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A Predictable Catastrophe
Assessing an Israeli Strike on Iran in 2010

Author: Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prev ention

March 4 , 2 01 0
Weekendav isen

(Originally av ailable in Danish.)

In January 1 9 9 5, the New York Tim es published a disquieting article best sum m arized by its title: "Iran May
Be Able to Build an Atom ic Bom b in 5 Years, U.S. and Israeli Officials Fear." Subsequ ent warnings from
Am erican neoconserv ativ es, Israeli officials, and Iranian exile gr oups went ignored, and m ost policy m akers
dism issed the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as m ore alarm ist than alarm ing.

The apathy toward Iran's nuclear am bitions ev aporated in 2 002 , when ev idence em erged that Iran had a
well-established clandestine nuclear program outside of the scope of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -of
which Iran is a m em ber-and its inspection arm , the International Atom ic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After sev en y ears of repeated rev elations of Iranian transgressions, tensions between the P5+ 1 -Am erica,
Britain, France, Germ any , Russia, and China-and Iran hav e grow n progressiv ely worse. If a bold, and
presently unforeseen, agreem ent between the P5+ 1 and Iran cannot be reached, it is increasingly likely that
Israel will attem pt a risky and highly -destabilizing m ilitary strike against Iran's know n nuclear weapons
facilities.

To analy ze the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran in 2 01 0, there are fiv e issues to consider:

First, the lev el of pessim ism surrounding a deal between the P5+ 1 and Iran has reached an all-tim e low. In late
Nov em ber, in outgoing com m ents as Director General of the IAEA, the prev iously optim istic Moham m ed
el-Baradei declared that the agency had hit "a dead end" in its ability to v erify the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program . In January , Tehran rejected the P5+ 1 diplom atic offer to ship m ost of its low-enriched
uranium to Russia for further enrichm ent to fuel nuclear reactors that produce m edical isotopes. More
recently , it rejected an Am erican offer to sell the isotopes directly to Iran.

Second, the Obam a adm inistration no longer believ es the findings of the alway s-contentious National
Intelligence Estim ate (NIE) of 2 007 , which judged "with high confidence that in fall 2 003 , Tehran halted its
nuclear weapons program ." The National Intelligence Council is drafting an updated NIE that will bring the
United States closer in line with its allies' estim ates, which reportedly contended that Iran both continued its
research and dev elopm ent work for building a bom b, and stands at the brink of hav ing the "breakout capacity "
to do so. The alignm ent of these m ore dire projections could cataly ze tacit U.S. and western support for Israeli
m ilitary action, if sanctions fail.

Third, foreign intelligence agencies do not know the current operational status or location of Iran's suspected
nuclear weapons program . In Septem ber, the U.S., France, and Britain disclosed a heretofore clandestine
uranium enrichm ent facility buried deep beneath a m ilitary com plex near the Iranian city of Qom . Caught
red-handed (y et again), Iran told the IAEA that there were no "other nuclear facilities that were currently
under construction or in operation that had not y et been declared to the agency ." Giv en Iran's com m itm ent to
dev eloping a clandestine uranium enrichm ent capacity stem s back a quarter century this is sim ply
unbeliev able.

Fourth, a fourth round of UN-sponsored econom ic and diplom atic sanctions against Ir anian officials and
entities connected to nuclear and m issile program s should soon be announced. It could be y ears, howev er,
between when additional sanctions, no m atter how "crippling," are im plem ented, and actually hav e an
effect-if any -on senior Iranian officials.

Fifth, and m ost im portantly , if their public and priv ate com m ents are to be believ ed, the Israeli gov ernm ent
of Benjam in Netany ahu will not allow Iran to dev elop the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. The question is
how long would Israel wait for new sanctions to dem onstrably fail at com pelling a change of behav ior in
Tehran?

The answer depends on intelligence and Iranian behav ior. If new and credible intelligence em erged indicating
either additional clandestine uranium enrichm ent facilities, or an explicit order from Iran's political
leadership to com m ence with a crash program to build a bom b, Israel could attack Iran's known nuclear
facilities.

If Iran blocked or harassed IAEA inspections of the Natanz centrifuge facility , or withdrew from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty , like North Korea did in 2 003 , Israel cou ld also launch a strike.

By one estim ate, it w ould take the Natanz facility roughly six m onths to turn its 1 ,7 6 3 kilogram s of
low-enriched uranium into enough highly -enriched uranium for a bom b. The last IAEA "phy sical inv entory
v erification" at Natanz was in late Nov em ber. Thus, this fall is a potential window for an Israeli attack if IAEA
inspectors were not allowed to return. The forthcom ing IAEA report will be telling about the transparency and
progress of Iran's uranium enrichm ent at Natanz.

An Israeli attack wou ld be an audacious, uncertain, highly destabilizing, and short-term solution. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicted that a m ilitary strike "would delay the Iranian [nuclear] program
for som e period of tim e, but only delay it, probably only one to three y ears." Nev ertheless, giv en the current
trendlines and entrenched positions of the P5+ 1 and Iran, an Israeli strike m ight be the foreseeable catastrophe
of 2 01 0.

Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This article appears in full on CFR.org by permission of its original publisher. I t was originally available here.
© Copy r i ght 201 0 b y the Counc i l on For ei gn Rel ati ons. A l l Ri ghts Reser v ed.