Verlag Barbara Budrich

Chapter Title: Serbia’s Recognizing Realities

Chapter Author(s): Sonja Biserko

Book Title: “Frozen conflicts" in Europe

Book Editor(s): Anton Bebler
Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich. (2015)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvdf0bmg.21

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Serbia’s Recognizing Realities

Sonja Biserko

The normalization agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, signed on April

19, 2013 has been crucial for both regional and bilateral stabilization. The
agreement put an end to the region’s fragmentation along ethnic lines and to
the illusion of Serbia’s political and intellectual elites that a shift in interna-
tional constellation would play into Serbia’s hands and enable a partition of
Kosovo. A “historical agreement” with the Kosovo-Albanians implying the
partition scenario for Kosovo has been planned from the very beginning of
ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Refraining from openly advocating this op-
tion Belgrade hypocritically insisted on the inseparability of its “south prov-
ince” as cemented by Serbia’s Constitution of 2006. Actually Belgrade has
been adjusting its Kosovo policy to the one for Bosnia-Herzegovina while
waiting for the right moment to come up openly with the partition scenario.
Ivica Dai finally uttered it in spring 2011. Other officials such as Foreign
Minister Vuk Jeremic followed in his footsteps. The normalization agreement
however practically guarantees Pristina’s sovereignty over the entire territory
of Kosovo and implements the provisions of the 2007 Ahtisaari plan for the
autonomy of the Serbian community.
The fact that EU practically imposed the agreement on the official Bel-
grade does not make it less important. The years-long negotiation process
was opened by the previous Serbian government headed by the Democratic
Party which concluded several “technical” agreements with Pristina. The
advisory opinion on Kosovo by the International Court of Justice stating that
its declaration of independence did not violate international law (2010) pro-
vided a legal basis for the negotiations.
Faced with strong resistance from the conservative bloc and the grey zone
of politics, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic skillfully manewered between Brus-
sels’ requests and domestic criticism. The ruling coalition – having itself
travelled a long path from a denial to an acceptance – obtained domestically
significant political legitimacy due to the political turn. The Serbian govern-
ment confirmed the agreement only two days after it was initialled in Brus-
sels, while the parliament ratified it with 173 votes out of 250. A political
consensus was very high with almost all opposition parties backing the
agreement. Only Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia /DSS/ voted against
it. The anti-European forces which, apart from DSS, included the Serbian
Radical Party, unrepresented in the parliament, and various right-wing
groups, failed to stage massive protests aimed at annulling the agreement.
Not even with the Serbian Orthodox Church’s open support this part of Ser-

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184 Sonja Biserko

bia’s social and political scene could not prevent the almost smooth political
turnabout concerning Kosovo. The leaders of Serbian municipalities in
Northern Kosovo also raised their voice against the agreement, threatened
with a referendum but missed the mark.
All relevant international actors as well as the pro-European part of the
Serbian civil society welcomed the conclusion of the Belgrade – Pristina
agreement. The support from the Serbs south of the Ibar river was also ex-
tremely important during the whole negotiating process.
The first eight rounds of talks between Serbia’s and Kosovo’s Prime Min-
isters Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci settled some key issues such as integrat-
ed border management,1 especially sensitive at the two “most sensitive”
crossings – Brnjak and Jarinje. The border management agreement tipped the
balance in the entire negotiating process. The seventh round was the most
difficult test of Belgrade’s cooperativeness as the Serbian side had to give up
the partition scenario for Kosovo on which it had insisted from the very be-
ginning. In the turmoil on Serbia’s political scene two positions crystallized:
a pragmatic stand of Ivica Dacic, on one hand, and, on the other, a strong
anti-European and xenophobic stand of influential conservative circles who
counted on President Tomislav Nikolic’s support. The encounters in Brussels
between I. Dacic and H. Thaci gradually prepared the Serbian public opinion
to accept the normalization of relations with Pristina as unavoidable. This
gave the government an alibi to move on.
Concessions made by Belgrade did not undermine the normalization
agreement’s strategic dimension – a definite withdrawal of Serbia and of its
institutions from Northern Kosovo. What Belgrade called “a maximum under
given circumstances” refered to the fact that only four municipalities with a
Serbian majority population (and only Northern Mitrovica) will make an au-
tonomous entity in Northern Kosovo and that this community of municipali-
ties will have institutions of its own. According to official Belgrade a major
accomplishments of the normalization agreement is the Serbian community’s
right to nominate a regional police commander and to have an appellate court
in Northern Mitrovica. Finally, Serbia asked for and obtained NATO’s guar-
antees that the Kosovo security forces would not enter and operate in North-
ern Kosovo without the Serbian community’s consent, unless specifically
ordered by the North Atlantic Alliance.
After 25 years of an irrational hegemonistic policy the Serbian elites final-
ly changed the course. “Knin, Vukovar, Bosnia, Kosovo were all parts of a
problem without a solution which did not allow us to deal with other mat-
ters”, wrote Prime Minister Ivica Dacic in his article for the daily Politika.
Thanks also to correct media coverage of the Brussels negotiations the Serbi-
an public finally calmly recognized the reality.

1 It means that the parties will gradually set up the joint, integrated, single and secure posts at
all their common crossing points and EULEX will be present.

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 Serbia’s Recognizing Realities 185

In the 1980s the Serbian Orthodox Church had played a major role in ad-
vocating the policy of conflict and strongly influenced all Serbian govern-
ments. During the dramatic parliamentary debate on the Brussels Agreement
the Church published Patriarch Irinej’s appeal on behalf of the Holy Synod
and of its believers. The Patriarch directly requested the three highest state
officials – President, Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister – to keep their
“promises made during the election campaign and in the post-election period
to never and on no account surrender, betray or sell Kosovo and Mehotija,
the historical ‘Old Serbia’.”2 “We shall not accept Europe’s invitation condi-
tioned by Kosovo. If they expect us to abandon and surrender Kosovo we
shall respond with ‘no, thank you’ and persevere with the hard and painful
life of the past five hundred years”, stated the Patriarch repeating the
Church’s most frequently used argument against the normaliazation agree-
ment.3 Prime Minister I. Dacic called the appeal superfluous. He retorted
harshly that the church should not tell the people “we all should be crucified
and suffer for the next 500 years to see cloudless skies”. He also reminded
the church dignitaries that their message was not sent from Pe but from Bel-
grade. “This means that the Serb Patriarchs abandoned Kosovo already in
1690”.4 This time the Church suffered a clear defeat. The government made
the Church understand that there was no place for it any more in Serbian poli-
tics. As the crucial decision drew closer the Church’s laic allies noticed that it
calmed down its Kosovo-related rethoric and openly criticized the Church’s
opportunism.
Fortunately the incumbent Serbian leaders in the North failed to prevent
the signing of the agreement despite raised tensions, barricades and incidents
they organized and threats they made. They could still obstruct the imple-
mentation of the agreement in a variety of ways. However it is evident that
they lost Belgrade’s support for operating within Serbia’s institutional system
and the power to mobilize their own people for subverting regional stability.
The success of implementation will depend primarily on the resolutenees of
Serbia’s ruling coalition’s to pursue normalization. The head of the DSS par-
liamentary caucus Slobodan Samardži stated: “All we can look forward to is
the non-implementation of the agreement. Now that you have signed it you
are guilty of treason in the true sense of the word. You have betrayed national
interests, … giving up our territory and people …You have promised to help
them, but you will be helping them as you helped the Serbs in Romania,
Hungary, Bosnia, Croatia, etc.”5 The conservative bloc was disappointed by
the fact that the Serbian Progressive Party, once in power failed to effect a

2 Danas, April 8, 2013.

3 S. http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/272343/Pravda-za-srpske-zrtve-Parastos-protiv-
presude-Haga.
4 Politika, April 8, 2013.
5 Parliamentary debate of April 13, 2013.

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186 Sonja Biserko

clear break with the previous “treacherous” policy of the Democratic Party
and of its then leader Boris Tadic. The conservative bloc’s advocacy of form-
ing a “strong patriotic bloc” as “a genuine opposition and a new force on the
Serbian political scene” sounds today like a pipedream.
The historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo opened the way to re-
gional peace, stability and good neighborly relations. The biggest challenge
for the Serbian side has been the implementation of the Brussels agreement
and closing down its parallel institutions in Northern Kosovo, above all the
security structures whose presence the Serbian government had long denied.
The Brussels Agreement as a whole provides Serbia with an opportunity to
exert considerable influence on Kosovo parliament and local self-government
institutions. On the other hand, its influence is slight when it comes to pro-
tecting Serbian cultural identity because the Serbian community does not
accept the status of a national minority.
The normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations has been burdened with
insufficient capabilities on both sides, high expectations and relatively tight
deadlines – in the first place for changing both communities’ mindsets. The
predominant Serbian mindset6 is reflected in the statement by Serbia’s Presi-
dent Tomislav Nikolic, “We are aware that we can hardly survive without
membership of EU but we are also aware that we cannot survive at all with-
out Kosovo and Metokhia.”7 Given resistance to normalization within the
government itself Belgrade might well slow down the process of normaliza-
tion. Civil society in Serbia can play an important role in monitoring the
Brussels agreements and in developing good neighborey relations, primarily
through educational outreach programs. The Serbia-Kosovo relations cannot
be stable as long as negative steretypes about the Albanian Kosovars predo-
minate in Serbian citizens’ perception. The biggest challenge will be to acti-
vate the Kosovo Serbian forces willing to work for the integration of Nothern
Kosovo into Kosovo’s legal system thus helping the Serbs in Nothern Koso-
vo to easier accept and live up with the Brussels agreements.
The Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s canceling the South Stream project once
again challenged Serbia’s “both EU and Russia” policy, similar to the once
“both Kosovo and EU” mantra. Considering Serbia’s candidacy status for EU
membership, the country is under growing pressure to adjust its international
posture to EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Prime Minister A.
Vucic stated that Serbia supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. On the other
hand, he and President T. Nikolic keep avoiding to condemn publicly Cri-
mea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation by Russia.

6 Ethnic discrimination, verbal and physical attacks against “different” persons or groups in
the Balkans countries is still a reality.
7 S. http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:454249-Nikolic-Tesko-
cemo-preziveti-bez-EU-a-bez-KiM-ne-mozemo.

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