Macariola v.

Asuncion

Facts: On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for
lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The
project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23,
1963. One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots
denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was
issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6,
1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his
wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2, 1970 a
certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling: No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a
Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. Respondent Judge did
not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier
purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr.
Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and
his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of
litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

RUBIAS vs. BATILLER

(51 SCRA 120); May 29, 1973

FACTS: Petitioner Domingo Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of
certain portions of lot which he bought from his father-in-law (Francisco Militante) when he was counsel
of the latter in a land registration case involving the lot in question against its present occupant respondent
(Isaias Batiller). Respondent claimed that the complaint does not state a cause of action, the truth of the
matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open, and continuous
possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
The trial court issued a pre-trial order which stated that during the pre-trial conference, the parties
have agreed that the facts are attendant in the case and that they will no longer introduce any evidence,
testimonial or documentary to prove them. (Pls. read the full text of the case to be guided on this portion.)

ISSUE: WON the contract of sale between the petitioner and his father-in-law was void because it was
made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in
dispute

RULING: YES! Manifestly, plaintiff’s complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute owner of the
land and to be restored to possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual or legal basis. The
purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his clients is categorically prohibited by Article
1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, and that consequently, plaintiff’s purchase of the property in
litigation from his client was void and could produce no legal effect by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph
7 of the Civil Code which provides that contracts “ expressly prohibited or declared void by law” are “
inexistent and void from the beginning” and that “these contracts cannot be ratified”.

The Court cited Director of Lands vs. Abagat (53 Phil 147; March 27, 1929), which the Court again
affirming the invalidity and nullity of the lawyer’s purchase of the land in litigation from his client,
ordered the issuance of writ of possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties
without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses.

Article 1491 of the Civil Code prohibits certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar
control over the property from acquiring such property in their trust or control directly or indirectly and
even at a public or judicial auction as follows: a.) guardians, b.) agents, c.) administrators, d.) public
officers and employees, judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers, and e.)
others especially disqualified by law.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971 

FACTS:
                In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes.  Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed.  Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. 
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The
lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when
Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. 

HELD:
                While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. 
                As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. 
                The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property.  As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.  
                Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.

Domingo v. CA, 367 SCRA 368 (2001)

Domingo vs. CAG.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001Ponente: J. Quisimbing

FACTS: Subject parcels of land were previously owned by Paulina Rigonan. She allegedly sold them to
the spouses Rigonan in 1965, who claim to be her relatives. Petitioners, however, alleged that they are the
closest surviving relatives of Paulina and they inherited the lots from her when she died in 1966.The
private respondents filed a complaint for reivindicacion in the RTC claiming that they were the owners of
the parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina, and that they had been in continuous
possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements thereon. They also
claim that the petitioners entered the properties illegally, and refused to leave them when asked to do so.
The petitioners contested that such deed was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents by virtue of intestate succession and
stating that the deed of absolute sale was fake and void. The CAreversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was valid despite the lack of consideration.

HELD: No. The sale was null and void ab initio due to lack of consideration, being grossly and
shockingly inadequate. Consideration is the why of a contract, the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into the contract. On record, there is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as
landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to several people. We see no apparent and
compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of land with a house and warehouse at a meager price
of P850 only. Moreover, there was no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her. The
private respondents did not prove the due execution of the deed of sale. When the Register of Deeds was
subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten but only a carbon copy was presented to the trial
court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a "duplicate original," the deed contained filled in blanks
and alterations. None of the witnesses directly testified to prove positively and convincingly Paulina's
execution of the original deed of sale. The carbon copy did not bear her signature, but only her alleged
thumbprint.

Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including ahouse
and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan,who claim to be
her relatives. Petitioners Domingo, Mangabat and Capalungan who claim to be Paulina’s closest
surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the property by means of stealth,force and intimidation
and refused to vacate the same. Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint forreinvindicacion against petitioners in
the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging their ownership of theland through the deep of sale executed by
Paulina Rigonan and since then have been in continuouspossession of the properties and introduced
permanent improvements thereon. According to thepetitioners, the deed of absolute sale was void for
being spurious since they inherited the three lotsand the permanent improvements as nearest surviving kin
within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Paulina. The RTC ruled in the petitioner’s favor, declaring them the lawful
owners of the contested land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the petitioners to vacate the
subject properties and surrender possession thereof.

Issues: Whether or not private respondents sufficiently established the existence and due execution of theDeed of Absolute
and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property. ; Whether or not Paulina Rigonan wascompetent to enter into said contract.

Ruling: Paulina Rigonan was in continuous possession of the property in this case, throwing an inverseimplication and serious
doubt on the due execution of the deed of sale. The same parcels of landinvolved in the alleged sale were still included in the
will subsequently executed by Paulina andnotarized by Atty. Tagatag. These circumstances, taken together, militate against
unguardedacceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale. At the time of the execution of
the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced ageand senile, attested by the testimony that she
played with her waste and urinated in bed. She diedan octogenarian barely a year when the deed was allegedly executed. The
general rule is that aperson is not incompetent to contract merely because of advance years or by reason of physicalinfirmities.
However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to preventthe person from properly,
intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights when she isundeniably incapacitated. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside and thedecision of the Batac RTC is reinstated.