Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BRITISH ACADEMY
VOLUME LXV
1979
LONDON
PUBLISHED FOR THE BRITISH ACADEMY
τ
DAWES H I C K S LECTURE
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES'
BY M . F . B U R N Y E A T
F ^ R O M t h e fact t h a t h o n e y a p p e a r s b i t t e r to some a n d
sweet to o t h e r s D e m o c r i t u s c o n c l u d e d t h a t it is n e i t h e r
sweet nor b i t t e r , H e r a c l i t u s t h a t it is b o t h . ' T h i s r e p o r t
f r o m Sextus E m p i r i c u s [PH ii. 63) testifies t h a t a r g u m e n t s
f r o m conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s c a m e early to t h e r e p e r t o i r e of
philosophy. D e m o c r i t u s ' p u r p o s e w a s to establish t h e v i e w
s u m m e d u p i n a f a m o u s f r a g m e n t : 'Sweet exists b y c o n v e n t i o n ,
b i t t e r by c o n v e n t i o n , c o l o u r b y c o n v e n t i o n ; i n reality a t o m s
a n d t h e void exist' (frag. 125). I f w e speak of h o n e y as sweet,
it is because this is the r e s p o n s e s a n c t i o n e d b y c u s t o m a n d
c o n v e n t i o n , especially linguistic c o n v e n t i o n , t o t h e w a y c e r t a i n
a t o m s i m p i n g e o n o u r o r g a n s of taste, b u t t h e r e is n o m o r e
to it t h a n t h a t : n o m o r e t h a n a response t o a t o m i c stimuli.
T e r m s like ' s w e e t ' a n d ' b i t t e r ' , ' w h i t e ' a n d ' b l a c k ' , c o r r e s p o n d
to n o t h i n g i n t h e collections of a t o m s w h i c h constitute t h e
t h i n g s in t h e w o r l d a r o u n d us. O u r a t t r i b u t i o n s of w h a t w e r e
l a t e r to be c a l l e d s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s are a p r o j e c t i o n o n to
t h a t world of o u r o w n , m e r e l y subjective affections.
H e r a c l i t u s ' message w a s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t : n o t t h e e m p t y s u b -
j e c t i v i t y of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s b u t their o n e - s i d e d p a r t i a l i t y .
I t m a y be q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r h e actually u s e d t h e h o n e y
e x a m p l e , b u t t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t his s t r a n g e g n o m i c
u t t e r a n c e s i n c l u d e others t o t h e s a m e or similar effect.
104 PROCEEDINGS O F THE BRITISH ACADEMY CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 71
S e a is t h e m o s t p u r e a n d t h e m o s t p o l l u t e d w a t e r : d r i n k a b l e a n d s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n b u t w h e r e v e r t h e r e is d i s a g r e e m e n t a n d o n e
s a l u t a r y f o r fishes, b u t u n d r i n k a b l e a n d d e s t r u c t i v e f o r m e n . v i e w is o p p o s e d t o a n o t h e r . A n d t h e m o r a l P r o t a g o r a s d r e w
(frag. 6i)
w a s t h a t e a c h of t h e c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s is t r u e for t h e
A g a i n , ' D o n k e y s w o u l d c h o o s e c h a f f r a t h e r t h a n gold' ( f r a g . 9 ) , p e r s o n whose a p p e a r a n c e it is. H i s d o c t r i n e t h a t m a n is t h e
'Pigs e n j o y m u d r a t h e r t h a n clean w a t e r ' f o r w a s h i n g i n ( f r a g . m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s r e c o m m e n d s a relativistic a c c o u n t of
13 w i t h Sext. E m p . PHi. 5 6 ) . A r e t h e y r i g h t or w e ? T h e i m p l i e d t r u t h w h i c h a l l o w s t h e h o n e y t o b e b o t h sweet a n d bitter, s u b -
a n s w e r is t h a t e a c h is r i g h t — f r o m h i s o w n p o i n t of v i e w . I t j e c t t o the q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t it is s w e e t for (in r e l a t i o n to) s o m e
follows t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t b u t e q u a l l y v a l i d p o i n t s of v i e w a r e p a l a t e s a n d b i t t e r for o t h e r s . By r e l a t i v i z i n g t h e a t t r i b u t i o n s
o n e - s i d e d , p a r t i a l reflections of r e a l i t y . A t s o m e d e e p e r level, of s w e e t a n d b i t t e r P r o t a g o r a s a v o i d s the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s e m -
f r o m a s i t ^vere a n a b s o l u t e g o d ' s - e y e v a n t a g e - p o i n t , t h e o p p o -
b r a c e d by H e r a c l i t u s . S i m i l a r l y i n m o r a l s , t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t
sition a n d c o n t r a s t is o v e r c o m e . T h e sea is b o t h p u r e a n d i m -
m a n is the m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s asserts t h a t m a r r y i n g o n e ' s
p u r e ; m u d is b o t h clean a n d d i r t y ; r u b b i s h is w e a l t h . I t s o u n d s
sister is right f o r o n e i n d i v i d u a l o r society, w r o n g for a n o t h e r .
like a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d so it i s — w i t h i n o u r h u m a n l a n g u a g e .
S o f a r we h a v e f o u r a n c i e n t c h a r a c t e r s on t h e s t a g e . W e s h o u l d
O u r l a n g u a g e is so s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t o call s o m e t h i n g p u r e is
b r i n g on s o m e of their m o d e r n - d r e s s c o u n t e r p a r t s . A n d first
to i m p l y t h a t i t is n o t i m p u r e a n d v i c e versa. B u t t h a t o n l y
Berkeley. Y o u d o n o t h a v e t o r e a d f a r i n t o t h e f i r s t of Berkeley's
raises t h e q u e s t i o n , a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n w e m e t
Three Dialogues b e f o r e y o u f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g :
with in Democritus, w h e t h e r the oppositions and contrasts
e n c o d e d in o u r l a n g u a g e c o r r e s p o n d t o a n y t h i n g in r e a l i t y . T h a t which a t o t h e r times s e e m s sweet, shall to a d i s t e m p e r e d p a l a t e
M a y b e t h e l a n g u a g e w h i c h m a k e s u s t r e a t t h e conflict o f a p - a p p e a r bitter. A n d n o t h i n g c a n b e p l a i n e r , t h a n t h a t divers p e r s o n s
p e a r a n c e s as a conflict, w h i c h m a k e s u s s a y t h a t w h e r e a p p e a r - p e r c e i v e d i f f e r e n t tastes in t h e s a m e f o o d , since t h a t w h i c h o n e m a n
a n c e s c o n f l i c t b o t h c a n n o t b e r i g h t , is itself a n aspect o f o u r d e l i g h t s in, a n o t h e r a b h o r s . A n d h o w c o u l d this b e , i f the t a s t e w a s
anthropocentric partiality. s o m e t h i n g r e a l l y i n h e r e n t i n t h e f o o d ? ( p . 180)'
I Text as in M . Marcovich, Heraclitus, Editio Maior (Mérida, 1967), ' For a defence of the authenticity of this fragment see Marcovich, op. cit.,
pp. 480-a. pp. 99-100.
104
PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 109
W h a t t h i s a c c o u n t of H e r a c l i t u s suggests as h i s answer t o t h e eye of t h e b e h o l d e r . O f c o u r s e the a r g u m e n t s m u s t b e
o u r e a r l i e r p r o b l e m is t h e f o l l o w i n g . T h e i n c l i n a t i o n to r e g a r d criticized. B u t t h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e criticism m u s t be j o i n e d by
' b l u e ' a n d ' h u e y ' as i n c o m p a t i b l y o p p o s e d is n o t to b e s u p - respect and understanding.
pressed b u t r a t h e r r e c o g n i z e d for w h a t it is, n a m e l y , a m a n i - I t is t h a t e l e m e n t of r e s p e c t , s o necessary f o r real u n d e r -
festation of the fact that w e c a n n o t a b s o r b the o t h e r creature's s t a n d i n g , w h i c h I miss i n A u s t i n ' s work a s a critic o f the
c o l o u r s c h e m e i n t o our o w n . T o r e c o g n i z e this is t o r e c o g n i z e t r a d i t i o n w h i c h h e r i g h t l y s a w as s t e m m i n g f r o m H e r a c l i t u s .
t h a t it lies i n t h e n a t u r e o f a v i e w p o i n t — a n y v i e w p o i n t — t o A u s t i n is a t h i r d case of d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e . I n his first c h a p t e r
c l a i m t h e a b s o l u t e allegiance of t h e o n e w h o s e v i e w p o i n t it is. h e explains t h a t h e c a n n o t g o b a c k to t h e v e r y earliest texts
H e r a c l i t e a n w i s d o m is t h u s c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e s t a n c e of a m a n f r o m before P l a t o , since t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r e x t a n t . S o h e
w h o r e c o g n i z e s t h a t his m o r a l i t y is o n e a m o n g o t h e r s , yet d o e s chooses A y e r a s his ' c h i e f s t a l k i n g horse', w i t h s u b s i d i a r y re-
n o t o n t h a t a c c o u n t feel, n o r t h i n k t h a t h e o u g h t to feel, its f e r e n c e s to P r i c e a n d t o W a r n o c k ' s book o n Berkeley. T h e s e
values t o b e a n y t h e less a b s o l u t e or b i n d i n g . T h e r e m a y b e w o r k s seem t o h i m 'to p r o v i d e t h e best a v a i l a b l e expositions of
difficulties i n expressing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g this s t a n c e , b u t i t is t h e a p p r o v e d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g theories w h i c h are a t l e a s t as
r e a l l y n o less d i f f i c u l t to c o n c e i v e a P r o t a g o r e a n o r D e m o c r i t e a n o l d as H e r a c l i t u s — m o r e full, c o h e r e n t , a n d t e r m i n o l o g i c a l l y
life w h i c h seriously a t t e m p t e d to t r e a t first-order e x p e r i e n c e e x a c t t h a n y o u find, f o r e x a m p l e , in D e s c a r t e s or B e r k e l e y '
a n d c o n c e r n s as relative o r subjective.^ A n d t h i s brings m e t o (p. i ) . But u n f o r t u n a t e l y , this w a s a serious h i s t o r i c a l m i s t a k e
t h e q u e s t i o n of diagnosis. o n Austin's p a r t .
I t was a m i s t a k e b e c a u s e t h e r e a s o n s A y e r p r o v i d e s f o r t h e
IX i n t r o d u c t i o n of s e n s e - d a t a a r e not t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p p r o v e d
W h e n I w a s discussing t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t reasons, t h o u g h A y e r h i m s e l f c l a i m s t h a t t h e y a r e :
t o t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e l a i d d o w n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e W h a t the advocates of the s e n s e - d a t u m theory h a v e done is to decide
dialogue, I considered t h e objection t h a t m y window-model to apply the w o r d 'see' or a n y other words t h a t designate m o d e s of
diagnosis was b o t h rude a n d unnecessary. I have, I hope, dealt perception to delusive as well as to veridical experiences, a n d a t the
sufficiently w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t it is n o t n e c e s s a r y . But I h a v e s a m e time to use these words i n such a w a y t h a t w h a t is seen o r other-
n o t a d d r e s s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t I m a k e it s o u n d a s if s o m e t h i n g wise sensibly experienced m u s t really exist and m u s t really h a v e the
r a t h e r d i s r e p u t a b l e is g o i n g o n i n t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t a n d properties t h a t it appears to h a v e . N o d o u b t they also use these words
t h e o t h e r s w e h a v e b e e n l o o k i n g at. I a m v e r y f a r f r o m t h i n k i n g in other, m o r e familiar, senses. But it is this usage t h a t leads t h e m to
this to b e so. I h a v e i n d e e d e m p h a s i z e d t h e p i c t u r e s a n d t h e t h e introduction of sense-data. (p. 2 4 ) '
m e t a p h o r s , b u t so t h a t w e m a y see t h e m for w h a t t h e y a r e . T h i s was w r o n g as h i s t o r y — n e i t h e r P r o t a g o r a s n o r B e r k e l e y
W h e t h e r it is t h e flawless close-up vision or t h e p r e h e n s i v e n o r Russell r e l i e d o n a n o v e l sense of 'see' o r ' p e r c e i v e ' — b u t
g r a s p , w h e t h e r i t secures a w h o l e o b j e c t or o n l y some p a r t of c o r r e c t as a n a c c o u n t of w h a t A y e r himself w i s h e d to d o , w h i c h
t h e s u r f a c e of o n e or j u s t a n o n - p h y s i c a l s u b s t i t u t e for t h e s e , w a s to m a k e t h e w h o l e issue a q u e s t i o n of w h i c h l a n g u a g e o n e
s u c h p i c t u r e s h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n in o u r e a r l i e s t a n d d e e p e s t chooses for t h e p u r p o s e s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y . O n t h e r e a d i n g
e x p e r i e n c e . I f t h e y h a v e elicited a smile, it s h o u l d h a v e b e e n I h a v e o f f e r e d in this l e c t u r e , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t f r o m
a s m i l e of r e c o g n i t i o n , n o t c o n t e m p t . F o r if, as H e r a c l i t u s c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s sets u p a p r i v a t e s u b s t i t u t e o b j e c t to
a d v i s e d , w e r e m e m b e r o u r d r e a m s , w e will r e c o g n i z e t h a t b e p e r c e i v e d i n t h e v e r y s a m e sense of the v e r b as t h a t i n w h i c h
t h e r e w a s a t i m e in o u r o w n lives w h e n t h e p r o b l e m o f c o n - w e originally w a n t e d to p e r c e i v e w h o l e o b j e c t s o u t t h e r e i n t h e
flicting a p p e a r a n c e s e n g a g e d o u r s t r o n g e s t feelings; a t i m e , w o r l d . W h a t is c h a n g e d b y a d d i n g the relativistic q u a l i f i e r s
m o r e o v e r , w h e n p e r c e p t i o n a n d v a l u a t i o n w e r e n o t yet d i s t i n -
I A footnote on the next page refers to G. A. Paul, 'Is there a Problem
g u i s h e d . W e k n o w too little a b o u t t h e p s y c h i c r o o t s of c r e a t i v e about Sense-Data?' (1936), in Swartz, op. cit., pp. 271-87, as clearly bring-
p h i l o s o p h y to t u r n o u r b a c k s o n t h e s e sources of i n s p i r a t i o n . ing out the point that the sense-datum theorist is simply recommending a
If t h e y a r e f o u n d d i s r e p u t a b l e , t h e f a u l t r e a l l y is, for o n c e , i n new verbal usage. But Paul denies that the sense-datum theorists themselves
I For valuable discussion of this and related issues, see Wiggins, op. cit. would represent their procedure in such terms (pp. 227—9).
110 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E B R I T I S H ACADEMY ^WiNTL·!«^ 1 1J1VJ i»»
'for m e ' , ' i m m e d i a t e l y ' , ' d i r e c t l y ' , a n d t h e like, is n o t the sense r e s p e c t f u l h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the o r i g i n a l sources is a
of t h e v e r b ' p e r c e i v e ' b u t its o b j e c t . W h a t g u a r a n t e e s t h a t first step t o w a r d s realism i n o u r o w n p h i l o s o p h y .
s o m e t h i n g r e a l l y is as it a p p e a r s to b e is n o t a special sense of
t h e v e r b b u t its t a k i n g as o b j e c t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is itself ( a n ) X
a p p e a r a n c e . ' A n d this is c o m p l e t e l y a t v a r i a n c e vsrith A u s t i n ' s
d i a g n o s i s i n t e r m s of linguistic sleight o f h a n d (cf. p p . 3-5) o r t h e I t is only fitting t h a t t h e e p i l o g u e be given t o the f o u n d e r of
u n j u s t i f i e d i n v e n t i o n of a s p e c i a l sense of ' p e r c e i v e ' (chap. I X ) , t h e series o f lectures i n w h i c h I h a v e t h e h o n o u r t o s p e a k .
I t is t r u e t h a t A u s t i n t e m p e r s his d i a g n o s i s f r o m time t o t i m e I n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y j u d i c i o u s a n d historically i n f o r m e d p a p e r
w i t h a n a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t it w a s A y e r w h o g a v e t h e s u b - o n ' A p p e a r a n c e and R e a l Existence''—a p a p e r which treats
j e c t a l i n g u i s t i c t u r n {cf. p . 102). B u t t h a t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y a s a single c o n t i n u i n g story,
is itself m o d i f i e d b y A u s t i n ' s v i e w t h a t t h e n e w linguistic c l o t h i n g w i t h equal h o n o u r s for Plato, K a n t , and H e g e l — D a w e s Hicks
is r e a l l y j u s t a disguise f o r t h e o l d t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s f o r a n h a s this t o s a y a b o u t R u s s e l l ' s version of t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m
ontological dichotomy between sense-data a n d material objects conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s i n The Problems of Philosophy:
( p p . 5 9 - 6 1 , 84, 105-7). A n d despite these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , h e I t is obvious, I think, t h a t this a r g u m e n t is fallacious, a n d t h a t the
c o n t i n u e s t o discuss t h e a r g u m e n t s a n d d i a g n o s e their m i s t a k e s conclusion does not follow f r o m the premises. F o r , in order to test it,
in p r e d o m i n a n t l y linguistic t e r m s , t a k i n g it t h a t A y e r does give suppose t h a t colour of some kind is i n h e r e n t in t h e table, t h a t t h e table
' t h e a p p r o v e d reasons' f o r t h e old t h e o r y . ^ T h e effect, a s m a n y has a specific colour. T h e n , surely, t h e r e would b e nothing to conflict
r e a d e r s o f Sense and Sensibilia h a v e felt, is t h a t A u s t i n ' s o b j e c t i o n s w i t h this supposition in t h e circumstances t h a t s u c h real colour will
fall u n h a p p i l y b e t w e e n t w o stools. T h e y n e i t h e r get t o t h e present a d i f f e r e n t aspect if a n o t h e r colour be reflected u p o n it, or if
b o t t o m of the traditional arguments, w h i c h r e q u i r e a diagnosis a blue pair of spectacles intervene between it and t h e eyes of the observer,
o r if it be enveloped in darkness r a t h e r than in daylight. T h e reasoning
d e e p e r t h a n linguistic m e t h o d s c a n a c h i e v e , n o r a r e they a p p r o -
would only b e valid on t h e assumption t h a t if the table is really
p r i a t e t o t h e essentially s t i p u l a t i v e , c o n s t r u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of
coloured, t h e real colour must a p p e a r the same i n darkness a n d in d a y -
Ayer's o w n enterprise.
light, through a pair of b l u e spectacles and w i t h o u t them, i n artificial
I t s e e m s to m e , then, t h a t as a critic A u s t i n falls short b e c a u s e light and in the sun's l i g h t — a n assumption which, on the view I a m
h e d i d n o t p r o p e r l y sort o u t t h e d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e he a d o p t e d taking, is a t o n c e to be dismissed as untenable. I f t h e colour d i d a p p e a r
w h e n h e d e c i d e d to l o o k a t t h e h i s t o r y t h r o u g h Ayer's spec- to be the s a m e in these v a r y i n g circumstances, then certainly there
tacles. H e w o u l d h a v e d o n e b e t t e r t o go b a c k t o the o r i g i n a l would be reason, and sufficient reason, for d o u b t i n g the reliability of
sources, w h i c h h e was of c o u r s e well e q u i p p e d t o h a n d l e . E v e n visual apprehension.- F o r obviously the conditions m e n t i o n e d — r e a l ,
t h e e a r l i e s t sources, p r i o r t o P l a t o , a r e n o t c o m p l e t e l y b e y o n d objective conditions, as I t a k e t h e m to b e — c a n n o t be without influence
u p o n any real colour the table m a y be said to possess, (p. 42)
t h e r e a c h of historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s I h o p e t o h a v e s h o w n .
I n t r y i n g t o s h o w this, m y essential c l a i m h a s been t h a t a T h i s is w h e r e w e c a m e i n , R u s s e l l ' s a r g u m e n t rests o n p r o p o s i -
t i o n ( i ) , ( i ) is e q u i v a l e n t to (2), a n d (2) is m a n i f e s t l y false.
' Let me add that I have nothing to say in this lecture about phenomena- T h e r e it i s — t h e logical r e f u t a t i o n n e a t l y l a i d out, c l e a r a n d
lism. Considered as a theory about the analysis of material object statements conclusive, j u s t o n e y e a r a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of The Problems
in terms of statements about perceptual experience, phenomenalism is a of Philosophy. W h y d i d it m a k e n o d i f f e r e n c e ? W h y , if s t r a i g h t -
separate issue from the introduction of sense-data (just one approach to
f o r w a r d l o g i c a l r e f u t a t i o n is e n o u g h , d o t h e a r g u m e n t s f r o m
perceptual experience) with which it has historically been associated.
^ T o mention just one of the historical distortions that result, Price, who conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s live o n ?
really belongs to the prelinguistic phase, gets landed with Ayer's account ' Proc. Arisi. Soc. 14. (1913/14), pp. 1-48.
(as quoted above) of hoAv sense-data are introduced (Ausün, p. 103). A - Compare Augustine, Contra Academicos iii, 26: ' I f an oar dipped in water
footnote seeks to make amends, but it does not m a k e clear that Price looked straight, I would rather accuse my eyes of false testimony'—so far as
only raised the matter of the senses of 'perceive' in chapter 2 of Perception I can discover, the point is original with Augustine, one of several that make
(pp. 22 £f.), after introducing sense-data in chapter 1 on the basis of an the Contra Academicos a pioneering work.
entirely epistemologica! argument from what we can and cannot doubt
(though cf. p. 5 η.).