Revue Internationale de Philosophie

STUDIES IN BERTRAND RUSSELL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Author(s): CONRAD J. KOEHLER
Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 26, No. 102 (4), BERTRAND RUSSELL 1872-
1970 (1972), pp. 499-512
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie
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 STUDIES IN BERTRAND RUSSELL'S
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

by CONRAD J. KOEHLER

Almost a quarter of a century has passed since Bertrand Russe

wrote his last major work in the theory of knowledge, Human Know
ledge : Its Scope and Limits. It was not, however, his only work in th
area. Yet, until recently his theory of knowledge was treated som
what in the way one would treat the weather. Everyone talked
about it, but no one did anything about it, at least not on any kind
comprehensive scale.
Prior to 1969 there were many articles devoted to certain aspects
of Russell's thought, a number of cursory treatments in historic
surveys, very few full-length studies, and not a single comprehensi
investigation of his theory of knowledge. The articles and surve
could not, of course, and did not intend to capture the range of his
interests and contributions to philosophy. As for the few full-lengt
studies of Russell's thought, they fell into three groups. One group
was composed of earlier studies which obviously could not deal with
Russell's mature philosophy, especially the work he had done sin
the 1920's. However, if Russell changed his mind as often as som
of his critics think he did, one would expect there to be quite a few
accounts of these "changes" before and after the 1920's. Such a
expectation, however, has remained unfulfilled. A second grou
consisted of studies in areas of Russell's thought, such as ethic
social and political theory, for which he is neither primarily known
nor particularly distinguished. In fact, Russell himself either he
tated about including some of these areas (ethics) in his philosophy,
or else he was quite definite about excluding others (social a
political theory) from it (x). The third group of studies was restricte

(1) See Russell's "Reply to Criticisms", in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, e

Paul Arthur Schilpp ("The Library of Living Philosophers" ; Evanston : Northwest
University Press, 1944), especially pp. 719-734.

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500 C. J. KOEHLER

in scope, for example, to Russell's method of construction or to his

theories of causation. Although the latter two topics, especially the
method of construction, are at the very center of Russell's theory of
knowledge, they can hardly be said to exhaust the range of subjects
in this most important area of his philosophy.
In 1969 and 1971 there appeared two books which have come the
closest so far to being comprehensive studies of the central area of
Russell's philosophy, namely, the theory of knowledge. One of the
books, Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge, by Elizabeth Ramsden
Eames (London : George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1969, 240 pp.),
is intended for philosophers and (very) intelligent laymen. The
other book, Russell and Moore : The Analytical Heritage, by A. J. Ayer
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1971, x + 254 pp.),
would seem to be intended for philosophers only. Both books are
comprehensive in the sense that they are concerned with Russell's
ideas before and after the 1920's (a decade beyond which, it seems,
few commentators and critics have been willing to go). Moreover,
the two books are especially important in that they treat Russell's
theory of knowledge as being at the center of his concerns in philo
sophy.
Prof. Eames has organized her book around three principal
themes in Russell's theory of knowledge : "analytic method",
"empiricism", and "realism". She uses these three themes as the
basis of her analysis in Chapters II-V and of her criticism in Chapter
VI. In her analysis Prof. Eames examines the themes and traces
the way they have worked out in Russell's mature philosophy.
Her criticism centers around certain questions concerning the
outcome and the compatibility of the themes with one another.
Prof. Ayer has organized his book around one fundamental theme
in Russell's philosophy : "the theory of descriptions". He takes
Russell's theory of descriptions to be "the bridge" between his
work in logic and his theories of meaning, truth, and knowledge.
In his analysis and criticism Prof. Ayer examines Russell's theory
of descriptions and traces the way it has worked out in Russell's
logical atomism and in his views of what there is. Although both
authors have organized their materials differently, they agree on
a number of fundamental points in the interpretation of Russell's
theory of knowledge. First, they agree that one finds the core of
Russell's entire philosophy in his theory of knowledge. Second,
they agree that the method of analysis stands at the heart of Russell's

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 russell's theory of knowledge 501

theory of knowledge. Third, they agree that the method of constru

tion as an application of the theory of descriptions is the fundamenta
tool in Russell's method of analysis. There are other areas of agr
ment in the two books, although I shall confine my remarks in the
present study to a consideration of the preceding three fundamenta
points. I shall organize my study around the three themes of Russel
theory of knowledge, his method of analysis, and his method
construction. In this way, I believe, one will obtain a brief thoug
more accurate outline of Russell's theory of knowledge and of these
two excellent commentaries on it (2).

Since Russell wrote on so many topics and over such a wide span
of time, it is difficult at first to point to any one subject or area as
being at the center of his concerns. Even when we confine our
attention to Russell's philosophy in what Prof. Ayer has called
"the narrower, more academic sense" (A, 8), our initial difficulty
remains. Except perhaps for ethics and the history of philosophy,
Russell's ideas are also many and varied within this restricted domain.
Commentators and critics have spent a considerable amount of
time in examining Russell's contributions to logic and the philosophy
of mathematics. There is, after all, the magnificent Principia Mathe
matica with its (attempted) reduction of numbers to classes and then
to propositional functions, its theory of descriptions, and its theory
of types. Indeed, if it were a question of the area in which Russell
made his most significant and influential contributions to philosophy,
one could make a very persuasive case for logic and the philosophy
of mathematics. Since the question, however, is what area Russell
himself took to be at the center of his concerns, one need not present
an extensive argument to show that it was the theory of knowledge.
Russell begins his philosophical autobiography by stating that
"There is only one constant preoccupation : I have throughout
been anxious to discover how much we can be said to know and with
what degree of certainty or doubtfulness" (3). He goes on to describe

(2) References to each of these two commentaries will be made in the present study
as follows. A quotation from Prof. Eames' book will be followed by a marking such as
(E, 85) which would refer to page 85 of Prof. Eames' book. A marking such as ' (A,
85) ' would refer to page 85 of Prof. Ayer's book.
(3) My Philosophical Development (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 11.

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502 C. J. KOEHLER

the origin of his interest in philosophy a

sophical development. Although the sourc
philosophy were religion and mathemati
that he raised about these areas clearly belon
ledge :
My original interest in philosophy had two sources. On the one
hand, I was anxious to discover whether philosophy would provide
any defence for anything that could be called religious belief, however
vague ; on the other hand, I wished to persuade myself that something
could be known, in pure mathematics if not elsewhere (4).

The same kind of questions, that is, epistemological ones, also

appear throughout the stages of Russell's philosophical development
after his rejection of Kant and Hegel. He seems to regard his early
enthusiasm for idealism as an aberration owing to his Cambridge
indoctrination in philosophy. In any case, Russell came to view
his early work in idealism as being irrelevant to his work after 1900.
Of course, it was after 1900 that Russell made a number of im
portant contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics.
However, there are several reasons for not taking these subjects as
being at the center of his concerns. In the first place, Russell's philo
sophical development takes place over a longer period of time than
does his work in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. After
1910 he did no work in pure mathematics. After 1925, when he
finished the second edition of the Principia, he did "no definitely
logical work", as he notes, except for several topics —- the principles
of extensionality, atomicity, and excluded middle — discussed in
the Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (5). On the other hand, it was not
until 1948 that his philosophical development culminated in his
Human Knowledge. Russell, in fact, states that after 1925 the work
of others in logic and the philosophy of mathematics had no effect
on his philosophical development (6).
A second reason is that even around the time of his work in logic
and the philosophy of mathematics, Russell's interest was equally
evident in the theory of knowledge. In the years from 1910 to
1914 Russell became interested, he says, "not only in what the phy
sical world is, but in how we come to know it" ; and he adds that

(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 127.
(6) Ibid.

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 russell's theory of knowledge 503

"The relation of perception to physics is a problem which

occupied me intermittently ever since that time" (7). Then, ab
1917, Russell became interested in "the problem of the relati
of language to facts" and, in particular, in "the extent to whic
behaviouristic account of knowledge is possible" (8).
In the third place, one will be able to give a more cohere
account of Russell's many kinds of interests by treating his wo
in logic and the philosophy of mathematics as prolegomena to
kind of problems which occupied him throughout his life. Inde
these were important and necessary prolegomena if Russell was
solve certain problems in the theory of knowledge. Among th
problems, for example, was the (epistemological and ontologi
status of such entities as numbers, substance, and the Ego. It w
Russell's theory of descriptions, in the form of his method of const
tion, which enabled him to give an answer to the question concern
our knowledge and the being of such entities. It would surely
a mistake, therefore, to attempt to divorce Russell's work in lo
and the philosophy of mathematics from his theory of knowledge
Prof. Eames and Prof. Ayer have shown quite clearly, I believ
that there is an intimate connection between Russell's work in log
and his theory of knowledge, and that "the bridge" (A, 27) is
theory of descriptions.
Nevertheless, both commentators begin their studies with
belief that the theory of knowledge is at the center of Russ
philosophical concerns. Prof. Eames tries to show that "when
is a matter of the kinds of philosophical questions which Bertr
Russell himself regards as important and which form the subj
of his inquiries, these are mainly epistemological" (E, 24). Pro
Ayer states that in Russell's theory of knowledge one can find "th
guiding principles of his whole philosophical approach" (A
Most important, of course, is Russell's own remark that "my fund
mental aim has been to understand the world as well as may be, an
to separate what may count as knowledge from what must b
jected as unfounded opinion" (9). The general method with w
Russell proposed to carry out his aim was the method of analy

(7) Ibid., p. 13.

(8) Ibid., p. 14.
(9) Ibid., p. 217.

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504 C. J. KOEHLER

and the particular one was his method of construction as a form of

the theory of descriptions. Let us turn, then, to an examination of
Russell's method of analysis, after which we shall consider his method
of construction.

II

The term 'analysis' is used in a number of ways in studies of

contemporary philosophical trends. It is used in a general way
to characterize such varied work as that of Russell ("logical analysis")
Moore ("linguistic analysis"), Heidegger ("dasein-analysis"), and
Sartre ("existential analysis"). The term is also used in a more
restricted way to refer only to that kind of philosophical work in the
tradition of Russell and Moore. For example, Prof. Eames states
that "One aspect of Russell's philosophy upon which all commen
tators and critics are agreed is that it exemplifies and pioneered
modern analytic philosophy" (E, 56) ; and Prof. Ayer subtitles his
study of Russell and Moore "The Analytical Heritage". However,
although this is a more restricted way in which to use the term, it
is not necessarily a more precise and descriptive one. To say that
Russell is an analytic philosopher because he makes use of a method
of analysis would not be sufficient, for example, to distinguish
Russell's approach to problems in philosophy from that of Moore.
As Prof. Ayer shows in his study, however, philosophical analysis
in the tradition of Russell has followed a course which is quite
different from that in the tradition of Moore. Consequently, in
order to gain a more accurate understanding of Russell's method
of analysis, we shall have to consider something about the way in
which his method differs from that of Moore.
One course which philosophical analysis has taken is that which
began with Russell, passed through the stage of Carnap's logical
positivism, and seems to have culminated in the logical pragmatism
of Quine. This form of analysis may be said to center around two
fundamental convictions. The first belief is that ordinary language
is unsuitable for the kind of interesting and important work that
can be done in science and philosophy. Ordinary language is said
to be unsuitable for such work, because it is basically unclear ; it
suffers from vagueness, from systematic ambiguities (the "egocentric
particulars", as Russell called them), and is subject to all kinds of
careless ambiguities. As a consequence of this first belief, the second

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 russell's theory of knowledge 505

conviction is that the analyst must turn to an artificial lang

which is free of the defects of ordinary language. In other w
the analyst must make use of logic to "regiment" (10) ordin
discourse in order to make it suitable for carrying out certain k
of work in science and philosophy. For example, Quine beli
that if we are ever to resolve ontological controversies, we must
uncover the ontological commitments of the competing theo
and in order to determine these commitments, Quine main
that we must translate the sentences of the theories into "canonical
form ", that is, into a form based upon the logic of quantification or
some equivalent. Philosophical analysis in the tradition of Russell,
then, is that form of analysis which makes an essential use of logic
for the regimentation of ordinary language.
The other course which philosophical analysis has taken is that
which began with Moore, was codified by Wittgenstein, and seems
to have culminated in the so-called ordinary language philosophy
of Ryle and Austin. Analysis in this tradition may be said to have
taken on a therapeutic role. Traditional philosophers, according
to this view, have generally tied their understandings into knots by
their twisting of ordinary language. The resultant affliction is some
thing called "conceptual cramps". The method of cure consists in
the analyst untying these knots by pointing out where the deviations
from ordinary language have occurred. After the patient is cured,
the analyst prescribes a closer attention to the many guides and
sufficiently transparent clues found in ordinary language for solving
or, more accurately, for dissolving those problems which only a
philosopher could raise.
This second form of analysis contrasts in several respects with
that in the tradition of Russell. First, therapeutic (or "linguistic")
analysis makes use of a method which is based on an appeal to the
sufficient clarity of ordinary language for solving (dissolving) so
called philosophical problems. The method of analysis in the tra
dition of Russell, on the other hand, uses logic to regiment ordinary
language in order to solve what are taken as genuine problems in
philosophy. Secondly, the result of the method of therapeutic
analysis "is not a theory but simply — no knots" (u). The method

(10) Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T.
Press, 1960), Chapter Five on "Regimentation."
(11) Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (New York : Harper
& Row, 1971), p. xi.

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 506 C. J. KOEHLER

of analysis which has its heritage in Russell, h

form of posing certain problems and then o
theories of reality and theories of knowled
later, one of the problems to which Russell
analysis was that of the epistemological and on
entities as numbers, substance, and the Ego
he proposed in view of this problem was the t
in the form of the method of construction. Fo
let us consider Russell's estimation and gene
method of analysis.
Russell states that he began his work in the t
with six "prejudices". These are prejudices,
in the sense of "being prior to an investiga
and not in the sense of "being immune to later
or rejection, had the outcome of the investiga
them" (E, 48). Among these six there is one,
"the most important", the "strongest", and
in his thinking (12). It is the one concerned
thod which Russell names, describes, and illust
sis :

My method invariably is to start from something vague but puzzling,

something which seems indubitable but which I cannot express with
any precision. I go through a process which is like that of first seeing
something with the naked eye and then examining it through a micro
scope. I find that by fixity of attention divisions and distinctions appear
where none at first was visible, just as through a microscope you can
see the bacilli in impure water which without the microscope are not
discernible. There are many who decry analysis, but it has seemed
to me evident, as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives
new knowledge without destroying any of the previous existing know
ledge. This applies not only to the structure of physical things, but
quite as much to concepts (13).

Russell believes the method of analysis has a number of merits.

One of these, as we see in the preceding quotation, is said to be that
analysis gives new knowledge without destroying the old. A second
merit, according to Russell, is that analysis "gives knowledge not
otherwise obtainable" (14), and that in order to solve philosophical

(12) My Philosophical Development, p. 133.

(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid., p. 229.

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 russell's theory of knowledge 507

problems "only by analysing is progress possible" (15). A th

merit is held to be that, although it may not immediately re
every problem in philosophy, analysis makes the ones that r
"fewer and more manageable" (16). Another merit, which is t
closely with the third one and which I shall discuss more fully l
is said to be that analysis "diminishes the range of possible erro
provides a smaller assemblage of hostages for the truth of the w
system" (17). Very briefly, Russell's belief here seems to be
on the following argument. Every set of problems requires a co
ponding set of assumptions. But every set of assumptions increa
the range of possible error. If it can be shown that certain as
tions need not be made, then the range of possible error is dimin
and so is the number of problems, some of which concerned wh
certain assumptions had to be made. Although Russell men
these merits, he tempers his estimation of the method of an
with the additional belief that "there does not exist a method which
will safeguard you against the possibility of error" (18).
There are three general elements of Russell's method of analysis :
(1) the starting point, (2) the process itself, and (3) the result. The
analysis starts with "the holding of beliefs which are hazy or am
biguous, which are complex, and which are felt to be certain without
one knowing what it is that one is certain about" (E, 56). The
analysis proceeds, according to Russell, along the general lines of
the method adopted by Descartes. One attempts to doubt the
initial and subsequent beliefs, retaining only those which can not be
doubted because of their clearness and distinctness (19). The analy
sis continues by "attention to component parts, by the tracing of
connections, and by the ordering and organizing of the complex"
(E, 56). It is important to note in this connection that for Russell
analysis involves the ordering of components, as well as their identi
fication. The analysis results in "a situation in which clarity and
precision have replaced vagueness and fuzziness, in which simples
have replaced complexes, and in which specific questions have

(15) Ibid., pp. 14-15.

(16) Ibid., p. 219.
(17) Ibid.
(18) "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in Logic and Knowledge : Essays 1901-1950
ed. Robert G. Marsh (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 181.
(19) Ibid.

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508 C. J. KOEHLER

replaced the large and indeterminate certainty of early belief" (E,

56).
The specific element of Russell's method of analysis is the essential
use of logic for the regimentation of ordinary language. It is this
element which characterizes Russell's method and which sets it
apart from that of Descartes and Moore. In the Principia Russell
and Whitehead set forth five reasons for "the use of a symbolism,
other than that of words", for their work in mathematical logic (20).
These five reasons among others, as Prof. Eames argues, seem to
be of a kind which could have "suggested" to Russell the use of a
regimented, or "artificial", language in philosophy generally (E,
61-64) and, as we shall see, in the theory of knowledge particularly.
One of these reasons is that philosophers are said to find a need for
a special vocabulary to express certain ideas different from those
treated by the language of ordinary speech. A critic in the analytic
tradition of Moore, on the other hand, might charge that this begs
the more important question of what a philosopher is supposed to
do ; and he would undoubtedly say that this is precisely how philo
sophers manage to tie their understandings into knots, namely, by
straying from ordinary language. Another reason given is that a
regimented language is thought to allow for greater economy (al
though not in every respect) and clarity than is to be found in
ordinary language. The claim for greater clarity, however, would
seem to beg the question at hand — whether a regimented or ordi
nary language is sufficiently clear for work in philosophy. Prof.
Eames notes that these reasons, together with the assumptions on
which they are based, are "the target of contemporary criticism
of Russell's method of analysis in particular and of the use of symbolic
logic in general" (E, 63). Nevertheless, it is clear that Russell thought
a philosopher could make important use of a regimented language,
and that Russell made the attempt in his theory of knowledge. Why
Russell made the attempt, how he carried it out in his theory of
knowledge, and what his estimation was of the results are the topics
to which we may turn now.

(20) Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. I
(2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), "Introduction" to Part I,
p. 1.

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 russell's theory of knowledge 509

III

According to the principle of economy known as "Occam's

razor", entities are not to be multiplied without necessity. This
is "the maxim", Russell says, "which inspires all scientific philo
sophising" (21), and it is this principle which inspired Russell's
own work, especially in connection with the method of analysis
generally and the method of construction in particular. Russell
held that in using Occam's razor "one was not obliged to deny the
existence of the entities with which one dispensed, but one was
enabled to abstain from ascertaining it" (22). This approach, as we
have seen, was said to have the advantage of reducing the number
of required assumptions for the problem at hand. Any reduction
in these assumptions would bring with it two further advantages.
First, the range of possible error would be diminished. Secondly,
there would be "a smaller assemblage of hostages for the truth of
the whole system".
Russell offered his own version of this principle, and it is this
particular version which guided him in his treatment of such entities
as numbers, substance, and the Ego. "Russell's razor" is as follows :
"Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for
inferred entities" (23). Russell referred to this as "the supreme
maxim in scientific philosophising", and it, too, is offered as a
principle of economy (24). At first glance, it is somewhat surprising
to find that Russell attempted to adhere to this maxim even during
the time of his earlier (Platonic) realism. This was a time when
Russell's universe was, indeed, bloated, although at the time he did
not believe it was needlessly overpopulated. The reason his uni
verse was bloated, as Prof. Ayer points out, can be found in one of
Russell's basic assumptions : "The meaning of a name is to be identi
fied with the object which it denotes" (A, 12). On Russell's view,
a necessary condition for a thing to be named is that it be capable of
being denoted ; and Prof. Ayer notes that in The Principles of Mathe

(21) Our Knowledge of the External World (Rev. ed. ; London : George Allen & Unwin,
Ltd., 1926), p. 112.
(22) My Philosophical Development, p. 13.
(23) "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics", in Mysticism and Logic (London : George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1917), p. 155.
(24) Ibid.

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510 C. J. KOEHLER

matics Russell interpreted this condition "very liberally" (A, 28).

In The Principles of Mathematics Russell held that "Whatever may be
an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition,
or can be counted as one, I call a term... Every term has being,
i.e. is in some sense" (25). On this interpretation, then, one could
in principle use names to refer to all kinds of entities. In particular,
since we can think of numbers, they are terms ; and since they are
terms, numbers can be said to be in some sense. Nevertheless, it
was also in The Principles of Mathematics that Russell proposed to
reduce mathematics to logic and, more precisely, to show that
numbers are logical constructions out of classes.
Russell's principal motive for attempting the reduction of numbers
to classes seems to have been to meet the demands of Occam's
(Russell's) razor. For, if numbers can be treated, not as inferred
entities, but as logical constructions out of classes, then there would
be a reduction in the ontological commitments and epistemologica
obligations of Russell's theory ; and this reduction would be accom
panied by one in the range of the possible error of his theory. I
would appear that this was a motive for The Principles of Math
matics, as well as for Russell's later work. Another motive may
have been, as Prof. Ayer suggests for The Principles of Mathematics,
that Russell seems to have assumed that classes are not as "myste
rious" (A, 20) as numbers, that is, that we can understand more
clearly what we mean by the term 'class' than what we mean by
'number'. Although we customarily used the terms 'number',
'one', 'two', and the like, Russell did not believe that such term
were understood clearly ; and Prof. Ayer adds that "he may als
have thought that the sense which he was giving to them was the
sense which they already implicitly had" (A, 19). A third motiv
which should have been but was not behind his early attempt t
reduce numbers to classes was, as Russell admitted, "that feeling for
reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract
studies" (26). Since Russell's earlier realism lacked that feeling,
he was unable to see just how bloated his earlier universe was and

(25) The Principles of Mathematics (2d ed. ; London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
1937), p. 43.
(26) Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1919)
p. 169.

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 russell's theory of knowledge 511

to realize that, in fact, it was needlessly overpopulated. However,

when Russell later combined this feeling for reality with his
concern for ontological and epistemological economy, he applied
his razor to all kinds of entities, among which were substance and
the Ego.
Whitehead had suggested a method of constructing points and
instants out of events. Russell attempted to generalize this method
and extend its use to other entities in physics and in common sense
as well. The method of construction, Russell hoped, would be the
way of "bridging the gulf between the world of physics and the
world of sense" (27). In Our Knowledge of the External World Russell
attempted to build part of such a bridge by showing that a "thing",
or permanent substance, can be constructed out of sense data.
His general procedure for dealing with the term 'permanent sub
stance he notes, is "to take our ordinary common-sense statements
and reword them without the assumption of permanent sub
stance" (Z8) ; and it was this procedure of "translation", of course,
which was at the heart of Russell's theory of descriptions. The
term 'thing', or 'permanent substance', Russell proposed, may be
defined as "a certain series of appearances connected with each other
by continuity and by certain causal laws", and the world from
which he started was "a world of helter-skelter sense-data..." (29).
The reason Russell started from such a world (of sense data, sensed
particulars, or percepts) is, as Prof. Eames shows throughout Chapter
IV, that Russell's own feeling for reality was that of an empiricist.
The result of this extrusion of permanent substance is, in Russell's
estimation, that "Everything will then proceed as before : whatever
was verifiable is unchanged, but our language is so interpreted as to
avoid an unnecessary metaphysical assumption of permanence" (30).
In The Problems of Philosophy, on the other hand, Russell had not
as yet managed to construct a permanent substance. Although
he did not think it was necessary to treat the Ego as a permanent
substance, he was unable to offer a construction of the Ego. Instead,
the best he could come up with at the time was that "it is probable,

(27) Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 106.

(28) Ibid., p. 111.
(29) Ibid., pp. 111-113.
(30) Ibid., p. 112.

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512 G. J. KOEHLER

though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that

which is aware of things or has desires towards things" (31). When
Russell later gave up the idea of knowledge by acquaintance, he
also gave up the idea of the Ego as an independent entity and
seemed to be denying its existence. As Prof. Ayer remarks, how
ever, "What it comes to is that the Ego is reducible : it succumbs to
the principle that constructions are to be substituted for inferences"
(A, 112) ; but Prof. Ayer believes that Russell hardly attempted to
offer such a construction.
In his initial estimation of the method of construction Russell
hailed it as the new method of scientific philosophizing. After its
apparently successful use in Our Knowledge of the External World,
Russell continued to apply the method of construction in The Analysis
of Matter and The Analysis of Mind. Although there were always the
demands of Occam's (Russell's) razor, there was also Russell's
empiricist feeling for reality. As this feeling for reality developed
into a strong sensitivity to the more strict demands of experience,
Russell changed his estimation of what he thought he had accom
plished with the method of construction in the theory of knowledge.
Given the demands of economy and experience, however, such a
change would seem appropriate.
Thiel College,
Greenville, Pennsylvania.

(31) The Problems of Philosophy (New York : Oxford University Press, 1912 ; "Galaxy
Book" edition), p. 51.

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