Republic of the Philippines The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana
SUPREME COURT Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that they
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and
IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the
decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by
the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said
court and held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and
void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then
appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its
improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino
Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that
the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in
their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any
lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the
defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent
per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the
plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the
value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner.
The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of
Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another
certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their
brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free
of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by
law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio
under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with
certificate of title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of
Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No.
496, which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the
municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the
petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate
value of the fruits which he received from the land; that the
petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land
and its possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be
restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or
encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of
deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu
thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner
pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of
the complaint and by way of special defense alleged that he was in
possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof
by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and
the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly
ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the
respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest
per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the
respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of
the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as
value of all the improvements which he introduced upon the
land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner
executed the following public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May,
1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age,
widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the
party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street,
Manila, P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree
to and with each other as follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute
registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of Alngan,
municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being
evidenced by homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the
Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of
the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral
Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W.
614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to
point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point
"4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point
"6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1,
point of beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points
1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on
bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property
claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South,
by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and
on the West, by property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing
true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections
12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of
the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on
July 8, 1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described
land consist of the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of
bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) boñga trees.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and
the assessed value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by
tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of
second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, the party of the first part hereby encumbers and
hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the
party of the first part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if
the party of the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to paid
to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on
or before the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half
(4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument, the
aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12
per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become null
and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force
and effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner and form
provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and
also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes
and assessments which are or may become due on the above
described land and improvements during the term of this
agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution
of this agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion
before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I.,
requesting cancellation of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325
referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No.
496, as amended by Act 3901.
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of
the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the
mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute
a deed of absolute sale of the property herein described for the
same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at
the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under
Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing
contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the
mortgage stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full
force and effect.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their
hands the day and year first herein before written.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without
cedula by reason of her sex, to me known and known to me to be
the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and
voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages
including this page of the acknowledgment and that each page
thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the
witnesses in their presence and in the presence of each other, and
that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one parcel.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in
1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay
the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into
another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect
the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the
petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the
products thereof, did not collect the interest on the loan,
introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000,
according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was
transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value
of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of
Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the contract
entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public
deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its
improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and
without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent
verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering,
however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of
error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals violated the
law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land
and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal
effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect
that the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail
because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281
of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall
be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The
contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance
with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room
for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning
of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit
1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal
contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per
cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of
the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties
having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in
the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract of
mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000
and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties
stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a
half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest
thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect;
in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be
paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was covenanted that
within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the
land would file a motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan
asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu
thereof another be issued under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause
VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years
and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land
in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of
the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it
was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under
clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void and
the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not
less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms,
clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order
should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when
such separation can be made because they are independent of the
valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties.
Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating
the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions
are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the
question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the
principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the
obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion
based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to
consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering
therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established
connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable
from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically
speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.
(Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed
in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains
several promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part
only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be
separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the
illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for
a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful
promise was made at the same time and for the same
consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due
to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or
by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. . . . (13
C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239
U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law.
ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke
v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet.
343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R.
Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the
parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal contract is
that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the
improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no
question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against
the law. The second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is
expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended
by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties
agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage
within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the
loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the
petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000,
including the interest stipulated and owing. The stipulation was
verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one
year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the
land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he
would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he
would attend to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made by
the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract
of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of
antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal
and void because it is legal and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the
first assignment of error is well-founded and that error was
committed in holding that the contract entered into between the
parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements
and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of
error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he
entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague
and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is
valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already
said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are
prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his
testimony, as to the verbal agreement entered into between him
and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of
Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error the same
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
he acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking
advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right
to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced by
him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract,
Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another verbal contract whereby
the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to
receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon,
provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated
interest and he would assume payment of the land tax. The
possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the
land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the
contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by
section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals
held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of
the land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana
Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter
could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The
Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith,
but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any
flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and
provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed
possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code, covered
by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real
rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the
possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit
the title thereto." We do not have before us a case of prescription
of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point. In
resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in
bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be
answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor
in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be
noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From
the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is
whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the
preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of
good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition
appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has
already been passed upon by competent authority, and even
established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and
the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon
to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a
clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to
which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing
is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal
principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact,
or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to
transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance
with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an
error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.
(Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV,
pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law
may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable
ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not
conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting
the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding
the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a
jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a
lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again
bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance
of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore,
be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to
the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the
petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act
may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession
and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we
have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible
and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in
good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning
of article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the
improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361
of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are
entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying
the petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as
appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect to
compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value
to be fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner
be compelled to pay them the sum of P650, being the approximate
value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying
the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as
the trial court that the respondents may elect to compel the
petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not
established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the
petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's
lifetime, the former would take possession of the land and would
receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition
that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he
would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at
bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should
apply the value of the fruits of the land to the payment of
stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another
of the elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under
article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to
stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also applied to the
payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing
remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This
interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas
the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly
reached said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of
said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this
should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from
the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the
annual land tax. We mention these data here to show that the
petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of
the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated
that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the secured
indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is
reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of
mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and
binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally
by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and,
as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a
possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to
have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the
latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy
and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin,
upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to
the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged
improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the
mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that
stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged
improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the
petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the
purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his
said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all
instances. So ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
According to the contract entered into May 16, 1932, between
Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner Marcial Kasilag, the
first, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 given to her by the
second, constituted a mortgage on the improvements only of the
land which she acquired by way of homestead. The improvements
which she mortgaged consisted of four fruit bearing mango trees,
one hundred ten hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6
betelnut trees, the assessed value of which was P660. The
condition of the loan were that if the mortgagor should pay the
mortgage on November 16, 1936, that is, four and a half years
after the execution of the deed, said sum of P1,000 with interest
thereon at 12% per annum, the aforesaid mortgage would become
null and void, otherwise it would remain in full force and effect and
would b subject to foreclosure in the manner provided by law; that
the mortgagor would pay all the land tax on the land and its
improvements during the duration of the contract; and that if after
the expiration of the said period of four and a half years the
mortgagor should fail to redeem the mortgage, she would execute
in favor of the mortgage an absolute deed of sale of the property
described in the contract for the same sum of P1,000 plus interest
due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
The principal rule in the interpretation of contracts is that "If the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall
be followed. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail"
(article 1281, Civil Cod). "In order to judge as to the intention of
the contracting parties, attention must be paid principally to their
conduct at the time of making the contract and subsequently
thereto." (Article 1282.)
Now, then what is the true nature of the contract entered into
between the parties by virtue of the deed of sale executed by them
on May 16, 1932? The Court of Appeals held that it is an absolute
deed of sale of a land with a homestead certificate of title, under
the guise of a loan secured by a mortgage upon its improvements
in order to go around the prohibition contained in section 116 of
Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517.
Closely examined, the only clauses of the contract which may lead
to the conclusion that it is one of the sale are those which state
that if at the expiration of the period of four years and a half the
mortgagor should fail to pay the amount of the loan plus interest
due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, she would
execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed of absolute sale of the
land whose improvements were mortgaged for the amount of the
loan and the interest owing. It will be seen that the sale would not
be made until after the lapse of four and a half years from the
execution of the deed, if the mortgagor should fail or should not
wish to redeem the mortgaged improvements. Consequently, the
obligation contracted by said mortgagor was no more than a
conditional promise to sell. Now, then, is this a promise to sell
valid? Like any other onerous, consensual and mutually binding
contract, that of promise to sell requires for its legal existence and
validity the concurrence of consent, consideration and subject-
matter. The contract before us dos not show what is the cause or
consideration for such promise to sell. Assuming that it was the
economic impotence of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged
improvements, before she could be compelled to comply with her
obligation to sell, there is need to wait until she should fail of funds
or to abandonment. The cause will come into being only upon the
happening of said event after the four and half years and only then
will the said contract of promise to sell have juridical existence.
The P1,000 and its interest, should the mortgagor fail to redeem
the improvements upon the maturity of the indebtedness, would
be the consideration of the sale; because the promise to sell is a
contract different and distinct from that of sale and each requires a
consideration for its existence and validity.
The terms of the contract are clear and explicit and do not leave
room for doubt that the intention of the contracting parties was to
constitute a mortgage on the improvements of the land in litigation
to secure the payment of the loan for P1,000, within interest
thereon at 12 per cent per annum. It cannot be said that this
contract is simulated because the assessed value of the
improvements is P860 only. It is well known that rural properties
are valued for assessment purposes not less than half of their
market value. The true value of the said improvements may
therefore be P1,720, and the mortgagee may have considered that
adequate. Moreover, the petitioner could not have the property
whose improvements were mortgaged to him the property whose
improvements were mortgaged to him even should the mortgagor
default in the payment of interest. He could only have the
mortgaged improvements in case of foreclosure should he bid
therefor at the sale. Neither could the mortgagor sell the same
property to the mortgagee, even after the expiration of five years
from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title, for then the
sale would be in satisfaction of an obligation contracted during the
five years, which is prohibited by the oft-mentioned section 116 of
Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517. The fact
that after one year the contracting parties had novated the
contract of loan secured by a mortgagee, converting the same into
a contract of anti-chresis because of the mortgagor's failure to pay
the accrued interest, does not show that they intended to enter
into a contract of sale, because the conversion in this case of the
contract of loan secured by a mortgage into one of antichresis was
accidental, due to the mortgagor's default in the payment of
unpaid interest for the first year. if the parties' intention from the
beginning had been to sell the property, the mortgagee would
have immediately entered upon the possession of the land instead
of waiting until after the expiration of one year. The transfer of the
Torrens certificate of title to the homestead by the original owner
to the mortgagee in 1934 was only a consequence of the
conversion of the mortgage loan into an anti-chretic loan, the
parties having such a transfer. The setting off of the interest on
the debt against the fruits of the property given in antichresis finds
authority in article 1885 of the of the Civil Code. There is,
therefore, no ambiguity in the terms of the contract warranting the
search outside its four corners for the true intention of the
contracting parties other than that of entering into a contract of
loan secured by the said improvements. If the true intention of the
contracting parties, as clearly gathered from the terms of the
contract, was to enter into a contract, was to enter into a contract
of loan secured by a mortgage upon the improvements, although
they should convert it into a contract of antichresis after one year
and although after the maturity of the loan with interest they may
wish to convert it into one of absolute sale — both conversions
being illegal and, hence, void, — 8 the original intention of
entering into a contract of loan secured by a mortgagee upon the
improvements would prevail, the said contract of loan being the
only one legal and valid, and the petitioner having acted in good
faith in making it.
The verbal contract of antichresis, entered into by the petitioner
Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio, being null and void ab
initio and without any legal effect because it is in violation of the
express prohibition of section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by
section 23 of Act No. 3517, (article 4 of the Civil Code), the
contracting parties should restore to each other the things which
have been the subject-matter of the contract, together with their
fruits, and the price paid therefor, together with interest, pursuant
to Article 1303 of the same Code. Marcial Kasilag, therefore,
should return to Emiliana Ambrosio or to her heirs the possession
of the homestead and the improvements thereon with its fruits,
and Emiliana Ambrosio or her heirs should pay him the sum of
P1,000, being the amount of the loan, plus interest due and
unpaid.
As to the improvements introduced upon the land by the
petitioner, having done so with the knowledge and consent of its
owner Emiliana Ambrosio, the former acted in good faith, and
under article 361 of the Civil Code, the owner of the land may
have the said improvements upon paying the indemnity provided
in articles 453 and 454, or may compel the said Marcial Kasilag,
who introduced the said improvements, to pay the price of the
land. If the herein respondents, as heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio, do
not wish or are unable to pay for said improvements, and Marcial
Kasilag does not wish or is unable to pay the land, said petitioner
would lose his right of intention over the same (Bernardo vs.
Batalan, 37 Off. G., No. 74, p. 1382), provided that he may
remove the improvements which he had introduced in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I concur in the majority opinion except
insofar as it holds that the interest is set off against the fruits of
the mortgaged improvements, because as a result of the nullity of
the contract of antichresis the petitioner should return to the
respondents the products of the mortgaged improvements, and
the latter should pay to the petitioner the amount of the loan plus
interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from
the date of the contract until fully paid.
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
On August 27, 1918, Emiliana Ambrosio put in a homestead
application for lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastre, Province of
Bataan. After complying with the requisite legal formalities, she
obtained therefor homestead patent No. 16074, the same having
been recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on Juner 26,
1931. On May 16, 1932, she entered with the herein petitioner,
Marcial Kasilag, into a contract, Exhibit 1, inserted in the foregoing
majority opinion.
Sometime in 1933, or a year after the execution of the
aforequoted and land taxes, whereupon, the mortgage, Marcial
Kasilag, and the mortgagor, Emiliana Ambrosio, verbally agreed
that the former would pay the land taxes and waive the unpaid
interest, enter into the possession of the property in question,
introducing improvements thereon, and thereafter be reimbursed
for the value of such improvements. Under this verbal pact,
Kasilag went into possession of the property, planted it with the
fruit trees allegedly valued at P5,000, and on May 22, 1934,
declared the same for taxation purposes. In 1934 the original
homesteader, Emiliana Rodriguez, Severo Mapilisan, Ignacio del
Rosario and Gavino Rodriguez.
On May 16, 1936, the said heirs, with the exception Gavino
Rodriguez who testified for the defendant, sued Marcial Kasilag in
the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover the possession of
the aforesaid property belonging to their mother. For answer, the
defendant put in as was in good faith with the knowledge and
tolerance of the plaintiffs, a counterclaim for P1,000 representing
the loan to the deceased homesteader with stipulated interest
there on, and a recoupment for P5,000 allegedly the value of the
improvements he had introduced upon the land. On the issues
thus joined, the trial court gave judgment for the defendant
couched in the following language:
Resuming all that has been said above, the court find and declares
that the deed of combined mortgage and sale executed by
Emiliana Ambrosio in favor of the defendant Marcial Kasilag and
dated May 16, 1932, is null and void as a contract for a future
conveyance or sale of the homestead, but valid as an equitable
mortgage on the improvements for the sum of P1,000; and that
the possession of the homestead by the defendant Marcial Kasilag
by virtue of said contract or by virtue of any other agreement is
null and void, but that the making of the improvements thereon by
him, which the court finds to be valued at P3,000, by virtue of the
verbal agreement entered into after the executing of the original
instrument of mortgage, was in good faith, entitling the said
Marcial Kasilag to be reimbursed of their actual value, the above-
mentioned amount. Wherefore, let judgment be entered declaring
that the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession as owners of the
homestead subject of the present suit, lot No. 285 of the Limay
cadastral survey, subject to an encumbrance of the improvements
for the sum of P1,000 in favor of the defendant, ordering the
defendant deliver unto the plaintiffs in turn to pay unto the
defendant jointly and severally, as heirs of their deceased mother
Rafaela Rodriguez the sum of P3,000, value of the improvements
introduced on said homestead by defendant. Let there be no
pronouncement as to costs." On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals reached a different result and
modified the judgment of the trial court as follows:
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring
that the contract, Exhibit "1", is entirely null and void; that the
plaintiffs and appellants are the owners of the lot in question
together with all the improvements thereon in common with their
brother, Gavino Rodriguez, and are, therefore, entitled to the
possession thereof; ordering the defendant and appellee to vacate
and deliver the possession of the aforementioned plaintiffs and
appellants free from any encumbrance; requiring latter, however,
to pay jointly and severally to the said appellee the sum of P1,000
with the interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from
and including the date this decision becomes final; and absolving
the said plaintiffs and appellants from the cross-complaint with
respect to the value of the improvements claimed by the appellee.
It is further ordered that the register of deeds of Bataan cancel the
certificate of title No. 325 in the name of the deceased, Emiliana
Ambrosio, and issue in lieu thereof anew certificate of title in favor
of the herein plaintiffs and appellants and their brother, Gavino
Rodriguez, as owners pro indiviso and in equal shares free from
any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided by law.
Without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The case is before us on petition for certiorari which was given due
course, filed by defendant-appellee, Marcial Kasilag, now
petitioner, against plaintiffs-appellants, Rafaela Rodriguez and
others, now respondents. The burden of petitioner's case is
condensed in the following assignments of error:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:
I. In having interpreted that document Exhibit "1" is an
absolute sale and declared it entirely null and void, and in not
having interpreted and declared that it is a deed of combined
mortgage and future sale which, if void as a contract for future
conveyance of the homestead in question is, however, valid as an
equitable mortgage on the improvements thereof for the sum of
P1,000 loaned by petitioner Marcial Kasilag to the homestead
owner Emiliana Ambrosio.
II. In holding that the petitioner was guilty of the violation of
the public land law for having entered into said contract Exhibit
"1".
III. In not giving probative value to the uncontradicted
testimony of the petitioner Marcial Kasilag that he was expressly
authorized by the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio to
introduction by him of improvements therein by virtue of the
verbal agreement entered into after the execution of the original
instrument of mortgage was in good faith, entitling him to
reimbursed of the actual value of improvements he introduced.
Boiled down to the fundamentals, there are only two propositions
which stands to be resolved in this appeal: (1) What is the legal
nature of the agreement, Exhibit 1, entered into by and between
the parties? and (2) Is Marcial Kasilag guilty of bad faith in
entering upon the possession of the homestead, paying the land
tax and introducing improvements thereon?
The numerous adjudications in controversies of this nature will
show that each case must be decided in the light of the attendant
circumstances and the situation of the parties which, upon the
whole, mark its character. However, for the purpose of
ascertaining the manner and extent to which persons have
intended to be found by their written agreements, the safe
criterion, the time honored test, is their contention which is
intimately woven into the instrument itself. It is true that resort to
extrinsic evidence is imperative when the contract is ambiguos and
is susceptible of divergent interpretations; nevertheless, the
primary obligation of the courts is to discover the intention of the
contracting parties, as it is expressed by the language of the
document itself. We are not authorized to make a contract for the
parties.
In the trial court as in the Court of Appeals, the discussion
centered on the nature and validity of the document, Exhibit 1.
This is the correct approach. The Court of Appeals, however,
rejected the conclusion of the trial court that it is an absolute deed
of sale which is null and void in its entirely because it is banned by
section 116, as amended of the Public land Act. The ruling is now
assailed by the petitioner. I share petitioner's view that the deed is
not what it was construed to be by the Court of Appeals.
From Article I to III thereof is a description of the homestead and
the improvements existing thereon. By its Article IV the
homesteader, Emiliana Ambrosio, "encumbers and hipothecates,
by way of mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles
II and III" under the conditions set out in Articles V, VI and VII. Its
closing Articles VIII and IX, particularly relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, speak, not of a present deed of absolute sale, but of one
to be executed "upon the expiration of the period of time (4½
years) stipulated in the mortgage" if "the mortgagor should fail to
redeem this mortgage". In other words, the redemption of the
mortgage by the payment of the loan may bring about the
frustration of contemplated sale, hence, to hold unqualifiedly that
the whole of Exhibit 1, or even a part thereof, is an absolute deed
of sale would be to do violence to the terms of the document it
self.
Still other tokens drive home the same conviction. The intimation
by the Court of Appeals that the petitioner "know, therefore, that
the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law," is an argument that the petitioner could not
have brazenly disregarded the law by intending Exhibit 1 to be an
absolute deed of sale. Its further observation that "the stipulation
under article VIII of the contract, Exhibit '1' . . . clearly indicates
that there was nothing left to be done except the execution of the
deed of absolute sale," is a concession that no such sale has yet
been executed. Finally it will be recalled that under Article VII of
Exhibit 1, "within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this
agreement the party of the first part shall file a motion before the
Court of First Instance of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., requesting
cancellation of homestead certificate of title No. 325 referred to in
Article 1 hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of
title under the provisions of Land Registration Act 496, as
amended by Act 3901." And by its Article IX it provides "That in
the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not
approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
automatically become null and void." (Underlining is mine.) We
have nothing in the record to show that the required motion was
filed within thirty days or thereafter, by Emiliana Ambrosio in life,
or by her successors-in-interest after her death. Indeed,
Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325, sought to be substituted by
another through the said motion, still stands. It is, evident,
therefore, that the projected sale has and may never come into
being, because under Article IX of Exhibit 1, it became
automatically null and void. This view, incidentally, precludes
further consideration of the validity or invalidity of the sale clause
of Exhibit 1, as it will purely academic to dwell upon the nature
and effect of a contract that has passed out of existence in the
contemplation of the parties.
Having reached the conclusion, upon its plain language and
unequivocal import, that Exhibit 1 is essentially and fundamentally
a mortgage upon the improvements found on the questioned
homestead, with a conditional clause for the future sale of said
homestead and improvements which has become a "dead twig"
still attached to a living tree because the condition has never been
performed, I would, under Articles 1281 and 1283 of the Civil
Code, be otherwise content in resting our decision of this aspect of
the case on this interpretation. But I do not propose to so limit my
inquiry in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals points to
contemporaneous and subsequent circumstances, beyond the four
corners of the document, Exhibit 1, allegedly revelatory of
petitioner's concealed but evident intention to circumvent the law.
I may state, at the outset, that these circumstances are fairly
susceptible of legitimate explanations. The appealed decision could
not conceive of a man, of petitioner's intelligence, who "would
accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for the
payment of a larger amount of P1,000." But we are concerned with
an assessed valuation which is not always nor even frequently the
value that it can command in the market. To ignore this is to live
in monastic seclusion. The appealed decision would imply from the
fact that petitioner subsequently paid the land taxes and from the
further fact that Emiliana never paid stipulated interest on the one
thousand-peso loan, that Exhibit 1 was meant to vest absolute title
irretrievably in the petitioner. It could hardly be supposed at the
time of the execution of Exhibit 1 that the homesteader would fail
to make these payments, nor does it seem just to draw from these
circumstances, induced by Emiliana's own neglect, deductions
unfavorable to the petitioner. That the petitioner went upon the
possession of the questioned property is not proof that he was
even already the would-be owner thereof, for as elsewhere stated,
the said possession came practically at the suggestion of or at
least with the consent of Emiliana Ambrosio as a result of her
failure to live up to her part of the bargain. Finally, the Court of
Appeals asked: "If the real purpose was to mortgage the
improvements only as specified in article IV of the contract, why is
it that in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure
to redeem the alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to
execute a de of absolute sale of the property described therein for
the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not
of" the improvements only'?" The precaution which the petitioner
took to have the sale clause of Exhibit I so phrased that the said
sale would not be affected until after the expiration of the five-year
period prohibited by law, at which time the alienation of the
homestead would then have been perfectly legitimate, may not be
without significance to show petitioner's respect for and intention
to be on the side of the law. The very mention of the word "sale"
in the document in question argues against any attempt at
concealment, for if the said document was intended as a cover and
cloak of an illegal alienation, then the reference to the contract of
sale therein was illtimed and foolhardy.
The question next at hand is whether or not the mortgage
constituted upon the improvement's of the homestead is valid. It
is, under express provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act,
before and after its amendment, reading pertinently that "the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations." I find no
occasion to dispute this legislative policy however mistaken it may
be. It is sufficient to observe that what the law permits may be
done. Upon the other hand, I find no occasion to test the legality
of the sale provisions of Exhibit 1, as I have heretofore said, this
question is, in my opinion, moot. Moreover, the petitioner,
technically, is barred from raising this question, as he did not
appeal from and, therefore, abided by the decision of the trial
court which outlawed this sale clause as violative of the provisions
of section 116 of the Public Land Act. This part of the decision of
the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals when the latter
struck down Exhibit 1 in its entirety and, even now, petitioner does
not complain against the destruction of Exhibit 1 with respect to its
sale clause. In other words, counsel for petitioner concedes all
along that the said sale clause may be properly legislated out. As
the mortgage provisions of Exhibit 1 are independent of and
severable from the rest thereof, the same are perfectly
enforceable. Where a part of the contract is perfectly valid and
separable from the rest, the valid portion should not be avoided.
(Ollendorf vs. Abrahamson, 38 Phil., 585.)
The question yet to be answered is whether the petitioner's
possession of the question homestead was in good faith so as to
entitle him to reimbursement for improvements introduced upon
the land. The basis of petitioner's possession was a verbal
agreement with the original homesteader whereby, for failure of
the latter to comply with her obligations to pay land taxes and
stipulated interest on the loan, the former assumed the said
obligations for the privilege of going into possession of the
property, introducing improvements thereon, and thereafter being
reimbursed for the value of such improvements. The petitioner did
enter upon such possession, planted the land to fruit trees valued
at P5,000, according to him, and P3,000, according to the trial
judge. It should be stated, in passing, that the Court of Appeals
was unable to belie this verbal agreement, although it was of the
opinion "that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the
testimony of the appellee with reference to the alleged verbal
agreement". Its reason for the opinion is not because the
testimony is untrue, but because even if it were true, "it only tends
to corroborate the allegation that he acted in bad faith when he
took possession of the property and made improvements thereon,
because then he knew full well that the homestead owner could
not enter into an agreement involving the future final and absolute
alienation of the homestead in his favor." As the said opinion and
the reason back of it does not involve a question of strict fact, it is
in our power to inquire into its soundness. The weakness of the
argument lies, first, in its, (a) inconsistency and (b) in the
misconception of the legal principle involved: inconsistency,
because it considers entry of possession, payment of land tax as
facts tending to show the real character of the transaction and as
evidencing bad faith on the part of the petitioner, but at the same
time it improperly rejects the verbal agreement by which such
facts are established. It is clear that we cannot directly reject the
verbal agreement between the parties in so fat as it is favorable to
the petitioner. The misconception proceeds from the erroneous
legal conclusion that, upon the facts, the good faith is attributable
to the petitioner alone and that Ambrosio was not to be blamed for
the prohibited alienation of the homestead, as I shall presently
proceed to discuss.
In holding that the petitioner was a possessor in bad faith, the
decision sought to be reviewed first laid down the premise that
such possession is banned by law at least for five years from the
issuance of patent (section 116, Public Land Act), assumed that
the petitioner had knowledge of such law, and then drew the
conclusion that the petitioner was aware of the illegality of his
possession. We think that the assumption and conclusion are
precipitate. As observed in the foregoing majority opinion-citing
Manresa-knowledge of a legal provision does not necessarily mean
knowledge of its true meaning and scope, or of the interpretation
which the courts may place upon it. In this particular case, what
section 116 of the Public Land Act prohibits is the "incumbrance or
alienation" of land acquired thereunder within the period
prescribed therein. We may concede, as assumed by the appealed
decision, that the petitioner was cognizant of said section 116, but
this is not saying that petitioner knew that his possession came
under the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" prohibited by law,
and that the petitioner, therefore, knew that his possession was
illegal. The import of the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" is a
subject upon which "men of reason may reasonably differ," in the
same way that we ourselves have differed in the deliberation of
this case. It is not correct to assume that the petitioner had
knowledge of the illegality of his possession. The contrary
assumption, namely, that petitioner had no idea of such illegality,
would have been more in accord with the experience of everyday,
for petitioner would not have invested money and labor in the land
and assumed obligations incumbent upon the homesteader if he
had even the least suspicion that all his efforts would count for
nothing and would in the end entangle him in a mild scandal. As
possession in bad faith does not necessarily mean possession
illegal under the law, it being necessary that the possessor be
aware of such illegality, it follows that the petitioner's possession
of the homestead of the respondents was in good faith. (Art. 433,
Civil Code.) "Good faith is always presumed, and the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the
person alleging it" (article 434, Civil Code.) As a bona fide
possessor, and it being unquestioned that the improvements
introduced by him upon the land redounded to its benefit, the
petitioner is by law entitled to be paid for the value of such
improvements in the amount of P3,000, as found by the trial
judge. "Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in his possession having the option of refunding the amount of
such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the
thing has acquired by reason thereof." ( Article 453, 2nd par., Civil
Code). The reimbursement in this particular case is the more in
order in view of the express undertaking of respondent's
predecessor-in-interest to pay therefor.
Even the equities of the case militate against the respondents and
in favor of the petitioner. There is a concession that the
petitioner's possession was neither imposed upon nor wrested
from the homesteader; on the contrary, it came about by virtue of
a mutual agreement whereby the said homesteader and the herein
respondents were spared the burden of paying for land taxes and
stipulated interest and extended the benefit of having their land
improved on condition that they pay the value of such
improvements upon redeeming the land. We also have
uncontradicted fact that P400 of the one thousand-peso loan were
given to the herein respondents and the balance kept by their
mother. They may not reap and retain these benefits at the same
time repudiate and go back upon contractual obligations solemnly
entered into.
But let grant that the contract, Exhibit 1, is one of absolute sale,
as found by the Court of Appeals, what then? As the land could not
be alienated for five years from the date of the issuance of the
patent, the sale was illegal and void because it was entered into in
violation of section 116 of the Public Land Act, as amended. By
whom was the law violated? Certainly, not by Kasilag alone but by
Ambrosio as well. Both are presumed to know the law, and we
cannot justly charge Kasilag alone with that knowledge on the
alleged reason that Kasilag is rich and Ambrosio is poor. Neither
can we proceed on the bare assumption that because Exhibit 1
was written in English it was prepared by Kasilag as if he were the
only English-speaking person in the Province of Bataan where the
document was executed. Are we already living in the midst of a
communistic society that we shall have to incline invariably the
balance in favor of a litigant who happens to be well-to-do,
regardless of the merits of the case? And to this end, shall we, by
a series of assumptions and deductions, impute to a party malice
aforethought dishonesty and bad faith, in entering into a
transaction made in the open sun, publicly recorded and whose
effectiveness was even conditioned by the approval of a court of
justice? If so, then I dare say that we have not profited by the
admonition of Aristotle in his Metaphysics centuries ago that
"justice is a virtue of the soul which discards party, friendship and
sentiment and is therefore always represented as blind." There is a
charm in rhetoric but its value in cool judicial reasoning is nil.
And if — as we are confidently told — we should relax the legal
principle with reference to Ambrosio, because she was "poor and
ignorant," I am reluctant to believe that she was ignorant of the
condition against the alienation inserted in all homestead patents,
and my knowledge of the Public Land Law, of the activities of the
Department and bureau charged with the administration of public
lands, gives me just the contrary impression. Every homestead
patent contains that condition. Circulars and instructions and
general information have been issued in pursuance with law. (Sec.
5, Act No. 2874; see also sec. 5, Comonwealth Act No. 141.) I
must presume that the Government and its officials charged with
the administration of public lands have complied with the law and
their duties in this connection, and I cannot believe that Ambrosio,
when she alienated the property, was unaware of the legal
prohibition. Under the circumstances, then, it is reasonable to
conclude that on the hypothesis that the document, Exhibit 1, was
a contract of absolute sale between Kasilag and Ambrosio, both of
them were guilty of infraction of the law. If this is correct, what is
the legal situation of the parties?
Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through
practically all the civil codes of Continental Europe, considers both
as having acted in good faith. "Realmente," bluntly observes
Manresa, "si los dos que se encuentran en lucha sobre la
propiedad han provocado el conflicto por su voluntad; a ciencia y
paciencia del dueno del suelo, ante cuya vista las obras se han
ejecutado, y con conciencia, por parte del que edifica o planta, de
que el terreno no es suyo, no hay razon alguna que abone derecho
preferente en favor de ninguno de los dos; deben, por tanto,
tratarse como si los dos hubiesen obrado de buena fe; la mala fe
del uno extingue y neutraliza, en justa reciprocidad, la del otro."
(Manresa, Codigo Civil segunda edicion Tomo III pag. 203.) Article
364 of our Civil Code then comes into play. "Where there has been
bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sewed, or
planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner of the
latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in
good faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist
whenever the act has been done in his presence, with his
knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on his part."
( Article 364, Civil Code; see also arts. 1303, 1306 ibid.) The codal
section is evidently based upon the vulnerable maxim of equity
that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A
court which seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant
uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if
relief is to be granted, it must be to a plaintiff whose conduct is
not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to have applied to his
adversary.
Fundamenta justitiae sunt, ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi
serviatur. I therefore concur in the result.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
In view of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are
final according to law, I dissent from the majority opinion as to the
legal denomination of the contract really entered into by the
petitioners and the now deceased Emiliana Ambrosio.
The facts according to the decision of the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
On August 27, 1918, the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio applied for
the land in question as a homestead, now known as lot No. 285 of
the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was
approved on September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on
November 10, 1927 which was approved on October 17, 1929. The
homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No.
325 were issued in favor of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which
were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of registrar of deeds
in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act 496.
"On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner, Emiliana
Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the defendant and
appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title
found that it was a homestead patent and knew, therefore, that
the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law, so he devised a means by which the proposed
sale might not appear in any document and had the patentee,
Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit '1',
purporting to be a mere mortgage of the improvements thereon
consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; 110 hills of bamboo
trees, 1 tamarind, and 6 boñga trees, with the assessed value of
P860, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 alleged to have been
loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee, Emiliana
Ambrosio. It was expressly stipulated in that document that the
aforementioned amount should be paid within four and a half years
from the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the condition
being that if she would fail to redeem the alleged mortgage at the
expiration of the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property therein described for the same
amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including all unpaid
interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the
alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the said
Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might
become due on the land and improvements during the term of the
agreement and that within thirty days after the date of the
execution thereof she should file a motion before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead
certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu
thereof a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act 496, as amended by Act 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in
the name of the homestead (owner) Emiliana Ambrosio, and
assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial
Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was raised to
P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of
P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the execution of the
contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellant entered upon the
actual possession of the land and had been holding the same up to
the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued
according to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for
his own exclusive benefit.
Relying upon the foregoing facts, the majority contends that the
contract executed by the parties was one of mortgage, as per
Exhibit 1, with a promise to sell the land in question. I cannot hold
to these rulings of the majority, because the nature of the contract
of mortgage is inconsistent with the idea that the creditor should
immediately enter upon a possession of the mortgaged land; that
he should pay the land tax; that he should accept as security
something whose values does not cover the amount of the loan
sought to be secured, for in this case the supposed loan was
P1,000, and what were mortgaged were only the improvements
consisting of 4 mango trees, 110 hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind
tree and 6 betelnut trees, assessed at P860.
I believe that the contract which the parties intended to execute is
a promise to sell the land, for which reason Ambrosio retained the
right of ownership of the land and its improvements while the deed
of the promised sale had not been executed. Under the terms of
the deed Exhibit 1, Kasilag could not be considered the owner of
the land, nor could he execute any act promised upon the
assumption of ownership, nor could he alienate the same as he
had no title to it. But the parties, in consideration of the fact that
Kasilag paid in advance the price of the land and assumed the
obligation to pay the tax thereon, which Ambrosio could not pay,
agreed that Kasilag may enter upon the enjoyment of the land
until the promise to sell is converted in fact into an absolute sale
by the execution of the corresponding deed by Ambrosio. It was
stipulated, however, that if the sale is not approved by the Court,
Kasilag would collect the amount of P1,000 paid him as a
mortgage credit, with all the interest due and payable.
Under these circumstances, the conclusion of law that Kasilag
acted in bad faith is not supported by the established facts.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs are bound to comply with the contract as
heirs of Ambrosio, by executing in favor of Kasilag the deed of sale
of the land, but should the sale, for any reason, be not approved,
Kasilag may collect the amount of P1,000 with all the interest
thereon, and may execute the judgment obtained by him upon the
land and all its improvements, deducting, however, in his favor the
value of the improvements which he introduced upon the land in
good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the decision of
the Court of Appeals should be reversed and that another should
be entered against the respondents, requiring them to execute the
deed of sale of the land in favor of the petitioner, provided that if
the sale, for any reason, be not approved by the court, the
petitioner may execute his credit upon the land and all its
improvements, after deducting the value of the improvements
introduced by him upon the land.
MORAN, J., dissenting:
According to section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section
23 of Act No. 3517, "lands acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for
a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period."
About June 11, 1931, homestead patent No. 16074 was issued to
Emiliana Ambrosio, now deceased. On May 16, 1932 Emiliana
Ambrosio offered the sale of the said homestead to the herein
petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, and in view of the above-quoted legal
prohibition, the parties executed the document Exhibit 1, copied in
the majority decision. The heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio filed a
complaint for the annulment of the contract in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, and from the judgment rendered by said court
an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which held that the
true contract between the parties is one of absolute sale,
wherefore, it is null and void under the already cited legal
prohibition. Marcial Kasilag comes to this court on certiorari, and
this court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The only question is as to the true contract between the parties at
the time of the execution of the deed Exhibit 1; Kasilag contends
that the contract is that set out in the document Exhibit 1, that is,
a mortgage of the improvements of the homestead to secure a
loan of one thousand pesos given to Emiliana Ambrosio; and the
latter's heirs, in turn, contend that the contract is one of the
absolute sale of the homestead, wherefore, it is null and void. The
findings of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the evidence of record are as
follows:
On August 27, 1918 the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, applied for
the land in question as a homestead, not known as Lot No. 285 of
the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was
approved on September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on
November 10, 1927 which was approved on October 17, 1929. The
homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No.
325 were issued in favor of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which
were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of the register of
deeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No.
496.
On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner Emiliana
Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the defendant and
appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title
found that it was a homestead patent and knew, therefore, that
the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express
prohibition of law, so he devised means by which the proposed
sale might not appear in any document and had the patentee,
Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit 1,
purporting to be a mere mortgage of the improvements thereon
consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; one hundred ten hills
of bamboo trees, one thousand and six boñga trees, with the
assessed value of P860, in consideration of the sum of P1,000
alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said
patentee Emiliana Ambrosio. It was expressly stipulated in that
document that the aforementioned amount should be paid within
four and a half years from the date of the instrument (May 16,
1932), the condition being that if she failed to redeem the alleged
mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated period, she would
execute a deed of absolute sale of the property therein described
for the same amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including
all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of
the alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the
said Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might
become due on the land and improvements during the term of the
agreement and that within thirty days after the date of the
execution thereof she should file a motion before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead
certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu
thereof of a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in
the name of the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio, and
assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial
Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was raised to
P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of
P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the execution of the
contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellee entered upon the
actual possession of the land and had been holding the same up to
the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued
according to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for
his own exclusive benefit.
Construing the contract, Exhibit 1, in the light of all the foregoing
facts and circumstances under which it was executed in relation to
the subsequent acts of the contracting parties, we are led to the
inescapable conclusion that their real intention was to execute an
agreement of absolute sale of the homestead together with the
improvements thereon. The stipulation concerning an alleged
mortgage in the instrument is a mere devise to circumvent the law
which expressly prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of the
homestead during the period of five years from the date of the
issuance of the homestead patent. (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874 as
amended by Act No. 3517.)
It is inconceivable, and, therefore, we refuse to believe that the
appellee, Marcial Kasilag, being an intelligent man far above the
average, would accept improvements valued at only P860 as
security for the payment of a larger amount of P1,000, the alleged
loan. We entertain no doubt that at the time the execution of the
contract, Exhibit 1, the appellee knew that the homestead owner,
Emiliana Ambrosio, a poor ignorant woman, was badly in need of
money and that she was determined to dispose of and alienate
definitely her homestead, as evidenced by the fact testified to by
Gavino Rodriguez as witness for the said appellee that she actually
offered to sell the land to the latter. He also knew that she would
not be able to pay back to him such a large amount with interest
of 12 per cent per annum because she had no other income except
what she would derive from the homestead. Under such
circumstances, there is reason to believe that she was no longer
concerned with the form in which the contract would be drawn, as
long as could obtain the amount of P1,000 which was agreeable to
her as the price of the homestead she offered to sell to the
appellee. This conclusion is supported in part by the subsequent
action of Emiliana in not paying any interest on the alleged loan of
P1,000 or the land taxes thereon since the execution of the
contract and by the action of the appellee in declaring the land for
tax purposes in his own name as owner thereof, notwithstanding
that he had no interest in the land, as he alleged, except in the
improvements only.
The contract of absolute sale was consummated, because the
grantor, Emiliana, received full payment of the purchase price
disguised as a loan of P1,000 and placed the grantee, Marcial
Kasilag, in absolute possession and control of the land conveyed to
him with all the improvements thereon. The stipulation under
article VIII of the contract, Exhibit I, to the effect that the grantor
would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property herein
described for the said amount of this mortgage including all unpaid
interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the
mortgagee', clearly indicates that there was nothing left to be
done except the execution of the deed of absolute sale, which is
merely a matter of form in contracts of this nature, which was
postponed until after the expiration of four and a half years
because by that time the period of five years within which the
property could not be alienated nor encumbered in any way, as
provided by section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No.
3517, supra, would have already expired. If the real purpose was
to mortgage the improvements only as specified in article VIII
thereof it was provided that in case of failure to redeem the
alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a deed
of absolute sale of the property described therein for the same
amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of 'the
improvements only'? It is clear, therefore, that the real contract
under Exhibit 1, was one of absolute sale and not a mortgage with
future sale.
In other words, although the document Exhibit 1 states that it is a
mortgage of the improvements, with a stipulation regarding a
future sale of the land in case of failure to comply with the
mortgage obligations, in reality the true contract between the
parties is one of absolute sale in the light of the circumstances of
the case, among them the following:
First, Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale, not the mortgage, of her
homestead to Marcial Kasilag, and it is a fact found established by
the Court of Appeals that she was agreeable to the sum of one
thousand pesos as the price of the sale offered by her. If this is so,
it is unlikely that Kasilag would refuse the offer of sale of the
homestead and would accept in lieu thereof a simple mortgage of
the improvements, for the same sum of one thousand pesos;
Second. In the deed it is stipulated that, if at the expiration of the
period of four and a half years, the debtor should fail to redeem
the mortgage, she would execute in favor of the creditor, Marcial
Kasilag, a deed of absolute sale not only of the mortgaged
improvements but also of the land for the same amount of the
loan of one thousand pesos. This magic conversion of the
mortgage of the improvements into an absolute sale of the land at
the expiration of four and a half years and without any additional
consideration can only mean that the two contracts are one and
the same thing, and that the first has been availed of to go around
the legal prohibition. The scheme is very obvious, and to make any
attempt to reconcile it with good faith is simply to fall into it.
The mortgage of the improvements could not have been intended
because the supposed loan which it guaranteed was the same
price of the stipulated sale to be later executed, and further
because Kasilag knew, according to the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, that Emiliana Ambrosio was a poor and ignorant
woman who was not in a position to return to one thousand pesos;
Third. Kasilag had always considered the contract as one of sale of
the land and not as a mortgage of the improvements, because he
put the tax declaration of the land in his name, paid the
corresponding land tax, took possession of the land, received the
fruits thereof for his exclusive use, and introduced thereon
permanent improvements, one of them being a summer house, all
of which were valued at about five thousand pesos. It is not an
attribute of a contract of mortgage that the creditor should take
possession of the mortgaged property, or that he should pay the
taxes thereon. Kasilag would not spend five thousand pesos for
permanent improvements if he knew that his possession was
precarious.
Fourth. In the document it is stipulated that the debtor would pay
interest, but she did not pay any, and the alleged mortgage was
not foreclosed thereby, which shows that the stipulation was
nothing but a ruse.
Fifth. The deed Exhibit 1 was drawn by Kasilag, because it is in
English, and the other party is a poor and ignorant woman,
wherefore, all doubts and uncertainties arising therefrom should be
resolved against Kasilag. It is to noted that in this document are
phrases indicative of the real contract between the parties. For
instance: in clause IV the word paid and not loaned is used in
referring to the loan of one thousand pesos; and clause IX of the
document states "the foregoing contract of sale."
Under all these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that
the real contract between the parties is an absolute sale, and that
the contract of mortgage was made to appear in the document
Exhibit 1 for the sole purpose of defeating the legal prohibition.
Nevertheless, the majority of this Court, brushing aside the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals without stating its
reasons therefor, holds as to the document Exhibit 1, that "as the
terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be
interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses." I have
already shown in speaking of the second circumstance, that the
context itself of the document Exhibit 1 discloses strong tokens
that the contract between the parties was one of the sale and not
of mortgage. Moreover, the rule relied upon by the majority is only
applicable in the absence of any allegation that the document does
not express the real contract between the parties. Under section
285, No. 1, of Act No. 190, a document, however clear its
conditions may be, may and should be rejected when it is alleged
and shown by evidence aliunde that it does not express the true
intent of the parties. We have often considered as document, by
its terms a contract of absolute sale, as one of mortgage because
it has been so alleged and established by convincing oral evidence.
(Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil., 100; Villa vs. Santiago, 38 Phil.,
157; Laureano vs. Kilayco, 34 Phil., 148; Cuyugan vs. Santos, 39
Phil., 970; Rodriguez vs. Pamintuan, 37 Phil., 876; see also Manalo
vs. Gueco, 42 Phil., 925; Gatmaitan vs. Nepumuceno, 42 Phil.,
295.)
The majority decision does not only pass over the findings of fact
made by the Court of Appeals, but further, gives weight to certain
facts which said court finds not to have been established. For
instance, we have the following passages the majority decision:
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in
1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay
the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into
another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect
the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon. . . . .
. . . This stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties
after the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner
would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits
thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of
interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the
land tax. . . . .
These two paragraphs state as an established fact the supposed
verbal contract between the parties which Kasilag tried to prove by
his testimony. However, the Court of Appeals expressly held: "We
believe, however, that the trial court erred in giving probative
value to the testimony of the appellee (Marcial Kasilag) with
reference to the alleged verbal agreement with the deceased,
Emiliana Ambrosio, and based thereon the conclusion that the
appellee acted in good faith," (Words in parenthesis are mine.)
Rule 47, paragraph (b), of our Rules, provides expressly that in
appeals to this court on certiorari, "only questions of law may be
raised and must be distinctly set forth." And we have held in
various decisions that in passing upon the legal conclusions of the
Court of Appeals, we shall abide by the findings of fact of said
court.
I, moreover, find certain ambiguities in the majority decision, for
while it states on the one hand that the verbal contract had for its
purpose the "alteration of the mortgage contract clearly entered
into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis,"
(underscoring mine) thereby implying that the mortgage contract
was abandoned by the parties and ceased to exist, in the
dispositive part of its decision, the majority holds that the
mortgage of the improvements is valid and binding, and gives to
the respondents the right to "redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the
amount of P1,000 . . . ." It, therefore, requires compliance with a
contract that has ceased to exist.
While on the one hand the majority states that the aforesaid
verbal contract is one of antichresis and that it is void, on the
other hand, it gives force thereto by holding that the interest on
the loan of one thousand pesos is sufficiently "set off by the value
of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which the petitioner
received." And, furthermore, why should the interest be set off
against the fruits of the improvements only and not against those
of the entire land? And if the verbal contract of antichresis is void,
why is Kasilag not required to render an accounting of the fruits of
the land received by him which may exceed the total amount of
interest, taxes and even the principal itself?
The majority states that Kasilag, in taking possessions of the
homestead, receiving its fruits and introducing improvements
thereon, did so under the void contract of antichresis, and did so in
good faith as he was excusably unaware of the legal provision
which prohibits the incumbrance of the homestead within the
period of five years. Whether Kasilag was aware or unaware of the
legal prohibition is again a factual question resolved by the Court
of Appeals as follows: "the appellee ( Marcial Kasilag) was also
aware of these provisions which were incorporated in the
homestead patent shown to him at the beginning of the
transaction" (Words in parenthesis are mine). I do not understand
how we can disturb this factual finding.
I found, moreover, that in the majority decision it is ordered that,
if the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio cannot pay the value of the
permanent improvements introduced by Marcial Kasilag, the latter
may have the homestead by paying to them its price in the
market. The improvements were appraised by the trial court at
three thousand pesos, and as the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio
probably inherited nothing from the latter but poverty, they will
eventually be unable to pay the said amount and, in the last
analysis, will lose the homestead of their mother. The practical
effect, therefore, of the majority decision is that the heirs of
Emiliana Ambrosio will be deprived of the homestead by virtue of a
void antichretic obligation contracted by her within the period of
five years from the granting of the homestead. And this, at least,
is in violation of the spirit of section 116 of the Homestead Act.
I have other reasons which I need not set out to bring this dissent
to a close. But before I conclude, I should like to state that the
Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of
the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he
may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as
become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare
of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. Moreover, a man with a home and a
means of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess
affection for his country, whereas one without a home and in
penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous element
in the social order. The Homestead Act at once aims at the
promotion of wholesome and happy citizenship and the wiping out
of the germs of social discontent found everywhere.
Considering the social and economic ends of the Homestead Act,
the courts should exercise supreme care and strict vigilance
towards faithful compliance with all its benign provisions and
against the defeat, directly or indirectly, of its highly commendable
purposes. And it is my firm conviction that where, as in the
present case, a rich and clever man attempts to wrest a
homestead granted to a poor and ignorant woman, the slightest
tokens of illegality should be enough to move the courts to apply
the strong arm of the law.
I dissent from the majority decision and vote for the affirmance of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AVANCEÑA, C.J., dissenting:
I concur in this dissenting opinion of Justice Moran.

Kasilag v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 46623, 7 December 1939
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from
the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered
by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that
the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the
plaintiffs-respondents (Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the
owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common
ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are
entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner
should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the
improvements thereon and free from any lien.
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an
accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed
accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the
land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for
his part accepted the contract of mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the
alienation of lands Petitioner, acting in good faith took possession
of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that the
enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit
transaction of Antichresis.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good
faith?
RULING:
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of
the parties has already passed upon by competent authority, and
even established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and
the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon
to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a
clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to
which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different this
is possible and excusable errors arising from complex legal
principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines
Even ignorance of the law may be based upon error of fact, or
better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to
transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance
with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and error
of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of
good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It
is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because
he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements
he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating
the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did
not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis
and that the latter, as lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the
petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may therefore, be the basis of good faith.We do not
give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which
consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land,
because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the
change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner,
to about which we have stated that the petitioner’s ignorance of
the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the
petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and
enjoying its fruits.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE respondents.
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.
The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in
reality a very simple question from the viewpoint of the Solicitor
General. We agree with the latter. There is actually only one issue
to be resolved in this action. That issue is whether or not the
respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the
petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of
action.
Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.
But first the facts.
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national
formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A. 1 As he
left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward
Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with
the Philippine Revenue Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. 2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in
the amount of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978.3 This assessment
was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm of Bump, Young
and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was denied by
the Commissioner on July 7, 1978.5 No further action was taken
by the estate in pursuit of that protest.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been
admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon 6 Ward
Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso
Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the
allowance of the will in the Philippines.7
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8 The will was
allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary
administrator. 9 As such, he filed a second estate tax return with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980.10
On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an
assessment on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87.11 This
was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and
Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980.12
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the
probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate
tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978.13 He said
that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment
had long become final and executory.
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the
protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second assessment
of P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he filed on September
15, 1981, a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
challenging the said assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the
petitioner stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of 195
days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment
in a letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982.16 This
cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and
academic.17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25,
1984.18 The petitioner then came to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the
shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his
exclusive, and not conjugal, property; (2) whether the said stocks
should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death or six
months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal filed with the
respondent court should be considered moot and academic.
We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.
In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote as follows:
Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O.
ELEGADO Ancillary Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton
& Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila
Sir:
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR
GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon, U.S.A. on March 14,
1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand were issued by
this Bureau. One is for the amount of P96,509.35 based on the
first return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87,
based on the second return filed.
It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on
February 9, 1978 on the basis of the estate tax return filed on
September 16, 1976. The said assessment was, however,
protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but was denied on July
7, 1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period,
the same has become final.
In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid
assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15) days upon receipt
hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this Bureau, BIR
National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. The assessment for
P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby
cancelled.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second
assessment for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived
of a cause of action as it was precisely from this assessment that
he was appealing.
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition
questioning the assessment of July 3, 1980, was "premature" since
the protest to the assessment had not yet been resolved.20 As a
matter of fact it had: the said assessment had been cancelled by
virtue of the above-quoted letter. The respondent court was on
surer ground, however, when it followed with the finding that the
said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic.
There was really no more assessment to review.
The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment
on July 3, 1980, had the effect of canceling the first assessment of
February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the
second assessment did not have the effect of automatically
reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not binding on
him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who
had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax
Appeals.
The petitioner is clutching at straws.
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second
assessment of P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it clear that
"the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only based on the
estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this Office for
final determination of the correct estate tax due from the estate.
Any amount that may be found due after said investigation will be
assessed and collected later." 21 It is illogical to suggest that a
provisional assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which
had clearly become final and executory.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be
serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid
because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was
based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the
petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance
therewith because of their ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference
because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to
reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws
in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination
than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that
the first assessment is already final and executory and can no
longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was made
on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The
protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken
thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that the
assessment has become final and executory.
In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have
accepted its denial. In his motion with the probate court, the
respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a letter dated January
29, 1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor Graham thru the aforesaid
foreign law firm informed claimant that they have paid said tax
liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and Puno, Philippine law
firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext., Makati, Metro Manila that
initiated the instant ancillary proceedings" although he added that
such payment had not yet been received.22 This letter was an
acknowledgment by the estate of the validity and finality of the
first assessment. Significantly, it has not been denied by the
petitioner.
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot
now raise the question of its validity before this Court any more
than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What
the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the
denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it
received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the
petitioner could then have raised the first two issues he now raises
without basis in the present petition.
The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the
decedent should be considered conjugal property or belonging to
him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. So too is the time at
which the assessment of these shares of stock should have been
made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved by the Court
of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to act on the
petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had already been
cancelled. The assessment being no longer controversial or
reviewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to
rule on the petition except to dismiss it.

If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an

error in the computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner insists,
that error can no longer be rectified because the original
assessment has long become final and executory. If that
assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was — was
committed not by the respondents but by the decedent's estate
itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now
complain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the

petitioner. It is so ordered,

Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho
SUPREME COURT and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife
Manila of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the
other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with
THIRD DIVISION Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of
the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.]
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI
YEN, petitioners, 
decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE,
RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF (2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen
APPEALS, respondents. are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
[CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64-
65.]

CORTES, J.: held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed

Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that
of the probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE
of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said and a new judgment rendered as follows:
petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel
Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to
Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy
nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of
Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman
the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9;
with whom he lived as husband and wife without
Rollo, p. 107.]
benefit of marriage for many years:
 (2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai
Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese
wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao
Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China
(sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat
on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit
"G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the
Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid
and accordingly, said property should be excluded
from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court
of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12;
Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration,
which was however denied by respondent court. They thus
interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3)
and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the
motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of
judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1)
and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on
June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a
resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and
decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners
assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT
TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN
VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES,
MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND
RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in
accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven.
To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial
and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat
on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the
practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the
parents of her husband; that the agreement was
that she and Sy Mat would be married, the
wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
out; that the said agreement was complied with;
that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest
being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old;
that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7,
1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have
been living in FooKien, China before he went to the
Philippines on several occasions; that the practice
during the time of her marriage was a written
document [is exchanged] just between the parents
of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any
elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is
that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would
talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the
parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a
date as an engagement day; that on engagement
day, the parents of the groom would bring some
pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be,
and then one month after that, a date would be set
for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding
date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him
a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on
that same day, the parents of the bride would give
the dowry for her daughter and then the document
would be signed by the parties but there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
that during the wedding day, the document is
signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties
themselves do not sign the document; that the
bride would then be placed in a carriage where she
would be brought to the town of the bridegroom
and before departure the bride would be covered
with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town
of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the
veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according
to said Chinese custom), there were many persons
present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the
carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy
Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest
brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her
mother; that as to the whereabouts of that
document, she and Sy Mat were married for
46 years already and the document was left in
China and she doubt if that document can still be
found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy
Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know
the whereabouts of that document because of the
lapse of many years and because they left it in a
certain place and it was already eaten by the
termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they
lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat
went to the Philippines sometime in March or April
in the same year they were married; that she went
to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to
China; that again she went back to the Philippines
and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that
she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the
several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee
who stated that he was among the many people who attended the
wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate
is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the
parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp.
15-16; Rollo, pp. 
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified
before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to
Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission
to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in
Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following entries are
found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses
—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place
of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on
January 12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found:
"Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address
of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977
by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that
"according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat
a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese
were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic
of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage  between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish
the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or
custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes &
RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The
law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of
right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.)  ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to
establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section
45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of
witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country,
as are also printed and published books of reports
of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An
official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent
evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of
a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110
Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works
v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For
failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling
they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as
judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case
of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is
the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
[Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging
the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to
prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the
contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage
to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his
testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated
by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be
decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage  in
accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court
has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in
the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof
that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng  marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or
eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil.
633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that
the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the
testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence
to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar
as said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue
posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is
competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint
for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on
marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as
ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31,
1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here
in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged
marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p.
51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true,
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of
private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners'
filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where
the following are entered: "Children if any: give
number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living
in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who
stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only
three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah,
Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12,
1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy
Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of
 Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May
marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated 7, 1958.
that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually
Kiat told her he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of agree and covenant that—
whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted
son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.] (a) The stocks and merchandize
and the furniture and
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee equipments ..., shall be divided
with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be into two equal shares between, and
accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it own
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat one-half of the total and the other
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another half to Asuncion Gillego who shall
[See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of transfer the same to their children,
the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
[Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
(b) the business name and
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's premises ... shall be retained by Sy
acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina Kiat. However, it shall be his
with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit obligation to give to
of marriage. They have in their favor their father's the  aforenamed children an
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered amount of One Thousand Pesos
into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the
First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only rental of the two doors of the same
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise building now occupied by Everett
made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus: Construction.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

2. The parties also acknowledge that they are
common-law husband and wife and that out of
such relationship, which they have likewise
decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely:
Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born
on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28,
1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the
existence of the 
common-law husband-and-wife relationship
between the parties, of the real estates and
properties registered and/or appearing in the name
of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree
and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to
their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
 Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be
administered by Asuncion Gillego during her
lifetime  ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court
of record by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See
Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy
Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the
parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic
Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278,
otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with
regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship,
adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital
obligations, legal separation of spouses, and
actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of
title six and title seven, chapters one to three of
the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-
23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R.
No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and
jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See
Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R.
No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no
longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters
should arise as an incident in any case pending in
the ordinary court, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615.
August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case involving
paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated
 as an incident in the intestate or testate
proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-
42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration
proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of
conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance
and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut
v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but
more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this
Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
*** The presumption that, in the absence of proof,
the foreign law is the same as the law of the
forum, is known as processual presumption which
has been applied by this Court in the cases of Lim
v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil, 472
(1917); International Harvester Co. in Russia v.
Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845 (1918);
Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil, 867 (1924); and Rayray
v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26,
1966,18 SCRA 450.
**** Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. Section 1 of said
Act is the exact copy of section 19-A of Rep. Act
5502.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was

denied for lack of merit on March 9, 1981, Counsel
for the petitioners then filed a Motion for
Consolidation and for Extension of Time to File
Motion for Reconsideration which was granted on
July 8, 1981. On February 17, 1982, however,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of March 9, 1981 was denied.

** Other than the exceptions contained in this

article, this provision of law is derived from Section
19, Act No. 3613 and Section IV, General Order
No. 68.
 Republic of the Philippines BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON
SUPREME COURT IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
Manila
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
EN BANC edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T.
G.R. Nos. 95122-23             May 31, 1991 Gatchalian, et al.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING BIDIN, J.:
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY,
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN
General seeking 1) to set aside the Resolution/Temporary
KALAW, petitioners, 
Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent
vs.
Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila,
petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from
Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,respondents.
commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which
would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, cases.
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN
KALAW, petitioners, 
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment
vs.
with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC
lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of
Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T.
Commissioners, et al., over his person with prayer that he be
GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T.
declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case
GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T.
to the trial court for further proceedings.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to

G.R. Nos. 95612-13             May 31, 1991
respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court considers the
comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,  and petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition and
vs. gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a
native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural
mother, Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before
the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that
he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose
Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old
minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria,
Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with
them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the
Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing
the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and
Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago
Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a
decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his
companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16,
1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued
Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have
been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on
review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry.
The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of
William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a
review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special
Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the
exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E",
petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was
issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners
dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory
(Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of
Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became
the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21
SCRA 532) wherein this Court sustained the validity of the decision
of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on
July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others
covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for
re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion
case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to
the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July
6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall
of the warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-
petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order
reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino
citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him
(Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of
Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that
respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with
violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c),
and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also
known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration
for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-
petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian
(Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on
the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela
Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of
Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued
the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion
to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife
and minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge
Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the
same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1)
respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of
Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case,
appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of
Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in
the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine
the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the
process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela
Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised
in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and
jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases
of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to
the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent
judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others
that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to
declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to
proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally
resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no
longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's
citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-
judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which
he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in
the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of
Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or
commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board
of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not
quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional
Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court
of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpusand injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are
vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
Court of Appeals is vested with —
 (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board
or commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-
paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial
agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively
appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under the law,
Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically
appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco
vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic
Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security
Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent
Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the
Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this
Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P.
Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as
follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any
provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a
final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment
of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of
Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum
Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under
Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight
hundred seventy-five, also known as the
"Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration
Commission; the Social Security Commission; the
Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal
therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed
questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or
all three kinds of questions. From final judgments
or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved
party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the
abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over quasi-
judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the
corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor
Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations
Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless,
reviewable by this Court through a petition
for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the
Commission of Land Registration,  en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission
are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are
decisions of the Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of
 Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the
Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and
logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis
supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations
Commissions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this
Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434,
provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of
Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said
commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs
in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of
the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those
quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders,
and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In
fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with
Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be
subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter
and applicable laws.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court
specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to
B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter, provides that the
decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be
subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in the
absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the
same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided
for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is
not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to,
and may be reviewed through a special civil action
for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]).
And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board
of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings
(Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an
exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged
deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be
allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in
the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to
live in peace, without molestation from any official or
authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation
proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to
the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas
corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board
lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the
deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the
remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation
of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at
all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent undue
 harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed
administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted
right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after
the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it,
besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public
opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of
Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not
without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo
vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however,
should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed
only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the
records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We
shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take
cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian
would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of
Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the
former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the
pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial
Court. But not in the case at bar.1âwphi1 Considering the
voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence
presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at
this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for
"it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive
to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court
only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and
from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74;
Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger
Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37
[1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co.,  Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA
357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a
position to resolve the dispute based on the records before
it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and
the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends
of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the
case or when public interest demands an early disposition
of the case or where the trial court had already received all
the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra;
Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19
SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety
& Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which
avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the
parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil.
592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is
that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat
vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citingSamal vs. CA, 99
Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont,
Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See
also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1
[1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the
Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the form of public
documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special
Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September
6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of
Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to
adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against
respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's
decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already
settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial
determination of respondent's citizenship specially so where the
latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines
(for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong
vs. Deportation Board, supra).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292
[1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this
Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered
as  res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.

According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs.
conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivocases, We Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue
resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6,
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship
1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether
of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by
the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it
an administrative agency, as a material issue in the
appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was
controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active
superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall
participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the
which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely
party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter
pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of
shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship
respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said
in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that
cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship
on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian.
in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any
Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be
other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance
bound by a decision rendered therein.
with the procedure herein stated.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
(dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine
cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's
citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For
citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine
authorized representative took active part in the resolution
of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs.
thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth
478 [1983]). in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by
petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a
party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of
respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the
warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with
the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the
same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise
known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens
are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue
warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be
for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for
purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and
void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67
SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975];
Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562;
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua
To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he
constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case
and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is
not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of
investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue
the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15,
1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for
purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian
included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the
Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and
immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning
the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right
to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was
based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has
obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners'
cause. As records indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted
to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition
of respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously
covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-
hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in
1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due
course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to
the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-
petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962
decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the
July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants.
The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants
as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f
at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s)
of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized
travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could
have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the
Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the
July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification
Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the
last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent
William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino
citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of
citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather
of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in
the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July
6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian
is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants
is based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian
whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960. (Annex
"37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein
have not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or
grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago
Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra)
where advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the
Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment
of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a
Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born
in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine
Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by
the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of
January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of
his petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted
on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20,
1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a
Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs.
Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open
the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of
the case, where it is not even put in issue, is quite much to late.
As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show
that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to
be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even
question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and
addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that
respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged
cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest
in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after
the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93
Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places
this case beyond the reach of the resultant consequence of
the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor
when she admitted that she gained entrance into the
Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese
resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband,
and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject
of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more
than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission.
Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the
mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in
the investigation conducted in connection with the landing
of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any
effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the
mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant
in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net
profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must
have considered the irregularity not serious enough when,
inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as
a properly documented preference quota immigrant"
(Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two
years later the immigration officials would reverse their
attitude and would take steps to institute deportation
proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe
that much as the attitude of the mother would be
condemned for having made use of an improper means to
gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent
residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian,
to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to
remain even illegally to the extent of validating her
residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit
his deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him
to live separately from his mother through no fault of his
thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from
lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction
or oversight on the part of immigration officials has
created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of
equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein
involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and
deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the
warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear
that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by
their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners
against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant
of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the
Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices
Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962
and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid
in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William Gatchalian
even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined
that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years
limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations
under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is
reiterated that such deportation proceedings should be instituted
within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal
sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a
fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more
than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document
personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration
laws by appearing under an assumed name; fictitious
name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration
document, to any person not authorized by law to receive
such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document,
knowing it to be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or
misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose
represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under
oath any false statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines
without first securing an immigration clearance certificates
required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of
the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one
thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two
years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10
years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also
prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326
[1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after  eight years for
those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for
violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be
initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the
Immigration Act being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation
of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final
order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself
provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is
forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the
offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the
penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to
execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla,
Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a
final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate
action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of
the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule,
therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within
five (5) years after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises
when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act;
and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of
the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced
deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William
Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce
the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years
(Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent
William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the Philippines. He
married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-
petition) with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage
contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He
holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9",
"10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised
his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in
business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp.
as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a
taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously
enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation
proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by
or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country
is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility
of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one
who has helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and
be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted
drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to
any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation
under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright
illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is
diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien.
In support of their position, petitioners point out that Santiago
Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the
marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu
Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other
than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing
what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it
should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China
wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners
conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid.
Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the
citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid
marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that
it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the
case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that
of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed
on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William
Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as
records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that
the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony
subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration
authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to
each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition
in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this
salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus,
Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian
and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but
are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the
rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of
the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any
doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as
to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in
mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and
other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under
our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a
Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is
likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian
who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an
order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of
Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship
of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA
552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat,
however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason
that the parties therein testified to have been married in China by
a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized
to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now
Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve
the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit;
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation
proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction
over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases
No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in
the  ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the
established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship,
and that "a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners
in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of
Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-
judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William
Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and,
above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I have
solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance,
rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the
case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits would
do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions
or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the
settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the
application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On
the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the
unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were done
absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, the rule
laid down in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals (160
SCRA 848) does not apply.
Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resolutions of 15 September 1987
and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively,
and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6
June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625
(Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et
al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have
invoked the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial
courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned
orders, respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former
court and his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint
before the latter has not been explained. It is to be noted that he
is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long
resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-
Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor children are
not parties to the case before the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Their causes of action are based mainly on their claim
that the acts of the Boards against William tend to deprive plaintiff
mother consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors
protection and support. At once, the viability of their causes of
action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have valid causes of
action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the case filed
by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint
before another court was part of a strategy to frustrate the
proceedings before the Boards. As correctly maintained by the
petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case of forum-shopping,
especially considering the fact that on September 4, 1990, or two
days before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court the
government filed a motion to dismiss the case before the Manila
court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned and proscribed.
In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463),
promulgated on 28 November 1980, this Court held that a party
"should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different forums." In the Resolution of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon
Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197,
this Court held:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-
shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade
the administration of justice. (See also Buan vs. Lopez, Jr.,
145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. vs.
PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of Natural Resources, et al.
vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566; Limpin
vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA
639; Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877;
Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175 SCRA 717;
Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA 154; Adlawan vs. Tomol,
179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73).
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the
regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-petition, he is
now before this Court in an active offensive role. This is a very
clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court the issue of
his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original
jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance;
he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose,
instead, to separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the
proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished when the
two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from
commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which
would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No.
90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation charges
against William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in
the  ponencia as another authority which allows William Gatchalian
to enjoy the protective mantle of the exceptionary rule affecting
the exclusive power of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation to try and hear cases against aliens and in the process
also determine their citizenship is either not applicable or is mis-
applied. This case laid down the principle that "when the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right
to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts
should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. . . . If he is a
citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor
justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue,
granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The
word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include
the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said courts do
not have any appellate jurisdiction over the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, the Board of Commissioners and the
Board of Special Inquiry. This case was decided in 1955 yet, or
twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial
intervention is that the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, or as stated in Co vs. Deportation
Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are no reasonable grounds for the belief that
the claim is correct.
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a
conclusive or substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a
Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very serious doubts surround such
a claim from the beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines
was made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino)
which was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new
Board of Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C.
Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan,
Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William
Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented.
Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was
issued by the Commissioners commanding the deportation officer
to exclude William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their
removal from the country on the first available transportation in
accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were
nationals. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads as follows:
The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named
applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration in an Order, dated July 12,
1960. It is alleged that applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN,
FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN and
BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the legitimate children of
Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim Tee. Except for the
self-serving testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and his
alleged children, there has not been submitted any
evidence of Santiago Gatchalian's marriage to Chiu Gim
Tee and the birth of the alleged children of the couple. The
personal records of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this
office do not reflect the names of applicants as his
children, and while two names listed in his Form 1 (ACR
application), Jose and Elena, bear the same name as two
of herein applicants, the difference in the ages of said
applicants, casts serious doubt on their identity. Apropos,
the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, GLORIA GATCHALIAN,
FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN and
BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not having satisfactorily proved
as the children of Santiago Gatchalian, determination of
the citizenship of the other applicants, JUAN GATCHALIAN,
PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, whose
right to Filipino citizenship are merely drawn from their
fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian, is
unnecessary. (Decision, Annex "E" of Petition).
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William's alleged
grandfather, I cannot find sufficient credible evidence to support
his claim of Filipino citizenship. For a long time before 20 July 1960
he considered himself a Chinese citizen. The "conclusion" of the
Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino citizen is based
on totally questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot
inspire belief. The Order itself, signed by Associate Commissioner
Felix Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as follows:
This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of
SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese and holder
of ACR No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 February
1951 and ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He is alleged to
be the son of Filipino parents who were not lawfully
married.
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo,
Manila, on 25 July 1905, to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian. It is noted that in his application for alien
registration filed with this Office on 13 January 1951,
Santiago Gatchalian stated that his deceased parents were
Pablo Pacheco and Marciana. He was identified by his only
brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who insisted that he and
petitioner are illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there
is a certificate signed on 26 October 1902 by Maxima
Gatchalian, their maternal grandmother, giving consent to
the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian to Pablo Pacheco
(Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his parents did not actually
get married. In proof of this, the baptismal record of the
petitioner expressly states that Santiago Gatchalian was
born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6 October 1905,
 being the son of Marciana Gatchalian, "filipina", and an
unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907,
Parish Priest of Binondo, Manila).
The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his
civil status, has been interchangeably using his paternal
and maternal surnames. In school he was known as
Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920-21, Meisic, Manila;
Certificates of completion of third and fourth grades, Meisic
Primary School); but in his residence certificate dated 17
September 1937, and in Tax Clearance Certificate issued
on 2 October 1937, he is referred to as Santiago
Gatchalian; and in a communication dated 6 June 1941, he
was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes office.
Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder
brother who is better informed about their origin, the
incontestable entry in his baptismal record that he is
illegitimate and the entry in the marriage contract of his
elder brother wherein the father's name is omitted and the
mother, Marciana Gatchalian, is described as Filipina
(marriage contract dated 29 November 1936) there is
sufficient evidence to establish that Santiago Gatchalian is
really Filipino at birth, being the legitimate child of a
Filipino woman.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien
registration is granted, petitioner shall henceforth be
shown in the records of this office as a citizen of the
Philippines and the issuance to him of the appropriate
Identification certificate showing his correct status is
hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July 1960, Annex "1" of
Comment with Counter-Petition).
As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five children,
we only have his self-selling oral testimony, thus:
Q What is the name of your wife?
A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.
Q Is she still alive?
A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.
Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their
names, ages and sexes?
A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are
as follows:
Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria
Gatchalian, born February 20, 1929 in Amoy; Francisco
Gatchalian, born on March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena
Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy; Benjamin
Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.
Q Where are they living now?
A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-
law by the name of Chu Lam Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of the
proceedings before the Citizen Evaluation Board on 12
February 1960, Annex "2" of Comment with Counter-
Petition).
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for insisting,
through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an illegitimate son? The
only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in
which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a
"filipina." But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of
illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the
legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among the
presumptions which the ponencia precisely applied when it
rejected the petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to establish his
claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of
William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were
allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification
why these presumptions should be liberally applied in favor of
claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to
purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco during such
proceedings and when he testified, he gave his name as Santiago
Gatchalian Pacheco. This is an incontrovertible proof that he
recognized the legitimate union of his father and mother.
On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be confronted re
his claim as to the number of his children; he testified thus:
Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you named
as your children the following: Jose, Gloria, Francisco,
Elena and Benjamin, all born in Amoy, arranged according
to the order of their ages. However, in your Form 1 when
you secured your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose
Gatchalian and Elena Gatchalian. Why, what is the reason
why in this form that you filled up in 1951, you mentioned
only Jose and Elena?
A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is
not my handwriting. It is the handwriting of my broker or
the clerk of my broker. However, when they prepared that
I mentioned my children named Jose, Gloria, Francisco,
Elena in a piece of paper which I gave to him, except
Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?
A Because he was not yet baptized then. (Transcript, p. 7,
Annex "2" of Comment with Counter-Petition).
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the respect of
a passing glance.
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any immediate definite
positive step against the 6 July 1962 decision and the warrant of
exclusion.
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that he and
others covered by the warrant of expulsion filed a motion for re-
hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. There has been no
explanation for the unreasonable delay in the filing of the motion.
It may be surmised that it was due to his minority, considering
that he was allegedly only twelve years old when he arrived in
Manila from Hongkong on 27 June 1961. But, such minority was no
obstacle to the filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of
Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
Board of Commissioners were not only highly anomalous, irregular
and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority. The
Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify
or reverse a Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered
about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power or authority
to approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or
reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry,
to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of
Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Gatchalian
as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board
of Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at all it was
legally and validly done. The Board of Commissioners is composed
of the Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy
Commissioners. In the absence of any member of the Board, the
Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the
Bureau of Immigration to serve as member thereof. In any case
coming before it, the decision of any two members shall prevail.
(Sec. 8, C.A. No. 613 as amended). The Department Head referred
to is the Secretary of Justice since the Commission is, for
administrative purposes, under the supervision and control of the
Department of Justice.
The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was void and
invalid ab initio. In view thereof, the rationalization in
the  ponencia that the issue could be re-opened since the decision
of the Board of Commissioners of 6 July 1962 did not
constitute res judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded
that the 6 July 1962 decision did not constitute res judicata, I find
it both strange and illogical to give full faith and credit to the
unilateral action of Mr. Nituda and to use it to bar the Boards from
exercising its power and jurisdiction over William Gatchalian.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it
rather strange why Santiago did not mention him in his testimony
before the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was
already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the
proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of
his alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent
events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry
into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he
obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two
successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered
the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena,
Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived
from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and
son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also
arrived from Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he
is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage
contract shows that he is a Filipino citizen; he holds passports and
earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised
his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines
since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer
Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the
companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment
provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately
25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously
enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated the
deportation proceedings against him, are not of any help to
William Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor strengthen his
claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal
and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15
March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid  ab initio cannot
be a source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be
cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by
the void decision.
In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant of
exclusion issued against William Gatchalian pursuant to and by
virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners
subsists and remains valid and enforceable.
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State
can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is
already barred by prescription considering that Section 37 (b) of
the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected .
. . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."
Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 paragraph (a) of this section at any time after
entry, but shall not be effected under any other
clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five years after the cause of deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be
effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the
alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of
Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As amended
by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2,
7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not apply. These
clauses read as follows:
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the
time of entry;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of
any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as
a non- immigrant;
 (8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or
teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and
authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized
government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the
assault or assassination of public officials because of their
office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful
destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching
such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of
such doctrines;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or
black-marketing, independent of any criminal action which
may be brought against him;
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized
under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred and
Seventy-Three, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating
to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for
his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his
entry.
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to Mr.
Gatchalian. In issue in that case was the deportation of a minor
whose mother fraudulently entered the Philippines by using the
name of a resident Chinese merchant who is not her lawful
husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was
initiated within five years following her entry. Said mother did in
fact acquire permanent residence status. Furthermore, the minor's
mother never claimed to be a Filipino citizen.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of
respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon
Capulong as having been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER
the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the
COUNTER-PETITION.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my
distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice A.A. Bidin, and I,
therefore, undertake to submit this separate opinion.
For convenience, the following is a  precis of the matters discussed
in detail below.
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is
defective in its language. The surrounding facts, however, make
quite clear that an amended warrant of arrest or mission order, or
a new one correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration
Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out an existing
and valid Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners
("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion remain valid and effective and
enforceable against respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-
applicants for that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held that
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants failed to
subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippine citizenship in 1961.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine
citizenship by any mode of entitlement  subsequent to his
application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by
any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and supposed
filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a
supposed citizen of the Philippines.
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo,1 the Supreme Court upheld
the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC
and the Warrant of Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian,
the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by
immigration authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-
applicants, which include respondent William Gatchalian. The
validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian,
as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed in
issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC,
and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs.
Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6 July
1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not
substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in
effect ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine
citizens, whatever their true nationality might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the
claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian, a
detailed examination of the facts, including the supposed status of
Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born Philippine citizenship, shows
that those claims to Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven
by respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants. Since
respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have been
naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a Philippine
citizen.
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I
respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with this Court which
is charged with the application of the law as it is in fact written,
but with the political branches of the Government. It is those
departments of Government which must consider the desirability
and wisdom of enacting legislation providing for the legalization of
the entry and stay of aliens who may be in the same situation as
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants.
I oath following Office Memorandum Order No. 45
1. Petitioner argues that respondent William Gatchalian's arrest
follows as a matter of "consequence" of the Warrant of Exclusion
issued by the BOC on 6 July 1962. This is opposed by respondent
Gatchalian upon the ground that the Mission Order or Warrant of
Arrest does not mention that it is issued pursuant to a final order
of deportation or Warrant of Exclusion.
The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990
issued by petitioner Commissioner Domingo, CID, reads in part as
follows:
Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams
Team No.
Subject: William, Juan, Francisco, Jose, Benjamin,
Jonathan, Pedro, Gloria, Elena, all surnamed Gatchalian
Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Section 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
2. Make a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest under Rule 125, Section 12.
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and
immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning
the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right
to counsel;
4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with the Special
Prosecutor's Office and, in case of a search, prepare and
file an inventory of the properties seized, verified under
 x x x           x x x          x x x
The above Mission Order merely referred to Section 37 (a) of the
Immigration Act, as amended, and to Sections 45 and 46 of the
Administrative Code (should be Immigration Law), and that its
wording suggests that the arrest is sought to be carried out for the
purpose of carrying out a preliminary investigation or custodial
interrogation rather than for the purpose of enforcing a final order
of deportation or warrant of exclusion. More specifically, the
Mission Order failed to mention the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and
Warrant of Exclusion. At the same time, there is no gainsaying the
fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion
do exist and became final and, as discussed in detail below,
remain valid and effective.
It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990, Special
Prosecutor Mabolo had filed a Manifestation or Motion before the
Bureau of Immigration explicitly referring to the Warrant of
Exclusion issued against respondent William Gatchalian and his
original co-applicants for admission in 1961, which had been
passed upon in Arocha vs. Vivo(supra), and argued that there was,
therefore, no longer any need to adduce evidence in support of the
charges against respondent William Gatchalian.
Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or Mission Order
dated 15 August 1990, ineptly worded as it is, may be amended so
as to refer explicitly to the mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a
new warrant of arrest or mission order issued similarly explicitly
referring to the Warrant of Exclusion.
2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the Warrant of
Exclusion of 6 July 1962 which read as follows:
WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the proceedings
had on the application for admission as Philippine citizens
of JOSE GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN, BENJAMIN
GATCHALIAN, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN,
GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM
GATCHALIAN, and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the Board of
Commissioners found them not entitled to admission as
Filipinos in a Decision, dated July 6, 1962, and ordered
their exclusion as  persons not properly documented;
AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board of
Commissioners, dated 6 July 1962, ordering the exclusion
of above-named applicants, has now become  final and
executory.
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the
undersigned by law, you are hereby ordered to exclude the
aforenamed individuals and cause their removal from this
country to the port where they came or to the port of the
country of which they are nationals, on the first available
transportation, in accordance with law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian was a party
to the 1961-1962 proceedings before the Bureau of Immigration
which proceedings culminated in the 6 July 1962 Decision of the
BOC and the aforequoted Warrant of Exclusion.
It is, however, insisted by respondent William Gatchalian that the
Warrant of Exclusion may no longer be executed or implemented
as against him in view of the passage of approximately twenty-
eight (28) years since the issuance of such Warrant. Respondent
Gatchalian here relies upon Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
which states that:
Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected under clauses 2,
3, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Par. (a) of this Section at any
time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other
clauses unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arises . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the
five (5) year-limitation is applicable only where deportation is
sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other
than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or
exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and 12
of Section 37 (a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that, to
the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any
time after entry."
Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that the Government
has sought to effect the exclusion and deportation of respondent
William Gatchalian upon the ground that he had entered the
country as a citizen of the Philippines when he was not lawfully
admissible as such at the time of entry under Section 37 (a) (2),
since the BOC had held him and the other Gatchalians there
involved as not properly documented for admission, under  Section
29 (a) (17) of the Immigration Act, as amended. On 7 July 1990,
the Acting Director of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI")
initiated the proceedings immediately before us by writing to the
Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent William
Gatchalian, and his co-applicants covered by the Warrant of
Exclusion dated 6 July 1962, be charged with: "Violation of Section
37 (a), paragraphs 1 and 2, in relation to Section 45 (c), (d) and
(e) of Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as the
Immigration Act of 1940." The Secretary of Justice endorsed this
recommendation to Immigration Commissioner Domingo for
investigation and immediate action. On 20 August 1990, Special
Prosecutor Mabolo filed a charge sheet against respondent William
Gatchalian which specified the following charges:
The respondent is an alien national who unlawfully gained
entry into the Philippines without valid travel document in
violation of the Immigration Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub pars.
(1) and (2);
That respondent being an alien misrepresented himself as
Philippine Citizen by false statements and fraudulent
documents in violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 45,
par. (c), (d) and (e).
That respondent being an alien national is an
undocumented person classified as excludable under
the Immigration Act, Sec. 29 (a) sub par. (17).
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, provides as follows:
Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the
Immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry; (As
amended by Republic Act No. 503).
(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this act, who was not lawfully admissible at the
time of entry.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to Section 29 (a) of
the Immigration Act, as amended, which lists the classes of alien
excluded from entry in the Philippines, as follows:
Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens shall be
excluded from entry into the Philippines;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this act.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time limitation is
applicable in respect of the carrying out of the Warrant of
Exclusion issued in 1962.
A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so. What was
involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of
Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the
right of a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen to enter for the
first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the
Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the
country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such claimed
status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the
right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of
time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as
Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of
aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the
Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to
deportation.
Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their
country of origin.2 This is so in cases where the alien has not yet
gained a foothold into the country and is still seeking physical
admittance. However, when the alien had already physically
gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of
legal basis, the alien can be excluded any time after it is found
that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.
Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the
rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the
fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had
gained physical entry.
It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), this
Court upheld the 6 July 1962 Order of the BOC and the application
of the Warrant of Exclusion, in respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even
though more than five (5) years had elapsed by the time the
Court's Decision was promulgated on 26 October 1967.
Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically inside the
country, it is the government's basic position that he was never
lawfully admitted into the country, having failed to prove his claim
of Philippine citizenship, and hence the Warrant of Exclusion of 6
July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for that matter, may be
executed "at any time" under Section 37 (b). It is the correctness
of that basic position which must be ascertained and in that
ascertainment, the mere passage of time is quite peripheral in
relevance considering the express language of Section 37 (b).
My distinguished brother, Bidin,  J., finally invokes Act No. 3326,
and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the
arrest for purpose of deportation is made more than five (5) years
after the cause for deportation arose, the prescriptive period of
eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took effect
on 4 December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect
of criminal prosecutions for violations penalized not by the Revised
Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not otherwise
establish a period of prescription. In other words, Act No. 3326
establishes a statute of limitations for the institution of criminal
proceedings. It is, however, quite settled that deportation
proceedings cannot be assimilated to criminal prosecutions for
violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of special
statutes.3 Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only
where the special act itself has not established an applicable
statute of limitations for criminal proceedings. It cannot, however,
be said that Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier)
has not established an applicable statute of limitations. For,
precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation may be effected under certain clauses of Section 37
(a) "at any time after entry." One of those instances is, precisely,
deportation upon the ground specified in Clause (2) of 37 (a)
which relates to "any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this act, who was not lawfully admissible at the
time of entry." Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to
specify a prescriptive period for deportation under Section 37 (a)
(2), expressly authorizes deportation under such ground "at any
time after entry." It is, thus, very difficult to see how Act No. 3326
could apply at all to the instant case.
Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually involved in
the case at bar is exclusion, not deportation.
3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) has
already resolved the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian adversely to him and that such ruling
constitutes res judicata. Upon the other hand, respondent William
Gatchalian vehemently argues that neither the 6 July 1962 BOC's
Decision nor Arochadefinitely settled the question of his
citizenship.
My respectful submission is that respondent William Gatchalian's
argument constitutes a highly selective reading of both the BOC
Decision and the Decision in Arocha Written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for
a unanimous court. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC, in its
dispositive portion, reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this
Board finds and hereby holds that the applicants[Jose
Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian, Benjamin Gatchalian, Juan
Gatchalian, Pedro Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco
Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and Johnson Gatchalian]
herein have not satisfactorily proved their claim to
Philippine citizenship and therefore the Decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry, dated July 6, 1961 admitting
them as Filipinos is hereby reversed, and said applicants
should be, as they are hereby ordered excluded as persons
not properly documented.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 1961
claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens,
determination of their right to enter the Philippines thus
indispensably involved the resolution of their claim to Philippine
citizenship. In other words, the determination of that citizenship in
the instant case was not a mere incident of the case; it was rather
the central and indeed the only issue that had to be resolved by
the BOC. Review of the 1961 proceedings before the BSI shows
that the sole issue before it was the supposed Philippine citizenship
of the applicants. Thus, the very same issue of claimed Philippine
citizenship was resolved by the BOC when it reversed the 6 July
1961 decision of the BSI. This case may be distinguished from
other types of cases, e.g., applications for public utility franchises,
petitions for change of name, applications for registration as voter,
filing of certificates of candidacy for an elective position, etc.,
where the central issue is not citizenship although resolution of
that issue requires a determination of the citizenship of the
applicant, candidate or petitioner.
The ruling of the BOC that respondent William Gatchalian and his
co-applicants for admission as Philippine citizens had not
satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine citizenship, can only
be reasonably read as a holding that respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants were not Philippine citizens,
whatever their true nationality or nationalities might be. Thus, it
appears to be merely semantic play to argue, as respondent
William Gatchalian argues, that the 1962 BOC Decision did not
categorically hold him to be an "alien" and that the BOC had
merely held him and his co-applicants as "not properly
documented." The phrase "not properly documented" was strictly
and technically correct. For William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants had presented themselves as Philippine citizens and as
such entitled to admission into the country. Since the BOC rejected
their claims to Philippine citizenship, William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants were non-Filipinos "not properly documented for
admission" under Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as
amended.
4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had before it the
following items:
1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which allowed the
entry of respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants as
citizens of the Philippines;
2. A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July 1961 BSI
decision, which had been "noted" by two (2)
Commissioners but rejected by Commissioner Galang on
14 and 26 July 1961 and 21 August 1961, respectively;
3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in which the BOC
had reviewed motu proprio the Gatchalian proceedings
before the BSI and reversed the BSI decision of 6 July
1961;
 4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962 issued
pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC; and
5. A decision of the Manila Court of First Instance dated 31
July 1965, rendered in a habeas corpusproceeding brought
to effect the release of Pedro Gatchalian who had been
taken into custody by immigration officials pursuant to the
6 July 1962 Warrant of Exclusion.
The Court of First Instance ("CFI") decision ordered Pedro
Gatchalian's release upon the ground that the 6 July 1962 BOC
Decision had been issued beyond the one (1) year period for
review of the BSI decision of 6 July 1961. The CFI decision was
reversed and nullified by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962 had
not been antedated and that it was valid and effective to reverse
and nullify the BSI order granting admission to the Gatchalians as
citizens of the Philippines.
The Court also held that the split BOC decision of July-August 1961
did not operate to confirm and render final the BSI decision of 6
July 1961, the split decision being null and void because it had not
been rendered by the BOC as a body.
The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian's argument that he
was not bound by the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision:
It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. 5-A
refer only to the cases of Gloria, Francisco and Benjamin
Gatchalian. But the designation of the case is "Gloria
Gatchalian, et al." No reason is shown why the case of
these three should be considered and voted upon
separately, considering that the claims to citizenship and
entry of all were based on the same circumstances,
applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino and that all their applications for
entry were in fact jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry
in one single decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-
24844).4
I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling
in Arocha disposes of the contention here being made by
respondent William Gatchalian that he is not bound by the Decision
in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that the 1962 BOC Decision was
valid and effective and William was certainly one of the applicants
for admission in the proceedings which began in 1961 before the
BSI.
Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the Court
in Arocha did not find him nor any of his co-applicants to
be aliens and that all the Court did was to hold that the 6 July
1962 Board of Commissioners decision had not been antedated.
This contention cannot be taken seriously. As has already been
pointed out several times, the 1962 Board of Commissioners
decision held that William Gatchalian and his eight (8) other co-
applicants for admission had not proved their claim to Philippine
citizenship; not being Filipinos, they must have been aliens, to be
excluded as persons not properly documented. Moreover, a review
of the Rollo in Arocha vs. Vivo shows that the parties there had
expressly raised the issue of the citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian in
their pleadings. The Solicitor General, in his fifth assignment of
error, argued that the Court of First Instance had erred in
declaring Pedro Gatchalian a Filipino, and simultaneously urged
that the 6 July 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners was
quite correct. Pedro Gatchalian, upon the other hand, contended
that precisely because he was a Filipino, the Bureau of
Immigration had no jurisdiction to exclude him. 5
The Court also said in Arocha:
Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not traverse the
allegation of appellant Commissioners in their return to the
writ of Habeas Corpus that appellee Pedro Gatchalian
gained entry on the strength of a forged cablegram,
purportedly signed by the former Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Felixberto Serrano, and apparently authorizing
appellee's documentation as a Filipino (par. 3[a] of Return,
C.F.I. Rec., pp. 15-16). Such failure to deny imports
admission of its truth by the appellee, establishes that his
entry was irregular. Neither has he appealed the decision
 of the Commissioners of Immigration to the Department
Head.6
Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was effected
simultaneously with that of Francisco and William Gatchalian, on
exactly the same basis and on the strength of the same forged
cablegram allegedly from then Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, it must follow that the entry of Francisco and
William Gatchalian was similarly irregular. The applications for
admission of the nine (9) Gatchalians were all jointly resolved by
the BSI on 6 July 1961 on the identical basis that they were all
descendants of Santiago Gatchalian, a supposed natural born
Philippine citizen.
5. The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision by
Commissioner Nituda in 1973, cannot be given any effect. A close
examination of the same reveals that such purported reversal was
highly irregular.
Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr. Nituda, being in
1973 Acting Commissioner of Immigration, had the authority to
reverse the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962, since he (Nituda) had
immediate control, direction and supervision of all officers, clerks
and employees of the Bureau of Immigration. Control means,
respondent Gatchalian continues, the power to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.7
Respondent Gatchalian's view is obviously flawed. The
Commissioner's power of control over the officers and employees
of the Bureau of Immigration cannot be compared to the power of
control and supervision vested by the Constitution in the President
of the Philippines (which was what Ham was all about), for the
Commissioner's general power of control cannot be said to include
the power to review and set aside the prior final decision reached
by the BOC. The Commissioner of Immigration, acting alone,
cannot be regarded as an authority higher than the BOC itself
(constituted by the Commissioner and the two [2] Associate
Commissioners), in respect of matters vested by the governing
statute in such Board itself. One of these matters is precisely the
hearing and deciding of appeals from decisions of the BSI, and
the motu proprio review of the entire proceedings of a case within
one (1) year from the promulgation of a decision by the BSI. 8
Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the Immigration
Act as amended, as empowering Nituda to reverse the 1962 BOC
Decision. Section 29 (b) reads as follows:
Section 29. . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the
Commissioner of Immigration, in his discretion, may
permit to enter (sic) any alien properly documented, who
is subject to exclusion under this section, but who is —
(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who
is returning from a temporary visit abroad;
(2) an alien applying for temporary admission.
It is difficult to understand respondent's argument. For one
thing, Section 29 (b) relates to an "alien properly
documented" while respondent Gatchalian precisely claims
to be a citizen of the Philippines rather than a resident
alien returning from a temporary visit abroad or an alien
applying for temporary admission.
It should be recalled that Nituda's 1973 Decision approved
a ruling rendered by a Board of Special Inquiry in 1973
that respondent Gatchalian was properly documented, a
ruling which was precipitated by a "Petition for Rehearing"
filed by respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 8
March 1972 before the BSI. There are a number of obvious
defects in the action of the BSI. Firstly, the motion for
rehearing was filed way out of time.Rule 3, B 22 of the
Immigration Rules and Regulations of 1 January 1941
provides as follows:
 At any time before the alien is deported, but not
later than seven days from the date he receives
notice of the decision on appeal of the Board of
Commissioners, the applicant or his attorney or
counsel may file a petition for rehearing only on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. Such
petition shall be in writing and shall set forth the
nature of the evidence discovered and the reason
or reasons why it was not produced before. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Gatchalian's and his co-applicants' motion for
rehearing was filed, not seven (7) days but rather ten (10)
years after notice of the 1962 BOC Decision had been
received by them. Secondly, Rule 3, B 25 of the
Immigration Rules and Regulations prescribed that any
motion for rehearing shall be filed only with the Board of
Commissioners; the Gatchalians' motion for rehearing was
filed with the BSI which then purported to reopen the case
"without first securing the consent in writing of the
Commissioner of Immigration" as required by Rule 2, D
20.
Furthermore, the purported reversal of the 1962 BOC
Decision was made not by the duly constituted BOC in
1973, but only by its Chairman, then Acting Commissioner
Nituda. Mr. Nituda's action flew in the face of Rule 3, B 22
of the Immigration Rules and Regulation, which mandates
that the decision of any two (2) members of the BOC shall
prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda purported to act as
if he were the entire BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in
1973 could not have lawfully reversed a final decision
rendered by the BOC ten (10) years ago.9
We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha vs.
Vivo (supra) where the Supreme Court expressly outlined the
procedure to be followed by the BOC in resolving cases before
them. This court was very explicit in holding that individual
actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
. . . [T]he former Immigration Commissioners appeared to
have acted individually in this particular instance and not
as a Board. It is shown by the different dates affixed to
their signatures that they did not actually meet to discuss
and vote on the case. This was officially made to record by
the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9,
on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.
that for the past several years, the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration has not met
collectively to discuss and deliberate in the cases
coming before it. [Citation omitted]
Individual action by members of a board plainly renders
nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The
Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners
precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively
and in order that their views and Ideas should be
exchanged and examined before reaching a
conclusion (See Ryan vs. Humphrise, LRA 1915F
1047). This process is of the essence of a board's action,
save where otherwise provided by law, and the salutary
effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act
individually, without benefit of discussion.
The powers and duties of boards and commissions
may not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done
by the members convened in sessions, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least
a quorum present. [Citation omitted]
Where the action needed is not of the individuals
composing a board but of the official body, the
members must be together and act in their official
capacity, and the action should appear on the
records of the board. [Citation omitted]
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of
different individuals, that board can act officially
only as such, in convened sessions, with the
 members, or a quorum thereof, present. [Citation
omitted]10 (Emphasis supplied)
The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 Decision of the
BOC could not hence be considered as the act of the BOC
itself.
The pretended act of reversal 0of Mr. Nituda must,
therefore, be stricken down and disregarded for having
been made in excess of his lawful authority. The 1973
order of Nituda was ineffective to vest any right upon
respondent Gatchalian who, it is worth nothing, did not
pretend to submit any newly discovered evidence to
support their claim to Philippine citizenship already
rejected by the 1962 BOC. In essence, Mr. Nituda
purported not merely to set aside the 1962 BOC Decision
but also the 1967 Decision of this Court in Arocha vs. Vivo.
II
I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which
make up the basis of the claim of William Gatchalian to
Philippine citizenship. The most striking feature of this
claim to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a fragile
web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total
lack of official documentation whether Philippine or foreign,
of negative facts and of invocation of presumptions without
proof of essential factual premises. Put in summary terms,
the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship
rests upon three (3) premises, to wit:
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine
citizen;
b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as
a legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which
leads to the intermediate conclusion that Francisco
was a Philippine citizen; and
c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to
the final conclusion that William Gatchalian is a
Philippine citizen.
I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the facts
made of record will show that the correctness and factual
nature of each of these layered premises are open to very
serious doubt, doubts which can only lead to the same
conclusion which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it
reversed the BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove
the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of his
eight (8) alleged uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when
they first arrived in the Philippines.
1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian must be considered first. Santiago was
allegedly born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905 to Pablo
Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. The records do not
disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco but everyone,
including William Gatchalian, assumes that Pablo Pacheco
was a Chinese subject and never became a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. The basic claim of Santiago was that his
mother Marciana Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen and
that Marciana was not lawfully married to Pablo Pacheco
and that consequently, he (Santiago) was an illegitimate
son of Marciana Gatchalian.
The first point that should be made in respect of Santiago's
claim was that he had always regarded himself as a
Chinese citizen until around 1958 or 1960, that is, when he
reached the age of 53 or 55 years. Santiago, by his own
testimony, lived the bulk of his adult life in China where he
went in 1924 at age 19 and where he stayed for about 13
years returning to the Philippines for the first time in 1937.
He returned in the same year to China, stayed there for
another nine (9) years, and then came back to the
Philippines again in 1946. He once more left the Philippines
for China on 14 April 1947 and returned on 14 June 1947.
Upon his second return to the Philippines in 1946, he
documented himself as a Chinese national: he was holder
of ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He continued to be
documented as such, the record showing that he was also
holder of an ACR No. A-219003 dated 13 January 1951.
Santiago, again by his own statement, married in China a
Chinese woman. This Chinese wife, however, Santiago
never brought or attempted to bring to the Philippines and
she allegedly died in China in 1951, or four (4)
years after Santiago had permanently returned to the
Philippines.
In 1958, when he was 53 years of age, Santiago obtained
a residence certificate where for the first time he described
himself as a Filipino. It was also only in 1960, that is,
when Santiago was 55 years of age, that he filed a petition
for cancellation of his ACR obviously upon the theory that
he had always been a Philippine citizen. It was at the
hearing of his petition for cancellation of his ACR that
Santiago made his oral statements concerning the
supposed circumstances of his birth, parentage and
marriage. Santiago's petition to cancel his ACR was
apparently made in preparation for efforts to bring in, the
succeeding year, a whole group of persons as his supposed
descendants.
The second point that needs to be made in respect of
Santiago's claim of citizenship resting on his supposed
status as an illegitimate son of a Filipina woman, is that no
birth certificate bearing the name of Santiago Gatchalian
was ever presented.
Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the name Santiago
Gatchalian was presented showing the name of Marciana
Gatchalian, Filipina, as mother, with the name of the father
unknown. There was also presented a marriage certificate
dated 1936 of Joaquin Pacheco, alleged brother of
Santiago Gatchalian, also showing Marciana Gatchalian as
mother with the name of the father similarly left blank.
These two (2) pieces of paper, together with Santiago's
own statements to the Citizenship Evaluation Board as well
as the statements of Joaquin Pacheco to the same Board,
constituted the sum total of the evidence supporting
Santiago's claim to Philippine citizenship and on the basis
of which an Order dated 12 July 1960, signed by Felix S.
Talabis, Associate Commissioner, granted the petition to
cancel Santiago's alien registry.
In so issuing his Order granting cancellation of Santiago's
ACR, Commissioner Talabis disregarded Santiago's failure
to present a birth certificate, in obvious violation of rules of
the Bureau of Immigration which expressly require the
submission of a birth certificate, or a certified true copy
thereof, in proceedings brought for cancellation of an ACR
upon the ground that the petitioner is an illegitimate son of
a Filipina mother.11 It is well-settled that a baptismal
certificate is proof only of the administration of baptism to
the person named therein, and that such certificate is not
proof of anything else and certainly not proof
of parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or
illegitimacy.12
That Order also casually disregarded a number of other
things, one of which was a document dated 1902 signed
by Maxima Gatchalian, the mother of Marciana Gatchalian,
stating that Maxima —
. . . residing in the City of Manila, mother of
Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of
age, her father being dead, do hereby
freely consent to her marriage with Pablo C.
Pacheco, of Manila, and that I know of no legal
impediment to such marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
Such parental consent indicated that a marriage ceremony
would have taken place shortly thereafter as a matter of
course; otherwise, the consent would have been totally
pointless. Even more importantly, Commissioner Talabis'
Order disregarded the testimony of Santiago Gatchalian
himself in the same cancellation proceedings that he
(Santiago) believed that his parents had been married by
the Justice of the Peace of Pasig, Rizal.13 In his Order,
Commissioner Talabis referred to the fact that Santiago
Gatchalian had been "interchangeably using his parental
and maternal surnames. In school, he was known
as Santiago Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921, Meisic
Manila; Certificates of Completion of Third and Fourth
Grades, Meisic Primary School). But in his Special Cedula
Certificate No. 676812 dated 17 September 1937, and in
tax clearance certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is
referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a
Communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to
as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office." At the very least, such use of both paternal and
maternal surnames indicated that Santiago was uncertain
as to his supposed illegitimacy. In our case law, moreover,
the use of a paternal surname may be regarded as an
indication of possession of the status of a legitimate or
acknowledged natural child.14
Perhaps the most important aspect of Commissioner
Talabis Order granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR, is
that such Order failed to give any weight to the
presumption in law in favor of marriage, a presumption
significantly reinforced by the parental consent given by
Maxima Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter
Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C. Pacheco. A related
presumption is that in favor of the legitimacy of offspring
born of a man and woman comporting themselves as
husband and wife.15 I respectfully submit that these
presumptions cannot be successfully overthrown by the
simple self-serving testimony of Santiago and of his
alleged brother Joaquin Pacheco and by the two (2) pieces
of paper (the baptismal certificate of Santiago and the
marriage certificate of Joaquin Pacheco). It seems relevant
to point out that Joaquin Pacheco, too, was unable to
present any birth certificate to prove his supposed
common parentage with Santiago Gatchalian; Joaquin was
allegedly born in 1902, the same year that Maxima
Gatchalian gave her consent to the marriage of Marciana
Gatchalian and Pablo C. Pacheco.
The third point that needs to be underscored is that
Santiago Gatchalian did nothing to try to bring into the
Philippines his supposed sons and daughters and
grandchildren since 1947, when he returned permanently
to the Philippines, and until 1960. The story given by the
nine (9) supposed descendants of Santiago when they first
arrived in the Philippines was that they had left the
People's Republic of China and had gone to Macao in
1952 and there they stayed until they moved to
Hongkong in 1958. It should also be noted that the
youngest supposed child of Santiago, Benjamin Gatchalian,
was said to have been born in China in 1942 and was
consequently only five (5) years old when Santiago
returned permanently to the Philippines in 1947. In other
words, Santiago Gatchalian behaved as if the nine (9)
supposed descendants did not exist until 1960 when
Commissioner Talabis' Order cancelling Santiago's ACR
was issued.
It may also be noted that Santiago's 1951 ACR application
mentioned only two (2) children of Santiago: Jose and
Elena. In 1961, however, Santiago stated before the
immigration investigator that he had a total of five (5)
children: Jose, Elena, Francisco, Gloria and Benjamin.
Santiago's explanation strongly echoes a common lawyer's
excuse for failure to seasonably file some pleading, and, it
is respectfully submitted, is equally contrived and
unpersuasive; that he had his clerk fill up the ACR; that he
gave his clerk four (4) names (not five [5]); that the clerk
had simply failed to fill up the ACR correctly. In its 6 July
1962 Decision, the BOC noted that "while the two (2)
names listed in [Santiago's] [ACR application] Jose and
Elena, bear the same names as two of the [9]
applicants, the difference in the ages of said persons
compared to the said applicants, casts serious doubts on
their Identity."16
It is suggested in the majority opinion that the question of
citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter which
cannot be reviewed by this Court; that per the records of
the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960, Santiago
Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and
that this forecloses re-opening of that question thirty (30)
years later. I must, with respect, disagree with this
suggestion. The administrative determination by the
Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does
not constitute res adjudicatathat forecloses this Court from
examining the supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian upon which private respondent William
Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid
examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago
Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by
William Gatchalian, considering that one of the central
issues here is the tanability or untenability of the claim of
William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and hence to
entry or admission to the Philippines as such citizen.
2. The second of the three (3) premises noted in the
beginning of this section is: that Francisco Gatchalian was
the legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian and therefore
followed the supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago.
This premise has in fact two (2) parts: (a) the physical
filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as the son of Santiago
Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago Gatchalian was lawfully
married to the Chinese mother of Francisco Gatchalian.
This premise is remarkable for the total absence of
documentary support for either of its two (2) parts.
Francisco was born in Amoy, China in 1931, according to
Santiago. The sum total of the evidence on this premise
consists of Francisco Gatchalian's own statement and that
of Santiago. No birth certificate or certified true copy
thereof, or comparable documentation under Chinese law,
was submitted by either Santiago or by Francisco. No
secondary evidence of any kind was submitted. No
testimony of a disinterested person was offered.
Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been married in China
in 1926 to a Chinese woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of which
marriage Francisco was allegedly born. No documentary
proof of such marriage in China, whether primary or
secondary, was ever submitted. Neither was there ever
presented any proof of the contents of the Chinese law on
marriage in 1926 and of compliance with its requirements.
It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts
and relies upon the existence of a valid foreign marriage
must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the
fact of compliance with the requisites of such law, but also
the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-
Gonzales,17 the issue before the Court was whether the
marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the deceased Sy Kiat in
accordance with Chinese law and custom had been
adequately proven. In rendering a negative answer, this
Court, speaking through Cortes, J., said:
These evidence may very well prove the  fact of
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However,
the same do not suffice to establish the validity of
said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and
custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory."
The law requires that "a custom must be proved as
a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article
12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source
of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca
vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article
71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine
law.
 Construing this provision of law the Court has held
that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence
of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence [Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43, 49 (1922).18(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof other than
Santiago's bare assertion that a marriage ceremony between
Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China in
accordance with Chinese law. The contents of the relevant Chinese
law on marriage at the time of the supposed marriage, was
similarly not shown. Should it be assumed simply that the
requirements of the 1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical
with the requirements of the Philippine law on marriage, it must be
pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian
submitted proof that any of the requirements of a valid marriage
under Philippine law had been complied with.
I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority
opinion upon our conflicts rule on marriage embodied in Article 71
of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code; then Section
19 of Act No. 3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign
marriage valid in accordance with the law of the place where it was
performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to
operate  until after the marriage performed abroad and its
compliane with the requirements for validity under the marriage
law of the place where performed, are first shown as factual
matters. There is, in other words, no factual basis for a
presumption that a lawful marriage under Chinese law had taken
place in 1926 in China between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim
Tee.
It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot simply rely
upon a presumption of legitimacy of offspring of a valid
marriage.1âwphi1 As far as the record here is concerned, there
could well have been no marriage at all in China between Santiago
Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as Santiago had insisted
that his father and mother had never married each other) and that
consequently Francisco Gatchalian could just as well have followed
the nationality of his admittedly Chinese mother.
3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed filiation of
William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco which resulted
in William's following the supposed Philippine citizenship of
Francisco Gatchalian. William was, according to Santiago
Gatchalian, born in Amoy, China in 1949. Here again, just in the
case of Francisco Gatchalian, there is a complete absence of
contemporaneous documentary evidence of the supposed filiation
of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian.19 The only support ever presented for such alleged
filiation consisted of the oral statements of Santiago Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian and William Gatchalian. It is difficult to resist
the impression that there took place here a pyramiding of oral
statements, each resting upon another oral statement and all
going back to the supposed bastardy of Santiago, a status
suddenly discovered or asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in
life. No birth certificate, or comparable documentation under
Chinese law, exhibiting the name of William Gatchalian was
submitted.
Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a Chinese woman,
Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according to Chinese custom. Once
again, we must note that there was no proof submitted that a
marriage ceremony satisfying the requirements of "Chinese
custom" had ever taken place in China between Francisco and Ong
Siu Kiok; neither was there any proof that a marriage "according
to Chinese custom" was valid and lawful under Chinese law in
1947 and of factual compliance with the requirements of the law
and custom in China concerning marriage. 20 Ong Siu Kiok was
alleged to have died in Macau and never came to the Philippines. It
must then follow, once again, that no presumption of a lawful
marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese
wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian. It follows still further
that William Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of
legitimacy in his own favor. As in the case of his putative father
Francisco, William could as well have followed the nationality of his
concededly Chinese mother.
One final note: it might be thought that the result I have reached 3
 Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commission of Immigration
is unduly harsh considering the prolonged physical stay of William and the Director of National Bureau of Investigation, 104
Gatchalian in the country. But this Court must apply the law as it Phil. 949 (1958); La Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 683
is in fact written. I respectfully submit that the appropriate (1948).
recourse of respondent William Gatchalian, should he feel that he
has some humanitarian claim to a right to stay in the Philippines,  21 SCRA at 539.
4

is to the political departments of Government. Those departments

of Government may then consider the wisdom and desirability, in 5
 Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 32 (Brief for the
the light of the interests of the country, of legislation permitting
Respondents-Appellants, p. 28); Rollo of G.R. No. 24844,
the legalization of the entry and stay in the Philippines of
p. 41 (Brief for the Petitioner-Appellee, p. 8).
respondent William Gatchalian and those similarly situated. Unless
and until such legislation is enacted, this Court really has no choice
save to apply and enforce our immigration law and regulations and  21 SCRA at 541.
6

our law on citizenship.

 Citing Ham vs. Bachrach, 109 Phil. 949 (1968).
7

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE the  Section 27 (d), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended.
8

Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990

issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-5214, 9
 See Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. Fernandez, et
as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 al., 120 Phil. 178 (1964).
September 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to RE-AFFIRM
that respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen. 10
 21 SCRA at 540.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Regalado, JJ., concur
 Memorandum Circular, Department of Justice, dated 28
11

August 1958; Administrative Memorandum, Bureau of

Immigration, dated 17 March 1952, cited in E.F.
Hernandez and O.A. Domingo, Philippine Immigration Law
and Procedure, (1970 ed.,) p. 437.
Footnotes
 See, e.g., People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984);
12

* Renamed Bureau of Immigration as per Executive Order Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980);
No. 292. Fortus vs. Novero, 23 SCRA 1331 (1968); Cid vs.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 (1968); Vidaurraza vs. Court of
FELICIANO, J.:  dissenting: Appeals, 91 Phil. 492 (1952); and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8
Phil. 135 (1907).
1
 21 SCRA 532 (1967); 128 Phil. 566 (1967).
 The transcript of the investigation conducted on 12
13

February 1960 in CEB No. 3860-R, In Re Petition to Cancel

2
 Section 36, Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended, or Alien Registry, Santiago Gatchalian, petitioner, Annex "2"
Immigration Law.
of private respondent Gatchalian's "Comment with said our parents are married." (Annex "B-9" of
Counter-Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13 states: private respondent Gatchalian's "Comment with
Counter-Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13)
"[Immigration Investigator]
 E.g., In Re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974); and Adriano vs.
14

Q It says here, "this is to certify that I, the De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350 (1912).
undersigned, residing in the City of Manila, mother
of Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of  See, in this connection, Rule 131, Section 5 (cc) and
15

age, her father being dead, do hereby freely (dd) of the Rules of Court.
consent to her marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of
Manila, and that I know of no legal impediment to  Annex "37" of Comment with Counter-Petition, G.R. Nos.
16

such marriage." Was your father, Pablo C. 95612-13.

Pacheco, and mother, Marciana Gatchalian,
ultimately or eventually married because of this
 167 SCRA 736 (1988).
17
consent of your grandmother?

 167 SCRA at 743-744.

18
[Santiago Gatchalian]

 William Gatchalian presented his own marriage contract

19
A Yes, I was informed by my brother Joaquin
executed in 1973, which showed as his parents Francisco
Pacheco that our parents were married by the
Gatchalian and Ong Siu Kiok. This, of course, has no
justice of the peace of Pasig, Rizal." (Emphasis
probative value for present purposes.
supplied)

 Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales,  supra.

20
In his subsequent testimony in the same
proceedings, Joaquin Pacheco, and a singularly
accommodating immigration investigator who
posed obviously leading questions, sought to
soften the impact of Santiago's admission that his
parents were married:

"[Immigration Investigator]

Q Or is it because [Santiago] was ashamed to

admit that he was a legitimate child and that is the
reason why he said your parents were married?

[Joaquin Gatchalian]

A It may be also that he is ashamed to make it be

known that he is a legitimate child that is why he

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,  violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate
court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein
petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and Chief
Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through its Area
Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal
interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract
of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January
21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension
of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective January
21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which
the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24,
1980, while in command of a flight, committed a noise
apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping
incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched
the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few
days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt.
Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a
course of A-300 conversion training at Aeroformacion,
Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having
successfully completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as
captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as
captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated
cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains
in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's
requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently,
defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff
of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
(Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were
found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the
twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his
termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be
paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice
(Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot
his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-
month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible
avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave
only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary.
(t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved
to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a
quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to
dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2)
that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in
the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was
employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his
employment contract and/or documents executed in
Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction.
(pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that:
(1) where the items demanded in a complaint are the
natural consequences flowing from a breach of an
obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a
civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3)
if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's
dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's
motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer
reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss
and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches,
waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and
that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor
of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against defendant
Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at
the current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as
and for unearned compensation with legal interest from
the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at
the current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and
the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential
damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;
 P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00
as and for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court
and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of
the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to
illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on
January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for
reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO
THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER
MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT
WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination
of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because
of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine
Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the
Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant
filed its appeal before said court. 5 On this matter, respondent court
was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising
further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based
on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to
him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982,
was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144,
so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said
article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on
Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error.
The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal
originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but
which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional
Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil
Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the
Labor Code, viz:
 Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from
employee-employer relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred.
xxx     xxx     xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has
long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled,
that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code may not  be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is
a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations. 9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the
money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not
limit its application only to "money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims
arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission,
261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor
Code is a special law applicable to money claims arising
from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily
prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing
Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282,
294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate
court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to
illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than
four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8,
1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date
of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-
appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but
on which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which
governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission.
However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal
leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of
Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff
leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due
to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the
employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law
between the parties. From the moment the same is
perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when
plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he
was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by
giving three months written notice or by payment of three
months salary. Such provision is clear and readily
understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
 xxx     xxx     xxx Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound

by the provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a
signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted
that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed,
Footnotes
he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines
Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is  Rollo, pp. 30-32.
1

estopped from questioning the legality of the said

agreement or any proviso contained therein.13  Id. at 65.
2

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that  Id. at 40.
3

respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it

did not err in its findings, including the reason for the  Id. at 54.
4

retrenchment:
 Id. at 32.
5

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide

recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in
the company's growth particularly in the regional operation  Id. at 33.
6

(Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no

choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting
7
 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
down services, number of frequencies of flights, and ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant- (1) Upon a written contract;
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-
appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
xxx     xxx     xxx
reasonably needed.14
8
 Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to
four years:
conclude that petitioner's termination from employment was for an
authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to
respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt xxx     xxx     xxx

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of 9

 Manuel L. Quezon University Association v. Manuel L.
the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED. Quezon Educational Institution Inc., 172 SCRA 597, 604
(1989), citing De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893 (1967);
SO ORDERED. Lagman v. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579 (1966); Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 172 SCRA
571, 575 (1967); Barcenas v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 498, 503
(1990); Central Negros Electric Cooperative Inc., v. NLRC,
236 SCRA 108, 114 (1994).

 297 SCRA 743 (1998).

10

 Id. at 750-751 (1998).

11

 180 SCRA 353, 363 (1989).

12

 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

13

 Id. at 37.
14