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Daniel Byman
To cite this article: Daniel Byman (2019) Israel’s Four Fronts, Survival, 61:2, 167-188, DOI:
10.1080/00396338.2019.1589094
Most observers seem to agree that Israel faces war, but they disagree on
where war will occur. Israel is beset on every border. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) warns that Israel and Hamas are in perpetual tension
and once again ‘on the brink’ of a full-scale confrontation in Gaza.1 Marwan
Muasher, Jordan’s former foreign minister, argues that a third intifada in
the West Bank is ‘very likely’.2 A senior US intelligence officer sees ‘real
potential’ that Israel might go to war with the Lebanese militia Hizbullah,
and that such a war could drag in Iran and other regional powers.3 Even if
Israel dodges those three bullets, Ehud Yaari, a respected Israeli analyst,
assesses war between Iran and Israel in Syria as ‘almost inevitable’.4 The
Trump administration’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria and
chaotic regional diplomacy are further complications, removing a steady-
ing force in the region and pushing Israel to take more matters into its
own hands.
Yet the situation is not as dire as it might seem. Israel has always had
to balance multiple foes and the risks of simultaneous conflicts. After the
state’s founding in 1948, its leaders wrestled with the threat of renewed war
from neighbouring countries and the threat of terrorism. Over the years, the
dangers have evolved. Although it is highly unlikely that Israel will be wiped
off the map by invading armies given its superior military capabilities, the
Daniel Byman (@dbyman) is a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This article draws on several short pieces written for lawfareblog.com.
Israel will have to build up its deterrent posture against Iran, as it has done
against Hizbullah in Lebanon. This is likely to require regular uses of force
but also care to ensure that violence does not escalate or provoke interna-
tional terrorism against Israel.
The Israelis should also try to drive a wedge between Tehran and
Damascus. At times, this will mean military strikes and other limited uses
of force to enforce Israel’s red lines. Beyond that, Israel may need to prod
Moscow to use its influence with Damascus. The Israeli government should
also change its policy towards the United States, moving away from its
embrace of the Republican Party to a more even-handed approach. Ideally,
the Trump administration would in turn become more even-handed,
restraining Israel from its worst impulses, and acting as a stabilising force
in the region. So far, however, the White House appears eager to make the
regional situation more rather than less dangerous.
Hamas might decide that a confrontation, even one it will lose, is preferable
to the status quo because it will focus international attention on Gaza.
Yet the uneasy peace since 2014 suggests that a conflagration is not inevi-
table, and if it were to occur could probably be contained. Hamas has few
means to challenge Israel directly, and its indirect methods, such as dem-
onstrations and flaming kites, are reaping few lasting rewards. Hamas is
failing at governance and diplomatically isolated, and retains relative politi-
cal strength only because alternative and more peaceful Palestinian voices
are even more discredited. It may again try to attack Israel, but the result is
likely to be a punishing Israeli response that leads to a brief international
outcry but no change that benefits Hamas.
Hamas has been unable to govern Gaza effectively and win over
Palestinians through administrative competence. Egypt and Israel have
imposed a tight blockade, and the PA has successfully used its control
over much of the money going to the Palestinian community to under-
mine Hamas.9 The PA has also assumed control of Gaza’s border crossing,
depriving Hamas of the taxes it once collected at the terminals. The Trump
administration cut funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,
which has provided food for many Gazans. Blackouts are common in Gaza,
and unemployment hovers at around 60%.10 Although Hamas faces no real
challenge to its rule in Gaza, it also strives to distinguish itself from Fatah,
the main secular political party and core element of the PA, through its
ability to govern and its willingness to fight Israel, but it is failing in both
respects. In 2012 and 2014, Hamas sought to use a confrontation with Israel
to grab world attention and ensure its resistance credentials. Its weak politi-
cal position gives it an incentive to do so again.
Hamas, however, has yet to come up with a winning strategy against
Israel. Although Hamas’s rhetoric remains hostile, the effectiveness of Israel’s
missile-defence system limits Hamas’s ability to harass with indiscriminate
rocket attacks, as it has done in the past. Israel’s destruction of parts of
Gaza in the various wars and bombing campaigns exacerbates the misery
of Gazans with little for Hamas to show in return. In April 2018, Hamas
tried a new approach by instigating the ‘March of Return’ protests, blending
its operatives in with Palestinian civilians, and encouraging women and
Israel’s Four Fronts | 171
millions of dollars, so that the group could manage the sudden and heavy
burden of governance.17 But the wars in Syria and Yemen, where Hamas and
Iran back opposite sides, have frayed relations, leading Iran to dramatically
curtail its support for Hamas.18
Nevertheless, Iran values its relationship with Hamas. It has long played
up the Palestinian cause in its rhetoric, and ties to the group give Iran cred-
ibility as an Islamic power as opposed to merely a Shia one. When Israel
went to war in Gaza in 2012 and 2014, Iran increased its aid, despite tension
over Syria.19 Yet in Iran, as in much of the Arab world, there is Palestinian-
issue fatigue, and domestic problems, including the dire economic crisis
there, have taken priority.20 For now, however, Iran and Hamas appear to
have reached a modus vivendi, and with Syria winding down, this may
become stronger. Iran resumed aid to Gaza in May 2017, following a change
in Hamas’s leadership.
Ironically, Hamas and Israel both have the same answer to Gaza’s trou-
bles – the PA – albeit with vastly different caveats. From Israel’s point of
view, if the PA took control of Gaza, it could be a peaceful alternative to
Hamas and an acceptable channel for international aid. Hamas, for its part,
recognises that it cannot govern Gaza given all the pressure and isolation it
faces, and remains eager to pass the burden to the PA. But Hamas will not
surrender its weapons, as Israel and the United States demand, for two main
reasons. Firstly, Hamas considers itself an anti-Israel ‘resistance’ move-
ment, and pursuing a conciliatory posture would undermine its credentials.
Secondly, Hamas’s leadership fears the PA would arrest and torture Hamas
members.21 The PA brutalised Hamas when it controlled Gaza before 2007,
and Hamas has reciprocated against PA loyalists remaining in Gaza.22
Hamas and the Fatah party have periodically reconciled, but any coopera-
tiveness has usually been quickly disrupted.23 The PA is reluctant to try to
bring prosperity to Gaza since doing so would allow Hamas to get back on
its feet. Thus, Israel increasingly recognises that the PA is unlikely to be the
solution to the Gaza dilemma. Israel proposes a return to the status quo,
whereby Hamas would disarm and release Israeli prisoners without Israel
making releases of its own, as a prelude to any comprehensive deal – terms
it knows Hamas would not accept.
Israel’s Four Fronts | 173
would inflict a ‘heavy price’ on the Palestinians and that they have no
good options for revolt.34 ‘It is easier to raise slogans about a new intifada
than to build a strategy for one’, he says.
The collapse of Arab support also reduces the likelihood of violence.
During the first intifada in 1987 and the second intifada in 2000, the
Palestinian territories became the centre of the Arab world’s stage. Today,
however, the Palestinians are a regional sideshow. Syria and continued
fallout from the Arab Spring consume far more attention. No Arab leaders
are raising the Palestinian banner. Finally, Israel itself is prepared for a
return to violence. Before the second intifada broke out, Israel let many of
its intelligence networks among Palestinians wither, instead relying on the
Palestinian security services to suppress violence. Now the security barrier,
checkpoints, a military presence and aggressive intelligence collection are
all in place. Palestinians harbour few doubts that Israel would come down
hard should even small-scale violence erupt.
Perhaps the West Bank’s most ominous problem is the weakness of the
peace camp there. The Palestinian security forces may tire of being seen as
collaborators. This risk for Israel is particularly high in a succession crisis,
when some leaders may try to drum up violence and accuse their rivals
of being Israel’s puppets.35 This is not likely to lead to a third intifada, but
it could increase day-to-day disturbances and otherwise upset the West
Bank’s relative calm.
Lebanon, it is less likely to use the country as a platform for the fight against
Israel, especially if it can employ Syria for that purpose instead.47
In fact, from an Israeli point of view, Hizbullah’s strong political position
in Lebanon is a vulnerability that enhances Israel’s deterrent. On account
of Hizbullah’s increased political influence after the 2018 elections and
central role in the Lebanese government, it is more credible for Israel to
hold the entire state responsible for any actions emanating from Lebanon
and threaten massive retaliation there – an approach recently endorsed by
Israeli Naftali Bennett, a rising political force in government.48 Israel can
disrupt Lebanon without resorting to the massive bombing that occurred
during the 2006 war.49 Small raids and other circumscribed forms of mili-
tary pressure would scare off investment and tourism. Such an approach,
however, would fly in the face of past US policy, which has sought to
separate the Lebanese government from Hizbullah and to strengthen gov-
ernment forces. Since 2006, the United States has provided almost $2 billion
in equipment to the Lebanese army and helped train its forces.50 Israel is
subject to other political constraints. Israeli retaliation against Hizbullah’s
strongholds would entail heavy civilian casualties, as Hizbullah’s forces are
intermingled with Lebanon’s population. Although Israeli policymakers
would blame Hizbullah for cynically using human shields and the Trump
administration would back them, pictures of dead civilians would lead
much of the world to blame Israel.
Iranian policy is uncertain, and this raises many questions for
Hizbullah’s future course. On the one hand, Trump’s decision to scuttle the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – that is, the Iran nuclear deal – has
diminished Iran’s stake in preserving regional order. On the other, Tehran’s
leaders may fear that Trump’s decision is a prelude to war and want to
avoid ratcheting up tensions. Hizbullah’s future role in Syria also remains
unclear. When Syria was strong and Lebanon was weak, the Assad regime
harassed Israel from Lebanese territory, using proxies there to keep the
fight against Israel away from Syria. Now that the roles have been reversed,
with Hizbullah and Iranian forces deployed in Syria and provoking Israeli
strikes on Syrian turf, it may prove difficult to keep the Syrian and Lebanese
theatres distinct. Israel, for its part, has to worry that the Syria and Lebanon
Israel’s Four Fronts | 179
As the Syrian regime has consolidated its position, so has Tehran.55 Iran
has bases in Syria and is constructing weapons-production plants there.
Both its officers and proxies are well integrated into the regime’s military
effort, and often play leading operational roles. Even though it is gradually
winning the civil war, the Syrian regime still cannot stand on its own two
legs. US ambassador James Jeffrey notes that while the United States may
control the air in much of the Middle East, ‘Iran controls the sand’.56
Israel has stepped up its efforts, bombing Syria almost daily in 2017. In
May 2018, Israel struck 50 airfields, weapons depots, intelligence sites and
other Iranian targets within Syria in its most extensive military operation
there since 1974, and its most significant campaign against Iranian targets
ever.57 It also has struck at Hizbullah and other Iranian proxies operating
near the Israeli border. Iranian military responses have been feckless. In
2018, Iranian forces fired rockets from Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan
Heights.58 Most of them ended up landing in Syria or being intercepted by
Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defence system. Israeli jets also destroyed a rocket
launching pad near Damascus.59 For now, Iran and Hizbullah appear to
recognise that escalation is a losing game. When assisting with the Assad
regime’s offensive in Daraa, Hizbullah limited the number of fighters it
deployed and did not flaunt its presence.60
Russia plays a critical role in Syria. It is the only state that has good rela-
tions with all three regional combatant states: Syria, Iran and Israel. The
Netanyahu government has actively tried to maintain a serviceable relation-
ship with Moscow, a change from the customary frosty relations, and urged
Russian President Vladimir Putin to restrain Iran in Syria.61 In September
2018, however, bilateral relations became strained when the Syrian mili-
tary accidentally downed a Russian plane during an Israeli airstrike, which
Russia blamed on Israel.62 This prompted the announcement of the S-300
deal and may portend a more hostile relationship. Thus far, Israeli raids and
defence systems have kept the threat limited, but it is not clear how long
crisis stability will endure given that the Syria front presents convenient
opportunities for Iran to threaten Israel. Iran can also escalate in other thea-
tres. Its ties to the Houthis in Yemen, for example, enable Tehran to target
Israeli shipping in the Red Sea.63 And international terrorism remains an
Israel’s Four Fronts | 181
option for Iran, which has instrumentalised Hizbullah and its own opera-
tives around the globe when striking Israel directly looked infeasible.64
In Trump we trust?
Israel has long relied on the United States to shape events in the region.
Indeed, part of the reason for Israel’s cautious policy on Syria is that the US
under Obama sought to avoid intervention, and Israel did not want to get
ahead of the US.65 The Trump presidency, however, marks a stark departure
from Obama’s tenure and the constraints that went with it.66 Trump has
good relations with Netanyahu, whom Obama found distasteful. The Israeli
leader is one of the few foreign leaders Trump seems to like. In addition,
many of Trump’s senior officials vie with one another to maintain strong
links with Israel. Gone are the days when a US administration would chas-
tise Israel for building more settlements in the West Bank or killing civilians
in Gaza.
Yet the Trump administration’s policies also carry several serious risks
for Israel. Trump is sceptical about US intervention in the Middle East and,
in general, has not tried to orchestrate its geopolitics. When important allies
like Qatar fight with other allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump
merely eggs Qatar’s rivals on from the sidelines. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE are engaged in a destructive and fruitless war unconstrained by
Washington. In Syria, Trump is withdrawing the small number of deployed
US forces, despite the continued presence of ISIS and concerns that Iranian
militias might fill the void. It would be beneficial for Israel if the United
States maintained its military presence in eastern Syria, coordinated Turkey
and other allies in pressuring ISIS, and prevented Iran from building bases
there that provide land bridges from Iraq into Syria. The Trump team also
will not save Israel from its worst instincts. Already, there is an anything-
goes perception among Israeli leaders.67 In the past, they have often
regarded the United States as an overbearing but ultimately responsible
parent. They have been openly resentful of the US for admonishing Israel
not to expand settlements in the West Bank or putting too much pressure
on the Palestinians, but the Israelis realised the strategic relationship was
worth such concessions. Now, however, the light always seems to be green.
182 | Daniel Byman
US support for Israel is also becoming more and more politicised domes-
tically. According to one 2018 poll, Republican support for Israel is almost
three times higher than Democratic support.68 Israel is courting the US evan-
gelical community more than ever. Although many Democratic politicians
consider themselves staunch supporters of Israel, Democrats appear to be
particularly critical with respect to settlements and human-rights issues.69
In addition, Netanyahu’s vocal and public criticism of the Iran nuclear deal
antagonised Democrats, and Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the deal
has only rubbed salt in the wound. Democratic support is therefore fragile,
and the close relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, following the
poisonous one between Netanyahu and Obama, only exacerbates this politi-
cisation. Israel should be worried that policies it initiates today with US
support might come under intense criticism when Trump is gone.
* * *
Israel faces no major conventional military threat. Yet its foes’ very weak-
nesses could lead to military clashes in Lebanon and Gaza, and unrest in
the West Bank. They will not win militarily, but a clash with Israel is a way
to rally flagging supporters, shore up their legitimacy and attract world
attention. At a tactical level, Israel needs to do a better job preparing for
less violent, hybrid measures such as Hamas’s March of Return. This may
involve developing and using non-lethal weapons to neutralise flaming
kites and repel demonstrators charging the barrier.70 The Trump adminis-
tration may tolerate Israel’s killing of 100 Palestinian civilians, but other US
administrations are less likely to do so, particularly if Israel continues to
throw its lot in with the Republican Party.
In Syria, it is incumbent on Israel to create a stable situation despite numer-
ous enemies and uncertain geopolitics. This calls for a reliable deterrent,
which will require Israel to make its red lines clear to all actors, including Iran
and Russia, and to act forcefully and decisively when they are violated. At
times, military strikes in Syria on Iranian facilities and those of its proxies may
be necessary. The long-term goal would be to drive a wedge between Syria
and Iran, making it clear that Syria will pay a price when Iran is too aggres-
Israel’s Four Fronts | 183
sive there. The time is not yet ripe for this decoupling, as the Syrian regime is
still desperate for outside assistance. But as Assad regains control over Syria,
he will be more receptive to distancing himself from Iran. In the meantime,
the United States could transfer additional missile-defence systems and tech-
nologies to help Israel control its border with Lebanon and Syria.
Israel hopes to keep Hamas weak but Gaza stable, a balance that may
prove difficult to hold. In Gaza, Israel and the United States should try to
improve economic conditions and urge the PA to take more responsibility.
Israel, however, must be wary of pushing Hamas too close to the brink. As
Israeli security analyst Gabi Siboni points out, ‘If Israel collapses the Hamas
regime, what comes after? Every alternative is awful.’71 Without taking down
Hamas, however, Israel could promote stability in Gaza and in the West Bank
by restoring political credibility to pro-peace Palestinians. The greatest source
of Hamas’s strength is the PA’s political weakness, and it is likely to grow as
the leadership fragments and the prospect of meaningful peace talks dwin-
dles. Serious restraints on settlements and moves towards peace negotiations
could reverse these trends and serve Israel well in the long term.
Netanyahu appears to have acknowledged that Russia’s prominence as a
regional player has increased, while the United States’ has diminished: for the
first time in decades, Israel now faces a formidable air defence and air force on
its border. Netanyahu is courting Putin, and Israel has tried to get Moscow to
force its Syrian and Iranian allies not to deploy Iranian or Hizbullah’s forces
near the Israeli border.72 The S-300 sale is a tremendous setback, and Israel
will need to woo Russia more energetically to prevent additional high-tech
transfers. Here the Trump administration’s servile attitude towards Moscow
might pay off: the US could press Russia to halt such transfers. The Kremlin’s
response would be an indicator of whether Russia will play a constructive
role in the region. Along these lines, the US Congress can help Israel if the
White House is unwilling to do so. Although Congress should remain sup-
portive of Israel and consider military aid to mitigate the missile threat from
Syria, it should not cheerlead every Israeli initiative, recognising that many
have more to do with Israeli domestic politics than Israeli security. Congress
should also encourage Israel to resume peace talks, halt settlement building
and otherwise practice and encourage political moderation.
184 | Daniel Byman
Notes
1 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting communities-near-strip-could-be-
War in Gaza’, 20 July 2018, https:// evacuated/.
www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- 6 Mitch Ginsburg, ‘Israel Fighting a
north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/ “Campaign Between the Wars” Says
israelpalestine/b60-averting-war-gaza. IAF Chief’, Times of Israel, 29 January
2 Carnegie Middle East Center, ‘How 2013, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
Likely Is the Outbreak of a New israel-fighting-a-campaign-between-
Palestinian Intifada in the Coming wars-says-iaf-chief/.
Years?’, 8 February 2018, http://carnegie- 7 Isabel Kershner, ‘Hamas
mec.org/diwan/75452?lang=en. and Israel Are in a Perilous
3 ‘An Israel–Hizbullah War Could Cycle. Is War a Miscalculation
Easily Draw in Iran, US Intel Official Away?’, New York Times, 21 July
Warns’, Times of Israel, 14 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.
2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ com/2018/07/21/world/middleeast/
an-israel-hezbollah-war-could-easily- israel-gaza-hamas.html?smprod=nytcore-
draw-in-iran-us-intel-official-warns/. ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-sharek.
4 Ehud Yaari, ‘Bracing for an Israel–Iran 8 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting
Confrontation in Syria’, American War in Gaza’.
Interest, 30 April 2018, https://www. 9 ‘Hamas Condemns PA Actions to
the-american-interest.com/2018/04/30/ Undermine Lifting of Gaza Siege’,
bracing-israel-iran-confrontation-syria/. Middle East Monitor, 11 July 2018,
5 Michael Bachner and Judah Ari Gross, https://www.middleeastmonitor.
‘IDF Says War in Gaza Approaching, com/20180711-hamas-condemns-
Communities Near Strip Could Be pa-actions-to-undermine-lift-
Evacuated’, Times of Israel, 9 August ing-of-gaza-siege/.
2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ 10 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting
idf-says-war-in-gaza-approaching- War in Gaza’.
Israel’s Four Fronts | 185