CASE NAME People vs.

Andan

TOPIC Procedures on Custodial Investigation

Case No. / Date G.R. No. 116437|March 3, 1997.
Ponente Per Curiam
Doctrine Voluntary but uncounselled confession of the accused is admissible in evidence.

Facts:
 February 19, 1994, Baliuag, Bulacan, PablitoAndan y Hernandez alias“Bobby”, raped Marianne Guevarra, twenty years
of age and asecond-year nursing student.
 Andan in order order to suppress evidence against him and delay the identityof the victim, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully andfeloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollowblocks
in her face and in differentparts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal woundswhich directly caused her death.
 Marianne’s gruesome death drew public attention andprompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form acrack
team of police officers to look for the criminal.
 Accused was brought to police headquarters, upon seeing the mayor, he approached him and whispered a requestthat
they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said “Mayor,
patawarinmoako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne.” Later, confession was also witnessed by the public
and the media.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the Mayor w/o the counsel is valid.

RULING: Yes.

The voluntary but uncounseled confession of the accusedto the Mayor and to the media was
admissible in evidence. In this case, it was noted that it was the accused who freely, spontaneously and
voluntarily sought the Mayor for a private meeting, and the Mayor did not know that the accused was going to
confess his guilt. Accused talked with the Mayor as a confidant, not as a law enforcement officer.

The confession made by the accused to the news reporters were likewise free of undue influence
from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed the accused;
they were not acting under the direction and control of the police. Constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to the spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime

Guilty

Note:
In the case of People vs. Suarez, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to
his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something else.
The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
People vs. Pinlac
G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988

Facts:

The accused was convicted of two criminal cases for robbing Mr. Sato and killing Mr. Osamu. He assailed his conviction on the
contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence,
torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

He provided his version of the incident, which is contrary to the facts presented by the plaintiff. He claimed that he was
arrested without any Warrant of Arrest shown to him despite his demand; that he was ordered to reenact the crime, thereby
leaving his fingerprints and sole prints all over the premises of the crime scene; and that during the investigation at the Police
Headquarters, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged

Issue: 
Whether or not that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession

Ruling:
Yes.  the trial court have erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, for it was obtained thru force, torture,
violence and intimidation, without having been apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses.

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, the evidence were mere circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused, which then was
satisfactorily explained, the accused being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato. The court held that the guilt of the
accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus acquitted.
People vs. Macam
G.R. Nos. 91011-12. November 24, 1994
Ponente: Justice Quiason

FACTS:

Appellants Ernesto and Danilo Roque, together with Macam, Cedro and Cawilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with
Homicide. They conspired to rob Benito Macam and kill Leticia Macam. The appellants were arrested without a warrant. When
they refused to admit the robbery killing, they were brought to the QC General Hospital before the surviving victims in
handcuffs and made to line up in handcuffs together with some policemen in civilian clothes for identification.

ISSUE

Whether or not their warrantless arrest and uncounseled identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up
at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights.

HELD
No. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The right to counsel is extended to critical stages of prosecution which include police line-up. After the start of the
custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. However, the
prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants’ identification at the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary
sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused cannot be applied. On the
other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open
court. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin.

The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. They have
not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their
arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not
guilty and by participating in the trial.
People vs. Hon. Ruben Ayson and Felipe Ramos – GR 85215, July 7, 1989

FACTS

Private respondent Ramos was a ticket clerk in PAL when a report came out that he was allegedly involved in irregularities in
ticket sales. He was informed that an investigation would be conducted regarding the matter.

After the investigation, Ramos was informed of the findings of the Audit team. Ramos confessed to the branch manager that he
had indeed “misused” the proceeds from the ticket sales, but he was willing to settle. He asked for a compromise agreement to
pay back the stolen funds, but no such agreement was finalized.

PAL filed an estafa case against Ramos. Ramos's response to the investigation was put in writing and presented as Exhibit A
while his handwritten admission was presented as Exhibit K during the trial. However, Judge Ayson dismissed both pieces of
evidence as he claimed that they were the “fruits of a poisonous tree”. According to him, the exhibits were inadmissible as
evidence because the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights and assisted by counsel when he confessed to
committing the crime.

ISSUE

Whether Exhibits A and K are inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

HELD

YES. Judge Ayson contended that they should be inadmissible as evidence because they violated Ramos's right against self-
incrimination as well as his Miranda rights. The Court ruled otherwise. These rights may only be invoked when the accused is
subjected to custodial investigation by police officers. In this case, the accused was not under custodial investigation at the
time he made his written admission or documented confession to the PAL officers. Moreover, he executed them willingly, as
evidenced by the fact that he wanted to have a compromise agreement with PAL for him to gradually pay back the stolen
funds.
PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]

Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco
Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the
deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was
allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the
police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station
where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
PEOPLE VS. DY [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]

Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at
Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel
Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed
firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and
who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar.
Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to
Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while
cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make
such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is
not applicable in the instant case.

Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the
bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police
custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by
the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the
accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the
Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No
written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation
 People of the Philippines vs. Arnel Alicando y Briones
GR No. 117487, 12 December 1995
Facts:
Arnel Alicando was charged and later on convicted with the crime of rape with homicide, and sentenced to suffer death
penalty. Alicando and his counsel appealed the decision of the trial court and cited 3 reasons for the said appeal. One of which
was that some prosecution evidences were inadmissible. They assailed that said inadmissible evidence were gathered by the
police as a result of custodial interrogation where Alicando confessed the crime without the benefit of counsel.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a verbal confession made during custodial interrogation without the benefit of counsel and the physical
evidence derived therefrom may be admitted as evidence in court?
2. What is the fruit of the poisonous tree?
3. What evidence is required for a valid waiver of the accused’s right to remain silent and right to counsel?

Ruling:
1. No. SC held that uncounseled confession as well as physical evidence derived therefrom are inadmissible as evidence in
court. The high court explained that the manner by which the evidences were derived was contrary to the Constitution, that
such was a blatant violation of the accused’s constitutional right.

2. SC explained that the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is rule which indicates that once the primary source (tree) is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary evidence or derivative evidence (fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. SC
also indicated that the said rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

3. SC held that in order that a waiver of an accused’s right to remain silent and to counsel may be considered valid, there must
be a clear and convincing evidence for the same. SC also held that the burden to prove that the accused waived said rights
prior to making a confession under custodial interrogation lies with the prosecution. The high court also stated that the
prosecution has the burden to show that the evidence derived from the confession is not tainted as “fruit of the poisonous
tree”. The high court also emphasized that the Constitution provides for only one mode of waiver, to wit: it must be in writing
and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, records show that the prosecution failed to discharge this burden. SC also
highlighted that even the lack of timely objection of the appellant to the introduction of constitutionally proscribed evidence
did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was
based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the
suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the
location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued,
resulting to the death of some of the suspects.

After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this
was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge
Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the
authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD

(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of
his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial
investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already considered as the
suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were
intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.

However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the
presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.

(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is
caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and © when the
one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions.
The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The
authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed
the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.

Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case
because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest
the legality of the warrantless arrest.
Luz v. People (G. R. No. 197788; February 29, 2012)

CASE DIGEST: RODEL LUZ y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. (G. R. No. 197788; February 29, 2012).

FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and this prompted
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante
were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which
included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It
found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the
CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE: Were the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu incident to a lawful arrest?

HELD: There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under
R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under
arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-
station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the
time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. GRANTED.

People vs. Gerente

GR No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

Facts: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren,
started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the
house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention
to kill Clarito Blace. Appellant allegedly agreed: “Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy
Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped
a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about
4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by
a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali,
proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a
hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes that she saw
the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the
house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found
them to be marijuana. When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

Issue: Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime committed by the accused is justified and valid in
arresting the latter without securing an arrest and search warrant.

Held: Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without
a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved
of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.” The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente,
as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and
of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search
conducted on Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.” The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack
them unless he is first disarmed.
 UMIL V. RAMOS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

l Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows
who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
l Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the
sparrows of the NPA).
l Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
l Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
l In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners; that a mere
suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing
an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized
government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at
the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had
shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing
offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the
CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural,
Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it would have been better for the military
agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause
for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial
authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute
and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule
113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other
administrative sanctions.

G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.  

GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts:

While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City, they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.They approached the petitioner and identified themselves
as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 revolver, two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions but failed to do so.

Issue:

Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was valid.

Ruling:

An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

Contrary to the argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually
committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
 PEOPLE V. MENGOTE - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

l Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner
of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
l A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
l Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that they saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was
holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
l The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
l His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were
taken from them.
l Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
l One other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the
articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the
robbers.
l He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver.
l Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the
weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.
l It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no
warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because
the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant.
l The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful

HELD:

NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was
merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

The Court takes note that there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and
his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of the
participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that
they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation
conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he
was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house. Hence, accused-appellant is
acquitted.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle.
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was
able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for
petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police
detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to
the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has
waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for
certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. 

(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid
effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion,
membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is
because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their
information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. 

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement
that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should
have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is
ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary
investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.
People Vs. Dramayo Case Digest

People Vs. Dramayo 

42 SCRA 60
G.R. L-21325
October 29, 1971 

Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an
accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station
themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal 

Issue: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is
meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the
law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof regular to constitute the offense." 

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence
deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not
come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal
contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had
been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise
being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty
having arisen as to their capability.
Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts:
 Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that
there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg.
53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate
for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term
of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are
present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a
hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent,
and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be
encouraged to come in to politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee
has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again.

It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty
of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear
and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's
petition was meritorious.
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988

Facts:

Antonio de los Reyes, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner,
who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report. Five years later,
it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which was
subsequently accepted by President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint with the same charges.

An investigation took place, and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity, but was denied.

Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Tatad. A motion to quash the information was
made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases
filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his
constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.

Held:
YES. Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case found to be violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to due process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation can not be
corrected

Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The long delay in resolving the case
under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-
day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Though the
period fixed by law is merely "directory," it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of
close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Alonte vs. Savellano - GR No. 131652, March 9, 1998

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñ an, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan with accomplice
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The
case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Biň an. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue
due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to
the Manila Regional Trial Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte
and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision
and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process
when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between
him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on
numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)
144 SCRA 43
G.R. No.72670
September 12, 1986

Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.
It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin
of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended
the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not
give due consideration.The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as
principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence
of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that
double jeopardy may be invoked later on.The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan
and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to
present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a
re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e)
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does
not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the
authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was
undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.The denial on the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-
trial was granted.
G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
SENATOR ESTRADA vs OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:

On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaintfiled by the NBI and Atty. Baligodfor
Plunder. And on 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada another complaint for the crime of plunder.

Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December2013 and
14 March 2014.Sen. Estrada filed his request to be furnished with copies of counter affidavits of the otherrespondents,
affidavits of new witnesses and other filings.Sen. Estrada’s request was made "pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by thecomplainant which he may not have been furnished’ and to ‘haveaccess to the evidence
on record’ based on section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The Ombudsman issued an assailed order denying the motion of Estrada in response to his request stating that under the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not entitled to be furnished of the
copy of all the filings of the respondents. The rights of respondent Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
depend on therights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights he believes that he is entitled to
orthose that may be derived from the phrase "due process of law."

On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution whichfound probable cause to indict Estrada and his co-
respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts ofviolation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a motion for
reconsideration of the joint resolutiondated 28 March 2014 and dated 7 April 2014. He prayed for the issuance of a new
resolution dismissing thecharges against him. Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014
Order denying his request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set
asidethe 27 March 2014 Order.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated his right to constitutional due process.

2. Whether or not Estrada has no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
than to file the petition for certiorari.

3. Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari constitutes forum shopping.

Ruling:

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his request for the counter affidavits of his co-respondents violates hisconstitutional
right to due process. However, he fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is acompulsory requirement of due process
in a preliminary investigation for the Ombudsman to furnish a respondentwith the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.Estrada’s claim.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probablecause, and
"probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Apreliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the fullexercise of his rights, such as
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a
preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine thewitnesses which
the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that therespondent shall only have
the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by thecomplainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,to be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine.

Second. Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is premature.

Justice Velasco’s dissent prefers thatSen. Estrada not "be subjected to the rigors of a criminal prosecution incourt” because
there is "a pending question regarding the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of its discretion preceding thefinding of a probable
cause to indict him." Restated bluntly, Justice Velasco’s dissent would like this Court toconclude that the mere filing of the
present Petition for Certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s denial of SenEstrada’s Request should have, by itself, voided all
proceedings related to the present case.

Although it is true that, in its 27 March 2014 Order, the Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s request, theOmbudsman
subsequently reconsidered its Order. On 7 May 2014, the same date that Sen. Estrada filed the present petition, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order thatfurnishedSen. Estrada with the counter-affidavits his co-respondents and directed him to
comment within anon-extendible period of five days from receipt of said Order. Sen. Estrada did not file any comment, as
noted in the4 June 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman.

On 4 June 2014, the Ombudsman issued another Joint Order and denied Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsiderationofits 28
March 2014 Joint Resolution which found probable cause toindict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents withone count of
plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019. In this 4 June 2014 JointOrder, the Ombudsman
stated that "this Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of motions forreconsideration in this proceeding in light of its
grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7May 2014 Order to formally respond to the above-named
respondents’ claims.

We underscore Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion
forreconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order. Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file thisPetition for Certiorari before
this Court. Sen. Estrada’s resort to a petitionfor certiorari before this Court stands instark contrast to his filing of his 7 April
2014 Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution finding probable cause.

It is apparent that Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is premature for lack of filing of a motion for reconsideration
before the Ombudsman. When theOmbudsman gave Sen. Estrada copies of the counter-affidavits and even waited for the lapse
of the given period forthe filing of his comment, Sen. Estrada failed to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault.
Thus, Sen.Estrada’s failure cannot in any way be construed as violation of due process by the Ombudsman, much less ofgrave
abuse of discretion. Sen. Estrada has not filed any comment, and still chooses not to.

Forum Shopping

Sen. Estrada also raised in this petition the same issue he raised in his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March2014 Joint
Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause. While his motion for reconsideration of the 28March 2014 Joint
Resolution was pending, Sen. Estrada did not wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman andinstead proceeded to file the
present Petition for Certiorari. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order on 4 June 2014and specifically addressed the issue that
Sen. Estrada is raising in this Petition. Thus, Sen. Estrada's presentPetition for Certiorari is not only premature, it also
constitutes forum shopping.
People Vs. Holgado  (85 Phil 752G.R. No. L-2809March 22, 1950)

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
ArtemiaFabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said ArtemiaFabreag of her personal
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr.Ocampo, which no evidence was
presented to indict the latter. 
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. 
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that
it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the
guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. 

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the
supposed instructions of Mr.Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making
of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no
way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the
fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to
be capital by the court.
Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and
oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellant’s opposition
because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did
not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating
on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to
avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.

Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at
bar.

Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related
provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains
more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation  rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for
not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the
proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the
hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice. 
Pecho vs. People
G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996

Facts
The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of
official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the
crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it
only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy
since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the
filing of the information.

Issue
Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted

Held
No. there is no merit in the petitioners claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be
convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents.

The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he
is chargedwith as follows:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if
one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must  contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime.  What determines the real nature and cause
of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one  charged, is
necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two
offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.

However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as
conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted. 
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]

Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of
the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which
set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded
and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner
guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the
purview of .RA.3019.

Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019
sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation
of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).

The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all
kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor
transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element
is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding,
respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged
that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner
and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General
commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It
is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts
him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of
the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent
Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional
right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that
the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in
view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28,
1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified
and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with
due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.