Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of
the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a
possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be
certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before
the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court
had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward
while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has
transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the
effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public
respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which
provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary
and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on
this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in
by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is

within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive
powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its
power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to
address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there
is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified
until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed
before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters
that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed
on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant
motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations
was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January
4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray
dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5,
1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone
the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents
that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer
restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are
invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there
should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing
even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the
metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes
and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-
entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner

seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a)
Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably
makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested
parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents
are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic
Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is
hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

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The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998
a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28,
1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he
has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this
Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced
and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision
was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction
to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor
the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the
court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has
become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible. 5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6
viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which

constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence
has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or
alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal
or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper
order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the
court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of
the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and
writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
 Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and
the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law
this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King;
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the
trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged
that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom
the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the
investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of

jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution
7
vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6
of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law
or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating
that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression,
did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that
this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can
diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled
out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to
control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39
governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120
governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court
for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject
to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules
of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules
of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70%
in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation;
it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do
so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of
its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further
ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,

practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5),
Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection

and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that
this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions,
a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction
of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the
case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on
November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on
December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the
jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the
trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to
provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated
November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo
Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof,
particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when
requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by
the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief"
state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's

Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the
non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional
guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of
public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide
the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein

respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections
pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such
Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act
No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the
mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the
execution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the

information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise
 by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to
Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of
his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For
instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the
execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with.
The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even
work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at
execution set by the President would be earlier than that
designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about

the date of execution to herein respondent and the public
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28,
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the

State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It

supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for
any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by
the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have
become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of
the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December
7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to
information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction
over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed
for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its
Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court
has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not
depend on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision
in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14
Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,

the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by
the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members
of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For
instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is
generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation
of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of
its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the
power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of
the three branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner

must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted
especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m.
He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January
4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought
for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed
has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they
would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also
sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib
Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the
same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional
recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4,
1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court
hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be
executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether
petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the
Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there
were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's
allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the
print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is
a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members
whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress
is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law
(R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the
Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There
was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3
p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in
session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment
but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with
the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be
made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others,
by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life
was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of
some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law
and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take
the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e.,
the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital
punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior
events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or
amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of
the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature
and that of Senator Pimentel.

18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor

General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez
entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to
reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of
death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department
of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the
President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the
death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of
January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in
the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by
an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that
the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In
addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the
Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In
light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has
served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question
of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will
probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime
and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by
emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans
on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if
it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when
the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when
anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this
Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold.
As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution —
and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a
better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom
only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of
rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage
of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering
justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair
to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4,
1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for
execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law
and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,

Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

 Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set
forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of
death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-
numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other
things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-
examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a
co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if
truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time
for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider
its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and
executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for
the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction
of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the
Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence
teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of
settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief
cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is
the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which

constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence
has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the
court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated,
functus est officio suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event
that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
 proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of
the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of
the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and
writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and
the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law
this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King;
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the
trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged
that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial
duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if
however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final
judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve,
and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the
convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor
constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective
spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not
prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress
from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry
date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of
Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain
circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal
or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed,
it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-examination by
Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the
Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to
undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so
much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the
conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the
death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress
to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial
instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject
to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must
be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That
the capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental
law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just
because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must
first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that
would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death
penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous
nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the
death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given
the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime
would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify,
the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the
crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally
killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to,
stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally
be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of
offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the
Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree,
most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the
presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution,
an issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition
each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as
I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of
the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction
to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I
will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the
context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or
amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and
that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the
TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to
the imposition of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical
essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional

insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with
the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting
Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the
Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I
hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the
upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I
submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I
also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is
likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659
( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by
the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that
death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal
injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for
Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by
his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial
ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was nor
brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming
the trial court's sentence of death. 4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not
been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They
proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death
penalty already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a
prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive
one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely
suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it
from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution
clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime
remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may
longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution.
As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom

delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus
clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition
of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal
from the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames
of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the
Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an
exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation
of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and
liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death
penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at
some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language
of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to
"provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective;
and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the
existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous"
before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty.
For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death
penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual
offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to

"provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the
Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in
the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either
collectively for all the offenses or individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death
penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took
effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the
limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the
death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the
very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer,
I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the

death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the
meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself
merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an
applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which
courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In
deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas"
clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient

definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously
declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by
which the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes
"grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical
definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract
from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it
with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an

introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its
text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with
the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death
as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were
already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes
were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law
were already to punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen.
Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from
existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already
death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were
already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit
has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very
same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental
law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under
and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the
Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was
an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what
possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but
brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I
believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on
"heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses
already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:

1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which

have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or
viciousness unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential
ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter
perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is
carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence,
evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its
heinousness.
21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to
qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of
treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier
penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution
also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the
capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22
made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best
feeble and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase
in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for
each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the
words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very
specific reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659,
Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative
Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr.
Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would
like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the
death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The
Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this
particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling
reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the

Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason
as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after
1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if
one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense
committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution
speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it
refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?
 MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this
time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those
who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of

"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that
these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed
deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics
from the Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate
particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact
declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the
year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between
Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume
of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman
inform us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.

Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death
penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied
by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished
the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume
of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40
percent.
 MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death
penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that
the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40
percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm
that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading
now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime
rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent.
Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same
document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the
document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures
on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year
1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the
figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in

1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related
cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no
death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death

penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against
heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the
commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on
and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent
to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the
culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the
academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the
constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is
included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in
favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people,
particularly where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the
issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos,
guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its
fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is
in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the
Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is
arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by
giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology
and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people
more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the
strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as
the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech.
assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these
rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment,
utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the
death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The
"Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons

 37
have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death
penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts
reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn
between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent
(27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to
P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%)
earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not
know how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below
the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these
earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the
middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn
variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts
do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts
earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural
workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth
thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and
construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in
allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport
workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16)
of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service
industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians,
security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio
technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About
four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the
armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%)
are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty
four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog;
twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano.
The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan,
Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and
understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven
percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven
(27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them
graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine
(9) convicts did not study at all.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations

sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the
powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in
capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and
presentation are required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the
underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was
woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court
until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written
in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are
themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a
death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to
engender in the minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but
unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in

particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be
misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the
law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate
against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way,
as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings
complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life
(sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever
the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or
classes of people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of
educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined
to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-
than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore
inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices,
violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty
neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such
law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing
a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in
the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the
underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts
and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise
above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position
are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we
cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to
advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the
Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively
inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged
in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and
so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better.
This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It
did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the
death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be
ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent

requirements:

a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the

prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the
crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define
or characterize the crime as "heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons
which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of
the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must
both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the
heinous nature of the offense.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling
reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes
generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to

the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While
the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it
advisedly limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A
Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and
ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to
defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church
indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both
clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which
man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution
reluctantly allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of
"absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare
and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA
7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of
"compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of
the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for
under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the

penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.