Republic of the Philippines allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses.
This
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO
MANUEL, petitioners, 
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION),
LABOR ARBITER FLAVIO AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M),
INC., respondents.
Raul E. Espinosa for petitioners.
Lucas Emmanuel B. Canilao for petitioner A. Manuel.
Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-20840-78-T
entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres, Complainants-Appellants, v.
F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN- IV-
20855-78-T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E.
Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the appeal of
petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
ordering private respondent to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to
their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for
every year of service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred to as Zuellig)
filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) an application
seeking clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco,
Romeo Cipres, and Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)
application was seasonably opposed by petitioners alleging that the
company is not suffering from any losses. They alleged further that they
are being dismissed because of their membership in the union. At the last
hearing of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no
longer contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed that the sole
issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to petitioners.
Petitioners, who were in the sales force of Zuellig received monthly
salaries of at least P40,000. In addition, they received commissions for
every sale they made.
The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Zuellig and F.E.
Zuellig Employees Association, of which petitioners are members, contains
the following provision (p. 71, Rollo):
ARTICLE XIV — Retirement Gratuity
Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old
age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said
employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an
amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of service. One
month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to
the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed
equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being
considered one year, including probationary employment. (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing provides:
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. — The termination of employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving-devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses, and other similar causes, shall entitle the
employee affected thereby to separation pay. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and other similar causes, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provide:
xxx
Sec. 9(b). Where the termination of employment is due to retrechment
initiated by the employer to prevent losses or other similar causes, or
where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment
is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees, the employee shall be entitled to termination pay equivalent at
least to his one month salary, or to one-half month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
xxx
Sec. 10. Basis of termination pay. — The computation of the termination
pay of an employee as provided herein shall be based on his latest salary
rate, unless the same was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention
of the Code, in which case the basis of computation shall be the rate
before its deduction. (Emphasis supplied)
On June 26,1978, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads (p. 78, Rollo):
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent should be as it is
hereby, ordered to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their
one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every
year of service that they have worked with the company.
SO ORDERED.
The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission was
dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of Voluntary
Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated April 7, 1980 filed by
petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the ground that he wants "to abide by
the decision appealed from" since he had "received, to his full and
complete satisfaction, his separation pay," resolved to dismiss the petition
as to him.
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances
should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of
computation of their separation pay.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of
separation pay due them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their
basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added
together. They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes
commission as part on one's salary, to wit;
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings,
however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money,
whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis,
or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer
to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for
work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and
includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not include any
profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the employer.
Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code as well
as its implementing rules to include commission in the computation of
separation pay, it could have explicitly said so in clear and unequivocal
terms. Furthermore, in the definition of the term "wage", "commission" is
used only as one of the features or designations attached to the word
remuneration or earnings.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their
separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos v.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166, where
We ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay,
account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of
her transportation and emergency living allowances." This ruling was
reiterated in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987,
155 SCRA 124 and recently, in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. 78524, January 20, 1989.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned
sales commission should be included in the monthly salary of petitioner for
the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in the definition
of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly declared by the courts that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation or construction; there is only room for application (Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17, August
22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. L-2 7455,
June 28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for
itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to
obscurity. How ever, it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with
Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor
Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules, there appears
to be an ambiguity. In this regard, the Labor Arbiter rationalized his
decision in this manner (pp. 74-76, Rollo):
The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the Code can be
correctly be (sic) stated as a general definition. It is 'wage ' in its generic
sense. A careful perusal of the same does not show any indication that
commission is part of salary. We can say that commission by itself may be
considered a wage. This is not something novel for it cannot be gainsaid
that certain types of employees like agents, field personnel and salesmen
do not earn any regular daily, weekly or monthly salaries, but rely mainly
on commission earned.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the
implementing rules in conjunction with Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of the
Code specifically states that the basis of the termination pay due to one
who is sought to be legally separated from the service is 'his latest salary
rates.
x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly pay or monthly
salary'.
The above terms found in those Articles and the particular Rules were
intentionally used to express the intent of the framers of the law that for
purposes of separation pay they mean to be specifically referring to salary
only.
.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code and other Decrees on
Labor has its own pecularities and nuances and should be interpreted in
that light. Thus, for a specific provision, a specific meaning is attached to
simplify matters that may arise there from. The general guidelines in (sic)
the formation of specific rules for particular purpose. Thus, that what
should be controlling in matters concerning termination pay should be the
specific provisions of both Book VI of the Code and the Rules. At any rate,
settled is the rule that in matters of conflict between the general provision
of law and that of a particular- or specific provision, the latter should
prevail.
On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):
From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the implementing rules, it
could be deduced that wage is used in its generic sense and obviously
refers to the basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece or
commission basis or other method of calculating the same. It does not,
however, mean that commission, allowances or analogous income
necessarily forms part of the employee's salary because to do so would
lead to anomalies (sic), if not absurd, construction of the word "salary." For
what will prevent the employee from insisting that emergency living
allowance, 13th month pay, overtime, and premium pay, and other fringe
benefits should be added to the computation of their separation pay. This
situation, to our mind, is not the real intent of the Code and its rules.
We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which defines the
term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article
284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing
Rules, which mention the terms "pay" and "salary", is more apparent than
real. Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration
made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay
of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. Indeed, there is eminent authority for
holding that the words "wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 38 Permanent Edition, p. 44 citing Hopkins vs.
Cromwell, 85 N.Y.S. 839,841,89 App. Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary,"
the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium," is often used
interchangeably with "wage", the etymology of which is the Middle English
word "wagen". Both words generally refer to one and the same meaning,
that is, a reward or recompense for services performed. Likewise, "pay" is
the synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.).
Inasmuch as the words "wages", "pay" and "salary" have the same
meaning, and commission is included in the definition of "wage", the logical
conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the separation pay of
petitioners, their salary base should include also their earned sales
commissions.
The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for deciding the
petition in favor of the petitioners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia argumenti, that
the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that
the petitioners would be inspired to put a little more industry on the jobs
particularly assigned to them, still these commissions are direct
remuneration services rendered which contributed to the increase of
income of Zuellig . Commission is the recompense, compensation or
reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker
or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of
his transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., citing Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750). The nature
of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for
services rendered demonstrate clearly that commission are part of
petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some
salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and
allowances or commissions alone, are part of petitioners' wage or salary.
We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesman do not received any
basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions
alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists. Bearing in mind
the preceeding dicussions, if we adopt the opposite view that commissions,
do not form part of wage or salary, then, in effect, We will be saying that
this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled
to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. Will this not
be absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit
of our labor laws and considering the purpose of separation pay which is,
to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown the
the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the issue of the
salary base that should be used in computing the separation pay, We held
that:
The commissions also claimed by petitioner ('override commission' plus
'net deposit incentive') are not properly includible in such base figure since
such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioner.
Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were
earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners, these
should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof,
what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned
during their last year of employment.
The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's
provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of
interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor
Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No.
71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. 78763, July 12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code
which provides that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by
including allowances and commissions in the separation pay of petitioners
Jose Songco and Amancio Manuel. The case is remanded to the Labor
Arbiter for the proper computation of said separation pay.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182069               July 03, 2012
ARNOLD D. VICENCIO, Petitioner 
vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR and HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., in
their capacity as Acting Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of
the Hon. Commission on Audit, and ELIZABETH ZOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Pctitiur; for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules or Court, secking to annul Decision No. 2008-022 dated 15 February
2008 of the Commission on Audit (COA). 1
On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng
Malabon (SPM), presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting
Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled
"An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay
Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for
Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their
Respective Areas of Concern x x x."2
On 9 December 2003 and 1 March 2004, the City of Malabon, represented
by Hon. Galauran, entered into separate Contracts for Consultancy
Services with Ms. Jannette O. Vijiga, 3 Mr. Meynardo E. Virtucio4 and Mr.
Hernando D. Dabalus (2003 Consultancy Contracts). 5
Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner was elected City
Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the
Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the
Sanggunian Secretariat.
To complement the manpower requirements of the existing Sanggunian
Secretariat, petitioner deemed it necessary to hire the services of
consultants with the end view of augmenting and upgrading its
performance capability for the effective operation of the legislative
machinery of the city.
Petitioner thus wrote a letter dated 19 July 2004 to Atty. Danilo T. Diaz ,
the City Legal Officer of Malabon, inquiring as to whether it was still
necessary for the SPM to ratify a newly entered contract of consultancy
services between it and the candidate for the consultancy position. The
letter states in part:
This is an inquiry regarding the hiring of consultants by virtue of an
ordinance giving authority to the City Vice Mayor to enter into consultancy
services (Ordinance no. 15-2003).
As you very well know, the services of the consultants hired by the former
administration, particularly by the Sangguniang Panglungsod, ended last
June 30, 2004. Hence, we are confronted by this inquiry: Would there still
be a need for the Sangguniang Panglungsod to ratify a newly entered
contract of consultancy services between the SP and the candidate for
said consultancy position? Kindly render your humble opinion on the
matter.6
Atty. Diaz then responded to the said inquiry through a letter dated 26 July
2004, which categorically stated that ratification was no longer necessary,
provided that the services to be contracted were those stipulated in the
ordinance. The letter states thus:
In response to your query contained in your letter dated July 19, 2004,
regarding the hiring of consultants for the Sanggunian Secretariat by virtue
of Ordinance No. 15-2003, giving authority to the City Vice Mayor to enter
into consultancy services and whether there is still a need for ratification of
said consultancy contract by the Sanggunian, the answer is, such a
ratification is no longer necessary provided that the contract of consultancy
services to be executed is precisely the services stipulated in said
ordinance. In essence, the Ordinance no. 15-2003 already stated what
consultancy services should be secured and hence, if the contract for
consultancy services to be executed is precisely those as provided in said
ordinance, ratification is a mere suplasage. 7
On 21 January 2005, the SPM adopted City Ordinance No. 01-2005
entitled "An Ordinance Appropriating Funds to Cover the Various
Expenditures and Activities of the Local Government of Malabon City for
the Period from January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2005." The total
amount of funds appropriated was ₱ 511,070,019 for the spending of the
entire city government. Out of this amount, ₱ 792,000 was earmarked for
consultancy services under the Legislative Secretariat.
On 1 February 2005, petitioner, representing the City Government of
Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms.
Jennifer S. Catindig8 and Atty. Rodolfo C. delos Santos (2005 Consultancy
Contracts).9 On 11 February 2005, another Contract for Consultancy
Services was entered into between Mr. Marvin T. Amiana 10 and the city
government.
After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants
rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, they were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor.
On 19 December 2005, Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-
12-01911 was issued by Ms. Atenie F. Padilla, Supervising Auditor of the
City Auditor’s Office, Malabon City, disallowing the amount of three
hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (P384,980) for
being an improper disbursement. The AOM disclosed the following
pertinent findings:
 City Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 was used as
basis of authority in hiring consultants. Analysis of the said City
Ordinance revealed that it specifically authorized the former Vice-
Mayor, Hon. Mark Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into a contract for
consultancy services in the Sangguniang Secretariat covering the
period June to December 2003 only. Said ordinance does not give
authority to the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Arnold D. Vicencio to
hire consultants for CY 2005.
 Progress accomplishment report for the month, to determine the
services rendered were not attached to the disbursement
vouchers.
 No information as to what method had been made by BAC in the
hiring of individual consultants whether through the selection from
several registered professionals who offered consulting services or
through direct hiring without the intervention of the BAC.
 Copies of the approved contracts together with supporting
documents were not submitted to the City Auditor’s Office within
five (5) days from execution of the contract for review and
evaluation contrary to COA Circular No. 76-34 dated July 15, 1976,
thus the City Auditor’s Office was precluded to conduct timely
review/evaluation to inform management of whatever deficiencies
noted so that immediate remedial measures could be properly
taken.12
On 12 May 2006, respondent Elizabeth S. Zosa issued Notice of
Disallowance (ND) No. 06-009-101 (05) 13containing the result of the
evaluation conducted on the AOM issued by Ms. Padilla. The persons held
liable for the disallowed amount relative to the hiring of the three
consultants were the following: (1) petitioner, in his capacity as City Vice-
Mayor, for certifying that the expenses/cash advances were necessary,
lawful and incurred under his direct supervision and for approving the
transaction; (2) Mr. Eustaquio M. Angeles, in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge, City Accountant, for certifying to the completeness and propriety
of the supporting documents of the expenditures; and (3) Ms. Catindig,
Atty. Delos Santos, and Mr. Amiana, as payees. The above-named
persons were further directed to settle the said disallowance immediately.
Pursuant to Sections 48, 50 and 51 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445,
the parties found liable had a period of six months within which to file an
appeal. The disallowance was anchored on the following findings:
- There was no authority for the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Arnold D.
Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005. City Ordinance No. 15-2003
dated October 30, 2003 which was used as basis of authority to hire
consultants specifically authorized the former Vice-Mayor, Hon. Mark Allan
Jay G. Yambao to enter into a contract for consultancy services in the
Sangguniang Secretariat covering the period June to December 2003 only.
- There were no Progress Accomplishment Reports for the month, to
determine the services rendered.
- No information as to what method had been made by BAC in the hiring of
individual consultants whether through the selection from several
registered professionals who offered consulting services or through direct
hiring without the intervention of the BAC.14
On 22 June 2006, the SPM wrote a letter 15 informing Ms. Padilla that the
three consultants hired by petitioner rendered services covering the period
January to December 2005. In its view, the hiring of these consultants and
the services they rendered were in good faith.
Aggrieved by the disallowance, petitioner appealed it to the Adjudication
and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA. On 12 June 2007, the ASB
issued Decision No. 2007-030, 16 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Premises considered, the instant appeal of Hon. Arnold Vicencio is hereby
denied. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101 (05) dated 12
May 2006 involving the amount of P384,980.00 representing fees to
consultants Mr. Marvin T. Amiana, Atty. Rodolfo Delos Santos and Ms.
Jennifer Catindig, is hereby affirmed. However, the instant appeal of Mr.
Estaquio Angeles is hereby granted. Mr. Angeles is therefore excluded
from the persons liable listed under Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101
(05).17
Thereafter, herein petitioner filed a letter dated 7 July 2007, 18 addressed to
Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, COA Chairperson. The letter prayed for the
reversal and setting aside of the earlier Decision of the ASB. On 15
February 2008, public respondent issued the assailed Order. It appears
that the letter of petitioner was treated as an appeal to the Commission
Proper of the COA and was subsequently denied. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for
reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal, is denied. 19
On 28 March 2008, the instant Petition was filed, raising the following
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS
OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED ASB DECISION NO. 2007-030,
RELATIVE TO THE DISALLOWANCE OF DISBURSEMENTS
CONCERNING THE SERVICES RENDERED BY HIRED CONSULTANTS
FOR THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG MALABON.
On 8 April 2008, this Court directed respondents to comment on the
Petition. On 28 July 2008, they filed their Comment, in which they averred
that Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized the expenditure of
funds for the compensation of consultants only from June to December
2003. Thus, the contracts for consultancy entered into in 2005 were
contrary to the ordinance cited and were therefore void for being
unauthorized and bereft of any legal basis. There is also no room for
interpretation of the ordinance, as the same is clear, and, additionally,
actually contains no preamble. Further, respondents argue that to allow the
disbursement of public funds to pay for the services of the consultants,
despite the absence of authority for the same, would allow a circumvention
of the applicable COA rules and circulars.
Petitioner thereafter filed his Reply to the Comment, in compliance with this
Court’s 12 August 2008 Resolution. In his Reply, he contended that he had
the authority to enter into the consultancy contracts pursuant to Ordinance
No. 15-2003. As the ordinance was ambiguous, there was a need to
interpret its provisions by looking into the intent of the law. He also
manifested that the Ombusdman had dismissed the administrative and
criminal Complaints for violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6713 and for
Usurpation of Authority, previously filed against him over the same
transactions. The Ombudsman held that, while Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically mentions then Vice-Mayor Yambao, the intent in passing the
law may not be ignored. It was the intention of the city council to authorize
the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy contracts, and not
Vice-Mayor Yambao only. Petitioner also argued that the ends of
substantial justice and equity would be better served by allowing the
disbursement for consultancy services that have already been rendered.
We deny the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the Petition has a procedural flaw that should
merit its outright dismissal. Through the Verification and Certification
attached to the instant Petition, petitioner states that the contents of the
Petition "are true and correct of [his] own personal knowledge and belief
and based on authentic records and/or documents." 20
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to
be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief"
or "knowledge, information and belief," shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading. A pleading, therefore, in which the verification is based merely on
the party’s knowledge and belief – as in the instant Petition – produces no
legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to
be remedied.21
In any case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing the assailed Decision.
Petitioner contends that the ordinance authorizes the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao in particular, to enter into consultancy
contracts. Notably, it was even Hon. Vice-Mayor Benjamin C. Galauran,
who was acting Vice-Mayor at the time, who entered into the 2003
Consultancy Contracts. Petitioner also argues that there is no indication
from the preamble of the ordinance, which can be read from the minutes of
the SPM meeting, that the ordinance was specifically designed to empower
only Vice-Mayor Yambao, or to limit such power to hire for the period June
to December 2003 only.
We disagree.
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the
following are the powers and duties of a city vice-mayor:
ARTICLE II
The City Vice-Mayor
SECTION 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. – (a) The city vice-
mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all
warrants drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures appropriated for
the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials
and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose
manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter
in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of
this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city
mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I
of this Code; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
(b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-eight (28) for a highly urbanized city
and Salary Grade twenty-six (26) for a component city, as prescribed
under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto.
Under this provision, therefore, there is no inherent authority on the part of
the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. 22 Thus, the
authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was
strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to
the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed
as a "continuing authority" for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 provides in full:
City Ordinance No. 15-2003
An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay G.
Yambao, to Negotiate, and Enter into a Contract for Consultancy Services
in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective
Areas of Concern, as Aforementioned, To Wit:
(1) A Legal Consultant
(2) A Consultant on Education Affairs and
(3) A Management Consultant
That said consultants shall be paid/compensated at the rate of Twenty Two
Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00) each, per month, effective upon approval of
this ordinance subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures,
rules and/or regulations;
That the source of funds for appropriations thereof shall be made available
for expenditures to be earmarked for payment/compensation for said
consultants, covering the period from June to December of 2003, thereby
authorizing further the City Vice Mayor to effect the necessary funding
thereof, pursuant to the pertinent provision, aforecited, in Chapter 4,
Section 336 of R.A. 7160;
That copies of this ordinance be furnished all concerned for their
information and guidance.
Adopted: October 30, 2003. 23 WHEREFORE, the Commission on Audit Decision dated 4 January 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation.1âwphi1 It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter SO ORDERED.
into consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern. Further, the
appropriations for this particular item were limited to the savings for the MARIA LOURDES P. SERENO
period June to December 2003. This was an additional limitation to the Associate Justice
power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to contract on behalf of the city. The
fact that any later consultancy contract would necessarily require further WE CONCUR:
appropriations from the city council strengthens the contention that the
power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was limited in scope. Hence,
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
petitioner was without authority to enter into the 2005 Consultancy
Senior Associate Justice
Contracts.

Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
interpretation.24 Thus, the ordinance should be applied according to its Associate Justice
Associate Justice
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice.25 In the instant case, there is no reason to depat1 from this rule,
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
since the subject ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Section 103 of P.O. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds
or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a
(On leave)
personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
therefor. The public official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner's Associate Justice
act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit
without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local
Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on the opinion of the (On leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It ROBERTO A. ABAD*
does not, however, exculpate him from his personal liability under P.D. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
1445.

In sum, the COA's assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as Associate Justice Associate Justice
conferred on it by the Constitution26

The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; Associate Justice Associate Justice
and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and property should be prevented. 27 Thus, no grave
abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.
 13 
CERTIFICATION Id. at 103-104.

14 
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in Id.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court. 15 
Id. at105-106.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 16 

Id. at 120-124.
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended) 17 
Id. at 124.

18 
Id. at125-126.

Footnotes 19 
Id. at 11.
*
 On leave 20 
Id. at 18.
1 
Rollo, pp. 21-25. Issued by acting COA Chairperson Reynaldo A. Villar 21 
Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA) v. Presiding Judge of
and Commissioner Juanito G. Espino, Jr. RTC-Negros Occidental, Br. 52, Bacolod City, G.R. No. 179878, 24
December 2008, 575 SCRA 575.
2 
Id. at 33-34.
22 
R.A. 7160, Sec. 456 (b)(1)(vi) provides:
3 
Id. at 39-41.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
4 
Id. at 42-44. which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:
5 
Id. at 45-47.
(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf
6 
Id. at 48. all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon
authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance; x
7 
Id. at 49. x x.

23 
8 
Id. at 50-52. Rollo, pp. 33-34.

24 
9 
Id. at 53-56. National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission,
383 Phil. 910 (2000).
10 
Id. at 57-59. 25 
Municipality ofParanaque v. V.M. Really Corporation, 354 Phil. 684
11  (1998).
Id. at101-102.
26 
12  Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, 6 September 2011,
Id. at 102.
656 SCRA 767.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400               October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,  Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring
its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T.
BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National
Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He
timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s
appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2,
2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to
wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to
reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007
Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before
the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the
15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following
ISSUES
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO
THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE
WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN
APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT
REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR
APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL
IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING
AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE
NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY
AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT
INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be
resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to
marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According
to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in
the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the
said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be
applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the
Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity
was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February
14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious
nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage
as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing
the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not
"incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance
is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. 8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that
the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. 9 As the statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure." 10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of
substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the
meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her
favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure
must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit. 11 As a corollary, rules prescribing
the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are
considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature,
these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the
reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early
as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial
of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already
attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It
follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction
of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC
decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up
for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus,
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In
the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court
reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should Associate Justice
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but Chairperson
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
technicalities. NACHURA CASTRO*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at
stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. ATTESTATION
Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of the Court’s Division.
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
Associate Justice
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
Chairperson, Second Division
this Code.
CERTIFICATION
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.16 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break
up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their RENATO C. CORONA
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 17 Chief Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. Footnotes

*
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA  Designated as an additional member in lieu of Justice Roberto A. Abad,
Associate Justice per Special Order No. 905 dated October 5, 2010.

1
WE CONCUR:  Rollo, pp. 43-48. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-
Lontok with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of
this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
2
 See Rollo, p. 8; see also Annex A of petition, rollo, p. 44. Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
3
 G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 427-428.
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 which provides:
4
 Annex B of petition; rollo p. 49.
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
5
 Rollo, pp. 12-14. nation.

6
 Id. at 329. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
7
 Supra note 3, citing Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990,
185 SCRA 766,722. Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
8
 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA
17
116, 132.  Azcueta v. Republic, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009, 588 SCRA 196,
205, citing Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424
9
 Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. SCRA 725, 740; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil 169, 180-181
189600, June 29,2010, citing Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and (1996).
Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 368, 376.

10
 Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 519, 531,
citing R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 124 (5st ed., 2003).

11
 Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July
27, 2009, 594 SCRA 139, 143, citing Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, 435
Phil. 83 (2002).

12
 Id., citing Gonzales v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653, July 30, 2007, 528
SCRA 490.

13
 510 Phil. 268, 274 (2005).

14
 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil 456, 460 (1995).

15
 G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447, 460-461,
citing Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil 864, 877 (2002), citing Labad
v. University of Southeastern Philippines, 414 Phil 815, 826 (2001).

16
 Almelor v. Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Br. 253, G.R. No.
179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447 citing 1987 Philippine
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12 which provides:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY
EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO,
COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC,
AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is
a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the
employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance,
now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it
is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National
Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers
and members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the
filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it
was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear
before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should
not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as
any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were
"temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further
obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free
ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at
Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and
from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and
unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2
The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March
5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations
Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its
manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on
April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the
Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4Then
came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against
private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca,
president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of
living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management
personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting
the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of
which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May
23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a
complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of
petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged
that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its
manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free
ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a
motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of
picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that
therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as
noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition
for certiorari.
Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court
required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary
injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing,
a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and
the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing
the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to restrain the
respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise
case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the
exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide
strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof,
amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12
On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining
the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order
complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other
hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof.
He met squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had
jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant
petition has merit and should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same
time the decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As
pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters
with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v.
Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however,
Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and
provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters
shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The
ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and
moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. 18 That is
not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on
May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending
Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus
enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those
based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising
from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills
Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of
a court of first instance then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August
21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those
that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2)
unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It
is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to
money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-
employee relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this
petition. certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of
jurisdiction to act on the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it
can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial
court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred
on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express
terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has
been the constant ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v.
Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice
Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of
courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this
Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to
the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that
ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages
arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the
ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court:
Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an
employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation
benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor
Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was
categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction
is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit
of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived
exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in
presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of
which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of
workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees'
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases
involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this
Code." 28 That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon
v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30
3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in
March of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when it filed the
complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On
this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of
Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the
question involved was the failure of the same private respondent,
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-
one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople
certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case:
"On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would
not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory
arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the
labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees
would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August 20, 1982.
Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar
as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in
the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended,
specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is
certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a strike has already
taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall
immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between
the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and
the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the
light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217.
In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law
with competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original
jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It
can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has
vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to
by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management
& Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management &
Financing Co., Inc.  34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor
matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it
to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the
view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice
should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor
Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and
equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor
matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what
essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred
by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies
arising from employer-employee relations.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20,
1982, issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in
his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is
enjoin from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except
for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary restraining order of August
5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
De Castro, J., is on leave.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: 13 He was assisted by then Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno;
Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D.
I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated Aquino
amendments.
14 Manifestation, in Lieu of Answer, 5-6, citing pars. (3) and (5) of Article
217.

Separate Opinions 15 L-47629, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 577.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: 16 L-48706-07, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 248.

I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated 17 Manifestation, 8.
amendments.
18 Cf. Garcia v. Martinez, L-47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA 331; Calderon
Footnotes Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L-52235, October 28, 1980, 100 SCRA 459; Abad
v. Phil. American General Insurance Co., L-50563, October 30,1981, 108
1 The other respondents are Lt. Col. Jacob Caruncho, Commanding SCRA 717. In all three cases, it was made clear that money claims arising
Officer, Zamboanga District Command, PC, AFP and Zamboanga Wood from employer-employee relations by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
Products. 1367 were cognizable by the ordinary courts, labor arbiters being excluded
from passing upon "claims for moral and other forms of damages."
2 Annex K to Petition 2.
19 Manifestation, 14.
3 Manifestation of Solicitor General in Lieu of Answer, par. 1.
20 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of subparagraph 2 of
paragraph (a) of the Labor Code (1981).
4 Ibid, par. 2.
21 Article 2l7 of the Labor Code, par .(2).
5 Ibid, par. 3.
22 24 Phil. 504.
6 Ibid, par. 4.
23 Ibid, 513.
7 Ibid, par. 5.
24 In Asuncion, Jr. v. Segundo, G.R. No. 59593, promulgated on
8 Ibid, par. 8.
September 24, 1983, reference was made to Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Co., L-25316, February 28, 1979, 88
9 Ibid. SCRA 616. The opinion acted 13 cases starting from People v. Mapa, L-
22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 to Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
10 Ibid, par. 10. L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381. After the Manggagawa decision
came two later cages of the same tenor: Banawa v. Mirano, L-24750, May
11 Resolution of this Court dated August 3, 1982. 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-
31057, May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 710. All in all, since the 1967 decision in
12 Resolution of this Court dated August 5, 1982. Mapa, seventeen cases have applied the ruling in Lizarraga Hermanos.
25 L-58877, May 15, 1982; 112 SCRA 578.

26 Ibid, 580.

27 Ibid, 581.

28 Ibid, 581-582.

29 L-58265, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 52.

30 L-58133, March 26, 1982, 113 SCRA 69.

31 The complaint in the lower court was signed by Alberto de la Rosa,

resident manager of private respondent. He was assisted by two members
of the bar, Demosthenes S. Baban and Monico E. Luna, Annex J to
Petition.

32 G.R. No. 64183.

33 Ibid, 2.

34 L-27953, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 187.

35 Ibid, 91.

36 Ibid. Cf. Allied Free Workers Union v. Apostol, 102 Phil. 292 (1957);
Bay View Hotel Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers Union, L. 21803, Dec. 17,
1966, 18 SCRA 946; Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-20303, Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226; Seno v. Mendoza, L-
20565, Nov. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1124; Security Bank Employees Union v.
Security Bank and Trust Company, L-28536, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503;
Manila Hotel Co. v. Pines Hotel Employees Association, L-24314, Sept. 28,
1970, 35 SCRA 96; Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-25984, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 550; Espanilla v. La Carlota
Sugar Central, L-23722, March 31, 1971; 38 SCRA 186; Mindanao Rapid
Co., Inc. v. Omandam, L-23058, Nov. 27, 1971, 42 SCRA 250
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166199               April 24, 2009
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,  Intelligence operatives at his residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA
vs.
CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated September 14, 2004 and the
Resolution2 dated November 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside the Resolution dated
April 1, 2003 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners (BOC)
of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case filed
against Christopher Koruga (respondent), an American national, for
violation of Section 37(a)(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; while the
assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo
received an anonymous letter 3 requesting the deportation of respondent as
an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United
States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in
1983.
On the basis of a Summary of Information,4 the Commissioner issued
Mission Order No. ADD-01-1625 on September 13, 2001 directing Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G. Caligasan, Chief of the Intelligence
Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct
verification/ validation of the admission status and activities of respondent
and effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed
as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads:
On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by
CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission
Order No. ADD-01-162;
That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled
Substance Act in connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier
of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of America,
thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of
Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail 7 and Supplemental
Petition for Bail,8 respondent was granted bail and provisionally released
from the custody of the BI.9
Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum 10 and the BI
Special Prosecutor's Memorandum, 11 the BOC rendered a
12
Judgment  dated February 11, 2002 ordering the deportation of
respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended.
On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 but
it was denied by the BOC in a Resolution dated March 19, 2002.
Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19,
2002, respondent filed on April 2, 2002, a Manifestation and Notice of
Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam14 with the Office of the President, which
referred15 the appeal to the DOJ.
On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a
Resolution16 dismissing the appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration17 which he subsequently withdrew18 on April 23,
2003.
On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition19
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the
Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment
dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC.
20
On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision  setting aside the
Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment
dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the deportation case
filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal
ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no violation of
Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the
law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for
violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of
Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further failed to
present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support
their allegations that respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S.
Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the record the
alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the
conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited drugs law in the
USA; that even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged
offense, his deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the
prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not to a foreign drugs law but
to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972"; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive
authority to decide as to the right of a foreigner to enter the country, still,
such executive officers must act within the scope of their authority or their
decision is a nullity.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration21 was denied by the CA in its
presently assailed Resolution22 dated November 24, 2004.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT CASE WHICH
FALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE
COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE HEREIN RESPONDENT
WERE DROPPED.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS REQUIRED BEFORE
RESPONDENT COULD BE DEPORTED.23
Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation
proceedings and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert
the sufficiency of the evidence presented therein; that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners when they sought the
deportation of respondent since he was convicted by the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act and underwent probation in lieu of the imposition of
sentence; that the dismissal of the charge against respondent was only
with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling the
conditions for his probation, and was not an acquittal from the criminal
case charged against him; that there is a valid basis to declare
respondent's undesirability and effect his deportation since respondent has
admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case.
On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him
reek of persecution; that the CA did not commit any error of law; that all the
arguments raised in the present petition are mere rehashes of arguments
raised before and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even assuming that
Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 does not apply,
there is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to deport respondent.
There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of
the BOC over deportation proceedings bars judicial review, and (2)
whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent.
The Court resolves the first issue in the negative.
It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has
jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.24 Nonetheless, Article VIII,
Section 125 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by
law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute
absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the
President,26 the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when
the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 27
In Domingo v. Scheer,28 the Court set aside the Summary Deportation
Order of the BOC over an alien for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion in violation of the alien's constitutional and statutory rights to due
process, since the BOC ordered the deportation of the alien without
conducting summary deportation proceedings and without affording the
alien the right to be heard on his motion for reconsideration and adduce
evidence thereon.
29
In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,  the Court held that while, as a general rule,
the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it
is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions
which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason,
would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition
for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the CA as provided by law or by
the Rules of Court, as amended.30 Clearly, the filing by respondent of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the order of
deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted.
This brings us to the second issue.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is
merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or
permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or
deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided
for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. 31
Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for
the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
xxxx
(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law
governing prohibited drugs;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent contends that the use of the definite article "the" immediately
preceding the phrase "law on prohibited drugs" emphasizes not just any
prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at that time,
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.32
The Court disagrees.
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that
in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 However, a literal
interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to
absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a
whole.34 After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.35 Indeed, courts are not to give
words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequences.36
Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it
applicable only to convictions under the Philippine prohibited drugs law, the
Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby aliens
convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the
country to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It
suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of
Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported, while aliens convicted
of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. The
Court must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly,
such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so
would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason
is not allowed in law.
Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation,
not one which defeats the very purpose for which the law was passed. This
Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, always
cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose
of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or
absurdity, and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results.37
Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign
prohibited drugs law and the Philippine prohibited drugs law, neither should
this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. 38 Thus,
Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs
laws, whether local or foreign.
There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA for
attempted possession of cocaine, as shown by the Order Deferring
Imposition of Sentence (Probation). 39 While he may have pleaded guilty to
a lesser offense, and was not imprisoned but applied for and underwent a
one-year probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he was
convicted under a prohibited drugs law, even though it may simply be
called a "misdemeanor drug offense." 40 The BOC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent.
The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the
BOC:
x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated
8 October 2001 that he pleaded guilty to the amended information
where he allegedly attempted to have in his possession a certain
controlled substance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a "Petition
for Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and Enter Plea of Not Guilty" to obtain
a favorable release from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
filing of the said charge.
Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the
respondent's plea of guilty to the lesser offense. Though legally allowed in
the U.S. Law, We perceive that this strategy afforded the respondent with a
convenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the plea
of guilty is by itself crystal clear acknowledgment of his involvement
in a drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from conviction
and sentencing cannot hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-
related charge.
This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a
drug-related offense. The crime may have been committed two
decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident actually
happened. This is the very core of his inadmissibility into the
Philippines. Apparently, respondent would like Us to believe that his
involvement in this drug case is a petty offense or a mere misdemeanor.
However, the Philippine Government views all drug-related cases with
grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972" and the creation of various
drug-enforcement agencies. While We empathize with the innocent
portrayal of the respondent as a man of irreproachable conduct, not to
mention the numerous written testimonies of good character submitted in
his behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however,
outweigh our commitment and sworn duty to safeguard public health and
public safety. Moreover, while the U.S. Government may not have any law
enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine immigration authorities
certainly do in the able and competent exercise of its police powers.
Thus, this case of the respondent is no different from a convicted
felon abroad, who argues that he cannot be removed from the
Philippines on the ground that the crime was committed abroad.
Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated
aliens demanding their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent
may not be a menace to the U.S. as a result of his being discharged from
criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the immigration
authorities should unquestionably admit him into the country.
x x x x41 (Emphasis supplied)
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not
acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of
time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained
entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal
basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not
lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.42 Every sovereign power has
the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds
as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. 43 The
power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power.44 It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of
the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the
deportation of respondent Christopher Koruga under Section 37(a)(4) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, is REINSTATED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. Footnotes

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ 1

 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and concurred in by
Associate Justice Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., CA rollo, p.
610.
WE CONCUR:
2
 Id. at 677.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 3
 CA rollo, p.140.
Chairperson
4
 Id. at 139.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA 5
 Id. at 138.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
6
 CA rollo, p. 141.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 7
 Id. at 144.
Associate Justice
8
 Id. at 154.
ATTESTATION
9
 Id. at 157.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of 10
 Id. at 159.
the Court’s Division.
11
 Id. at 187.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 12
Chairperson, Third Division  Id. at 243.

13
CERTIFICATION  Id. at 72.

14
 Id. at 103.
15 28
 Id. at 124.  466 Phil. 235 (2004).

16 29
 Id. at 74.  G.R. No. 149013, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 419.

17 30
 Id. at 126.  Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 4.

18 31
 Id. at 133.  Supra note 28, at 269-270; 487.

19 32
 CA rollo, p. 9.  Repealed by Republic Act No. 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002" approved on June 7, 2002, or about four (4) months
20
 Supra note 1. after the BOC rendered its Judgment on February 11, 2002.

21
 CA rollo, p. 630.
22
 Supra note 2.
23
 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
24
 Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May
31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853, 874; Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
81798, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 756, 761; Miranda v. Deportation
Board, 94 Phil 531, 533 (1954).
25
 Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, states:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
26
 See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360,
November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Tañada v.
Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49.
27
 Republic v. Garcia, G.R No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502;
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
33
 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), p. 131, citing Central
Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1954); Espino v.
Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 92; Philippine Acetylene
Co. v. Central Bank, 120 Phil. 829 (1964).
34
 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 137, 149; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank
Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November 25, 2003, 416 SCRA 436,
460; In Re Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 643 (1903).
35
 Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Buñag, G.R. No. 143784,
February 5, 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 37; Cosico, Jr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118432, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 583,
591; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.,
G.R. No. 28502-03, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 364, 370.
36
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, supra, note
35; People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236, 242 (1933).
37
 Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, G.R. No. 78309,
September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 513, 519; Bello v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-38161, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509, 518; Vda. de Macabanta v.
Davao Stevedore Terminal Company, G.R. No. L 27489, April 30, 1970, 32
SCRA 553, 558; Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, G.R.
No. L-26406, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248, 256.
38
 BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.R.
No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484; Pilar v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 759, 763;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215.
39
 CA rollo, p. 650.

40
 Letters dated September 19, 2001 and September 20, 2001 of Michael
A. Newbill, Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, CA rollo,
pp. 148 and 149.

41
 CA rollo, p. 245.

42
 Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, supra note 24, at 896.

43
 Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948).

44
 In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).

45
 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines)
Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level,
called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the
actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be
awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the
third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a
thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an
Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for
third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in
the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the
qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from
which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will
be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-
day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest".
The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes
of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the
seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from
which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize
winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage
are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media
for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications
relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in
view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to
any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not,
shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited
in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its
addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any
manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise
for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is
conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct
any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the
person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly
written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of
whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic
transfer service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to
him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person
or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining
money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or
payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic
transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or
company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for
the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or
telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its
agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General,
dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy
of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest
does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed,
the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested
clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a
reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved
no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under
controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven
years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General
maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it
does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by
the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the
use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well
threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be
issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition
for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying
"that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not
to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of
the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the
petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public
distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic
issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court,
which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was
invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are
affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights
thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In
amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the
matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of
Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al.
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades
vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof
upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present
controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The
appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence,
concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased
patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority
charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power
and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously
pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales
promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in
the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other
media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance
clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the
premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the
appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly
declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to
be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in
which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged.
The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was
matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground.
And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will
have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for.
The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its
proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the
appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is
an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial
thereof on the other, concerning a real — not a mere theoretical —
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are
substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence
of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to
enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's
proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and
enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest
and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the
appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if
any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the
case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-
133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284
Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here
no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the
clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules
of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity
of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the
circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can
be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest.
This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is
precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the
appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction
or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement
on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief
action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed.
Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous
or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly
defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle
lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety — nay, the necessity —
of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper,
animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead
(III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases
cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs.
Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22
Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the
situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose
between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law
apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it
launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only
incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of
a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the
appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it
becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect
a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted.
As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of
liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to
promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which,
in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in
the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or
prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of
the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the
final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to
subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this,
he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil
Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same
authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide
thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will
terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have
herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs.
Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that
if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject
to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to
determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin
vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d.,
903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory
relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using
almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983
thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the
use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning
"any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon
these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in
1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which
significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the
abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative
one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in
analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions,
prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second,
prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public
Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil.,
395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction
Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize
and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of
contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of
inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration
therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened
inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a
definitive yard-stick in the following terms —
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn
the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does
condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some
kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity
of the language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched.
Thus —
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You
don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the
Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense
from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever
be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to
go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on
demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the
winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair
exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate",
Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme
does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers
who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be
indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest.
Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the
use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not.
A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or
to give anything of value.1awphîl.nèt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for
sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex
products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry
blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down
in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether
the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not
whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in
return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the
standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The
following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at
rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact
does receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a
result of the drawing; does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith
Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S.,
p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may
be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of
consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here
invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was
predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the
Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a
lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in
which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the
proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have found it to be —
is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be
spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied
to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value
but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize
(54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817;
Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail
Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W.,
493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell
vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the
term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is
no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest
can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift
enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose
will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings
there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by
chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to
constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178
So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d.,
689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally
impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of
prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139,
142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297;
People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs.
Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas.,
521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent
conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory
provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in
54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the
element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by
statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel.
Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that
we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is
used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery
settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied
upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein
included.
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of
Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases,
perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the
end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like
lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as
described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied

by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic
aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed
to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed
matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As
applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in
the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the
gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839,
143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it
has been held —

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute

"lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48437. September 30, 1986.]
MANTRADE/FMMC DIVISION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION
(represented by PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNION —
PSSLU Fed. — TUCP), Petitioner, v. ARBITRATOR FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN and MANTRADE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATORS; DECISIONS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. — The
contentions of respondent corporation have been ruled against in the
decision of this court in the case of Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero,
promulgated on July 16, 1984, wherein it stated: . . . "A voluntary arbitrator
by the nature of her functions acts in a quasijudicial capacity. There is no
reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond
this court’s review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in
accordance with law and yet we do not hesitate to pass upon their work
where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of
discretion in their officials acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari."
(130 SCRA 392, 399, 400-401)
2. ID.; ID.; GRANT FOR HOLIDAY PAY MONTHLY PAID EMPLOYEES;
ISSUE SETTLED IN THE CASES OF INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND
AMERICA EMPLOYEES’ UNION VS. INCIONG, [132 SCRA 633], AND
CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. OPLE [141 SCRA 9]. —
Respondent arbitrator opined that respondent corporation does not have
any legal obligation to grant its monthly salaried employees holiday pay,
unless it is argued that the pertinent section of the Rule and Regulations
implementing Section 94 of the Labor Code is not in conformity with the
law, and thus, without force and effect. This issue was subsequently
decided on October 24, 1984 by a division of this court in the case of
Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong,
wherein it held as follows: "We agree with petitioner’s contention that
Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction
No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the
guise of clarifying the Labor Code’s provisions on holiday pay, they in
effect amended them enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 11,
rec.). . . . "From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid
employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the
implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of
Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting
under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules, section 2, which provides
that: ‘employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the
number of working days therein , with the salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all
days in the month whether worked or not." (132 SCRA 663, 672-673) This
ruling was reiterated by the court en banc on August 28, 1985 in the case
of Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, wherein it added that:
"The questioned Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the
Secretary’s Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely
‘employees who are uniformly paid by the month’. While additional
exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid
employees have already been paid holiday paid, it constitutes a taking
away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An
administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more
than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires." (138
SCRA 273, 282. See also CBTC Employees Union v. Clave, January 7,
1986, 141 SCRA 9.)
3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS;
APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE REMEDY IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent
corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act which the law does not clearly enjoin as a duty. True
it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation,
the remedy being an action for specific performance (Province of
Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
376). In the case at bar, however, in view of the above-cited subsequent
decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant holiday pay to
monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable
remedy (Dionisio v. Paterno, July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales v.
Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA
492).
DECISION
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by petitioner against
arbitrator Froilan M. Bacungan and Mantrade Development Corporation
arising from the decision of respondent arbitrator, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CONSIDERING ALL THE ABOVE, We rule that Mantrade Development
Corporation is not under legal obligation to pay holiday pay (as provided for
in Article 94 of the Labor Code in the third official Department of Labor
edition) to its monthly paid employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of
not less than the statutory or established minimum wage, and this rule is
applicable not only as of March 2, 1976 but as of November 1,
1974."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner questions the validity of the pertinent section of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended on which
respondent arbitrator based his decision.
On the other hand, respondent corporation has raised procedural and
substantive objections. It contends that petitioner is barred from pursuing
the present action in view of Article 263 of the Labor Code, which provides
in part that "voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final,
inappealable, and executory," as well as the rules implementing the same;
the pertinent provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation; and Article 2044 of the Civil Code
which provides that "any stipulation that the arbitrators’ award or decision
shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040."
Respondent corporation further contends that the special civil action
of certiorari does not lie because respondent arbitrator is not an "officer
exercising judicial functions" within the contemplation of Rule 65, Section
1, of the Rules of Court; that the instant petition raises an error of judgment
on the part of respondent arbitrator and not an error of jurisdiction; that it
prays for the annulment of certain rules and regulations issued by the
Department of Labor, not for the annulment of the voluntary arbitration
proceedings; and that appeal by certiorari under Section 29 of the
Arbitration Law, Republic Act No. 876, is not applicable to the case at bar
because arbitration in labor disputes is expressly excluded by Section 3 of
said law.chanrobles law library : red
These contentions have been ruled against in the decision of this Court in
the case of Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, promulgated on July
16, 1984, wherein it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We agree with the petitioner that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators
must be given the highest respect and as a general rule must be accorded
a certain measure of finality. This is especially true where the arbitrator
chosen by the parties enjoys the first rate credentials of Professor Flerida
Ruth Pineda Romero, Director of the U.P. Law Center and an academician
of unquestioned expertise in the field of Labor Law. It is not correct,
however, that this respect precludes the exercise of judicial review over
their decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration
awards final, inappealable and executory, except where the money claims
exceed P100,000.00 or 40% of the paid-up capital of the employer or
where there is abuse of discretion or gross incompetence refers to appeals
to the National Labor Relations Commission and not to judicial review.
"In spite of statutory provisions making ‘final’ the decisions of certain
administrative agencies, we have taken cognizance of petitions
questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice, or
erroneous interpretation of the Law were brought to our attention. . . .
 x       x       x
"A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. There is no reason why her decisions involving interpretation of
law should be beyond this Court’s review. Administrative officials are
presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do not hesitate to pass
upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of
abuse of discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions
for certiorari." (130 SCRA 392, 399, 400-401)
In denying petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, respondent arbitrator stated
that although monthly salaried employees are not among those excluded
from receiving such additional pay under Article 94 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, to wit:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular
daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but
such employee shall be paid compensation equivalent to twice his regular
rate; and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Year’s Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the
thirtieth of December, and the day designated by law for holding a general
election.
they appear to be excluded under Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules
and Regulations implementing said provision which reads thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SEC. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not.
Respondent arbitrator further opined that respondent corporation does not
have any legal obligation to grant its monthly salaried employees holiday
pay, unless it is argued that the pertinent section of the Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 94 of the Labor Code is not in
conformity with the law, and thus, without force and effect.
This issue was subsequently decided on October 24, 1984 by a division of
this Court in the case of Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’
Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, wherein it held as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WE agree with the petitioner’s contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III
of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued by the then
Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the
Labor Code’s provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by
enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 11, rec.)
"Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850,
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular
daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers . . .’
"The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code’s holiday pay
provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof which reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘Art. 82. Coverage. — The provision of this Title shall apply to employees
in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
domestic helpers, persons, in the personal service of another, and workers
who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in
appropriate regulations.’
x       x       x
 492).

"From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of respondent arbitrator is SET
are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the ASIDE and respondent corporation is ordered to GRANT holiday pay to its
implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of monthly salaried employees. No costs.
Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting
under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules, Section 2, which SO ORDERED.
provides that: ‘employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be
paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.’" (132 SCRA 663,
672-673).

This ruling was reiterated by the Court en banc on August 28, 1985 in the
case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, wherein it added
that:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"The questioned Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the
Secretary’s Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely
‘employees who are uniformly paid by the month.’ While the additional
exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid
employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking
away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An
administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more
than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires." (138
SCRA 273, 282. See also CBTC Employees Union v. , Clave, January 7,
1986, 141 SCRA 9.)

Lastly, respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to

compel the performance of an act which the law does not clearly enjoin as
a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual
obligation, the remedy being an action for specific performance (Province
of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
376). In the case at bar, however, in view of the above cited subsequent
decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant holiday pay to
monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable
remedy (Dionisio v. Paterno, July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales v.
Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance
Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same
corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check payable
to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which
check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner
alone, since jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully
fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay
a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of
P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him,
petitioner through counsel orally manifested that he was taking an appeal.
Having been so notified, the trial court on the same day ordered the
forwarding of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July
1987, petitioner through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a
notice to file his Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days. Petitioner
managed to secure several extensions of time within which to file his brief,
the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. 1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by
his then counsel of record, sought advice from another counselor. On 30
November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in
the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however, accepted by
the lower court, since the records of the case had already been forwarded
to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and Petition for
Probation" dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for
Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner asked the
Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the alternative, to
remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with the records of the
criminal case, for consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as
amended. At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in abeyance until after
the Court of Appeals shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the
Court of Appeals, petitioner formally withdrew his appeal conditioned,
however, on the approval of his Petition for Probation. 2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that it had no objection to
petitioner Llamado's application for probation. Private respondent-
complainant, upon the other hand, sought and obtained leave to file a
Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for probation, to which
Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his
"Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18 March
1988.
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr.
Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion
was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a
concurring opinion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988, with another, briefer,
dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the
majority in the Court of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the
dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application for
probation which was filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with the
trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of
Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's
Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief had been
sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but before actual filing of
such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated on
24 July 1976. Section 4 of this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been
taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis
supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could
grant an application for probation "at any time" "after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been
taken from the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the application
for probation was "deemed [to constitute] automatic withdrawal of
a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D.
No. 1257 so as to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
court may, senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing
of the application for probation and he may submit his comment on such
application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to
the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the
latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the date of the
judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be acted upon by the
trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis
supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals
that it had established a prolonged but definite period during which an
application for probation may be granted by the trial court. That period was:
'After [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time-
commencement of service of sentence-takes place not only after an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after
judgement has been rendered by the appellate court and after judgment
has become final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by
P.D. No. 1257 provides that "the application [for probation] shall be acted
upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court";
for the appellate court might have increased or reduced the original penalty
imposed by the trial court. It would seem beyond dispute then that had the
present case arisen while Section 4 of the statute as amended by P.D. No.
1257 was still in effect, petitioner Llamado's application for probation would
have had to be granted. Mr. Llamado's application for probation was filed
well before the cut-off time established by Section 4 as then amended by
P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was
once again amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so amended and in
its present form, Section 4 reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis
supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its
present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during which
an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial
court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and — within the
period for perfecting an appeal — ." As if to provide emphasis, a new
proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is
worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the
phrase which said that the filing of an application for probation means "the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The deletion is quite logical
since an application for probation can no longer be filed once an appeal is
perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would have to
be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner
Llamado was convicted by the trial court), to the instant case, we must
then inquire whether petitioner Llamado had submitted his application for
probation "within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put a little differently,
the question is whether by the time petitioner Llamado's application was
filed, he had already "perfected an appeal" from the judgment of conviction
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of
B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that
such appeal is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with
the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the Philippines. As noted
earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his
intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of appeal
and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal"
and the clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current form, should not be
interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the
"whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a
period of fifteen (15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also urged that
"the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not
apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at the earliest
opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo
in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have recourse to "the
cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal laws [should]
be liberally construed in favor of the accused," and to avoid "a too literal
and strict application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which would "defeat
the manifest purpose or policy for which the [probation law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of
petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to persuade
ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to
grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as
indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but
rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest opportunity" to
withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses invoked by
petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period. There was
absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to that period for
the operative words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such
fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly
speaking; they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they
articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, in
the present case, an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the
substantive content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D.
No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of
the statute; in the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990
do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as amended.
Upon the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal" used in
Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the loose language "first
opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an
appeal" is, of course, a term of art but it is a term of art widely understood
by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself
essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible
meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in our procedural
law and so the law-making agency could only have intended to refer to the
meaning of those words in the context of procedural law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes,
we note at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be
given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however, have no authority to
invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law" where the words of
the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute,
leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit
of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a
clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The
"true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all
others who are charged with the application and implementation of a
statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of
the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the
words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external,
mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the
words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation
rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too
frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning
which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the
language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the text of
Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The
Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need
for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage
in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects the
conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The
first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he
would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First
Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will
surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law
much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as
to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in
considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals
with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the
words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of
what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have
agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily
have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
interpretation and construction. 6
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our
people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated.
There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read a
statute as the legislative authority wrote it, not as he would prefer it to have
been written. The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the
Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and
discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under
cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the
words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the
constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion.
Once a judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of
the legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In a polity like
ours which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting power through the
separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly careful
lest they substitute their conceptions or preferences of policy for that
actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge believes
passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have said
on the particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to
reach the conclusion that therefore that was what the law-making authority
was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained:
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are
confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its particular
exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the constraints
imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter of
verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in
construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has
lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly
admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the
limitations A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out
except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7
Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as
amended has vested in the trial court the authority to grant the application
for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the
same and should have (as he had prayed in the alternative) remanded
instead the records to the lower court. Once more, we are not persuaded.
The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his
appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand
the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually to
attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the
argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have reached, that is, that
petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1 Records on Appeal, p. 21.
2 Records on Appeal. pp. 41-42.
3 These clauses read:
WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who are
convicted of offenses and who may be entitled to probation still appeal the
judgment of conviction even up to the Supreme Court, only to pursue their
application for probation when their appeal is eventually dismissed.
WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution, conviction
and appeal entails too much time and effort, not to mention the huge
expenses of litigation, on the part of the State;
WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government in
investigating and prosecuting accused persons from the lower courts up to
the Supreme Court, are often times rendered nugatory when, after the
appellate court finally affirms the judgment of conviction, the defendant
applies for and is granted probation;
WHEREAS, the probation was not intended as an escape hatch and
should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but
should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to
be reformed and rehabilitated
WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems above-
mentioned confronting our probation system.
4 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12.
5 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 US 174 (1889); 33 L
Ed 302. See also Idaho Commission on Human Rights v. Campbell, 506 P.
2d 112; 95 Id. 215 (1973).
6 29 Phil. at 188 (1915); Italics supplied.
7 Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia Law Review
527 (1947); Reprinted in 4 Sutherland,' Statutory Construction (4th ed.
1972) 409 at 416-417. Italics supplied.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,  the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy,
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for
benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of
the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply
to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of
age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A
recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative
results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner
of RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The
law merely requires that a government employee whether regular,
temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the
Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of
the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover,
personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits,
such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason
why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision
of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only
require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2,
1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your
separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special
civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted
under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the
provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-
1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e.
membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-
INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated
from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616,
4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or
P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of
this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory
separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and
their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any
one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the
regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to
the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were
given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who
was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has
rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government
should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per
appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of
NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and
Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The
project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December
1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is
not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service
(Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a
long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the
expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even
qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security
of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation
or retirement benefits but reorganization 5to streamline government
functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the
law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to
special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and
definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no
necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce
voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no
need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-
span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and
local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the
parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of
employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as
amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who
the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which Department of Foreign Affairs;
superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 (5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely maintain a separate merit system;
includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage,
unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector. (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is non-career service; and
classified as follows:
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of
the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the particular project for which purpose employment was made.
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed
Included in the non-career service are:
twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil
service eligible becomes available. 8
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at
the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of
office and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in
nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and
universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research 4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency,
to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and
hiring agency.
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,
unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70;
Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated
as a laborer holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga
River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975,
she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1
September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R &
R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA —
UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1
June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management &
Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While
with this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5
November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until
the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment
paper 12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with
the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted
projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or
cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27
June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the
Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of determining
creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national
government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides
that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly
approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered
creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services
rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable
services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as
some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by
contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on
contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or
manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for
retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis
provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official
records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned
shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984,
the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May
1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment
as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in
nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991)
characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the
service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that
which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the
following:
a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent
with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-
existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent
with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of
the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3
years" — the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration
thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what
is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee.
Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during
his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the
latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former
are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its
benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-
INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had
not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and
benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,  16 comes to mind where,
workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one
project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent
employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive
projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be
disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would
violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents'
submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said
law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the
applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary
implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the
rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in
the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early
Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation
on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments
for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No.
33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its
wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed
overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on
coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as
well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government
service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as
used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with
definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including
those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis
supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to
trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished
upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their
case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project
personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired,
the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel
serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years
of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's
argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for
a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla,
and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the
objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be
achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees
(casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no
abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would
merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and
future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration
of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular
No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No.
6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an
aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not
be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive,
elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-
terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed
by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be
promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous
personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the
coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and
mental well-being of public servants"22 After all, co-terminous personnel,
are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as
petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a
reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the
application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for
the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application
must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2)
years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15)
years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No.
6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
Footnotes
1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989.
2 Annex "E", Rollo, P. 11
3 Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14.
4 Rollo, p. 24-25.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY, RETIREMENT AND
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS
WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo,
61.
7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No.
11, S. of 1991, 5 April 1991.
8 Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July
1978; Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA
320.
9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September
1987)
10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77.
11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.
12 Rollo, p. 70.
13 Page 3, this decision.
14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed. p. 161.
15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664.
16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910.
17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February
1968.
18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-
119 citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No.
L-37251, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-
30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v.
Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560,
October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil.
679 (1957) and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).
19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 — 8 March 1988, 6:30. p.m.
20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to
Government Employees Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who have
rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for other
Purposes.

21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series

of 1990, 21 May 1990.

22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129             July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,  municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the
defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited
in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is,
consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court
of First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was
charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A
preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a
probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace
the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A
second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof
the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No.
15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the
prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single
question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer
or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city,
employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in
a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken from
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the
following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of
the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of
any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or
any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the
words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the
Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that
under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge"
was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In
other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein
were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In
Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices
of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself
of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified
by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of
judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of
Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices
of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed
as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed
a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed
with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to
Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the
term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while
acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is
said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and
clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the
Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos.
1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act
No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be
shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later
on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the
Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the
passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall
be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947,
when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic
provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605,
666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos.
599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election
law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall
he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at
any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the
position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of
the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal,
provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his
office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term
of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be
construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any
election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or
officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take part
in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and
shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a
term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not
be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote
at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September
15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the
Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of
the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of
any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or
any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No.
3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes
part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or
by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in
all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on
August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No
justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee
shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election
nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the
first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances
when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357
and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the
enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other
words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law
simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to
justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of
the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from
the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the
phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from
the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can
there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of
Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by
the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of
the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately
exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown
that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law,
or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should
be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly
construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal
in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be
strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal
statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process
demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the
law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common
world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25,
L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that
the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is
to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159).
The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this
particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal
District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such
construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes
must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland
Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of
criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354;
See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale
L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that
the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview.
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges,
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under
the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident
purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace
within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the
Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of
First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious
intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of
judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or
special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court,
and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan
political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On
the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election
Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of
the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over
certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the
peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases,
and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office
the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to
serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate
situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that
the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the
peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing
the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of
note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact
that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the
provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676,
which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under
Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the
officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that
with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political
activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676
was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that
it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law,
cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the
motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members
of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into
consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to
a mere draft of a bill.
of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions
to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists
why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been
included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial
court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that

justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must
be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old
Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they
were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act
No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said
the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise
known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond
reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of
the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a

justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court
nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule

G.R. No. 147097 - Carmelo Lazatin, et al. v. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID
and ANGELITO A. PELAYO,Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD
DIVISION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000,
recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500,
charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and
supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and
he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting
to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was
allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution 2 dated
May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners of
fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the
Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution 3 dated
September 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against
petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA)
to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum 4 dated October 24, 2000,
the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the
OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners.
On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and
ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were
then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
HIS JURISDICTION.
 II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS,
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman
had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases
against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that
under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP
(formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a
separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners
conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate
and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority
over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability
because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as
reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for
expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects that
are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It
has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under
said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully
dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such
other functions or duties as may be provided by law." Elucidating on this
matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the
Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the
Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions,
and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the
Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
xxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers,
functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners
Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated
functions of the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers
or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law." So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken
away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by
law."
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I
suppose.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions
that can be performed by the Ombudsman are "such
functions or duties as may be provided by law." The
sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might
remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer
these to the Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create
a constitutional body which has neither punitive nor
prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might
be raising the hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman
can later on be implemented by the legislature, why not
leave this to the legislature?
xxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner
Blas Ople):
xxx
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to
say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are
also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should
prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels
that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order
that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an
irreversible disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the
OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the
Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and
Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other
Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing
Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of
the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or
subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may
remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by
express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,
the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or
duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has
the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of
the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the
powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to
the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other
powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This
Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. 8
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v.
Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, 10 the
Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag,
declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the
power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries
with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had
not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the
Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of
additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare
decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied
in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.14 
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.
Remington Steel Corporation,15the Court expounded on the importance of
the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practicethat when a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as
in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule
of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court
has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting
aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to
convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied
to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would
be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly
conferred by law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP,
to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's
disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is
based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled
that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be
stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, 18 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorariproceedings, judicial
review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of
the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence.
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error
of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari . An error of judgment
is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-
examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of
probable cause would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the
evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP
Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due
course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the value
of the Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court
not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by
substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in
exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three
branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated
from any outside pressure and improper influence. 21
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable
cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public official
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such
abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. x x x23
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in
a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in
accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control
and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated
September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or
action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been
included as a respondent in this petition.
 14
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of  Id. at 145, citing Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil.
merit. No costs. 785, 793 (2002). (Emphasis supplied).

15
SO ORDERED.  G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.

16
Endnotes:  Id. at 197-198. (Emphasis supplied).

*
 Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special
Order No. 646 dated May 15, 2009.
17
 Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc. v. Pagdanganan, G.R.
No. 167866, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 549, 564.
18
 G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564.

19
**
 Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special  Id. at 578. (Emphasis supplied).
Order No. 631 dated April 29, 2009.
20
 G.R. No. 138142, September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA 571.
1
 Rollo, pp. 48-57.
21
 Id. at 581-582. (Emphasis supplied).
2
 Id. at 58-70.
22
 G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 207.
3
 Supra note 1.
23
 Id. at 216.
4
 Rollo, pp. 114-117.

5
 Id. at 13.

6
 G.R. No. 120422, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 566.

7
 Id. at 575-579.

8
 Id. at 580-582.

9
 G.R. No. 164250, September 30, 2005, 268 SCRA 473.

10
 G.R. No. 121017, February 17, 1997, 471 SCRA 715.

11
 Id. at 743

12
 G.R. No. 166062, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 252.

13
 G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 132.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner  matters became worse.
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met
sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod
City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975.
Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a
student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on
board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City
until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they
finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two
months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on
vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his
marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at
least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At
one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal
abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no
longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to
change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed,
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent
assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children.
She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her
injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and
stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for
support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As
respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the
reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into
a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03
August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence
to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an
answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his
answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and
the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of
the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently
denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was
legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion
to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The
appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of
the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage
and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven
by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 
promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application
and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied
retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand
of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its
assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown
to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so
defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been
explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court,
in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases').
Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. 3 The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith 5 under the
familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
 5
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an  Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285;
entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent Tanada vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural 6 
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment
of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization
of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social

institution and the foundation of the family 6 that the State cherishes and
protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship,
however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these
cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.;

Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.

Footnotes:

1 
Rollo. pp. 42-43

2 
240 SCRA 20.

3 
268 SCRA 198.

4 
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,  it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents),
duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected
departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and
the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory
pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first
paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more
than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of
having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1)
vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision,
disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and
with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the
Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On
August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and
agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph
of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that
Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective
MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their
respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine
Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of
the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12vested the power to appoint the
members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country
became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking
confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves
with the members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution, 14 with the fusion of the executive and
legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices
ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became
exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that
the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary
of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, 15 the members of
the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the
JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially
altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. 18 It has been
the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its
decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing
only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from
Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in
declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of
the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable
to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first
and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived
at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in
the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which
the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex
to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon
which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation
of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to
exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according
to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch
tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight
in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012
Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative
of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention
been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions
were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One
example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." 20 Another is Section 8
thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be
confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately." 21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these
provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly,
the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be
handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII,
by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on
plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that
the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary
function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be
discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which
particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate
an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its
legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-
President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two
Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with
powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to
1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two
Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening
and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular
members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the
Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the
Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was
in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major
branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from
the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative
of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the
1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any
further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated
doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with
one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should
adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to
respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also
a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the
creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two
votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of
judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-
numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in
the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper, 30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST
Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is
composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained
to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral
nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that
"Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2)
representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has
contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the
Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx
The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the
three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable
tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was
designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in
the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution.
Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government,
is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its
representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative
and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary.
The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act
as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among
the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of
Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice
cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of
what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule
that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To
permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress
sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries
with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has
more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of
the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still
safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the
JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC
should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first
time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled
is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the
doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an
infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and
cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality
are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the
interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this
case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which
was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct
what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the
Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution,
read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and
justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would
otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the
Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According
to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not
foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by
judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked
to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast
in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or
convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden
the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the
inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and
tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the
exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is
hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 3
 Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Judicial
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE and Bar Council (JBC) defer the consideration of all nominees and the
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO preparation of the short list to be submitted to the President for the position
Associate Justice
Associate Justice of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;" id. at 303-304.

4
 Entitled "Resolution expressing anew the sense of the Senate that the
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Senate and House of Representatives should have one (1) representative
Associate Justice Associate Justice each in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and that each representative is
entitled to a full vote;" id. at 305-307.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD 5

Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
 Entitled "Resolution to file an urgent motion with the Supreme Court to set
Associate Justice for oral argument the motion for reconsideration filed by the
representatives of Congress to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in the
case of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ G.. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., G.R. No. 2022242 considering the
Associate Justice primordial importance of the constitutional issues involved;" id. at 308-310.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
6
 Entitled "Resolution authorizing Senator Joker P. Arroyo to argue,
together with the Counsel-of-record, the motion for reconsideration filed by
the representative of the Senate to the Judicial and Bar Council in the case
of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr.;" id. at 311-312.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN 7

 Id. at 313-314.
Associate Justice
8
 Id. at (318-I)-(318-K).
CERTIFICATION
9
 Id. at 318-J.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, T hereby certify that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation 10
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, id. at 326-380; Respondents’ Memorandum,
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. id. at 381-424.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 11

 Malolos Constitution Article 80 Title X. – The Chief Justice of the
Chief Justice Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National
Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the
Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the
Legislative and Executive Powers."
Footnotes
12
 1935 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. – The Members of the Supreme
1
 Rollo, pp. 257-286. Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments."
2
 Id. at 287-298.
13
 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates,
437.
14
 Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of
the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the
President."
15
 1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p.
487.
16
 List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio
Secretaries and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer,
Judicial and Bar Council, rollo, pp. 62-63.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January
12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001.
19
 Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2nd ed.
1926), p. 26.
20
 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4. – The President and the Vice-
President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
xxx
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x.
21
 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 9. – Whenever there is a vacancy
in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was
elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)
22
 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18. – The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
23
 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 27(1). – Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and
return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider
it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
24
 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 24. – All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
25 31
 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 23 (1). – The Congress, by a vote of  Rollo, pp. 91-93.
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. 32
 G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
26
 1987 Constitution, Article VII Section 4. – The returns of every election 33
 Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)
for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers
of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to 34
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., p. 198.
the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the 35
 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2009 ed., p. 231.
election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon 36
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner  Id., citing Cartwrite v. Cartwrite, 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).
provided by law, canvass the votes.
37
 Id., Agpalo, p. 232
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
38
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number  Dissenting Opinion, Chief Justice Panganiban, Central Bank (Now
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA
299, citing Peralta v. COMELEC. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA
27
 1987 Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1). – The House of 30, 77, citing concurring and dissenting opinion of former Chief Justice
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of Fernando, citing Malcolm.
impeachment.

xxx The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.

28
 Dated March 27, 2007; Annex "D," rollo, p. 104.

29
 Annex C, id. at 95. Quoting the interpretation of Article VIII, Section (1) of
the Constitution by Fr. Joaquin Bernas in page 984 of his book, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary. He quoted
another author, Hector de Leon, and portions of the decisions of this Court
in Flores v. Drilon, and Escalante v. Santos, before extensively quoting the
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 (pages 444 to 491).

30
 Annex "E," id. at 1205.
 ABAD, J.:

On July 17, 2012, the Court rendered a Decision 1 granting the petition for
declaration of unconstitutionality, prohibition, and injunction filed by
petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, and declaring that the current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is unconstitutional. The
Court also enjoined the JBC to reconstitute itself so that only one member
of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance
with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

On July 24, 2012, respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and

Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. moved for reconsideration. 2 The Court
then conducted and heard the parties in oral arguments on the following
Issues:

1. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight members, two of whom are members of Congress, runs counter
to the letter and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

A. Whether or not the JBC should be composed of seven members only.

B. Whether or not Congress is entitled to more than one seat in the JBC.

C. Assuming Congress is entitled to more than one seat, whether or not

each representative of Congress should be entitled to exercise one whole
vote.

I maintain my dissent to the majority opinion now being reconsidered.

To reiterate, the vital question that needs to be resolved is: whether or not
the Senate and the House of Representatives are entitled to one
representative each in the JBC, both with the right to cast one full vote in
its deliberations.

At the core of the present controversy is Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
DISSENTING OPINION Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting Section 8(1) above, the majority opinion reiterated that in Having said that the Senate and the House of Representatives should
opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of the have one representative each in the JBC, it is logical to conclude that each
Congress," the Filipino people through the framers of the 1987 Constitution should also have the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations. To split
intended Congress to just have one representative in the JBC. The the vote between the two legislators would be an absurdity since it would
majority opinion added that there could not have been any plain oversight diminish their standing and make them second class members of the JBC,
in the wordings of the provision since the other provisions of the 1987 something that the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. Indeed, the
Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift to a bicameral JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on January 12, 2000 and
legislative body. recognized the right of both legislators to cast one full vote each. Only by
recognizing this right can the true spirit and reason of Section 8(1) be
The mere fact, however, that adjustments were made in some provisions attained.
should not mislead the Court into concluding that all provisions have been
amended to recognize the bicameral nature of Congress. As I have For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration.
previously noted in my dissenting opinion, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a
member of the Constitutional Commission himself, admitted that the ROBERTO A. ABAD
committee charged with making adjustments in the previously passed Associate Justice
provisions covering the JBC, failed to consider the impact of the changed
character of the Legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the
Congress" in the membership of the JBC.3
Footnotes
Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate
or the House of Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to 1
ignore the fact that they are still separate and distinct from each other  Rollo, pp. 226-250.
although they are both involved in law-making. Both legislators are elected 2
differently, maintain separate administrative organizations, and deliberate  Id. at 257-284.
on laws independently. In fact, neither the Senate nor the House of
3
Representatives can by itself claim to represent the Congress.  http://opinion.inquirer.net/31813/jbc-odds-and-ends (last accessed
February 15, 2013).
Again, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to limit the
4
term "Congress" to just either of the two Houses can be seen from the  Webster's New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 477.
words that they used in crafting Section 8(1 ). While the provision provides
for just "a representative of the Congress," it also provides that such
representation is "ex officio" or "by virtue of one's office, or position." 4 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is

automatically the Senate representative to the JBC. In the same way,
under the House of Representatives rules, the Chairperson of its Justice
Committee is the House representative to the JBC. Consequently, there
are actually two persons in Congress who hold separate offices or
positions with the attached function of sitting in the JBC. If the Court
adheres to a literal translation of Section 8(1 ), no representative from
Congress will qualify as "ex officio" member of the JBC. This would deny
Congress the representation that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended it to have.
 Both the Senate and the House of Representatives must be represented in
the Judicial and Bar Council. This is the Constitution's mandate read as a
whole and in the light of the ordinary and contemporary understanding of
our people of the structure of our government. Any other interpretation
diminishes Congress and negates the effectivity of its representation in the
Judicial and Bar Council.

It is a Constitution we are interpreting. More than privileging a textual

preposition, our duty is to ensure that the constitutional project ratified by
our people is given full effect.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8 of the

Constitution which provides the following:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a

representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member
of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(Emphasis provided)

Mainly deploying verba legis as its interpretative modality, the main opinion

chooses to focus on the article "a." As correctly pointed out in the original
dissent of Justice Robert A bad, the entire phrase includes the words
"representative of Congress" and "ex officio Members." In the context of
the constitutional plan involving a bicameral Congress, these words create
ambiguity.

A Bicameral Congress

Our Constitution creates a Congress consisting of two chambers. Thus, in

Article VI, Section 1, the Constitution provides the following:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines

DISSENTING OPINION which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives x x x.
(Emphasis provided)
LEONEN, J.:
Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines".1 Members of the House of Representatives, on the other
I dissent.
hand, are elected by legislative districts2 or through the party list
system.3 The term of a Senator 4 is different from that of a Member of the
House of Representatives.5 Therefore, the Senate and the House of
Representatives while component parts of the Congress are not the same
in terms of their representation. The very rationale of a bicameral system is
to have the Senators represent a national constituency. Representatives of
the House of Representatives, on the other hand, are dominantly from
legislative districts except for one fifth which are from the party list system.
Each chamber is organized separately. 6 The Senate and the House each
promulgates their own rules of procedure. 7 Each chamber maintains
separate Journals.8 They each have separate Records of their
proceedings.9The Senate and the House of Representatives discipline their
own respective members.10
To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the
Philippines, but there is a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives. There is no single journal for the Congress of the
Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the
House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the
Senate and a Record of proceedings for the House of Representatives.
The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the
Senate that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.
Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its
members.
No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she
reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of Representatives reports
to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House
of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Congress does not exist separate from the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get
directions from the Senate. By constitutional design, he or she cannot get
instructions from the House of Representatives. If a Senator represents the
Congress rather than simply the Senate, then he or she must be open to
amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate if the
House of Representatives’ instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution
vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives.
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No
Member of the House of Representatives may carry instructions from the
Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the House of Representatives may
therefore represent Congress as a whole.
The difference between the Senate and the House of Representative was
a subject of discussion in the Constitutional Commission. In the July 21,
1986 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Jose F. S.
Bengzon presented the following argument during the discussion on
bicameralism, on the distinction between Congressmen and Senators, and
the role of the Filipino people in making these officials accountable:
I grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives
are closer to the people that they represent. I grant the proposition that the
Members of the House of Representatives campaign on a one-to-one
basis with the people in the barrios and their constituencies. I also grant
the proposition that the candidates for Senator do not have as much time
to mingle around with their constituencies in their respective home bases
as the candidates for the House. I also grant the proposition that the
candidates for the Senate go around the country in their efforts to win the
votes of all the members of the electorate at a lesser time than that given
to the candidates for the House of Representatives. But then the lesson of
the last 14 years has made us mature in our political thinking and has
given us political will and self-determination. We really cannot disassociate
the fact that the Congressman, the Member of the House of
Representatives, no matter how national he would like to think, is very
much strongly drawn into the problems of his local constituents in his own
district.
Due to the maturity of the Filipinos for the last 14 years and because of the
emergence of people power, I believe that this so-called people power can
be used to monitor not only the Members of the House of Representatives
but also the Members of the Senate. As I said we may have probably
adopted the American formula in the beginning but over these years, I
think we have developed that kind of a system and adopted it to our own
needs. So at this point in time, with people power working, it is not only the
Members of the House who can be subjected to people power but also the
Members of the Senate because they can also be picketed and criticized
through written articles and talk shows. And even the people not only from
their constituencies in their respective regions and districts but from the
whole country can exercise people power against the Members of the
Senate because they are supposed to represent the entire country. So
while the Members of Congress become unconsciously parochial in their
desire to help their constituencies, the Members of the Senate are there to
take a look at all of these parochial proposals and coordinate them with the
national problems. They may be detached in that sense but they are not
detached from the people because they themselves know and realize that
they owe their position not only to the people from their respective
provinces but also to the people from the whole country. So, I say that
people power now will be able to monitor the activities of the Members of
the House of Representatives and that very same people power can be
also used to monitor the activities of the Members of the Senate. 11
Commissioner Bengzon provided an illustration of the fundamental
distinction between the House of Representatives and the Senate,
particularly regarding their respective constituencies and electorate. These
differences, however, only illustrate that the work of the Senate and the
House of Representatives taken together results in a Congress functioning
as one branch of government. Article VI, Section 1, as approved by the
Commission, spoke of one Congress whose powers are vested in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of Congress"
should participate in the Judicial and Bar Council, it cannot mean a
Senator carrying out the instructions of the House or a Member of the
House of Representative carrying out instructions from the Senate. It is not
the kind of a single Congress contemplated by our Constitution. The
opinion therefore that a Senator or a Member of the House of
Representative may represent the Congress as a whole is contrary to the
intent of the Constitution. It is unworkable.
One mechanism used in the past to work out the consequence of the
majority’s opinion is to allow a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representative to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council but to each allow them
only half a vote.
Within the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chief Justice is entitled to one
vote. The Secretary of Justice is also entitled to one whole vote and so are
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the private sector, legal academia,
and retired justices. Each of these sectors are given equal importance and
rewarded with one whole vote. However, in this view, the Senate is only
worth fifty percent of the wisdom of these sectors. Likewise, the wisdom of
the House of Representatives is only worth fifty percent of these
institutions.
This is constitutionally abominable. It is inconceivable that our people, in
ratifying the Constitution granting awesome powers to Congress, intended
to diminish its component parts. After all, they are institutions composed of
people who have submitted themselves to the electorate. In creating
shortlists of possible candidates to the judiciary, we can safely suppose
that their input is not less than the input of the professor of law or the
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or the member from the
private sector.
The other solution done in the past was to alternate the seat between a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and the
House of Representatives would mean not giving a seat to the Congress at
all. Again, when a Senator is seated, he or she represents the Senate and
not Congress as a whole. When a Member of the House of Representative
is seated, he or she can only represent Congress as a whole. Thus,
alternating the seat not only diminishes congressional representation; it
negates it.
Constitutional Interpretation
The argument that swayed the majority in this case’s original decision was
that if those who crafted our Constitution intended that there be two
representatives from Congress, it would not have used the preposition "a"
in Article VIII, Section 8 (1). However, beyond the number of
representatives, the Constitution intends that in the Judicial and Bar
Council, there will be representation from Congress and that it will be "ex
officio", i.e., by virtue of their positions or offices. We note that the provision
did not provide for a number of members to the Judicial and Bar Council.
This is unlike the provisions creating many other bodies in the
Constitution.12
In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only from the
preposition "a" and from there provide a meaning that ensures a difficult
and unworkable result -- one which undermines the concept of a bicameral
congress implied in all the other 114 other places in the Constitution that
uses the word "Congress".
Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is within
the expectations of the people who ratified the Constitution by also seeing
and reading the words "representative of Congress" and "ex officio."
This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet regarding the
authoritativeness of the text of the Constitution. It does not detract from the
text. It follows the canonical requirement of verba legis. But in doing so, we
encounter an ambiguity.
In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 we said:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio
legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history
of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing
of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind
the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional
provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. Consequently,
the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not
the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis
provided)
And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,13 we said:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that
the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.
The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable result
or one which undermines the intended structure of government provided in
the Constitution. Text is authoritative, but it is not exhaustive of the entire
universe of meaning.
There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to the
meaning of "representative of Congress" and "ex officio." There is no
compelling reason why there should only be one representative of a
bicameral Congress.
Proposed Reasons for Only One Representative of Congress
The first reason to support the need for only one representative of
Congress is the belief that there needs to be an odd number in the Judicial
and Bar Council.
This is true only if the decision of the constitutional organ in question is a
dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no. It is in this sense that a tie-breaker
will be necessary.
However, the Judicial and Bar Council is not that sort of a constitutional
organ. Its duty is to provide the President with a shortlist of candidates to
every judicial position. We take judicial notice that for vacancies, each
member of the Judicial and Bar Council is asked to list at least three (3)
names. All these votes are tallied and those who garner a specific plurality
are thus put on the list and transmitted to the President. There had been
no occasion when the Judicial and Bar Council ever needed to break a tie.
The Judicial and Bar Council’s functions proceed regardless of whether
they have seven or eight members.
The second reason that the main opinion accepted as persuasive was the
opinion that Congress does not discharge its function to check and balance
the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in the Judicial and Bar
Council. From this premise, it then proceeds to argue that the
Representative of Congress, who is ex officio, does not need to consult
with Congress as a whole.
This is very perplexing and difficult to accept.
By virtue of the fundamental premise of separation of powers, the
appointing power in the judiciary should be done by the Supreme Court.
However, for judicial positions, this is vested in the Executive. Furthermore,
because of the importance of these appointments, the President’s
discretion is limited to a shortlist submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar
Council which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court but
composed of several components.
The Judicial and Bar Council represents the constituents affected by
judicial appointments and by extension, judicial decisions. It provides for
those who have some function vis a vis the law that should be applied and
interpreted by our courts. Hence, represented are practicing lawyers
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines), prosecutors (Secretary of the
Department of Justice), legal academia (professor of law), and judges or
justices (retired justice and the Chief Justice). Also represented in some
way are those that will be affected by the interpretation directly (private
sector representative).
Congress is represented for many reasons.
One, it crafts statutes and to that extent may want to ensure that those who
are appointed to the judiciary are familiar with these statutes and will have
the competence, integrity, and independence to read its meaning.
Two, the power of judicial review vests our courts with the ability to nullify
their acts. Congress, therefore, has an interest in the judicial philosophy of
those considered for appointment into our judiciary.
Three, Congress is a political organ. As such, it is familiar with the biases
of our political leaders including that of the President. Thus, it will have
greater sensitivity to the necessity for political accommodations if there be
any. Keeping in mind the independence required of our judges and
justices, the Members of Congress may be able to appreciate the kind of
balance that will be necessary -- the same balance that the President
might be able to likewise appreciate -- when putting a person in the
shortlist of judicial candidates. Not only do they appreciate this balance,
they embody it. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
(unlike any of the other members of the Judicial and Bar Council),
periodically submit themselves to the electorate.
It is for these reasons that the Congressional representatives in the
Judicial and Bar Council may be instructed by their respective chambers to
consider some principles and directions. Through resolutions or actions by
the Congressional Committees they represent, the JBC Congressional
representatives’ choices may be constrained. Therefore, they do not sit
there just to represent themselves. Again, they are "representatives of
Congress" "ex officio".
The third reason to support only one representative of Congress is the
belief that there is the "unmistakable tenor" in the provision in question that
one co-equal branch should be represented only by one
Representative.14 It may be true that the Secretary of Justice is the political
alter ego of the President or the Executive. However, Congress as a whole
does not have a political alter ego. In other words, while the Executive may
be represented by a single individual, Congress cannot be represented by
an individual. Congress, as stated earlier, operates through the Senate and
the House of Representatives. Unlike the Executive, the Legislative branch
cannot be represented by only one individual.
A Note on the Work of the Constitutional Commission
Time and again, we have clarified the interpretative value to Us of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thus in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, we emphasized:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms
of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention ‘are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give Us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.’The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers’ understanding thereof.15 (Emphasis provided)
Also worth Our recall is the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr.
on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:16
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could
discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the
Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it,
surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond
what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote
and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may
sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop
on theirs.17 (Emphasis provided)
In addition to the interpretative value of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission, we should always be careful when we quote from their
records without understanding their context.
The Committees of the Constitutional Commission were all tasked to finish
their reports not later than July 7, 1986. 18 The Second and Third Readings
were scheduled to finish not later than August 15, 1986. 19 The members of
the Sponsorship and Style Committee were tasked to finish their work of
formulating and polishing the style of the final draft of the new Constitution
scheduled for submission to the entire membership of the Commission not
later than August 25, 1986.20
The Rules of the Constitutional Commission also provided for a process of
approving resolutions and amendments.
Constitutional proposals were embodied in resolutions signed by the
author.21 If they emanated from a committee, the resolution was signed by
its chairman.22 Resolutions were filed with the Secretary-General. 23 The
First Reading took place when the titles of the resolutions were read and
referred to the appropriate committee.24
The Committees then submitted a Report on each resolution. 25 The
Steering Committee took charge of including the committee report in the
Calendar for Second Reading. 26 The Second Reading took place on the
day set for the consideration of a resolution. 27 The provisions were read in
full with the amendments proposed by the committee, if there were any. 28
A motion to close debate took place after three speeches for and two
against, or if only one speech has been raised and none against it. 29 The
President of the Constitutional Commission had the prerogative to allow
debates among those who had indicated that they intended to be heard on
certain matters.30 After the close of the debate, the Constitutional
Commission proceeded to consider the Committee amendments. 31
After a resolution was approved on Second Reading, it was included in the
Calendar for Third Reading. 32 Neither further debate nor amendment shall
be made on the resolution on its Third Reading. 33 All constitutional
proposals approved by the Commission after Third Reading were referred
to the Committees on Sponsorship and Style for collation, organization,
and consolidation into a complete and final draft of the Constitution. 34 The
final draft was submitted to the Commission for the sole purpose of
determining whether it reflects faithfully and accurately the proposals as
approved on Second Reading.35
With respect to the provision which is now Article VIII, Section 8 (1), the
timetable was as follows:
On July 10, 1986, the Committee on the Judiciary presented its Report to
the Commission.36 Deliberations then took place on the same day; on July
11, 1986; and on July 14, 1986. It was on July 10 that Commissioner
Rodrigo raised points regarding the Judicial and Bar Council. 37 The
discussion spoke of the Judicial and Bar Council having seven members.
Numerous mentions of the Judicial and Bar Council being comprised of
seven members were also made by Commissioners on July 14, 1986. On
the same day, the amended article was approved by unanimous voting. 38
On July 19, 1986, the vote on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary
took place.39 The vote was 43 and none against. 40
Committee Report No. 22 proposing an article on a National Assembly was
reported out by July 21, 1986. 41 It provided for a unicameral assembly.
Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., made the presentation and stated that
they had a very difficult decision to make regarding bicameralism and
unicameralism.42 The debate occupied the Commission for the whole day.
Then, a vote on the structure of Congress took place. 43 Forty four (44)
commissioners cast their votes during the roll call. 44 The vote was 23 to
22.45
On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened for xxxx
purposes of introducing amendments to the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10,
11, 13, and 14.46 MR. RODRIGO: Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council,
the President appoints four of them who are the regular members.
On October 9, 1986, the entire Article on the Legislature was approved on
Third Reading.47 xxxx

By October 10, 1986, changes in style on the Article on the Legislature MR. CONCEPCION: The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate
were introduced.48 partisan politics.51

On October 15, 1986, Commissioner Guingona presented the 1986 xxxx

Constitution to the President of the Constitutional Commission, Cecilia
Munoz-Palma.49 It must also be noted that during the same day and in the same discussion,
both Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion later on referred to a
It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission either through the Style ‘National Assembly’ and not a ‘Congress,’ as can be seen here:
and Sponsorship Committee or the Committees on the Legislature and the
Judiciary was not able to amend the provision concerning the Judicial and MR. RODRIGO: Another point. Under our present Constitution, the
Bar Council after the Commission had decided to propose a bicameral National Assembly may enact rules of court, is that right? On page 4, the
Congress. We can take judicial notice of the chronology of events during proviso on lines 17 to 19 of the Article on the Judiciary provides:
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The chronology should
be taken as much as the substance of discussions exchanged between the
The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with
Commissioners.
the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
The quotations from the Commissioners mentioned in the main opinion
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
and in the proposed resolution of the present Motion for Reconsideration
should thus be appreciated in its proper context.
MR. RODRIGO: So, two things are required of the National Assembly
before it can repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning the
The interpellation involving Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion took
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, etc. — it must
place on July 10, 1986 and on July 14, 1986. 50 These discussions were
have the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
about Committee Report No. 18 on the Judiciary. Thus:
MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.52
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On July 14, 1986, the Commission proceeded with the Period of
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of
Amendments. This was when the exchange noted in the main opinion took
members of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts. At present it
place. Thus:
is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on
Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to establish MR. RODRIGO: If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be
a new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members, called the exactly the same as the provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII,
Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the Section 5.
members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this
Council. xxxx
If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the
Judicial and Bar Council, this will be a diminution of the appointing power
of the highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the Philippines
elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a
group of seven people who are not elected by the people but only
appointed.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in
our constitutional provisions on appointments. The members of the
Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a
municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of three names by this committee of seven
people, commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and
Commission on Civil Service x x x even ambassadors, generals of the
Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate
the Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of the
high-ranking officials?
Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch
the honor of our President without being effective at all because this
Council will be under the influence of the President. Four out of seven are
appointees of the President, and they can be reappointed when their term
ends. Therefore, they would kowtow to the President. A fifth member is the
Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member
represents the legislature. In all probability, the controlling party in the
legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative from
the National Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And
may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that even the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So, it is futile; he will be
influenced anyway by the President. 53
It must again be noted that during this day and period of amendments after
the quoted passage in the Decision, the Commission later on made use of
the term ‘National Assembly’ and not ‘Congress’ again:
MR. MAAMBONG: Presiding Officer and members of the Committee, I
propose to delete the last sentence on Section 16, lines 28 to 30 which
reads: "The Chief Justice shall address the National Assembly at the
opening of each regular session."
May I explain that I have gone over the operations of other deliberative
assemblies in some parts of the world, and I noticed that it is only the Chief
Executive or head of state who addresses the National Assembly at its
opening. When we say "opening," we are referring to the first convening of
any national assembly. Hence, when the Chief Executive or head of state
addresses the National Assembly on that occasion, no other speaker is
allowed to address the body.
So I move for the deletion of this last sentence. 54
Based on the chronology of events, the discussions cited by the main
ponencia took place when the commissioners were still contemplating a
unicameral legislature in the course of this discussion. Necessarily, only
one Representative would be needed to fully effect the participation of a
unicameral legislature. Therefore, any mention of the composition of the
JBC having seven members in the records of the Constitutional
Commission, particularly during the dates cited, was obviously within the
context that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a
bicameral legislature.
The composition of the Congress as a bilateral legislature became final
only after the JBC discussions as a seven-member Council indicated in the
Records of the Constitutional Commission took place. This puts into the
proper context the recognition by Commissioner Christian Monsod on July
30, 1986, which runs as follows:
Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic
of what the thinking of this group is, that all the provisions that were being
drafted up to that time assumed a unicameral government. 55
The repeated mentions of the JBC having seven members as indicated in
the Records of the Constitutional Commission do not justify the points
raised by petitioner. This is a situation where the records of the
Constitutional Commission do not serve even as persuasive means to
ascertain intent at least in so far as the intended numbers for the Judicial
and Bar Council. Certainly they are not relevant even to advise us on how
Congress is to be represented in that constitutional organ.
We should never forget that when we interpret the Constitution, we do so
with full appreciation of every part of the text within an entire document
understood by the people as they ratified it and with all its contemporary
consequences. As an eminent author in constitutional theory has observed
while going through the various interpretative modes presented in
jurisprudence: "x x x all of the methodologies that will be discussed,
properly understood, figure in constitutional analysis as opportunities: as

starting points, constituent parts of complex arguments, or concluding
evocations." 56
Discerning that there should be a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representatives that sit in the Judicial and Bar Council so that Congress
can be fully represented ex officio is not judicial activism. It is in keeping
with the constitutional project of a bicameral Congress that is effective
whenever and wherever it is represented. It is in tune with how our people
understand Congress as described in the fundamental law. It is consistent
with our duty to read the authoritative text of the Constitution so that
ordinary people who seek to understand this most basic law through Our
decisions would understand that beyond a single isolated text -- even
beyond a prepos1t10n in Article VIII, Section 8 (1 ), our primordial values
and principles are framed, congealed and will be given full effect.
In a sense, we do not just read words in a legal document; we give
meaning to a Constitution.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration and deny
the Petition for lack of merit.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 2.
2
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5 (1).
3
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2). See also the recent case of Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC et al., G.R. No. 203766, for the most recent
discussion on the nature of the party list system.
4
 The term of a senator is six years, extendible for another term.
CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 4.
5
 The term of a member of the House of Representatives is three years,
and may be extendible for three consecutive terms. CONSTITUTION, Art.
VI, Sec. 7.
6
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16.
7
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1).
8
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4), par. (1).
9
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4), par. (2).
10
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3).
11
 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 63 (July 21, 1986).
12
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 2: The Senate shall be composed of
twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters
of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.;
Art. VI, Sec. 5: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law...;
Art. VI, Sec. 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be…;
Art. VI, Sec. 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting
of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators,
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein.;
Art. VIII, Sec. 4.1: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members...;
Art. IX (B), Sec. 1: The civil service shall be administered by the Civil
Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners...;
 20
Art. IX (C), Sec. 1: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule II, Sec. 9.
a Chairman and six Commissioners...;
21
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.
Art. IX (D), Sec. 1: There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners...; 22
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.

Art. XI, Sec. 11: There is hereby created the independent Office of the 23
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and 24
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 21.
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.; 25
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 22.
Art. XII, Sec. 17 (2): The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be 26
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 22.
composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the 27
Bar.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 23.

28
13
 Atty. Romulo A. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 23.
191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, 797-799.
29
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 24.
13
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February
30
22, 1981, 194 SCRA 317, 325.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 25.

31
14
 Francisco I. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 26.
Escudero and Rep. Neil C. Tupas, Jr., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, p.
32
18.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 27.

33
15
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra at 337.  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 27.

34
16
 Charles P. Curtis. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2, Houghton Mifflin,  Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 29.
1947.
35
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 29.
17
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412
Phil. 308, 363 (2001). 36
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 27
(Thursday, July 10, 1986).
18
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION Appendix 2, p. 1900,
(July 10, 1986), PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 50, RESOLUTION 37
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, RECORD NO. 27
PROVIDING FOR THE RULES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL (Thursday, July 10, 1986).
COMMISSION (PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 50), Rule II, Sec. 9.
38
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 27
19
 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule II, Sec. 9. (Thursday, July 10, 1986).
39
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34 UP Law Constitution Project analyzes exhaustively the best features and
(Saturday, July 19, 1986). the disadvantages of each. Our people, having experienced both systems,
are faced with a difficult decision to make.
40
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34
(Saturday, July 19, 1986). Madam President and my dear colleagues, even in our own Committee, I
had to break the tie in favor of unicameralism. Commissioner Sarmiento, in
41
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34 his Resolution No. 396, aptly stated that the Philippines needs a
(Saturday, July 19, 1986), which reads: unicameral legislative assembly which is truly representative of the people,
responsive to their needs and welfare, economical to maintain and efficient
RECONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL, ON THIRD READING, OF THE and effective in the exercise of its powers, functions and duties in the
ARTICLE ON THE JUDICIARY. On motion of Mr. Bengzon, there being no discharge of its responsibilities. Commissioner Tingson, however, said that
objection, the Body reconsidered the approval, on Third Reading, of the despite its simplicity of organization, resulting in economy and efficiency,
Article on the Judiciary, to afford the other Members opportunity to cast and achieving a closer relationship between the legislative and executive, it
their votes. Thereupon, upon direction of the Chair, the Secretary-General also resulted in the authoritarian manipulation by the Chief Executive,
called the Roll for nominal voting and the following Members cast an depriving in the process the people from expressing their true sentiments
affirmative vote: through their chosen representatives. Thus, under Resolution No. 321,
Commissioner Tingson calls for the restoration of the bicameral form of
legislature to maximize the participation of people in decision-making.
Abubakar
43
 I, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 35,
Alonto
(Monday July 21, 1986).
Azcuna 44
 I, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 35,
(Monday July 21, 1986), which reads in part:
Natividad
xxx
Tadeo
With 22 Members voting for a unicameral system and 23 Members voting
With 5 additional affirmative votes, making a total of 43 Members voting in for bicameralism, the Body approved the proposal for a bicameral
favor and none against, the Chair declared the Article on the Judiciary legislature.
approved on Third Reading.
45
42
 Bernas, Joaquin, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, NO. 35 (Monday, July WRITERS, 1995, pp. 310-311.
21, 1986), which reads in part:
46
 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 102
MR. DAVIDE: (Tuesday and Wednesday, October 7 and 8, 1987).

xxx 47
 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 103
(Thursday, October 9, 1986), which reads in part:
A Unicameral Structure of the National Assembly. — In the records of the
1935 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions, and now the 1986 xxx
Constitutional Commission, advocates of unicameralism and bicameralism
have eloquently discoursed on the matter. The draft proposal of the 1986
 56
With 29 Members voting in favor, none against and 7 abstentions, the  Lawrence Tribe, as cited in It is a Constitution We Are Expounding, p. 21
Body approved, on Third Reading, the Article on the Legislative. (2009), previously published in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
Chapter 1: Approaches to Constitutional Analysis (3rd ed.2000).
48
 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 104
(Friday, October 10, 1986).

49
 V, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 109
(Wednesday, October 15, 1986), which reads in part:

xxx

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, I have the honor on behalf of the

Sponsorship Committee to officially announce that on October 12, the
1986 Constitutional Commission had completed under the able, firm and
dedicated leadership of our President, the Honorable Cecilia Muñoz
Palma, the task of drafting a Constitution for our people, a Constitution
reflective of the spirit of the time — a spirit of nationalism, a spirit of
dedication to the democratic way of life, a spirit of liberation and rising
expectations, a spirit of confidence in the Filipino. On that day, Madam
President, the Members of this Constitutional Commission had approved
on Third Reading the draft Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
— a practical instrument suited to the circumstances of our time but which
is broad enough to allow future generations to respond to challenges which
we of this generation could not foretell, a Charter which would seek to
establish in this fair land a community characterized by social progress,
political stability, economic prosperity, peace, justice and freedom for all…

50
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986) AND
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 486-487 (July 14, 1986).

51
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986).

52
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986).

53
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 486-487 (July 14, 1986).

54
 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 510 (July 14, 1986).

55
 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 434 (July 30, 1986).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190779               March 26, 2010
ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO, Petitioner,  airsoft gun and its replica/imitation in going to and from the game site and
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 questioning the validity of Resolution No.
8714 insofar as it provides that the term "firearm" includes airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations, which results in their coverage by the gun ban
during the election period this year.
Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing,
Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2)
Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security
Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. The Resolution was promulgated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on December 16, 2009, and took
effect on December 25, 2009.
Resolution No. 8714 contains the implementing rules and regulations of
Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms) and Section 33 (Security Personnel and
Bodyguards) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, entitled An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
Section 1 of Resolution No. 8714 prohibits an unauthorized person from
bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public
places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or
public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during
the election period.
Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term "firearm" includes
"airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that can
cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real." Hence, airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban during the election
period from January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010.
Petitioner claims that he is a real party-in-interest, because he has been
playing airsoft since the year 2000. The continuing implementation of
Resolution No. 8714 will put him in danger of sustaining direct injury or
make him liable for an election offense 2 if caught in possession of an
playing the sport during the election period.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in including "airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations" in the definition of "firearm" in Resolution No.
8714, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions "airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations." He asserts that the intendment of R.A. No.
7166 is that the term "firearm" refers to real firearm in its common and
ordinary usage. In support of this assertion, he cites the Senate
deliberation on the bill,3 which later became R.A. No. 7166, where it was
clarified that an unauthorized person caught carrying a firearm during the
election period is guilty of an election offense under Section 261 (q) of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Further, petitioner alleges that there is no law that covers airsoft guns. By
including airsoft guns in the definition of "firearm," Resolution No. 8714, in
effect, criminalizes the sport, since the possession of an airsoft gun or its
replica/imitation is now an election offense, although there is still no law
that governs the use thereof.
Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows: (1) Annulling
Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includes airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations within the meaning of "firearm," and declaring the
Resolution as invalid; (2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further
implementing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations are concerned; (3) ordering the COMELEC to amend
Resolution No. 8714 by removing airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations
within the meaning of "firearm"; and (4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a
Resolution directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police and other law enforcement agencies deputized by the
COMELEC to desist from further enforcing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
"firearm" in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
and for Other Purposes)4 provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. − During the election period, no person
shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public
places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public
conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless
authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses
shall be suspended during the election period.
Only regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and other law enforcement agencies of
the Government who are duly deputized in writing by the Commission for
election duty may be authorized to carry and possess firearms during the
election period: Provided, That, when in the possession of firearms, the
deputized law enforcement officer must be: (a) in full uniform showing
clearly and legibly his name, rank and serial number, which shall remain
visible at all times; and (b) in the actual performance of his election duty in
the specific area designated by the Commission.
xxxx
SEC. 35. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission shall issue rules and
regulations to implement this Act. Said rules shall be published in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 8714, which contains the implementing rules and
regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. The pertinent portion
of the Resolution states:
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881), Republic Acts Nos. 6646, 7166, 8189, 8436, 9189, 9369
and other elections laws, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to promulgate the following rules and regulations to
implement Sections 32 and 33 of Republic Act No. 7166 in connection with
the conduct of the May 10, 2010 national and local elections:
SECTION 1. General Guiding Principles. – During the election period: (a)
no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons
in public places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private
vehicles or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the
same; and (b) no candidate for public office, including incumbent public
officers seeking election to any public office, shall employ, avail himself of
or engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether or not
such bodyguards are regular members or officers of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or other law
enforcement agency of the Government.
The transport of firearms of those who are engaged in the manufacture,
importation, exportation, purchase, sale of firearms, explosives and their
spare parts or those involving the transportation of firearms, explosives
and their spare parts, may, with prior notice to the Commission, be
authorized by the Director General of the PNP provided that the firearms,
explosives and their spare parts are immediately transported to the
Firearms and Explosives Division, CSG, PNP.
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Resolution:
(a) Election Period refers to the election period prescribed in Comelec
Resolution No. 8646 dated 14 July 2009 which is from 10 January 2010 to
09 June 2010;
(b) Firearm shall refer to the "firearm" as defined in existing laws, rules and
regulations. The term also includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their
replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to
believe that they are real;
(c) Deadly weapon includes bladed instrument, handgrenades or other
explosives, except pyrotechnics.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Who May Bear Firearms. − Only the following persons who are in
the regular plantilla of the PNP or AFP or other law enforcement agencies
are authorized to bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons
during the election period:
(a) Regular member or officer of the PNP, the AFP and other law
enforcement agencies of the Government, provided that when in the
possession of firearm, he is: (1) in the regular plantilla of the said agencies
and is receiving regular compensation for the services rendered in said
agencies; and (2) in the agency-prescribed uniform showing clearly and
legibly his name, rank and serial number or, in case rank and serial
number are inapplicable, his agency-issued identification card showing
clearly his name and position, which identification card shall remain visible
at all times; (3) duly licensed to possess firearm and to carry the same
outside of residence by means of a valid mission order or letter order; and
(4) in the actual performance of official law enforcement duty, or in going to
or returning from his residence/barracks or official station.
xxxx
(b) Member of privately owned or operated security, investigative,
protective or intelligence agencies duly authorized by the PNP, provided
that when in the possession of firearm, he is: (1) in the agency-prescribed
uniform with his agency-issued identification card prominently displayed
and visible at all times, showing clearly his name and position; and (2) in
the actual performance of duty at his specified place/area of duty.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Enforcement. – Any person who, not wearing the authorized
uniform mentioned herein, bears, carries or transports firearm or other
deadly weapon, shall be presumed unauthorized to carry firearms and
subject to arrest.5
Petitioner contends that under R.A. No. 7166, the term "firearm" connotes
real firearm. Moreover, R.A. No. 7166 does not mention airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations. Hence, its implementing rules and regulations
contained in Resolution No. 8714 should not include airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the definition of the term "firearm."
The Court is not persuaded.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor 6 held:
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law.7
Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No.
8714 pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to
issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A.
No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to
provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons, as well as the definition of "firearms," among others.
These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a
constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on
election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In its Comment,8 the COMELEC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, states that the COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns
in the term "firearm" and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is
to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation
or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to
distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the
will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a
recreational gun, which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the objective is
to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections this year.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, there is a regulation that governs the
possession and carriage of airsoft rifles/pistols, namely, Philippine National
Police (PNP) Circular No. 11 dated December 4, 2007, entitled Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Importation,
Exportation, Sale, Possession, Carrying of Airsoft Rifles/Pistols and
Operation of Airsoft Game Sites and Airsoft Teams. The Circular defines
an airsoft gun as follows:
Airsoft Rifle/Pistol x x x includes "battery operated, spring and gas type
powered rifles/pistols which discharge plastic or rubber pellets only as
bullets or ammunition. This differs from replica as the latter does not fire
plastic or rubber pellet.
PNP Circular No. 11 classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a special type of air
gun, which is restricted in its use only to sporting activities, such as war
game simulation.9 Any person who desires to possess an airsoft rifle/pistol
needs a license from the PNP, and he shall file his application in
accordance with PNP Standard Operating Procedure No. 13, which
prescribes the procedure to be followed in the licensing of firearms. 10 The
minimum age limit of the applicant is 18 years old. 11 The Circular also
requires a Permit to Transport an airsoft rifle/pistol from the place of
residence to any game or exhibition site.12
A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other
regulated fields, does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed.13
The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution
No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period is a
reasonable restriction, the objective of which is to ensure the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.1avvphi1
However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and
airguns from the term "firearm" under Resolution No. 8714, because they
are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns.
Petitioner further contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance
with the State policies in these constitutional provisions:
Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
xxx
Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x x x sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among
family members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the
State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to
choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner
contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, states that it
adheres to the aforementioned state policies, but even constitutional
freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some extent to
serve appropriate and important interests.
As a long-time player of the airsoft sport, it is presumed that petitioner has
a license to possess an airsoft gun. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that
a licensee of an airsoft gun is subject to the restrictions imposed upon him
by PNP Circular No. 11 and other valid restrictions, such as Resolution No.
8714. These restrictions exist in spite of the aforementioned State policies,
which do not directly uphold a licensee’s absolute right to possess or carry
an airsoft gun under any circumstance.
Petitioner’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion by respondent
COMELEC implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of power
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.14
The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
including airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution No.
8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with the
apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections
this year. However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns
are excluded from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion
of replicas and imitations of airsoft guns from the term "firearm" is MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are hereby Associate Justice Associate Justice
declared excluded from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. The
petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the
term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
covered by the gun ban during the election period. Associate Justice

No costs. CERTIFICATION

SO ORDERED. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
Associate Justice the Court.

WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice
Footnotes
**
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
*
Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice  On official leave.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
**
 Acting Chief Justice.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
1
Associate Justice  Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
2
 The election offense of carrying firearms outside residence or place of
business is punished with imprisonment of not less than one year, but not
more than six years; and the guilty party shall not be subject to probation.
In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to
hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. [Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881, Sections 261 (q) and 264.]
3
 Petition, rollo, pp. 10-11.

4
 Approved on November 26, 1991.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
5
Associate Justice Associate Justice  Emphasis supplied.

6
 G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 581.
7
 Id. at 599-600. (Emphasis supplied.)

8
 Rollo, pp. 35-53.

9
 Paragraph V (Restriction), PNP Circular No. 11 dated December 4, 2007.

10
 Paragraph VIII (Registration), PNP Circular No. 11 dated December 4,
2007.

11
 Id.

12
 Paragraph IX (Transport of Airsoft Rifle/Pistol), PNP Circular No. 11
dated December 4, 2007.

13
 See Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534.

14
 Sangcopan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 170216, March 12,
2008, 548 SCRA 148, 158-159.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I concur with the majority’s decision and add the following discussions in its
support.
The Law on Firearms
The definition of "firearm" has evolved through various statutes and
issuances.
Under Act No. 1780, 1 a firearm was defined as any rifle, musket, carbine,
shotgun, revolver, pistol or air rifle, except air rifles of small caliber and
limited range used as toys, or any other deadly weapon from which a
bullet, ball, shot, shell or other missile or missiles may be discharged by
means of gunpowder or other explosive; the barrel of any of the same shall
be considered a firearm.
Under Act No. 27112 (which repealed Act No. 1780), firearms include rifles,
muskets, carbines, shotguns, revolvers, pistols and all other deadly
weapons from which a bullet, ball, shot, shell or other missile may be
discharged by means of gunpowder or other explosives; the term also
includes air rifles except such as being a small caliber and limited range
used as toys; the barrel of any firearm shall be considered a complete
firearm for all the purposes hereof.
Commonwealth Act No. 466, as amended, 3 follows the definition under Act
No. 2711, with the modification that the term firearms include air rifles
coming under regulations of the Provost Marshal General.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866 4 codifies the laws on illegal/unlawful
possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition of firearms,
ammunition or explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunition or explosives, and imposed stiffer penalties for its
violation. It does not, however, define the term firearm. The definition is
provided in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1866 as
follows:
Firearm – as herein used, includes rifles, muskets, carbines, shotguns,
revolvers, pistols and all other deadly weapons from which a bullet, ball,
shot, shell or other missile may be discharged by means of gunpowder or
other explosives. The term also includes air rifles and air pistols not
classified as toys under the provisions of Executive Order No. 712 dated
28 July 1981. The barrel of any firearm shall be considered a complete
firearm. [Emphasis supplied.]
Executive Order (EO) No. 712, to which the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of PD 1866 refers, regulates the manufacture, sale and
possession of air rifles/pistols which are considered as firearms. Under its
Section 1, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary is given the authority to
prescribe the criteria in determining whether an air rifle/pistol is to be
considered a firearm or a toy within the contemplation of Sec. 877 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Under Section 3, the Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary is also delegated the authority to act dispositively on all
applications to manufacture, sell or possess and/or otherwise deal in air
rifles/pistols whether considered as firearms or toys under the criteria to be
prescribed pursuant to Section 1. The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary
shall also prescribe, under Section 4, the rules and regulations to
implement EO 712.
Republic Act (RA) No. 8294 5, which amended PD 1866, also does not
define the term firearm but categorizes it into two: (1) low powered firearm
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower;
and (2) high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter, such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45
and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with
firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three.
The Election Firearms Ban under RA 7166
When a statute defines the particular words and phrases it uses, the
legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective
of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual
sense; otherwise put, where a statute defines a word or phrase employed
therein, the word or phrase should not, by construction, be given a different
meaning; the legislature, in adopting a specific definition, is deemed to
have restricted the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition. 6
Significantly, RA 7166 did not provide a statutory definition of the term
"firearms." The absence of this statutory definition leads to the question of
what the term "firearms" under RA 7166 exactly contemplates? Various
rules of statutory construction may be used to consider this query.
First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is
that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be
given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should
be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted
usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are
presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and
common use and acceptation.7
Second, a word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its
ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is
intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally
spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be
understood in a general sense.8
Third, a word of general signification employed in a statute should be
construed, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, to
comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its
enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well. This
rule of construction, known as progressive interpretation, extends by
construction the application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within
its general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to its
passage, and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and
transitory.9
Fourth, as a general rule, words that have or have been used in a technical
sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have
been previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal
meaning of the words; the presumption is that the language used in a
statute, which has a technical or well-known legal meaning, is used in that
sense by the legislature.10
We cannot apply the first cited rule, under which a firearm could mean a
weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder 11 - this is the
common usage or acceptation of the term. Specifically, we cannot apply
the rule as there previously existed a more comprehensive definition of the
term under our legal tradition, i.e., the definition originally provided under
Act 1780 which Act 2711 substantially adopted. Under this cited statutory
definition, the term "firearms" may include any other weapon from which a
bullet, ball or shot, shell or other missile may be discharged by means of
gunpowder or other explosive. Thus, a weapon not using the medium of
gunpowder may also be considered a firearm.
Under the fourth rule above, the term "firearms" appears to have acquired
a technical or well-known legal meaning. The statutory definition (under Act
2711) included air rifles, except those with small caliber and limited range
and used as toys, and that the barrel of any firearm shall be considered a
complete firearm for purposes of the law regulating the manufacture, use,
possession and transport of firearms.
As our legal history or tradition on firearms shows, this old definition has
not changed. Thus, we can reasonably assume, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, that when the legislature conceived of the election firearms
ban, its understanding of the term "firearm" was in accordance with the
definition provided under the then existing laws.
However, this old definition should not bar an understanding of "firearm"
suggested by the third rule above – that RA 7166, as an act of Congress,
is not intended to be short-lived or transitory; it applies not only to existing
conditions, but also to future situations within its reasonable coverage.
Thus, the election firearms ban (RA 7166) applies as well to technological
advances and developments in modern weaponry.
It is under this context that we can examine whether an airsoft gun can be
considered a firearm. As defined,
Airsoft guns are firearm replicas, often highly detailed, manufactured for
recreational purposes. Airsoft guns propel plastic 6mm and 8mm pellets at
muzzle velocities ranging from 30 meters per second (m/s) to 180 m/s (100
feet per second [f/s] to 637ft/s) by way of compressed gas or a spring-
driven piston. Depending on the mechanism driving the pellet, an airsoft
gun can be operated manually or cycled by either compressed gas such as
Green Gas (propane), or CO2, a spring, or an electric motor. All pellets are
ultimately fired from a piston compressing a pocket of air from behind the
pellets.12
Other than firearms discharged with the use of gunpowder, the law on
firearms includes air rifles but subject to appropriate regulations that the
proper authority may promulgate as regards their categorization, whether it
is used as a toy.13 An air gun (e.g. air rifle or air pistol) is a rifle, pistol,
or shotgun which fires projectiles by means of compressed air or other gas,
in contrast to a firearm which burns a propellant. Most air guns use metallic
projectiles as ammunition. Air guns that only use plastic projectiles are
classified as airsoft guns.14
An airsoft gun appears to operate on the same principle as air rifles – i.e., it
uses compressed air – and could properly be considered to be within the
coverage of an administrative determination of whether it could be
considered a toy or a firearm. From this perspective, airsoft guns can be
considered a firearm subject to regulation by the proper authorities.
The Authority to Categorize Air Rifles and Airsoft Guns PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR
RELEVANT PURPOSES." Enacted on June 6, 1997.
Pursuant to the cited EO 712, the President, then exercising legislative
6
powers and authority, delegated to the Chief of the Constabulary [now the  Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 177-178 (2003).
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)], the authority to determine
whether certain air rifles/guns can be treated as toys or firearms. 15 Under 7
 Id. at 180.
this same authority, then PNP Chief Avelino Razon issued PNP Circular
No. 11 on December 4, 2007. 8
 Id. at 183.

PNP Circular No. 11 requires that airsoft guns and rifles be given the same 9
 Id. at 185.
treatment as firearms and air rifles with respect to licensing, manufacture,
possession and transport limitations. In effect, this is the PNP Chief’s 10
 Id. at 187.
determination, by regulation, that airsoft guns and rifles are not simply
considered toys beyond administrative regulation but, on the contrary, are 11
considered as weapons subject to regulation. Based on this Circular, they  WEBSTER’s Third New International Dictionary, 84 (1993 ed.).
are included under the term "firearms" within the contemplation of RA
12
7166, and are therefore appropriate subjects of COMELEC Resolution No.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airsoft_gun; last visited March 16, 2010.
8714 issued pursuant to this law.
13
 See Executive Order No. 712.
ARTURO D. BRION
14
Associate Justice  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gun; last visited March 16, 2010.

15
Footnotes  See Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004.

1
 An Act to Regulate the Importation, Acquisition, Possession and Transfer
of Firearms and to Prohibit the Possession of Same Except in Compliance
with the Provisions of this Act. Enacted October 12, 1907. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
2
 The Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Enacted March 10, 1917 and Manila
Effective October 1, 1917.
EN BANC
3
 National Internal Revenue Code. Enacted July 1, 1939.
G.R. No. 196201               June 19, 2012
4
 Promulgated June 29, 1983 and took effect 15 days following its
publication in the Official Gazette. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, 
5
 AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE vs.
NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON FLORENTINO VELOSO, Respondent.
ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR DECISION
EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER BRION, J.:
We review the petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by
petitioner Francisco T. Duque III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), assailing the decision1 and the resolution2  prompt admission of culpability; (3) the return of the money; and (4) the
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01682-MIN. The
CA modified CSC Resolution No. 061714, 4 finding Florentino Veloso
(respondent) guilty of dishonesty, by reducing the penalty imposed by the
CSC from dismissal from the service to suspension from office for one year
without pay.
The Facts
The records show that the respondent, then District Supervisor of Quedan
and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro
City, was administratively charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty in
connection with his unauthorized withdrawals of money deposited by
Juanito Quino (complainant), a client of Quedancor. The complainant
applied for a restructuring of his loan with Quedancor and deposited the
amount of ₱50,000.00 to Quedancor’s cashier for his Manila account. In
three (3) separate occasions, the respondent, without notice and authority
from the complainant and with the assistance of Quedancor’s cashier,
managed to withdraw the ₱50,000.00 deposit. Upon the discovery of the
withdrawals, the complainant demanded the return of the money and
called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in Cagayan de Oro City,
who issued to the respondent a memorandum requiring him to explain the
withdrawals and to return the money.
In compliance with the memorandum, the respondent returned the money.
The respondent admitted having received the ₱50,000.00 from
Quedancor’s cashier knowing that it was intended for the complainant’s
loan repayment.
From the established facts, the respondent was charged by Quedancor
with dishonesty, and was subsequently found guilty of the charges and
dismissed from the service. The CSC affirmed the findings and conclusions
of Quedancor on appeal.
Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the CSC, the
respondent elevated his case to the CA which adjudged him guilty of
dishonesty, but modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year
suspension from office without pay. The CA cited the case of Miel v.
Malindog5 as supporting basis and relied on Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (Uniform Rules) which allows the
appreciation of mitigating circumstances in the determination of the proper
imposable penalty. The CA took into account the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) the respondent’s length of service of 18 years; (2) the
respondent’s status as a first time offender.
The Present Petition
The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law and
jurisprudence which penalize the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from
the service. The CSC also argues that there are no mitigating
circumstances to warrant a reduction of the penalty, for the following
reasons:
(1) The respondent’s length of service aggravated his dishonesty since the
respondent took advantage of his authority over a subordinate and
disregarded his oath that a public office is a public trust. The respondent’s
length of service cannot also be considered mitigating given the number of
times the dishonest acts were committed and the supervisory position held
by the respondent.
(2) The admission of guilt and the restitution by the respondent were made
in 2003, while the misappropriation took place in 2001. The respondent
admitted his culpability and effected payment not because of his desire to
right a wrong but because he feared possible administrative liabilities.
(3) The respondent was charged with, and admitted having committed,
dishonesty in three separate occasions.
(4) Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules imposes dismissal from
the service for dishonesty, even for the first offense.
In compliance with our Minute Resolution dated May 31, 2011, the
respondent filed his comment to the petition. The respondent begs the
Court to apply jurisprudence where the Court, for humanitarian reasons,
refrained from meting out the actual penalties imposed by law, in the
presence of mitigating circumstances. In this case, the respondent calls
attention to the following circumstances: (1) that he is the sole breadwinner
of his family; (2) his length of service with Quedancor; and (3) other than
this case, no other administrative case had been filed against him for his
past 21 years of government service.6
The Issue
The issue in this case is the determination of the proper administrative
penalty to be imposed on the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed by Section
52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty
even as a first offense. The aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional
principle that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to
such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. 7  First, we have repeatedly held that length of service can either be a
It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the
application of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances in the
imposition of administrative penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only
when clear proof is shown, using the specific standards set by law and
jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case justify the mitigation of the
prescribed penalty.
In appreciating the presence of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances to a given case, two constitutional principles come into play
which the Court is tasked to balance. The first is public accountability
which requires the Court to consider the improvement of public service,
and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government
by ensuring that only individuals who possess good moral character,
integrity and competence are employed in the government service. 8 The
second relates to social justice which gives the Court the discretionary
leeway to lessen the harsh effects of the wrongdoing committed by an
offender for equitable and humanitarian considerations.
A significant aspect which the CA failed to consider under the
circumstances is the inapplicability to the present case of the Court’s ruling
in Vicente A. Miel v. Jesus A. Malindog, 9 which in turn cited Apuyan, Jr. v.
Sta. Isabel10 and Civil Service Commission v. Belagan.11 The rulings in
these three (3) cases were rendered under different factual circumstances
involving dishonest acts, i.e., submission of false entries in the Personal
Data Sheet, the solicitation of money, or the non-compliance with the
prescribed court procedure, among others. In terms of seriousness and
gravity, these dishonest acts differ from the dishonest acts committed by
the respondent who used public funds under his responsibility for his own
personal benefit. Unlike the cases cited by the CA, we also take into
account the nature of Quedancor’s business – it is a credit and guarantee
institution where the public perception of the official’s credibility and
reputation is material.
In the clearest of terms, the CA upheld that factual findings of the CSC.
Thus, it is on the basis of these findings that we must now make our own
independent appreciation of the circumstances cited by the respondent
and appreciated by the CA as mitigating circumstances. After a careful
review of the records and jurisprudence, we disagree with the CA’s
conclusion that mitigating circumstances warrant the mitigation of the
prescribed penalty imposed against the respondent.
mitigating or an aggravating circumstance depending on the facts of each
case.12 While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the
respondent, it is not considered where the offense committed is found to
be serious or grave;13 or when the length of service helped the offender
commit the infraction.14 The factors against mitigation are present in this
case.
Under the circumstances, the administrative offense of dishonesty
committed by the respondent was serious on account of the supervisory
position he held at Quedancor and the nature of Quedancor’s business.
Quedancor deals with the administration, management and disposition of
public funds which the respondent was entrusted to handle.
The respondent’s dishonest acts carried grave consequences because
Quedancor is a credit and guarantee institution, and the public’s perception
of its credibility is critical. In this case, the sanction of dismissal imposed on
the respondent as a dishonest employee assures the public that: first,
public funds belonging to Quedancor are used for their intended purpose;
second, public funds are released to their proper recipients only after strict
compliance with the standard operating procedure of Quedancor is
followed; and lastly, only employees who are competent, honest and
trustworthy may manage, administer and handle public funds in
Quedancor.
Like a bank, Quedancor as a credit and guarantee institution is expected to
observe the highest degree of competence and diligence as it is a
business imbued with public interest. 15 To promote trust and confidence,
employees in Quedancor are expected to possess the highest standards of
integrity and moral uprightness. The respondent’s dismissal from the
service is a measure of self-protection and self-preservation by Quedancor
of its reputation before its clients and the public.
We additionally note that length of service should also be taken against the
respondent; the infraction he committed and the number of times he
committed the violations demonstrate the highest degree of ingratitude and
ungratefulness to an institution that has been the source of his livelihood
for 18 years. His actions constitute no less than disloyalty and betrayal of
the trust and confidence the institution reposed in him. They constitute
ingratitude for the opportunities given to him over the years for career
advancement. Had it not been for the respondent’s length of service, he
could not have taken the subject funds for his own use as he could not
have held a supervisory position. In addition, the respondent’s length of
service allowed him to take advantage of his familiarity with Quedancor
operations and employees – a factor that made the misappropriation
possible.
Second, the circumstance that this is the respondent’s first administrative
offense should not benefit him. By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV
of the Uniform Rules, the commission of an administrative offense
classified as a serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal
from the service even for the first time. In other words, the clear language
of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-time offender as a
mitigating circumstance. Likewise, under statutory construction principles,
a special provision prevails over a general provision. 16 Section 53, Rule IV
of the Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the appreciation of
mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances, must thus yield to the
provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules which expressly
provides for the penalty of dismissal even for the first commission of the
offense.
While we are not unmindful of the existing jurisprudence 17 cited by the
respondent where the penalty of dismissal from the service was not
imposed despite the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules, the respondent failed to clearly show exceptional and compelling
reasons to justify a deviation from the general rule.
Finally, we reject as mitigating circumstances the respondent’s admission
of his culpability and the restitution of the amount.1âwphi1 As pointed out
by the CSC, the respondent made use of the complainant’s money in 2001
while the restitution was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the
administrative case against him. 18 Under the circumstances, the restitution
was half-hearted and was certainly neither purely voluntary nor made
because of the exercise of good conscience; it was triggered, more than
anything else, by his fear of possible administrative penalties. 19 The
admission of guilt and the restitution effected were clearly mere
afterthoughts made two (2) years after the commission of the offense and
after the administrative complaint against him was filed. With these
circumstances in mind, we do not find it justified to relieve the respondent
of the full consequences of his dishonest actions.
All told, in reversing the CA’s decision, we emphasize that the principle of
social justice cannot be properly applied in the respondent’s case to shield
him from the full consequences of his dishonesty. The Court, in Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,20 clearly recognized the limitations
in invoking social justice:
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing
simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only
when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge of scoundrels any more
than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty.
Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are
clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for
the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the
workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their
own character.21 [Emphases supplied.]
Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful disbursement of public
funds or loss of public property. 22Greater damage comes with the public’s
perception of corruption and incompetence in the government. 23
Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and
public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 24 These constitutionally-
enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical
flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working
standards by all in the public service.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated August 20, 2010 and the
resolution dated March 8, 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 01682-MIN. The resolutions of the Civil Service Commission,
affirming the decision dated August 11, 2004 of the Quedan and Rural
Credit Guarantee Corporation, imposing upon respondent Florentino
Veloso the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, for consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
dishonesty, are hereby REINSTATED. the Court.

SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act 0f 1948, as amended)
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice *
 On official leave.

1 
Dated August 20, 2010; rollo, pp. 28-33.
(On Leave) TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* CASTRO 2 
Dated March 8, 2011; id. at 34-35.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
3 
Twenty-First Division. The assailed rulings were penned by Associate
Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justice Romulo
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
V. Borja and Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
4 
Dated September 25, 2006; rollo, pp. 41-52.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD 5 
G.R. No. 143538, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 119, 135, citing Apuyan,
Associate Justice Associate Justice Jr. v. Sta. Isabel, Adm. Matter No. P-01-1497, 430 SCRA 1; and Civil
Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004, 440
SCRA 578.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice 6 
Rollo, pp. 60-65.

7 
Cesar S. Dumduma v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606,
(On Leave) MARIA LOURDES P. A.
December 4, 2011.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA* SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice 8 
Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, G.R. No. 155732, June 3, 2004, 430
SCRA 593, 608.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE 9 

Supra note 5.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
10 
Supra note 5.

11 
CERTIFICATION Supra note 5.
12 
Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, supra note 8, at 604.

13 
Id. at 605, citing University of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 89454, April 20, 1992, 208 SCRA 174; Yuson
v. Noel, A.M. No. RTJ-91-762, October 23, 1993, 227 SCRA 1; and
Concerned Employee v. Nuestro, A.M. No. P-02-1629, September 11,
2002, 388 SCRA 568.

14 
Id. at 605-606.

15 
Philippine Savings Bank v. Chowking Food Corporation, G.R. No.
177526, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 318, 330.

16 
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 141309, June
19, 2007, 525 SCRA 11, 23.

17 
Supra note 5.
Republic of the Philippines
18 
Rollo, p. 20. SUPREME COURT
Manila
19 
Ibid.
SECOND DIVISION
20 
247 Phil. 641 (1988).
G.R. No. 189755               July 4, 2012
21 
Id. at 650.
EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner, 
22 
Jerome Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 189479, April 12, vs.
2011. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondent.
23 
Ibid.
DECISION
24 
Ibid.
SERENO, J.:
25 
Ibid.
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 100454. The CA affirmed with modification
the Decision3 and Order4 of the Office of the President (O.P.) in OP Case
No. 05-G-224, which had set aside the Decision 5 of the Board of
Commissioners of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
in HLURB Case No. REM-A-041210-0261 and affirmed the Decision 6 of
the Housing and Land Use Arbiter in HLURB Case No. REM-030904-
12609.
The controversy stems from a water facility in Happy Glen Loop
Subdivision (the Subdivision), which is situated in Deparo, Caloocan City.
Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen
Loop, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its
obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all its rights over several
parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as receivables from the lots
already sold.7
As the successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo represented
to subdivision lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility
was available in the Subdivision.8
For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility
as their only source of water. 9 This fact was acknowledged by Marcelo and
Hermogenes Liwag (Hermogenes), petitioner’s late husband who was then
the president of respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association
(Association).10
Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to
Hermogenes. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099
was issued to him. When Hermogenes died in 2003, petitioner Emeteria P.
Liwag subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association, demanding
the removal of the overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land. 11
Refusing to comply with petitioner’s demand, respondent Association filed
before the HLURB an action for specific performance; confirmation,
maintenance and donation of water facilities; annulment of sale; and
cancellation of TCT No. 350099 against T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation
(the owner and developer of the Subdivision), petitioner Emeteria, and the
other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, Housing and
Land Use Arbiter Joselito Melchor (Arbiter Melchor) ruled in favor of the
Association. He invalidated the transfer of the parcel of land in favor of
Hermogenes in a Decision dated 5 October 2004, the dispositive portion of
which reads:12
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Confirming the existence of an easement for water system/facility or
open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well
and overhead tank are situated,
2. Making the Temporary Restraining Order dated 01 April 2004
permanent so as to allow the continuous use and maintenance of the said
water facility, i.e., deep well and over head water tank, on the subject lot,
by the complainant’s members and residents of the subject project, and
restraining all the respondents from committing the acts complained of and
as described in the complaint,
3. Declaring as void ab initio the deed of sale dated 26 February 2001,
involving Lot 11, Block 5 in favor of spouses Liwag, and TCT No. C-
350099 in the name of same respondents without prejudice to
complainant’s right to institute a criminal action in coordination with the
prosecuting arms of the government against respondents Marcelo and
Liwag, and furthermore, with recourse by Liwag against T.P. and/or
Marcelo to ask for replacement for controverted lot with a new one within
the subject project; and
4. Ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the
amount of ₱ 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the amount of ₱ 20,000.00
as damages in favor of the complainant’s members.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found
that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space. Moreover, it ruled that Marcelo
had complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1216
with the donation of 9,047 square meters of open space and road lots. It
further stated that there was no proof that Marcelo or the original
subdivision owner or developer had at any time represented that Lot 11,
Block 5 was an open space. It therefore concluded that the use of the lot
as site of the water tank was merely tolerated. 13
Respondent Association interposed an appeal to the OP, which set aside
the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed that of
the Housing and Land Use Arbiter. 14
The OP ruled that Lot 11, Block 5 was an open space, because it was the
site of the water installation of the Subdivision, per Marcelo’s official
representation on file with the HLURB National Capital Region Field Office.
The OP further ruled that the open space required under P.D. 957
excluded road lots; and, thus, the Subdivision’s open space was still short
of that required by law. Finally, it ruled that petitioner Liwag was aware of
the representations made by Marcelo and his predecessors-in-interest,
because he had acknowledged the existence of a water installation system
as per his Affidavit of 10 August 1982.15
Petitioner Liwag unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, 16 then filed a
Rule 43 Petition for Review before the CA.17
The CA affirmed that the HLURB possessed jurisdiction to invalidate the
sale of the subject parcel of land to Hermogenes and to invalidate the
issuance of TCT No. C-350099 pursuant thereto. 18 The appellate court
agreed with the OP that an easement for water facility existed on the
subject parcel of land and formed part of the open space required to be
reserved by the subdivision developer under P.D. 957. 19 However, it ruled
that Arbiter Melchor should not have recommended the filing of a criminal
action against petitioner, as she was not involved in the development of the
Subdivision or the sale of its lots to buyers. 20 The CA likewise deleted the
award of attorney’s fees and damages in favor of respondent. 21
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition before this Court.
The Court’s Ruling
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
I violation of this obligation. Thus, this allegation makes out a case for an
The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case at bar
The jurisdiction of the HLURB is outlined in P.D. 1344, "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of
its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957," viz:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature.
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, broker or salesman.
When respondent Association filed its Complaint before the HLURB, it
alleged that Marcelo’s sale of Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes was done in
violation of P.D. 957 in the following manner:
12. Through fraudulent acts and connivance of [T.P. and Ernesto Marcelo]
and the late Liwag and without the knowledge and consent of the
complainants all in violation of P.D. 957 and its implementing regulations,
respondents T.P. and Ernesto Marcelo transferred the same lot where the
deep well is located which is covered by TCT No. C-41785 in favor of
spouses Hermogenes Liwag and Emeteria Liwag to the great damage and
prejudice of complainants x x x.22 (Empasis in the original)
We find that this statement sufficiently alleges that the subdivision owner
and developer fraudulently sold to Hermogenes the lot where the water
facility was located. Subdivisions are mandated to maintain and provide
adequate water facilities for their communities. 23 Without a provision for an
alternative water source, the subdivision developer’s alleged sale of the lot
where the community’s sole water source was located constituted a
unsound real estate business practice of the subdivision owner and
developer. Clearly, the case at bar falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB.
It is worthy to note that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over
complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and
the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to
comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the
Subdivision a better place to live in. 24 This interpretation is in line with one
of P.D. 957’s "Whereas clauses," which provides:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems,
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers. x x x.
P.D. 957 was promulgated to closely regulate real estate subdivision and
condominium businesses.25 Its provisions were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. 26 The decree aimed
to provide for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which
aggrieved parties in transactions involving subdivisions and condominiums
may take recourse.27
II
An easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen
Loop Subdivision
Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable
for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner, 28 for
the benefit of a community, 29 or for the benefit of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong. 30
The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and
apparent or non-apparent. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are
quoted below:
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-
apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant,
without the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and
depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually
kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the
same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of
their existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the
Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent,
because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and because it
is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its
use to the public.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the water tank on
Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find that the easement of water
facility has been voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision
owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and
the original developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the
facility was continuously used as the residents’ sole source of water. 31 The
Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. 32 It is therefore clear
that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through
prescription.
III
Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision forms part of its open
space
The term "open space" is defined in P.D. 1216 as "an area reserved
exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads,
places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other
similar facilities and amenities.33
The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water
facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory construction to determine
whether these areas fall under "other similar facilities and amenities."
The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that
where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include – or to be restricted to – things akin to or resembling,
or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. 34
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find
that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of
the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar facilities and amenities"
should be interpreted in like manner.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the
community. Water is a basic need in human settlements, 35 without which
the community would not survive. We therefore rule that, based on the
principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of
the law to create and maintain a healthy environment in human
settlements,36 the location of the water facility in the Subdivision must form
part of the area reserved for open space.
IV
The subject parcel of land is beyond the commerce of man and its sale is
prohibited under the law
The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved
for public use and are beyond the commerce of man. 37 As such, these
open spaces are not susceptible of private ownership and appropriation.
We therefore rule that the sale of the subject parcel of land by the
subdivision owner or developer to petitioner’s late husband was contrary to
law. Hence, we find no reversible error in the appellate court’s Decision
upholding the HLURB Arbiter’s annulment of the Deed of Sale.
Petitioner attempts to argue in favor of the validity of the sale of the subject
parcel of land by invoking the principle of indefeasibility of title and by
arguing that this action constitutes a collateral attack against her title, an
act proscribed by the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioner is mistaken on both counts.
First, the rule that a collateral attack against a Torrens title is prohibited by
law38 finds no application to this case.
There is an attack on the title when the object of an action is to nullify a
Torrens title, thus challenging the judgment or proceeding pursuant to
which the title was decreed. 39 In the present case, this action is not an
attack against the validity of the Torrens title, because it does not question
the judgment or proceeding that led to the issuance of the title. Rather, this
action questions the validity of the transfer of land from Marcelo to
petitioner’s husband. As there is no attack – direct or collateral – against
the title, petitioner’s argument holds no water.
Second, the principle of indefeasibility of title is not absolute, and there are
well-defined exceptions to this rule.40 In Aqualab Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs
of Pagobo,41 we ruled that this defense does not extend to a transferee
who takes the title with knowledge of a defect in that of the transferee’s
predecessor-in-interest.
In this case, Spouses Liwag were aware of the existence of the easement
of water facility when Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
them.1âwphi1 Hermogenes even executed an Affidavit dated 10 August
1982 attesting to the sufficiency of the water supply coming from an
electrically operated water pump in the Subdivision. 42 It is undisputed that
the water facility in question was their only water source during that time.
As residents of the Subdivision, they had even benefited for almost 30
years from its existence. Therefore, petitioner cannot be shielded by the
principle of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title, as she was not an
innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
From the discussion above, we therefore conclude that the appellate court
committed no reversible error in the assailed Decision and accordingly
affirm it in toto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 100454 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
 14 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Decision of the OP dated 5 March 2007, rollo, p. 134.
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended) 15 
Id. at 133-134.

16 
Order of the OP dated 26 July 2007, rollo, p. 137.

17 
Footnotes CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, p. 38.

1  18 
CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, penned by Associate Justice Id. at 47.
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar
B. Dimaampao and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.; rollo, pp. 38-54. 19 
Id. at 49.
2 
CA Resolution on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 20 
Id. at 52.
September 2009, rollo, pp. 55-56.
21 
Id. at 53.
3 
Decision of the OP dated 5 March 2007; rollo, pp. 127-134.
22 
Complaint with a Prayer for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
4 
Order of the OP dated 26 July 2007; rollo, pp. 135-137. Restraining Order dated 8 March 2004, rollo, p. 70.
5 
HLURB Board of Commissioners Decision dated 7 June 2005, rendered 23 
Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s
by Commissioners Romulo Q. Fabul, Teresita A. Desierto, Francisco L. Protective Decree and Other Related Laws, Sec. 11(B) (4).
Dagnalan (no signature) and Jesus Y. Pang; rollo, pp. 120-123.
24 
Arranza v. B.F. Homes, 389 Phil. 318, 329 (2000).
6 
HLURB Arbiter’s Decision dated 5 October 2004, penned by Atty. Joselito
F. Melchor; rollo, pp. 86-93. 25 
Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Sps. Ignacio, G.R. No. 164789, 27
August 2009, 597 SCRA 266.
7 
CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, pp. 39-40.
26 
Sps. Osea v. Ambrosio, 521 Phil. 92 (2006).
8 
Id. at 40.
27 
Id.
9 
HLURB Arbiter’s Decision dated 5 October 2004, rollo, p. 87.
28 
Civil Code, Art. 613.
10 
Id.
29 
Civil Code, Art. 614.
11 
CA Decision dated 13 March 2009, rollo, p. 40.
30 
Id.
12 
HLURB Arbiter’s Decision dated 5 October 2004, rollo, p. 93.
31 
HLURB Arbiter’s Decision dated 5 October 2004, rollo, p. 87.
13 
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated 7 June 2005,
rollo, p. 122. 32 
Civil Code, Art. 620.
33 
P.D. No. 1216, Sec. 1.

34 
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999).

35 
Rules and Standards for Economic and Socialized Housing Projects to
Implement Batas Pambansa Blg. 220, Rule III, Sec. 5(B).

36 
P.D. 1216, first Whereas clause.

37 
P.D. 1216, second Whereas clause.

38 
P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 48.

39 
Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 452 Phil. 238 (2003).

40 
Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, 24 February 2009, 580 SCRA
175. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
41 
G.R. No. 182673, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 435. Manila

42 
Joint Affidavit of Gerry Bautista and Hermogenes R. Liwag dated 10 EN BANC
August 1982, HLURB Records, p. 10.
G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym

OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner, 
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES;
THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF
REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION
and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and
others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,  requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more
law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785  1 issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several
Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political
parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the
status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were
scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number
of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)
divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes
observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of
the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on
10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under
Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered
parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political
parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed
Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping
only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and
more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the
Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec
a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be
deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for
the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly
amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees
not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-
Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It
also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,  6 but subsequently reset it to
May 3, 2001.7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.  8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition  9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,  10 the Court
directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,  13 the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed
respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an
Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed
with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections,
but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court
and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In
an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of
five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to
address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to
the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65
is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies
in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues
that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19,
20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A  18 dated November 9,
2000.19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of
2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution  20 and the Rules of Court, such
challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by
Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration
was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the
Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna
sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at
the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's
action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition
before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall
lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."  24 Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the
party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice
x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most
objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."  27 For its part,
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941
allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that
the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may
"be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm.
Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list
system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."  32 This was also
clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas
Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-
hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng
mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the
system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups
or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation
of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may
participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished
member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On
this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to
our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the
legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is,
in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may
be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
scheme possible."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Themselves Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people,
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with
this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
organizations and parties; and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.  37

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which
states:
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation,"
"marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined "SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a
constituencies." party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people
in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope.
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
workers, and professionals."
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to
not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and
can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified
or specialized by those in immediate association.  38
 The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the
Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation
in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
of society."39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could
participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to
enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to
be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even
the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas
hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes
Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence,
the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common
sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-
Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a
tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the
stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more
awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does
not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is
likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank
accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our
midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher
folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement – to come
out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win
in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives
through the simplest scheme possible.  45 Logic shows that the system has
been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to
open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood
when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature
allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for
the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter
the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the
open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected
through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary
to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for
the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same
tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C.
Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed
intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that
the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose
is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in
which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when
the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be
made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being
construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court
stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary  48 that "the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x
only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is
couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by
law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law
first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its
plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no
need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely
express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of
RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which
must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec
failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On
the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that
any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be
struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the
outright disqualification of the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-
NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including
PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues
that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec
Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x."
We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list
election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the
purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the
154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the
law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity
using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a
trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the
truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be
given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec
for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court
finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record --
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be
elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are
not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they
must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral
Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am
saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court
notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not
be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional
proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent
this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal
fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT
RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or
pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the
Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and
sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a
member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition
is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see
any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6
of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group
for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list
system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. The participation of the government or its
officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair
to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented
by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral
committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is
not going to represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this
Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to
refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and
reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections'
receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice
principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The
party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less
in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine
power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to
those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for
them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent
of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the

Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without
any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system.
Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling
the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization.
Footnotes
1
 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda
G. Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.

2
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions  Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious 3
words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of  Ibid., pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 48-49.
people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the
4
framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.  Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.

5
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby  Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines 6
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of
determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is 7
 See Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear
to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House 8
 TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
10
 Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
21
 "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings
11
 Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos are not allowed:
Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the
Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the xxx
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug
Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
and Sports and Health Foundation. decision except in election offense cases;
12
 Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45. xxx"
13
 Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46. 22
 Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the
Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and
14
 These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the 2, Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; Rollo (GR No. 147589),
Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
23
 Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222,
15
 Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998;
Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation
CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor v. CA, GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No.
General, and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda 134169, February 2, 2000
were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
24
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per
16
 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88. Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
Commission on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central
17
 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
Aksyon Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum,
25
pp. 3-6.  Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez,
Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona
18
 Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-
26
list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national  ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per
and local elections. Panganiban, J.

19 27
 OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.  Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; Rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 18.
20
 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power
28
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies  Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion 29
 OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30
 Emphasis supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31
 It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early
days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
46
 JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990
ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259,
264 (1938).

47
32
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.  See Agpalo, Ibid., p. 313.

48
33
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.  194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting
Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
34
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
49
 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
35
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314
SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August
36 12, 1999.
 Infra.
50
37  Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781,
 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez
October 6, 2000.
v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
51
38  See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999;
 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.
Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257
39
SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA,
 OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244. 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302
40
 Infra. SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
41
 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148. 52
 TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
42
 Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko. 53
 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; Rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 19.
43
 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
54
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
44
 Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A
free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free 55
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.
choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
56
 §2 (5), Article IX (C).
45
 Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: "x x x. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in 57
 Christian S. Monsod.
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their 58
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible." 59
 See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
60
 See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP
881.

61
 The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of
Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.