LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
NICASIO BOLOS, J.R. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
BORJA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 133495; September 3, 1988
FACTS: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term
ending in 1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who
was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that
Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998;
hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the
Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision
and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in
that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
HELD: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as
mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death,
of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of
the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office
should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent
the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of
the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the
drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full
and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to
govern them.
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE
GR NO. 184082; March 17, 2009
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Alleging that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the resolutions on March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008 holding that petitioner
Bolos is disqualified as a candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy.
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the 2007 Barangay and SK Elections.
For three consecutive terms, Bolos was elected to the position of Punong Barangay in
the Barangay Elections of 1994, 1997, and 2002. In May 2004, while sitting as
incumbent Punong Barangay, Bolos ran for Municipal Councilor and won.
He assumed his office on July 1, 2004 and left his post as Punong Barangay, until June
30, 2007. Bolos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking on Oct. 29, 2007. The respondent Cinconiegue contends that Bolos had already
served the three-term limit and filed a petition before the COMELEC for the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate. He contends that petitioner’s
relinquishment of his position as Punong Barangay in 2004 was a voluntary
renunciation of his post. Bolos countered that his election and assumption of office as
Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law and must be considered as an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term.
Petition was heard by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bohol and the Hearing
Officer’s action were endorsed to and received by the Commission on November 21,
2007. The First Division of COMELEC ruled that petitioner’s relinquishment of the
office of Punong Barangay, as a consequence of his assumption of office as
Sangguniang Bayan member, was a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by COMELEC.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s election, assumption and discharge of the functions
of the Office of Sangguniang Bayan member can be considered as voluntary
renunciation of his office as Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol?
2. Whether or not the Honorable Commission on Elections acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction amounting to lack or grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Punong Barangay in the Barangay
Elections 2007?
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary
renunciation by petitioner for his position as Punong Barangay. The COMELEC
correctly held that when Bolos filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of
Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts
attending to his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor pointed out to an
intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to
higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his COC
for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal
electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed,
return to his former position. He knew that his election as a municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of
it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law.
He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term
when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member, which is
deemed a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
2. The Court ruled that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner from being
a candidate for Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and SK
Elections.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions are hereby
AFFIRMED.
FACTS: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
Dauis, Bohol for three consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his
incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on
July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor
he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the 2007 Barangay
Elections.
Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same
office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already
served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the
position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’
relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his
part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner
knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary
renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it
must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of
service. Pending the resolution of the case before the Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in the
election.
The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has
already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus
disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation of
Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong
Barangay by Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is
deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.
HELD: The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials
on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan
members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next
regular election of barangay officials.
Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
In Lonzanida vs. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the
three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and
at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be
determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office
as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary
renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan,
he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his
election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then
after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his
election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held,
and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did
not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule
without any act of the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a
term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve
upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established
rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.
In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He
instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he
won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is
deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO JR., DANILO B. FALLER, AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO
GR No. 184836; December 23, 2009
FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively.
In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.
This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order;
hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel
it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)of RA 7160.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favor in
its Resolution of November 28,2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did
not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the2004-2007 term because
of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of
the three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision
fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to
no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in
Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during
which an official has title to office and can serve The word "term" in a legal sense
means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
mayhold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption…
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public
official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for
his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory
judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification
(viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
terms…… The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. (EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule
is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s
continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint
one since no vacancy exists.
MARIO D. ORTIZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR NO. 78957, June 28, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections
[COMELEC] by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992.
Petitioner together with Commissioners Quirino D. Marquinez and Mangontawar G.
Guro, petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads as follows:
The undersigned Commissioners were appointed to the Commission on Elections on
July 30, 1985.
Following the example of Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, on the premise
that we have now a revolutionary government, we hereby place our position at your
disposal.
The Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the
information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the
President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective
immediately." All seven former commissioners then filed to claim their retirement
benefits. In its en banc Resolution the COMELEC denied the applications for
retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that
they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as
amended" without specifying the reason therefor.
Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, contending that he
was entitled to the benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred
therein that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the
President; that he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in
the term of [his] office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to
retirement benefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
Code which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed
fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment."
The respondents posit the view that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented
the completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years
of service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was
accepted by the President of the may be entitled to retirement benefits.
RULING: Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the
reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be
considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law.
Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a Complete
and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention
to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied,
of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance
by competent and lawful authority.
Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the
legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to
surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political
authority and the appointing power. The curtailment of his term not being
attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice
demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much ahead of
the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the
same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose
tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the
service entails no removal but an expiration of his term.
FELIPE EVARDONE VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, VICTORINO
ACLAN, AND NOEL ACLAN
GR No. 94010 & 95063; December 2, 1991
SUMMARY: Mayor Evardone challenges the constitutionality of COMELEC Reso 2272
based on Art. X Sec. 3 Const., he claims that there is no LGC which will serve as basis
for COMELEC in issuing said Reso. Ct said that the LGC in place was BP 337. Thus, the
assailed Reso is a valid exercise of COMELEC’s powers based on Secs. 54 to 59 of BP
337. Doctrine on effectivity of the LGC of 1991: Since the LGC of 1991 will take effect
5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
only on Jan. 1, 1992, the old LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present
case.
FACTS: Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having
been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. On Feb. 4, 1990, Apelado
et al. filed a petition for recall of Evardone.
Thereafter, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, which approved the
recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct
the signing of the petition for recall on Jul. 14, 1990. COMELEC also has a prior
resolution on recall proceedings, Resolution No. 2272 (based on the Const. and Secs.
54 to 59) dated May 23, 1990.
On Jul. 10, 1990, Evardone filed before SC a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for TRO, which SC issued on Jul. 12. However, it was only on Jul. 15 that the
field agent of COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO — a day after the
completion of the signing process. So, the signing process pushed through. COMELEC
thereafter nullified the signing process. Apelado et al. filed an MR, but COMELEC
denied the same.
Evardone now challenges the constitutionality of Resolution No. 90-0557, asserting
that Art. X Sec. 3 of the 1987 Const. repealed BP 337.
EVARDONE’S CONTENTION: Art. X Sec. 3 provides that the Congress shall enact a LGC
which shall provide for mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. His theory
is that since there was, during the period material to the case, no local LGC enacted by
Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Const., there is no law which will serve as
basis for the COMELEC Resolution.
COMELEC’S REBUTTAL: The constitutional provision does not refer only to a LGC
which is in futurum but also in esse.
The adoption of the 1987 Const. did not abrogate the provisions of BP 337, unless a
certain provision thereof is clearly irreconcilable with the 1987 Const. In this case,
there is no inconsistency, thus both are operative.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Resolution No. 2272 is constitutional? YES
2. WON the TRO issued by SC rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition
for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272? NO
RATIONALE:
1. First, the applicable law is BP 337.
Art. XVIII Sec. 3 of the 1987 Const. expressly provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Const. shall remain operative, until amended,
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION
repealed or revoked. RA 7160, providing for the LGC of 1991, approved by the
President on Oct. 10, 1991 specifically repeals BP 337, as provided in Sec. 534
Title IV of said Act. But RA 7160 will take effect only on Jan. 1, 1992 and
therefore, the old LGC — BP 337 — is still the law applicable to the present case.
This was also discussed by the Const. Commissioner Nolledo during the Const.
deliberations.
2. The assailed Resolution is based on Secs. 54 to 59 of BP 337. It is
constitutional.
Chapter 3 (Secs. 54 to 59) of BP 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of
local elective officials. Sec. 59 expressly authorizes COMELEC to conduct and
supervise the process of election on recall and in the exercise of such powers,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.
3. The TRO does not render nugatory the signing process; it is valid and has
a legal effect. However, herein petitions have become moot and academic.
Records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall as early as on Feb
1990, but he was not vigilant in following it up and determining the outcome of
such notice. As attested by Election Resgistrar, 34% signed the petition for
recall. There is no turning back the clock.
WON the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question.
HOWEVER, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of BP 337, which states:
“Sec. 55. Who May be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall may not be held
— (2) No recall shall take place within 2 years from the date of the official’s
assumption of office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.”
The Const. has mandated a synchronized national and local election on May 2,
1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately 7 months before the
regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable
LGC (BP 337).
Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed for having become moot and academic.
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
SALVACION MONSANTO VS. FULGENCIO FACTORAN
GR No. 78239; February 9, 1989
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the
sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that
clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to
the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without
the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the
absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has
wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the
date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period
of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive
Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
ISSUES:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon her by the sentence?
HELD:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to
the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt
so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of
a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does
not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be
entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification

from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil
liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil
Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of
the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administrative – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020