“Compare, contrast and evaluate Descartes’ and Leibniz’s arguments for the existence of

God”

Descartes and Leibniz are two key philosophers whose contributions in various

areas influenced much of our modern thinking. Particularly with reference to religious

philosophy, we see that both Descartes’ and Leibniz’s contributions have greatly

influenced the area of philosophy devoted to proving the existence of God. While

Descartes’ provides us with two different proofs for God’s existence, Leibniz evaluates

and modifies one of Descartes in order to safe proof it from its earlier criticisms.

Descartes’ two arguments for God’s existence: the trademark argument, and the

ontological argument, can be found in his Meditations 3 and 5 respectively. The

trademark argument (Nigel Warburton, Philosophy: The Classics, 2nd edition) is called as

such because it is as if God left as a trademark on his creation (man) the revelation of His

existence. That is, the innate idea of God is like a trademark stamp. The argument relies

on this innate idea, and then applies the Causal Adequacy Principle(Nigel Warburton,

Philosophy: The Classics, 2nd edition), which states that the cause must contain all

attributes of the effect, if not more. Descartes begins by stating that he has doubts and

desires, which proves that he is a deficient and imperfect being. He continues to assert

that it would be impossible to understand deficiency and imperfection without the idea of

perfection to use as a base of comparison. By proving that he has the idea of perfection,

he can begin his argument for God’s existence. Descartes argues that, because he has the

idea of perfection, the idea must have a cause (because something cannot come from

nothing). By applying the Causal Adequacy Principle to ideas, he asserts that the cause of

the idea of perfection must have as much perfection as the idea itself. But since he’s

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already established that the idea of perfection could not have come from him, as he is

imperfect, it follows that the idea must have come from God. As he states “it is no

surprise that God, in creating me, should have placed this idea in me to be, as it were, the

mark of the craftsman stamped on his work” (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

(Meditation 3)). This allows Descartes to conclude that God is perfect, and cannot be a

deceiver (because deception entails imperfection) which means that God would not create

beings in which that which seems clear and distinct is actually false. Therefore, Descartes

can trust his clear and distinct ideas, and since he has a clear and distinct idea of God,

God must exist. Essentially, Descartes is saying that we have an idea of God, who is an

infinite and perfect being; that idea couldn’t have been caused by anything lesser (than an

infinite, and perfect being) and so God must have caused the idea of himself within is; If

God caused the idea, then he must exist in order to do so.

But herein lies the greatest flaw in the argument: in order to know our idea of God

is clear and distinct, we need to know that God exists (and isn’t a deceiver). So we find

ourselves trapped in a Cartesian Circle (Nigel Warburton, Philosophy: The Classics, 2nd

edition), where what we perceive is true because God exists, but we can only be sure that

God exists because we perceive it to be true. Another problem arises when we consider

the application of the Causal Adequacy Principle which serves essentially as the fulcrum

of Descartes’ argument. Firstly, why does Descartes assume that the principle can be

applied to ideas? The Causal Adequacy Principle is used to describe affects of the

physical world. But since Descartes is a dualist and believes that the physical and mental

are two different realms, it appears as though he is severing that distinction merely for the

purposes of making his argument more plausible. Even if we do apply the principle to our

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ideas, we reach another criticism: why do all our ideas need a cause? Moreover, why do

these ideas impose necessity: Surely to have an idea of something (for example, a perfect

island) does not dictate that it is necessary for this island to exist, or that it does exist at

all. Secondly, as pointed out by Cottingham (John Cottingham, Descartes), the principle

doesn’t allow for objects to be “greater than the sum of its parts”. Cottingham uses the

example of a sponge cake: the property of “sponginess” that the cake gained during its

baking was not present in its ingredients (the eggs, flour, sugar, etc.), so where did the

cake get its characteristic “sponginess” from? A broader example can be seen in

evolution. Science has proven that life evolved from inanimate matter (the elements

effecting the earth), and so in this sense, animate life was caused by something lesser

than itself. Another obvious criticism of Descartes argument is its founding assumption

that everyone has within them the clear and distinct idea of God. Could this idea we all

have not simply be derived from early indoctrination? Essentially, Descartes has erred in

making his argument too specific: instead of asking “Why is there something rather than

nothing?” (the Cosmological Argument) he asks “Where does my idea of God come

from?”

In the Ontological argument, Descartes states that because God is a supreme and

perfect being, it would be an imperfection to not exist, and therefore in his very concept

God proves that he necessarily exists. Since we have the idea of God in our minds, to

exist within the mind solely is less perfect than to exist within the mind and reality, so

God must exist in reality because his very nature is perfection. Descartes fortifies his

argument by explaining that we can conclude truths regarding objects from the very ideas

of them. For example, from the idea of a triangle we can conclude that its angle’s add up

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to 180 degrees. It follows that if we can conclude truths, then they are both possible and

actual: therefore from the idea of God as a perfect being we conclude that it is possible

and actual that God exists. For something to be possible it is true in some possible world,

but for something to be necessary it is true in every possible world, including the actual.

That is to say, it would be a limit for God to exist in some possible world and not every

possible world (for him to possibly exist), and since God is a limitless being, he must

exist in every possible world (necessarily exist).

But this argument is not without its flaws. The same Cartesian circle that exists in

the Trademark argument is also found within the Ontological one, as it depends on

having a clear and distinct idea of God, which would only be possible if God existed in

the first place. The argument clearly attempts to define God into existence, which is

nothing more than a logical trick. Again, Descartes assumes that thoughts impose

necessity, and so by conceiving of God, he must exist to validate his perfect conception.

It could be argued that an unlimited being should not require necessity: surely as a

characteristic of being unlimited, He should depend on nothing to cause his existence.

The greatest problem with Descartes Ontological argument is the assumption that

existence is a property. Properties are modifiers of the subject, which can only occur

when the subject is already in existence. Therefore existence cannot be a property, as it is

still used to modify the subject even if the subject doesn’t exist. Essentially, “existence”

is the condition of a subject, on which properties depend. That is, if something exists, we

can then define it to have properties such as height, colour, characteristics, etc. But these

properties are only true if the object exists. If the object does not exist, we define it no

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further than saying it does not exist (we do not give it height, colour, characteristics, etc.).

This means that existence continues to modify the subject regardless of its state of being,

where as properties do not.

Leibniz had his own thoughts and criticisms of Descartes, despite following in a

similar vain with his proof of God’s existence. Leibniz thought that to prove God’s

existence first it must be proved that he is possible, since when rationalized, properties of

God contain contradictions. Leibniz states “I know what being is, and what it is to be the

greatest and most perfect, nevertheless I do not yet know, for all that, whether there isn’t

a hidden contradiction in joining all that together.. In brief, I do not yet know, for all that,

whether such a being is possible” (Leibniz, letters to Foucher, to Elizabeth, and to

Molanus, p.91, Modern Philosophy, an Anthology of Primary Sources). Leibniz thought

that Descartes arguments were based on the presumption that God is possible merely

because of a clear and distinct idea, but that essentially, Descartes offered no further

proof. Through his criticisms of Descartes, Leibniz creates his own argument for God’s

existence. Whilst Descartes’ believed that if we can clearly and distinctly conceive of

something, then it is known and actual; Leibniz asserted that if something is logically

consistent, then it is possible. By eliminating Descartes’ dependency on “clear and

distinct ideas” Leibniz manages to save himself from the Cartesian Circle. He explains

that in order for there to be a logical inconsistency in God’s concept, there must be a

contradiction, which requires both an affirmation and negation of the same property. He

then defines God as a being that necessarily has all positive properties. He continues to

explain that positive properties are those which cannot be further analyzed, and are at

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their simplest form. Since he believes that something is possible if it contains no

contradictions, he applies that by explaining that simple properties, by their very nature,

cannot contain contradictions. Since there are no contradictions in the concept of God, He

is logically consistent, and therefore exists. For example, God is infinite because to be

finite is to have a limit, or negation. Evil and Sin are negations of positive properties,

which can be further applied to created beings. Since we are finite, and to be finite is to

have a negation, then we have evil and sin. But Leibniz’s argument is perhaps too

simplistic. Whilst he is correct in asserting that simple properties don’t individually

contain negations, once they combine to form God’s complete concept they cease to be

simple, and can contain contradictions. An example of this is the simple property of “All

Light” combined with the simply property “All Dark”. If God is everything, he is both

“all light” and “all dark”, simultaneously, which is clearly a contradiction. This can be

further applied to God’s ability to be “all merciful” whilst “all just”, or “omniscient”

whilst “omnipotent” (if God is all knowing then he can foresee our chosen paths, but if he

is all powerful then he grants man the free will and ability to create his path). Lastly, the

same criticism that was placed on Descartes’ also applies to Leibniz: possible existence

does not entail or impose necessary existence, since we can conceive of things that are

logically consistent, and yet do not actually exist.

To conclude, both Descartes and Leibniz have put forth strong argument’s for

God’s existence. Leibniz’s must be commended as it avoids the traps and shortcomings

that are evident in both of Descartes’. Whilst both arguments have their shortcomings,

Leibniz’s, though being an argument of logic and semantics, is stronger than Descartes in

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its mere simplicity. By reducing his argument to definitions he avoids the caveats that

slow Descartes’ to circumlocutory assumptions. Essentially, Descartes’ arguments, whilst

being a good stepping stone, are the foundation on which a more plausible argument for

God’s existence could develop.