Cajigas v.

People
[G.R. NO. 156541 : February 23, 2009]

LUZ CAJIGAS and LARRY CAJIGAS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

Petitioners were charged with two counts each of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as
amended by PD 818.

Private complainant Daisy Fuentes (Daisy) testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the selling of
ready-to-wear clothes (RTW) and jewelries. Petitioners bought jewelries from her totaling P55,000.
Petitioners paid for the jewelries by issuing two postdated checks. Daisy alleged that petitioners assured
her that the checks were sufficiently funded. These checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason "Account Closed."

Daisy claimed that petitioners went again to her house and purchased jewelries worth P33,000. As
payment for the jewelries, petitioners issued five postdated checks. Petitioners again assured Daisy that
the checks were funded. However, the checks, except for one, bounced for the reason "Account
Closed." †υαl 

Daisy further claimed that she went twice to the house of petitioners to demand payment. On her first
visit, petitioners allegedly evaded Daisy and on the second time, Daisy discovered that petitioners were
no longer residing there. Daisy searched for petitioners in Zamboanga and Cagayan de Oro City until the
latter were located sometime in 1994 in Sucat, Parañaque, where they were finally arrested.

Larry denied the charges against him. Larry testified that he knew Daisy and her husband but he never
went to Daisy's house. He also stated that he had not seen the checks issued by his wife and co-accused
Luz; that he and his wife did not have any joint bank account; and that he did not make any assurance
that the checks subject of the criminal cases were sufficiently funded. On cross-examination, Larry
testified that he was not aware of the transactions between his wife, Luz, and Daisy.

Luz, on the other hand, testified that she had been transacting with Daisy from 1986 to 1989 involving
jewelries and purchase orders. Luz admitted issuing the checks subject of these cases. As their usual
practice, Luz would purchase items from Daisy payable in five months and Luz would issue postdated
checks before getting the items. If the amount involved was small, Daisy would wait for it to accumulate,
then Luz would issue a check. Luz would then redeem the checks. However, in the present criminal
cases, Daisy did not return the checks after several demands to do so.

After the trial, the RTC found petitioners guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
of the petitioners for two counts each of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as
amended by PD 818.
ISSUE

Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as amended by PD 818.

HELD

The petition is partly meritorious.

Luz is guilty of two counts of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the RPC. The elements of estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the RPC are (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee.22

In the present case, the prosecution sufficiently established Luz's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for two
counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. Luz admits issuing the subject postdated
checks as payment for the jewelries she purchased from Daisy. In their various transactions, Daisy
always required the issuance of checks in exchange for the jewelries purchased by Luz.

Since Daisy would not have parted with the jewelries had it not been for Luz's issuance of the subject
postdated checks, the checks were clearly issued as inducement for the surrender by Daisy of the
jewelries. The issuance of the checks was simultaneous to the delivery of the jewelries. It was a
customary practice between the parties that Luz had to issue checks as payment for the jewelries she
purchased from Daisy. Daisy also testified that she accepted the checks as payment for the jewelries
precisely because Luz assured her that the checks were funded and would not bounce.26 Relying on such
assurance, Daisy even negotiated some of the checks to her jewelry suppliers.27

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Larry's guilt for the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
court's finding that Larry is guilty as a co-conspirator of Luz for the two counts of estafa.

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must
be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. In the present case, the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of establishing conspiracy between Luz and Larry based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There was no proof that Larry had knowledge that Luz, the issuer of the checks, had
no funds in the bank. The following facts were not disputed: (1) it was Luz, not Larry, who usually
purchased jewelries from Daisy; (2) it was Luz, not Larry, who issued and directly negotiated the checks
as payment for the jewelries; and (3) the checks were all drawn against Luz's personal bank accounts.
The previous transaction between Larry and Daisy involving a purchase order with Geegee Shopping
Center was absolutely separate and different from the transactions between Luz and Daisy, which
mainly involved the sale of jewelries. Besides, whether Larry had previously transacted with Daisy does
not convincingly prove conspiracy between Luz and Larry in defrauding Daisy. Likewise, the fact that
Daisy knew Larry longer than Luz does not prove Larry's guilt for the crime charged.

There is also no evidence on record to show that Larry had any agreement or understanding with his
wife and co-accused Luz to defraud Daisy.
People v. Quesada
60 Phil. 515
VICKERS, J.:

FACTS
The appellant was charged with the crime of estafa. It appears from the evidence that
Raymunda Garganilla agreed to sell to the defendant a parcel of registered land for P500, and executed
and delivered to the defendant the corresponding deed of sale, together with the owner's duplicate
certificate of title; that at the instance of the defendant the consideration was stated in the deed as
P1,000. On the same date the defendant issued and delivered to Raymunda Garganilla a check on the
Bank of the Philippine Islands for P500 postdated December 7, 1932 which at her request was made
payable to her nephew, Marcelino Julio, who was present at the time of the transaction. The check was
presented to the bank about December 14th, but payment was refused because defendant's account
had been closed. In the meantime, the defendant had left Manila for the provinces, and the purchase
price of the land was never paid by him.
The attorney for the appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding that the accused-
appellant issued a postdated check in payment of an obligation, knowing that he did not have funds in
the bank, without informing the seller of the land involved herein of such circumstances, and in
convicting the accused-appellant.
The contention of the appellant is that it was agreed between him and Raymunda Garganilla
that the check would not be presented to the bank for payment until the deed was registered in the
office of the register of deeds, and that he would then make a deposit in the bank to cover the check;
that he presented the deed and the duplicate certificate of title to the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija
about December 4th, but for reasons unknown to him the register of deeds refused to register the deed
and returned the documents to him; that he then went to the provinces and could not return the deed
and the certificate of title to the vendor.
Marcelino Julio testified that he did not know that the check was postdated when it was
delivered to him and his aunt by the accused, but that in the lawyer's office on the same occasion when
the sale was made they noticed that it was postdated; that nothing was done about it because the check
was retained by Attorney Quilon, who claimed a part of the sum represented by the check. Julio stated
that it was agreed by the parties that the deed should be registered before the check should be cashed;
that the deed should be registered on December 7, 1982, but that it was never registered; that
Raymunda Garganilla retained possession of the land.

ISSUE
Whether or not defendant is guilty of estafa.
HELD
No. The lower court erred in finding the defendant guilty of estafa.
It was agreed that the check should not be presented for payment until December 7, 1932, in order to
give the defendant an opportunity to secure the registration of the deed. So far as the record shows, the
defendant presented the deed for registration about December 4, 1932, but the register of deeds
refused to register it. The testimony of Julio tends to corroborate the declaration of the defendant that
the check was issued under the condition that if the deed could be registered he would deposit in the
bank a sum to cover the check; in other words, if the deed could not be registered, the check would not
be cashed, but returned to the defendant.
Since the parties agreed that the deed should be registered before the check should be cashed, that is,
on or before December 7th, and if this agreement was made, it is clear that the failure of the defendant
to present the deed for registration, if that were proved, and to deposit the funds to cover the check
constitute merely a breach of his contract, a civil obligation, and not the crime of estafa.
Under the Revised Penal Code postdating a check, or issuing it in payment of an obligation, the offender
knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances
is not a crime in itself. It is a part of article 315, which defines and punishes various forms of estafa or
swindling. The payee or the person receiving the check must be defrauded by the act of the offender .
In the case at bar, the check itself showed that it was postdated. This clearly implied that the defendant
did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check when he issued it, and the parties
undoubtedly so understood it. The defendant promised to register the deed and deposit the funds by
December 7th, but that was merely a promise to perform an act in the future, a promise to pay, and the
non-fulfillment thereof gives rise to only a civil action.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court is reversed and the appellant is acquitted of
the charge.

Nagrampa v. People
G.R. No. 146211. August 6, 2002
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

FACTS

Federico Santander testified that Corseno Bote, FEDCOR’s Sales Manager, brought to FEDCOR
petitioner Manuel Nagrampa. Nagrampa purchased an Excavator Equipment and paid in cash down
payment. To cover the balance, he issued 2 postdated checks. The checks were drawn against the
Security Bank and Trust Company. Upon the assurance of FEDCOR’s salesman that the checks were
good, FEDCOR delivered to petitioner the equipment. FEDCOR presented the checks for payment,
however, they were dishonored on the ground that petitioner’s account with the drawee bank, Security
Bank, already been closed. FEDCOR demanded payment from petitioner; but the latter failed to pay.
Hence, estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases were filed against
petitioner.
For his part, petitioner testified that he bought from Corseno Bote a backhoe and paid cash, as
evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt. In addition, he issued and handed to Corseno Bote two
checks. The agreement with Corseno Bote was that petitioner would replace the two checks with cash if
the backhoe would be in good running condition. The backhoe was delivered at petitioner’s jobsite.
After five to seven days of use, the backhoe broke down. Such fact was reported to Ronnie Bote, and the
backhoe was thus repaired. After one day of using it, the backhoe broke down again. Petitioner again
reported the matter to Ronnie Bote, who told him that the equipment should be brought to the latter’s
office for repair. After a week, petitioner demanded from Ronnie Bote the return of the backhoe, the
cash and the two postdated checks, but to no avail.
The trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of two counts of violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Upon noticing that the decision of
the trial court did not resolve the issue of petitioner’s liability for estafa, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution ordering the return of the entire records of the case to the trial court for the latter to decide
the estafa case against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of. As
might be expected, petitioner also appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court finding
petitioner guilty of estafa and violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. It also denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for violation for BP 22.

2. Whether or not petitioner can avail of the benefits of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.

2. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for estafa.

HELD

1. Yes/ there is no error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the trial court’s decision convicting
petitioner of violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

It can be gleaned from the allegations in the information that petitioner is charged with the first type of
offense under B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner admitted that he issued the two postdated checks. He did not deny that the same were
dishonored on the ground that the account from which they were to be drawn was already closed at the
time the checks were presented for payment. Neither did he rebut the prosecution’s evidence that the
account against which he drew his two postdated checks had been closed in May 1985 yet, or more than
four years prior to the drawing and delivery of the checks.

The fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg.. 22
is of no moment. the 90-day period is not an element of the offense but merely a condition for the
prima facie presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.

In this case, FEDCOR presented the checks for encashment on 22 February 1990, or within the six-month
period from the date of issuance of the checks, and would not therefore have been considered stale had
petitioner’s account been existing. Although the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did
not arise, such knowledge was sufficiently proved by the unrebutted testimony of Mirano to the effect
that petitioner’s account with the Security Bank was closed as early as May 1985, or more than four
years prior to the issuance of the two checks in question.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
2. No. He cannot avail himself of the benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.
virtual 1aw library
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22.

Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge. Should the judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
not be deemed a hindrance.

In this case, when petitioner issued the subject postdated checks even though he had no more account
with the drawee bank, having closed it more than four years before he drew and delivered the checks,
he manifested utter lack of good faith or wanton bad faith. Hence, he cannot avail himself of the
benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000

3. Yes. Petitioner’s conviction for the crime of estafa is sustained.

The crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, has the
following elements: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the
payee thereof. ob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the
surrender by the party deceived of his money or property, and not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation.

The existence of the first two elements in the case at bar is not disputed. Petitioner maintains that the
third element is not present.

Damage as an element of estafa may consist in (1) the offended party being deprived of his money or
property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right; or (3) temporary prejudice. 34

In this case, the deprivation of the property of FEDCOR is apparent. Undoubtedly, the reason why
FEDCOR delivered the backhoe to petitioner was that the latter paid the P50,000 down payment and
issued two postdated checks in the amount of P75,000 each.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner’s claim that he returned the equipment was not duly proved; he never presented as witness
the agent who allegedly received the equipment from him. Moreover, he admitted that he never wrote
FEDCOR about the return of the allegedly defective backhoe to Ronnie Bote; neither did he go to
FEDCOR to claim the return of the equipment or of the cash down payment and the two checks. Such
admissions belie his allegation that he returned the equipment to FEDCOR.
If indeed petitioner returned the backhoe to Ronnie Bote and yet the latter did not heed his demands
for the return of his cash payment and the checks, he (petitioner) should have, at the very least, gone to
or written FEDCOR itself about the matter. Instead, he again paid FEDCOR the amount of P15,000 during
the pendency of the case. Such payment to FEDCOR negates his claim that he returned the backhoe; it
may even be tantamount to an offer of compromise. Under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibr

Dreamworks Construction v. Janiola

GR 184861, June 30, 2009

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President
for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. Correspondingly,
petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC
on February 2, 2005.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint
against petitioner by filing complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between
the parties, as well as for damages.Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the
MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the
criminal case claiming that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases

MTC issued granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings. The MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
assailed decision denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the
RTC ruled that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays
in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by
private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil
action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was
instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.

Hence, this petition before the SC under Rule 45.

ISSUE

Whether or not the proceeding in the criminal case should be suspended on the basis of prejudicial
question in the civil case.

HELD
No. There is no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case. The civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial question
to exist.

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
action. 

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting
that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the elements of a prejudicial question:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Private respondent claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and
void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere
scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that
the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime
punishable under BP 22.

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that
the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed,
is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.