PROPERTY

CASE DIGEST

LAUREL v. GARCIA
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

FACTS:

The subject property in issue – Roponggi Property – is one of the 4 properties procured from the
Japanese government for national development projects which are part of the Reparation Agreement
between the Philippines and Japan as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses
in life and property and their suffering during World War II.

As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai
on July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government
to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The present
petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to
stop the sale of the Roppongi property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?

RULING:

No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement
which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that
it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that the Roppongi site
has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents – There is no law authorizing its
conveyance. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur.

MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS, INC. v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976

FACTS:

Page 1 of 3
ABENOJA, RAVEN JOIE G. I JD-1
 PROPERTY
CASE DIGEST

The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a
portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. Subsequently
Act No. 1657 amended the former act which states that the City of Manila was authorized to sell or
lease the set aside a portion of the lot for a hotel site. The City of Manila sells the land to Manila
Lodge No. 761 (later changed by court to Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks, Inc.), then the latter sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). The City of
Manila filed a petition for re-annotation of its right to repurchase the lot. The TDC then filed a
complaint that the City of Manila was estopped from repurchasing the property.

After due trial the court a quo rendered its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public
park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale
of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment. Hence, the present petitions for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila
and not a park or plaza?

RULING:

No. The Court held that the subject lot is of public dominion, intended for public use. The right to
dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as amended,
however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the
reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. Court stated that if the reclaimed
land were patrimonial property, there would be no need of giving special authorization to the City to
dispose of it. Said authorization was given because the reclaimed land was not intended to be
patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and without the express authorization to dispose of the
northern portion, the City could not dispose of even that part.

Furthermore, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." If the reclaimed
area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. The
"extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use. Also, pursuant to
Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast, sea, inlets and shores are parts of the
national domain open to public use. When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its
character of being property for public use. In the case, due to the dredging, silt from estuary on the
low lands completely submerged in water thereby gradually formed the lots in question.

In addition, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the
reclaimed area as a hotel sites. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be
leased or sold; it is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio
alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property.

With regards to the argument of the petitioners that argue that according to Article 344 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in order that the character of property for public use may be so attached to a plaza, the
latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the subject property was not
yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be
property for public use. It was held that it is not necessary that a plaza be already constructed for it to
be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such. In the case at bar,
it has been shown that the intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the
extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a
plaza.

Accordingly, the petitions are denied for lack of merit.

Page 2 of 3
ABENOJA, RAVEN JOIE G. I JD-1
 PROPERTY
CASE DIGEST

Page 3 of 3
ABENOJA, RAVEN JOIE G. I JD-1