Renewable Energy Focus
Volume 24
March 2018 www.renewableenergyfocus.

com

RESEARCH REVIEW
PV based distributed generation power
system protection: A review
Hermanus L.R. van der Walt, Ramesh C. Bansal* and Raj Naidoo

Department of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, University of Pretoria, South Africa

This review paper is focused on common protection challenges related to the integration of distributed
generation (DG) into medium voltage (MV) distribution power systems. Protection challenges, as
indicated by the general scientific community, are explained and discussed. Based on these challenges,
several alternative centralized and decentralized protection alternatives are explained and critically
evaluated. Photovoltaic (PV) based distributed generators are connected to the utility grid through
inverters, which are able to control active and reactive parts of their output and also limit their fault
current contribution. Research is proposed to quantify the risks to protection in conventional power
systems with increasing presence of distributed generation. Since the positive, negative and zero
sequence current output from PV inverters can be controlled, conventional overcurrent protection using
negative and zero sequence current is proposed to increase the protection reliability and maintain
coordination in the presence of distributed generators.

Introduction Conventional power systems take on a radial topology on

In recent years, the world has seen a significant growth in energy
requirements. To meet this requirement, and driven by environ-
mental issues with conventional power plants, engineers and
consumers have started a growing trend in the formation of
distributed renewable power plants. Examples of such plants are
photovoltaic (PV) power plants and wind turbine power plants [1–
4]. The rising cost of electricity has increased the demand for
renewable alternatives, which has in turn decreased the invest-
ment cost of renewable alternative energy [5,6]. The high scalabil-
ity which renewable alternatives offer, makes it an attractive
option for small to medium power consumers looking to increase
their security of supply and reduce their electrical reliance upon
electricity utilities [7]. The integration of distributed generation or
distributed generators (DG) in power system networks pose some
concerning challenges for power system protection and control
engineers [8–10]. The challenges, such as rising fault levels and bi-
directional power flow, need to be addressed for continuous
growth in distributed energy resources.
*Corresponding author. van der Walt, Hermanus L.R. (reynekesda@gmail.com), Bansal, R.
C. (rcbansal@ieee.org), Naidoo, R. (raj.naidoo@up.ac.za)
distribution level, in which a single source is used to feed several
loads [11–14]. Due to the typically slow dynamics of the overall
load on a distribution station, voltage control is done locally by
using reactive compensators and voltage regulators [15]. With the
fast dynamics introduced by inverter based PV plants, the slow
dynamics of conventional networks are being challenged. Several
challenges are introduced by the addition of DG such as voltage
control, power quality, reactive power contribution and power
system stability, many of which the general scientific community
are trying to address by using appropriate control techniques
[16–25].
Conventional distribution systems are characterized by fault
levels which are significantly higher than load current. This makes
fault detection using overcurrent relays possible. Conventional
distribution level feeder protection is based on time grading of
simple overcurrent relays. Breakers in a given current path from
the source to the load are coordinated in such a way, that the
closest upstream breaker seen from a fault will operate first; dis-
connecting the smallest possible section of a line upon clearance of
a fault. Coordination is maintained by using time grading between

1755-0084/ã 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ref.2017.12.002

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 RESEARCH REVIEW
breakers in a given path to a load [26]. Current research trends all
indicate that this type of conventional protection is being threat-
ened by the addition of DG [27–29], especially taking into account
the effect of changing fault levels on switchgear and other power
system equipment [30]. Adding DGs into a conventional single
source distribution network will result in bi-directional power flow
not only during normal operation but also during faults. It will also
cause dynamic and stochastic fault levels. Overcurrent protection
is typically based on fault levels and grading between breakers is
done assuming a uniformly decreasing fault level as the fault
RESEARCH REVIEW
moves further away from the substation. The addition of DGs
into distribution networks requires a re-evaluation of these con-
ventional protection methods. Current research trends are aimed
toward proposing new protection solutions to highly penetrated
DG power systems, since conventional timed overcurrent protec-
tion can potentially become unreliable and unable to protect the
power system.
Protection risks
With the addition of several generators within a distribution
network, new protection requirements arise for PV plant integra-
tion, especially with high penetration levels. Distributed genera-
tors are characterized by high scalability and typical sizes range
from 1 kW to 1 MW of which typical examples are inverter fed PV
systems, variable speed permanent magnet wind generators, dou-
bly fed asynchronous generators or variable rotor resistance induc-
tion generators. Inverter type generators are characterized by fault
currents typically less than 2 times the rated current [31]. Since
these generators do not have the capacity to supply vast amounts
of fault current during short circuit fault conditions, it is not
always possible to pick-up faults by only conventional detection
of overcurrent. Inverters would typically employ voltage and
frequency protection to detect faults [32,33]. The existing grid
codes such as the IEEE Standard for Interconnecting Distributed
Resources [34], the German directive for connecting generating
plants to the medium-voltage power grid [35] and the Grid con-
nection code for renewable power plants (RPPS) connected to the
electricity transmission system (TS) or the distribution system (DS)
in South Africa [36] along with interconnection studies [37,38]
provides grid connection guidelines such as that generators should
disconnect from the grid if voltage at the point of connection falls
below 85% within 2 s, and within 0.2 s if the voltage drops below
50%. During this fault time, before disconnection, or when the
voltage does not sag enough to disconnect, the generators will
however still provide fault current into the network. If the PV
penetration levels are high enough, this additional fault current
could cause loss of coordination and false tripping. These condi-
tions are described below.
Sympathetic tripping
The addition of generators within a distribution network is con-
sidered a problem, since it will cause higher fault levels and
sympathetic tripping due to power flow and fault current now
becoming bi-directional [39–41]. Sympathetic tripping is a condi-
tion which could occur when a protection breaker trips for faults in
adjacent feeders [42,43]. Consider fault F1 in Figure 1.
If the distance between PV3 and fault F1 is small with low fault
impedance, breaker B3a might operate sympathetically due to the
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Renewable Energy Focus
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March 2018
FIGURE 1
Distributed generation distribution network.
undervoltage condition which will arise at PV3 due to the fault F1.
The operating time of breaker B11 will depend on its tripping
characteristic curve, the fault level of the distribution grid and
the distance between the substation and the fault. If the under-
voltage condition created at PV3 is lower than the prescribed low
voltage ride through capability and breaker B11 does not clear the
fault faster than the set undervoltage trip condition for DGs, breaker
B3a will trip, effectively disconnecting PV3 from the grid without
any requirement to do so to clear the fault. Effective tripping of B11
would clear the fault without the need for PV3 to be disconnected.
Depending on the fault level contribution of a DG such as PV3,
and also depending on the strength of the grid in terms of fault
levels, other examples could also arise. Due to conventional time
and sensitivity coordination in distribution systems, B21 would be
set to trip faster than B2, which would be set to trip faster than B11.
B12 and B11 would have the same pick-up and time multiplier
settings since they both grade with B1. For a fault F2 on the system,
because of the grading, if PV1 contributes sufficient fault current, it
could cause B21 to trip before B12 trips to clear the fault. Having
B21 trip would not isolate the fault, but would only result in loss of
supply to loads downstream of B21 and it would also result in loss
of potential income for PV1. The fault ride through capabilities
required by grid codes only applies to DG POC (Point of Connec-
tion) breakers. The fault ride through capabilities of PV1 would
therefore not have any effect on blocking the protection of B21.
Sympathetic tripping is only applicable when significant fault
current contribution from the DG is present. It is thus dependent
on DG size, DG fault current capabilities, levels of penetration and
grid fault levels.
Protection blinding
Protection blinding is a situation that arise when a DG provides
enough voltage support during a fault and causes the fault current
contribution from the grid to reduce below levels where a
Renewable Energy Focus
Volume 24
March 2018
FIGURE 2
DG protection blinding.
protection relay will pick-up the overcurrent condition [41,44–46].
The condition is illustrated with fault F1 in Figure 2.
Without any contribution from PV1, the fault current in the
cable due to fault F1 would be entirely contributed by the grid and
the entire fault current would be seen by breaker B11. Since the
fault current would be more than the pick-up setting for breaker
B11, it would trip and isolate the fault. With the addition of PV1, it
is possible that during a fault, PV1 can provide enough voltage
support so that the fault current contribution from the grid
through B11 might be below the current pick-up level of breaker
B11. Even if the current is above the pick-up level of breaker B11,
the reduced fault contribution from the grid will result in delayed
tripping times of B11. Since the protection settings are quite often
chosen to be just below the maximum current ratings of the cables,
delayed tripping times could cause damage to the cables. The
addition of DG has thus completely or partially blinded breaker
B11 from seeing fault F1. Protection blinding, as with sympathetic
tripping, is highly dependent on grid fault levels, DG size and the
technology of DG being used [45].
FIGURE 3
(a) Recloser fuse coordination curves [47], (b) DG with recloser and fuses.
RESEARCH REVIEW
Loss of coordination
Another case where DG influences distribution level protection
severely is with the coordination between auto-reclosers and fuses.
Reclosers are frequently used to clear transient faults, while fuses are
used to clear permanent faults. This is typically used on medium
voltage overhead lines where transient faults due to falling
branches or lightning occurs frequently. Reclosers are set with
two tripping curves; a fast and a slow curve as illustrated in
Figure 3a [47]. The fast curve is set just slower than what would
be required for cold load pick-up [47]. During fault F1 in Figure 3b,
RESEARCH REVIEW
the recloser will trip on the fast curve to allow any transient fault to
clear. After a dead time delay, usually around 1–3 s, the recloser will
close again. Due to the fault being upstream of any fuse, no fuse will
see any fault current and will not blow. If the fault is a permanent
fault, the recloser will trip on the slow curve to isolate the line. If the
fault was downstream of the fuse as with fault F2, the fuse will blow
to clear the fault after reclosing. This will isolate the fault and the
recloser will not trip on the slow curve, enabling safe power delivery
to the rest of the line. With the addition of PV1 between the recloser
and the fuse, during the same fault F2, the fuse will see more fault
current due to the additional fault current contributed by PV1. The
current seen by the recloser will be I (fault-grid) and the current seen
by the fuse will be I (fault-total) as shown in Figure 3a. This will
cause, even for a transient fault, the fuse to blow before the fast curve
of the recloser could clear the fault and coordination between the
recloser and the fuse is lost [48,49].
Suppose the recloser is able to trip before the fuse blows, the
current supplied by PV1 could feed the fault and prevent it from
clearing during the off stage of the recloser [50]. Many of the faults
on MV overhead lines are transient faults and the addition of PV1
could eliminate the ability to clear these faults. Additional pro-
blems will also be introduced by PV1 during the auto-reclose stage
of the recloser. If PV1 is still generating during the off state of the
recloser, there could be a difference in phase angle between the
grid voltage and the voltage from PV1 [51]. The recloser will
require a method for synchronizing before reclosing. Keeping
PV1 connected while the recloser is open will result in the line
being ungrounded since the DG is not grounded on the grid side as
this cause problems with earth-fault protection.
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Protection alternatives
DG disconnection
As explained above, DG introduces several protection challenges
in distribution systems. Due to the ease of scalability, DGs are
commonly connected to the low or medium voltage networks
close to loads where overcurrent and earth-fault protection is used.
With the fast response times which are available with inverter
based generators, it is possible to disconnect all DGs upon detec-
tion of a fault within a few cycles. These faults can be detected with
undervoltage and overcurrent protection schemes. This would
RESEARCH REVIEW
enable conventional protection to detect overcurrent faults and
operate as if no DGs are installed in the network [52]. Fault current
would flow as conventional in one direction from the substation to
the loads and to the fault. The instantaneous disconnection of DGs
would however cause a power swing at the substation. With low
levels of penetration, the power swing will be small and no
significant influence will be seen in the power system. If penetra-
tion levels are high, the power swing will be large and could cause
voltage dips and flickering throughout the distribution network.
The sudden loss of generation could cause power system instability
and could potentially lead to a collapse of the distribution net-
work. With high levels of penetration, overloading of feeders
could occur if all DGs are suddenly lost [35]. Disconnection of
all DGs in the event of a fault is discriminative toward a multi-
source/multi-owned power system and could also lead to a system
collapse.
Differential protection
Differential protection is widely suggested as the preferred method
of protecting distributed generation networks [53–58]. Differential
protection is generally used on transmission lines, substation
busbars and large power transformers with great success. Since
no grading with other relays are required, differential protection is
much faster, which is preferred for expensive equipment. It does
however come at a cost and is more expensive than overcurrent
protection. Differential protection requires communication
between all relays connected to the unit which is being protected
[53]. Since the biggest concern in DG protection is the varying
fault currents, an ideal protection scheme would be one that is
disconnected from this parameter. Several suggestions have been
made to use differential protection in DG protection since it does
not use fault levels for protection calculations [54,55]. Due to the
typical structure of distribution networks with relatively short
cables (typically less than 10 km) time synchronized measure-
ments of the current vectors are not required, because the signal
transmission time delay is insignificant over such small distances
[56]. Differential protection requires communication between all
relays connected to a common node/bus/line which would be
expensive to implement in a conventional distribution system
[57]. It also requires digital relay on all points of generation or
loads connected to a node/bus/line to summate all of the currents
to zero. In the event of relay failure, comparative voltage protec-
tion is suggested as a back-up. Comparative voltage protection
measures and compares the rms voltage at each relay. For a voltage
sag less than 70%, the relay with the lowest voltage will trip [56].
Both of these schemes require a communications link and a
communication failure event will leave both the main and
back-up schemes unable to protect the system.
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March 2018
Suggestions have also been made to consider each feeder with all
of its sources and loads as a single differential zone and use
decentralized differential protection [59,60]. Since the zone would
be relatively big, it would be difficult to determine where in the
zone a fault has occurred and this would add on the time required
to locate and rectify a fault. To resolve this, researchers [59]
suggested that each zone, along with all of its loads and sources
be simulated for each type of fault at different locations. After a
fault has occurred, the measurements form the relays can be
compared to the simulation results to identify the fault location.
It would require prior knowledge of all of the loads and generators
within a network. DGs such as PV or wind turbines have dynamic
outputs, depending on weather conditions, time of day and time
of year. It would not be possible to determine the network con-
ditions for simulations. The dynamic nature of loads and munici-
pal expansions would also make this task challenging.
Distribution feeders are usually not dedicated to a single load
and might feed to several mini-substations where MV to low
voltage (LV) transformers are located. A differential scheme would
require a differential relay located at each end of any line section.
This means that where a distribution feeder with N loads con-
nected to it would have conventionally had 1 digital protection
device, it would now require 2 N digital differential relays for line
differential and N + 1 relays for differential zone protection. Many
mini-substations are protected with mechanical relays and do not
have breakers with trip coils. Using differential protection would
require replacing of all of the mini-substation breakers. To be able
to use comparative voltage protection as a back-up, each relay will
require VTs to be installed. In microgrids where security of supply
is a key factor and investment cost is driven by a private sector,
differential protection might be a viable solution, but it is not
likely to be an attractive solution for a DG distribution grid.
Real time settings update
The research discussed in Section ‘‘Protection risks’’ indicates that
varying fault levels is one of the biggest challenges DG power
system protection has to deal with. If the fault levels in a network
are known at any given time, overcurrent settings can be updated
to compensate for the change in fault levels. It is also suggested
that the relays being used have directional functionality [61,62].
Renewable energy sources are highly dependent on weather con-
ditions which make their power output availability at any time
dynamic. Research suggests that if the available power and result-
ing fault conditions of a network is known for any given moment,
it would be possible to update relay overcurrent setting to com-
pensate or the additional fault current [63]. A possible solution
would be to calculate the fault levels offline for all possible network
topologies and stored in a database [64]. Based on the current
network topology, the settings on all relays can be updated using a
wireless or fiber communications network to all of the protection
devices on the network [65,66]. During operation, the actual
network values are compared to the updated settings to determine
the operating time for each breaker to maintain coordination with
other breakers [58,67,68]. This would require prior knowledge of
all possible network topologies. Due to the fast growing trend in
DG it is highly unlikely that all possible scenarios can be catered
for. The available power from each DG will need to be communi-
cated to the decision making point. Reclosers are often used on MV
Renewable Energy Focus
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March 2018 RESEARCH REVIEW

overhead lines and coordinated with fuses on laterals. These fuses
are not intelligent devices and would need to be replaced by
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Fuses are used to protect
single MV–LV transformers sized around 50–315 kVA. Replacing
fuses with IEDs could double the installation cost. Installing IEDs
at each of these locations cannot be justified by the income
generated by the electricity sold to the customers who are supplied
by these transformers. This method will require a communications
network in the MV grid along with replacement of all protection
equipment. The real time network topology information will
has a single point of failure. Communications failure or central
control unit failure will result in complete loss of protection.
PV inverters
PV sources are by nature DC sources. In order to connect them to the
AC grid, the DC voltage is converted to AC voltage by means of
power electronic inverters. Unlike turbine generators, there are no
large rotating parts with stored inertia. Turbine generators are able
to source large amounts of fault current during fault conditions
because of the energy stored in their rotating parts. PV inverters on

RESEARCH REVIEW
prove inaccurate when DGs are installed on a LV line in conjunc- the other hand, do not have this capacity [70]. Impact studies have
tion with fluctuating loads. been done on several PV inverters from different manufacturers to
determine the level of current contribution from these inverters
during system faults [71–73]. During these studies, several faults
Phase jump comparison
were simulated and the short circuit currents recorded. The results
The ideal protection scheme for highly penetrated DG networks
indicated that most PV inverters provided sub-transient fault cur-
need to be disconnected from fault levels. Recommendations have
rents from 100% to 210% of the rated current during the first cycle
been made to replace coordinated timed overcurrent protection
of the fault [74]. The sub-transient current reduced to the steady
with relays that use current phase jump comparison to detect
state fault current of around 120% nominal within less than 5 cycles
faults. Based on current system loading and frequency, it is possi-
[71–73]. With such low fault currents, overcurrent protection will
ble to predict the instantaneous value of a future current sample.
not be a viable option for protection. Current supervised under-
When faults occur, the impedance seen from the relay change to
voltage protection, frequency protection, differential protection
include the new fault impedance. Due to the change in imped-
and voltage unbalance monitoring is typically used to detect faults
ance, the magnitude and phase angle of the current vector will
in systems where only PV sources are present [68,75–78].
experience sudden changes. At each end on a line, an IED will
As mentioned in Section ‘‘Protection alternatives’’, it is undesir-
compare the magnitude and direction of a current sample to a
able to disconnect DGs for any faulted event on the surrounding
predicted value. If an abrupt change in the current direction is
power system. Present grid codes [34–37,79] require DGs to dis-
detected at any one of the nodes, the relay will trip and send a
connect for severe surrounding faults. When faults on the network
permissive trip signal to the relay on the other end of the line to
occur, to ensure safe operation, the faulted part of the network
isolate the line from both sides [39]. This scheme is a modified
where the maintenance personnel will work should not have any
differential scheme which is aimed at reducing the communica-
risk of being energized by DGs. For this reason, DGs are also
tion requirements of conventional differential schemes. It has the
required to stay disconnected from the grid if islanding occurs.
same drawbacks as differential protection and will also require two
This means disconnecting from the grid if the substation feeder, or
IEDs at each spur on a line which is currently not available.
any other breaker connecting the DG to the grid, trips. The
statement of severe surrounding faults needs to be quantified
Central protection unit and is done by the following requirements as listed in the South
As explained in Section ‘‘Protection risks’’, conventional time African Grid Code Requirements for Renewable Power Plants [36].
graded overcurrent coordination is not possible if DGs are inte- DGs with a nominal rating of less than 100 kVA should stay
grated into the network. If however, the system topology is known connected to the grid according to the frequency requirements
at any given time, it would be possible to determine coordinated shown in Figure 4 [36]. In addition to this, requirements for DGs to
tripping time for all relays in the network. In Section ‘‘Real time stay connected to the grid during voltage deviations are indicated
settings update’’ proposals were discussed which suggested calcu- in Table 1 [36]. Control requirements for active power curtailment
lation of relay tripping times based on the network topology and during over frequency conditions and reactive power support
known fault levels of all DGs. A similar approach would be to
measure the system quantities at any given time. If several mea-
surement devices are placed at all of the breaker points on a
network, real time data can be collected and transmitted to a
central location such as the distribution substation. When a fault
occurs, a central control unit can then calculate the faulted loca-
tion based on comparative measurements throughout the network
and trip the appropriate breakers to isolate the fault [69]. With the
direction of current flow at each node known, it is easy to deter-
mine which section is accepting overcurrent form all directions.
Sending this information to a central point will make comparison
between current direction and sizes simple. Measurement devices,
remote tripping capability and communications will be required at
each spur on a distribution feeder. With the protection of the FIGURE 4
whole system becoming centralized to a single device, this system Minimum frequency operating range for DG [36].

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 RESEARCH REVIEW
TABLE 1
Maximum disconnection times for DG less than 100 kW [36].
Voltage range (at POC) Trip time (s)
V < 50% 0.2
50%  V < 85% 2 components such as power transformers, earthing devices, cables
85%  V < 110% Continious operation
110%  V < 120% 2 ity and protection devices. Simulation measurements should
120%  V 0.16
RESEARCH REVIEW
during voltage sags are also given by the grid codes to support
power system stability [36].
Most common PV based DG plants and micro wind turbines
used for power plants less than 100 kW generate power at LV
levels. Power is either fed back into the grid through the utility
MV–LV transformer or through a dedicated transformer for larger
power plants [62]. In South-Africa, as in many other distribution
systems, a single earth point is required on the distribution net-
work to enable earth-fault protection to pick-up earth-faults. By
using a neutral earthing system, the fault current during asym-
metrical earth-faults is limited and cable insulation is protected
[80]. By creating a single earth point at the substation, all zero
sequence current will flow between the substation and the fault
location. If mini-substation transformers or DG feed-in transfor-
mers are earthed, zero sequence current will be distributed to all of
the possible earth paths and make earth-fault detection difficult
[81]. For this reason, during phase to ground faults, no zero
sequence current should be supplied by DGs to enable conven-
tional earth-fault protection to remain stable.
As mentioned above, grid codes also provide strict requirements
for low voltage reactive power support and active power curtail-
ment. Along with this, it also states that all renewable power plants
with a nominal rating above 4.6 kVA should deliver balance three
phase power. Power quality is to be assessed at the POC terminals
with regards to unbalanced currents and voltages. Modern control
techniques have been recommended and simulation models built
of various inverters to model and prove the normal and fault
current contributions from grid-tied inverters. Control techniques
have been developed to limit the negative sequence current con-
tributed during asymmetrical fault conditions, for symmetrical
and asymmetrical faults [82], [83]. This type of output control is
not possible with conventional rotating generators. PV inverters
can thus be characterized as only positive sequence sources and
will not facilitate zero or negative sequence current during asym-
metrical faults.
Future research opportunities
The challenges listed in Section ‘‘Protection risks’’ are mostly
aimed at generic distributed energy resources, which include wind
turbines with rotating machines. Many of the available research do
not take into account the low levels of fault current contributed by
inverter based DGs such as PV generators. For insignificant fault
contributions, conventional overcurrent and earth-fault protec-
tion will still be able to protect a DG power system as long as a
connection to the grid is always present and islanding is not
allowed [84]. The only method of validating and quantifying
the risks listed in Section ‘‘Protection risks’’ is through power
system simulations with software such as DIgSILENT
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March 2018
PowerFactory, PSCAD or similar software. The simulations should
take all of the system parameters into account. The parameters
such as the external grid (with its characteristics), distributed
energy resources (with its unique characteristics), power system
and overhead lines, distributed loads, power system loading capac-
include analysis through sequence components as this is a key
factor of power system fault studies [85].
When doing fault calculations using sequence components,
some basic assumptions are made to simplify calculations. All
generated voltages are assumed equal in magnitude and in phase
and no loading is considered between sources. All shunt reactance
such as load and magnetizing reactance is also neglected [86–88].
This method has proven reliable for fault calculations for many
years. If the fault current contributions from DGs are in the same
order as load current, it might well also be ignored.
For coordination between reclosers and fuses as described in
Section ‘‘Protection risks’’ the same argument might hold valid. It
needs however to be validated by power system simulations. If the
additional fault current contributed by DGs as seen by the fuse is
not significantly greater than the fault current seen by the recloser,
coordination will still hold between the fast recloser curve and the
fuse.
Most modern overcurrent relays currently being used for over-
current protection already have negative sequence overcurrent
protection available [89,90]. Using negative sequence overcurrent
protection would be a simple and inexpensive, yet effective
method of protecting DG power systems. Symmetrical three phase
faults will unfortunately not be protected by using this method.
For distribution systems where DG penetration levels are increas-
ing and upgrading of all protection equipment at once is not a
possible option, this method could increase the reliability and
security of the grid. By examining these challenges with power
system simulations, it can be established whether the addition of
DG causes a complete loss of protection, or whether it only delays
and discoordinates conventional protection. This information will
play a critical role in protection re-evaluation.
Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the protection challenges related to the
introduction of DG into MV distribution power systems. The loss
of coordination between conventional overcurrent relays is the
most commonly affected area. Reclosers are frequently used to
clear transient faults, while fuses are used to clear permanent
faults. Loss of coordination between reclosers and fuses are due to
additional fault current being injected into the power system
during faults. Various methods of alternative protection methods
have been suggested which were discussed and critically evalu-
ated. A common problem in all methods are the requirement for
communication networks, cost of implementation and the
inability to protect the power system when communication
between relays are lost.
PV sources are by nature DC sources. In order to connect them to
the AC grid, the DC voltage is converted to AC voltage by means of
power electronic inverters. Impact studies have been done on
several PV inverters from different manufacturers. The results
indicated that most PV inverters provided fault currents from
Renewable Energy Focus
Volume 24
March 2018
100% to 210% of the rated current. Since the most common small
scale renewable energy sources are inverted based, the effect of
additional fault current might not pose such a serious problem as
inverters are incapable of providing large fault currents. Due to
single point earthing systems on distribution grids, combined with
active current control of inverters, inverters can limit fault current
to only positive sequence current. It is thus proposed that power
system load flow and fault studies be carried out to quantify the
severity which DG will have on conventional distribution system
protection. It is also proposed that negative and zero sequence
overcurrent protection be used as an alternative to increase the
protection reliability in conventional distributions systems in the
presence of DG.
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