LABOR CASES WEEK 2-3 Issue:
1. Sto. Tomas v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012 Whether Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional
2. People v. Panis, G.R. No. L-58674, July 11, 1990
3. People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017
4. People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 214340, July 19, 2017
5. David v. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017
6. De Leon v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, G.R. No. 232194, June 19, 2019
7. Abosta Ship Management v. Hilario, G.R. No. 195792, Nov. 24, 2014
8. Santiago v. C.F. Sharp Crew Management, G.R. No. 162419, July 10, 2007
9. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009
10. Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014
11. Cuartocruz v. Active Works, G.R. No. 209072, July 24, 2019
12. Becmen Service Exporter v. Cuaresma, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, April 27, 2009
13. Sunace International Manpower Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, January 25,
2006
14. People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018
15. People v.Santiago, G.R No. 213760, July 1, 2019
16. People v. Sayo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019
17. Arambulo v. People, G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019
18. People v. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011
19. Drugstores Association of the Philippines v. National Council on Disability
Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016
20. Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017
1. Sto. Tomas v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012
Fact:
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies
on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the
welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress. On January 8, 2002
respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE
Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 96. respondents sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and
POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from
implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the
recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to
comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act
8042. The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping
application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act
committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an example, said the
trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by
the Labor Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one
day and a minimum fine of ₱200,000.00 but which could unreasonably go even as high as life
imprisonment if committed by at least three persons. Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree
that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were
not as condemnable as the others in the lists. The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A.
8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of
residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where
the crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional
in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended
parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
Held:
1) Section 6 is valid and constitutional. “illegal recruitment” as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed
and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or
authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated
in Section 6.
2) Section 7 is valid and constitutional. the RTC did not agree that the law can impose such
grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the
others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section
6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving
of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind
of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the
enactment of R.A. 10022 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of
imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7. in
fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside
the country’s borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an
effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled
by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted principals
would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely. The State under its police power “may prescribe
such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the
people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and plenary power of the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”
3) Section 9 is valid and constitutional. SEC. 9. states that Venue. – A criminal action arising
from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is
first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the
aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this Act. There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in
Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the
venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus: SEC. 15. Place where action is to be
instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied). Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to
the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared policy15 of providing
a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal
recruitment.
2. People v. Panis, G.R. No. L-58674, July 11, 1990
FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee
charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment
in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he
cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.”
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its
Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the
private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this
article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On
the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed
only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated all four information filed against
private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.
ISSUE:
SHOULD THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUIT BE COMMITTED AGAINST TWO OR MORE
PERSONS?
Ruling: The Court ruled that the number of persons is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. — “As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the “canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.” The number of persons dealt
with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the
acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if
only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement. The words ‘shall be deemed’ create that presumption.”
3. People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017
The RTC found Sison guilty (1) illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, and (2) estafa
under Article 315 of the RPC.
FACTS: Sometime in November or December 1999, Darvy M. Castuera (Castuera) was
introduced to Sison by her husband, a certain Col. Alex Sison (Col. Sison), a police officer
assigned at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Castuera's aunt, Edna Magalona, was then teaching
police officers at Camp Crame and Col. Sison was one of her students. Col. Sison happened to
mention that his wife can facilitate papers for workers in Australia. Castuera and Magalona then
proceeded to Col. Sison's home in Las Pinas. There, they met Sison and she briefed Castuera
on the requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia.
During that meeting, Sison introduced Castuera to another man who related that he was able to
go to Australia with Sison's help. She also showed Castuera pictures of other people she had
supposedly helped to get employment in Australia. Sison further narrated that a couple she had
helped had given her their car as payment. Because of Sison's representations, Castuera
believed in her promise that she could send him to Australia.
Sison asked Castuera for P180,000 for processing his papers. After some negotiations, Sison
agreed to lower the fee to P160,000. Castuera was to pay half before he leaves the Philippines
and the other half will be taken from his salary in Australia.
On 16 June 2000, Castuera met Sison at McDonald's in SM Megamall to give the P80,000 down
payment. Sison issued a signed document as proof of payment. Castuera's companions, his
aunt Edna Magalona and cousin Mark Magalona, also signed the document as witnesses. Sison
promised Castuera that she would personally process his visa application.
Sison, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. She told him that it was difficult
to get an Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia to get one. She also
said that Castuera's Australian visa was already in Malaysia and his personal appearance was
required there.
On 28 June 2008, Sison and Castuera left Manila for Zamboanga City by plane and from there,
rode a boat to Sandakan, Malaysia. Sison told Castuera that he only needed to stay in Malaysia
for a week then he would proceed to Australia.
Twice, they nearly overstayed in Malaysia. Each time, Sison and Castuera would leave for
Brunei, stay there for three days, and then go back to Malaysia. The second time they returned
to Malaysia, they met several of Sison's other recruits - other Filipinos who have come in
through Thailand - as well as Sison's co-accused, Rea Dedales (Dedales) and Leonardo
Bacomo (Bacomo). Castuera was told that the group would be proceeding to Indonesia to
process their Australian visas there. The group then left for Indonesia. However, the day after
arriving in Indonesia, Sison went back to the Philippines, leaving Castuera and the other recruits
with Dedales and Bacomo.
Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia was denied. Dedales
said it was harder to get an Australian visa from Indonesia and told Castuera to apply for a U.S.
visa instead. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which he paid.
However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport bearing
an Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return to the Philippines. He
asked for his US$1,000 back but Dedales would not return it. His Philippine passport was also
not returned immediately causing him to overstay in Indonesia. He found out then that the
extension papers that Dedales and Bacomo procured for him were fake.
Castuera sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Indonesia and was able to return to the
Philippines using his own funds.
Upon returning to the Philippines, Castuera filed a complaint against Sison, Dedales, and
Bacomo at the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The agency verified
that Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo did not have any license or permit to hire and recruit for
overseas employment.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of illegal recruitment and placement via a syndicate?
Is the accused guilty of estafa?
Can the accused be held guilty of both illegal recruitment and estafa?
HELD: The appeal has no merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with
modification as to the penalty imposed in the estafa case.
Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate - Economic Sabotage. Under Article 13(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, also known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, recruitment and
placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is defined in Article 38:
Article 38. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The
Department of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article. x x x x
RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, approved on 7 June 1995,
further strengthened the protection extended to those seeking overseas employment. Section 6,
in particular, extended the activities covered under the term illegal recruitment:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment [shall xxx] include the
following acts:
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Simply put, illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes." To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that "the accused gave
the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to deploy the
complainants abroad in a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for that
end."
Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license holders. Non-license
holders are liable by the simple act of engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while
license holders may also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited under Section 6 of RA
8042.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for
overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking
any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042.
In this case, Sison herself admits that she has no license or authority to undertake recruitment
and placement activities. The Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents
to others that he or she could send workers abroad for employment, even without the authority
or license to do so, commits illegal recruitment.
Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, as in the present case, has the following elements:
(a) the offender does not have the valid license or authority required by law to engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the "recruitment and
placement" activities defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or engages in any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042; and (c) the illegal recruitment
is "carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme." In the third
element, it "is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in
every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective."
The acts of Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo show a common purpose and and each undertook a
part to reach their objective. Their concerted action is evident in that either Sison or Dedales
was receiving payments from the recruits; that Dedales signed the acknowledgment receipt from
Sison; and that the three accompanied their recruits together in seeking out their visas in
Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, the impression given to Castuera and other recruits was that
the three were indeed working together.
Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in concert and conspired with one
another, their illegal recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage. The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
Estafa. The Court affirmed Sison's conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is
settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment
under RA 8042 and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. In People v. Daud, the Court
explained:
The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is
not necessary. for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act,
or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
All these elements are present in this case.
First, Sison misrepresented her qualifications and authority to send Castuera to work in
Australia. She actively made Castuera believe that she had the ability to do so — she showed
pictures of her "recruits," had one of them give a testimonial, and told him stories to convince
him of such ability. It did not matter that "they had no agreement"that their transaction was for
recruitment or deployment. All her acts were calculated to convince Castuera that Sison was
qualified to send him abroad for employment. It is enough that she "gave the impression that
[she] had the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes."
Second, Sison's false representation was made prior to or simultaneous to the commission of
the fraud. Sison used these false representations to convince Castuera that he would be able to
go to Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other recruits. These representations were
clearly mere devices to convince Castuera, whom she only met at that time, that she was a
legitimate recruiter.
Third, Castuera relied on Sison's representations. He believed that she could send him to
Australia because of the pictures and testimonials she showed him. He also relied on the fact
that his aunt knew Sison's husband, a police officer, adding to her trustworthiness. Sison banked
on that trust to convince Castuera to part with his money and be "recruited" into overseas
employment. Castuera believed that Sison had the same ability to send him to Australia. He did
not even ask for her authority or check for himself with the POEA, relying instead on her word.
This tells us that he was fully convinced based on Sison's representations.
Fourth, Sison's misrepresentation resulted in damage to Castuera. He paid the P80,000 down
payment that Sison required of him as processing fee, but the purpose for which it was paid
never materialized. Likewise, said amount was never reimbursed to Castuera despite his
demands for its return.
4. People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 214340, July 19, 2017
Facts: Appellant was charged with Illegal Recruitment in large scale in an Information alleging
that that accused falsely representing to possess authority to recruit job applicants for
employment abroad without first having secured the required authority from the POEA, illegally
collect and receive from GEPHRE 0. POMAR the amount of (₱5,500.00), as partial payment of
processing and placement fees for overseas employment, which illegal recruitment activities is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage, it being committed in large scale under
Sec. 6(m) paragraph 2 of Republic Act [No.] 8042, having committed the same not only against
Gephre O. Pomar but also against seven (7) others.
Appellant denied meeting any of the private complainants while she was in Iloilo and maintained
that her purpose in going to Iloilo was only to assist Shirley in processing the latter's business
license. Appellant likewise denied that she received money from the private complainants; she
claimed that it was Shirley who was engaged in recruitment activities.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Ruling: Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
In this case, private complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and
Pelipog testified that appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter who
could send them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon them that she had the
authority or ability to send them overseas for work by showing them a job order from Brunei and
a calling card; and appellant collected processing or placement fees from the private
complainants in various amounts ranging from ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00; and that she did not
reimburse said amounts despite demands. In addition, it was proved that appellant does not
have any license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the
certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons required
by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.
Ratio Decidendi: Recruitment becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority.
Gist: This is an appeal from Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.
5. David v. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017
FACTS:
Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila
and that sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented
that she could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded
payment of placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the
latter's application, to which the respondent heeded. Respondent's application was, however,
denied and worse, the money that she put out therefore was never returned. In her Counter-
Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for her to have
committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as evidenced
by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the
recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not
for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one
processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the
said friend. Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the
allegations of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in
Manila.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa.
2. Whether or not the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA.
HELD:
1. Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. The
express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising
from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction
was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within
the jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even
presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were committed within
Manila, such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were
deposited in certain banks located in Manila.
2. Yes. The respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Court has ruled that a private offended party can file a special civil action for certiorari
questioning ttie trial court's order acquitting the accused or dismissing the case, viz: In such
special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is alleged
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he/she may file
such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant.
6. De Leon v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, G.R. No. 232194, June 19, 2019
Facts: On January 31, 2005, de Leon began as a Hotel Personnel Planner for the Crewing
Department of respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), a manning agency
acting as agent for foreign principals and engaged in the business of send1ng Filipino seafarers
on board ocean-going ships or vessels. At the start of his employment, de Leon was given
PTC’s old
company handbook, De Leon’s first few years with PTC went well, and he was, in fact, promoted
to Hotel Personnel Officer in 2008. In December 2010, he was seconded by PTC to First
Maritime Shared Services, Inc. (FMSSI), PTC’s offshore processing unit, where he was given
the position of “Scheduler.” All throughout her stay with the company, she received several
awards.
In 2010, he was served with two written memoranda by the Human Resources Department of
PTC regarding a supposed violation of PTC’ s Code of Discipline, particularly Section 3, Number
2 of which provides:
E. Employees Behaviour, Relationship with Co-employees/Superiors
It is the duty and obligation of every employee to comply faithfully and
strictly with every rule, [regulation], instruction, notice or directive of the company relative to or in
connection with his work or employment. This includes strict compliances with notices to appear
on investigation to shed light on matter being investigated by or of interest of the company.
In 2012, PTC revised its Code of Discipline, in which it indicated more clearly its prohibition
against accepting gifts. On October 9, 2013, she together with another co-employee was caught
on CCTV accepting a brown bag from a co-employee to which the next day she was confronted
and confirmed that did accept a gift. On November 22, 2013, De Leon received a written
resolution terminating her employment.
Issue: Whether the termination of Petitioner’s employment is valid and legal.
Held: Yes. In light of the strict provisions of the POEA Rules, it was reasonable for PTC to
protect itself by crafting its Code of Discipline that imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal for
those who commit acts that, if construed to be PTC’s, would merit the cancellation of its license.
Thus, as it is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly
oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be
complied with until finally revised or amended, the dismissal of de Leon hinged on a rule that
provides for dismissal even on the first instance of violation – should therefore be upheld.
The Court has, in the past, upheld a company’s management prerogatives so long as they are
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements. In this case, the Court holds that PTC was well within its management prerogative
in terminating de Leon’s employment upon a finding of violation of its company rules.
It is likewise well to note that, as pointed out by PTC and by the NLRC in its Resolution, de
Leon’s actions reveal that he was aware that he was violating a company rule. By his own
admission in the present petition, he instructed Adefuin to give the gift in question to Brillante in
the far end of the office, as he knew that there was a CCTV camera in their work area. He thus
knew that he was at risk of getting caught doing an act he should not do. Despite this, he still
received the gift and did not return the same to Acar or even turned over the same to the Human
Resources Department as instructed by the Code of Discipline. This therefore constitutes willful
misconduct or disobedience of company rules that further justifies PTC’ s decision to terminate
de Leon’s employment.
7. Abosta Ship Management v. Hilario, G.R. No. 195792, Nov. 24, 2014
FACTS:
On 24 October 2002, an employment contract was executed by petitioner, on behalf of its
foreign principal Panstar Shipping Co., Ltd., and respondent. In this contract, the latter was hired
as a bosun (boatswain) of the foreign vessel Grand Mark for a period of nine months, with a
monthly salary of USD566. The contract was duly approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency.
Upon reporting to the office of petitioner, respondent was informed that the latter’s deployment
had been postponed due to shifting demands of the foreign principal. It appears, though, that the
foreign principal decided to promote an able seaman on board the vessel instead of hiring
respondent. Petitioner thus requested respondent to wait for another two to three months for a
vacancy to occur. In the meantime, respondent was allowed to make cash advances as financial
assistance.
Respondent filed a Complaint with the POEA against petitioner for violation of Section 2(r), Rule
I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules by failing to deploy respondent within the prescribed period
without any valid reason. Respondent likewise filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter on the
same ground.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the Complaint, alleging that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the matter, as jurisdiction was supposedly lodged with the POEA. However, the
Labor Arbiter denied the motion, stating that the action for damages arising from employment
relations was clearly within its jurisdiction.
On 13 February 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) granted petitioner’s
appeal and reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Order. The NLRC held that considering no employer-
employee relationship existed between the parties, the POEA had jurisdiction over the case. The
claim for non-deployment was administrative in character, and sanctions may be imposed by the
POEA.
On Appeal CA pointed out that Section 10 of the Labor Code provides that the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter includes claims arising by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages. Meanwhile, the POEA has jurisdiction over pre-employment cases that are
administrative in character. Thus, respondent’s Complaint was reinstated
After the parties submitted their respective Position Papers, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner
to pay respondent his salary for nine months in the amount of USD 10,071. The Labor Arbiter
found that the contract executed between the parties and the non-fulfillment thereof entitled
respondent to his salary for the whole duration of the contract.
ISSUE: WON non-deployment of the respondent was a valid exercise of management
prerogative?
Held: No. The controversy arose from the act of the foreign principal in promoting another
person, an act that effectively disregarded the contract dated 24 October 2002 entered into
between petitioner, on behalf of its foreign principal, and respondent. There was a clear breach
of contract when petitioner failed to deploy respondent in accordance with the POEA approved
contract.
Based on a communication sent by a certain M.K. Jin dated 10 October 2002, the foreign
principal had already chosen respondent from among the other candidates as BSN (bosun or
boatswain). Pursuant to this communication, petitioner entered into an employment contract and
hired respondent on 24 October 2002. Subsequent communications, though, show that the
foreign principal approved a different candidate for the position of BSN
Thus, petitioner did not deploy respondent.
There was an apparent violation of the contract at the time that the foreign principal decided to
promote another person as expressed in its communications dated 10 November 2002 and 14
November 2002. The vacancy for the position of boatswain ceased to exist upon the execution
of the contract between petitioner and respondent on 24 October 2002, a contract subsequently
approved by the POEA on 25 October 2002. Clearly, there was no vacancy when the foreign
principal changed its mind, since the position of boatswain had already been filled up by
respondent.
The contract was already perfected on the date of its execution, which occurred when petitioner
and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as on the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. Naturally, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and obligations, a breach of which may give rise to a cause of
action against the erring party. Also, the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and
respected. Thus, neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer
from being deployed without a valid reason.
True, the promotion and choice of personnel is an exercise of management prerogative.1âwphi1
In fact, this Court has upheld management prerogatives, so long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest, and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
However, there are limitations on the exercise of management prerogatives, such as existing
laws and the principle of equity and substantial justice deployment of respondent. He lost the
opportunity to apply for other positions in other agencies when he signed the contract of
employment with petitioner. Simply put, that contract was binding on the parties and may not
later be disowned simply because of a change of mind of either one of them.
The unilateral and unreasonable failure to deploy respondent constitutes breach of contract,
which gives rise to a liability to pay actual damages. The sanctions provided for non-deployment
do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or the imposition of a fine and the
return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting
an action for damages against the employer or agency that has failed to deploy him
Considering that it was petitioner who entered into the contract of employment with respondent
for and on behalf of the foreign principal, it has the primary obligation to ensure the
implementation of that contract.
This Court has consistently held that private employment agencies are held jointly and severally
liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract
of employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law on recruitment agencies and
foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment
of what is due him.
8. Santiago v. C.F. Sharp Crew Management, G.R. No. 162419, July 10, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for
about 5 yrs. In February 3, 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with
respondent, with the duration of 9 months. The contract was approved by POEA. Petitioner was
to be deployed on board the “MSV Seaspread” which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila
for Canada on 13 February 1998.
A week before the date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent’s Vice President,
sent a facsimile message to the captain of “MSV Seaspread,”, saying that it received a phone
call from Santiago’s wife and some other callers who did not reveal their identity and gave him
some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time, if allowed to depart, will jump ship in Canada like
his brother Christopher Santiago. The captain of “MSV Seaspread replied that it cancel plans for
Santiago to return to Seaspread.
Petitioner thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. Petitioner filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney’s fees against respondent and its foreign principal,
Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. The Labor Arbiter (LA) favored petitioner and ruled that the
employment contract remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed
and that respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when it
did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages. On appeal by respondent,
NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent
because the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from
the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of
an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual
damages, and attorney’s fees should be dismissed. But the NLRC found respondent’s decision
not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Petitioner filed MR
but it was denied. He went to CA. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC. Petitioner’s MR was
denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE:
When does an employer- employee relationship begin in the case at bar.
RULING:
There is some merit in the petition. The parties entered into an employment contract whereby
petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board “MSV Seaspread” for the
consideration of US$515.00 per month for 9 months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent
failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner was not
able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did not
commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties. However,
a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in
this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship would have taken place had petitioner
been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-
employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was
the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused
to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed
without a valid reason. Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of
Manila and boarding “MSV Seaspread” constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation
to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent,
the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of
labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the NLR) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
90 calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.”
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for
overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Respondent is liable to pay petitioner only the actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9)
months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay.
While the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said
amount regardless of whether or not he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was
prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much less overtime service, the fact
remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed
to board the vessel. The amount stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the
employee rendered overtime work. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his
job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to
his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and
unreasonable.
The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and
expenses of litigation. Respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will
jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several
persons whose identities were not even confirmed. This Court has upheld management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded
and unreasonable However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. because
respondent’s action was not tainted with bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioner’s
rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.
Seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular
employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign
every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The
exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART.
9 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal
of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in
Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the
amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the
salary period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and
23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA
applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation
leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the
finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary
awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven
to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA
eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the
petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA
skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this
Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with
applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant
worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of
limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and
vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
2. Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of
his illegal dismissal
3. Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not
disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all
three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner
at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total
of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was
belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity,
which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its
provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No.
8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the
minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present
case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a
suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in
case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their
basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with
fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated
into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment
Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on
designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004
Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that
petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract
consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
10. Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed
Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a
total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed
the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s
salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this
court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act.
No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as
well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
11. Cuartocruz v. Active Works, G.R. No. 209072, July 24, 2019
FACTS: ON JUNE 4, 2007, petitioner Arlene A. Cuartocruz and Cheng Chi Ho, a Hong Kong
national, entered into a contract of employment whereby petitioner shall work as the latter’s
domestic helper for a period of two years. She was tasked to do household chores and baby-
sitting, among others, for a monthly salary of HK$3,400 and other benefits. Respondent Active
Works Inc. (AWI), a Philippine corporation engaged in the recruitment of domestic helpers in
Hong Kong, is petitioner’s agency.
On Aug. 3, 2017, petitioner upon arrival in Hong Kong proceeded to the residence of her
employer. On Aug. 11, 2017, she received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is
required to improve her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which the
letter shall serve as a written notice of termination of her employment contract effective Sept. 11,
2007. On the same day, petitioner wrote a reply apologizing for giving false information by
stating in her bio-data that she is single when in fact she is a single parent.
In a letter dated Aug. 16, 2007, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration Department of
Wangchai, Hong Kong that he is terminating the contract with petitioner effective immediately for
the following reasons: “disobey order (sic), unmatch the contract which she submit before (sic)
and refuse to care my baby (sic).”
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of unpaid salaries and
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract of employment, reimbursement of
placement fee and other fees and moral and exemplary damages.
Does her complaint prosper?
Ruling: Yes.
Under Philippine law, workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process
beforetermination of their employment. They may not be removed from employment without a
valid or just cause as determined by law, and without going through the proper procedure. The
purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class from the employer’s
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss.
In this case, respondents failed to prove by substantial evidence that there was just or
authorized cause for the termination of petitioner’s employment. About a week into her job, or on
Aug. 11, 2007, petitioner received a warning letter from her employer requiring her “to improve
[her] attentiveness on [her] performance within one month xx x” failing which the letter shall
serve “as a written notice x x x that the x x x contract will be terminated with immediate effect on
Sept. 11, 2007.” Nonetheless, after five days, or on Aug. 16, 2007, petitioner’s contract was
terminated for the following reasons: “(1) disobey order (sic); (2) unmatch the contract which she
submit before (sic); and (3) refuse to care my baby (sic).”
The grounds cited for the termination of petitioner’s employment contract are considered just
causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but only if respondents were able to prove them.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer, who must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.
Here, no evidence was presented to substantiate the employer’s accusations. There was no
showing of particular instances when petitioner supposedly disobeyed her employer and refused
to take care of his baby. With respect to petitioner’s alleged misrepresentation that she was
single when in fact she was a single parent, there is also no showing how this affected her work
as a domestic helper.
In fact, being a mother herself puts petitioner in a better position to care for her employer’s child.
Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment,
the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. (Arlene A. Cuartocruz vs. Active Works
Inc., et al., G.R. 209072, July 24, 2019).
12. Becmen Service Exporter v. Cuaresma, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, April 27, 2009
Facts:
Jan 1997 – Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in
Saudi under a 3 year contract, for $247/mo.
June 1998 - she died. Jessie Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead inside her dormitory room with
mouth foaming and smelling of poison. Medical report of Al-Birk Hosp stated that the cause of
death was poisoning – halt in blood circulation, respiratory system and brain damage due to
poisoning from unknown substance.
Sep 1998 – her body was repatriated to Manila. The City Health Officer of Cabanatuan found
that Jasmin died under violent circumstances not poisoning – abrasions at her inner lip and
gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and
hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-
muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the
labia minora.
Mar 1999 – Jasmin’s body was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report tested negative ffor non-
volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k death benefits, 50k loss of life; 20k
funeral expenses; 10k medical reimbursement.
Nov 1999 – Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah Co (principal in Saudi)
claiming death and insurance benefits. Sps. Claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related having
occurred at the employer’s premises; their entitled to iqama insurance; compensatory damages
amounting to $103k which is the sum of her monthly salary 35 years (she was 25 yo when she
died, assuming she would survive until 60 yo).
Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide and relied on the medical report of Al
Birk. They deny liability since the Sps. Had already received their benefits from OWWA. Later,
Becmen manifested that Rajab had terminated their agency, and impleaded White Falcon as the
new agency of Rajab.
Summary of Rulings
LArb – dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk medical report
NLRC – reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable work-connected criminal
aggression; both agencies are solidarily liable to pay $113; later reduced to $80k
CA – affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary x remaining contract period)
Issues
WON entitled to insurance – NO
WON death is compensable – NO
WON death was by suicide – NO
WON Becmen and Falcon are liable – YES, solidary liability
Ratio
1. NOT entitled to insurance.
The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an
employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force
of law between the contracting parties. An examination of said employment agreement shows
that it provides for no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:
a. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
b. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end
thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
c. Transportation to and from work;
d. Free living accommodations;
e. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery
charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
f. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the
exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport
renewal, sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
g. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty four-
months of continuous service;
h. Eight days public holidays per year;
i. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per
labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other
benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court
granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits does not make the contract infirm
under PH laws since under Saudi law, foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these
benefits.
2. Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable (i.e., not liable for lost
earnings)
At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory room on personal time. Court
stated that the foreign employer cannot be expected to ensure her safety even while she is not
on duty. What an employee does on free time is beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry.
The dormitory room also cannot be considered as “employer’s premises”.
3. Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE
Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her
employment contract. This is beyond human comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina especially since
suicide is contrary to Christian belief. Court cited Filipina’s resilience despite abuse and
maltreatment. Based on past OFW experiences, Filipina’s do not simply commit suicide but
rather endure.
Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are patently inconclusive. Their report is
contradicted by the City Health Officer and by NBI. Even the toxicology report tested negative for
poisonous substances.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to death.
4. Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and exemplary damages
Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing Jasmin’s case as one of suicide
instead of fighting for her rights. The Agencies prioritized their corporate interest over that of
Jasmin.
RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act provides that the State shall at all times
uphold the dignity of its citizens, whether in the country or overseas. The rights and interest of
distressed overseas Filipinos are adequately protected and safeguarded.
Becmen and Falcon, both licensed recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by RA 8042.
Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to deployed OFWs, be the first to
come the rescue of our distressed OFWs; and have the primary obligation to protect the rights
and ensure the welfare of our OFWs. It should have been them who sought justice for Jasmin.
Instead, it was the parents who requested an autopsy in the Ph to confirm the Saudi report.
Court stated that the parents have done all that was within their power to investigate Jasmin’s
case on their own.
Art 19 CC – every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art 21 CC – any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the later for the damage.
Art 24 CC – in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Rajab, Becmen and Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because they
undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy the protective mantel of PH labor
and social laws, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is in keeping with the
Consti provision for the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employement, ensure
equal work opportunities.
All labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer.
As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages for which Becmen
and Falcon are solidarily liable. Grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of
misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Art 2219 (10) CC.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-basd employer
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employement. This is meanth to
assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment. If the agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners are also solidarily liable.
Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not absolve Becmen.
CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages, P250k as exemplary damages.
13. Sunace International Manpower Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, January 25,
2006
FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace
International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the
contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2
years.
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang,
and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She
alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges
that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of
Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence,
the filing of this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace
HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and
entered into a new and separate employment contract.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang
to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore
was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced.
The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed
after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese
broker communicated regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not
necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction
was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that
it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15,
2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s
filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-
year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
"owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the
agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing
directly with third persons.
14. People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018
Doctrines:
A. The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the “recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation” even if it does
not involve any of the means stated under the law.
B. Trafficking is considered qualified when “the trafficked person is a child”.
C. Trafficking is considered consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken
place since the mere transaction consummates the crime.
D. Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the
persons’ vulnerability as minors
E. The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to
the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse,
thus, justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when
the crime is aggravated, as in this case.
FACTS: In an Information, Nancy Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a. “ZOY” or “SOY” (Ramirez)was
charged with qualified trafficking of persons in relation to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208.
It reads:
That on the 5th day of December, 2009, at or about 9:45 o’clock (sic) in the evening, in xxx
Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the afore named
accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully maintain or hire Nica Jean xxx, 20 years old,
AAA, 16 year old minor, Cindy xxx, 20 years old and BBB, 15 year old minor, to engage in
prostitution and offered them for sex or any form of sexual exploitation to poseur customers.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution alleged that on December 5, 2009, police officers and members of the Regional
Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation in a KTV Bar in Lapu-
Lapu City. The operation was “based on their surveillance of a widespread sexual service for
sale by young girls”in the area.
While in the said bar, two women approached the police officers (who acted as poseur
customers) and introduced themselves as AAA and BBB. When they told the girls that they
would need two (2) more girls, another woman approached them and introduced herself as
Nancy, who was later identified as Ramirez. She told the poseur customers that she could
provide the girls. Then, BBB and Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls.
After Ramirez provided the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi and headed to a motel.
Ramirez had told the girls to accept the money that they would be given. In the taxi, one poseur
customer handed P2,400.00 to one (1) of the girls. As soon as the girl received it, they
introduced themselves as police officers, and turned the girls over to their team leader in a
civilian van parked near them. Later, Ramirez was arrested when BBB pointed to her as the
pimp.
In her defense, Ramirez testified that on the day of the entrapment, she and her sister were at
the area watching a live band when two (2) men rushed to them, arrested her, and pushed her
into a van. In the van, she saw BBB, who told her that police officers were around the area to
arrest prostitutes. The men then brought her to a gas station, where they were made to board
another van with other women and two (2) gay men.
In 2013, the Regional Trial Court found Ramirez guilty as charged.
Ramirez appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing that it was BBB who negotiated
with the poseur customers about the girls’ prices and received the supposed payment for sexual
services. She posits that the advanced payment made to BBB was contrary to human nature
and natural course of events since no sexual activity had occurred yet. She insists that she was
in the area just to watch a live band.
The CA denied the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court.
Thereafter, Ramirez appealed to the Supreme Court (SC).
While the case was pending before the SC, Ramirez sent a handwritten letterto the SC, insisting
that on the night of the incident, she was merely in the area with her sister to watch a live band.
She claims that she only met BBB that night, and that BBB suddenly dragged her to look for two
(2) more girls. She further alleges that it was BBB who negotiated with the two (2) customers
and that she had no idea what was going on. She submits that BBB pointed to her as a pimp
only because the police officers were threatening to detain her instead.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the prosecution proved Ramirez’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
trafficking of persons.
a. Define trafficking in persons.
b. What are the elements that must be established to successfully prosecute the crime
of trafficking of persons?
B. Whether it can be used as a valid defense the victim’s consent to the transaction, or
she/he received the supposed payment for his/her sexual services.
C. Whether the victims are entitled to moral and exemplary damages, if Ramirez be found
guilty.
RULING:
A. Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the “recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation” even if it does not involve any of
the means stated under the law. Trafficking is considered qualified when “the trafficked person is
a child”.
Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act No. 10364on February 6,
2013. In recognition of the amendments to the law, People v. Casio [749 Phil. 458 (2014)]
clarifies that crimes prosecuted under Republic Act No. 10364 must have the following
elements:
 (1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders”;
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person”;
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.”
Here, Ramirez was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation to Section 4(e) of
Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone “to maintain or hire a person
to engage in prostitution or pornography.”
The prosecution established that during the entrapment operation, Ramirez approached the
disguised police officer and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of whom
were minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of previous surveillance
conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force. Both minor
victims testified that this incident was not the first time that Ramirez pimped them out to
customers, and that any payment to them would include the payment of commission to her.
The SC in People v. Rodriguez(G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017) acknowledged that the
corroborating testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victims were sufficient to sustain
a conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybanez, et al. [793 Phil. 877 (2016)], the SC
likewise affirmed the conviction of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report on the
prostitution of minors within the area. In People v. XXX and YYY (G.R. No. 235652, July 9,
2018), the SC held that the exploitation of minors, through either prostitution or pornography, is
explicitly prohibited under the law. Casio also recognizes that the crime is considered
consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken place since the mere transaction
consummates the crime.
B. Ramirez cannot use as a valid defense either BBB’s and AAA’s consent to the
transaction, or that BBB received the payment on her behalf. In Casio:
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Similarly, in People v. De Dios (G.R. No. 234018, June 6, 2018):
It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse
of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA
was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of De
Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the
persons’ vulnerability as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in
the information and proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through the offer
of financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios.
In this case, Ramirez hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their
vulnerability as minors. AAA’s and BBB’s acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be
considered as a valid defense.
Ramirez initially used the defense of denial, testifying that she was merely in the area to listen to
a live band when the police rushed to her and arrested her. Denial, however, becomes a weak
defense against the positive identification by the poseur-buyer and the minor victims [People v.
Bandojo, Jr., G.R. No. 234161, October 17, 2018].
Moreover, Ramirez, in her handwritten letter to the SC, seemingly abandoned her earlier
statement that she was just in the area to watch a live band when the police rushed to and
arrested her. This time, she alleged that it was BBB who approached and dragged her to the
police officers, and who also started negotiating prices. This contradicts her earlier statement
that she had no knowledge of the transaction. Worse, this appears to corroborate the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies that she was indeed at the transaction.
C. The SC affirms the trial court and the Court of Appeals’ conviction of Ramirez in violation
of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a) and punished under Section
10(c). In Casio, however, the SC held that moral damages and exemplary damages must also
be imposed. In People v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017):
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thus, justifying the award
of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this
case.
Thus, in line with jurisprudence, it proper to impose moral damages of P500,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P100,000.00.
15. People v.Santiago, G.R No. 213760, July 1, 2019
FACTS: In an October 7, 2011 Information, Reynaldo Santiago, Jr. y Santos (Santiago), Ramil
Castillo y Merano (Castillo), and Rebecca Legazpi y Adriano (Legazpi) were charged with
committing acts of trafficking in persons under Section 4(c), in relation to Section 6(c) of
Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.7 The Information read:
That on or about September 30, 2011 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
a group consisting of three (3) persons and therefore acting as a syndicate, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly and jointly commit act of qualified trafficking in person
for purposes of prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage upon a (sic) person of AAA, by then and there, for a fee, offering her for sexual
intercourse or exploitation to Romeo S. David, a police asset.
On arraignment, Santiago and the other two (2) accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial then ensued.9
The prosecution, through witnesses Police Officer 1 Jayboy Nonato (PO1 Nonato), PO1 Mark
Anthony Ballesteros (PO1 Ballesteros), Melvin Espenida (Espenida), and AAA,10 established
the following:
On September 26 and 27, 2011, TV5 segment producer Espenida and his crew went to Plaza
Morga and Plaza Moriones in Tondo, Manila to investigate the alleged prostitution operations in
the area.11 They had earlier designated a confidential asset, alias "Romeo David"12 (David), on
whom a lapel microphone was clipped, to pose as a customer and transact with the alleged
pimps for a night with a minor.13 During the transaction, the pimps allegedly asked for
₱500.00.14 Espenida, who was on board a TV5 vehicle located about a hundred meters away
from where David and the pimps were, heard the transaction through the microphone.15
On September 29, 2011, Espenida and his crew filed a Complaint before the Regional Police
Intelligence Operations Unit, Regional Intelligence Division, Camp Bagong Diwa,16 reporting
about the rampant human trafficking in Plaza Morga and Plaza Moriones. Acting on the
Complaint, Police Senior Inspector Pablo Quejada, PO1 Nonato, PO1 Mabel Catuiran (PO1
Catuiran), PO1 Ballesteros, and other police operatives conducted an entrapment operation in
those areas.17
Later, at around 11:00 p.m., the team and David arrived at Plaza Morga. After surveying the
area, David pointed to the pimps, who, upon seeing the police, ran away but were eventually
caught and arrested. During trial, they were positively identified by the police officers in court as
the same people apprehended that night.18
After the arrest, the team proceeded to the hotel where the trafficked person, AAA, had been
waiting. The officers took her into custody and brought her to the Regional Intelligence Division
at Camp Bagong Diwa.19
According to AAA, at around 1:30 a.m. on September 30, 2011, she was about to buy coffee at
Plaza Moriones when Santiago called her, offering to pay her to spend a night with a customer.
He allegedly promised to pay AAA ₱350.00 out of the ₱500.00 that the customer would pay for
the transaction. Later, she and Santiago went to the hotel, which was 15 meters away from
Plaza Moriones.20 There, the police came and took them both into custody. AAA later confirmed
during trial that Santiago was the pimp, but said that she only saw Castillo and Legazpi for the
first time upon getting into the van bound for the police station.21
Santiago solely testified in his defense. He alleged that at around midnight of September 29,
2011, while he was selling coffee at Plaza Morga, around 25 meters away from Plaza Moriones,
he was approached by David, who said that he was looking for a woman. Santiago said that he
ignored the man.22
Then, Santiago allegedly saw AAA approach David, though he did not hear what the two had
talked about. AAA later waved at Santiago and invited him to accompany her. AAA brought
Santiago to a hotel, but as they were nearing it, the police arrived and arrested him.23
In its May 15, 2012 Decision,24 the Regional Trial Court convicted Santiago of committing
trafficking in persons punished under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act. It gave credence to AAA's testimony that Santiago recruited her to
have sex with David for ₱500.00. Santiago was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment and was
fined ₱1 million. Castillo and Legazpi were acquitted for the prosecution's failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.25 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused REYNALDO
SANTIAGO, JR. y SANTOS @ "REY" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 (a)
of Republic Act 9208 otherwise known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWENTY YEARS IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF
ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS.
Accused RAMIL CASTILLO y MERANO and REBECCA LEGAZPI y ADRIANO are hereby
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.26
In its May 30, 2013 Decision,27 the Court of Appeals affirmed Santiago's conviction. It found that
all the elements to establish that an accused had committed trafficking in persons, which were
the act, the means, and the exploitative purpose as provided under the Manual on Law
Enforcement and Prosecution of Trafficking in Persons Cases, were present.
Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals. Santiago later filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari,32 which this Court granted
in its September 8, 2014 Resolution.33 Subsequently, he filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner points
out that the lack of testimony from the confidential informant, David, raises doubts on whether
"petitioner truly offered AAA to him[.]"43 He adds that the witnesses were allegedly inconsistent
on David's identity.44
Petitioner also points out that AAA testified that she had not received the alleged consideration
for the transaction, dispelling the prosecution's claim that he was engaged in trafficking. Thus,
his defense of denial should not be dismissed since the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Reynaldo Santiago, Jr. y Santos is guilty of violating Section
4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
RULING: YES
This Court denies the Petition.
This Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings,50 especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.51 "The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their
demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand."52 The exception is when either or both
lower courts have "overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts which could have affected the
outcome of the case."53
Here, nothing warrants a reversal of the Court of Appeals' and the Regional Trial Court's
Decisions. This Court sustains petitioner's conviction.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, defines the crime
of trafficking in persons:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
In People v. Casio,54 we enumerated the elements of the crime:
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another["]; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs."
Here, the offense was committed on September 30, 2011,58 prior to the amendment. Thus, the
original provisions of Republic Act No. 9208 are applicable.
The Information charged petitioner with violation of Section 4(c), in relation to Section 6(c) of the
law. Section 4(c) punishes the act of "[offering] or [contracting] marriage, real or simulated, for
the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage[.]"
The trial court correctly convicted petitioner for violation of Section 4(a), instead of Section 4(c)
of Republic Act No. 9208. The Information sufficiently averred that: (1) petitioner committed an
act of qualified trafficking in persons by offering AAA to David for sex or exploitation; (2) the act
was done for a fee; and (3) for prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or debt bondage.59
The rule is settled that "what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in
the complaint or information[.]"60
In People v. Rodriquez,64 this Court held that the trafficked victim's testimony that she had been
sexually exploited was "material to the cause of the prosecution."65 Here, AAA's testimony was
corroborated by the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the entrapment operation.
They recalled in detail the steps they had taken to verify the surveillance report and ensure that
petitioner was the same person with whom the confidential informant transacted.66
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the testimony of the confidential informant is not
indispensable in the crime of trafficking in persons. Neither is his identity relevant. "It is sufficient
that the accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for the
established purpose of exploitation,"67 which was sufficiently shown by the trafficked person's
testimony alone. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
Jurisprudence consistently holds that there are compelling considerations why confidential
informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity
and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Another is the necessity to protect them from
being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known.
The testimony of the confidential asset is not relevant for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution of this case because his testimony would merely be corroborative and
cumulative. The testimonies of the trafficked person, AAA, clearly narrating what transpired on
the trafficking incident and the police officers regarding the entrapment operation were sufficient
to prove appellant's guilt of the crime charged.68 (Citation omitted)
Thus, we affirm the lower courts' conviction of petitioner for violation of Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(a), as punished under Section 10(a).69 Moreover, since this Court cannot impose an
indeterminate sentence due to the straight penalty imposed by law, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of 20 years of imprisonment and the fine of ₱1,000,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' May 30, 2013 Decision and July
31, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34942 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Reynaldo Santiago, Jr. y Santos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9208. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and to pay the victim, AAA: (1) a fine of One Million Pesos
(₱1,000,000.00); (2) moral damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and (3)
exemplary damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).
All damages awarded shall be subject to the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this Decision until its full satisfaction.
16. People v. Susan Sayo Reyes, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019
Facts:
The combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the "plaza girls" disclosed that...
these "plaza girls" have been under the control and supervision of SAYO as commercial sex
workers.
The "plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO on different occasions in 2004 by other "plaza girls."
SAYO then started to act as a pimp providing them with male customers for a certain
percentage.
Whenever they have customers, SAYO would bring them either to a motel or to ALFREDO
ROXAS's house who provides them a room for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) for thirty (30)
minutes use of the room.
ROXAS also provides condom for the male customers at Thirty Pesos (P30.00).
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Women and Children Complaint Division (CIDG-
WCCD) received a letter from the International Justice Mission (IJM), an International Non
Government Human Rights Organization, requesting for police assistance on the possible
rescue of three (3) minors exploited for prostitution in Pasig City.
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target area in Pasig City.
They were approached by SAYO who bluntly asked if they wanted women and she further
inquired if they wanted 15 year-old girls.
When the Nine Hundred Pesos (P900.00) was handed by one of the customers to SAYO to
cover the payment for the services of AAA, BBB and CCC, the CIDG-WCCO agents announced
that it was a raid. At that point, PO3 Anthony Ong executed the pre-arranged signal, in reaction
to which, the back-up operatives who were deployed in different strategic locations rushed
towards them and arrested SAYO and ROXAS.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision held:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, accused SUSAN SAYO y REYES is
hereby found. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification
Sayo had died on November 30, 2011 due to multiple organ failure, secondary to cervical cancer
Issues: Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Roxas was convicted of Qualified Trafficking of Persons, under Section 5(a) in relation to
Section 6 of RA 9208 in connection with minors AAA and BBB
Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not
Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses with their own
corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying circumstances of Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in persons,
such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering, selling, or trading
persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or debt bondage.
Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned
predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for knowingly leasing a room for the
purpose of prostitution. Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards
CCC.
In this regard, it should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified
by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of
trafficking.
Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses,
cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:DECLARE accused-appellant
ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON, GUILTY of ACTS THAT PROMOTE TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, for which he is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as provided for under Section 10(b) of the same law.ORDER accused-
appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON to PAY AAA, BBB, and CCC, the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each, as moral and exemplary damages, subject to legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full payment.DISMISS the case
insofar as accused-appellant SUSAN SAYO y REYES is concerned, in view of her death.
17. Arambulo v. People, G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019
FACTS: This case stemmed from an Information7 filed before the RTC charging petitioner with
the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, the accusatory portion of which states:
That in or about September 2011 up to January 12, 2012 in the City of Ca1amba, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused for money,
profit and consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit minors
AAA, 13 years old, BBB, 16 years old, CCC, 14 years old, for the purpose of committing
robbery, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid minors and in violation of the
aforementioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Essentially, the prosecution alleged that petitioner and his minor son, Dominique Dimple
Arambulo9 (Dominique), invited the latter's three (3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely
AAA, BBB, and CCC, 10 to their house sometime in 2011. It was then revealed that the purpose
of the meeting was to discuss petitioner's plans to commit robberies with the help of AAA, BBB,
and CCC. Upon learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but petitioner got angry
and punched him; thus, he was forced to join the group. AAA, BBB, and CCC then similarly
testified that not only was petitioner the mastermind of the series of robberies they subsequently
committed against various people, but he was also the driver of their getaway tricycle.11
In his defense, petitioner and Dominique similarly testified that the filing of the instant case was
merely an act of retaliation by a certain Lt. Hoseña,12 one (1) of the alleged victims of the
aforesaid robberies, following the dismissal of the theft and obstruction of justice cases filed by
the latter against petitioner.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated May 26, 2015, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of twenty (20) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty-two (22)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00.15
The RTC found that the prosecution, through the consistent, direct, and unequivocal testimonies
of AAA, BBB, and CCC, was able to establish that petitioner had indeed recruited them into
performing criminal activities, i.e., various robberies. In this regard, the RTC opined that
petitioner's aforesaid acts constitute Qualified Trafficking in Persons not only because the
victims were minors, but also because it is considered "in large scale" as it involved three (3) or
more victims.16
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed17 to the CA. In his brief, petitioner pointed out, inter alia, that the
crime being imputed to him is defined and penalized under Section 4 (k) of RA 9208, as
amended by RA 10364, which was approved on February 6, 2013, published on February 13,
2013, and thus, only took effect on February 28, 2013. Significantly, such provision did not exist
in the original version of RA 9208. Hence, since the acts for which he was being made
accountable for occurred sometime in or about September 2011 to January 12, 2012, or before
the amendatory law took effect, he could not be convicted of the crime charged.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated January 22, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as defined
and penalized under Section 4 (k) subparagraph 4, in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c), of RA
9208, as amended, and accordingly, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00, with int rest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of the ruling until fully paid.20
Mainly upholding the factual findings of the RTC, the CA held that the prosecution had
established the commission of the crime charged, and that he was properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution23 dated August
23, 2018; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
RULING: Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner elevated the matter before the Court
through a petition for review on certiorari. As a general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be
brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court;24 except when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in
which case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the CA.25 Clearly,
petitioner availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the
Court, despite having been sentenced to suffer life imprisonment by the CA. Nonetheless, in the
interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat the instant petition as an ordinary appeal in
order to resolve the substantive issue at hand with finality.26
In line with such treatment, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.27
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court affirms
petitioner's conviction, albeit. under a provision of law different from what is stated in the CA
ruling.
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The
same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in
persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph."28
The crime becomes qualified when any of the circumstances found under Section 6 of the law is
present.
It must be clarified that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 merely provides for the general definition of
"Trafficking in Persons" as the specific acts punishable under the law are found in Sections 4
and 5 of the same (including Sections 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C if the amendments brought about by RA
10364 are taken into consideration). This is evinced by Section 10 which provides for the
penalties and sanctions for committing the enumerated acts therein. Notably, Section 10 (c) of
RA 9208 (renumbered as Section 10 [e] under RA 10364) of the law also provides for penalties
for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" under Section 6. Nonetheless, since Section 6 only
provides for circumstances which would qualify the crime of "Human Trafficking," reference
should always be made to Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5 of the law. Hence, convictions for
"Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on: (a) the commission of any of the acts provided
under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5; and (b) the existence of any of the circumstances listed
under Section 6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be convicted of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons"
if he is not found to have committed any of the punishable acts under the law.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, petitioner similarly contends in his
appellant's brief29 filed before the CA and in the instant petition30 that the acts imputed to him,
i.e., recruiting minors to commit a series of robberies, constitute the crime defined and penalized
under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364. He then posits that since this
specific provision was only introduced by the amendatory law in 2013 as the original iteration of
Section 4 of RA 9208 did not contain the same, and the acts imputed to petitioner were
committed sometime in September 2011 to January 12, 2012 as indicated in the Information
against him, it may be said that at the time he committed said acts, there was no specific
provision in RA 9208 in its original form which specifically defines and penalizes the said acts as
Trafficking in Persons. As such, his conviction must be set aside.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
While petitioner correctly pointed out that he cannot be convicted under Section 4 (k) (4)31 of
RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364 since said provision was only enacted on February 28,
2013, or after the period stated in the Information when he committed the acts imputed against
him,32 this will not ipso facto result in his acquittal, as his acts of recruiting minors for the
purpose of committing a series of robberies reasonably fall under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its
original form, which reads:cralawred
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:cralawred
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage; (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines the term "forced labor and
slavery" as "the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse
of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception."
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found - through the consistent, direct, unequivocal, and
thus, credible testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC - that the prosecution had clearly established
the existence of the elements33 of violation of Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c)34
of RA 9208 in its original form, as evinced by the following: (a) petitioner, through his minor son,
Dominique, recruited three (3) other minors AAA, BBB, and CCC; (b) based on AAA, BBB, and
CCC's testimonies, petitioner was able to do so by taking advantage of their vulnerability as
minors, particularly through enticement, violence, and use of force and coercion; and (c)
petitioner recruited them for the purpose of engaging them to perform illicit work/services, i.e.,
commit a series of robberies. Notably, the ultimate facts constitutive of these circumstances
were clearly alleged and contained in the Information. In this regard, case law instructs that
"[t]he victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will."35
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the
best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties,
and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.36 Hence, petitioner's conviction for
Qualified Trafficking in Persons - not under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208 as amended by RA
10364 as erroneously ruled by the CA, but under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of the same law - must be upheld.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208 states that persons found
guilty of Qualified Trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than P2,000,000.00 but not more than P5,000,000.00. Thus, the CA correctly sentenced
petitioner to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00.
Finally, the Court orders petitioner to pay each of the victims, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the amounts
of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.37 Further, the Court deems it proper to impose on all monetary awards
due to the victims legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this
Decision until full payment.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2018 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37921 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Fernando B. Arambulo is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, defined and penalized
under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 9208. Accordingly, he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P2,000,000.00. He is likewise ORDERED to pay each of the victims, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the
amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
18. People v. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011
 On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Facts: Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration
On June 3, 2005 in the City of Zamboanga, Lolita Plando who was on her to the house of her into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta
grandfather, met Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Canete. On the day they met, Ronnie proposed to for Disabled Persons," was passed into law.5 The law defines "disabled persons", "impairment"
Lolita a work in Malaysia. She was interested and so she gave her mobile number. On the next and "disability" as follows:
day, Lolita and Ronnie met again to discuss further the job he was offering in Malaysia. She was
told that she will work as a restaurant entertainer and will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits. She SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, these terms are defined as follows:
only need to have a passport and she’s good to go on June 6, 2005. On the following day,
Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Lalli, the person who will be helping her and three other girls (a) Disabled Persons are those suffering from restriction of different abilities, as a result of a
to go to Malaysia to work. On June 6, 2005, Lolita together with Hadja Lalli, Nestor who the mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range
financier, and the 3 other girls went on board and travelled to Malaysia. Upon arriving the girls considered normal for a human being;
were introduced to a Chinese Malay who will be their Boss. When they arrived at the Pipen club,
they were informed that they will be work as entertainers. Lolita was forced. She had customers (b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or
night after night who used her and forced her to have sexual intercourse. Some even physically anatomical structure of function;
abused her. One night, Lolita was able to contact her sister who is in Malaysia and asked for
help. Lolita was able to escape – she was rescued and was able to go back to Zamboanga City. (c) Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
Lolita was advised to file a complaint against Hadja Lalli and Ronnie Arngoy with the police psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such
regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issue/s: On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 94427 was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of
Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal R.A. No. 7277 was amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability" and all
recruitment and trafficking in persons for their acts references on the law to "disabled persons" were amended to read as "persons with disability"
(PWD).8 Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20) percent discount on the
Ruling: purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered
The Court of Appeals and RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross income based on the net cost of
Illegal recruitment and Trafficking in Persons. goods sold or services rendered:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives. SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled
Section 6 of RA 8042 defines illegal recruitment, as follows: to the following:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or xxx
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and
xxxx
Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for
work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino
are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required
citizens upon submission of any of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:
by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the
accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying
(i) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay
and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons
captain of the place where the person with disability resides;
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.
(ii) The passport of the person with disability concerned; or
(iii) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the National
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows: Trafficking in Persons refers to
the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with application for a Temporary
victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction21 before the Court of Appeals to annul
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
and enjoin the implementation of the following laws:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442;
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;
19. Drugstores Association of the Philippines v. National Council on Disability
4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;
Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as
amended, as well as the assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA suspended the
effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof of respondent NCDA's compliance with filing of
said administrative order with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) and its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The effectivity of NCDA Administrative Order
No. 1 is hereby SUSPENDED pending Respondent's compliance with the proof of filing of NCDA
Administrative Order No. 1 with the Office of the National Administrative Register and its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA to lift the suspension of the
implementation of NCDA A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in the Philippine
Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as well as a certification from the ONAR showing
that the same was filed with the said office on October 22, 2009.22 Likewise, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision.
In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and lifted the suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering the
filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Is this an instance of eminent domain?
HELD: No, this is not an exercise of eminent domain. This is an exercise of police power to
promote the welfare of the people, especially those who have less in life. Consequently, there is
no need for just compensation. The law leaves reasonable and viable economic usefulness;
hence, there is no “taking.”
ISSUE: Does the law violate the reasonable means test (due process), considering it only
requires an ID?
HELD: No, it does not violate due process. The implementation is reasonable because, before a
person is issued a PWD ID, he must first show a medical certificate of his disability if it is not
apparent by the naked eye.
ISSUE: Does the law violate equal protection because it only targets retailers and not all players
in the drug industry?
HELD: No, it does not violate equal protection because the distinction between retailers and
manufacturers, etc. is real and substantial. Equal protection is not an iron-clad rule.
20. Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017
FACTS:
The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation
(petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the
Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents),
which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257,
otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No.
9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD),
respectively, and treating them as tax deduction. which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed
by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and
Development , the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council
on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of: Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003"
and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,"
particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and
persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction due to the
reason that claiming it affects the profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation in the
Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to
monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and
regulations for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring
establishments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a
law;
2. Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
3. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the
petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the law
4. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and violates the petitioners
right to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a law. Generally, the office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by the law. This is,
however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of
Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of
executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number of
jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of a law
or prohibit its implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to
the instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission of financial statements which were
wanting in the first case, but because it had the good sense of including questions that had not
been raised or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20%
discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and
violation of the equal protection clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid,
(1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the
law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being[.]

On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as
follows:

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or]
An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with
Disability as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes. This is defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of
a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range
considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an
individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.