Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-020-00453-z

Khaled Abou El Fadl and Amina Wadud’s

(re)politicisation of the mosque and employment
of social media as a means of shaping religious
identity based on values of progressive Islam

Sofia Tsourlaki 1

Accepted: 11 September 2020 / Published online: 24 October 2020

# Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract
This paper explores the employment of social media and Islamic religious sermons, as
a means of dissemination of progressive Islam, in the process of shaping the religious
identities of Muslims in the twenty-first century. This research is a case study that
focusses on Khaled Abou El Fadl, a prominent progressive Muslim scholar, and his
political activism in the mosque in the form of khutbahs (sermons). The presentation
of the importance and development of the mosque from solely a place of worship to a
place of political mobilisation creates a historical framework necessary for the under-
standing and evaluation of the case study. Amina Wadud’s activism in the mosque,
and the way this activism is presented on the social media, is used as a means of
comparison of the effectiveness of both scholars’ efforts. Given that the main channels
of communication for both these scholars are social media, the paper presents the main
points of the way the internet has affected notions of authority and knowledge in Islam
in the twenty-first century C.E. The existing literature regarding Islam and social
media focuses heavily on radicalisation and promotion of conservative Islam. There is
an absence of scholarly work regarding social media and progressive Islam, and this
article attempts to fill this gap in academia. The research included in this article was
carried out in London, between June and September 2019, and is based on heteroge-
neous sources available online, such as newspaper and journal articles, audio-visual
material, social media content and academic publications. It presents and analyses the
media content and evolution of the said khutbahs as recorded and published on
YouTube. It also evaluates their impact on the target audience through observation
of the comments available on YouTube and Abou El Fadl’s relevant references in the
videos.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-020-

00453-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

* Sofia Tsourlaki
Tsourlaki@gmail.com

Extended author information available on the last page of the article

310 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

Keywords Islamic religious sermons . Progressive Islam . Social media . Khaled Abou El
Fadl . Amina Wadud . Khutbas . Mosque . Mediatisation of religion . Politicisation of
Mosque . Female Imam . Human Rights and Islam

Introduction

Mediatisation of religion is an international field of study that develops fast in Europe

as a means of understanding the role of the social media in shaping religious identity
and therefore religious change (Lövheim and Hjarvard 2019). The academic works that
specialise in the relationship between the internet and Islam focus primarily on the way
radical Islam has expanded its doctrine worldwide and the online communication
channels among Muslims of the Middle East (Bunt 2003, El-Nawawy and Khamis,
2009). Books and articles addressing how the internet has affected Islam in the West
are rare and emphasise mainly on the binary of ‘mainstream scholars’ and ‘new
knowledge agents’. That is ulamā (Muslim scholars) that employ the internet to reach
a wider audience and individuals that lack formal education, religious or otherwise, and
use the internet to present themselves as preachers (Piela 2011:250). When comes to
social media such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter are dealt with as
subsections of the internet, and are seen solely as tools for proselytisation and recall of
weak-faith Muslims to Islam (Bunt 2018:48).
Therefore, one can observe a void in the literature, both on the importance of
social media in the shaping of Islamic religious identity in the twenty-first century
and therefore the development of Islam, and on the way, progressive Muslim
scholars employ social media aiming to disseminate their ideas. Given the contin-
ually increasing number of Muslims in the West and therefore the attention that
Islam attracts worldwide, the importance of such a study lays on bringing those two
aspects on the forefront of academia and triggering further research on the topic.
This article aims to expand the academic study of Islam beyond the popular
narrations of radicalisation and traditionalism, whereas in terms of the methods of
research, aims to normalise the regular use of social media content as a source of
academic research. Such expansion in the topic and the sources used in studying
Islam is a necessity for the holistic understanding of Muslims and the development
of Islamic thought in the twenty-first century. Since this paper is one of the earliest
studies on this subject, it does not aim to refute or confirm an existing hypothesis; it
rather attempts to examine the extent to which social media today are effective as
means of shaping religious identity and the platforms where movements within
Islam, such as progressive Islam, are shaping such identities.
Khaled Abou El Fadl is one of the most prominent progressive Muslim scholars,
exceptionally productive in books, newspaper articles, academic journal articles and
videos. He is also the most avid user of the internet, both in the form of the official
website and social media, as a means of dissemination of progressive Islam’s herme-
neutics, ideals and values. For these reasons, Abou El Fadl has been chosen as the
subject of this article that presents and evaluates his political activism in the space of the
mosque, as it has evolved from November 2014 which marks the beginning of online
availability of his khutbahs, until the date that this research was completed, in Septem-
ber 2019, based on material available on YouTube. There is an abundance of Abou El
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 311

Fadl’s videos online, ranging from lectures and opinions, question and answer sessions,
halaqas (study circles) and khutbahs1 (sermons), to interviews and discussions. For the
purpose of this article and given the fact that the topic is about the politicisation of the
mosque, the examination and analysis of the case study will focus solely on Abou El
Fadl’s khutbahs. Before the analysis of the khutbahs, a foundation is established on
topics that are related to the significance and means of the legitimacy of Abou El Fadl’s
activism, such as the role of the internet in Islam and the shaping of Islamic identity.
Finally, a brief mention of Amina Wadud’s activism for the role of women in leading
Islamic prayers of mixed congregation in the space of the mosque, and her employment
of the internet as a means of her message’s dissemination, serves as a means of
comparison of the two scholars’ impact in shaping the religious identity of Muslims
in the twenty-first century.

Internet, religious identity and the history of politicisation

of the mosque

The internet, Islam and the shaping of religious identity of Muslims in the west

During the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century C.E., the internet
began affecting Muslims in a manner similar to how other media such as printed
material, radio and television had done in the past. All forms of media have been
employed by Islamic religious institutions, preachers and states for proselytisation,
offering primarily translations of religious texts such as the Qur’an and the Hadith
along with the work of prominent Muslim thinkers (Mandaville 2002:78). In the
nineteenth century C.E., pamphlets or newspapers were heavily used, exclusively by
the ulamā, for political purposes. However, while their political influence flourished,
their religious authority diminished. By printing the classical Islamic texts and trans-
lating them in the vernacular, the scholars were no longer needed to explain the
intentions of the texts’ authors. The exclusive authority of the ulamā in transmitting
religious knowledge was contested and replaced by anyone who could read and
interpret the texts (Robinson 1993:245). This phenomenon intensified in the twentieth
century C.E., as literacy rates increased and new audio and visual media were utilised.
Khutbahs containing messages from ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb (d.1966) and
Abul A’la Al Mawdudi (d.1979) were recorded and distributed, in an effort to politicise
Islam among larger audiences (Mandaville 2002:73). However, this also resulted in a
backlash as it extended ideological fragmentation, weakening further the authority of
the ulamā.
What differentiates the internet from printed material and audio-visual media is that,
whereas in the past the number of entities and individuals that could afford the cost of
the product presented in such media was limited, today the internet’s open access and
low maintenance cost allow equal presence to an unlimited number of individuals and
entities that claim the right to offer their own interpretations of Islamic sources. The
creation of forums where ideas and interpretations could be exchanged directly along

1
Khutbah: Public preaching observed in the mosque during the Friday prayer (jum’a), in celebration of the
two festivals (Eid) and on other special occasions
312 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

with the development of a peer-to-peer culture where individuals could influence each
other, independent of traditional Islamic authorities, changed drastically the ‘traditional
form of top-down, one-to-many communication’ and dissemination of Islamic knowl-
edge (Hadden and Cowan 2000:18; see also Bunt 2009:02). Through the internet,
marginalised Islamic understandings and dogmas, such as Shia and Sufi Islam, were
offered an equally robust exposure to this of Sunni Islam. Therefore, lay believers could
now easily adopt a religious understanding that differed from the religious understand-
ing of their family, neighbourhood, local mosque or even country. Inevitably, the most
significant impact of the internet’s effect was experienced by the younger generations,
who very often ensured that their families would not be aware of their online activities
and the shaping of their own religious identity (Bunt 2009:08–09). Regarding the new
reality of the internet-influenced religious identity of young Muslims, Van Bruinessen
offers two models, the ‘religious market model’ where specialists produce knowledge
and lay believers have to choose from whatever is being offered, and the model where
younger believers construct their own forms of Islamic belief and practice, through
critical thinking (Van Bruinessen 2011:02). This critical thinking has contributed to
many Muslims’ disappointment regarding both official centres of Islamic knowledge,
which appear alienated and rigid, and the plurality of individuals with little or no
Islamic knowledge that employ the internet to promote themselves by advocating
elements or versions of Islam that could easily be repudiated by knowledgeable
individuals.
Unquestionably, there are young Muslims in the West that either imitate their
parents’ understanding and practice of religion passively or affiliate themselves to
specific religious movements such as Salafism and Sufi orders (Van Bruinessen
2011:18). However, these two categories are deemed to be the minority, leading to
the conclusion that the future of Islam in the West will be ‘largely determined by the
important proportion who are neither active members in the major social-religious
movements nor passive followers of their parents’ tradition, but actively seek Islamic
knowledge that is meaningful to them in the context of their life’ (Van Bruinessen
2011:18). Lacking an adequate and meaningful presence of an official Islamic voice on
the internet, the element of self-responsibility in shaping a religious identity that does
not clash with the political and cultural context of the believer befalls on the individual
(Mandaville 2002:73–79). Scholars such as Abou El Fadl enrich this online library of
Islamic knowledge, both in publishing their opinions and scholarly work. And whereas
official websites are still a popular platform for scholars, social media that were
previously frowned upon as entertaining tools attract more and more of academics.
Abou El Fadl, specifically, opts for publishing his ideas and Islamic understanding via
videos in his two YouTube channels, acknowledging the usefulness of social media
and the fact that the vast majority of people are much more receptive to audio-visual
material.

Politics in the mosque

The first mosques in the West appeared in Western Europe in the nineteenth century
C.E., in 1866 in Berlin for the Muslims who served in the army, in 1890 in Liverpool
by a convert and in 1899 in Greater London by a Hungarian Orientalist. Their function
aimed primarily to facilitate religious practices and education, avoiding any
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 313

involvement with politics, even during the First World War (Nielsen 2016:04–05). In
the USA, the first mosques were established in the early twentieth century, in 1921 in
Detroit, in 1925 in Iowa and 1930 in North Dakota. Although the majority of these
mosques aimed to serve the religious needs of the believers, there were some excep-
tions such as the Sunni mosque of the Albanian American community in Detroit,
established in 1949, which served as a centre where Albanian politics were discussed
(Curtis 2009:48–55). However, this appears to have been an exception. Following the
long-lasting traditions of the countries of origin of their organisers, mosques adopted an
apolitical character. To this day, politics is avoided in mosques of the West, where the
imams are meant to follow instructions and inform the council of the mosque for the
intended topic of the khutbah, and, as it will be shown in the tensions that rose between
Abou El Fadl and the Islamic Center of Southern California (ICSC) in the fourth
chapter, in cases of deviation from this policy, ramifications can occur.
This is the case in Muslim majority countries as well; however, throughout history, a
few exceptions have occurred. In the mid-1970s, Iran had more than nine thousand
mosques, which were under extensive state surveillance and where political discussions
were not allowed, in fear of attacks from the Shah’s security forces (Kurzman 2005:73).
Despite the monitoring, the supporters of the revolution did use the mosques as places
of meeting, discussion and delivering messages from the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini
(d.1989). The shift in the role of the mosques began with the verbal contestation of and
in some cases with physical attacks against the established clerical hierarchy’s authority
by midranking scholars who affiliated with Ayatollah Khomeini, especially after the
title of Imam2 was attributed to him (Kurzman 2005:80–81). By 1978–1979, the
mosques served as places of gathering, starting points for demonstrations and the
primary place for the distribution of information and printed material regarding Iran’s
revolution. The religious scholars, through mosques, established a network of commu-
nication that both spread the principles of the political cause among the local population
and secured international support from abroad (Kurzman 2005:71). In Iran’s case, the
use of the mosque for political purposes came from below, from the believers and the
lower ranking religious scholars who delegitimised and ignored the higher-ranked
ulamā. The two elements that contributed to this politicisation were financial indepen-
dence since the funding came from the believers and the fact that the religious scholars/
preachers were not appointed by the government.
This independence of the mosques’ religious leadership in Iran contrasts with the
situation in Egypt where, by 2000, more than 70% of Egyptian mosques were state-
owned, and a system of financial support for private mosques extended the level of the
state’s leverage on them (Moustafa 2000:07–08). In Egypt, since the mid-twentieth
century, the imams have been appointed and monitored by the Ministry of Religious
Endowments. The topics preached in khutbahs are carefully chosen by the High
Council for Islamic Preaching and on occasions where an imam deviates from the
given topics, he is deemed ‘[…] guilty of violations that harm social peace and security’
(Moustafa 2000:8). It is decided that if he ‘[…] moved from preaching to political
action, he must be removed’ (ibid.). Data shows that 83,000 of 114,000 mosques in
Egypt, as of 2016, were affiliated with the Ministry of Endowments, and the following

2
The title of Imam in Shia Islam has the connotation of the highest religious authority, associated to the twelve
imams, male descendants of Ali and Prophet’s daughter Fatima.
314 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

year, approximately 130, which is less than 0.12%, belonged to Sufi orders (Tantawi
2017, online and Mounir 2016, online). The rest of the mosques were either established
by the Islamists3 or influenced to serve as platforms of defence of the Islamists, who
have used mosques for purposes of political mobilisation throughout their history, and
especially in occasions of public unrest. In the 1980s, the Islamists were powerful
enough to politicise the significant number of mosques that they were controlling in
Cairo and Upper Egypt, with criticism against the government and the ‘enemies’ of
Islam (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004:76). Between 28 June and 14 August 2011,
specifically, the number of protests that began in mosques exceeded three hundred,
and the people considered mosques to be de facto spaces for anti-coup gatherings.
During the same period, Islamists not only used their own mosques but overtook other
mosques too in a manner similar to that which was encountered in the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 (Brown 2011:07 & Ketchley 2017:144–152). In July 2013, the
military of Egypt removed the elected President Mohamed Morsi from office in a coup
d’état, sparking a wave of protests. According to testimonies, throughout the summer,
gatherings that concluded in demonstrations were taking place primarily in front of and
sometimes inside mosques, with anti-coup chanting commencing right after the Friday
prayers (Ketchley 2017:144–152).
Finally, in one of his articles titled ‘Saudi Arabia Is Misusing Mecca’, published in
The New York Times in November 2018, Abou El Fadl condemned the long-lasting
exploitation of the Grand Mosque’s podium in Saudi Arabia as a means of
legitimisation of the kingdom’s rulers. He criticised the action of the Grand Mosque’s
Imam, the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, to proclaim the crown prince
Mohammad bin Salman a mujaddid4 (Abou El Fadl 2018, online). This is another case
of politicisation of the mosque, with the politicisation occurring top-down, from the
political power that controls the imams. A careful examination of the nature of the
content of Abou El Fadl’s khutbahs as it evolves throughout time allows the conclusion
that after that incident, his khutbahs became heavily political.

The use of mosque and social media by progressive Muslim scholars

Progressive Muslim scholars

Khaled Abou El Fadl is one of the leading Muslim scholars who upholds and promotes
progressive Muslim thought, otherwise also referred to as hermeneutic Islam or
progressive Islam (Duderija 2017:19). Progressive Islam is a transnational current;
even though some of the most prominent theoreticians originate from all corners of
the world, most reside in the USA and Western Europe. It is a continuation of the
classical Islamic tradition; the main difference between them lies in the level of
contextualisation of the sacred texts of Islam, primarily the Qur’an and secondarily
the Hadith. Progressive Islam is also the latest development of Islamic modernism, a
process that emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century as a reaction to

3
The word ‘Islamists’ describe both El Gama’a El Islamiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood.
4
A mujaddid, according to the hadith, is a great reformer that God sends once every century, to reclaim or
reinvigorate the faith.
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 315

colonialism, with thinkers such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (d.1897), Muhammad

Abduh (d.1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (d.1935), all of whom heavily politicised
Islamic reform (Rahman 1970:317). Progressive Muslim scholars are against both
secular and fundamentalist Islamic discourses, adopting a highly political notion of
‘social’ hermeneutics, following the model that sprouts from feminism and where the
personal is automatically political (Duderija 2013:70–74).
It is hard, if not impossible, to categorise progressive Muslim scholars into groups of
interests, as their chosen topics often overlap. However, a brief and general
categorisation would divide them into those who, primarily but not exclusively,
emphasise theology and politics (Fazlur Rahman, Abdolkarim Soroush), social justice
and religious reformation (Farid Esack, Ebrahim Moosa), social and gender justice
(Kecia Ali, Riffat Hassan, Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle)
and pluralism and interfaith dialogue (Omid Safi, Amir Hussain, Marcia Hermansen,
Farish A. Noor). Khaled Abou El Fadl is a progressive Muslim scholar whose work
touches upon almost all of the categories mentioned above, with particular emphasis on
social justice/human rights, religious reformation, gender justice and politics. Abou El
Fadl, however, is not the only one to orientate towards politics. Ahmad S. Moussalli is
another progressive Muslim scholar that discusses politics along with human rights and
Islamic fundamentalism (Moussalli 2001), whereas progressive Muslim scholars such
as Abdolkarim Soroush, Farid Esack and Ebrahim Moosa have an extensive presence
in political activism.
For progressive Muslim scholars, the notion of the role of human agency in the
process of the creation of the sacred texts of Islam, primarily the Qur’an, is crucial for
its interpretation without affecting its divine dimension (Duderija 2017:19). Moreover,
progressive Muslim scholars incorporate in the process of re-interpreting sacred texts
and evaluating previous interpretations of the Islamic tradition, elements of the con-
temporary social sciences in which they have been trained in Western institutions, a
detail that distinguishes them from other contemporary schools of thought (Duderija
2017:11 & Safi 2003:19). These ‘social hermeneutics’ are explained by Duderija as ‘a
highly participatory political endeavour enabling progressive Muslim scholar-activists
to seek socio-political change within a faith-based framework. For these actors, being
engaged in social hermeneutics implies that religious knowledge can act as a basis for
social transformation, revolution and collective political activism’ (Duderija 2017:02).
The main idea behind this type of incorporation between the Islamic tradition, contem-
porary social sciences/humanities and activism is the role of each of the believers, male
or female, as God’s viceroys on earth, having the moral responsibility to practice,
promote and defend justice even against their own interests (Abou El Fadl 2007a:130).
This idea that Abou El Fadl calls ‘religious conscience’ and deems its application
necessary in all matters that affect the human life, a life he considers to be sacred, is
very often encountered in his khutbahs and halaqas, but also in his scholarly work
(Abou El Fadl 2014:116).
Progressive Muslim scholars’ interpretations which go beyond binaries such as
tradition versus modernity or secularism versus religion are critical of ‘hegemonic
patriarchal, exclusivist and ethically ossified interpretations of […] inherited Islam-
ic tradition’ and strive to emancipate the oppressed and marginalised, considering
each human as both dignified and capable of taking responsibility of his or her own
connection with the divine, based on the principle that every human is a carrier of
316 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

God’s spirit (Duderija 2017:05). Contrary to the classical Islamic tradition where
the interpretation of the texts is exclusively a male area, female scholars have an
essential role and proportion in progressive Islam, focusing primarily on matters of
feminism and gender justice. Amina Wadud is perhaps the most popular of the
female progressive Muslim scholars, and like Abou El Fadl, she has utilised the
mosque as a place of activism, the impact of which has been intensified through the
social media.

Amina Wadud, the use of the mosque as a place of activism and the social media

Amina Wadud, perhaps the most recognised female progressive Muslim scholar in the
field of feminism and gender justice in Islam, has effectively used the mosque as a
place of activism in promoting women’s right to be equal with men in accessing
religious places. Regarding her hermeneutic approach, Wadud occupies herself exclu-
sively with interpreting the Qur’an and refutes not only traditional patriarchal interpre-
tations of the text but also the literal application of certain Qur’anic verses that promote
violence and discrimination against women (Wadud 2006:192–200). Furthermore, she
has established the Tawhidic paradigm, a model that is based on the principle of
Tawhid and aims to become ‘the inspiration for removing gender stratification from
all levels of social interaction’ (Wadud 2006:32). Finally, she reclaims space for
women, in aspects of ritual and knowledge, pushing for equality both in the mosque
and in the interpretation of the Islamic texts, opposing the male domination of
hermeneutics (Wadud 2006:08). However, Wadud is not the first to direct her work
on the aspect of women’s positions in Islam. The academic works of Fatima Mernissi
(Beyond the Veil [1975]) and Azizah Al Hibri (Women and Islam [ed. 1982]) preceded
Wadud in the field, whereas the work of Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam
(1992), was published in the same year as Amina Wadud’s first publication, Qur an
and Woman (1992).
What placed Wadud in the spotlight and contributed to her popularity was not
her academic output but rather her controversial activism in the space of the
mosque. In 2003, she led a mixed congregation in prayer, in a mosque in
Cape Town, repeating this pioneering act in the USA in 2005 and in the UK in
2008, causing a great deal of reaction (Al-Jazeera 07/08/2019, online & The
Guardian 07/08/2019, online). In an interview with Kecia Ali, Wadud stated that,
in her understanding, the only authoritative form of religion is the one based on
contemporary living experiences of believers and that people need to take agency in
creating their own mosques, surpassing institutions that do not respond to their
living experiences. She emphasised the power of the congregation and noted that
change always begins in small sizes and in due time becomes an established reality
that nobody questions. Wadud describes her activism as the physical application of
her belief, which only requires ‘the dedication to do whatever it is you want to do’
and the will to ‘stand apart from the majority’, whereas she explained that her role
entails advising and guiding those who want to imitate her (Wadud in Ali 2019:78–
79).
In Wadud’s case and upon the completion of this research in September 2019, the
internet and more specifically social media platforms such as YouTube and Facebook
have not been utilised to their full potential in promoting her academia or activism. She
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 317

does not have an official website and the official Facebook page under the name Amina
Wadud, which is ‘liked’ by 44,538 people5, is administered by a group of people rather
than herself, and only an insignificant proportion of its content is about her work or
activism. The Facebook account under the name Amina Wadud The Lady Imam is
followed by 6251 people and is being used as a personal account, the content of which
constitutes of family moments, favourite quotes and articles of various interests. The
YouTube channel The Lady Imam was established and published its first video in late
September 2018; however, it was not until 6 August 2019, almost 11 months later,
when the second video was published on the channel, announcing Amina Wadud’s
intention to use her YouTube channel more frequently to project more of her work and
ideas (The Lady Imam 07/08/2019, online). The announcement was published widely
through all other social media under the name of Amina Wadud and resulted in 300
views within one day (The Lady Imam 07/08/2019, online). On 29 August 2019,
Amina Wadud announced in her Facebook page under the name Dr. Amina Wadud the
creation of a Twitter account by the name ‘The_Lady_Imam’, urging Facebook users to
follow it, aiming to reach five thousand followers within one month (Dr. Amina Wadud
2019, online). The ongoing announcements of Wadud’s intention to engage more with
the various social media can be interpreted as an indication of the realisation of social
media’s importance in the dissemination of progressive Islamic ideas.
Despite the under-utilisation of Wadud’s YouTube channel, evident in the infre-
quency of publications and justifying the low number of subscribers,6 it is undeniable
that the internet is serving as a repository of both her academic work and her activism.
A Google search offers 192,000 results within 0.35 seconds for the name Amina
Wadud. There is a large number of her profiles and biographies in academic, activist
and feminist websites and a significant number of articles, primarily focussing on her
actions as a female imam. Beyond the virtual world, the impact of her ideas and
activism in the West is easily recognisable by the number of mosques established to
be led by female imams. Some of these female imams are leading mixed congregations
as in the case of The Inclusive Mosque Initiative in London, UK (established in 2012),
or exclusively female congregation such as The Women’s Mosque of America in Los
Angeles (established in 2015) and the Mariam Mosque in Denmark (established in
2016).
To conclude, Amina Wadud is a very popular and widely acknowledged progressive
Muslim scholar and has utilised the mosque with the aim to mobilise Muslims
worldwide towards social/gender justice, in an effective way. The method of her
activism is to lead by her paradigm. The choice of a mosque as the physical place of
this activism is symbolically vital as her actions needed to occur in this environment to
be meaningful and effective. Had Wadud led a mixed congregation in a private space
for prayer, the impact would not have been the same. It was the use of the mosque that
aggrandised the symbolism of her action. Her activism did have a significant impact
worldwide, demonstrating in the most striking way that Islam, as shaped and projected
in the West, inspires Muslims even in the Muslim majority societies (Hashas 2018:36).
One can assume that it is precisely due to this impact that the use of social media has

5
All data regarding Amina Wadud’s social media are as of 7 August 2019.
6
Only sixty-five subscribers as of 7 August 2019
318 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

slowly become important to Amina Wadud, who thus far has not utilised them to their
full potential.

Khaled Abou El Fadl and the social media

Khaled Abou El Fadl is a prominent scholar with studies in Islamic scholarship and
jurisprudence in Egypt and Kuwait and social sciences and Islamic law in US institu-
tions; therefore, he is an amalgamation of traditional Islamic Ulamā and western
academic, with specialisation in Sharia and human rights law. He has published
fourteen books and more than fifty articles regarding Islamic law, human rights and
matters that concern interpretations of Islamic theology. Beyond the disciplines of
human rights and law, Abou El Fadl emphasises matters that he deems essential for
every Muslim. One of these matters is the need for education and knowledge and very
often acknowledges, both in his videos and his academic work, limitations in his own
knowledge (Abou El Fadl 2014:116–117). In Islamic jurisprudence specifically, he
considers the vacuum of authority that emerged in the early twentieth century, and the
subsequent emergence of unspecialised, self-proclaimed experts of the Islamic tradition
such as the leaders of most Islamist movements, as the leading cause of the degradation
and deconstruction of the Islamic intellectual culture and Islamic law (Abou El Fadl
2007a:38–39 & KAEF[1] 2018:15:30–16:40).
Abou El Fadl extends his work beyond academia, fully utilising the internet. He has
an extensive presence on social media, under different names and entities. A YouTube
channel established in April 2011 under the name Search for Beauty7 and which
contains 2798 videos has 1117 subscribers and a total of 95,178 views. Under the
same name, there is an official website where a plethora of his publications, academic
or not, can be found. Moreover, there is a Facebook page under the name Khaled Abou
El Fadl that has almost 5000 likes, managed by a team affiliated with UCLA. With the
same name, there is also a Twitter account with 2132 followers which is managed by
Abou El Fadl’s son and whose content is approved by Abou El Fadl himself. In
December 2017, Abou El Fadl and his wife Grace Song, established in Los Angeles
The Usuli Institute, an academic-based institution that aims to promote knowledge,
challenge the status quo of traditional notions of Islam and set new standards in the life
of Muslims in the Western context (Usuli 08/08/2019 online). There are several social
media outlets under the name of The Usuli Institute, an official website, a Facebook
page with 2315 likes and 2584 followers, a Twitter account with 228 followers, an
Instagram account with 192 followers and a YouTube channel that contains 132 videos
and has 980 subscribers. The importance of these numbers becomes apparent when one
examines the content of these media outlets, which comprises lectures, discussions,
presentations, halaqas and khutbahs. The last two are extensively shared through all the
social media related, directly or indirectly, to Abou El Fadl, aiming to increase
exposure to their content.
The exposure that Abou El Fadl seeks through all possible social media is an
undeniable recognition of their importance in the dissemination of his ideas and

7
‘Search for Beauty’ is part of the title of one of Abou El Fadl’s books, published in 2005. The full title of the
book is The search for beauty in Islam: a conference of the books.
8
The statistics on Abou El Fadl’s social media are as of 8 August 2019.
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 319

activism. This makes him an exception among progressive Muslim scholars, the
majority of which do not utilise the social media efficiently and focus primarily on
academia and secondarily on traditional websites. Although academia does exist online,
parallel to its circulation on printed form, it remains within a circle of fellow academics
and students. The vast majority of the population is less inclined towards reading
academic papers and much more prone to material such as videos. As shown in the first
chapter, the internet is instrumental in the shaping of religious identity worldwide. This
is a reality Abou El Fadl has recognised and attempts to utilise by using audio-visual
material in simple and often emotional language, aiming to shape a distinct religious
identity for contemporary Muslims in and beyond the West.

Analysis of Abou El Fadl’s (re)politicisation of the mosque

Categorisation of Abou El Fadl’s online Khutbahs

Abou El Fadl’s khutbahs that are available online, on which this paper is based, cover
three categories of themes: (1) theological, related to Islamic principles, practice and the
believer’s responsibilities in Islam; (2) social, related to social justice, racism and
Islamophobia; and (3) political, related to the despotism of leadership in Muslim
majority countries and matters of political injustice and oppression against Muslims,
either as majorities (Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians) or minorities (Rohingyas and
Uyghurs). The khutbahs can also be categorised into three periods. The first period
begins in November 2009 and reaches June 2015, where all the khutbahs were
delivered exclusively in the premises of the ICSC. The khutbahs of this period9 last
an average of twenty-six minutes and are concerned exclusively with theological and
social matters, with only one exception of a generalised and very brief, less than a
minute’s mention of political injustice (KAEF[3] 2019:16:30–17:15). Much of their
content is concerned with theological matters, and in the few exceptions in which social
content exists, this is only addressed in the last few minutes of the khutbah.
The second period begins in April 2016 and reaches June 2019. In this period, Abou
El Fadl started delivering khutbahs more frequently, primarily in his private space
which for the first two years is described as the Institute of Advanced Usuli Studies,10
and from January 2018 as the Usuli Institute, while still delivering from time to time
from the ICSC. There is significant differentiation between the khutbahs of this period
delivered from ICSC and those delivered from his private place. The content in those
delivered from ICSC is primarily theological; however, politics do start to appear, as a
brief reference in the last minutes of the khutbah. For example, the only khutbah
delivered by Abou El Fadl that is available in ISCS’s YouTube channel from this
period contains the element of contestation of political authority, directed to both the
American and the Egyptian presidents (ISCS 2019:22:53–23:56). Contrary to those
delivered in ICSC, the khutbahs delivered from the Usuli Institute at the same period
are much longer, and their content is much more political. In those, Abou El Fadl

9
There are twelve videos available for these khutbahs covering a total of five and a half hours.
10
The first of these khutbahs was recorded in April 2016, whereas the Usuli Institute was established in
December 2017.
320 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

extends his political activism beyond the themes he discusses, to open calls for actual
political participation, such as the call for demonstration outside the Saudi Embassy in
the USA (UIVK[08] 2019:47:35–48:22). The duration of this period’s khutbahs is of
an average of twenty-five minutes for those from ICSC and an average of forty-five
minutes for those delivered from the Usuli Institute.
The end of the second period and the beginning of the third period occurs in
June 2019 and is the result of a clash between the ICSC and Abou El Fadl, based on
his politicisation of the mosque, which was deemed as a threat for division among the
congregation. Specifically, the ICSC decided to replace Abou El Fadl in the upcoming
Friday’s khutbah, due to his intention to dedicate the topic of the preaching to
Mohamed Morsi’s11 death. In the khutbah delivered on 21 June 2019 in the Usuli
Institute, Abou El Fadl read the ICSC’s decision which mentioned that the management
of the centre ‘will not involve the ICSC in foreign politics [.…] The centre’s policy is to
avoid political topics in Friday khutbah unless the political issue pertains directly to the
American Muslim community’. He also read an announcement that the centre pub-
lished to the community mentioning a previous occasion where Abou El Fadl, without
notifying the centre, criticised the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, an action
that the centre claims it caused an ‘immediate and significant emotional outburst’ in the
congregation. According to the announcement, the centre’s priority to avoid topics that
‘cause divisiveness within our multi-ethnic community’ justified their decision to
replace Abou El Fadl in the deliverance of the upcoming Friday’s khutbah (UIVK[04]
2019:06:00–11:53). The khutbahs of the third period are exclusively political, with a
brief reference to theological principles in the first five minutes or so, serving primarily
as a reminder of the religious character of a khutbah and as a link between the chosen
political topic and the religious responsibility of the audience. These khutbahs are the
longest with an average duration of one hour, and the style of deliverance is very
intense and emotionally charged.12

Content of Abou El Fadl’s online Khutbahs

Abou El Fadl, in almost every khutbah of the second and third period, directs his
criticism towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt for corruption, despotism and the killing of
fellow Muslims, Sunni and Shia (UIVK[03] 2019:27:00–48:40). He also condemns the
American political establishment, whether explicitly or by referring to the involvement
of American politics in every Muslim majority country. As such, when one of the
leaders of Muslims is condemned, such as the Egyptian regime, automatically the
American political establishment is condemned too (UIVK[04] 2019:26:55–28:52 and
UIVK[06] 2019:09:00–17:00). In this regard, he often condemns what he portrays as
ongoing colonisation of the Muslim majority countries, an intrinsic characteristic of
progressive Islam (Safi 2003:03).
He also often directs his criticism towards the religious leaders of Saudi Arabia
for cooperating with political authoritarianism and altering the meaning and prin-
ciples of Islam. He advises believers to ignore ‘the Islam that is coming from the

11
Mohamed Morsi was the elected president of Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013 when he was removed
from the presidency by a coup d’etat and since then remained imprisoned until his death in June 2019.
12
In a few cases, Abou El Fadl literally screams.
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 321

lands of hypocrisy, Egyptian Islam, Emirati Islam, Saudi Islam’, noting that ‘it has
become abundantly clear that Muslims of the West must see themselves as the
original pioneers of Islam’ (UIVK[02] 2019:23:30–32:19). Abou El Fadl often
condemns Wahhabism in his khutbahs as an ideology that has corrupted the true
beauty of Islam, an element that agrees with other progressive Muslim scholars’
advocacy against Wahhabism (Safi 2003:09). He clarifies that religious authorities
in Egypt are not to be blamed, for they act under the fear of the regime, as shown in
the previous chapter. As such, he reprobates both political authority and Islamic
religious authoritative figures that affiliate themselves with oppressive regimes
(UIVK[03] 2019:46:15–46:27).
His preaching is an attempt of appeal to the ethical system of the congregation,
relating the acceptance and tolerance of political injustice to loss of faith in God (KAEF
[1] 2018:05:48–06:13). He urges his audiences, both the physically present congrega-
tion of his khutbahs and the western Muslims that are watching his videos, to be true to
their faith and stand against the injustice of the leaders of Muslims. He considers this to
be their duty as Muslims, especially of those that can do so without the fear of harm: ‘if
you fail to do so, then nothing is left of your Islam […] you are a Muslim technically
[…] by performance only’ (UIVK[03] 2019:25:45–26:38 & 46:00–46:15). For Abou
El Fadl, political action in the form of disobedience and challenge of corrupt rulers is a
religious duty.
A point worth mentioning is that he often clarifies that when he talks in defence of
someone, it does not mean that he agrees with their actions or beliefs. In both the cases
of the Saudi academics condemned for execution and in the case of Mohamed Morsi’s
death, Abou El Fadl clarifies that he mostly disagrees with their ideas and actions but
speaks from the point of view of human rights and justice (UIVK[03] 2019:37:20–
37:50 & UIVK[04] 2019:30:35–33:50). This clarification is not surprising as human
rights, which he defines as ‘a fundamental moral commitment’, is the field of his
expertise (Abou El Fadl 2005:28). In his writings, he claims that belief in human rights
is similar to belief in God, based on the principle of the sanctity of human life (Abou El
Fadl 2005:28–35). In this manner, through his academic endeavours, human rights are
presented as inextricably related to religion, which is in harmony with his khutbahs and
discussions about them in the mosque.
Abou El Fadl has also written extensively about democracy in relation to Islam,
as a system that ‘protects individual rights’ and ‘promotes social and political
values […] of particular importance: pursuing justice […] non-autocratic, consul-
tative method[s] of governance and compassion in social interactions’ (Abou El
Fadl et al. 2004:5). Although terms such as ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic’ are not
commonly used in his khutbahs, terms that describe the political institutions of
Muslim countries and serve as antonyms of the words’ democracy/democratic’,
such as ‘oppressive’, ‘autocratic’ and ‘despotism’, are very commonly used.
Finally, Abou El Fadl, in his khutbahs, primarily expresses himself against both
the religious and political establishment of Saudi Arabia, which he deems inex-
tricably related. This is not a novelty, for he is adamant in condemning the
Wahhabi version of Islam and the ways in which it has infiltrated the Muslim
world, in his academic work as well. He attributes Islamic extremism to both the
eighteenth-century puritanical theology of Wahhabi interpretations of Islam and
the king Abd Al Aziz ibn Saud who legitimised Wahhabi Islam in twentieth
322 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

century, in the establishment of what is today Saudi Arabia (Abou El Fadl et al.
2002:06–09). At the same time, he disapproves of the way CRLO13 is reading and
applying Islamic law, noting that ‘in formulating Islamic law, it has become
common in the modern age to use the authority of the author to justify the
despotism of the reader’ (Abou El Fadl 2009:129). He clarifies that the reason
he opposes the practices and legal opinions of the CRLO is due to the influence
and impact that they have in Muslim societies worldwide (Abou El Fadl
2009:133).
As can be seen, there is a consistency between his heavily politicised academic
production and his political activism as practised through his khutbahs, which as a
result politicise the mosque. Throughout his khutbahs, he emphasises the need for
morality both as a foundation of every action and as a religious duty, a need that he also
mentions in his academic work when he writes, ‘to a large extent moral discourses have
become marginalised in modern Islam’ (Abou El Fadl 2007b:462).

The type of religious identity Khaled Abou El Fadl attempts to shape

Abou El Fadl, having acknowledged and taken advantage of the potential the social
media offer, addresses Muslims globally, although he does differentiate between
Muslims of the West and the rest of the Muslims, as will be demonstrated in the
next chapter. Based on the content of his khutbahs, the primary element of religious
identity that he attempts to shape is that of connection with the universal ummah
and the striving of good as a religious duty, reminding his audience that ‘Allah did
not say “talk about good within your limited national boundaries”’ (UIVK[04]
2019:28:30–28:32).
This sense of collective belonging is one of the main principles that Islam was
established on; however, it is also a characteristic that progressive Islam re-introduces,
especially in contrast to the separatism of Wahhabi Islam which, as was mentioned
earlier, is one of the dogmas that progressive Islam contests (Safi 2003:08–09). The
element of the emancipation of the believers in the form of freedom of religious
understanding and hermeneutics is related to the opposition to rigid interpretations of
Wahhabi Islam. Abou El Fadl urges his audiences to act based on their consciences and
disassociate themselves from religious authorities that collaborate with oppressive
political powers or distort the basic principles of religion. Although he does not advise
the total rejection of every scholar, he suggests intuition as the preferable criterion of
religious actions and interpretations, until the believers come across an ‘authoritative
scholar’ that they trust (UIVK[02] 2019:25:30–29:05). This revolutionary suggestion is
in accordance with the foundational axiom of progressive Islam, that the interpretation
of the texts, and as such the understanding of the religion is not the exclusive right of an
elitist class of scholars.
Abou El Fadl calls for support towards Muslims who live under oppression,
aiming to inculcate a sense of solidarity in accordance with what Duderija calls
‘Islamic liberation theology’ (Duderija 2017:05). Furthermore, he urges his audi-
ences to merge the Islamic, in the sense of religious duty towards God, with the

13
CRLO is the Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions, the official institution of Saudi Arabia
entrusted with issuing Islamic legal opinions (Abou El Fadl 2009, p. 133).
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 323

secular, in the form of political activism and human rights. Overall, Abou El Fadl’s
khutbahs aim to shape a progressive Islamic identity based on the principles of
respect towards humans as the representatives of God, social justice, human rights
and freedom. One needs to be cautious not to assume that the success or failure of
his call for immediate and visible political action is related to the success or failure
of his contribution to shaping a certain type of religious identity. The former can be
only an element of the latter; however, whether his efforts to shape a progressive
Islamic identity are fruitful or not requires thorough research and this paper cannot
serve this purpose.

Analysis

Legitimisation

Abou El Fadl’s biography on the UCLA website names him as ‘one of the world’s
leading authorities on Islamic law and Islam’ (UCLA 2019 online). Abou El Fadl
has clarified the distinction between one being ‘in authority’ and ‘an authority’.
Being in authority is understood as having a special position that offers the power
of issuing directives and commands. Being an authority is having special knowl-
edge or wisdom on a matter and as such being respected and willingly followed
(Abou El Fadl 2001:18). This distinction is crucial in discussing the way he gives
a political character to the mosque. His rich academic background, his long-lasting
preaching activity from the ICSC and his position as Khatib automatically legit-
imise him as both in authority and an authority. By both Western-orientated
legitimisation via education, research and reason and the Islamic-orientated
legitimisation based on classical Islamic studies, Abou El Fadl qualifies as an
authority himself, adding validity in his contestation of political and religious
authority.
Beyond the content of the khutbahs, there is also the element of symbolism.
The level of authority-claims by Abou El Fadl is expressed by the fact that the
camera is constantly focussed on him, and there is no question and answer
session. In a sense, he steps upon the preceding paradigm of generations of
imams, posing himself intellectually and physically as the highest authority in
the mosque. There have been other cases of progressive Muslim scholars where
khutbahs are much more democratic and communal. For example, Amina Wadud
in her khutbah delivered in a live Facebook video on 11 August 2019 from South
Africa not only had a question and answer session that lasted longer than her
khutbah itself, but she also turned the camera to the congregation, taking away the
focus of the attention from herself (Facebook 2019:42:33–1:20:00). Abou El
Fadl’s most political khutbahs are taking place during the Friday prayer, in the
Usuli Institute, turning his private space into a mosque, an action acceptable in
Islam based on the Prophet’s paradigm from the first years of Islam. Mernissi
writes that for the Prophet, the mosque ‘is not a building, but a perspective’,
denoting that he interpreted the term as ‘place of worship’, regardless of its shape
or structure, indicating that any space becomes a mosque when prayer is per-
formed (Mernissi 1991:69).
324 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

Method

Abou El Fadl is very efficient in merging the virtual with the physical. The early
attitude towards the study of the internet and Islam was that ‘online-digital Islam’ was
an entity that existed in virtual reality, distinctively separated from the real world (Bunt
2009:01). Though this might have been the case a decade ago, today’s realities are
different, and the term ‘digital environments’ refers to ‘a conceptual term that describes
the mutual permeation of the virtual with the physical world’. Not only any division
between the real and virtual is being deemed untenable in our days, but it is widely
accepted that digital environments do shape identities, including in the realm of religion
(Frömming et al. 2017:13–15). Abou El Fadl is the most striking example of a
progressive Muslim scholar that materialises this idea, as he transforms the physical
deliverance of a khutbah to a congregation of Muslims in California into virtual
activism disseminated through many different channels while urging his audience to
protest outside embassies (UIVK[08] 2019:47:35–48:22), boycott hajj and umrah
(UIVK[03] 2019:41:30–41:35) and even assist in the removal of custody of the holy
sites from Saudi Arabia (UIVK[03] 2019:41:00–48:46). The latest two calls are
exceptionally controversial as the hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam and a religious
obligation for every Muslim. Moreover, his suggestion for alternative custody of the
holy sites of Islam includes the United Nations, which is seen by many Muslims as a
Western/secular entity, incompatible to ideals and principles of Islam. Having a Muslim
scholar calling for the Muslims to violate their basic religious obligations for the sake of
politics, potentially endangering their soul’s salvation, is an idea not easily accepted by
believers. The connotation of this call, however, is that the monarchy in Saudi Arabia
draws legitimacy from the control it exercises over the two holy sites of Islam, which is
another indication of the impact of the politicisation of religion.
Neither the mobilisation of believers in the mosque nor the attempt to extend the
physical gathering in a mosque with a virtual gathering in an online platform is
something new. It has occurred in the case of Salman Rushdie affair and in the online
protest against the Innocence of Muslims case, where believers, after their prayer,
‘protest[ed] against issues that they deem controversial or unacceptable in their faith’
(Al-Rawi 2016:22). What is unique, though, is the political character of the call for
mobilisation. Abou El Fadl attempts to use techniques and strategies familiar to modern
Muslims to mobilise them against political powers. Abou El Fadl personalises his
experience as a migrant Muslim when he refers to himself as a migrant and he states:
‘Some of us has (sic) escape Muslim countries […] to escape governments that use
torture’, but at the same time he considers himself to be an American Muslim, detached
from his country of origin, referring to the USA as ‘our country’ and the American
president as ‘my president’ (KAEF[1] 2018-12:32–12:39 & KAEF[2] 2019-11:28–
11:34). He also very often reminds his audience that he has been at odds with the Saudi
regime for many years (UIFK[03], 2019, 47:00–48:00).

Appeal

It is hard, if not impossible, to measure the levels of appeal that Abou El Fadl’s political
activism through the mosque has. In a few cases, he has expressed his disappointment
over the lack of response to his message (UIVK[07] 2019:38:55–40:07) and mentions
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 325

complaints of the congregation regarding the topics he discusses as being boring and
not spiritually uplifting (UIFK[03] 2019:46:40–46:48), disconnected with the realities
of American Muslims (UIVK[07] 2019:19:48–20:14) or even complaints of the
organised Muslim community in America that considers his politicisation to be divisive
(UIFK[04] 2019:08:15–08:44). These are indications that there is not much acceptance
of his message, at least in the immediate congregation. Online, the numbers of likes,
followers and subscribers cannot be a reliable source given the unlimited factors that
can affect online presence.
On actual ‘on the ground’ impact, Amina Wadud’s activism is evidently more
effective. However, there are two elements that differentiate Wadud’s activism: time
and character. Wadud’s first prayer leading took place sixteen years ago, so there was
time for her paradigm to travel globally and find imitators. Also, the revolutionary
change she suggested is concrete and one that, due to its controversy wherever is
applied, attracts the attention of media, supporters and opposition. Moreover, those who
follow Wadud’s example are women and, as such, are personally connected to her
activism. This personal element works as an incentive and turns the said action into a
priority. Abou El Fadl’s political message is much more general and recent, counting
almost three years. He calls for opposition and condemnation of authoritative regimes;
however, he often mentions that this condemnation can be in one’s heart (UIVK[07]
2019:29:00–29:05), offering to his audience the luxury to ease their consciences by
simply thinking negatively about oppressive regimes. Time is an essential factor of the
dissemination of ideas, their transformation into convictions and their practical appli-
cation into visible and measurable actions, as seen in Wadud’s case. In Abou El Fadl’s
case, it has practically only been a three-year period since the politicisation of his
khutbahs, which is a very short period to expect immediate and visible results.
Another detail is the element of personal interest. Wadud calls for women to claim
religious space and authority as a means of strengthening their position and visibility in
the religion. Abou El Fadl requests the American Muslims to act on behalf of Middle
Eastern and Asian Muslims, and as such his call for action is mostly irrelevant to the
average American Muslim’s interest. This disconnect between Abou El Fadl’s activism
and American society is apparent from topics of great importance for Americans, which
he fails to address in his khutbahs. For example, on 3 August 2019, a mass shooting
took place in El Paso, TX, resulting in the death of twenty-two and the injury of twenty-
four people, and two days later India revoked the special status of Kashmir (BBC News
04/08/2019 online & Mukhopadhyay 2019, online). The topic of the khutbah delivered
five days later was dedicated in condemning Saudi Arabia for taking advantage of hajj,
without even a brief mention of the Texas shooting, whereas there were several
mentions of the case of Kashmir (UIVK[05] 2019, online). In several cases, Abou El
Fadl urges American Muslims to invest in lobbying, in a model that other nationalistic
or religious groups have done in the past (UIVK[07] 2019:33:40–36:55). In a particular
moment, an incident is mentioned when an American Muslim asked Abou El Fadl,
‘How will supporting you, help our children here in the USA?’ (UIVK[05]
2019:59:30–59:38). This remark indicates the different priorities between Abou El
Fadl’s preaching and American Muslims’ lives. It is evident that Abou El Fadl
advocates topics that do not appeal to the interests of American Muslims. In a way,
it appears that Abou El Fadl carries the mentality of a typical first-generation migrant
Muslim, unable to realise that American Muslims, the majority of them born in
326 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329

America, have developed religiously and politically in a different manner and are not
interested in international politics.

Conclusion

Abou El Fadl in his mosque, where he is free to express himself at will, has given to his
khutbahs a political character. Furthermore, he has eventually cut off ties of almost
forty years with the ICSC, in the name of freedom of expression (UIVK[09]
2019:33:05–43:40). These are acts of contestation of religious authority as manifested
in organised mosques, expressed through the control of the khutbahs as it began in the
Umayyad period and still practised in places like Egypt, as shown in previous chap-
ters14. He both re-defines and re-politicises the mosque, returning to the definition and
use a mosque had in the early years of Islam.
As the analysis of various khutbahs proved, Abou El Fadl is concerned with matters
that relate solely to Muslims, in what appears to be a call for solidarity among the
global ummah. However, he does differentiate between two categories of Muslims. The
Western Muslims which are his primary target audience, whom he considers privileged
for living in security and as such responsible in the eyes of God to defend the entire
ummah (UIVK[07] 2019:37:30–38:10 and UIVK[08] 2019:32:08–32:45). The other
category includes Muslims in every other part of the world, from Bosnia to China. As
such, an explicit fragmentation of the ummah emerges through his preaching, focussing
extensively on the needs of Muslims in the East, in what can be seen as a form of
nostalgia, justifying the highly emotional element presented in his khutbahs of the third
period.
Wadud and Abou El Fadl present two different case studies of activism in the
mosque. Wadud appeals to the personal interests of her audience, without a prominent
presence on the social media, as of yet. Despite this shortcoming, her message is
compelling, and she gains both popularity and opposition. Abou El Fadl employs
multiple social media extensively; however, his message is disconnected from his
target audience, and as such, his appeal is not adequate. Abou El Fadl acknowledges
the power of the internet in sharing information, especially in relation to Islam, both via
his action to engage in the regular publication of khutbahs and halaqas online but also
via statements when he says that the biggest jihad of our era is ‘the jihad of information
and mass communication, and knowledge’ (UIVK[07] 2019:33:48–33:56).
Abou El Fadl’s multiple accounts in almost every possible social media platform
and Amina Wadud’s intention of serious engagement with the same platforms indicate
that social media do become the latest tool in scholars’ hands, when they mean to
spread the word of their activism. It is too early to assess the impact this action has on
Muslims in the twenty-first century, and it also requires a much larger research, which
cannot be covered in this article. At this stage though, the findings of this paper show
that the impact of progressive Muslim scholars’ message increases when there is a
combination of an effective use of social media with topics that are of interest to their
target audiences. When the content of the message is appealing and engaging, then

14
The topic of religious authority as expressed in a mosque is wide and complex enough to cover a
dissertation on its own, so no further analysis will be given in this paper.
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:309–329 327

social media can serve as a repository or as a channel to reach a wider audience and
mobilise actions related to the message. However, if the content of the message lacks
appeal, then the use of social media alone cannot magnify its impact. Nevertheless,
regardless of the immediate impact the activism of progressive Muslim scholars has, in
an era of mass communication and exchange of ideas, the existence of such activism
online contributes to the shaping of religious identity of Muslims worldwide, as seen by
Amina Wadud’s paradigm.

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Affiliations

Sofia Tsourlaki 1

1
SOAS University of London, London N144QB, UK