined and formalized (Payer 2004).
Risk analysis is a tool that is increasingly applied in the marine and offshore industries to
manage safety, health and environmental protection. Collisions and groundings are low
probability, high consequence events, especially when tankers are involved. The collision
and grounding risk assessment includes the knowledge of accident occurring frequency.
This may be estimated in a navigational area, comparing experience or extrapolation from
historical data to an evaluation of consequences. The consequences would be measured in
terms of structural damage, the number of fatalities and injuries, the amount of material
released to sea, the immediate impact on environmental resources, and the subsequent costs
of restoration.
Risk minimizing measures include a combination of actions that reduce the frequency and
consequences of accidents. Those assessing the risk normally prioritize measures that are
adopted to reduce the number of hazardous situations that may cause an accident. On the
other hand, because the consequences of accidents are so serious, we must develop
crashworthy structure design and on-board space arrangement regulations and requirements.
Most of the current risk assessments were devoted to some specific aspects of a collision or
grounding; and comprehensive accident models that combine the likelihood of being in an
incident and the undesirable consequences to life, property and environment are scarce.
Figure 1 shows the steps in a risk assessment methodology for collision risk analysis.
3.2 Application to collision and grounding problems
Pedersen (2002) presented a risk analysis on a large suspension bridge that can also be
applied to fixed offshore structures close to high-density shipping lanes. The model is
based on dividing collisions into a number of different phenomena, and the subsequent
application of mathematical models to quantify the risk from each category.
As a way to reduce the consequences of accidents, Amdahl and Hellan (2004) presented an
on-board and shore-based risk support system for disabled ships that are intentionally
grounded. Related to this, Ueno et al (2004) have analyzed the possibility of predicting the
steady drifting motion of disabled ships in wind, waves and currents. Their analyses and
experiments show that there is no general unique solution for the mode of steady drifting
ships.
Figure 1: Overview of steps in a comprehensive collision risk analysis.

Friis-Hansen et al (2004) reported a pilot study that was to formulate a general framework
for evaluating the navigational risk in a specific geographic area. The framework is divided
into two phases. The first phase is a screening procedure that provides fast identification of
critical navigation areas, and defines the number of candidate ships that are potentially
involved in collisions or groundings. The second phase is a risk evaluation that takes into
account the effects of Risk Control Options adopted to mitigate risks. The screening
procedure combines statistics of past accidents with modeled traffic distribution.
A comprehensive software risk analysis package (GRACAT) was previously developed at

the Technical University of Denmark for calculating the probability of collisions,
groundings, and subsequent consequences (Friis-Hansen and Simonsen 2002). This
program was further enhanced using Artificial Neutral Network (ANN) that is trained to
predict the structural damage in a ship’s side as a consequence of ship to ship collisions
(Ravn and Friis-Hansen 2004). The input to the ANN is the absorbed energy, the length of
the involved ships, the draught of the struck ship, and the angle of collision. The predicted
output is the size of the hole (or holes), which is given as the dimensions of a box. The
ANN for damage prediction is used in connection with the risk evaluation of a selected
navigational area, where the cost related to oil spilled from a tanker is estimated. The paper
compares the long-term accumulated loss caused by oil spills in a given navigational area.
In addition, Lützen and Simonsen (2003), Son (2004), and Lehmann and Biehl (2004) have
created and applied various risk assessment methods and techniques to collisions and
groundings.
3.3 Application to waterway designs
One organization that is using collision and grounding risk analysis tools for the design of
waterways is the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities (IALA). The IALA has developed the “Risk Management Tool for Aids to
Navigation and VTS Authorities”. It is used for the cost effective design of navigational
aids in ports and waterways. IALA has also submitted a description of the procedure to the
50th IMO session 2004.
The IALA tool was developed to:

• Assess the risk in ports and waterways, compared to the risk level that authorities
and stakeholders deem acceptable. Some elements that may be considered include
those relating to vessel conditions, traffic conditions, navigational conditions,
waterway conditions, immediate consequences, and subsequent consequences;
• Identify appropriate risk control options to decrease risk to the acceptable level.
The available IALA risk control options include: improved co-ordination and
planning, training, rules, and procedures. These options include enforcement,
radio communications, active traffic management, waterway changes, and
information on: navigation, meteorology, and hydrology.
The complete tool is based on the four approaches described in Table 2 and consists of two
levels:
• Level One: the preliminary Qualitative Risk Assessment model developed by the
U.S. Coast Guard as the “Port and Waterway Safety Assessment model”
(PAWSA). It is undertaken by making a subjective assessment of a waterway’s
risk level, based on the experience and expert opinion of stakeholders.
• Level Two: the more detailed Quantitative Risk Assessment model developed by
the Canadian Coast Guard as the “IALA Waterway Risk Assessment Programme”
(IWRAP). IWRAP is capable of completing an in-depth study on waterways’
navigation requirements that enable meeting the required risk level. It can provide
information on the appropriate risk control options.
The key features of the IWRAP program are:

• Vessel positional accuracy - determined from a set of rules developed in a marine
aids study by the Canadian Coast Guard,
• Safety margin, drift angles and bank affect - calculated using formulae developed
mainly by PIANC, and
• Probabilities of grounding and collision - derived from the formulae presented in
Pedersen (1995).
IWRAP is a risk analysis program similar to GRACAT (Friis-Hansen and Simonsen 2002),
where the waterway is broken into discrete reaches and bends, and available traffic data are
used. A number of scenarios are then created using a combination of vessel types and
differing requirements for the waterway. The results from these scenarios provide
quantitative data for risk assessment within the waterway. The geographical arrangements
of any waterway that are set out on a vector chart can be applied directly to the model. The
values of traffic management tools in the waterway, such as radio navigation services, aids
to navigation, VTS, pilotage, and AIS can be inserted in this chart. The operational traffic
pattern in the model includes the number and types of ships using the waterway, ships’
speeds, ships’ critical domains, traffic routes, and the spatial distribution of traffic related to
time. Various meteorological and hydrological conditions may also be included.
As part of the validation process, IWRAP has been applied to the Straits of Bosporus,
Tampa Bay, and parts of the St. Lawrence River, with results indicating a strong correlation
between theoretical and actual incident data.
Other studies related to the design of waterways using simulations are presented by Gray et
al (2003) and Hutchison et al (2003).
3.4 Safety measures and risk control options
The cost of safety measures become important when risk control options are exercised to
reduce risks associated with collisions and groundings. The most cost effective risk control
options are often associated with the probability of occurrence.
Examples of preventive risk control options influenced by ship designers are:

• Bridge layout,
• Navigational equipment,
• Engine and steering control,
• Maneuverability, and
• Redundancy.
Similarly, the ship operator controls risk options such as:

• Ship speed,
• Manning levels,
• Crew attitude and training, and
• Maintenance.
Finally, the society is responsible for:

• Vessel traffic systems,
• Pilots,
• Traffic lanes,
• Aids to navigation,
• Introduction of AIS,
• Inspection procedures etc.
Once a collision or grounding has taken place, the hull material and structural arrangements
play important roles for limiting the consequences.
3.5 Recommendations
Future research on procedures to reduce the probability of collisions and groundings should
focus on developing risk-based software that is capable of rationally modeling the
associated cost, and reducing the risk of each risk control option. The calculated cost of
these risk reducing measures must then be compared to the calculated savings made from
reducing expenses associated with consequences such as: total number of lost ships, repair
to structural damages, environmental pollution, loss of life, loss of reputation, loss of cargo,
the loss of revenue, and other losses.
Only when such tools have been developed can investments in risk control options and
related safety improvements be balanced against the benefits.
High Speed Crafts (HSC) is another subject that needs further research. Here, the statistical
data are scarce, and the risks for these vessels are different from the risks for traditional
shipping vessels. HSC vessels have different risks because they have higher speeds, more
power, new hull forms, "new" materials, and new passive safety measures. Collision risk is
an excellent example of the difference risk assessments. In encounters between two fast
ferries or between a fast ferry and a slower vessel, the time it takes to make the necessary
assessments and maneuvers reduces drastically. A fast ferry traveling at roughly 50 knots
may be seen visually or on radar when it is about eight miles away. This means that there
can be less than five minutes before a collision occurs, if the other vessel also is a fast
vessel. During the five minutes, the other vessel is first detected, then the course and speed
are estimated, and the situation is assessed. This will take some time. Thereafter, there
must also be time for evasive maneuvers. The amount of time this takes will depend upon
the maneuverability of the vessels. In other words, collision avoidance for HSC is
completely different from that of traditional vessels; and existing risk assessment models
cannot be applied to HSC with confidence. If wing in ground (WIG) vessels are
introduced, then the problems associated with collision prediction will be even greater.
4. LIKELIHOOD OF INCIDENTS, PROBABILISTIC ENERGY

DISTRIBUTION
Here, incidents are defined as events that could or would result in an unintended collision or
grounding. In order to control losses related to collisions and groundings, it is important to
understand the causative factors of incidents.
4.1 Available approaches
Incident occurrence frequencies may be determined through: 1) statistics from historical

data, 2) expert opinions, 3) predictive calculation, or 4) risk analysis, as indicated in Table
1.
4.2 Statistics of incidents
As expected, unbiased statistics are the most reliable data for identifying typical and critical
incident cases. Nevertheless, statistics of historical data are not error free. Error sources
may be accidental underreporting, information misinterpretation, and incorrect incident
categorization regarding ship type, accident type, and severity. Most databases are usually
sparsely populated at the tail of the distribution. At the higher end, there are by nature very
few casualties, and at the lower end, casualties are generally under reported. Furthermore,
conditions surrounding an incident, such as vessel speed, loading condition, environmental
condition and so on, are not always recorded, and are sometimes poorly recorded.
TABLE 1
APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING INCIDENT OCCURRENCE FREQUENCIES AND ENERGIES
Approach Main Advantages Main Disadvantages

Statistics of incidents Long been regarded as the Limitation with incident reports,
only reliable sources difficulty in application to the future
Expert opinions Long been used when limited Subjective
by data
Predictive calculations Predict unfavorable Targets known scenarios, limits
conditions, inexpensive choice of software/programs,
restricted to occurrence probability
Comprehensive risk Rational, includes Relies on accident data for
analysis consequences benchmarking
We should also be careful when applying statistics from historical data to the future. A lot
of events will change over time, and these changes will lead to change in the frequency of
unwanted events. Some changes that will occur and affect the frequency of wanted events
are (Friis-Hansen et al 2004):
• Traffic composition and a greater number of vessels;
• Improved navigational equipment;
• Larger and faster vessels;
• The phase-out of single hull tankers and the increase of double hull tankers.
Thus, the following aspects should be born in mind so that the danger of misinterpretation
of historical data is minimized (Wang et al 2003):
• Statistics are based on past experience, and may not reflect present situations;
• Statistics of one geographical location can not be used for another location;
• Statistics from cases of damage may negatively impact the use of designs that have
not experienced damage.
Besides the well-known IMO database, some maritime organizations and agencies develop
and maintain their own marine accident databases. Examples of such organizations are:
• The United Kingdom Ministry of Transport, Marine Accident Investigation
Bureau (MAIB) has made significant progress regarding design and
implementation of a marine accident information management system.
• The Australian Transportation Safety Board (Australian TSB) has defined system
information requirements, and software engineers may begin to build an
information management system for their marine division.
• The Transportation Safety Board of Canada uses an extensive taxonomy to
document data from accident/incident investigations.
• The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has documented accident/incident data
that date back to the 1960’s.
• Japan’s Maritime Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) collects collision and
grounding accidents occurring in Japanese waters.
These databases are in various stages of development across governments and

organizations.
The database taxonomies and data elements are similar. However, various formats and
organizations are used. Three types of software have been applied: customized software
(MAIB), commercial off-the-shelf (Australian TSB), and software shells. Organizations
seem to be moving away from commercial off-the-shelf packages like ACCESS and
EXCEL to more customized software.
New and updated damage statistics from various databases with 930 grounding accident
records were used by Lützen and Simonsen (2003) in an attempt to determine the
probability of exceeding the current IMO design requirements. Distributions for the extent
of damage, such as damage length, damage height and damage width, were determined.
Furthermore, attempts were made at identifying the governing grounding scenarios, and
deriving a formula for the relationship between the amount of deformed structure and the
energy absorption.
The HARDER model (Lützen 2001) is based on a comprehensive review of casualties from
different scenarios. New and updated distributions for location, length, penetration, and
vertical extent of damage have been drawn from a large database with records of 2,946
casualties, 1,851 collisions, 930 groundings, and 165 other accidents.
Other recent comprehensive studies include statistical collision and grounding accident data
and analyze the data. These studies are: Zhu et al (2002), Skjong and Vanem (2004), Friis-
Hansen et al (2004), Wu and Liu (2004), and Liu and Wu (2004).
The maritime community needs a web-based and global unified incident reporting scheme.
4.3 Predictive calculations and energy reference values
The most commonly used calculation to determine the probability of ship to ship collisions
and groundings is based on the work by Fujii et al (1974). This two-step procedure first
requires determining the potential number of collision candidates or groundings as if no
aversive maneuvers are made. A distribution of ship traffic must be known for this part of
the analysis. In the second step, a so-called causation factor is determined that models the
effect of crew and equipment related actions to avoid the collision or grounding. This
causation factor depends strongly on the available navigational aids in the shipping area, the
weather conditions, the visibility, and the equipment on the bridge.
Predictive calculations are suitable for providing a history of incident probabilities and
typical energy reference values associated with an incident. Data for these types of
calculations are the probability density functions for the collision scenario, such as the
striking location, the collision angle, and the velocities of the vessels, the loading condition
of the striking vessel, and the sizes and types of vessels that strike other vessels. Lützen
(2001) gave example data for vessels in world-wide trade and also for vessels in specific
European routes. Based on the mathematical model for external collision analysis (see
Chapter 5) presented by Pedersen and Zhang (1998), and the data briefly discussed above,
the absorbed energy distribution of a ships’ structural crushing has been calculated using a
Monte Carlo procedure. Some results are presented in Figure 2, which shows the 50- and
90- percentile value of the energy that is absorbed when a collision takes place. This
depicts the striking location along the length of the struck vessel. For a smaller percentile,
the difference in absorbed energy relative to the striking location is small.
The results presented in Figure 2 are based on predictive calculations using the world fleet
as a basis for the composition of the striking vessels. It should be noted that the energy
released from crushing during a collision depends strongly on the distribution of ship types
and sizes, and therefore will be specific for specific geographic areas.
4 .5 250
4
3 .5 20 0
3
150
E [MJ]
E [MJ]
2 .5
x=0 .1
2 x=0 .3
10 0
1.5 x/ L = 0 .1 and 0 .9 x=0 .5
1 x/ L = 0 .3 and 0 .9 50 x=0 .7
0 .5 x/ L = 0 .5 x=0 .9
0 0
0 20 00 0 4 0 00 0 6 0 00 0 8 00 00 100 00 0 0 10 00 00 2 00 00 0 30 0 00 0 40 00 0 0
Dis place m e nt [t] Dis place m e nt [t]
Figure 2: The 50-percentile value (left) and 90-percentile value (right) for energy to be
absorbed as a function of struck vessel displacement and the striking location.
Several systems are currently being developed to help the Officers On the Watch (OOW).
Son et al (2004) have described a system to monitor the collision and grounding risk of
ships in real time in order to give guidance to the OOW. Pedersen and Liu (2004) have
presented a visualization-based information display system for collision risk assessment in
congested waterways. Zhou and Hearn (2004) have developed a Genetic Algorithm to
identify the optimal approach sequence of actions necessary to avoid identified potential
collisions. Lützen and Friis-Hansen (2003) analyzed the risk-reducing effect of
implementing Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) on ships. They used a Bayesian
network procedure to estimate the causation factor. Also, based on the assumption that AIS
is installed on all ships, Kayano et al (2004) have developed a collision avoidance algorithm
for collision avoidance support.
4.4 Recommendations
The committee recommends that the maritime community conduct further research in order
to clearly define or identify collision and grounding scenarios. The committee also
recommends developing, formalizing and unifying a procedure for recording collision and
grounding accidents.
5. MECHANICS OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING
Since the early 1990s, many predictive calculation procedures have been developed for
predicting a ship’s response in a collision or grounding. These methods have matured to
such a level that they are now being integrated into systems for evaluation and designs.
Nevertheless, the question of how to calculate a ship’s response in an accident continues to
be central to today’s research and development.
5.1 General
Accident analysis mechanics can be classified into two parts - external mechanics and
internal mechanics (Pedersen 1995). The external accident mechanics deal with the ships’
rigid body global motion under the force of the collision or grounding and the
hydrodynamic pressures acting on the wet surface. The internal accident mechanics
evaluates the ships’ structural failure response during the collision or grounding accident.
Those two parts are often treated separately, but in some cases, they are solved together.
5.2 Internal mechanisms
The analysis methods of internal mechanisms can be categorized into four groups: simple
formulae, simplified analytical approach, simplified FEM, and nonlinear FEM simulation.
Their advantages and disadvantages are summarized in the Table 2 (modified from Wang et
al 2003).
Simple formulae are best suited to estimate initial energy absorption. The recent extensive
studies on structural crashworthiness have produced many new simplified formulae that are
more rationally based and are applicable to a wider range of problems, including head-on
collision (Zhang, et al 2004), grounding (Zhang 1999, Pedersen and Zhang 2000b),
collision and bottom raking of high speed crafts (Simonsen and Tornqvist 2004a, Simonsen
et al 2004), and ship to bridge collision (Pedersen et al. 1998, Wang and Yi 1997, Li 1997).
TABLE 2
AVAILABLE METHODS FOR INTERNAL MECHANICS (STRUCTURAL RESPONSES)
Analysis efforts Results

Methods
Modeling Computation Energy Loads Stress
Simple formulae Fewest Fewest, hand X
calculations
Simplified Analytical Few Few, hand calculations X X
approaches
Simplified FEM Some Some, special X X
approaches programs
Non-linear FEM Extensive Extensive, expensive X X X
simulation software
Simplified analytical methods are best at balancing modeling difficulty with prediction
accuracy. The technological advances in the last decade are represented by the
establishment of the structural crashworthiness concept and methodology Wierzbicki 1991-
1999, Wang (2002). Applications of this advanced methodology to various collision and
grounding situations were summarized extensively by the ISSC 2003 Committee V.3 and
Wang et al (2002b). This group of approaches has the advantage of capturing the basic
characteristics of structural crashworthiness with minimized structural modeling efforts. A
series of methods has been developed using this advanced technology. Some have been
yielding results of practical importance (e.g., Zhang 1999, Wang and Ohtsubo 1999,
Pedersen and Zhang 2000b, Suzuki et al 2000, 2001, Tikka 2001, Brown 2002, Urban
2003, Simonsen et al 2004, Han et al 2005, Zhang and Wu 1990, Zhu et al 1996, Liang et al
2000, Xiao et al 2001).
Zhang et al (2004) reported analyses of plate crushing and ship bow damage in head-on
collisions, and reviewed and compared existing experimental and theoretical studies on
crushing analyses of plated structures. Simple formulae for determining the crushing force,
force-deformation curve and the extent of damage to a ship bow, expressed in terms of ship
principal particulars, are derived for longitudinally stiffened oil tankers and bulk carriers.
These formulae can be used in a probabilistic analysis of how much damage occurs from
ship collisions when a large number of calculations are generally required. Simonsen et al
(2004) conducted similar analyses to study the raking damage of bottom plating for high
speed crafts.
Simplified FEM (e.g., Paik at al 1999) has not been used much.
Application of nonlinear FEM simulation has been the main theme of recent studies (Wu et
al 2004, Zhang L. et al 2004, Endo et al 2004, Yamado and Endo 2004, Endo 2004, Jiang
and Gu 2004, Takaoka et al 2004, Tornqvist and Simonsen 2004, Wang et al 2003, 2002b,
Le Sourne et al 2003, Kajaste-Rudnitski et al 2004a, 2004b and 2005, Nolau Neto et al
2004, Jastrzebski et al 2004, Lehmann and Biehl 2004, Konter et al 2004, Oh et al 2005,
Liu and Gu 2003, Lee et al 2001, Klanac et al 2005, Ozguc et al 2005, 2006, Hu et al 2005,
Alsos and Amdahl 2005, Yamada et al 2005). This trend was clearly demonstrated in the
2nd and 3rd International Conference on Collision and Grounding of Ships. As expected,
we will see more FEM simulation applications in the coming years. Rapid advances in
computer technology and software capacity have made FEM simulation a preferred choice.
Many powerful special-purpose FEM packages, such as DYNA3D, DYTRAN and PAM-
CRASH, are now available and can account for large deformation, contact between
structures, non-linearity in material properties, and rupture. For analyzing a collision or
grounding accident involving high non-linearity, contact, friction and rupture, the explicit
methodology is suitable. The required calculation efforts are fewer than the commonly used
implicit methods. Convergence of calculations is much easier to realize.
5.3 Rupture criteria
It is probably most challenging to model rupture and tearing when applying the structural
crashworthiness concept. The structural crashworthiness concept also forms crucial
background for the important criteria of crashworthy ships. Advanced FEM packages
enable reliable automated simulation of the structural failure process up to when fracture
occurs, beyond which software aids, such as a user-defined subroutine, are needed for
tracing the initiation and propagation of cracks.
Traditionally, we assume that rupture occurs when the equivalent plastic strain in an
analyzed structure reaches a critical value. This critical value, sometimes referred to as
rupture strain, is related to the strain-stress curves obtained from mechanical tests of uni-
axially stretched metal coupons. In the simplified analytical approaches (see Table 2), the
rupture strain varies from 1% to 20%, and the determination is normally based on
calibration or judgment.
Some people have been interested in defining rupture strain for FEM analyses. This critical
value is found to be dependent on mesh size. Simonsen and Törnqvist (2004), Okazawa et
al (2004), Yamada et al (2005), and Alsos and Amdahl (2005) studied ranges of rupture
strain.
Refined simulation of fracture initiation and propagation requires that mesh size be small
enough. This, in turn, makes the analysis of large ship structures very time consuming and
computationally demanding. It is commonly known that a failure criterion based on the
equivalent strain is generally not valid in bi-axially loaded plates. Urban (2002), Hiramatsu
et al (2002), and Törnquist (2003) reported estimations of critical equivalent plastic strain
as a function of the stress triaxiality using model tests and FEM analyses. Several simple
failure criteria and damage models were implemented in the explicit finite element code LS-
DYNA (Törnqvist 2003). Törnqvist and Simonsen (2004) have shown that the so-called
combined Rice-Tracey and Cockroft-Latham (RTCL) criteria that account for the tri-axial
nature of the fracture provide a good comparison to test results for different materials and
various stress/strain states. They tested varying stress and strain states for validating these
fracture criteria and damage models.
The rupture failure may be explained using the metal forming theory. The maximum strain
that the material can sustain is limited by the local plastic instability. At failure, plastic
deformations concentrate on local areas. These areas have typical dimensions of plate
thickness. The failure process can be divided into diffuse necking and local necking phases.
Diffuse necking develops slowly as a result of strain rate hardening, and occurs when the
load reaches the maximum value. The final failure occurs by local necking during which
the deformation is concentrated on a small area away from where the structure remains
almost un-deformed. This theory of localized necking has been developed for thin metal
sheets, in which the assumption of plane stress is valid and the failure criteria can be based
on the bi-axial principal strain state formulations. For typical ship structures the stress state
is tri-axial, which complicates the development of simple rupture criteria.
There are various approaches presented to handle the tri-axial rupture criteria.
Broekhuijsen (2003) improved the rupture index approach developed by Lehmann and Yu
(1998), and presented an equation that describes the effective rupture stain, ενr, for multi-
axial stress and strain state as a function of the one-dimensional rupture strain, εR, and the
corresponding stress tri-axiality function f(β):
ενr = εR f(β)-1/m
Where, f(β) = 2(1+υ)/3 + (1-2υ)β2/3, β = 3σH/σeq, and σH and σeq are the hydrostatic stress
and the equivalent von Mises stress, respectively. In this equation, a value of m = 1.4 can
be used for steel structures, which corresponds to the typical power law strain hardening
exponent n = 0.2.
However, identifying rupture location requires information of the actual effective strain,εν,
over the entire structure. Lehman and Yu (1998) introduced a convenient Rupture Index,
IR, a parameter for micro plastic damage:
IR = εν f(β)1/m
Rupture is predicted to occur as soon as the following equation is satisfied:
IR ≥ εR
The proper value for one-dimensional rupture strain, εR, can be obtained by simulating the
tensile test coupons with nonlinear FEM calculations. Broekhuijsen (2003) has applied this
approach to compare the calculated rupture force with experimental value obtained for 12
mm mild steel specimens quasi-statically punched by a sphere 60 mm in diameter. The
experiments show that the Rupture Index approach can be applied to various stress states,
ranging from uni-axial to bi-axial states.
The welding of steel or aluminum structures will have an effect on the material properties of
the welded area. Welds will change the stress concentration factors due to changes in
geometry and will also affect the metallurgical properties (e.g., by decreasing or increasing
the hardness of the material). Simonsen and Abramowitz (2003) investigated the effect of
fractured welds or fractured parent material on the energy absorption of ships’ typical
structural subassemblies during deep collapse. They presented experiments and theories on
the crushing response of typical strength elements. The theories were created because of
the infinitely ductile material response and the consistently modified effect of fracture.
Jiang and Roehr (2004) studied the failure criteria for welding lines by both experiments
and numerical simulations.
5.4 External mechanics
For the external mechanics, simplified methodology based on rigid-body motion theory
(Petersen 1982, Pedersen 1995, Pedersen and Zhang 2000, Brown 2002, Paik et al 1999,
Wang and Ohtsubo 1999, Nolau Neto et al 2004, Suzuki et al 2000, 2001, Reich and Roher
2004) was often used.
Recent simulation methods enable a full six degrees of freedom simulation for ship motions
during groundings or collisions (Matusiak 2002). The most demanding task is to model the
contact force between the striking and struck ships. An approximate approach is to
determine the contact loads independently from running a nonlinear FEM analysis in
advance, and applying these loads to the ship motion analyses (Kajaste-Rudnitski et al
2004a). Simulation tools are also available to enable visualization of a grounding event
(Mäesalu and Matusiak 2004).
Määttänen (2005) reported a series of tests whose goals were to investigate the motions of
colliding ships and their interaction with the surrounding water, see Figure 3. These model
tests were designed to resemble full-scale experiments carried out in the Netherlands
(Wevers and Vredeveldt 1999). A total of 37 laboratory tests were performed to investigate
the phenomena in different collision scenarios. The effects of five parameters were studied.
They were collision velocity, collision angle, a bulbous bow, the mass ratio between the
colliding ships, and the location of the contact point on the struck ship. All six motion
components of both models and collision forces were measured. The penetration depth was
calculated based on the relative motions of the models assuming small rotational motions.
The test results of these scaled models were found to correlate well with the two full-scale
collision tests carried out in the Netherlands. The validation was made for 37 symmetrical
model scale tests. The parameters from the model scale tests were at full scale for
validation. Because the model scale tests had different mass ratios and initial kinetic
energies compared to the full scale tests, regression lines were plotted for the model scale
tests.
(a) Test setup
(b) Front view of test channel
Figure 3: Model test of ship collisions (Määttänen 2005).
The maritime community needs to validate the tools for predicting ship motions in an
accident. Data of full-scale collision and grounding experiments are now available; see
further information in the committee reports of ISSC 2003 V.3, ISSC 1997 V.4, and ISSC
1994 V.6.
5.5 Influences of fluid in tanks
These real-scale experiments reveal that ship motions are affected by the sloshing forces of
partially filled ballast tanks. Tabri et al (2004) demonstrated that better correlations could
be achieved when sloshing is also included in the simulation of ship movements. See
Figure 4. It is especially important that the second peak in the simulated time history could
not be captured if sloshing was excluded from the analysis. The variation of the energy
components also revealed the importance of sloshing. See Figure 5. Sloshing "stored" the
kinetic energy and thus, less energy became available for deforming structures. It was
estimated that in their experiment, 43% of the initial kinetic energy was dissipated by
structural deformation, reduced from around 65% without the sloshing water.
Arai et al (2002) proposed a new numerical treatment of the boundary condition for
accurate and stable assessment of the sloshing impact pressure based on a rectangular gird
system. The comparisons of the numerical results with experimental ones confirmed the
accuracy of the proposed technique.
Water in ballast tanks may also cause different structural behavior of ship structures. This
effect is yet to be explored.
5.6 Coupled internal and external mechanics
Studies on coupled internal and external mechanics continue the search for the best balance
between computational efforts and complexity in methodology of various mechanisms.
Some programs that calculate internal and external mechanics together have already been
developed. These include programs developed in the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Wierzbicki 1991-1999), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(Brown 2002), the Technical University of Denmark (Lützen and Simonsen 2002), and the
University of Tokyo (Suzuki et al 2000).
Määttänen (2005) compared the plastic deformation energy evaluated by the method based
on momentum conservation (Zhang 1999) to the experimentally measured energy. He also
reported on experiments that were setup for evaluating ship motions and structural
resistance in a collision. The deformation energy was evaluated in two different ways, one
based on the integration of a force-penetration curve, and the other was evaluated by
calculating the change in kinetic energy during contact. This computational model
corresponded well with the method based on the loss of kinetic energy, but gave slightly
different results when compared with the model tests. This was probably due to the
inaccuracy of the calculated penetration depth.
Figure 4: Numerically simulated and experimentally measured time history for collision
force (Tabri et al 2004). Due to water sloshing, the first peak is lower and then the second
peak occurs.
The elastic vibratory energy in the hull girder during a collision was investigated by
Pedersen and Li (2004). They concluded that the elastic hull girder energy usually occupies
a small amount of total energy for large commercial ships. This study validates a
commonly used assumption for considering the contribution of plastic deformation and
neglecting elastic energy.
Viscous effects are of minor importance. In many cases, notably collisions, the motion of
the struck ship during the contact phase is small, and the inertia forces are the most
important contribution. In simplified analysis of collisions, this is usually represented by a
constant added mass term (Pedersen & Zhang 2000a, Wang and Ohtsubo 1999, Suzuki et al
2000, 2001).
For a reliable risk assessment of collision and grounding events, it is necessary to analyze
many scenarios, taking into consideration the real structural configuration of ships and using
proper oil outflow simulations to evaluate the environmental impact. Brown (2002)
presents a Simplified Collision Model (SIMCOL) to calculate damage extent and oil
outflow in ship collisions. The proposed process, which uses physic-based models to
predict probabilistic damage in collision, provides a practical means of considering
structural design in a regulatory framework, in order to improve safety and environmental
performance of ships. SIMCOL is sufficiently fast to be applied to thousands cases of

collision as is required for probabilistic analysis.
Commercial simulation codes use the Lagrangian (finite element) and Eulerian (finite
volume, finite difference) solvers for modeling structures and fluids, respectively. Meshes
within each solver can be coupled together for the analysis of fluid-structure interactions. In
the Lagrangian solver, the grid points are fixed to the body under analysis and move in
space when the body (solid) deforms, resulting in distortion of structural elements. In the
Eulerian solver, the grid points are fixed in space, and the material of a body (fluid) under
analysis moves through the Eulerian mesh. The mass, momentum, and energy of the
material is transported from element to element. There are two types of algorithms for the
fluid-structure interaction: general coupling and Arbitrary Lagrangian-Euler (ALE)
coupling. The coupling algorithm computes the interaction between the two sets of
elements. In general coupling, the coupling surface on the Lagrangian structure is used to
transfer the forces between the two solver domains. In ALE, the Eulerian grid points may
move in space, whereby the material flows through a moving and deforming Eulerian mesh.
The ALE coupling is potentially faster than the general coupling.
Numerical collision simulations were performed using ALE coupling of MSC/DYTRAN or

LS-DYNA in the 1990s (see 1997 ISSC V.4, 1994 ISSC V.6). Gu & Wang (2001) recently
adopted this approach and introduced an inertia equivalent model (constant added mass)
that considerably reduced computational time. Other studies are Le Sourne et al (2001),
(2003).
A development of collision forces and consequential damages of collided ship hulls have
been considered by Kajaste-Rudnitski et al (2005). In this scenario, a moving Ro-Ro ship’s
bow and underwater bulb hits a side surface of another double bottom Ro-Ro ship, head-on.
Both ships suffer considerable damages; and the shear failure of shell elements is taken into
account. In this case, when equivalent plastic strain reaches a certain level, the element fails
to bear any more loads, and is automatically removed from the mesh, thus leaving a hole.
Bow structures have a range of stiffness, from completely rigid to quite flexible. The effect
of the surrounding water’s added mass is also studied. Dynamic explicit contact
formulation is also used for this analysis. Elastic-plastic steel material with kinematic
hardening is used for the thin-walled plating shells.
In the hybrid computational method developed by Reich and Rohr (2005), a ship’s
grounding process was simulated by combining a quasi hydro-elastic nonlinear Timoshenko
beam model for the hull girder structural responses, and a three-dimensional contact
problem model for grounding loads. The complex interaction between the ship bottom and
the soft seabed was treated as a contact problem and analyzed using a boundary integral
formulation. The interaction analysis also integrated the elasto-plastic behavior of structural
materials permitting isotropic hardening.
6
x 10
5
energy [J]
A
E
2 A
EKIN
1
ESL
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
time[s]
(a) Striking ship

5
x 10
20
energy [J]
18
EB
16
EB
KIN
14
12
ESL
10
8
WK
6
EB
4
2
EF
0
-2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
time[s]
(b) Struck ship
Figure 5: Variation of energy components throughout a collision (Tabri et al 2004):

EA, EB - total energy; EAKIN, EBKIN - kinetic energy involved in rigid body motions; ESL -
energy involved in sloshing; WK - work against damping; EB - bending energy; EF - work
against friction
5.7 Recommendations
For typical ship structures, the stress state is tri-axial, complicating the development of
proper failure criteria for rupture. There are various approaches presented to handle tri-
axial rupture failure. Still, validation of the available approaches is fairly limited, especially
with real structural configurations. For the proper modeling principles for rupture in
nonlinear FE-analysis, we especially need further studies.
Ship movements during collision are affected by sloshing in partially filled tanks.
Systematic analysis is needed to study the effects of partially filled tanks as well as the
effects of filled tanks in the double bottom or filled fore peak tanks in a striking ship,
considering the orientation of a collision.
6. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING
Disasters at sea caused by collisions and groundings may cause serious problems for the
environment, human lives, and property.
Collision and grounding accidents can very often lead to shell ruptures. Various aspects
should be examined such as fatalities, cargo spills, damage stability, residual strength
capability, increased load demands on the hull girder, and economical and social impacts.
Indirect costs can be much higher than those strictly connected with the accident.
The Earth’s ecological equilibrium is becoming more fragile. It is everyone’s responsibility

to contribute to a better world. The shipping industry is continuously improving onboard
safety. Statistics show that fewer and fewer ship accidents took place in recent years.
Nevertheless, we must not take this as a call for complacency, as accidents of tankers Erika
(off the coast of France) and Prestige (off the coast of Spain) remind us. Each accident,
every life lost at sea, every case of environmental pollution, is one too many, and no longer
tolerated by the public. Therefore, everyone involved with designers, builders, operators,
class societies, flag states, and so on, must continue to find ways to further reduce risks and
improve quality and safety in shipping (Payer 2004).
To minimize the risks associated with collision and grounding accidents, we must improve
ship operations to reduce the likelihood of accidents and design stronger ships to minimize
losses should an accident occur. More specifically, enhanced navigation systems and
bridge procedures reduce the possibility of accidents; whereas improved arrangements of
cargo tanks, structural crashworthiness, and stabilized damage minimize the consequences.
In addition, emergency response and life saving systems help to reduce the number of
fatalities.
6.1 Oil outflow
The IMO has established a probabilistic methodology to assess protection against oil
pollution from damaged tankers (IMO 2003a). The required width of wing ballast tanks
remains the same along the ship’s length, because the transverse damage extent does not
depend on the longitudinal location. Based on the same methodology, McAllister et al
(2003) estimated accidental oil spills from bunker tanks. This study was intended to shed
light on the potential oil spill risks of bunker oil tanks that were not regulated by MARPOL.
Endo (2004) points out that this IMO approach is not effective in estimating side damage
penetration. It is recognized, from collision accidents and FEM simulations, that the
transverse damage extent is usually much greater amidship than at fore and aft. Endo
proposes to adopt a weighting function that more accurately estimates the distribution and
extent of transverse damage along the ship’s length, taking into account the longitudinal
location of collisions. This would facilitate an improved tanker arrangement and
consequently cause more effective oil outflow prevention.
Friis-Hansen and Ditlevsen (2003) noted the effect of applying the future losses to the
present. They assumed that the risk profile asymptotically approaches a limit risk profile as
the operation time increases. This asymptotic profile is approximated by a lognormal
distribution. The risk profile modeling was applied to a study of oil spills from tanker
collisions in the Danish straits. They found that the distribution of the oil spill volume per
spill could be represented by an exponential distribution both in Oeresund and in the Great
Belt. When applied in the Poisson model, a risk profile reasonably close to the standard
lognormal profile is obtained. Moreover, based on data pairs (volume, cost) for world-wide
oil spills, one infers that the conditional distribution of the costs given the spill volume can
be modeled by a lognormal distribution. By un-conditioning the exponential distribution of
the single oil spill, a risk profile for the costs is obtained that is indistinguishable from the
standard lognormal risk profile. Finally the so-called Life Quality Index is used to quantify
the risk acceptance criterion for the pollution of the environment. This NPWI acceptance
criterion is applied to the oil spill example.
6.2 Damage stability
Damage stability evaluation in collision or grounding events can be performed within a

probabilistic approach. This is done while considering the probability of damage of certain
dimensions to a particular compartment or group of compartments, and the probability of
surviving the damage scenarios.
The HARDER project developed new probability distributions of damage p- and v-factors,
studied the survivability of a ship after damage, and established a generalized formula for
the survival s-factor based on the highest significant wave a damaged ship can survive, and
the probability of that survivable seastate occurring (Tagg and Tuzcu 2002). The total
survivability of the ship is calculated as the sum of survivability given all possible damages,
and this corresponds to the Attained Subdivision Index A = Σi pi vi si. The Required
Subdivision Index R is then formulated to ensure a safety level equivalent to the SOLAS
regulations. The subdivision of a ship is considered sufficient if A > R.
Figure 6: Event tree for collision of bulk carriers according to survey of recent accidents.
Skjong and Vanem (2004) used the data from the HARDER project in analyzing the
damage stability of generic bulk carriers following a collision. See also Figure 6. The
frequency of serious collisions and the frequency of flooding after damage were obtained
from accident databases containing records of historical accidents and world fleet statistics.
6.3 Ship evacuation
Collisions and groundings may cause flooding of passenger ship compartments, and expose
the vessels to the risk of losing stability and sinking. This could cause disastrous
consequences such as the loss of human lives. If preventative measures fail, passengers and
crews have to be evacuated, and an orderly and timely evacuation can save the life of many
people.
Emergency evacuations are considered extremely crucial to passenger ships and Ro-Ro
ships. Evacuation analyses shall be performed early in the design process for such ships,
with the objective to assess, for all possible damage scenarios, the time necessary for
evacuation. Total evacuation time shall be analyzed in all its components (i.e., awareness
time, travel time, embarkation time, and launching time) in order to implement a number of
risk control options capable of preventing or mitigating life loss. Ship designers are
encouraged to achieve enhanced evacuation performances by innovative design on new
passenger ships (Vanem and Skjong 2004).
Numerical tools (software) are now available for analyzing complex ship and human
behavior in an accident. The maritime EXODUS simulates mustering and evacuating
passengers and crews. Program FREDYN calculates progressive flooding, and has been
utilized by van’t Veer et al (2004) to study the behavior of a damaged large passenger ship
in waves.
6.4 Residual strength
A ship may collapse after a collision or grounding because of inadequate longitudinal

strength. It is important to keep the residual strength of damaged structures at a certain
level in order to avoid additional catastrophic consequences. Prestige’s recent accident
shows the importance of a reliable assessment of the damaged vessels’ longitudinal strength
in real emergency situations and time pressure. Hull girder collapse can be assessed by
comparing the applied extreme bending moment and the residual bending capacity of the
damaged hull girder.
A measure of the residual bending capacity can be based on either the maximum elastic
bending moment corresponding to occurrence of initial yielding (section modulus based
residual strength), or the maximum bending moment beyond which the ship will break its
back due to extensive yielding and buckling (ultimate bending moment based residual
strength).
The hull girder section modulus is a well-accepted parameter to measure the longitudinal
bending strength, especially where brittle failure modes associated with fracture or unstable
buckling is concerned.
The ultimate hull girder strength is a better indication of the bending capacity when ductile
failure modes are predominant. The ultimate strength can be estimated using the
incremental strain approach by calculating the moment-curvature relationship of hull girder,
and thence the maximum resisting moment offered by all structural members contributing to
the longitudinal strength. Through such an approach, it is possible to trace out the complete
sequence of the damaged hull girder’s progressive collapse and then a more realistic safety
margin can be realized. For a proper evaluation of the hull girder’s ultimate strength,
special-purpose programs, simple formulae, or nonlinear FEM packages can be used. See
also Committees II.1 and III.1.
To appraise the influence of different damage scenarios, the residual strength index can be
calculated as the ratio of the damaged hull’s strength to that of the intact hull. Wang et al
(2002a) present some simple equations for a quick evaluation of the residual section
modulus of typical commercial ships. Different degrees of damage caused by either a
collision or grounding is assumed, and the formulae were derived from an extensive study
of 67 ships (double-hull tankers, single-hull tankers, bulk carriers, container carriers).
These formulae provide very handy tools for predicting the residual strength of a ship’s hull
in an accident, without performing step-by-step detailed calculations. They are also useful
as elements in a decision making process related to salvage and rescue, and can be easily
integrated into a risk assessment scheme. Ozguc et al (2006) compared residual hull girder
ultimate strength of a single-hull and a double-hull bulk carrier with collision damages.
Damage to side structures was derived from FEM analyses of various collision scenarios.
They also studied effects of corrosion wastage. Kozlyakov and Egorov (1991) reported that
for vessels losing the side structures on either port or starboard side, the hull girder section
modulus was reduced by about 25%, and could be as high as 47% in container carriers. In
addition, the damaged hulls were exposed to additional stresses for losing symmetry in its
cross section. The combined action of vertical bending and torsion could cause up to 50 –
80% reduction of the ship’s longitudinal strength.
6.5 Post-accidental loads
In the case of serious accidents such as collisions or groundings with adverse consequences
to the structures, there can be weighty repercussions on the residual strength and loads that
act on the hull girder after damage.
There were limited studies on increased static loads of grounded and collided vessels.
Pedersen (1994) created a mathematical model for ships grounding on a sloping rigid shore.
He calculated the grounding reaction forces; and found that the longitudinal strength of a
grounding ship may not be sufficient. In addition, the strength margin depends on ship size,
loading state, the shape of the ground, and the coefficient of friction. Reich and Rohr
(2005) demonstrated again that static grounding loads (bending moments and shear forces
on hull girders) can be accurately calculated, and properly developed coupled models can
capture the global behavior of hull girders in grounding. Tagg and Akar (2004) and Iversen
(2005) reported studies on the residual strength of passenger ships in flooded conditions. A
typical passenger ferry heeled following some collision scenarios. The longitudinal bending
moments on the damaged vessel were calculated using the loading computer, and added to
the wave loads under the assumed sea-state to give the total hull girder loads.
Wave loads of a flooded vessel are generally regarded less severe than the designed wave
loads that are normally similar to those on average North Atlantic routes. The IACS
Unified Requirement S17 specifies an 80% design wave-induced bending moment in
evaluating the adequacy of a hull girder’s strength when flooded. Chan et al (2001) studied
the dynamic motions of wave-induced loads on a damaged Ro-Ro vessel, using both
experimental and numerical approaches. The total loads were determined by combining
static loads and the most probable extreme wave loads obtained from a short-term statistical
method. Flooding of engine room was found to give the worst hull girder loads. Vorobyov
and Nilva (1997) and Nilva (1998, 1999 and 2000) investigated the wave loads on a
grounded ship using both experimental and numerical approaches.
6.6 Other consequences
Other consequences that need to be addressed include, but are not limited to, fire following
collision or grounding, blocked traffic, second collision, and leakage of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and consequential explosion (in case of LNG carriers).
6.7 Recommendations
Clear identification of accident scenarios is needed for a more uniform risk assessment,
considering the different subjects involved (structural behavior of ship, emergency
response, evacuation, rescue, simulation of oil spill, fire protection, effects on
environmental resources, restoration time, etc.).
Crashworthiness is an aspect of the ships’ structural design that should be given greater
consideration. It is an aspect that is not generally considered in current regulations except
for GL (see section 2.2)
Further studies must be directed towards improving the prediction of a damaged ship’s
survivability with reference to both the new loading demand (due to the flooding water and
wave loads) and the residual capability of the hull girder (considering the effects of the
unsymmetrical bending and of the shear force in the damaged sections). We would prefer
to see additional development of simplified analytical approaches for rapid and reliable
strength assessments during emergency.
Additional developments that we need are joint probability of accident occurrence and
probable sea states in an accident. We need to consider areas where collisions and
groundings are likely to occur and areas that are normally congested such as harbor
approaches and channels. As a result, the significant wave height of the sea state at the time
of collision can be estimated in accordance with the findings of, for example, the HARDER
project. An example of cumulative probability of the significant wave height is illustrated
in Figure 7 (HARDER 2001):
Figure 7: Cumulative probability of significant wave height at time of collision.

7. ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Currently, there is no clear vision on the principles of accident design when considering
structural crashworthiness. Obviously, the ultimate goal of applying the structural
crashworthiness concept is to reduce risks associated with collisions and groundings.
However, a direct unambiguous relationship between crashworthiness and risk reduction is
difficult to establish.
At the moment, damage claims tend to be disproportionate. For example, masters of some
troubled ships were and are being held prisoner by some countries on doubtful legal
grounds, because they caused environmental pollution. The international maritime
community needs a common understanding of risks and acceptance criteria.
7.1 Principles
There are two classes of hazards to be addressed: loss of life at sea or on shore, and damage
to the marine environment (Skjong and Vanem 2004). Both hazards lead to financial costs,
especially in the latter case. There is no general consensus among sea-going nations
regarding acceptable risks. Currently, two approaches seem to be adopted in the maritime
industry: comparative and absolute risk assessments. Both hinge on the definition of risk R,
being a multiplication of probability p with consequences C.
R= pC
7.2 Comparative risk assessment
In a comparative risk assessment, a risk comparison is made between an existing system and
a new system (Vredeveldt et al 2004, Zhang L et al 2004). The assumption is that the
existing system complies with the prevailing law and is, therefore, acceptable from a
societal point of view. The new system can therefore be proven to be equivalent, if its
inherited risks are calculated in the same fashion, and are comparable with the existing or
conventional design.
This comparative risk assessment approach avoids the difficulty in defining acceptable
failure probabilities in combination with consequences.
The recent IMO regulations on damage stability use the attained subdivision index A as a
measure of survival probability. This index is defined by the following equation:
A = ∑ pi ⋅ si
The probabilities pi of conceivable damages i are prescribed by the regulations. They are
based on collision damage statistics, which do not consider crashworthiness explicitly.
When the ship survives the given damage i, then the survival parameter si is set to 1.
Because the definition is similar to the typical risk format and the collision statistics are
used, these recent IMO damage stability regulations are viewed by some as implication that
designs complying with these regulations have a risk level acceptable to society.
When sufficient survival cases can be found for which the aggregated value of pi si yields a
value larger than the required threshold R (the required subdivision index), the ship is
judged to comply with the implicitly required safety. The choice of the actual value for R is
completed by a comparison with existing ships. Thus, safety equivalence is pursued. The
designer can influence the survival si of damages by providing ample compartmentation of
the hull. Under SOLAS, the designer can not influence the damage or its associated
probability pi. Therefore, from a regulatory viewpoint, providing crashworthiness does not
pay off.
However, Zhang L et al (2004) report an equivalent safety approach for damage stability of
ships, including crashworthiness. Vredeveldt et al (2004) present a similar approach
applied on inland waterway chemical tankers, aiming to prevent cargo release after a
collision.
7.3 Absolute risk assessment
In various studies on the probabilities and consequences of collisions and groundings, the
societal assessment was performed in a more or less absolute sense (Lehmann and Biehl
2004, Friis-Hansen et al 2004, Delautre et al 2005, Vanem and Skjong 2004, Trbojevic
2005a, 2005b). Table 3 is an example risk matrix, which is modified from Lehmann and
Biehl (2004).
The numbers in the matrix cells indicate a ranking. Values of up to 3 are acceptable.
Values of 4 and 5 indicate that efforts must be made to reduce probability and/or
consequences, with reasonable costs. Values above 5 are not acceptable, and action must
be taken to mitigate risk.
The probability of occurrence (or likelihood) can be quantified in different ways. For
example, consequences were expressed in terms of equivalent fatalities (3rd column) by
Skjong (2001).
Risk assessments are not unique for the maritime environment. Other industries, such as
chemical industries, face similar challenges. Adequate methodologies are described in
various publications, such as (CPR 14E 1997) and (CPR 18E 1999).
Recently, a guideline was developed on the application of crashworthy side structures in

inland waterway ships (TNO 2005) carrying hazardous cargo. The risk concept is used to
balance enlarging cargo tanks against reducing the likelihood of tank penetration, by
providing crashworthy tank structures.
TABLE 3 PERCEPTION OF PROBABILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
Equivalent
fatalities
Catastro- Ship breaks apart
10.00 4 5 6 7
phic and/or sinks
One or more tanks
Severe are penetrated; cargo 1.00 3 4 5 6
flows into the sea.
Cargo tanks are not
penetrated, but side
or bottom shell
plating is penetrated.
Significant Fuel oils etc. that are 0.10 2 3 4 5
stored in tanks of
double side or
double bottom spill
into sea.
No damage to
Minor 0.01 1 2 3 4
marine environment
Extremely Remote Reasonably Frequent
remote probable
7.4 Recommendations
The potential of providing a ship structure’s crashworthiness seems underrated at this

moment. Figure 8 shows an FN diagram depicting the yearly probability of fatalities on
passenger ships due to various causes. It is remarkable that the collision scenario shows a
relatively high probability of fatalities. It illustrates the advantage of reducing the
vulnerability to collision through improving crashworthiness.
Nevertheless, no clear relationship has been found between the ship structure’s
crashworthiness and the probability of passenger survival, nor is there a connection to
hazardous cargo outflow. The ship’s design can be assessed when the probability
distributions of kinetic energy sailing with a known displacement and speed are calculated,
and the hull’s crashworthiness is estimated for a given area of navigation.
Along these lines, we can develop a method to quantify the effect of crashworthiness on
ships’ survivability with respect to damage stability. In the case of passenger ships, the
effect that crashworthiness has on the time it takes to sink or capsize should be considered,
especially in view of passenger evacuation. Similarly, a method must be developed to
quantify the effect crashworthiness has on reducing the probability of cargo outflow.
It also seems opportune to work toward a common risk denominator, so that shipping safety
performance can be compared to the safety performance of other modes of transportation.
In this respect, the civil engineering industry provides very valuable ideas and concepts,
such as The International Council for Research and Innovation in Building and
Construction (CIB 2001.)
Figure 8: FN diagram of passenger ships carrying more than 3,000 persons.
8. DESIGNS AGAINST COLLISION AND GROUNDING
Increased safety concerns require improved structural crashworthiness, in particular with

respect to grounding and collision accidents. Structural crashworthiness of double hulled
tankers can be improved, especially to prevent high-energy collision accidents. Recent
investigations on innovative designs demonstrate the tendency to minimize the extent of
damage. On the other hand, reducing the striking ship’s stiffness or changing the collision’s
form also emerge as potential options for reducing accidental damages. As usual, due
consideration was paid towards balancing the need to increase a hull structure’s energy
absorption against the need to commercially produce and inspect the hull in the future.
8.1 Buffer bow
Collision damages vary. The degree of damage sometimes depends on vessel positions
during the collision, and the relative stiffness between the striking and struck vessels. A
right-angle collision can cause the struck vessel’s side shell penetrated and the striking bow
crushed. An oblique collision may cause the striking bulbous bow to bend a little while
being crushed. Rigid bulbous bows create concentrated damage (penetration), while soft
(more flexible) striking bows cause wider and shallower damage to struck side structures.
It was concluded that reinforcing side structures more is not cost effective (ASIS 1997). A
more feasible option to reduce side structure damage is to have weaker striking bows. This
leads to the concept of buffer bows, a very cost effective way of reducing pollution. Buffer
bows can be built without increasing cost. For example, transversely framed bows are
much softer or more flexible than longitudinally framed bows, and are easier to crush in a
collision. Transversely framed bows are also not inferior in taking on wave slamming
loads. Bows can also be built with blunter forms so that when they penetrate a struck
vessel, the penetration is wider and shallower (Kitamura 2000, Endo 2004, Endo et al 2004,
Yamada and Endo 2004, Yamada et al 2005).
However, if the ship owner uses the buffer bow, either the buffer bow must be mandatory,
or there should be a financial advantage, such as an insurance discount. In making buffer
bow regulations, the bow’s form should not be specified. Instead, the maximum load or
absorbing energy should be specified. In addition, the buffer bow concept can be achieved,
and should be left to the designer.
8.2 Innovative double hull designs and steel sandwich panels
Recently, some new steel double hull structures were invented to achieve better energy
absorption capacity. Figure 9 shows some innovative hull designs developed by Schelde
Naval Shipbuilding and Ship Laboratory of the Helsinki University of Technology. The
intention of these new designs was to prevent early crack occurrence during a collision or
grounding. Reported studies are about the Y-type shell structures (Konter et al 2004, Hu et
al 2005), and sandwich side shell panels (Naar et al 2002, Klanac et al 2005), see Figure 10.
The X-type sandwich panels have been shown to absorb more energy without the
occurrence of cracks (Törnqvist and Simonsen 2004).
Figure 9: Innovative and traditional hull designs.
Klanac et al (2005) have studied several different conceptual crashworthy steel sandwich
designs and compared them with traditional existing structures for ship side shells. The
problem is approached as a multi-criteria design where the side structure is designed to
maximize energy absorption and minimize penetration depth, breadth, cost of production
and weight, while satisfying needs of standard service.
6
°
60
5 100
360
50
180
5
675
(a) Dimensions
10
energy [MJ]
Outer plating tear

Inner hull tear
8
sandwich,
500 mm
6
4 sandwich,
360 mm
conventional
2
0
0,0 0,3 0,5 0,8 1,0 1,3 1,5
penetration [m]
(b) Energy absorption
Figure 10: Novel design of a steel sandwich panel (Klanac et al 2005).
8.3 Double hulls
There were also parametric studies whose researchers sought to improve structural designs
of double hull tankers. Design parameters such as plate thickness and width of wing ballast
tanks were mixed, and the range of the tanker structures’ during collisions or groundings
were calculated (Paik et al. 1999, Kitamura 2000, Tikka 2001, Lützen and Simonsen 2002,
Sajdak and Brown 2005). When streamlined programs which incorporated simplified
analytical methods became available, a large body of accident events and design variations
could be analyzed, and the effectiveness of potential improved double hull structures were
estimated in probabilistic format.
8.4 Composite and sandwich panels
Urban (Urban 2003) reported laboratory test results on the crushing of six sandwich
intersections, which were assembled of an E-glass/polyester laminate and a polyurethane
core. The T- and X- intersections represented the connection between the upper deck and
side shell and the connection of deck and longitudinal bulkhead in an HSC bow,
respectively. Generally, no failure was observed before the ultimate strength was reached.
After ultimate strength was reached, white bands of damaged laminate formed across the
flanges varying from 1 cm to 5 cm in thickness. These specimens showed good global
stability during the crushing tests, and none failed in a global buckling mode. Numerical
simulations of these tests strongly correlated with the initial crushing responses, but the
predicted ultimate strength and average crushing forces were not satisfactory.
As part of the EU SANDWICH project, the behavior of steel sandwich panels under local
impact loading was investigated experimentally, numerically, and analytically (Kujala et al,
2004 and Tabri, 2003). Verification data was obtained by a series of laboratory
experiments. Different configurations included several coating and filling materials,
multiple core designs, and different material properties. This project also included full-
scale testing optimization of X-type steel sandwich panels as part of the CRASHCOASTER
project. The results revealed good energy absorption capability, without loss of integrity of
the side structures (Törngvist and Simonsen, 2004).
8.5 Aluminum panels
Urban also conducted tests on aluminum intersection crushing (Urban 2003). Cracks were
observed in the welded intersections of some specimens. The folding mechanisms were
similar to steel intersections until the onset of cracks. Once there are cracks, the membrane
stretching is relieved by the separation of component flanges, and the plastic hinges’
bending dominated.
8.6 Economic considerations
Vessel owners normally invest more in materials to improve crashworthiness. Boitsov

(2002) formulated a simplistic quantitative procedure for evaluating the positive effects of
reducing oil spills and the negative effects of reducing payloads. He estimated the
consequences of strengthening side structures, hoping that these probabilistic economic
impact studies would provide a better basis for deciding to invest more in materials. Similar
studies were conducted by Appolonov et al (2002).
8.7 Recommendations
The Committee recommends that the community continue to develop designs that reduce
pollution caused by collisions and groundings. Some innovations that may work would
include changes to the structural arrangement and using steel sandwich panels.
In the process of searching for more environmentally friendly vessels, one cannot ignore
other considerations, such as economical limits, international regulations, and classification
societies’ design rules. Decisions about innovative designs should be based on systematic
approaches to balance various demands and requirements.
In view of the demand for heightened high speed craft safety, and the emerging
commercialization of navy vessel classifications, further development on composite and
aluminum panels is needed.
9. OFFSHORE STRUCTURE COLLISION
The offshore industry has a risk management concept that is totally different from that of the
marine industry. (Refer also to Committee V.2 for broader coverage on general offshore
related development). As represented by the Recommended Practice of the American
Petroleum Institute (API), the offshore industry has established systemic assessment
procedures for fixed platforms that address the probability of occurrence, risk ranking,
structural analyses, and acceptance criteria. While people become more interested in
developing oil and gas in deeper and more remote offshore locations, we see some research
and development that focus on collision risk assessment of floating structures, especially
ship-shaped FPSOs. This chapter is focused on general methodology and design accident
scenarios for FPSOs.
This chapter also surveys research and projects on ship-to-bridge collisions. Bridges and
offshore installations remain in specific locations, and therefore their risks are managed in a
somewhat similar manner.
9.1 Existing criteria in offshore design codes
The API recommends evaluating the structural performance of (fixed) platforms that
suggest a high risk to life safety and/or the possibility of failure when there is a fire, blast or
accidental loading, see API Recommended Practice 2A-WSD (API 2000). This API RP
specifies the following assessment tasks for evaluating the events (fire, blast, and accidental
loading) that could occur to the platform over its intended service life and service
function(s):
• Task 1, assign a platform exposure category for the platform
• Task 2, assign risk levels to the probability of the event
• Task 3, determine the appropriate level of risk for the selected platform and event
• Task 4, conduct further study or analyses to better define the risk, consequence
and cost of mitigation
• Task 5, reassign a platform exposure category and/or mitigate the risk or the
consequence of the event
• Task 6, assess structural integrity if the platform is considered high-risk
Vessel collision during normal operations is one of the accidental loading possibilities.
Such a scenario for platforms in the Gulf of Mexico is one when 1,000-ton supply vessel
collides, either head-on or broadside, with the platform at a speed of 0.5 m/s. The vessel is
chosen to represent typical OSVs in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. This API RP requires that the
platform survive the initial collision, and meet the post-impact criteria. During the
described collision, the offshore structure absorbs energy primarily from localized plastic
deformation of the tubular wall, elastic/plastic bending, and elongation of the member. In
addition, if the fendering device is fitted, then there is global platform deformation, in
addition to ship deformation and/or rotation. After collision, the damaged platform should
retain sufficient residual strength to withstand one-year environmental storm loads in
addition to normal operation loads. In the North Sea (see, e.g., NTS 1999, ISO 2005a), the
collision is described as one from a vessel of 5,000 tons with a drifting speed of 2.0 m/s
(DNV 2001). The collision energy is 14 MJ for a broad-side collision and 11 MJ for a
head-on collision.
There are some limited reports on ship-to-platform collision and the consequential risks to
the damaged structures. Experts recognize that ship collisions are not likely to cause the
push-over failure of collided platforms that lose some individual structural members,
especially in a benign environment. However, minimum structures may see rapid
deterioration of the overall structural integrity if impact damages are left un-repaired
(Grewal and Lee 2004).
9.2 FPSO collision
An FPSO has a typical tanker shape and therefore uses the structural designs of tankers.
There have been several ship impacts with FPSOs. In five incidents, shuttle tankers caused
the impact; and one near contact of a shuttle tanker was reported. None of these impacts
were critical, and in fact, the consequences were marginal. There are also reports of
offloading shuttle tankers colliding with FPSOs in the North Sea. The most severe shuttle
tanker impact so far involved energy of 37 MJ (BOMEL 1999).
Compared to many fixed installations that are supported by truss constructions, an FPSO
has a higher level of structural redundancy, and therefore can survive a high level of
collision impact energy (Wang et al 2003). Analyses of collision resistance can be based on
fundamental methods and approaches covered in sections 5.2 to 5.4, and Skallerund and
Amdahl (2002).
Moan et al (2002) reported that the critical energy for penetrating the wing tanker of an
FPSO that is 40 m wide and 21 meters deep is about 8 to 18 MJ when the FPSO is struck by
a 42,000 DWT tanker; 40 to 55 MJ when the FPSO is struck by a 18,000 DWT tanker; and
57 MJ when its engine room is penetrated by a tandemly moored shuttle tanker. These
figures are indicative of the energy’s magnitude. Many other influential factors, such as
striking bow designs, also play a role, and therefore collision situations should be treated on
a case by case basis.
There is no formalized acceptance criterion for an FPSO collision, especially not for
structural designs. Relevant studies are limited. Some things that may be considered during
structural design are oil spills, residual strength, and the cost of impact, among others.
9.3 FPSO collision scenarios
FPSOs have a risk profile different from fixed platforms and commercial trading tankers;
because they are stationed in one location, and are routinely visited by supply boats and
shuttle tankers. FPSOs can be struck by these vessels. In addition, passing ships also pose
a collision risk if an FPSO is close to a sailing route. Three main scenarios require detailed
assessment (Moan et al 2002, Wang et al 2003):
• Visiting supply vessels (high frequency and low consequences),
• Passing vessel collision (low frequency and high consequences), and
• Offloading shuttle tankers (medium frequency with high potential consequences).
Accident scenarios for supply vessel collisions may be established based on historical
incident data. Because of the frequent supply vessel visits and the potential for
accompanying accidents, there are many incident data that are adequate for statistically
presenting incident trends. Nevertheless, we should note the accident records interpretation.
See also sections 4.1, 4.2.
Many incident data are available from the North Sea. For many years, data have been
collected from the North Sea, and analyzed. The Health and Safety Executive, United
Kingdom (HSE 2004) has published many results of such analyses. For the Gulf of
Mexico, collision incident records can be found from the U.S. Minerals Management
Services (MMS 2000) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG 1999). MacDonald et al
(1999) presented an analysis on collision risks in the Gulf of Mexico. Classification
societies such as ABS, DnV, LR and NK also maintain vessel incident databases.
Generally, these in-house databases cover other geographical areas as well, but are not
confined to offshore installations.
In an analysis on a collision between a supply vessel and an FPSO in West Africa, Oh et al

(2005) assumed that a collision could occur in three places: on the riser, the protector, and
the deflector. They selected to look into collisions that induce large deformations on the
framed structure at a colliding speed of 1 m/s. They estimated that the speed was a result of
marine equipment failure, or human error.
Occurrence probability of passing vessel collisions can not be fully captured using only
historical incident data. Very limited data are available. Even though there are some, the
presence of an offshore installation will absolutely affect the situation when it is absence.
There is increasing interest in developing techniques combining historical data with an

analytical model, because historical data can not always be used for predicting the future.
This is especially true for passing vessel collisions, because the traffic pattern varies from
one location to another. Haugen (1998) described a conceptual route-based model for an
annual collision frequency rate per year for a given installation.
A few incidents of shuttle tanker collisions occurred, but the likelihood of this type of
accident is very difficult to specify from sparse historical data. Often, expert opinions are
the only choice that decision makers have when there is very little data of previous
incidents. Recently, Chen (2003) and Chen et al (2002, 2003) reported a simulation-based
approach that showed promise as a potential alternative of simply collecting expert
opinions. This new approach adopts operation simulators widely used in training crews for
predicting how close a shuttle tanker may come to an FPSO during an offloading operation.
With a large number of simulations of offloading operations, the relative motion between an
FPSO and an offloading tanker can be fit into some statistical models. Then the probability
of collision can be estimated based on those outcomes.
9.4 Design events for FPSO collision
Moan et al (2002) generated an energy spectrum that showed the cumulative collision
frequencies versus the energy generated by a collision, with the event corresponding to a
specified annual exceedance probability of e.g. 10-4. The most probable impact locations
(bow, stern, side) and impact geometry should be established based on the dimensions and
geometry of the structure (FPSO) and of the impacting vessel. It should also account for
draught variations, the operational sea-state, and vessel motions.
Collision scenarios involve supply ships impacts, relatively less frequent shuttle tanker
impacts when in tandem to offloading operations, and passing vessel collisions. Colliding
supply ships may cause penetration of the side shell, but it is unlikely to penetrate the inner
skin causing oil outflow or overall hull girder failure. Stern impact by a tandem shuttle
tanker is a possible event and may cause flooding of the aft machinery room, and damage
the aft flare tower. Collisions caused by passing vessels are dependent on the location of
the FPSO relative to ship lanes. Studies on sites in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico
show that the annual impact probability may vary from about 10-3 down to 10-6 or less.
Such impacts may be caused by vessels traveling at high speeds that have large mass, and
may result in significant impact energy and damage potential. Therefore, we can predict
that it will cause flooding and outflow from one or two wing tanks, and a center tank.
9.5 Ship - Bridge collision
A survey of international bridge projects (Pedersen et al 1998) reveals that efforts have
been made to minimize the risk of collisions to bridges, bridge users, and the environment.
To reduce risk, both bridge safety and navigational safety need to be addressed. A risk
analysis requires:
• Establishment of a realistic representation of the navigational activity,
• Conditions and practice that can be expected once the bridge has been built,
• Selection of a design collision scenario (e.g., ship size, speed) to measure collision
severity,
• Assessment of consequences such as structural failure,
• User fatalities and environmental pollution,
• Acceptance criteria establishment (preferably prior to commencement of risk
analyses), and
• Evaluation of preventative and protective measures.
Building on the experiences of ship collision analyses for the Great Belt Bridge, Pedersen
(2002) presented a symmetrical methodology for addressing collision risk for fixed
installations close to high-density shipping lanes. Causation factors and the number of
collision candidate ships are taken into account. Traffic of different ship types, length, and
loading conditions are based on statistical data.
China has been building many new bridges over the Yangzi River and many bays. To
provide the design load for bridge piers, analyses of ship to bridge collisions have been
completed for most of the bridge construction projects. Also, special collision-protecting
structures have been designed and constructed for some of bridges.
China has two rules that specify collision force: 1) “Design Rules for Highway and
Bridges” (China Railway Publishing House 1985), and 2) “Technical Rules for Engineering
of Railway” (China Communication Press 1989). Ship collision forces in the former rules
are tabulated and specified according to the river way grade, and are defined in the later
rules by the following function: F = γ V sin(W/(C1+C2))0.5, where, γ is the kinetic energy
reducing ratio (which is 0.3 during a normal ship to bridge collision, and 0.2 otherwise), V
is the velocity of the striking ship, W is the mass of the ship; C1 is the elastic deformation
ratio of ship, C2 is the elastic deformation ratio of bridge. In addition, design formulas in
AASHTO-1994 and in IABSE were often referred in estimating collision force.
The Chinese projects mainly used simplified non-linear collision analyses or full FEM
dynamic simulations using DYTRAN or DYNA software. The size and speed of striking
vessels were estimated from the voyage statistics and 30~50 years of water-route
development layout at the bridge’s location. The speed of the current, wind, and other
natural conditions were considered in some cases. Bridges with multi-spans had different
collision scenarios specified for piers of main and auxiliary spans. Various vessels, speeds,
draft, tides, etc. were assumed.
9.6 Recommendations
The marine community needs to formalize the risk assessment approach for addressing
ship-to-floating installation collisions. Further investigations may define design accident
scenarios, the probability of shuttle tanker impact, and accidental loads with specified
exceedance probabilities.
The offshore industry has been using simplified structural models in calculating energy
absorption. More sophisticated tools such as the nonlinear FEM are recommended so
that structural responses during and after a collision can be more precisely predicted.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Crashworthiness: The concept and methodology of structural crashworthiness are maturing

and have reached a level where they can be applied in analyses and evaluations of a wide
range of collision and groundings. The committee advocates more studies and application,
and recommends continued tools refinement to apply to structural crashworthiness.
Probability of collision and grounding events: Future research on procedures that reduce
collision and grounding probabilities should focus on developing risk-based software. The
software should be capable of rationally modeling the cost and risk reduction features of
each risk control option. The calculated cost of these risk reducing measures must then be
compared with savings from calculated reductions in expenses. When such tools have been
developed, we can balance risk control option investments and related safety improvements
against the benefits.
Risk assessment: Risk assessment approaches are well suited to collision and grounding
issues, and are expected to continuously stand in the center of future development. The
committee recommends focusing on integrating predictive calculation tools, including the
development of streamlined software/programs. The committee knows that collision speeds
in damage reports are not certain, and are of questionable credibility. We therefore
recommend that the global community move towards unifying procedures to more precisely
record incidents and damages.
Rule and regulation development: Future rules and regulations on collisions and
groundings need to address:
• Design incident/accident scenarios,
• Responses (of ships, offshore installations, bridges, etc) to an incident/accident,
and
• Consequences and acceptance criteria.
Risk assessment approaches are now viable tools to use for developing rules and
regulations. Experiences of offshore industry and other industries provide a wealth of
useful information, and may be good references for the shipping industry. The committee
identifies some key development directions, which include framework for rule and
regulation development, formalized accident scenarios, and definition of damage extents,
among others.
Predictive calculation approaches: The latest research and development since the early
1990s has produced many useful tools that can predict various aspects of a collision or
grounding. Topics that will further refine these methods include:
• Rupture strain,
• Post-accident loads (both still-water and dynamic loads),
• Grounding, and
• Influences of ballast water or cargo oil in tanks.
The number of these advanced predictive calculation approaches will reply on the
development of useful software.
Applications: The committee highly recommends more active application of the latest
research and development achievements to offshore industry and high-speed crafts. We
need further in-depth studies to investigate the behavior of aluminum and sandwich panels.
We also need further studies to look into innovative designs that maximize the
crashworthiness in an accidental impact.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The committee has received support and valuable comments from many individuals: Jorgen
Amdahl, Bart Boon (Standing Committee Liasion), Haibo Chen, Weichen Cui (China
Standing Committee member), Igor Davydov (committee member until 2005), G.V.
Ergorov (Ukraine Correspondent), Zhiqian Hu, Lyuben Ivanov, Ozgur Ozguc, Bo
Simonsen, Jack Spencer, Yoichi Sumi (Japan Standing Committee member), and Leshan
Zhang. Diana Combs provided extensive editorial assistance. Leanne Ebow and Jim Speed
helped with proof-reading.
This committee and committee chairman would like to express our sincere appreciation to
all these individuals for their continuous supports and encouragement during the last 3
years.
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Collision and Grounding

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16th INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND

OFFSHORE STRUCTURES CONGRESS

2. PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGY OF COLLISION AND

3. APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY .............................. 11

4. LIKELIHOOD OF INCIDENTS, PROBABILISTIC ENERGY DISTRIBUTION 16

5. MECHANICS OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING ............................................. 20

6. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING..................................... 30

7. ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.............................................. 36

8. DESIGNS AGAINST COLLISION AND GROUNDING ....................................... 39

9. OFFSHORE STRUCTURE COLLISION ................................................................. 44

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................... 49

Research and development in 1990s were characterized by:

As of the late 1990s, the foci have been:

2. PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGY OF COLLISION AND

2.1 Accidental limit state design

2.2 Existing design standards

The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has developed a series of

2.3 Current trends in design standard development related to accident limits

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is developing “Goal Based Standards”

2.4 Recent national and international projects

The EU-funded CRASHCOASTER project (Vredeveldt 2001) has established a

In the U.S., the Ship Structure Committee (www.shipstructure.org) recently sponsored a

In Europe, a new Network of Excellence on Marine Structures (MARSTRUCT) was

The committee recommends that performance-based design standards be developed by the

3. APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

3.1 Risk assessment methodology

3.2 Application to collision and grounding problems

Figure 1: Overview of steps in a comprehensive collision risk analysis.

A comprehensive software risk analysis package (GRACAT) was previously developed at

3.3 Application to waterway designs

The IALA tool was developed to:

The key features of the IWRAP program are:

3.4 Safety measures and risk control options

Examples of preventive risk control options influenced by ship designers are:

Similarly, the ship operator controls risk options such as:

Finally, the society is responsible for:

4. LIKELIHOOD OF INCIDENTS, PROBABILISTIC ENERGY

4.1 Available approaches

Incident occurrence frequencies may be determined through: 1) statistics from historical

4.2 Statistics of incidents

Approach Main Advantages Main Disadvantages

These databases are in various stages of development across governments and

4.3 Predictive calculations and energy reference values

5. MECHANICS OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING

5.2 Internal mechanisms

Analysis efforts Results

5.3 Rupture criteria

Rupture is predicted to occur as soon as the following equation is satisfied:

5.4 External mechanics

(a) Test setup

(b) Front view of test channel

Figure 3: Model test of ship collisions (Määttänen 2005).

5.5 Influences of fluid in tanks

5.6 Coupled internal and external mechanics

performance of ships. SIMCOL is sufficiently fast to be applied to thousands cases of

Numerical collision simulations were performed using ALE coupling of MSC/DYTRAN or

(a) Striking ship

(b) Struck ship

Figure 5: Variation of energy components throughout a collision (Tabri et al 2004):

6. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLISION AND GROUNDING

The Earth’s ecological equilibrium is becoming more fragile. It is everyone’s responsibility

6.1 Oil outflow

6.2 Damage stability