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Same; The provision granting an exemption as a special
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
* by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
Public Officers; The privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.—True, election
is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity
of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However,
inspite of its
_______________
* EN BANC.
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to
ascertain the applicable law.
Same; All top officials of Government—executive, legislative
and judicial are subject to the majesty of law; Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position.—We
start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the
public mind that election or appointment to high government
office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from
the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is
the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
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privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms.—The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily
addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
689 has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
Same; Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of
the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests.—Because of
the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised
Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest.
He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons
still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment,
there was no immunity from arrest.
Same; The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.—The
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from
691
690
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 691
People vs. Jalosjos
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Same; One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.—One
rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself.
It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person
charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it
is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks
to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction
in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and
thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
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Same; Election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.—We,
therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.
GONZAGA-REYES, J., Concurring Opinion
Public Officers; The continued incarceration of accused-
appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of
his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.—
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In
People v. Divina we held that the trial court’s judgment of
conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged
is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-
appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of
his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
692
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People vs. Jalosjos
Same; Accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory
rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua is not entitled to
the privilege of parliamentary immunity.—The accused-appellant,
having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled
to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from
the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal
construction of the constitutional privilege is not in order.
Same; Doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to
criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed
during his previous term.—Accused-appellant’s contention that
his reelection constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such
an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by
even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v.
Comelec, Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v. Guingona we
laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may
have committed during his previous term. The administrative
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liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal
liability.
MOTION to be allowed to discharge duties as
Congressman.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Prospero Cresceni; Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates
Law Offices; Saguisag & Associates; Balisado Law Office;
and Lazaro Law Firm for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts
693
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People vs. Jalosjos
1
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general? In answering the query, we are called
upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context
of penal law.
The accused-appellant’s “Motion To Be Allowed To
Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives” was filed on the grounds that—
1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression
of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any
ruling, giving priority to any right or interest—not
even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
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To bar accused-appellant from performing his
3. duties amounts to his suspension/removal and
mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by
the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained
lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide
member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
________________
1 RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
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People vs. Jalosjos
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the “mandate of
sovereign will.” He states that the sovereign electorate of
the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by
his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions
of a Con-gressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State.
He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects
to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top
officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the
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duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
695
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 695
People vs. Jalosjos
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; x x x.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of
immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and
in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
x x x but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after
its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
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The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has
696
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos
also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is
enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of
Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that—
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason
why he should be exempted from the operation of Section
11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions
if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo
2
v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that—
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be
readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo
case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not
apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not
_______________
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2 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
697
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People vs. Jalosjos
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration
3
of justice. As stated in
United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the
injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional
Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus4
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the
electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted
by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-
appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion.
This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside
from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s
penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons, to wit:
_______________
3 19 Phil. 208, 212.
4 Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
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a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on
Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City,
on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from
the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at
the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the
Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan
City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by
chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his
transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City,
when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit:
a) to join “living-out” prisoners on “work-volunteer
program” for the purpose of 1) establishing a
mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany
trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he
was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project
area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic
of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in
Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar
to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an
emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a spe-
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
cial class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard
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are the5 following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe:
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to
the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during
their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from
the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition
that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently
and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after
legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that
precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to
be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member
of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and
that he has always
________________
5 44 SCRA 37 [1972].
700
699
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
699
People vs. Jalosjos
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is
allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
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No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like
any other member of the House of Representatives “[h]e is
provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-
214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full
complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an]
inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents.”
Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also
appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who
is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-
appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these
acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down
to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor
6
shall any person
be denied the equal protection of laws.” This simply means
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in
_______________
6 Art. III, Sec. 1.
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
7
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes
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the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as
all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of
the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending
on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the
law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are 8
made
in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of gov-
_______________
7 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
8 Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
702
701
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos
701
eminent authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may9 plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
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germane to the purposes of10the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal
liberty; coercion exercised upon a person
11
to prevent the free
exercise of his power of locomotion.
More explicitly, “imprisonment” in its general sense, is
the restraint of one’s liberty. As a punishment, it is
restraint by judgment of12a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint
on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of 13
his free action
according to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is
the detention of another14 against his will depriving him of
his power of locomotion and it “[is] something more than
mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint
15
within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier.”
________________
9 See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.
10 See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980];
Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat,
68 Phil. 12.
11 Black’s Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
12 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway
Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140 F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F.
1014, 1016 at p. 470.
13 Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.
14 Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.
15 Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
16
nature, changes an individual’s status in society. Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of
preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as
well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands17 require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against
the accused-appellant’s claim that re-election to public
office gives priority to any other right or interest, including
the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
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          Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), And also in the separate opinion
of Hon. Justice Reyes.
     Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., We concur with the main
and separate opinion.
     Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate
opinion.
          Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the
separate opinion.
          Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the
separate opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
     Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.
_________________
16 Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and
Prisoners’ Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
17 Ibid.
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos
CONCURRING OPINION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
703 For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-
appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the
trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of
703 acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending
appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of
Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his
constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his
incarceration pending appeal of the judgment of conviction
and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his
legislative functions, including attendance of legislative
sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-
appellant’s motion is bereft of any legal merit.
The Bill of Rights provides—
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
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not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of1 habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics
supplied)
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.—
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
_______________
1 1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of statutory rape, which 2 is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. In People v. Divina we held that the trial court’s
judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of
the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued
incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and
constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to
provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting
immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal
justification for accused-appellant’s motion. The
Constitution states that—
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any 3 speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant
to attend legislative sessions would constitute an
unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest
bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress.
Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the
general principles of official immunity support an expanded
interpretation of such privilege.
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4
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution
limited the privilege from arrests to “all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace.” This provision
was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
which was in turn based upon the American Constitution.
In accordance with
________________
2 221 SCRA 209 (1993).
3 Art. VI, sec. 11.
4 Art. VI, sec. 15.—The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
706
705 706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos
705
American precedents, the words “treason, felony and
breach of the peace” 5
have been construed to include all
indictable offenses. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the
freedom from arrest6 only encompassed civil arrests.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege
was broadened to include arrests for crimes punishable by
imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of
the privilege, the rationale for granting members of
Congress immunity from arrest remained the same—to
ensure that they are not prevented from performing their
7
legislative duties. In fact, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members to
expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include
searches because, unlike arrests, it was not demonstrated
that the conduct of searches would prevent members 8
of
Congress from discharging their legislative functions.
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is
a necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective
performance of official functions. Members of Congress, in
particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion
and judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of
the people, would certainly be impeded in the exercise of
their legislative functions if every dissatisfied person could
compel them to vindicate the
________________
5 Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425.
4
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6 Art. VIII, sec. 9—A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and in going
to and returning from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall ________________
surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-
four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, 9 Mechem, F. R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A member (1890), 431.
shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or 10 Supra.
debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.
708
7 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.
8 Ibid., 178-185.
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
707
People vs. Jalosjos

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 707

People vs. Jalosjos
wisdom of their enactments in an action 9for damages or
question their official acts before the courts.
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from
the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the
widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the
privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or
the gravity of the offense of which the accused is charged.
Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes
punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital
punishment, does not fall within the scope of the
constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only
invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor
offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As
10
enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, “when it comes to
freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same.”
The accused-appellant, having been convicted of
statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the
privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from
the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a
liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual
circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege
from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that
stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction
is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his
arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of
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Accused-appellant’s contention that his re-election
constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered
inutile by even the police 11
power of the State is 12hollow. In
Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 13
Aguinaldo v. Santos and in
Salalima v. Guingona we laid down the doctrine that a
public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-
elected
14
official may have committed during his previous
term. The administrative liability of a public officer is
separate and distinct from his penal liability.
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself provides
for the immunities from the general application of our
criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of
such immunities must similarly be based upon an express
constitutional grant.
I vote to deny the motion.
Motion denied.
Note.—View that rank may have its privileges but
certainly a blatant disregard of law and administrative
rules is not one of them. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268
SCRA 332 [1997])
——o0o——
________________
11 Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.
12 212 SCRA 768 (1992).
13 257 SCRA 55 (1996).
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14 Salalima v. Guingona, id.

709

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