G.R. No.

75919 May 7, 1987 defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,  defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe
vs. rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal
STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and
MAISIP, respondents.  severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages
as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners. attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price
of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents. 
the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of
over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5

R E S O L U T I O N 
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of
opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint
was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and
GANCAYCO, J.: possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as
merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 
6

Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and
to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As
the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.  designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.  sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in
the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —  should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. 

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages. While the present case is
2
an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for
temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the
annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks
for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein.  However, in the
present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was
brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an
investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff
through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint
on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount
of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October
15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present
4
case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating
the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs
specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.   Still no amount of damages were
7
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.  payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an
damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to
ownership and possession of real property.   An amended complaint was
8 the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
also admitted.  9 prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is
obvious.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery
of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition
should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the of this unethical practice. 
docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was
held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
computation of the filing fee. 11 
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
expunged from the record. 
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged
in the original complaint. 
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of pronouncement is overturned and reversed. 
the actual date of filing in court. Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. 
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. 
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the
basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. 

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this
case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, petitioners,  their complaints.
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for
petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for
private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.  assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of
a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially
against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses
of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify
the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).  subsequently paid by private respondent.
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which
prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded
by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon
the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases
assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were
under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this
Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the
directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of
Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was
then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case
No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees
and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were
likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in
 
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him
to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and,
in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. 
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by
petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of
Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this
Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not
indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the
prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private
respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70. 
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance
with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk
of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of
Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
 
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00.1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
 1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715
insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as
amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due
course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the
docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to
reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the
basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on
April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of
nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may
be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as
herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in
the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that
should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid
the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners
cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as
follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The
ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot
apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in
court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers
that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein
this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket
fee paid was insufficient.  thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a
forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice
of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of
P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after
receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the
amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts,
this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected. 
In Lee vs. Republic,  8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become
a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor
General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration
was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be
filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this
Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23,
1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. 
In Malimit vs. Degamo,  9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were
applied. It was an original petition for  quo warranto contesting the right to office of
proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by
law.10However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said
period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed
to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed. 
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must
be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that
said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the
same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead
he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before
the same court. 
Then in Magaspi,  12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and  Lee  that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee,
the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint
sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be
declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner
monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is
delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00. 
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of
the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action
was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its
assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The
trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.  Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the
Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary
damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral
damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of
the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The
opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court.
The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which
plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid
the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional
fee it must be based on the amended complaint.  admitted.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to
have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We
reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the
complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to
be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of
property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for
damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the
damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial
court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint. 
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi  in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the
property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the
issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale
of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff.
It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked
the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid
and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The
amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.  P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the
docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the
amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from
the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for
damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be
assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about
P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint. 
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was maintained. 
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the
said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial
court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the
complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no
amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was
 
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for
the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint
and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared
null and void.13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together
with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester.
In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted
to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated.
The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the
docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint
wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as
actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his
pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of
P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which
he paid. 
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately
fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on
August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional
docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in
the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, SO ORDERED.
petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49. 

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The
pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious
not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. 

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the
case was decided by this Court.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.

Still insufficient contention: a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same. 

Thus, the Court rules as follows: 

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable
time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee
that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned
from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay
the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. 
G.R. No. 88421               January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners  cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE
SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific
performance with damages is presented by this petition for prohibition.
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private
respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of
exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental
complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18,
1989. Hence this petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of
P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the
assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration.
Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of
exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and
supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 1 a similar case
involving an action for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the
docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in
the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners that since the action concerns real estate, the
assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the fees. Such rule cannot
apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages although
it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the
amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount
of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state
the amount of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be
dismissed in accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that
the determination of the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the
court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private
respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court
ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court
wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to
mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for
exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the
Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award
thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion
to make the clarification that
SC: RTC wrong. The phrase "awards claims not specified in the pleading" refers only
to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading” for then it will
not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the
complaint or any pleading, should be specified.

 While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or

corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the
parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of
which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper
assessment of the appropriate docket fees.

 The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that
may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

HENCE, the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as
it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a
reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as
to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the
payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period

The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers
from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed
for.

As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the
record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow,
within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental
complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and
require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period. 4

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge
from the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental
complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion,
give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its
amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 224834
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner  passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed
vs
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA,
as Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 224871
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of
Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a
Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc., Petitioners,  filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly. 11 Later on, Harvest
vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP,
JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ,
ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C.
MIGALLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari  are the
Decision2 dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated May 25, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the
Resolution4 dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and, accordingly, reinstated the case and
remanded the same to the court a quo  for further proceedings after payment of the
proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert
Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.)  are, in their own
capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.
(Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of
Directors.5 As per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held
every June 15.6 However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3)
o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap
Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015
ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of
shares with total value of ₱l Billion which was earlier approved in a Board Resolution
before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was made "to give the
stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after taking into
consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest
All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction)8 involving an intra-corporate controversy against Alliance, and
its other Board members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H.
See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara
Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al.  principally
claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a
condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in
the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights proportionate
to their existing shareholdings.9 Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia,  the
declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015 indefinitely
postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015
approving the SR0.10 The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with
All, et al.  filed an Amended Complaint:12 (a) deleting its prayer to declare null and void
the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b)  instead,
prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the
SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of
Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should
have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was
valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al.  did not mention such capital infusion
in their prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00.
On the other hand, Harvest All, et al.  maintained that they paid the correct filing fees,
considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not
a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that
they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to
defraud the government.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the RTC dismissed the instant complaint for
lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing
fees.16 Citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC,17 and the Court's pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu),18 the RTC found that
the basis for the computation of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the
SRO, it being the property in litigation. As such, Harvest All, et al.  should have paid
filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and not just ₱5,860.00. In this
regard, the RTC also found that Harvest All, et al.'s payment of incorrect filing fees
was done in bad faith and with clear intent to defraud the government, considering
that: (a)  when the issue on correct filing fees was first raised during the hearing on
the application for TRO, Harvest All, et al.  never manifested their willingness to abide
by the Rules by paying additional filing fees when so required; (b)  despite Harvest
All, et al.'s admission in their complaint that the SRO was valued at Pl Billion, they
chose to keep mum on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and
(c)  while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the body of their complaint,
they failed to indicate the same in their prayer, thus, preventing the Clerk of Court
from making the correct assessment of filing fees.19
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the CA reversed the RTC's order of
dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a
quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees. 22Also citing Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu,  the CA held
that the prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies always involve a
property in litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that the basis for
the computation of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and,
thus, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20
Million and not just ₱5,860.00.23 However, in the absence of contrary evidence, the
CA held that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith and had no intention of
defrauding the government, as they merely relied in the assessment of the Clerk of
Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, the CA ordered the reinstatement of
Harvest All, et al.' s complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further
proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees.24
The parties moved for reconsideration,25 which were, however, denied in a
Resolution26 dated May 25, 2016. Hence, these consolidated petitions.
The Issues Before the Court
The primordial issues raised for the Court's resolution are: (a)  whether or not Harvest
All, et al.  paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same should have been
based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al.  indeed paid
insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act was made in good faith and without
any intent to defraud the government.
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is
partly granted.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest
All, et al.'s complaint should be based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus,
essentially holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation - both the
RTC and the CA heavily relied on the
Court's pronouncement in Lu. In Lu,  the Court mentioned that in view of A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, it seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a
property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated."28
However, after a careful reading of Lu,  it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly
pointed out29 that the foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
To recount, in Lu,  the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate
controversy instituted therein, i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct docket fees were
paid.30 Despite such pronouncement, the Court still went on to say that had the
complaint therein been filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it
would have ruled otherwise because the amendments brought about by the same
"seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated,"31 viz.:
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or
other cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed under Section
7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was
omitted from the reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing "[a]ctions
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not
involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that
an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value of
which is always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest
amendments seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere
inspection of corporate books.
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express
phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000
during which time Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision. Even
the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the
applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for
computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an
intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated, such as an action for inspection of corporate books. The immediate
illustration shows that no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in
the assessment of the docket fees.32 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves
a property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly non-
determinative of the antecedents involved in that case and, hence, cannot be
controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it adjudicates similar cases upon the
principle of stare decisis.  As it is evident, these passages in Lu only constitute an
opinion delivered by the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a hypothetical
scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,
which it was not) different from the actual case before it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, 33 the Court had the opportunity to define
an obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects as follows:
[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is
made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an
adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for
purposes of res judicata."34  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo  erred in applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect.
This is because
depending on the nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an intra-corporate
controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable or incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
 primarily for the recovery of a sum of money = considered capable of
pecuniary estimation; MTC or RTC depending on the amount of the claim
 where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money and recovery of money is purely incidental = incapable of pecuniary
estimation; RTC
In this case, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of
holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of
sum of money.
 Mention of SRO merely narrative to emphasize the dilution of their voting
interest
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
[C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
[C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts). 36 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate controversy may be
classified as an action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A
cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals
that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation's bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize,
so that their voting interest with the corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus,
Harvest All, et al.  sought for the nullity of the Alliance Board Resolution passed on
May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending
completion of subscription to the SR0.37 Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for
nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the
by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of Alliance's
impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et  al.'s
action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et
al.  do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the
SRO; and (b)  such mention was merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize
the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if
the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of
money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of
Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their
principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-
SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which introduced amendments to the schedule of legal
fees to be collected in various commercial cases, including those involving intra-
corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC effective 16 August 2004, incorporated the equitable schedule of legal fees
prescribed for petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i) thereof and, furthermore,
provided under Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of
the said rule shall apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-
corporate controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as
follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DELETED as
the fees covering petitions for insolvency are already provided for in this Resolution.
As for cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the applicable fees shall be those
provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of
Court depending on the nature of the action.  actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of
Section 7 (a) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of
the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the determination
of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose:
1. on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court's recognition that the
subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable
of pecuniary estimation;
2. and on the other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter
dictum)  implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter
which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-
SC dated October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this
case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make
them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they merely
pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v.
CA,39 the Court thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural
rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily
apply to procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new
obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor
take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as
a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be
made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees
provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving
property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC
dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:
(a)  to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of
₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient
compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b)  if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et
al.' s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice,
and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with
dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the
regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R.
No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further
proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.