Go vs.

Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio Buenaventura

Facts:

The late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen

Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of land situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City (subject property) and, thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 was issued in
her name. She constructed a three-storey building thereon, called D'Lourds Building...
where she resided until her death
Felisa supposedly sold the subject property to one of her daughters, Bella
Guerrero (Bella), the latter's husband, Delfin Guerrero, Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon
Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law husband; Bella and Delfin, Sr.
paid P15,000.00 as consideration therefor.
Thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 in the name of Felisa was cancelled and TCT No.
49869 was issued in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr.
Resurrecion, the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella, began to occupy the
second floor of the D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until her death.
As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella,
married to Delfin, Sr., was irretrievably destroyed in the interim, Bella caused its
reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-74910 again registered in their names
When Felisa died... she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and
testament, half of the subject property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis
(Rhea) and Regina A. Bihis (Regina) (collectively, the Bihis Family). The Bihis Family
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Felisa's
purported will likewise declared Bella as the administrator of the subject property.
On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, a petition for the probate of
Felisa's will. She was eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa
and, in an inventory of Felisa's properties, Bella included the subject property as part
of... said estate... the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled.
Felimon Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina
Buenaventura Mariano (Teresita), apparently the heirs ofFelimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon,
Sr.), executed a purported Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon
Buenaventura, Sr., and caused its annotation on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869).
By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was cancelled and TCT No. N-
170416 was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella, and her co-
petitioners in G.R. No. 212045, Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A.
Guerrero (Lester) (collectively, Bella, et al.).
 Through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property was sold to Wilson
and Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of P4,500,000.00, a transaction completely
unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis Family.
Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or
lessees of the subject property. The probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as
administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and eventually, granted letters of administration to
Resurrecion herein respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as... represented by the Bihis
Family, and the Bihis Family, in their personal capacities (collectively, respondents),
filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages before the RTC, against Bella, et al.,
Wilson, Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her
lifetime, merely entrusted the subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for
the purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and mortgage from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have the title over the subject
property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested herself of
her ownership over the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence
thereon, as well as her act of leasing several units to various tenants.
In fact, in a letter addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and
Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and Delfin,
Sr. to procure a loan from the GSIS. At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.'s
signatures appear beside their names.
Respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they
were aware of the facts and circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry
into the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella, et al.
In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was
owned by Bella and (the late) Felimon, Sr., as evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910
(49869), which title was issued to them as early as February 10, 1960.
Such title has therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years without
having been voided or nullified by a court decree they have exercised acts of ownership
over the subject property, such as mortgaging the same and leasing the building to third
parties.
Finally, they asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the
inventory of properties of the Estate of Felisa was merely because of inadvertence.
For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the
subject property from Bella, et al. he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the
Estate of Felisa. He testified that before they acquired the subject property, verified the
validity of the title covering the same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of
two (2) months had lapsed before the sale was consummated because his lawyer
advised him to request Bella to cancel the encumbrance annotated on the title over the
subject property.
 Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found that there was an implied trust between Felisa, on the one hand,
and Bella and Felimon, Sr., on the other, created by operation of law. The RTC
concluded that it was the intention of the late Felisa to merely entrust to Bella and
Felimon, Sr. the subject property for the sole purpose of using the same as collateral to
secure a loan with the GSIS.
As such, while it is true that a title was issued in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr.,
and Felimon, Sr. by virtue of the sale of the subject property to them, it was clear that
Felisa never intended to relinquish her ownership over the subject property. In
concluding so, the RTC gave probative weight to the September 21, 1970 letter
executed and signed by Felisa which not only reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for purposes of securing a
loan from the GSIS, but also expressed Felisa's desire to have the subject property
divided equally among her heirs.
However, the RTC held that reconveyance can no longer be effected since the
subject property had already been transferred to Wilson and Peter, whom it found to be
purchasers in good faith.

Ruling of Court of Appeals

The CA modified the RTC Decision, and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of
the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson and Peter; (b) the
reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa; and (c) the cancellation of
TCT No. N-170475 in the name of Wilson and Peter, as well as the issuance of a new
title in the name of the Estate of Felisa by the Register of Deeds.
The CA upheld the RTC's finding that an implied trust was constituted between
Felisa, during her lifetime, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. when the former sold
the subject property to the latter.
Like the RTC, it gave substantial weight and credence to the September 21,
1970 letter executed by Felisa which expressed her intention to convey the subject
property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. only for the purpose of obtaining a loan
from the GSIS.
The CA similarly found that Felisa had not intended to relinquish her ownership
over the subject property in their favor, as evidenced not only by the said letter but also
by her contemporaneous and subsequent acts of ownership, i.e., leasing the building to
tenants, instituting ejectment suits, having business permits issued in her name,... and
including the subject property in her last will and testament.
The CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin,
Sr., and Felimon, Sr. did not operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon
them, as a cetiificate of title is not equivalent to title.
 With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust had already prescribed, the CA found that prescription has not set in.
Citing jurisprudence, it held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
prescribes in ten (10) years, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. However, the rule applies only when the claimant or the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.
When the claimant is in actual possession of the property, the action for reconveyance,
which is effectively an action for quieting of title, is imprescriptible.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was an implied trust created
between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.
II. Whether or not the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed.
III. Whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject property in
good faith

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The petitions are bereft of merit.

The Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa, on the one hand,
and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as
concluded by the RTC and the CA but an express one;... two, the present action for
reconveyance has not yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not purchasers
in good faith.
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that an implied trust was
established, heavily giving credence, among others, to the September 21, 1970 letter
which partly reads:
“Hindi naman kaila sa iyo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina
Filemon C. Buenaventura Sr., Bella Alvarez Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang daltilan
nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.
Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at
walang sinumang nagbigay o tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Feling mo
ay walang naibigay na pera dito.
Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-
kapareho ang paghahati ng bawat isa sa anumang aking kabuhayan.”
Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration - the validity and
due execution of which were never put in issue, hence, indubitably established that an
implied trust was established; instead, the Court rules that an express trust was duly
proved in this case.
The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely
declared her intention of transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin,
Sr., and Felimon, Sr. In order to merely accommodate them in securing a loan from the
GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject
property and articulated her wish to have her heirs share equally therein.
Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created between
Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon Sr., as both trustees and
beneficiaries, the execution of the September 21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all,
the nature of the trust established between them as an express one, their true intention
irrefutably extant thereon.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance
instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that
express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.
In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the
remaining trustee, sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter.
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are
purchasers of the subject property in good faith, the Court concurs with the CA's finding
that they are not.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
some other person's claim or interest in the property
Corollory thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons
other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those
in possession. Without making such... inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in
good faith.
The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
He also claimed that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation,
and that he was aware that individuals other than the sellers... were in possession of the
subject property.
As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation
on the title covering the subject property and of the occupation thereof by individuals
other than the sellers negates any presumption of good faith on the part of Wilson and
Peter when they purchased... the subject property. A person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an
innocent purchaser for va1ue
The petitions are DENIED
 Security and Exchange Commission v. Hon. Laygo et al.
G.R. No. 188639, September 02, 2015

FACTS:

Pursuant to the mandate of Securities Regulation Code, the SEC issued the New
Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans to govern the pre-need industry
prior to the enactment of the Pre-Need Code. It required from the pre-need providers
the creation of trust funds as a requirement for registration.
Legacy, being a pre-need provider, complied with the trust fund requirement and
entered into a trust agreement with Land Bank. In mid-2000, the industry collapsed for a
range of reasons. Legacy, like the others, was unable to pay its obligations to the plan
holders. This resulted in Legacy being the subject of a petition for involuntary insolvency
by private respondents in their capacity as plan holders. Through its manifestation filed
in the RTC, Legacy did not object to the proceedings and was declared insolvent by the
RTC.

RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

The trial court also ordered Legacy to submit an inventory of its assets and
liabilities.
The RTC ordered the SEC, to submit the documents pertaining to Legacy's
assets and liabilities. The SEC opposed the inclusion of the trust fund in the inventory of
corporate assets on the ground that to do so would contravene the New Rules which
treated trust funds as principally established for the exclusive purpose of guaranteeing
the delivery of benefits due to the plan holders. Despite the opposition of the SEC,
Judge Laigo ordered the insolvency Assignee to take possession of the trust fund.
Judge Laigo viewed the trust fund as Legacy's corporate assets and, for said reason,
included it in the insolvent's estate.
The Assignee argues that Legacy has retained a beneficial interest in the trust
fund despite the execution of the trust agreement and that the properties can be the
subject of insolvency proceedings. To the Assignee, the ―control mechanisms in the
Trust Agreement itself are indicative of the interest of Legacy in the enforcement of the
trust fund because the agreement gives it the power to dictate on LBP (trustee) the
fulfilment of the trust, such as the delivery of monies to it to facilitate the payment to the
plan holders.
 ISSUES:

1) Whether Legacy is a beneficiary in the Trust Fund Agreement;

2) Whether Legacy is a debtor of the plan holders with respect to the trust fund

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The SC ruled that Legacy is not a beneficiary. A person is considered as a beneficiary

of a trust if there is a manifest intention to give such a person the beneficial interest over
the trust properties. Here, the terms of the trust agreement plainly confer the status of
beneficiary to the plan holders, not to Legacy. In the recital clauses of the said
agreement, Legacy bound itself to provide for the sound, prudent and efficient
management and administration of such portion of the collection "for the benefit and
account of the plan holders," through LBP as the trustee.
This categorical declaration doubtless indicates that the intention of the trustor (Legacy)
is to make the plan holders the beneficiaries of the trust properties, and not Legacy. It is
clear that because the beneficial ownership is vested in the plan holders and the legal
ownership in the trustee, LBP, Legacy, as trustor, is left without any iota of interest in
the trust fund. This is consistent with the nature of a trust arrangement, whereby there is
a separation of interests in the subject matter of the trust, the beneficiary having an
equitable interest, and the trustee having an interest which is normally legal interest.

No. Legacy is not a debtor of the plan holders relative to the trust fund. In trust, it is the
trustee, and not the trustor, who owes fiduciary duty to the beneficiary. Thus, LBP is
tasked with the fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of the plan holders as to matters
within the scope of the relation. Like a debtor, LBP owes the plan holders the amounts
due from the trust fund. As to the plan holders, as creditors, they can rightfully use
equitable remedies against the trustee for the protection of their interest in the trust fund
and, in particular, their right to demand the payment of what is due them from the fund.
Verily, Legacy is out of the picture and exists only as a representative of the trustee,
LBP, with the limited role of facilitating the delivery of the benefits of the trust fund to the
beneficiaries -the plan holders. The trust fund should not revert to Legacy, which has no
beneficial interest over it. Not being an asset of Legacy, the trust fund is immune from
its reach and cannot be included by the RTC in the insolvency estate.
 SEVERINO ET AL VS CA

GR NO. L- 39299, OCTOBER 18, 1988

.
FACTS:

The property in question is a parcel of land with an area of 635 square meters
and situated in San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan.  It was originally owned by Leon Hilario
and is now being disputed between the herein petitioners, who are his great
grandchildren by his daughter Silvestra, and the private respondent, Teodora Garcia,
who is his granddaughter by his daughter Catalina. 

In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their
names by virtue of their continuous and exclusive possession thereof since 1895, by
themselves and their father and grandfather before them. After proper notices by
publication and posting as required, the trial court issued an order of general default,
there being no opposition to the application, and proceeded to hear the evidence of the
applicants ex-parte. On the basis thereof, the application was approved on March 31,
1966.

On June 8, 1966, the herein private respondent filed a petition to set aside the
said decision.

RULING OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT:

The trial Court granted, admitting at the same time her opposition to the
application and setting the case for reception of her evidence. This evidence sought to
show that the land was inherited by Leon Hilario's three children, but the son,
Felicisimo, waived his right thereto and thereby made his two sisters, Silvestra and
Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's daughter, she was entitled to one-half of
the property, the other half going to Silvestra's heirs, the petitioners herein and the
latter's
grandchildren. 

On September 13, 1968, the trial judge issued an order dismissing the opposition
and reinstating his original order of March 31,1966. His reason was that whatever rights
Teodora might have had over the property had been forfeited by extinctive prescription
because she had left the land in 1942 and had not since then asserted any claim
thereto until 1966.

On appeal to the respondent court,  this decision was reversed on the ground

that the appellees had not clearly proved that they had acquired the property by
prescription. Hence, the appellant was entitled to one-half of the property as heir,
conformably to her opposition in the court a quo. Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, they have now come to this Court in a petition for review by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 ISSUES :

Whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the private respondent
was entitled to one-half of the land, which she had not lost by extinctive prescription
because it was held by them in trust for her.

RULING Of THE COURT OF APPEALS

When, therefore, the respondent court accepted the private respondent's

allegation that the land was inherited by the parties from their common ancestor, Leon
Hilario, such a finding, based on the record and not rejected but even assumed by the
trial court, did not, in our view, constitute grave abuse of discretion. And when, on the
strength of this finding, it then held that an implied trust was created between the
petitioners who were in possession of the land, and Teodora Garcia, their aunt and co-
heir, that too, as we see it, is not an arbitrary assumption.

The Court feels this is the more plausible relationship between the parties,
compared to the version offered by the petitioners, who claim they acquired the property
from their grandfather through their father, who apparently acquired it from his mother,
Leon Hilario's daughter. It does not appear that they have pre-empted the other heirs to
the property through any other mode of acquisition, like sale or some similar exclusive
transaction. They have not submitted any evidence of how they acquired the land from
their great grandfather, confining themselves to the assertion that they have continued
his original possession, presumably as heirs of their father, who inherited from his
mother Silvestra, who was the daughter of Hilario. If this be their theory, then they
unavoidably must recognize Teodora Garcia's own claim to the subject property as she
too was an heir, being the daughter of Catalina, who was also a daughter of Hilario.

The respondent court, rejecting this contention, held that the petitioners'
possession was not for their benefit alone but also in favor of Teodora, who was a co-
heir with them and therefore also a co-owner of the property. In other words, their
possession, while adverse to the rest of the world, was not against Teodora herself,
whose share they held in implied trust for her as a co-owner of the land, and whose
fruits their father shared with her occasionally, or at least promised her she would get
eventually. The Court believes that this, too, is not an arbitrary conclusion.

Tax declarations are indicia but not conclusive proof of ownership.  If the property
was declared in the name of To as Pangan only, it could be that this was done only for
reasons of convenience, more so if it was understood, as the private respondent did,
that he was declaring the property not only for himself but for herself also as the other
co-owner. As for the admitted fact that Teodora Garcia never actually paid the real
estate taxes, the explanation she gave was that she assumed her share of such taxes
was being paid from her share in the fruits of her portion of the land, which she said she
was not getting regularly, much less in full. We hold that this explanation is also
plausible enough.

It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as

adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them.   Hence, as long
as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will not prescribe and
may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the other co-owners.  
However, if the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over
it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to
it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that moment, the question
involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere partition. 

According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was admitted by
the private respondent herself Testifying for herself at the hearing on her opposition in
the registration proceedings, she declared:

For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have
been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in
question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of
prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of
their own title if they do not seasonably defend it. 

Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the  cestui
que trust;

2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and

3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. 

On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is not convinced
that the above requirements have been satisfied. Although there are admittedly some
precedents to the contrary, it would appear that the weight of authority requires a
categorical and final rejection of the co-owners' claim, usually manifested by a formal
legal action, to make the prescriptive period start to run against the claimant. Thus—
Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or for
recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an act
of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the latter. 

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear

repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse
possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription. 
 An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the
effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted. 

The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated
the trust relation in 1956 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of
possession against private respondents so that the counterclaim of the private
respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute
ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse possession of
the same is well within the 10-year prescriptive period. 

There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of

property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent
beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name. 

The established evidence clearly shows that the subject land was inherited by
the petitioners and the private respondent as co-heirs of their common ancestor, Leon
Hilario, whose possession they continued to acquire prescriptive title over the property.
That possession was originally in the name of all the heirs, including Teodora Garcia,
who in fact had been assured by Tomas Pangan, the petitioners' father, that she would
get the share to which she was entitled. The petitioners have not proved that their
possession excluded their co-owner and aunt or that they derived their title from a
separate conveyance to them of the property by Leon Hilario. Parenthetically, such a
conveyance, if it existed, would be questionable as it might have deprived Leon's other
children of their legitime. In any case, the petitioners appear to have arrogated the
entire property to themselves upon their father's death sometime in 1942 or at the latest
in 1965 when they sought to register the land in their names to the exclusion of Teodora
Garcia.

The question is, Did such an act begin the period of extinctive prescription
against the private respondent?

Manifestly, the petitioners have acted in bad faith in denying their aunt and co-heir her
legal share to the property they had all inherited from Leon Hilario through their
respective parents. This is regrettable as Teodora Garcia is their father's first cousin
who apparently trusted him and, indeed, relied on his promise that her share would be
protected. Tomas Pangan presumably was sincere in this assurance, but it was
unfortunately not honored by his children upon his death for they soon dismissed out of
hand Teodora Garcia's claim to the subject property.

In cases where there is a clear showing of imposition and improper motives, the courts
must be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the exploited.  So said the respondent
court, and we agree, We note that the private respondent "is a poor and ignorant 62-
year old widow" * whose misplaced trust in her nephews and nieces is being used now
precisely to defeat her claim to the share that she believes is rightfully hers. It is a sorry
spectacle, indeed, to see her own close kin longing up on her, so to speak, to deprive
her of her small heritage, and in her old age at that.

With all this in mind, we affirm the finding of the respondent court that there was no
adequate notice by the petitioners to the private respondent of the rejection of her claim
to her share in the subject property. Noticeably absent here is a categorical assertion by
the petitioners of their exclusive right to the entire property that barred her own claim of
ownership of one-half thereof nor is there any explanation as to why they said she had
no right to a share. If this trusting woman did not immediately take legal action to protect
her rights, it was simply because of forbearance toward her nephews and nieces, let
alone the fact that there was really no cases belli as yet that required her to act
decisively. That legal provocation arose only when the petitioners commenced the
registration proceedings in 1965, and it was from that time she was required to act, as
she did, to protect her interests.

In an earlier case  we stressed that this Court is not only a court of law but also of
justice. Faced with a choice between a decision that will serve justice and another that
will deny it because of a too strict interpretation of the law, we must resolve in favor of
the former, for the ultimate end of the law is justice. Bonus judex secundum aequum at
bonum judicat stricto juri praefert.  This is a wise maxim we will follow here in ruling for
the deprived and ignorant old widow.

The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED