Israel

Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1
Lab File Title
Israel DA
Israel DA.....................................................................................................................................................................1
1NC – Shell.................................................................................................................................................................2
1NC – Shell.................................................................................................................................................................3
UQ – Relations High...................................................................................................................................................4
Link – Reduction.........................................................................................................................................................5
Link – Extended Deterrence.......................................................................................................................................6
Link – Pressure...........................................................................................................................................................7
Link – Disarmament...................................................................................................................................................8
Link – Disarmament...................................................................................................................................................9
Link – Disarmament.................................................................................................................................................10
Link – Reduction.......................................................................................................................................................11
Link – CTBT.............................................................................................................................................................12
Link – FMCT............................................................................................................................................................13
I/L – NPT..................................................................................................................................................................14
Impact - Terrorism....................................................................................................................................................15
Impact – Opacity Good – Peace Process..................................................................................................................16
Impact – Opacity Good – Deterrence.......................................................................................................................17
Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race.............................................................................................................................18
Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race.............................................................................................................................19
Impact – Disclosure – Relations (1/1)......................................................................................................................20
Impact – Disclosure – Accidental Launch/Miscalc..................................................................................................21
Impact – Disclosure – Accidents – Environment......................................................................................................22
Impact – Disclosure – NPT Collapse........................................................................................................................23
Impact – Disclosure – Iranian Nukes........................................................................................................................24
Impact – Disclosure - Israeli/Iran War.....................................................................................................................25
2NC - AT – Pressure Now.........................................................................................................................................26
2NC – Impact – Turns the Case................................................................................................................................27
2NC – AT: No Umbrella For Israel...........................................................................................................................28
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Impact Shield................................................................................................29
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Generic.........................................................................................................30
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Hezbullah.....................................................................................................31
2NC – AT: Israeli Disclosure Good – Deterrence.....................................................................................................32
AFF – NonU- Relations Low....................................................................................................................................33
AFF – NonU – Pressure Now...................................................................................................................................34
AFF – No First Use...................................................................................................................................................35
AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad - Strikes.....................................................................................................................36
AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad – Iran Power Vacuum...............................................................................................37
AFF – No Arms Race................................................................................................................................................38
AFF – Pressure Good................................................................................................................................................39
AFF – Disclosure Good – Deterrence.......................................................................................................................40
AFF – Disclosure Good – Iran..................................................................................................................................41
General – ProDite Stanley Foundation.....................................................................................................................42
Lab File Title
1NC – Shell
( ) Israel isn’t facing pressure to abide by the NPT now -
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 9 (“Revision of Nuclear – Non
Proliferation Agreement”)
http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/FeaturedTopics/PFFeaturedTopics/0,1764,1039,00.html?
tablename=article_detail&
This position reflects growing anxiety among Arab countries over the danger of nuclear proliferation
in the region. There is one country that enjoys “nuclear obscurity” and it isIsrael. According to some
sources, Israel possesses around 200 nuclear warheads, which makes it the fifth greatest nuclear power in
the world. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for the first time admitted that Israel possessed nuclear
weapons during his visit to Germany in December 2006. However, Israel does not face any apparent
internationalpressure over its nuclear weapons capabilities or over its joining the NPT. Iran is another
country that is relentlessly seeking to develop its nuclear capabilities and to complete its nuclear fuel cycle,
although there is no evidence or indicator to prove that it possesses nuclear weapons or that it intends to do
so. The lack of transparency over Iran’s nuclear program and its continued defiance of the international
community raise skepticism over its objectives in this regard.
( ) Link – A change in the structure of the US nuclear arsenal would create momentum to
pressure Israel to join the NPT
Moyer 6/15/2009 (Bill, “Letter to Congressman McDermott – Please Vote No on War
Supplemental” Backbone Campaign, 6/15/2009)
Many progressive grassroots leaders across the country are sickened by the spinelessness of supposedly
progressive beltway and internet groups such as MoveOn, Campaign for America's Future, and USAction
who take orders from the administration rather than build movement to pull that administration in a
progressive direction. Their drastic misinterpretation of what it means to build movement is a betrayal
and strategic blunder. True progressives must say NO to the continued militarization of our foreign
policy and not allow the Pentagon to push the President on military spending or allow it to define our
national grand strategy on its failed terms. We must call for vast de-militarization of our foreign
policy. Progressives must lead the way in calling for a "three cups of tea" development and diplomacy
strategy abroad, funding surges in opportunities not troops. We must create momentum for nuclear non-
proliferation byreducing our nuclear arsenal, demand Israel, Pakistan and India join the NPT, and
help Pakistan ensure the security of their nuclear weapons as a step toward a regional Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone.
( ) Pressure would kill relations and cause nuclear disclosure

Pakistan Daily 6/19/2009 (“The Elephant in the Room: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons”)
http://www.daily.pk/world/middle-east/10475-the-elephant-in-the-room-israels-nuclear-
weapons-.html
Today, only 4 states in the world – India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea – are not signatories. India, Israel and Pakistan have never
signed; North Korea did sign, but has since withdrawn from the Treaty. The US delegate to the preparation conference was Assistant
Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, the newly appointed chief disarmament negotiator for the US. The following sentence in her
statement to the conference on 5 May 2009 worried Israel: “Universal adherence to the NPT itself – including by India, Israel, Pakistan
and North Korea – also remains a fundamental objective of the United States.” [17] There was nothing new in the US calling for
universal adherence to the NPT. However, the fact that Israel was explicitly named caused anxiety in Israel.
No doubt the fact that the US, its closest ally, put it in the dock alongside North Korea , a founder member of
the “axis of evil”, didn’t please either. The Guardian reported that “a diplomatic row” had broken out between the US
and Israel about her remark [18]. You can understand why Israel is worried: this has the appearance
of the US reverting to its policy prior to the Nixon/Meir agreement in September 1969, when it was
pressing Israel to join the NPT. Joining the NPT has serious implications for Israel. Since it acquired
nuclear weapons after the beginning of 1967, it cannot sign the Treaty as a “nuclear-weapon” state. If Israel were
forced to sign the NPT, it would have to give up its nuclear weapons and sign as a “non-nuclear-
weapon”.
Lab File Title
1NC – Shell
Disclosure causes Israel’s neighbors to preempt in the near term despite deterrence.
Beres 97 (Louis René Beres, Professor of Political Science @ Purdue, 1997
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~lberes/newpales.html)
It is also clear that merely acknowledging what one's adversaries have already believed need not necessarily
enhance Israeli deterrence. Even if Israel should move from its position of ambiguity to disclosure (full
or partial), enemies of the Jewish state might still not believe the nuclear threat and commence
aggression. Or, perhaps even more ominously for Israel, disclosure could prod enemy leaders to
preempt in the near term, a decision that would flow from their presumption that (1) war with Israel is
inevitable; and (2) Israel's vulnerability will only diminish.
The conflict goes nuclear.

Steinbach 02 Steinbach, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace,” March
2002
www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious
implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.
Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would
now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union
has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose
of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super
sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel
no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate
disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear
weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if
not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons
of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle
East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
Lab File Title
UQ – Relations High
( ) US-Israel relations are high now despite tensions –
Haaretz 7/22/09(“Envoy: No –US Isarel Crisis; ‘Not Yet’ Says Think Tank”)
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1102302.html
But a highly-respected Tel Aviv think tank said the two countries could be on a "collision course"
unless Israel undertook practical measures to back up its statements that it wanted peace with the
Palestinians. "There is no crisis in Israel-U.S. relations. Here we are talking about disagreements over
certain subjects, very, very specific," Ambassador Michael Oren told Israel Radio. The State Department
summoned Oren over the weekend to ask for clarifications over an Israel plan to construct housing units on
the site of a defunct hotel in occupied East Jerusalem. Oren said there was "goodwill" between the two
countries in attempting to solve the dispute. "I am sorry to disappoint, but there is no crisis," Oren added.
"We are talking about an extremely deep alliance (between Israel and the U.S.)"
Lab File Title
UQ – Relations High – AT: Media

( ) Relations are high now – media exaggerates
Xinhua News 7/26/09 (“News Analysis: Key Week in Israeli-US Relations”)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/26/content_11776239.htm
But media talk of a major rift between Israel and the United States is exaggerated, according to Keinon.
"That's true both in Israel and in the United States. I don't want to sound as if there's no problem. There
is a problem. Obama is different, but I think what's being missed here is that a significant
disagreement over issues is being blown up into a major crisis over relations," he said.
Even before the trio's visits, the Syrian track was seemingly given a boost. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid
al-Moallem held talks in London with his British counterpart David Miliband on Friday. That conversation
focused on several issues, including the resumption of Israeli-Syrian peace talks.
Lab File Title
Link – Reduction
( ) Reduction in weapons results in pressure for Israel to reduce their nuclear program
Laird 7/21/09 (Burgess, A guide to the challenges Facing president obama’s nuclear abolition
agenda” Carnegie Council, July 21 2009)
Other Nuclear Weapons States. As deeper strategic arms reductions occur between the United
States and Russia—reductions that would take the parties substantially below 1,000 warheads—the
negotiations will need to be opened up to include the other nuclear weapons states. At first, this would
entail involving China, France and the United Kingdom. At even lower numbers, in the neighborhood of
400 warheads and below, the other four states with nuclear weapons—Israel, India, Pakistan and North
Korea—would need to be brought into the discussions. If current bilateral armsreductions negotiations
with Russia are difficult and future negotiations of deeper cuts more difficult still, imagine the degree of
difficulty in reaching agreement when the negotiations are multilateralized.
Lab File Title
Link – Extended Deterrence

( ) Erosion of US leadership results in an increase of pressure on Israel to join the NPT
AFP 00 (“US Conference on Disarmament Opens Today; Growing Us Isolation to Put Increased
Pressure on Israel”) http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/042400-01.htm.
We expect to see a lot of pressure on Israel," she said, and added that the review conference would
probably set up a subsidiary body to deal with the Middle East "so as not to overburden the NPT." Experts
said the growing international isolation of the United States is another factor
increasing pressure on Israel. "The erosion of US leadership makes it much more likely that there will
be pressure to name Israel" in a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in
the Middle East, said Zia Mian, a physicist and nuclear policy analyst at Princeton University. Some
delegates had "a sense that aspects of US domestic politics have hijacked the NPT," he added, and the
administration of President Bill Clinton seemed to have accepted its isolation and decided to ride out the
storm. Other non-signatory countries that could face some peer to join the treaty are India and Pakistan --
both of which tested nuclear weapons in 1998 -- and Cuba, which is not thought to have any. At the
last NPT conference in 1995, non-nuclear members of the NPT agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely in
return for a commitment from the five declared nuclear powers -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain
and France -- that they would negotiate in good faith towards nuclear disarmament.
Lab File Title
Link – Pressure
( ) The US will pressure Israel to come in line with NPT commitments because of it’s non-
proliferation leadership
Engelen 5 (Angelique Van, “Israel Termed A Nuclear Power By US Officials”
http://www.globalpolitician.com/2581-israel.
In the last two weeks, two non-senior US officials indirectly called on Israel to start planning on
cancelling its nuclear weapons programs. Even though they said this is not intended for 'the foreseeable
future', their publicly terming Israel a nuclear power on a par with India and Pakistan might be a sign
that the US perceives of nuclear issues as too serious to condone the double standards it employs freely
on other issues. US-Israeli relations at high level are, however, unlikely to be subject to much change over
the issue. Much to the chagrin of the rest of the international world, which wants the US to apply pressure on
Israel to actually make good on its signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by ratifying it. Israel might
also be called up to sign the Biological Weapons Convention, which it would do if it were serious about its
endorsement of the objective to creating a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. At the highest level, the US
tends to avoid the Israeli nuclear issue as an element of its foreign policy toward the rest of the Arab
world, but perhaps the Iranian developments no longer render this position indefinitely tennable.
Lab File Title
Link – Disarmament
( ) Disarmament would strengthen Article VI of the NPT and pressure Israel into
compliance
Moltz 5 (Clay, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2005, “Practical
Steps for Improving Us Nonproliferation Leadership”)
Reaffirm U.S. commitment to Article VI of the NPT and state the desirability of moving toward a
nuclear-weapon-free world by the middle part of the 21st century. Such a statement would strengthen
adherence by other states to the NPT and also weaken past arguments made by India, Pakistan,
and Israel about the absence of a time-bound plan within the NPT for disarmament as an excuse for
their non-membership in the NPT. The statement should be followed by talks with the existing NPT states
to plan for a coordinated and phased drawdown, keeping stability and security as the top priority, as well as
by international pressure on India, Pakistan, and Israel to develop a timetable for their nuclear disarmament
(and making final disarmament of the permanent NPT weapons states contingent on the latter’s full
compliance). The exact terms may focus in the initial stages on deployed weapons only, until adequate trust
and verification mechanisms could be developed. But the political importance of recommitting theUnited
States to Article VI would be significant and would have powerful implications for shorting up recently
weakened nonproliferation norms.
Lab File Title
Link – Disarmament
( ) Commitments on non-proliferation will spur pressure on Israel to join the NPT
Landau 5/12/9 (Emily, Senior Research Associate @ the Institute for National Security Studies,
“The US and The NPT: Israel On the Line?” The Mideast Peace Pulse, INSS Insight No. 107,
May 11th 2009) http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/us-and-npt-israel-line
In her opening statement at the 3rd session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the
2010 NPT Review Conference, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller discussed the three pillars of
the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the context of her
comments on nonproliferation, she noted that "universal adherence to theNPT itself - including by
India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea - also remains a fundamental objective of the United States."
This sentence caused an immediate flurry of reactions in the Israeli media over whether this signified a
change in the US position on Israel, and whether we could now expect increased pressure from the US in
this regard. Coming in the somewhat charged period of new governments in both the US and Israel, and the
sense of new pressures on Israel regarding the Palestinian question, this quick (over)reaction is perhaps not
surprising. However, the immediate context of the statement underscores that it does not in itself
indicate a break with past positions. The timing of the speech was determined by the NPT PrepCom
cycle, and within this context it is standard US practice to express support for the NPT, including the
hope that all states eventually join.
( ) Any negotiations with Israel in the context of disarmament will include pressure to
sign the NPT
Ferguson 9 (Barbara, “US Wants Israel, India, Iran to sign NPT” Arab News Online, May 7th
2009)
Obama’s efforts for universal adherence to the NPT, includingIsrael, will certainly be on
the agenda when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with Obama on May 18 in
Washington, when Netanyahu is expected to seek assurances from Obama that he will uphold the US
commitment and will not trade Israeli nuclear concessions for Iranian ones.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Hosseini jumped into the fray yesterday by
saying that the halt of US cooperation with “Zionists” (Israel) is a step toward
nuclear disarmament worldwide, the official IRNA news agency reported.
“Any measure taken by the US regarding nucleardisarmament should be verifiable, transparent and
irreversible,” Hosseini said, adding that US officials should take more practical steps if they were honest
about helping nuclear disarmament worldwide
Lab File Title
Link – Reduction
( ) Obama will extend his arms control agenda to Israel – demanding a nuclear freeze
Benn 8 (Aluf, Haaretz Correspondent, “Will Obama Press Israel To Allow Nuclear Inspection of
Dimona Reactor” December 28th 2008)
.During the Bush years, Israel enjoyed relative quiet in this realm. This was after Bush had agreed to
offer assistance to India for development of civilian nuclear reactors, despite its refusal to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and even though it had carried out nuclear weapons tests. In Israel, the status quo
remains in effect, and Prime Minister Olmert asked Bush during their final meeting last month to pass on
to Obama the understandings that exist between the U.S. and Israel on nuclear matters .Now Israeli
officials are expecting that Obama will return to the "freeze treaty," even if not immediately. If
Netanyahu comes back into power, and persists in his opposition to withdrawing from the territories, he will
be more vulnerable to pressures in the nuclear realm. Israel has made its willingness to move forward on
arms control contingent on progress in the peace process; it will have difficulty refusing to cooperate
on both issues at once. Obama will not demand that Israel rid itself of whatever nuclear capabilities it may
have, but he might well demand a freeze, in order to strengthen the American position, and to tempt
Egypt and Syria not to follow in Iran's footsteps. For years now, Egypt has tried to provoke Israel, in every
possible international forum, on nuclear issues; it will not make any concessions to the Americans if Israel is
not dealt with
Lab File Title
Link – CTBT
( ) US non-proliferation leadership will spur support for Israel to sign the NPT and
pressure to sign the CTBT
National Security Network 5/28/09 (“Strong Diplomacy Needed to Address Nuclear
Challenges” http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1319
Bipartisan task forces call on the US to provide diplomatic leadership to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime in order to protect the United States. Senior political and military leaders spell
out how US security can be safeguarded through US leadership to rebuild a strong series of global rules
against proliferation – beginning with new negotiations with Russia and the ratification of a treaty that bans
nuclear testing – at the same time that the US continues to take strong stands to protect its allies and deal
firmly with countries that try to develop or sell nuclear weapons. Former Clinton administration Secretary of
Defense William Perry and George H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote in a Wall
Street Journal op-ed yesterday: “An effective strategy to reduce nuclear dangers must build on five
pillars: revitalizing strategic dialogue with nuclear-armed powers, particularly Russia and China;
strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; reaffirming the protection of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella to our allies; maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and
implementing best security practices for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide.”
Perry and Scowcroft are also the co-chairs of a CFR task force on nonproliferation. The task force’s report
recommends, in part, that the U.S. “Reaffirm support for the agreed positive and negative security
assurances that the United States has made to nonnuclear NPT states.” A recent report from the
bipartisan, Partnership for a Secure America (PSA), made similar recommendations for strengthening the
nonproliferation regime. PSA recommends that the U.S. “Reaffirm the NPT as the cornerstone of
global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts by sending a high-level delegation to
the 2010 Review Conference.” The CFR report also recommends that the U.S. “Seek to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), first assembling an expert group to analyze the policy and
technical issues related to the CTBT and then presenting the treaty for Senate ratification; if successful
in ratifying the treaty, work with other holdout nations to do the same.” The CFR task force also
stresses the importance of American efforts to work with individual partners, namely Russia and China, “The
report underscores the need to strengthen nuclear risk reduction with the two major nuclear-armed states of
Russia and China. The U.S. and Russian presidents recently pledged to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The
Task Force supports efforts to renew legally binding arms control pacts with Russia by seeking follow-on
agreements to START and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The report also urges
the United States and Russia to initiate a serious strategic dialogue, because it is only through such
engagement that they can open up opportunities for deeper reductions in their arsenals and gain a better sense
of the feasibility of moving toward multilateral nuclear arms control.” [Wall Street Journal, 5/27/09. Council
on Foreign Relations, 5/09. PSA, 5/09]
Lab File Title
Link – FMCT
( ) Israel strongly opposes the FMCT
Reif and Foley 7/15/9 (Kingston, and Madeleine, “Purpose of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty”
Factshet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, The Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation,
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/articles/071509_factsheet_fmct/
 Israel strongly opposes a FMCT because it does not believe that a FMCT would be an adequate
safeguard against Iranian development of nuclear weapons.[11]  China has traditionally linked its
support for a FMCT to the United States and other parties’ cooperation on a treaty for the prevention of an
arms race in outer space (PAROS). China also worries that given the small size of its nuclear arsenal relative
to the United States and Russia, a FMCT could limit its capacity to increase the size of its nuclear forces.[12]
 Russia officially supports a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes to
which every state with enrichment programs and the capability to produce a nuclear weapon is a signatory.
This includes India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, all of whom have strong reservations about the treaty.
[13]  In 2008, Pakistan issued a letter to the President of the CD outlining its position on a FMCT. In light
of its view that India possesses a larger stockpile of fissile material, it wants a verifiable treaty that addresses
past, present, and future production of fissile material.[14]
( ) More evidence – Isarel backlashed seriously when Clinton tried to make them sign
Perkovich 5/14/9 (George, “The Obama – Netanyahu Meeting: Nuclear Issues” May 14th 2009,
Canegie Endowment for International Peace)
While it is generally an Israeli interest to prevent all other bilateral issues from affecting the nuclear question,
it is ironic that Prime Minister Netanyahu drew a direct linkage during his first term. According to Israeli
journalist Aluf Benn, in the context of the Wye River negotiations in October 1998, Netanyahu asked for and
received an appendix in the form of a signed secret letter from President Clinton in which the United
States committed to be sympathetic to Israel's preservation of its "strategic deterrence capabilities"
and ensure that the U.S. would consult Israel in advance of arms control initiatives. Israel was
concerned that the Clinton administration's push to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would
ultimately create major pressure on Israel to put a cap on its nuclear weapon program, or at least
expose it more publicly. Clinton's letter was seen as a reassurance of the validity of the Nixon-Meir accord.
Lab File Title
I/L – NPT
( ) Pressure causes Israeli backlash -
IPT News 5/8/9 (“Is Washington Readying Confrontation with Israel Over Nuclear Deterrent?”)
http://www.investigativeproject.org/blog/2009/05/is-washington-readying-confrontation-
with-israel-over.html
Faced with Iranian stonewalling, the Obama Administration has been sending mixed signals about how
far it is prepared to go in pressuring Israel. Goettemoeller declined to say whether the administration
would press Israel to sign the NPT. Washington Times reporter Eli Lake got mixed signals when he put the
question to administration officials: A "senior White House official" described Israeli and Iranian
nuclear programs as unrelated "apples and oranges." But, asked whether the Obama Administration
would press Israel to join the NPT, the official replied: "We support universal adherence to the NPT.
[It] remains a long-term goal." When asked the administration's position on the 1969 understanding, the
senior White House official had no comment. If Obama leans on Netanyahu over signing the NPT, look
for the Israeli leader to push back – hard. During the 1998 Wye River peace negotiations, Netanyahu
sought a personal commitment to the Nixon-Meir understanding from President Clinton because of Israeli
concerns about a treaty barring the production of fissile materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons.
Israel was worried that the treaty might oblige it to allow inspections of its Dimona facility. Aluf Benn
of Ha'aretz reported on a letter Netanyahu sent Clinton during the Wye River talks which contained the
following passage: "We will never sign the treaty, and do not delude yourself, no pressure will help. We
will not sign the treaty because we will not commit suicide."
Lab File Title
Impact - Terrorism
( ) US deterrence acts as a buffer for Israel versus terrorist groups
Bar 8 (Shmuel, “Deterring Terrorists: What Israel Has Learned” Hoover Institution Stanford
University) http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/19466219.html
There is a certain relationship between deterrence and the images of states that are perceived as allied against
terrorist organizations. Israel ’s deterrent image in the eyes of terrorist groups benefits from
the perception of U.S. backing for Israeli counter-terrorism policies, which has been enhanced since
September 11, 2001, and was reinforced during the last Lebanon War. There is no evidence that the
American imbroglio in Iraq and the failure of the U.S. to capture bin Laden have diminished
this perception. On the other side of the coin, the 2006 Lebanon War was perceived by many terrorist
groups as a proxy war between the U.S. and Iran or even as a preview of a future American attack on
Iran
Lab File Title
Impact – Opacity Good – Peace Process

( ) Nuclear opacity is key to the peace process – gives Israel the backing to make strategic
concessions.
Joshi 00 (Sharad, “Israel’s Nuclear Policy: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”)
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_00jos01.html
Israel’s nuclear posture has had its effect on peace negotiations and Arab attitudes after 1973. Though still
ambiguous, Israel’s nuclear option became more or less accepted after 1973. Over the next 20 years, this
changed Arab perceptions and helped moderate Palestinian demands. The Arabs realised that war was futile
and that the Arab-Israeli conflict could only be resolved through negotiations. Though the principle issues
remain unresolved, there are no longer any strategies for an all out Arab attack.
Egypt took the first step. During the Camp David peace talks, Egypt ignored the nuclear issue, understanding
that stressing it could wreck the negotiations. In fact, during his historic visit to Jerusalem in November
1977, Prime Minister Sadat confided to the then Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann, that his decision to
make peace with Israel was considerably influenced by the latter’s nuclear arsenal. 27 Most Arab states are in
fact, far more concerned with Iran/Iraq’s nuclear ambitions than Israel’s ‘bomb in the basement’. Many
Arabs actually concede in private, the positive and stabilising effects of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, if only
because of their hopes that these weapons would make it easier for Israel to make the necessary
territorial concessions in return for peace. 28 In the last few years, as part of the ongoing peace process,
Israel has withdrawn, from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of its land for peace deal.
The process was initiated in the late 70s when Israel gave back the Sinai to the Egyptians. Its nuclear
deterrent has no doubt given it the requisite confidence and security to take such a step.
Lab File Title
Impact – Opacity Good – Deterrence

( ) Opacity is key to the Israeli deterrent
Probably the main factor behind the development of the Israeli nuclear arsenal has been to deter any
Arab attack, whether conventional or non-conventional (NBC). It has been argued that Israel’s nuclear
arsenal has been largely irrelevant to the process of war initiation in the region. But in the present situation,
Israel’s nuclear status does play a major role in deterring a concerted attack by an Arab coalition. As
mentioned in an earlier section, the Arab states have a huge arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the
means to deliver them, and also a sizeable conventional arms arsenal. Whatever the internal dynamics and
rivalries of the Arab states, the very presence of such deadly WMD in the Arab inventories requires an Israeli
counter-capability, to take care of any eventuality in the future. It is often stated that nuclear weapons could
not deter an Arab invasion in 1973. The territorial objectives of Egypt and Syria were limited to recovering
the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights lost to Israel in 1967, and not the destruction of the Jewish
state. More importantly, their broader political objective was to get the superpowers involved in the Arab-
Israel conflict. It has been argued that since the objectives did not include the destruction of Israel, it
could not use nuclear weapons as they were only for a last resort scenario. In reality, at that time, Israel’s
ambiguous nuclear deterrent was still quite weak, at least as perceived by the Arabs. Another argument is
that it is possible that the Arabs invaded in 1973 because they believed the Israelis had not really developed a
reliable deterrent force. So they might have decided to try and recover their territories before Israel did in fact
acquire these capabilities. Israel’s nuclear arsenal, though still opaque, is now accepted by everyone as
forming an effective deterrent. If it has actually developed low yield tactical nuclear weapons, in the form
of tank shells, land mines, etc, it means that Israel now has counterforce nuclear capability. Its nuclear arsenal
can now be used in the battlefield. In the event of a 1973 type Arab invasion, Israel may not hesitate to use
nuclear weapons—the Arabs know it, and this will deter them. It must be understood that Israel’s nuclear
arsenal and Arab perceptions of it have changed since 1973, strengthening the deterrence.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race

( ) Disclosure would spark uncontainable waves of proliferation in the Middle East
Center for Strategic International Studies 2008 (“Israel’s Nuclear Ambiguity” Center for
Strategic International Studies, http://forums.csis.org/poni/?p=83
Should Iran actually obtain a nuclear weapon, there will be a great urge byIsrael to also declare itself a
nuclear power and threaten Iran with total annihilation in response to any attack. However, changing its
stance of nuclear ambiguity would ultimately harm Israel’s security in several key ways. First, one of
the many anticipated US responses to an Iranian “bomb” would be extending the US nuclear umbrella
to Iran’s Arab neighbors. Many Arab regimes would already feel pressure to reject this umbrella and
respond to the “Iranian bomb” with the development of an “Arab bomb.” As the US tries to stem the
tide of proliferation in the Middle East, this task will become significantly more difficult if the Arab
states also feel the need to respond to an “Israeli bomb.”
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race

( ) Disclosure prompts rapid proliferation
The Jerusalem Post 6/15/9 (“Washington, Israel and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1244371097459&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle
%2FPrin
First, any disclosure could induce a Middle East arms race just as the Iranian nuclear program
threatens to do. Since 2006, more than a dozen countries in the region including Egypt, Turkey, Algeria and
member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have been pursuing civilian nuclear energy, arguably as a
hedge against developments in Iran. IfIsrael adopts an explicit nuclear doctrine, with or without joining
the NPT, it may prompt these countries to develop nuclear programs even more quickly - virtually
assuring that any non-proliferation goals of the Obama administration in the region are dead on
arrival. Last year, the Arab League announced that Arab countries, all of which are signatories to the NPT,
would walk away from it if Israel ever officially acknowledges it has nuclear weapons.
( ) It’s opaque posture is key to maintain peace in the middle east

Israel’s opaque nuclear posture helps maintain a nuclear status quo in the Middle East. Any attempt at
an official disclosure or testing of weapons would open the nuclear Pandora’s box in the Middle East.
The Arabs have lived with this situation for three decades. As mentioned earlier, moderate Arab states,
especially in the Persian Gulf, are more concerned about Iranian/Iraqi nuclear ambitions while becoming
quite complacent about Israel’s nuclear ambiguity. Some Arabs, especially Palestinians, even see the
Israeli undeclared deterrent as playing a positive and stabilising role in promoting the cause of Arab-
Israeli peace, because it gives Israel the courage to make tough territorial concessions from a position
of strength. Therefore, behind common Arab public demands that Israel sign the NPT and place its nuclear
establishment under IAEA safeguards, lies considerable flexibility and political realism. 31
A change in the ambiguous posture would start an intensified arms race and disrupt the fragile peace
process. Until there is comprehensive peace in the region, it might be best not to acknowledge the
nuclear issue at all.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Relations (1/1)

Disclosure would blindside the US causing a diplomatic row between the US and Israel –
ambiguity is best for regional security.
Kaye 4 (Dalia Dassa Kaye is currently a visiting professor of political science at the University
of Amsterdam, Arms Control Today November 2004
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Kaye.asp)
The basic counterargument is that nuclear ambiguity has served both Israel and the cause of nonproliferation
well by enhancing deterrence against any military threat to Israel’s existence, while not providing the added
incentive for any of its Muslim neighbors to acquire the bomb that might result from an open declaration of
its nuclear status. It has also given Israel leverage in obtaining advanced conventional weapons and other
military assistance from U.S. administrations concerned that Israel might resort to nuclear weapons without
them. In addition, no declared nuclear-weapon state has ever given up its weapons, the implication
being that acquiring and relinquishing nuclear weapons are most easily accomplished under conditions
of ambiguity.[13] Finally, the policy of ambiguity is integral to Israel’s 1969 secret agreement with the
United States, and it is difficult to imagine any significant shift in this policy without some new nuclear
understanding between Israel and the United States. This in turn might lead to a wider public debate
on such fundamental issues as who is entitled to have nuclear weapons, an outcome unlikely to be
welcomed by either the U.S. government or that of the other weapon states.
US support for Israel is key to democracy and peace.

ADL, Anti Defamation League, 2006
http://www.adl.org/israel/advocacy/how_to_respond/us_israel_relations.asp?xflag=1
The United States is a longstanding strong ally of Israel based on shared democratic values and strategic
interests including the rejection of terrorism and violence. The United States has a great interest in the
stability of the Middle East, a region that is afflicted by extremists who violently oppose the U.S., Israel and
democracy, rogue states with large military arsenals which include non-conventional weaponry, and other
authoritarian regimes. Bolstering and supporting peace, stability and democracy in the region through
relations with Israel is in America’s strategic interest. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently
demonstrated that Americans of all backgrounds support strong U.S.-Israeli relations and view Israel as a key
ally of the United States.
Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction

Diamond, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, 95
(Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of
illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made
common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic
ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the
global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security
are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality,
accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Accidental Launch/Miscalc

( ) Israeli nuclear program is at high risk for an accidental launch
%2FPrin
Not only would joining the NPT likely spur a regional arms race - undermining the Obama
administration's nuclear non-proliferation efforts - it could potentially destabilize the region at a time when
the US must deal with the volatile situation in Iraq and, simultaneously, a belligerent Iran. Embryonic
nuclear programs are less likely to have the control and operational safety features of the established
nuclear powers. Moreover, new nuclear states are inherently dangerous because of their vulnerability
to preemptive first strikes that could prompt them to launch their nuclear weapons in response to a
real or perceived warning, thus increasing the risk for nuclear war. If any of the Arab countries currently
pursuing civilian nuclear energy begin to develop nuclear weapons programs in response to disclosure (or the
development of Iranian nukes), they would be particularly susceptible to these dangers.
( ) Miscalculation in the middle east would escalate into a nuclear war -

In 1981, Israel successfully bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor. But in its goal of denying nuclear capability to
anyone else in the Middle East, it can no longer attempt such pre-emptive air strikes. The most likely
candidates to threaten Israel are Iran (which recently tested its Shahab-3 long range missile), Syria, and to a
lesser degree, Iraq. At least the first two have undertaken measures like concealment, dispersion, hardening
and installation of air defence equipment to prevent any Israeli air strikes. Since pre-emption is ruled out,
therefore Israel may be forced to adopt a ‘launch on warning’ posture as it does not have the luxury of
waiting to assess the damage from a first strike before responding.
In turn Iran, Iraq or Syria, lacking secure second strike forces of their own would be under great
pressure to launch their missiles first—another first strike posture. There could thus be a hair trigger
alert scenario. The possibility of nuclear war breaking out by accident or design would be great and
would place intolerable strain on Israel’s freedom of military movement and civilian morale.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Accidents – Environment

( ) Nuclear accidents would put the entire country at risk of radiation
Environmental costs and nuclear accidents are among the biggest risks of a nuclear programme. And
in a small country like Israel, even the slightest accident could put a major proportion of the population
in danger. A Chernobyl size accident could put the entire country at peril. Another worrying factor is that
even for incorporating general safety measures there are high costs, which the government might avoid.
According to internal government reports, the Dimona nuclear reactor is suffering severe damage after 35
years of operation. 21 The government is loath to decommission the reactor thereby increasing the chances of
an accident. As it is there have been numerous reports of illnesses caused to technicians and their families
due to accidents at the facility. Analysis from a Russian satellite imagery (1989) shows that the
installation has a major pollution problem. The area just west of the reactor is unnaturally barren. This is
the sector where the waste treatment facility is located and where the toxic byproducts appear to be stored.
Safe disposal of toxic wastes is another problem, and here again Israel’s territorial size is a drawback as
any waste treatment facility would not be far away from a population centre. Till the time the Dimona
reactor is not decommissioned, the risks of nuclear accidents, and environmental pollution would
continue to grow.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – NPT Collapse

( ) Israeli disclosure would collapse the NPT
Third, any change in Israel’s nuclear ambiguity could help undermine the global non-proliferation
effort. As the list of nuclear countries begins to expand, many leaders look to the 2010 NPT Review
Conference and other initiatives as opportunities to revitalize and strengthen the global non-proliferation
regime.Israel, not being a member of the NPT, would face increased pressure to join and/or and
abandon its nuclear arsenal. Many countries, including Iran, would likely use Israel’s nuclear arsenal
as a means to try to sabotage the 2010 conference. Rather than increase its security, a declared Israeli
arsenal could help lead to a new wave of proliferation that ultimately undermines both Israeli and
global security.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure – Iranian Nukes

( ) Israeli disclosure results in Iran gaining the upper hand in negotiations – making
Iranian proliferation inevitable
Second, by admitting to having nuclear weapons, Israel will strengthen Iran’s negotiating tactic that it
must be treated in an even handed manner as other countries. Iran can claim, somewhat convincingly,
that any rollback of its nuclear program should be accompanied by similar rollbacks in Israel’s
nuclear program. Israel would be forced into a position of either giving up its nuclear capability, an
unlikely prospect, or indefinitely living with an Iranian nuclear arsenal.
Lab File Title
Impact – Disclosure - Israeli/Iran War

( ) Disclosure results in an Israeli Iranian war that goes nuclear because of US draw-in
Baklin 7 (Dmitriy, “On US-Israeli Plans For a Nuclear War” Global Researcher, January 20,
2007) http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4529
Joseph J. Sisco asked Secretary of State William Rogers to try and curb Israeli ambitions before it is too late.
«If this process continues, and it becomes generally assumed that Israel has the bomb, it will have far-
reaching and even dangerous implications for the U.S.», —the Assistant Secretary of State wrote.
Speaking of the perilous consequences, he especially emphasized that «Israel’s possession of nuclear
weapons would do nothing to deter Arab guerrilla warfare…, on the contrary it would add a dangerous new
element to Arab-Israel hostility …». This gives added substance to the warning that came in Dmitry Sedov’s
article «2007 to open a new page in the world’s history», in which the author refers to motivations underlying
Teheran’s aspirations for nuclear parity with Israel and the likelihood of a regional nuclear conflict. Dmitry
Sedov also refers to ways of avoiding this conflict. If the world community is genuinely interested in finding
a solution for this problem, «there immediately emerges an option for establishing a regional nuclear-free
zone in the Middle East. Under this option, Israel would get an official guarantee of military assistance from
the US in the event of a military aggression and would destroy its bombs, whereas Iran would light-heartedly
renounce uranium enrichment, buying finished fuel elements from Russia». In this case, however, one would
need to «take a step towards settlement of the Middle Eastern problem on principles of equality, which
appears unthinkable to the US and Israel. For the following step would mean radical concessions on the part
of Israel, which would be the only way to peace, – withdrawal from occupied territories to the boundaries
defined by the UN, and establishment of an independent Palestinian state». And this is something to which
Washington and Tel Aviv are adamantly opposed. It should be unambiguously stated that, in the event
of an Israeli nuclear attack against Iran, the US will automatically become an accessory of the
aggressor in creating nuclear weapons, their proliferation in the Middle East and their use in an armed
conflict that cannot help growing into a big nuclear war.
Lab File Title
2NC - AT – Pressure Now

Obama won’t put pressure on Israel until it’s fulfilled its disarmament objections –no risk
of your take out.
Laird 7/21/09 (Burgess, A guide to the challenges Facing president obama’s nuclear abolition
agenda” Carnegie Council, July 21 2009)
Finally, the President's third objective of securing international commitment to punish states found in
violation of the NPT is aimed at rallying the NPT member states to take concrete action with regard to
North Korea and Iran, and more generally, other nations that would contemplate following their
example. There are a number of rationales offered to explain why the international community has not taken
more concerted action regarding such violations. One is that U.S. policies in this regard amount to an effort
to deny nations their right to civilian nuclear technology, and is, in the final analysis, part of a larger effort to
lock-in a world of nuclear haves and have-nots. A second rationale is that the United States itself is in no
position to make such demands because it is not living up to its obligation of pursuing disarmament. A
third argument is that U.S. claims that other nations are pursuing nuclear weapons are not to be believed;
here, the U.S.'s post-9/11 claims of Iraq's WMD program are cited as the prime example.
Lab File Title
2NC – Impact – Turns the Case

( ) Nuclear war in the middle east kills all hopes of global disarmament
Steinbach 2002 (John, DC Iraq Coalition, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction a Threat to
Peace” Third World traveler, Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG) March 3, 2002)
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Israel/Israel's_Nuclear%20Weapons.
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of
nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab
nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last
resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The
nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it
the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the
principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and
other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in
1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously
complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of
nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual
use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining
its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the
deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
Lab File Title
2NC – AT: No Umbrella For Israel

( ) Israeli perceives the US nuclear umbrella
Sinovets 6 (Polina, Odessa National University, CNS Visiting Fellow, “Nuclear Deterrence in
Iran-Israeli Relationship” Fall 2006)
The 2002 US National Security Strategy 2006 states that “We are strengthening deterrence by developing a
New Triad composed of offensive strike systems …(to) deter some of the new threats we face, while also
bolstering our security commitments to allies. Such security commitments have played a crucial role in
convincing some countries to forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our nonproliferation
objectives”.i Although Israel was not named in this document, some of the Israeli experts believe, that
guarantees of the United States will be spread for Israel as well.ii Here, perhaps, it is possible to speak
about indirect assurances for Israel, although there are several concerns, that enhancing US nuclear
assurances towards Israel will undermine Washington’s relations with such Arab partners, such as Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, who consider Israeli nuclear capabilities as a threat to the Middle East security iii.
( ) US has an indirect security umbrella over Israel

Freilich and Rosecrance 6 (Chuck, Former Deputy National Security Advisor of Israel and a
Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Richard, Distinguished Research Prof of Political
Science @ UCLA and Senior Fellow of the Belfer Center @ Harvard’s Kennedy School,
“Confronting Iran: A US Security Guarantee for Israel?” July 6th 2006)
For Israel, the prospect of even one Iranian nuke getting through its defenses is totally unacceptable. A
possible defensive posture would thus have to be based primarily on deterrence, through the threat of massive
retaliation. Although Israel's own deterrent capabilities are significant, they could be greatly
strengthened through "extended US deterrence", i.e., a formal guarantee of Israel's security in the form of
a defense treaty or memorandum of understanding. The US is already committed, de-facto, to Israel's
security and President Bush has reaffirmed this in recent statements regarding Iran. The question is
whether a formal guarantee would significantly add to this de-facto one and give Israel the confidence
to rely on a deterrent posture.
Lab File Title
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Impact Shield

( ) US deterrence capability is necessary to supplement Israeli deterrence
Freilich and Rosecrance 6 (Chuck, Former Deputy National Security Advisor of Israel and a
Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Richard, Distinguished Research Prof of Political
Science @ UCLA and Senior Fellow of the Belfer Center @ Harvard’s Kennedy School,
“Confronting Iran: A US Security Guarantee for Israel?” July 6th 2006)
The issue of Israel's independent deterrent capabilities might, of course, be raised by the US. Despite its
past diplomatic formulae, however, the US may actually have an interest in Israel's retaining these
capabilities, which would thereby obviate the need for the US to come to its aid. It is, therefore, doubtful
that the United States would actually insist that Israel divulge/dismantle them. Moreover, if the treaty
represented an alternative to an attack on Iran (assuming US opposition to any such strike, American or
Israeli), the treaty would achieve a new and useful deterrent result. The concept of extended
American deterrence should be considered solely as an addition to Israel's independent deterrent, not
as a substitute for it. The time to begin consideration of this option, however, is near. Failure of current
diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Iran may soon make it a pressing issue.
Lab File Title
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Generic

( ) Israel won’t use the nuclear option
Levran 1 (Aharon, “The Decline of Israeli Deterrence” Ariel Center for Policy Research, Policy
Paper No 113, 2001) http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp113-xs.html
Second, the IDF has lost its monopoly in the area of attacking the enemy's rear front with air strikes deep in
their territory which display superiority, exact a steep price from the aggressor, abbreviate the duration of the
war, minimize casualties and of course rehabilitate the deterrence which was terminated with the start of the
war. Once the Arabs were supplied with ground-to-ground missiles capable of striking Israel's sensitive home
front with relative ease, Israel no longer had the monopoly in this area (as seen in the 1991 Gulf
War).Israel still maintains exclusivity in nuclear potential, but its use is limited, for obvious reasons,
and is to some extent neutralized by chemical and biological weapons in the arsenals of the countries in
the region. A new Israeli monopoly is in the deployment of the "Arrow" missiles, which could
potentially neutralize the regional ground-to-ground missile threat. Perhaps then, the state of
Israel's deterrence will immeasurably be enhanced.
( ) Israeli leadership is perceived as weak

More than the declining IDF victory curve and the loss of the monopoly in weapons and mode of
action, the aversion of Israeli leadership and society to wield its power for a long while now,
"contributes" to the deterioration of deterrence. Among the leadership and "elite" in Israel, a significant
lessening in the willingness to exert force even when appropriate and essential, and the determination with
which it is used has taken effect. This phenomenon plays a significant role in the decline of Israeli deterrence,
especially in low intensity conflicts. This was manifest in the Yom Kippur War (1973), in the opposition to
the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor (1981), in the penetrating debate over the issue of "war by choice"
(1982), in the Gulf War, and more. The aversion to use force was exacerbated by the advent of the "peace
process". This process disrupted and even emasculated more than a few justified conventions in the
Israeli security doctrine, including the areas ofdeterrence and achieving decisive victories
Lab File Title
2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Hezbullah
( ) Israel has no ability to deter Hezbullah

Bottom line: Israeli deterrence against the Palestinians and the Hizbullah is non-existent. True, in "low
intensity conflicts" it is difficult to maintain deterrence capability, though it is not impossible and there
are examples to prove it. On the other hand, Israel still maintains its deterrence capability against an all-out
war initiated by Arab countries, which as mentioned above, have not launched a war since 1973. Similarly,
nuclear deterrence is preserved versus non-conventional weapons.
Lab File Title
2NC – AT: Israeli Disclosure Good – Deterrence

( ) Opacity is key to deterrence it stops Arab neighbors from proliferation
%2FPrin
Nor would full disclosure enhance deterrent power, as some policymakers and academics have argued. The
suspicion alone remains a powerful deterrent force vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. The policy of
ambiguity has been a key factor in limiting Arab aggression - from Egypt's and Syria's limited aims in the
1973 Yom Kippur War to Saddam Hussein's decision to refrain from firing chemical warheads during the first
Gulf War. Even some of the most ardent rejectionists no longer call for Israel's destruction, as is
evidenced by the Arab peace initiative that Saudi Arabia began promoting in March 2002 and which
has since been adopted by the Arab League.
Lab File Title
AFF – NonU- Relations Low
( ) Relations low – Cairo Speech

IHS 7/27/9 (“Israel-Us relations strained Obama Stance”)
http://www.janes.com/news/security/jiwk/jiwk090727_1_n.shtml
Gates' visit comes a day after George Mitchell, the US special envoy to the Middle East, also visited Israel.
The two visits come at a time of increasing tension between Israel and Washington.
Tension has been evident since the formation of a right-wing government in Israel on 31 March and US
President Barack Obama's high-profile speech to the Arab world on 4 June.
( ) Relations low now – Obama

Caragea 7/30/09 (Anton, Prof of International Relations and Poli Sci and Direct of the
Institute for Research on International Relations and Political Science in Romania, “Syria:
The Key for Peace in the Middle East” http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3389.cfm)
The U.S. diplomatic overture to Syria is no doubt designed to exercise pressure on Israel. U.S.-Israel
relations have been suffering since Obama's speech in Cairo. And until now, Israeli government chose to
ignore the joint pressure from the United States, the European Union and Russia for a sincere dialogue with
Palestine Authority and a halting of settlement expansion in territories occupied after the 1967 war. The U.S.
decision to send a new ambassador to Damascus, along with European Union rapprochement with
Syria, indicates that Israel cannot hope to indefinitely go against international community wishes.
( ) Relations low – Jerusalem trip

Abrams 8/1/2009 (Elliot, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, “Why Israel Is Nervous”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204619004574320532174317294.html
The tension in U.S.-Israel relations was manifest this past week as an extraordinary troupe of Obama
administration officials visited Jerusalem. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, National Security Advisor
James Jones, special Middle East envoy George Mitchell and new White House adviser Dennis Ross all
showed up in Israel’s capital in an effort to…well, to do something. It was not quite clear what.
Since President Obama came to office on Jan. 20 and then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 31,
the main motif in relations between the two governments has been friction. While nearly 80% of American
Jews voted for Mr. Obama, that friction has been visible enough to propel him to meet with American Jewish
leaders recently to reassure them about his policies. But last month, despite those reassurances, both the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the Anti-Defamation League
issued statements critical of the president’s handling of Israel. Given the warm relations during the
Bush years and candidate Obama’s repeated statements of commitment to the very best relations with
Israel, why have we fallen into this rut?
Lab File Title
AFF – NonU – Relations Low

( ) Relations low now – Obama
Bolton 6/29/2009 (John “It’s Crunch Time for Israel on Iran”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052970203609204574316093622744808.html)
Relations between the U.S. and Israel are more strained now than at any time since the 1956 Suez
Canal crisis. Mr. Gates’s message for Israel not to act on Iran, and the U.S. pressure he brought to
bear, highlight the weight of Israel’s lonely burden.
Lab File Title
AFF – NonU – Pressure Now

( ) Pressure on Israel to join the NPT now – Gottemoeller
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 7( “Revision of Nuclear Non-
It seems the United States has started to realize this truth and has asked Israel to join thenuclear non-
proliferation treaty for the first time. The US Assistant Foreign Secretary, Rose Gottemoeller, recently
stated that the US would seek a worldwide endorsement of the NPT for stopping the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, which would include countries like Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Israel,
however, turned down this call by alleging that the treaty will not be “not useful” in meeting the objective, as
observers ruled out the possibility of the US putting pressure on Israel to join the NPT. This, however, should
force Arab countries to avail of this unprecedented development in the US position by continuing to affirm
that the security and stability of the Middle East and the world could not be achieved unless the region
becomes free of nuclear weapons.
Lab File Title
AFF – No First Use

( ) Israel won’t perceive the change in nuclear doctrine
The Stanley Foundation 8/22/08 (“A New Look at No First use of Nuclear Weapons” Maxims
News Network,
http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080822stanleyfdtnnuclearfirststrikedoctri
ne10808221601.htm.
Many participants emphasized the realist’s perspective that, despite our attempts to reduce the salience of
nuclear weapons, many countries do not see nuclear weapons as a tool to “ensure that nuclear weapons are
never used,” but rather as an essential guarantee of their security against conventional attack. For example, a
US NFU doctrine will have no effect on Israel’s nuclear strategy. Likewise, Russia sees its nuclear
weapons as a way to offset the erosion of its conventional military strength. This applies to states like North
Korea and Iran as well. Their nuclear programs are, in large part, a response to US conventional
military might, so a change in US nuclear doctrine is unlikely to affect their own nuclear decisions.
Lab File Title
AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad - Strikes

( ) Nuclear umbrella causes aggression that will lead to a strike -
1) Decrease conflict stability on the lower levels – first of all it concerns the conventional balance. Here,
so-called Israeli “security activism” based on the traditionally offensive character of Israeli military
strategy might be even intensified. James Russell argues that the strategic umbrella provided by US
forces could in fact encourage Israel to act more aggressively than it otherwise would, since its actions
would be backed not by its own nuclear force, but also by the thousands of warheads in the US
arsenaliv. This might provoke conventional stalemates between Iran and Israel, following the example of
India-Pakistan interaction, where the impossibility of the great conflict provokes numbers of the smaller
conflicts on example of Kargile1.
1
Lab File Title
AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad – Iran Power Vacuum

( ) Nuclear umbrella bad – restricts Israel’s freedom and allows Iran to gain control in
the middle east
2) The threat of escalation can also deter lower levels of violence, and this situation may be even
enhanced in the framework of the extended deterrence system. Therefore, military guarantees,
provided by the United States will restrict Tel Aviv’s freedom of actions, and will oblige it to
subordinate its defense considerations to Washington’s interests and policy, a situation that already took
place in 1991, when Israel didn’t react to Iraqi Scuds strikes. This might create the situation, when Israeli
military capabilities will be restricted, while Iran will start acting in a more challenging way, gaining
by its traditional asymmetrical strategies more and more political advantages and at the same time
eroding Israeli positions in the region. Such scenario tends to be extremely risky, as political maneuvering
demands from Tehran a certain degree of brinkmanship behavior, which will present it as unpredictable and
risky state, eager to invoke its nuclear weapons against any pressure or threat. This strategy, traditionally
characteristic for Iran, might help its leaders to avoid potential deterrent measures of Israel, as the latter
would have to keep prudence by not provoking the risk of nuclear escalation. Going along this way Israel and
the US risk to witness full transformation of regional balance of power in favor of Iran.
Lab File Title
AFF – No Arms Race

( ) Israeli nuclear weapons doesn’t result in middle eat prolif -
A common argument is that the Israeli nuclear capability has led to the pursuit of WMD and ballistic
missiles by some of the Arab states and Iran. This is only partially correct. The fact is that the Arab states
have pursued such capabilities to counter each other also. The region’s extraordinary complexity, the
numerous actors, and the sources of conflict also have to be considered. 15 The resulting divisions in
the Arab world have ensured that the chances of a combined Arab attack are low.
Lab File Title
AFF – Pressure Good

( ) Pressure on Israel to sign the NPT is key to stop proliferation
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 9 (“Revision of Nuclear – Non
http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/FeaturedTopics/PFFeaturedTopics/0,1764,1039,00.html?
tablename=article_detail&
The desired security and stability in the Middle East region necessitates making the area free of weapons of
mass destruction, particularly free of nuclear weapons. This objective will not be achieved unless the
international community puts pressure on Israel to join the NPT and to opens its nuclear facilities to
international inspection because it is the only country in the region that possesses nuclear weapons. If
this objective is not achieved, then any effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
region will be a failure. This observation was clearly made by the official spokesperson of the Egyptian
foreign ministry, when he affirmed that existing Western policies that are putting pressure on Iran to abandon
its nuclear weapons will not be successful because it is ignoring Israeli nuclear capabilities.
Lab File Title
AFF – Disclosure Good – Deterrence

( ) Disclosure enhances Israeli deterrence – proves survivability and the will to use.
Louis Rene Beres, Prof of Poli Sci @ Purdue, 7 Feb 07 http://www.infoisrael.net/cgi-
local/text.pl?source=4/b/iv/070220071
Before such an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel, and before it is deterred from launching
retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough that it knows that Israel simply has the
bomb. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks
and that they are pointed menacingly at very high-value population targets. Removing the bomb from Israel’s
basement could significantly enhance Israel’s nuclear deterrence to the extent that it would heighten enemy
perceptions of secure and capable nuclear forces. Such an end to deliberate ambiguity could also underscore Israel’s
willingness to use these nuclear forces in reprisal for certain enemy first-strike and retaliatory attacks. From the
standpoint of successful nuclear deterrence, perceived willingness is always just as important as perceived
capability.
( ) Disclosure makes clear Israel’s willingness to use nuclear force – enhances deterrence.
Louis René Beres, Professor of Political Science @ Purdue, NATIV Online 2003
http://www.acpr.org.il/english-nativ/issue1/beres-1.htm
The second factor of nuclear communication for Israel concerns willingness. How may Israel convince
potential attackers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an unacceptably destructive retaliation and
counterretaliation? The answer to this question lies, in part, in the demonstrated strength of the
commitment to carry out the threat and in the precise nuclear weapons that would be available. Here,
too, continued nuclear ambiguity could create the impression of an “unwilling” Israel. Conversely,
movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level of disclosure could heighten the impression of an
Israel that is willing to follow through on its threats.
Lab File Title
AFF – Disclosure Good – Iran

( ) Israeli disclosure is necessary to secure Israel against a nuclear armed Iran.
Louis Rene Beres, Prof of Poli Sci @ Purdue, 7 Feb 07 http://www.infoisrael.net/cgi-local/text.pl?
source=4/b/iv/070220071
In deterring existential attacks, the situation for Israel is now changing rapidly and dramatically.
Understandably, Tehran is oblivious to the persistently hollow call for sanctions threatened by a fictitious
“international community.” Tehran now continues to move systematically and purposefully toward its own
nuclear capability. An unexpected preemptive strike against Iran’s developing nuclear assets and
infrastructures, by the United States and/or Israel, is a permissible act of “anticipatory self-defense” under
international law. Unless that happens, Israel will be facing a fully nuclear adversary that has called openly
and repeatedly for its annihilation. With this in mind, it is by no means clear that nuclear ambiguity will
remain sufficiently persuasive to secure Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture. In my own judgment – and
according to the uniquely informed calculations of Project Daniel – Israeli coexistence with a nuclear Iran
would surely be contingent, inter alia, upon accepting apt forms of Israeli nuclear disclosure.
Lab File Title
General – ProDite Stanley Foundation

Here are the people that were involved in the symposium
The Stanley Foundation 8/22/08 (“A New Look at No First use of Nuclear Weapons”
Maxims News Network,
http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080822stanleyfdtnnuclearfirststrikedoctri
ne10808221601.htm
Participant List Co-Organizers Matt Martin, Program Officer, Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley
Foundation Scott Sagan, Co-Director of CISAC and Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
Discussants Linton Brooks, Former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security; Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration Sid Drell, Professor Emeritus and Deputy Director, Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University Rapporteur Peter Scoblic, Executive Editor, The New
Republic Participants George Bunn, Consulting Professor, CISAC, Stanford University Lynn Eden,
Associate Director for Research and Senior Research Scholar, CISAC, Stanford University Charles
Ferguson, Fellow, Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations Siegfried Hecker, Co-Director
and Research Professor, CISAC, Stanford University David Holloway, Raymond A. Spruance Professor of
International History, CISAC, Stanford University Tom Isaacs, Director, Planning and Special Studies,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Raymond Jeanloz, Professor of Astronomy, University of
California, Berkeley Michael May, Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs,
CISAC, Stanford University Steve Miller, Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Michael
Nacht, Dean, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley Janne Nolan, Professor
of International Affairs, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh Pavel
Podvig, Research Associate, CISAC, Stanford University Nina Tannenwald, Associate Research Professor
of International Relations, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University Dean Wilkening,
Director, Science Program, CISAC, Stanford University Barron YoungSmith, Research Assistant, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Staff Rupal Mehta, Assistant, CISAC, Stanford University Veronica
Tessler, Program Associate, Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley Foundation
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Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1

Lab File Title

( ) Pressure would kill relations and cause nuclear disclosure

The conflict goes nuclear.

UQ – Relations High – AT: Media

Link – Extended Deterrence

Impact – Opacity Good – Peace Process

Impact – Opacity Good – Deterrence

Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race

Impact – Disclosure – Arms Race

( ) It’s opaque posture is key to maintain peace in the middle east

Impact – Disclosure – Relations (1/1)

US support for Israel is key to democracy and peace.

Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction

Impact – Disclosure – Accidental Launch/Miscalc

( ) Miscalculation in the middle east would escalate into a nuclear war -

Impact – Disclosure – Accidents – Environment

Impact – Disclosure – NPT Collapse

Impact – Disclosure – Iranian Nukes

Impact – Disclosure - Israeli/Iran War

2NC - AT – Pressure Now

2NC – Impact – Turns the Case

2NC – AT: No Umbrella For Israel

( ) US has an indirect security umbrella over Israel

2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Impact Shield

2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Generic

( ) Israeli leadership is perceived as weak

2NC – AT: Israeli Deterrence Good – Hezbullah

( ) Israel has no ability to deter Hezbullah

2NC – AT: Israeli Disclosure Good – Deterrence

AFF – NonU- Relations Low

( ) Relations low – Cairo Speech

( ) Relations low now – Obama

( ) Relations low – Jerusalem trip

AFF – NonU – Relations Low

AFF – NonU – Pressure Now

AFF – No First Use

AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad - Strikes

AFF – Nuclear Umbrella Bad – Iran Power Vacuum

AFF – No Arms Race

AFF – Pressure Good

AFF – Disclosure Good – Deterrence

AFF – Disclosure Good – Iran

General – ProDite Stanley Foundation

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