ABSTRACT

Nigeria is a state populated by a plethora of ethnic, historical, religious and culturally diverse
people, endowed with a vast range of natural, mineral and human resources. It is thus
expected that she should be one of the most prosperous nations in the world. Ironically, she
is mired in a myriad of problems. This paper examines the Nigerian federal system of
government in relation to her many problems. It also argues for a re-definition and re-
structuring of the federal system as practiced in order to achieve the much coveted goals of
economic development, political stability and over-arching security.

Keywords: Federalism, power sharing, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

In 1919, an Irish poet, W. B. Yeats composed “the second coming” comprised in part of the
lines; “...things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,”
These lines are reminiscent of the Nigerian reality. Since 1960 Nigeria has had
“democratically elected” governments toppled by Military regimes and swung like a
pendulum from federal arrangements to authoritarian dispensations as the case may be. In
effect, the autocratic essence of the military has rubbed of on civilian rule resulting in
increased corruption, gross misconduct and inequalities. For ease of understanding, the
content of this paper is discussed under five headings; introduction, conceptual clarification,
evolution of Nigerian federalism, contending issues in Nigerian federalism and conclusion.
This paper also argues for a re-structuring of Nigerian federalism in order to make it a
workable model in Nigeria.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

The purpose of conceptualization in any academic paper is to give operational definitions to

important concepts used in the discourse. As Rubbin and Babbie (1989) noted, we specify
what we mean to provide clarity as to the way particular terms are used in order to facilitate
contextual operationalization and comprehension. Thus an attempt has been made to
operationalize federalism.

What is Federalism?

Federalism has been defined in as many ways as there are authors. However a classical
definition sees it as “a method of dividing powers so that the general and regional
governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent.” (Wheare; 1963).
From Wheare’s definition we are able to deduce the important principles of federalism
which are those of “division of powers” and “co-ordination and non-subordination”.

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A. V. Dicey described the foremost characteristics of a “completely developed federalism” to
include the division of powers among governmental bodies (each with limited and co-
ordinate powers), along with the supremacy of the constitution and the authority of the
courts as the interpreter of the constitution. From this definition we deduce the importance
of the constitution as being the highest body of law, and of the judiciary’s role as the sole
interpreter of the constitution in a federal state.

Donald V. Smiley gave a three part operational definition of federalism as entailing (i)
legislative powers are distributed between a central and regional government, (ii) the
powers of the central and regional governments are not subject to change by the other
levels of government and (iii) individual citizens are subject to laws enacted by both the
central and regional governments. This definition is important because it distinguishes on
the one hand federalism from unitarism (in unitary systems sub-units are created and
dissolved, and their powers allocated at the discretion of the central government) and
federalism from confederalism on the other hand (in confederations, the central
government does not have direct access to the citizens of it’s component units). It thus
brings to the fore the concept of dual loyalty inherent in federalism.

King (1982), explained federalism from two angles viz, ideological and institutional. To him
ideological federalism could connote a balance between autonomy and independence. Here
it has been advanced as a tool for balancing demands for unity and separatism. In contrast
he explained institutional federalism to mean a federation as an institutional arrangement
taking the form of a sovereign state and distinguished from other states solely by the fact
that its central government incorporates regional units into its decision procedure on some
constitutionally entrenched basis.

From the above, federalism can thus be described as a system of organizing a state which
deposits power, authority and functions in different levels of government as an expedient
means of providing efficient administration for, and ultimately fostering co-operation
among a heterogeneous population with varying and sometimes conflicting needs,
occupying a single territo

Why Federalism?

Nations federate for different reasons. Appadorai (1975), identified five “conditions for the
establishment and continuance of a federation” as follows;

i. The desire for union: This may be born out of a sense of military insecurity and
of the consequent need for common defence (Wheare, 1963) e.g the United
States of America: Or out of a hope of economic advantage from the union e.g
the Commonwealth of Australia in 1900.

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 ii. The desire for local independence: While there must be a desire for a union,
there is also a strong desire by “the component states for the preservation of
their independence in all but essentially common matters is a precondition” for
the formation of a federal organization (Appadorai, 1975; 499).
iii. Geographical contiguity: The federating components have to share common
boundaries or” in the least not be too far apart or the desire for a union will not
easily emerge”.
iv. The absence of marked inequalities among the component units: The
federating units must not show significant disparities in terms of strength as the
stronger units may attempt to control the federation. An example is the German
empire established in 1871 where the preponderant dominance of Prussia
negated the federal principle.
v. Political education and legalism: The survival of a federation depends on the
capacity of the people to “appreciate the meaning of double allegiance and to
prevent the centrifugal principle of political action from overcoming the
centripetal”. It also involves a general willingness of the people to defer to the
authority of the law courts.

Thus federalism as a system of governance is “pragmatic, dynamic, utilitarian and evolving.

It can only thrive on consultation, negotiation, compromise, bargaining and agreement
between the constituent governments. It grows under a system of mutuality and
interdependence (Ikelegbe, 2004; 128).

Formation of Federations

Federations basically as institutions are the operational embodiments of federalism as a co-

operative ideology. Alfred Stepan (1999), identified three categories of federations based
on their mode of formation; coming together, holding together and putting together
federations. Coming together federations (national or mononational federations) is the
voluntary union of previously independent state with common culture. Holding together
federations (multi-ethnic federations) are federations formed through a process of
democratic bargaining. In contrast a putting together federation is established through a
“heavily coercive effort by a non-democratic centralizing power to put together a
multinational state (ibid; 23). This third type of federation, lack a democratic base and
content. The origins of Nigeria’s federalism can be traced to this third category of
federations.

EVOLUTION OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The origin of Nigerian federalism dates back to the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and
Southern Protectorates. The Federal Structure began to take shape under Sir Arthur
Richards on the creation of the three regions under the Richards constitution of 1946 albeit

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it remained a unitary decentralized system. Federalism was officially adopted under the
Lyttleton constitution of 1954. This constitution was adopted as a result of the controversies
which trailed the Macpherson constitution especially the 1953 motion for self-governance
and the consequent Kano riot of the same year. These occurrences, as Oyedele (1999)
points out made it vividly clear that the regions had to be granted a considerable amount of
autonomy for them to co-exist and only a federal arrangement could guarantee such a
degree of autonomy.

Nigerian federalism which came into its own at independence in 1960 has operated at
both the political and fiscal context even though a lot is left to be desired as it has not
operated in tandem with true federal principles. Like a pendulum “Nigeria’s federalism has
oscillated between the excessive regionalism of the First Republic (1960-1966) and the
excessive centralization of the military era and relatively the post-military era (Adeyeri:
2005).

In its history, Nigerian federalism has moved from a three region arrangement in 1946 to
a four region arrangement in 1963 to its current 36 state and 774 Local Government Areas
structure. The purpose of these changes was to give the diverse interests in Nigeria a sense
of belonging and reduce feelings of marginalization. These changes however seem to be
counter-productive as they seem to have only increased the degree of imbalance as
demonstrated in the continued centralization and concentration of power at the centre
along with its accompanying effects as well as the dominance of certain ethnic groups. This
structural imbalance is portrayed in the Northern region which by virtue of it’s massive
landmass (281, 782 sq/km), comprises more than 50% of Nigeria’s total land space and
population. Muhammed, (2008) opines that this has made it dominant over other regions
so much so that it is the decider on matters of joint deliberation at the National Assembly
leading to hostility between it and the other regions of the south.

The over-concentration of power at the centre has had a negative impact on the practice
of fiscal federalism to the extent that the component units are all dependent on the federal
government for survival. This is an aberration to the extent that they cannot execute their
functions without the assistance of the central government and this being one of the great
contradictions of federalism in Nigeria has turned the units into mere appendages and
stooges of the central government.

Regarding fiscal federalism, Access to political power at the centre is the most crucial
factor in resource distribution and revenue allocation. In this situation, the “group” that
controls political power at the centre ultimately controls revenue allocation and therefore
has the opportunity to appropriate a large portion to its own advantage to the detriment of
the wealth producer and other component units. This scenario is exemplified by the
consistent and systematic relegation of derivation as the principle of revenue allocation
since 1951 (Ofeimun: 2005). This has led to feelings of marginalization which resulted in

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protestations and agitations by minority interest groups for resource control and state
creation which has remained a recurring decimal and a stumbling block to nation-building.

In fact, Nigerian federalism has evolved in such a manner that Ikelegbe (2004), points that it
is difficult to “brand it”. As a result terms like “unitary, command and militarist federalism”
have been employed to describe it. Its very structure had given rise to a number of
contradictions such as the impact of the colonial legacy, military rule, structural imbalance
and centralization of power which have coalesced in a wide range of teething issues.

CONTENDING ISSUES IN NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The colonial background, military influence, structural imbalance and the over-
concentration of powers in the federal government has over the years resulted in some
pervasive problems with the Nigerian federalism. These challenges have often manifested in
form of the following;

1. The Minority Question and state creation

2. Arbitrary military intervention in governance
3. Oil and minority agitations for resource control
4. Ethno-religious conflict
5. The federal character dilemma
6. Corruption
7. Leadership crisis and acrimonious intergovernmental relations.

The Minority Question and State Creation

The agitation of minority groups in Nigeria for adequate representation pre-dates
independence to the colonial era. This has been one major problem to nation building in
Nigeria as groups attach their survival in the Nigerian project to ethnic representation and
access to federal resources. This has led to the formation of political parties along ethnic
lines such as the Benin and Delta People’s Party (1953), Mid-West Movement (1956),
Calabar-Ogoja Rivers states Movement (1954), United Middle Belt Congress (1955) and the
Borno Youth Movement. Their agitations have always led them to demand for state creation
as a means to determine their own development as distinct from the other major ethnic
groups. To address the minority question and their clamour for states, the Willinck’s
commission had advised against state creation but the fostering of a sense of belonging.
Since the creation of the first 12 states in March, 27 1967 to the current 36 in 1995, the
agitation has not dissipated. In Delta state for example the Igbo speaking ethnic are
clamouring for the creation of an “Anioma state” as a response to the perpetual domination
by the Urhobo.

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Military Intervention In Governance
Of Nigeria’s 54 years of independence, some 30 of those years has been spent under
military rule. Perhaps the greatest harm done by the military to the Nigerian political system
is the massive centralization of power coupled with the destruction of democratic values in
the Nigerian federation. It has been argued in scholarly discourse that thirty years of military
rule so fundamentally altered the federal structure to the advantage of the central
government that Nigeria became more a unitary state than a federal state (Adeyeri; 2005).

Oil and Minority Agitations

Oil which is the main revenue earner of the Nigerian federation, has been at the centre of
many conflicts. The fact that it is found in areas mostly occupied by minority ethnic groups
yet laws like Decree 51 and Decree 9 has firmly placed all petroleum resources within
Nigeria and all offshore oil wells respectively within the sole control of the central
government has created deep feelings of resentment within the minority groups especially
those of the Niger Delta. The struggle for resource control has resulted in conflict like the
secession attempts of Isaac Adaka Boro on the declaration of the Republic of the Niger Delta
following the inability of the 1957 constitution to resolve the minority question. This issue
has also pitted the central government against the south-south states government in the
offshore/onshore dichotomy debate.
The issue of inaccessibility to resources situated within their territory coupled with the
impact of environmental degradation arising from oil exploration in the Niger Delta and as
Obi, (2000) argues, the relegation of the derivation principle in revenue allocation in favour
of the principles of “equality” and “population of states” in response to the shift of the
country’s source of wealth from agriculture to petroleum and the desire of the major ethnic
groups to continuously control national revenue, has in recent years led to the proliferation
of militant groups aiming to re-adjust the perceived imbalance. These groups include Niger
Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), Egbesu, Ijaw National
Congress (INC), Niger Delta Liberation Army (NDLA), Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND), Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), Chikoko and
the Martyr Brigade. However the amnesty programme and the creation of the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of the Niger Delta as well as the amnesty
programme inaugurated under President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua has proven to have
curtailed this trend to certain extent but tensions still remain as threats by groups to re-arm
regularly issue from the region.

The Federal Character Dilemma

The Federal Character principle is an important feature of the 1979 constitution. Its
enacting law in the 1999 constitution summarises it as “the composition of the federation or
any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to
reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to
command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons

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from a few states, a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its
agencies.” As Adeyeri, (2005)puts it, “Federal Character is a euphemism for ethnic
balancing. It is an instrumentality for ensuring unity in diversity by balancing appointments
between groups and within the officer corp and the armed forces”. This principle is not
unique to Nigerian federalism alone. it is obtainable in the USA as “affirmative Action” and
in India as “quota system” in some areas (Ayua; 1994). It is however a contentious issue in
Nigeria as it has ironically led to the domination of federal institutions especially the military
and paramilitary by the major ethnic groups with a preponderance of population to the
disadvantage of the less populated ethnic groups and its prioritization of place of origin over
merit in appointments leading to mediocrity.

Ethno-Religious Conflict
Ethnic and religious crisis has been a recurring decimal in Nigeria’s federal experiment.
Religious conflict which usually manifests in form of physical violence especially in the
northern parts of the federation is traceable to the high level of poverty, ignorance, distrust
and mutual hatred among ethnic and religious groups. This has greatly hampered the
forging of a united nation and politicians prolong the unhealthy situation by promoting
religious sentiments for selfish purposes.
Religious and ethnic violence are not unrelated as manifested in places like Jos, Plateau
state where the indigene/settler debacle between the Birom indigenes and Hausa settlers
has resulted in countless loss of lives and destruction of property. This situation also results
in communal clashes even at an intra ethnic level such as experienced between the Umuleri
and Aguleri clashes over boundaries in Anambra East Local Government area and also at an
inter-ethnic level as demonstrated in the violence between the Itsekiri and Ijaw, Itsekiri and
Urhobo of Delta state, Jukuns and Kutebs in Taraba State, Tivs and Jukuns in Benue state,
Ijaws and Ilajes in Ondo state and between the Hausa-Fulani against the northern minorities
in most of the northern states (Alabi; 2006). Recent crisis of this nature include the Eggom
case in Nasarrawa and the many cases of Fulani herdsman guerrilla styled attacks in Plateau,
Benue, Taraba and even Delta state.

Corruption
Corruption has dogged the steps of Nigeria’s federalism since its inception and became
blatant in the Second Republic and subsequent regimes manifesting in varying forms from
fiscal misappropriation to electoral fraud by the political class and top officials of the
federation. Corruption is so endemic that Transparency International 2013 corruption
ranking out of 177 countries, places Nigeria as the 33rd most corrupt nation in the world.
The uninhibited diversion, misappropriation of public funds for personal use at all levels of
the Nigeria federal structure has retarded development of the Nigerian state.

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Leadership crisis and Intergovernmental Relations Conflict
The many problems of Nigeria’s federalism have been compound by the absence of
purposeful and committed leadership. The Nigerian leadership being more concerned with
personal gains has resorted to dubious means of holding unto power via electoral
malfeasance and the urgent desire to control the federal structure at all levels has generally
resulted in an acrimonious relation between the government at the centre and the
government at the state levels. Cases in point include the faceoff between the Lagos state
and federal government under Bola Ahmed Tinubu and Olusegun Obasanjo over the 2005
creation of Local Governments Areas by Lagos state. This crisis dragged on to include their
successors when President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua wrote a letter in 2009 to Governor Raji
Fashola requesting him to scrap the so called Local Council Development Area (LCDA’s) but
the latter insisted on maintening them. And in the 2013 Nigerian Governors Forum (NGF)
fracas which pitted the governor of River state against the Federal Government of President
Goodluck Jonathan. Leadership crisis can be said to be the single most significant factor that
has prevented and stunted the positive growth and evolution of Nigerian federalism.

CONCLUSION
In view of the above, it is obvious that Nigerian federalism is embattled with numerous
problems. And while the unitary posture of Nigerian Federalism can be traced to the
colonial legacy and the prolonged encounter with the military, its continued abysmal
performance can be blamed on failure by civilian leaders to encourage genuine power
sharing which has concocted crippling rivalries between the federal government and the 36
states over revenue from crude oil sales and other resources. The imbalanced structure has
also engendered negative competition between various interest groups to control state
resources and thus encouraged the emergence of ethnic militias who feel marginalized
while politicians exacerbate inter-ethnic, inter-communal and religious tensions for selfish
gains.
Therefore the continued failure of Nigerian federalism cannot be blamed on any other
quarters but squarely on selfish, undedicated and uncommitted leadership. Ikelegbe (2004)
is of the opinion that inherent in federalism is a network of arrangements built on good
governance principles by which effort can be commonly, jointly and co-operatively
harnessed to address common problems among constituent governments. The current
structure of Nigerian federalism as it is, is an obstacle to political stability and portends
grave dangers if allowed to continue unchanged.
Thus for Nigeria to surmount the many problems bedevilling it which indeed are effects
of poor management of the government structure, there has to be a genuine commitment
on the part of leadership to commit to wholesome policies of good governance hinged on
equitable political arrangements, transparent and accountable practices as well as public
conduct to bring about a fundamental re-definition and re-structuring of the Nigerian
federal structure to accommodate the many proclivities of her diverse constituting interests.
First on the list should be a committed willingness to engineer a national resource allocation

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formula that satisfies all vested interests and at the same time gives the constituting units
enough latitude to operate with unrestrained autonomy within their allotted sphere of
influence.

REFERENCE

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Nigeria”, in Festus O. Egwaikhide et al, Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria,
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Political and Legal Issues (Lagos, Concepts Publications, 2008)
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Wadsworth
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Edition, Macmillan
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