Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Mikhail Drugov
27 June 2017
Information
1. Informative advertising. Persuasive advertising.
2. Disclosure. Quality Signalling. Warranties.
Competition policy issues
3. Horizontal mergers.
4. Collusion I. The basic model. Factors facilitating collusion.
Collusion at lower than monopoly level.
5. Collusion II. “Carrot-and-stick”strategies. Imperfect
information. Leniency. Screening.
6. Vertical relations. Double marginalization. Downstream Moral
Hazard. Chicago critique and its critique.
Various topics
7. Switching costs. Networks.
8. Innovation and R&D.
9. Intellectual property.
10. Behavioral Industrial Organization. Loss aversion. The market
for quacks.
Industrial Organization, Week 1, Lecture 1 5 / 14
History of Industrial Organization
Before the 1930s
I “Structure-Conduct-Performance” paradigm
I Structure (the number of sellers in the market, their degree of
product di¤erentiation, the cost structure, the degree of
vertical integration with suppliers, and so on) determines
I Conduct (which consists of price, research and development,
investment, advertising, and so forth) which yields
I Market performance (e¢ ciency, ratio of price to marginal cost,
product variety innovation rate, pro…ts, and distribution)
I Often rested on loose theories
I Emphasized empirical studies of industries
I Initially, book-length studies of single industries
Í«°°´§ Ü»³¿²¼
ο© Ó¿¬»®·¿´ Ю·½» Û´¿¬·½·¬·»
Ì»½¸²±´±¹§ Í«¾¬·¬«¬»
˲·±²·¦¿¬·±² כּ ±º Ù®±©¬¸
Ю±¼«½¬ Ü«®¿¾·´·¬§ ݧ½´·½¿´ ¿²¼
Ê¿´«»ñÉ»·¹¸¬ ο¬·± Í»¿±²¿´ ½¸¿®¿½¬»®
Þ«·²» ߬¬·¬«¼» Ы®½¸¿» Ó»¬¸±¼
Ô»¹¿´ Ú®¿³»©±®µ Ó¿®µ»¬·²¹ ̧°»
Ó¿®µ»¬ ͬ®«½¬«®»
Ò«³¾»® ±º »´´»®
Ю±¼«½¬ Ü·ºº»®»²¬¿¬·±²
Þ¿®®·»® ¬± Û²¬®§
ݱ¬ ͬ®«½¬«®» Ы¾´·½ б´·½§
Ê»®¬·½¿´ ײ¬»¹®¿¬·±² Ì¿¨» ¿²¼ Í«¾·¼·»
Ü·ª»®·º·½¿¬·±² ײ¬»®²¿¬·±²¿´ Ì®¿¼» Ϋ´»
λ¹«´¿¬·±²
Ю·½» ݱ²¬®±´
ß²¬·¬®«¬
ݱ²¼«½¬ ײº±®³¿¬·±² Ю±ª··±²
Ю·½·²¹ Þ»¸¿ª·±®
Ю±¼«½¬ ͬ®¿¬»¹§ ¿²¼
ß¼ª»®¬··²¹
λ»¿®½¸ ¿²¼ ײ²±ª¿¬·±²
д¿²¬ ײª»¬³»²¬
л®º±®³¿²½»
Ю±¼«½¬·±² ¿²¼ ß´´±½¿¬·ª» Ûºº·½·»²½§
Ю±¹®»
Ú«´´ Û³°´±§³»²¬
Û¯«·¬§