Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ARTICLE 6
1. People vs. Lamahang; GR 43530; 03 August 1935
Facts:
- CFI: guilty of attempted robbery with additional penalty for habitual delinquency
- At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in
the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods
located on the last named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was
sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking
one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed
up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
Issue: WON accused should be held liable for attempted robbery
Held: No
- It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that,
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation.
- The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation
to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.
- There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter
Tan Yu’s store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had
started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely
arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that
an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection - that said beginning of execution,
if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
- Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force
or violence another person’s dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this
offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession,
for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused
may reasonably be inferred.
- Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and
cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes.
- Hence, it was held that the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted
robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling
2. Baleros vs. People; GR 138033; 22 February 2006
Facts:
- RTC & CA: guilty of attempted rape
- In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30.
Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding
bed.
- Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical
on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move.
Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to
scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals
were very tight. Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until
at last her right hand got free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she
was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
- The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused
Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa
kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako"
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
Held: Yes.
- There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is
whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked
cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of
an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate
intention, is anybody’s guess.
- xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the
felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced
the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however,
slight, is not completed.
- However, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under RPC
- As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. That Malou, after the incident in
question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual
attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that
she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
3. People vs. Labiaga; GR 202867; 15 July 2013
Facts:
- RTC & CA: murder & frustrated murder in different criminal action
Version of the prosecution
- At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters,
Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo.
Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of
their house. Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away
from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and
Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. Gregorio
and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on
arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
o Autopsy of Judy: death was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound."
o Medical examination of Gregorio: sustained a gunshot wound measuring one
centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma
formation" in his right shoulder. (doctor said wound was not serious)
Version of the defense
- Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident. He claimed,
however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged
him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant
tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired.
He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Issue: WON accused is guilty of crime charged
Held: SC: murder and attempted murder not frustrated
- In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have
been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to
convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death
without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. In the instant case, it does not appear that the
wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction against appellant for
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder?
Held: No. (The defense were not corroborated by others so disregarded by courts)
- In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
- Here, the attendant circumstances showed that appellant and his companions
intended to kill Eric and his brothers Elmer, Abelardo, and Mark Ryan. The three
(3) victims sustained multiple fatal stab wounds. As stated, the attendant
circumstances here clearly show that appellant and his companions did intend to kill
the Evangelista brothers. They were able to deal multiple fatal blows on at least
three (3) of the brothers; but as for Eric, they did not spare him. He was also stabbed
by Baynosa. It just so happened they missed to hit him on a vital part like what they
did to Eric's three (3) brothers.
Issue: WON he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its
consummated stage of which he was convicted
Held:
- We have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.
- The appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and
weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of
people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom
the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the
manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a
whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into
account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free
disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.
- All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the
colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to
produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed
fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution,
including the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion
of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade
the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been
performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been
completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the
consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet
they do not align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. There is no
language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition of
the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been
produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its
conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal
support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their
erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. We thus
conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.
Issue: Whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged
in the information
Held: No. But he is guilty of Attempted Theft only not Consummated
- The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated - these being conclusions of
law - but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information."
- In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which
was "Frustrated Theft," may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, but, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused's will. This averment,
which could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge
nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the
accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge
against him was consummated theft.
- As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be
read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated
that the crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to
mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only.
Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
- "[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was
charged in the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not
how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be
informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put
on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint
or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right."
- [Petitioner] and [his wife] were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass
wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993,
Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in
Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. The young girls were
accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the
name of "Jess".
- On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to
sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was
on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA
realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked.
Norberto ordered her not to scream or she'll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto
away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought
back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires.
Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother
otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the
house boy) but she failed to wake him up.
- Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching
the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were
shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
- Defense: Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the
municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to
mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the
municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants
filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from
him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that
they faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his
hands, constituted attempted rape
Held: No. Only acts of lasciviousness
- Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the
penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest
only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony
of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
- The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear
and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With
such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not
attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any
inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and
lust for her.
ARTICLE 8
1. People vs. Evasco; GR 213415; 26 September 2018
Facts:
- RTC & CA: muder
- On June 6, 2006, at about 9:00 p.m., witness Lorna went to the house of their
neighbor, one Armando, to fetch her husband, Wilfredo. When Lorna arrived at
Armando's house, she saw Ernesto boxing Wilfredo. Thereafter, she saw Jimmy hit
Wilfredo's head with a stone. As a result, Wilfredo fell to the ground with his face
up. While Wilfredo was still on the ground, Jimmy continuously hit him with a stone
and Ernesto was boxing Wilfredo's body. After mauling Wilfredo, Jimmy and
Ernesto walked away together. Subsequently, Lorna brought Wilfredo to the
hospital and was pronounced dead-on-arrival.
- According to Lorna, Wilfredo did not fight back when Ernesto and Jimmy mauled
him. He just parried the hands of Ernesto. She also claimed that Jimmy was standing
at the back of Wilfredo, when he pounded a stone on Wilfredo's head many times.
Defense
- Ernesto and Wilfredo had a heated argument. Because the group was allegedly
accustomed to such argument, the group did not interfere. Thereafter, Ernesto and
Wilfredo had a fist fight. Wilfredo stood up and Ernesto pushed him on a chair. Then,
Wilfredo fell to the ground. The group tried to pacify Ernesto and Wilfredo because
the latter was already lying on the ground. In his cross-examination, Jimmy stated
that when Ernesto and Wilfredo were fighting, he was held by Armando and was
told not to interfere.
- As the "Valizing" left, Eva Castaño, who was then riding a motorcycle twelve meters
behind the said jeepney saw Dioscoro, Eddie, Edwin, Edgar and Efren holding bolos.
Eva Castaño knew Efren, Edwin and Eddie even before the incident because she
used to go to where said accused lived and had seen them in the place.
- Manuel, the conductor, was then holding on with both hands on the "Valizing" and
was standing on its rear step board.
o Suddenly, Efren and Eddie stabbed Manuel at the back, causing the latter to
fall on the ground. As Manuel lay flat on the ground, Edwin hacked Manuel
on the head and many times on the body. Edgar also hacked Manuel.
Dioscoro was seen holding a bolo as he stood near Manuel.
Defense:
- Appellant Edwin said that he saw his brother Edgar and Manuel, the victim, were
fighting. He ran inside the house of a certain person nicknamed "Caradol" to get a
long bolo. His house was 30 meters away from the place where Edgar and Manuel
were fighting. At the time he saw them, Edgar and Manuel were delivering stab
thrusts at each other. After about 20 minutes of fighting, Manuel fell down because
he sustained wounds on his head and nape. Edgar was wounded on the finger of his
left hand. Efren did not get involved. Edwin did not know where Dioscoro was during
the fight and he does not know Eva Castaño.
- Efren & Dioscoro (dead): deny everything; alibi
Issue: Whether or not Eddie (at large), Efren, and Edwin are guilty of the crime of
murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes
- Efren and Edwin's defenses of alibi and denial deserve no credence since they were
not able to prove the impossibility of their physical presence at the time and scene
of the incident.
- As for the issue of conspiracy, Efren and Edwin alleged in their Brief that "the facts of
the case were wanting of any overt acts that are reflective of any conspiracy
amongst the five accused." However, in the same Brief, Efren and Edwin cited the
direct testimony of Eva Castaño which revealed that "after the victim was first
stabbed at the back by accused-appellant Efren, the other accused Edwin did the
hacking thrust, followed by Edgar; while the other two accused, Dioscoro and Eddie,
were merely described xxx as being there carrying a weapon."
- Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the
unity of action and purpose. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it
may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is
common purpose to commit the crime.
- In this case, the hacking acts of Efren and Edwin, when taken together with the
stabbing act of Efren, reveal a commonality and unity of criminal design. The
defense cannot aver that Dioscoro and Eddie's mere act of carrying a weapon is not
an overt act reflective of conspiracy because clearly, such act is in line with the crime
of murder. Regardless of the extent and character of Dioscoro and Eddie's respective
active participation, once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals. The act of one is the act of all.
- Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the
actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive
for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after
the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient.
When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the
degree of participation of each.
- In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang
was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing
the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to
wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1
Montecalvo and Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a
principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial
evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all
three are considered principals by direct participation.
Issue: WON the trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime
charge
Held: No.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance orfurtherance of the
complicity.
- Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the
kidnapping in the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the
execution of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its
accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only after the
kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential element of the crime.
- We disagree. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission
of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.
- Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is
liable as a principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
- Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant
received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since
both victims were still being illegally detained by the kidnappers. While his receipt
of the ransom money was not a material element of the crime, it was nevertheless
part of the grand plan and was in fact the main reason for kidnapping the
victims. Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that releases from
captivity. Without ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be
achieved. The positive identification of accused-appellant constitutes direct, and not
merely circumstantial, evidence.
- However, the CA’s modification is erroneous. The appellate court found that the
accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and
Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston. It is the appellate court's
reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing
them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the
intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also
pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done
with an intent to kill."
- Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused,
regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
- The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in
agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were
able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their
attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of
conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective
liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs
as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
- In this case, We find that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of
concerted action before, during, and after the commission of the crime which
would demonstrate accused-appellants' unity of design and objective. There is no
direct proof nor reliable circumstantial evidence establishing that Juan and Daniel
conspired with the unidentified men who stabbed Spouses Asistin.
- The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s
house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault.
- Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with
Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to
attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against
appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.
- Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and
that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert
towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were
two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to
escape from the crimes they separately committed.
- Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion . Bokingco had
already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated
because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop.
- In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is
likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against
them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the
admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As
we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish
the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative
value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col. Bokingco’s judicial admission
exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the
latter hit him in the head. All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no
sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.
Conspiracy
- Padayhag’s sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and
bringing him to where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling
with the two, went to the house of Castillo’s sister together with Castillo and Rocky,
and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution would have us
rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that
without Padayhag’s help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky. We are not
persuaded.
- There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert
with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that
directly and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any
space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed,
conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.
- Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act
must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous
action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been
motivated by a common design.
- Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with
Castillo’s plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. After the two spent the day
together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as reason her love for
the child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass from the
province who only finished Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by the
more worldly Castillo. Padayhag’s testimony reveals her naiveté.
- Padayhag’s confusion in the way she answered the questions propounded to her
only highlights the fact that she was not aware of Castillo’s plans and was vulnerable
to the latter’s manipulation. Her straightforward and wide-eyed admission of facts
that incriminate her demonstrate a level of honesty that can only be found in
those who do not know the art of deceit. Far from a cold and calculating mind,
Padayhag strikes us as one whose innocence often leaves her at the mercy of her
more worldly peers. It is clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo was
doing nothing wrong. Whatever moved her to do what Castillo asked of her is up for
speculation. What matters is that her motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap
the boy. To impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be intentional
participation in the criminal act, not the unwitting cooperation of a deceived
individual.
- In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an
individual as a conspirator should focus on all acts before, during and after the
commission of the crime. We have done precisely that, and it is precisely why we
rule for her innocence. After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left when Castillo
brought the boy to her sister’s house in Caloocan. She never visited nor contacted
Castillo afterwards. She remained at her house and refused to go with Castillo when
the latter suddenly tried to coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as
ransom was found in her possession. Her involvement in the "pay-off" was never
established. The testimony of two prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt.
Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo when the latter picked up the
ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillo’s admission in open court that she
brought along a certain "Mila" and not Padayhag. In addition, the testimonies of
these two police officers suffer from their failure to explain how they suddenly lost
track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes.
- All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We also find
that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time
with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also
in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for
their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances,
the above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from
PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their
possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
CONTRARY TO LAW.
- After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them.
- The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused
within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was
sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
- Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme
Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Held: Yes
- We stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious
one. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with
a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy
must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
- In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her
unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that
such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and
necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or
irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration
of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that: “What
accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any "overt act"
of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds
but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the
public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of
Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act
is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.”
- The law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of
her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges
they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the
accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
- The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to
impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The
reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally
unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled
in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human
rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the
absence of any conspiracy between them.
- On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director directed auditors to verify and submit a
report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in
Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway
Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they conducted an investigation
and in due course submitted their findings. Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the
issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned.
They discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts. One set
consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices
and were duly signed by thr Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. The LAAs
were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the
Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which
do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief
Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance
Officer. These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly
undated and were sometimes duplicated. They could not be traced to the files and
records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The accounting entry for the
disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable
Unliquidated and credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury. All
of these were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them because since
October 1977, he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were
indications that the practice had been going on for years.
- The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and
Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were
accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being
found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the
basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed,
convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the
accused.
- On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the
Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among
the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly
for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as
bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund
releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these
general vouchers.
- The anti-graft court (Sandiganbayan) has found the case has merit and that Fernan
Jr. and Expedito Torrevilas along with the other accused guilty as co-principals in the
crime of Estafa through falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, sentenced each of them to
imprisonment and payment of the penalties. (six cases)
Held: No.
- We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy.
The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the
government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Mangubat (Chief Accountant),
Preagido (Accountant III), Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Cruz (Clerk II), who
controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the
many spokes of the wheel.
- After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the
finding of the anti-graft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other
accused. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the
absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord finality to
the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not
aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the
indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration.
The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with
the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on near
impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed
acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of
the objective of the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally
sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and
materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the
Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated
documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be
properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of
checks.
- In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu
highway scam in a trenchant manner: “Where the acts of each of the accused
constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of them would
prevent the chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its
consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But when each and everyone
of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with
martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt acts,
so much so that the common objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal
release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents, then
each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-
established and universally-accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or
impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists
notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense.”
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting
the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal charges against the former President and
the other respondents therein. One of the charges was for the plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 and among the respondents was the former’s president’s son the petitioner in this case
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The charge was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the
case was assigned to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused
was set on July 10, 2001. No bail for petitioner's provisional liberty was fixed. On April 24, 2001,
petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that
the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than
one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-
accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. On April
30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as
required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's "Motion to Quash
and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." Petitioner's alternative prayer to post bail
was set for hearing after arraignment of all the accused.
The Amended Information is divided into three parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former
President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second
paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of
plunder; and (3) the four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the
names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in subparagraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit…" In this subparagraph (a),
petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or
collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million
-----
As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends, and conspirators were filed with the respondent
Office of the Ombudsman.
The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the
filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and
the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime
of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Issue:
Should the charge against petitioner be dismissed on the ground that the allegation
of conspiracy in the Information is too general?
Whether petitioner Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada may be tried for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in one act or offense that is illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080
Held:
No. In the crime of plunder, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case
at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in
the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation
and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts, and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
Under the Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a
penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion, and sedition. In
contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of
the offense. When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements
of the said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. The requirements on the
sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.
There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,
for the act of one is the act of all.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein has performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.
Following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in
the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the
accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
Thus, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is
not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. 22 In this case, the totality
of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a
common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of
dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive
through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing
white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If
indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just
obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle
likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. “Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means “to carry or convey from one place to another.” 23 It was well established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex
van going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of
the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge.24
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."13The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262
would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17
Held: Yes
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court
in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary
parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal,
considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects
the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the
object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius"
finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of
statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. 25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus premature
for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the
determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.