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Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. (Freund, The Police Power [Chicago, 1904]).
Police power is the power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and
property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to
limitations of the Constitution, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police
power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety,
security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential
attribute of government (Marshall vs. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883)
Police power has been defined as the Dzstate authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.dz As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169,
25 August 1989])

 
Police power regulates not only the property but, more importantly, the liberty of private
persons, and virtually all the people.
The scope of police power, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
(Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989])




The justification for police power is found in the ancient Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex, and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.
Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. (Lingo Lumber
Co. vs. Hayes, Tex. Civ. App. 64 SW 2d. 835, 839)
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Common law maxim meaning that) one should use his
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another (1 Bl. Comm. 306. Chapman
vs. Barnett, 131 Ind. App. 30, 169 N.E. 2d 212, 214).
It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state,
plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323)
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the Ǯlaw of overwhelming necessity.ǯ It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason
that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent
domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance. It is the plenary power of the State Dzto govern its citizens.dz (Sangalang vs. IAC,
[GR 71169, 25 August 1989])

  
Pervasive and non-waivable. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs
Ȅ or the public order Ȅ of the general community. (Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, [GR
78164, 31 July 1987])
Essential, insistent and illimitable. The police power of the state has been described as the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers, which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18
December 1986])
Dynamic. Police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of
changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override
a constitutional guaranty, such as that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of
contracts must yield to the police power of the state. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18
December 1986]) Police power is dynamic, not static, must move with the moving society it
is supposed to regulate. Once exercised, it is not deemed exhausted and may be exercised
repeatedly, as often as it is necessary for the protection or the promotion of the public
welfare.
Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a
legitimate police objective.


 

 
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call
for correction by the courts. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor, [GR L-
24693, 31 July 1967])
 1. Police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay. Police power cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a contract or even a treaty.
2. Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to
enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein. (Villanueva vs. Castaneda, [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987])

The exercise of police power, the choice of measures or remedies if indeed action is made,
and the ascertainment of facts to which police power is to be based, lies in the discretion of
the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police
power. The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion,
a refusal of the electorate to return to members of the legislature who have been remiss in
the discharge of their duties. The remedy chosen by the legislature cannot be attacked on
the ground that it is not the best suggested solution, that it is unwise, impractical,
inefficacious, or even immoral. These issues are political in nature, and cannot be inquired
into by the legislature.






1. Lawful subject. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power. The enjoyment of private
rights, when within the scope of police power, may be subordinated to the interests
of the greater number.
2. Lawful means. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
lawful objective must be pursued through a lawful method. The means employed for
the accomplishment of the police objective must pass to the test of reasonableness
and conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights for the protection of
private rights.







  


A mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose Ȅ that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive Ȅ
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. (PBMEO vs. PBM,
[GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) Notwithstanding the Dznew equal protection approachdz with its
emphasis on Dzsuspect classificationdz and Dzfundamental rights and interests standard,dz the
Dzrational relation testdz still retains its validity. (Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January
1984])











A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973])
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An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) it must not
contravene the constitution or any statute, (2) it must not be unfair or oppressive, (3) it
must not be partial or discriminatory, (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade, (5) it
must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
(Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994])
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8; Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The
petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A.
Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda
F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-
66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch
LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch
LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch
139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig
in GR 75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX]
in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma
Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and
Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs.
Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.
c/; Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.
4;< Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of
the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain
acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts
which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to
or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid.
Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that
the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court
should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.
Î 2

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8; On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of
Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of
the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view
at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would
be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or
their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes
and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class
motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old
from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del
Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of
Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July
1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority
to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and
void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme
Court.
c/; Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is
valid and/or constitutional.
4; Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become
the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the
kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city
government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease
or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in
all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended
to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could
be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
´

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8; Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any
barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where
the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where
massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin,
Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of the
Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court,
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of
property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied
by the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case
involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal.
c/; Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
4; The objectives behind its enactment are: Dz(1) To be able to impose payment of the
license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating
the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might
grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.dz The Court has
been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made
clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the
police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts. Such is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has
continued to be.
*7

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8; The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation
created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its
powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success
in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this
end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance
Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the
operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An
Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation
therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined
by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the
decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for
review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
c/; Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the
establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or
resolution.
4; The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While
it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the
illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local
Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as
municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.
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8; On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular
77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within
the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above
BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR), to
implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed
and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of
model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those
of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to
nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and
fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a DzManifestation
and Urgent Motiondz, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on
20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a
DzManifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petitiondz praying that the case
be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial,
to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their
interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al.,
through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later
informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI,
et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court.
c/; Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs and older, is
a valid administrative issuance.
4; Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just
and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service
to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing is not
essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its
road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of
multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The
span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that
by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on
investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that
standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process
has been met.