554

turbed here. “ The presumption of regularity of official pro-

ceedings would require the denial of the writ in the absence of
any evidence concerning what did occur” at the trial (People
ex rel. Williams v. Murphy, 6 N Y 2d 234, 236). The burden of
proof remains on the relator. But, he should be given a further
opportunity to establish his contentions through sworn
testimony, if he is so advised.
No real opposition is offered by respondent to the procedural
availability of habeas corpus. We have held that the presence
of a defendant in a murder case when the jury returns for
further instructions is essential to the court’s jurisdiction- to
proceed with the trial (Maurer v. People, 43 N. Y. 1, 5, supra).
Where the issue raised is one of jurisdiction, the fact that the
error appears on the face of the record or may be inferred there-
from does not affect the right to invoke habeas corpus (People
v. Schildhaus, 8 N Y 2d 33, 36). Indeed, relator already has
been denied relief by way of coram nobis on the authority of
People v. Shapiro (3 N Y 2d 203) and hence habeas corpus would
seem appropriate here.
The order should be reversed and the proceeding remitted to
the Supreme Court, Cayuga County, for.further hearings and
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion;
Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Fuld, Froessel, Van
Voorhis and Burke concur.
Order reversed and matter remitted to Special Term for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion herein.

Dorothy Haag, Also Known as Dorothy Hawthorne, Appellant,

v. Norman Barnes, Respondent.
Argued April 24, 1961; decided May 18, 1961.
 555

Alfred A. Rosen for appellant. I. The laws of New York

relied on by respondent do not bar this proceeding but impose
conditions on him. II. The Illinois statute relied on by respond-
ent is no bar to the instant proceeding. The factual context out
of which the agreement arises has the most significant contacts
in New York. New York law therefore applies to the case at bar.
(Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155.) III. Appellant’s stay in
California prior to the birth of the child and two years after the
signing of the agreement does not break her chain of residence
556

in New York. Appellant’s designation of Illinois law to govern

the agreement was not effectively made. IY. The Illinois
statute expresses a policy which is different from and contrary
to ours and need not he enforced in our forum. (People ex rel.
Hansen v. Ciemeniecki, 221 Ill. App. 275; People v. Tice, 272
Ill. 516; Hauskins v. People, 82 Ill. 193; People v. Dile, 347 Ill.
23; Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y 2d 408; Straus & Co. v. Cana-
dian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407; Anonymous v. Anonymous,
14 Misc 2d 622; Lynch v. Bailey, 275 App. Div. 527; Roth v.
Patino, 185 Misc. 235; Matter of Landau, 172 Misc. 651; Holzer
v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830; Rhyne v.
Katleman, 206 Misc. 202, 285 App. Div. 1140.) Assuming,
arguendo, that the agreement is governed by the laws of Illinois,
nevertheless, it does not come within the purview of the statute
relied upon by respondent. Hence, the instant proceeding is
not barred.
Phoenix Ingraham for respondent. I. A contract which is
valid where made is valid everywhere unless it is against the
public policy of the forum. (Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific
Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407.) II. The agreement relied upon by
respondent is an Illinois agreement, validly drawn in conformity
with the laws of Illinois. (Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155.)
III. Since the agreement was good where made, it is valid in
New York unless it is against the public policy of this State.
(Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U. S. 397; Lynch v. Bailey, 275 App. Div. 527.) IV. The
Illinois agreement is not against the public policy of New York.
(Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 280 App. Div. 348, 305 N. Y. 288;
Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407;
Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y 2d 408; Rhyne v. Katleman, 206
Misc. 202, 285 App. Div. 1140; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S.
449; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32; Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562.)

Fuld, J. This'appeal is-concerned with the effect in New York

of an agreement made' in another State for the support of '
a child
horn out of wedlock. •
'
The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges that in 1947she moved
from Minnesota "and took'up residence in New-York City and
that since then she has been 'a resident of this -State. The defend-
 557

ant Norman Barnes, on the other hand, is now and was, during
the period involved in this litigation, a resident of Illinois.
According to the statements contained in the complainant’s
affidavits, she met the defendant in the spring of 1954 in New
York. She was a law secretary and had been hired by the defend-
ant through an agency to do work for him while he was in New
York on one of his business trips. The relationship between the
man and the girl soon “ ripened into friendship ” and, on the
basis of representations that he loved her and planned to divorce
his wife and marry her, she was “ importuned ” into having
sexual relations with him.
The complainant further alleges that she became pregnant as
a result of having sexual relations with the defendant and that,
upon being informed of this, he asked her to move to Illinois to
be near him. She refused and, instead, went to live in California
with her sister to await the birth of her child. Fearing that the
defendant was losing interest in her, however, she returned to
Chicago before the child was born and, upon attempting to com-
municate with the defendant, was referred to his attorney. The
latter told Dorothy to choose a hospital in Chicago, which she
did, and the baby was born there in December, 1955, the
defendant paying the expenses.
Shortly after the birth of the child, her attempts to see the
defendant in New York failed and she was advised by his attor-
ney to return to Chicago in order that an agreement might be
made for the support of her and her child. Returning to that
city, she procured an attorney, recommended by a friend in New
York, and signed an agreement on January 12, 1956. The
agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. It recites payment to the complainant by the defendant of
$2,000 between September, 1955 and January, 1956 and a will-
ingness on his part to support her child in the future, on condi-
tion that such payments “shall not constitute an admission”
that he is the child’s father;
2. The defendant promises to'pay $50 a week and $75 a month,
i.e., a total of $275 a month, “ continuing while [the child] is
alive and until she attains the age of sixteen years ’’;
3. The complainant agrees 1‘ to properly support, maintain,
educate, and care for [the child] ’’;
 558

4. The complainant agrees to keep the child in Illinois for

at least two years, except if she marries within that period;
5. The complainant “ remise [s], release [s] and forever dis-
charge [s] Norman Barxes •* * # from all manner of actions
* * * which [she] now has against [him] or ever had or
which she * * * hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon
or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever * * *
including *. * * the support of [the child] and
6. The parties agree that their agreement “ shall in all
respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of
the State of Illinois
Shortly after the agreement was signed, the complainant
received permission, pursuant to one of its provisions, to live
in California where she remained for two years. She then
returned to New York where she and her child have ever since
been supported by the defendant in full compliance with the
terms of his agreement. In fact, he has provided sums far in
excess of his agreement; all told, we were informed on oral
argument, the defendant has paid the complainant some $30,000.
The present proceeding was instituted in 1959 by the service
of a complaint and the defendant was thereafter arrested pursu-
ant to section 64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. A
motion, made by the defendant, to dismiss the proceeding was
granted by the Court of Special Sessions and the resulting order
was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
The ground urged for dismissal was that the parties had
entered into an agreement providing for the support of the child
which has been fully performed; that in this agreement, the-com-
plainant relinquished the right to bring any action for the sup-
port of the child; and that, in any event, the action is precluded
‘by the laws of the State of Illinois which, the parties expressly
agreed, would govern their rights under the agreement. In
opposition, the complainant contended that New York, not
Illinois, law applies; that the agreement in question is not a suf-
ficient basis for a motion to dismiss under either section 63 of
the New York City Criminal Courts Act or section 121 of the
Domestic Relations Law, since both of these provisions provide
that ‘‘ An agreement or compromise made by the mother
* * * shall be binding only when the court shall have deter-
 559

mined that adequate provision has been made ’’; and that, even
were the Illinois law to apply, it does not bar the present
proceeding.
The motion to dismiss was properly granted; the complainant
may not upset a support agreement which is itself perfectly
consistent with the public policy of this State, which was entered
into in Illinois with the understanding that it would be governed
by the laws of that State and which constitutes a bar to a suit for
further support under Illinois law.
The complainant is correct in her position that, since the
agreement was not court approved, it may not be held to be a
bar to her suit under New York internal law. (See N. Y. City
Grim. Cts. Act, § 63; Domestic Relations Law, § 121.) On the
other hand, it is clear that the agreement is a bar under the
internal law of Illinois since it provides, in the language of that
State’s statute, for a ‘‘ sum not less than eight hundred dollars ’’.
(See Ill. Rev. Stat., former ch. 17, § 18, amd. by former ch. 17,
§ 52 [now ch. 106%, § 65].) The simple question before us,
therefore, is whether the law of New York or of Illinois applies.
The traditional view was that the law governing a contract
is to be determined by the intention of the parties. (See Wilson
v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 322-323; Stumpf v. Hallahan,
101 App. Div. 383, 386, affd. 185 N. Y. 550; Grand v. Livingston,
4 App. Div. 589, affd. 158 N. Y. 688.) The more modern view is
that “ the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties’
intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis
rather upon the law of the place 1which has the most significant
contacts with the matter in dispute ’ ”. (See Auten v. Auten,
308 N. Y. 155, 160; see, also, Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N. Y.
288, 305.) Whichever of these views one applies in this case,
however, the answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law
applies.
The agreement, in so many words, recites that it “ shall in
all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws
of the State of Illinois ’’ and, since it was also drawn and signed
by the complainant in Illinois, the traditional conflictsrule would,
without doubt, treat these factors as conclusive and result in
applying Illinois law. But, even if the parties’ intention and the
place of the making of the contract are not given decisive effect,
 560

they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining

which-jurisdiction “ ‘ has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute’”. (Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155, 160,
supra.) And, when these important factors are taken together
with other of the “ significant contacts ” in the case, they like-
wise point to Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts
are the following: (1) both parties are designated in the agree-
ment as being “ of-Chicago, Illinois ”, and the defendant’s place
of business is and always has been in Illinois; (2) the child was
born in Illinois; (3) -the persons designated to act as agents for
the principals (except for a third alternate) are Illinois resi-
dents, as are the-attorneys for both parties who drew the agree-
ment; and (4) all contributions for support always have been,
and still are being, made from Chicago; •'
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York contacts
are of far less weight and significance. ■ Chief among these is the
fact that child and mother presently live in New York and that
part of the “ liaison ” took place -in New York. When these
contacts are measured against the parties’ clearly expressed
intention to have their agreement governed by Illinois law and -
the more numerous and more substantial Illinois contacts, it may
not be gainsaid that the-££center of gravity ” of this agreement
is Illinois and that, absent compelling public policy to the con-
trary (see Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y.
407, 414), Illinois law should apply.
As to the question of public policy, we would emphasize that
the issue is not whether the New York statute reflects a different
public policy from that of the Illinois statute, but rather whether
enforcement of the particular agreement before us under Illinois
law represents an affront to our public policy. (Cf. Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 111; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466,
471; Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 6,
§ 332a, comment g.) It is settled that the New York Paternity
Law requires something more than the provision of ‘‘ the bare
necessities otherwise required to be supplied-by the community ”,
that,££ although providing for indemnification of the community,
[it] is chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child ’’. (See
Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y 2d 408, 411.) In our judgment,
enforcement of the support agreement in this case under Illinois
law and the refusal to allow its provisions to be reopened in the
present proceeding does not do violence to this policy.
 561

As matter of fact, the agreement before us clearly goes beyond

11indemnification of the community ’ ’ and the provision of ‘ ‘ bare
necessities ”. Whether we read it as a whole, or look only to the
financial provisions concerned ($275 a month until the child
reaches the age of 16), we must conclude that “ the welfare of
the child ’’ is fully protected. (See Rhyne v. Katleman, 285 App.
Div. 1140, affg. 206 Misc. 202 [$10,000 lump sum held sufficient].)
The public policy of this State having been satisfied, there is no
reason why we should not enforce the provisions of the parties’
support agreement under Illinois law and treat the agreement
as a bar to the present action for support.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Froessel, Van
Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur.
Order affirmed.

The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Rudolph

Waterman and Albert Devine, Respondents.
Argued March 28, 1961; decided May 18, 1961.