PEOPLE VS.

MARIANO
G.R. NO. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, JUNE 30, 1976

FACTS: 
Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of
misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being
the person in authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan.
Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction.
He claimed that the items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military
commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty,
hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.

The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: 
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.

RULING:
YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos” Section 44,
paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged against
respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6)
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa
case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor
Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct
offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the
other.
“Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense
and impose the punishment for it. 
DAVID v. MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 209859 June 5, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila
and that sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and
represented that she could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner
demanded payment of placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the
processing of the latter's application, to which the respondent heeded. Respondent's
application was, however, denied and worse, the money that she put out therefore was never
returned. In her Counter-Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was
physically impossible for her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the
alleged time of recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further
averred that she was never engaged in the recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the
amount deposited in her account was not for her but was just coursed through her to be given
to her friend in Canada who was the one processing respondent's application, as evidenced by
a certification to that effect issued by the said friend. Further, petitioner argued before the
Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations of recruitment were true, the case
should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa.

2. Whether or not the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA.

HELD:

1. Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. The
express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising
from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction
was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within
the jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even
presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were committed within
Manila, such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were
deposited in certain banks located in Manila.

2. Yes. The respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Court has ruled that a private offended party can file a special civil action for certiorari
questioning ttie trial court's order acquitting the accused or dismissing the case, viz: In such
special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is alleged
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he/she may file
such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant.
PEOPLE v. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, GR NO. 168641, 2007-04-27

Facts:

On June 12,... 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida
Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other. On August
16, 1999,... private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint
for slight physical injuries against... respondent and his co-accused. The Information was,
however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20,
2000.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the
Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the
crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had...
not yet prescribed. Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but
the RTC denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC. Respondent then
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed,
the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with
the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had
prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC. Yet, the information was filed
with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To
use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
"unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much
more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore,
already prescribed when filed with the court on Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking
the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision.

Issues:

whether the... prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by
the City Prosecutor.

Ruling:

It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the
running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical
injuries.

The answer is in the negative. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus: Art. 91.
Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or... information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation for the filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription
began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of... the
complaint with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of... the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.

The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such
mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended
party. The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the
petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of
preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the City
Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the
information.

The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of
the information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right
of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the... mere
expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, GR No. 102342, 1992-07-03

Facts:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.

The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime
had prescribed, but the motion was denied. The petitioner first argues that the charge against
her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the
civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a
prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:

Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal
by... the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and... punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Issues:

The applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

Ruling:

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in... the
last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that
rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"... the instant
case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,
[8] and is thus covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure.

under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until its too late. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the
crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and
ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.

It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done... only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim (G.R. No. 168662)

Facts:

Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, is the copyright owner of various animated
characters sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated, which allowed local
entities to manufacture petitioner’s products. A search warrant was issued against respondent
Lim alleged to be selling imitations of petitioner’s products. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
complaint for copyright infringement with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy
(TAPP) of the DOJ. Respondent asserted that he obtained his merchandise from petitioner’s
authorized manufacturers. The complaint was dismissed. CA affirmed and further held that the
offense had already prescribed.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed.

(2) Whether or not there is copyright infringement.

Ruling:

(1) NO. Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws
starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused). Petitioner in this instance filed its
complaint-affidavit 1 year, 10 months and 4 days after the NBI searched respondent’s premises
and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in
court, respondent’s alleged violation had not yet prescribed. In the recent case of Brillantes v.
Court of Appeals, we affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. Thus, the
prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by
petitioner’s timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.

(2) NO. To be criminally liable for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites
must be present: possession of the infringing copy and knowledge or suspicion that the copy is
an infringement of the genuine article.

The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against
respondent for violation of the IPC. The TAPP found that: Evidence on record would show that
respondent bought his merchandise from legitimate sources. While it appears that some of the
items seized during the search are not among those products which [GGI] authorized these
establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent bought these from the abovecited
legitimate sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing that respondent relied on the
representations of these manufacturers and distributors that the items they sold were genuine.
As such, it is not incumbent upon respondent to verify from these sources what items [GGI]
only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, the items in his
possession are not infringing copies of the original [petitioner’s] products.

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI.

Facts:

Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business associate,
Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in
payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored.
Petitioner, Panaguiton, made demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against
Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office.

During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.
Tongson alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not
associates. Panaguiton showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his
complaint against Tongson. In a resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense
had already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the Department of Justice thru
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But on motion for reconsideration,
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez declared that the offense had not prescribed. On
motion for reconsideration, this time by Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had
already prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense has prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of special acts
and that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings
are instituted.

Held:

SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law,
“institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

The court ruled and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a
definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no
longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
SECURITIES v. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, GR No. 135808, 2008-10-06

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036,
enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from taking cognizance of or
initiating any action against the respondent corporation Interport Resources Corporation (IRC)
and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio
Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with
respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. In the same Decision of the
appellate court, all the proceedings taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC
Omnibus Orders of 25 January 1995... and 30 March 1995, were declared void.

On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with
Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or
the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would... own and operate
a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement also stipulates that
GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. At
that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go... on-line by mid-
September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of
IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.

IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the agreement
was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but
that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC
sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994. The SEC averred that it received
reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that
some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material
insider information. On 16 August 1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to
submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC
Chairman further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers
and Exchanges Department (BED) of the SEC to explain

IRC's failure to immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of
Material Facts. In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16
August 1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its
directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the SEC on
22 August 1994 to... explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material information
as required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.

On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules
on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it
failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC
pronounced... that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving
IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded by an
Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to
investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents also claimed that the SEC violated
their right to due process when it ordered that the respondents appear... before the SEC and
"show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them,"
and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their
cases tried jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding... the alleged violation
committed by the respondents.

Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994, wherein
they moved for discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before the SEC until
the undue publicity had abated and the investigating officials had become reasonably free
from... prejudice and public pressure.

No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions, but on 25
January 1995, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the Commission resolves and hereby
rules: To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in accordance
with the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department
(PED), Securities and Exchange Commission, to be composed of Attys. James K. Abugan,
Medardo Devera (Prosecution and Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and
Exchanges Department), which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the case by
conducting continuous hearings, if possible.

To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the respondents to appear
and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.

To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit. The SEC filed a Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the case may be investigated by the PED in accordance
with the SEC Rules and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose
creation the SEC had earlier ordered.

Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section
54 of the aforementioned law.

Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions
and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to
"make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has...
violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding that a person has
violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution.

Issues:

The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on 20 August 1998. It determined that there
were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents... allegedly violated. The Court
of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file
any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it
ruled that no civil, criminal or... administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the
respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal protection. It further
resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed
Omnibus Orders for the sole... purpose of re-filing the same case against the respondents.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY

AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY
CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS
DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN
TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES OF
PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS[25] ARE INVALID AS THEY
FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.

I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.

Ruling:

Respondents filed a Supplemental Motion dated 16 May 1995, wherein they prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating
and proceeding with the hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5 May 1995, the
Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which
effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against the
respondents herein. It is well... established that administrative authorities have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies,
provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the
statute as well as purport to... carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is
undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive
prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute contains...
sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation.

Principles:

As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the

National Labor Relations Commission and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency,
created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on the
basis of... position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence. In fact, the hearings before such agencies do not
connote full adversarial proceedings. Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants
to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require
otherwise would negate the summary nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings.

II. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act since said provisions were reenacted in the new law. The SEC retained the
jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the Securities
Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.

HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 169823-24, 2013-09-11

Facts:

Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code... and with a... violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
3019

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Criminal Case No. 28001

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring
together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos...
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of... ownership of 2.5 billion shares of stock in Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation and 4... billion) shares of stock in The Energy Corporation,
to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E.
Marcos on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project at Morong, Bataan in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct the Project constitute the crime of corruption of public
officials.

Criminal Case No. 28002

HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with Ferdinand E. Marcos, being
then the close personal friend and golfing partner being further the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and
family physician of the Marcos family, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Project, request and receive from Burns and Roe, the
total amount of $1,000,000.00 and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation total amount
of total amount of Seventeen $17,000,000.00... in consideration of accused DISINI securing
and obtaining the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do... the
engineering and architectural design, and construct the said PROJECT request and receive
subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI and Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form.
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. On January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated resolution denying the motion to quash. Disini moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution dated January 17, 2005, but the Sandiganbayan denied his motion on August
10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution.

Petitioner's argument

Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal
Case (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were
not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the
informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration
cases; (3) the cases were... filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and
(4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan. (OSG)
counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal
Case were filed within the purview of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases
stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate
under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases
to recover ill-gotten wealth.

Issues:

THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES CHARGED.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTION.

BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY ABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE

OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD THE 'SUFFICIENCY' OF THE INFORMATIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT DEMONSTRATED ITS
PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
QUASH THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
PRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM

Ruling:

Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
Sandiganbayan... was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over... all
cases involving:... a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials...
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:... x x x x... b. Other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27'
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional...
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.

xxxx

Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG... to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President
Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as
to their private or public status.

Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249...
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249,... x x x
x... a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the... following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director
and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office. (bold emphasis supplied)... x x x x... public officials occupying positions classified as
Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b, signifying...
limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance
of Criminal Case.

Disini's being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses
charged.

The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed. In resolving the issue of
prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time
when the prescriptive period is interrupted.

The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case.

Under the second paragraph of Article 210, Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code... period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials... charged against
Disini is 15 years.

As for Criminal Case... charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express
provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, shall
prescribe in 15 years. Prior... to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. In
People v. Pacificador... prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused.

1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the... applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years. For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No.
3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326 Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.

The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans v. Desierto. Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day
the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the...
prescriptive period.

An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of
the invasion of a right which will support a cause of... action. In other words, the courts would
decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." Accordingly, we are not
persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the
contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. The unlawful
acts or transactions in relation to it... were discovered only through the PCGG's exhaustive
investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to
institute Civil Case... against Disini.

Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character,... enjoyed the
presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions.
Considering... during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of
the transactions, it would be unreasonable... to expect that the discovery of the unlawful
transactions was possible prior to 1986. The criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the
preliminary investigation.

In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

According to Panaguiton, While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec.
2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become... the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive
when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any... kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable
by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in
the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary... investigation that
interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only
five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April
1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office... of the Ombudsman.

The informations were sufficient in form and substance... a complaint or information must
state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to
dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may
be properly sustained.

The fundamental test... in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on
this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law.

Extrinsic matters or evidence... aliunde are not considered. Test does not require absolute
certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be
any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

The informations in Criminal Case... have sufficiently complied with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of... the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When the offense is committed by
more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

The information in Criminal Case... alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth
that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986... conspiring and confederating with then
President Marcos. The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the
Revised Penal Code are: That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to
a public officer; and that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or
indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials,... stated that: (1) Disini
made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer;... and (2) in
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in
committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that... would
make him liable for direct bribery.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging
the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense
under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;

That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage
from any person having some business, transaction, application, request, or... contract with
the government;

That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.

The allegations in the information would establish that Disini, being the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time
the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free
access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and
close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and
$17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and
application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the
public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal... relations, intervened to secure
and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction of the PNPPP.

Decision

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions... by
the Sandiganbayan... and DIRECTS... petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

Principles:

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, GR No. 152662, 2012-06-13

Facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint

for estafa and violation of Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan... with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City... respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
(P9,658,592.00... in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment. On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. Five days
thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing
as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of
the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action. Aggrieved, private
complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice.

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22.
The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks however,
dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22... were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan... before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest". She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The presiding judge... granted the
motion in an Order.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal to RTC... presiding judge of
RTC reversed the Order of the MeTC... respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review... this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action. On 12 March 2002,
the CA reversed the Decision of RTC... thereby dismissing Criminal Case... for the reason that
the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

Ratiocinated that: Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part
of 1995,... it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private
[complainant] of... the fact of dishonor of the subject checks... five (5) days grace period granted
by law had elapsed... pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or
until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information... against the petitioner before
the proper court.

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes, the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are 'judicial proceedings', which means the filing of the
complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise... stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any
date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering
that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of
both ordinances and special laws

OSG sought relief to this Court

Petitioner's arguement

According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and
further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription
for violations of... special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the
court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged... the filing of the complaint-affidavit by

Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.

Respondent's arguement
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City
Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the
offense charged is a violation of a special law.

the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code
and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[15] Respondent
pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by

Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between
offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered
by the RPC.

Issues:

whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such... offense.

Ruling:

Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances... and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,"... is the law applicable
to BP Blg. 22 cases... the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)... xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year... it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance
with the aforecited law.

The running of the prescriptive... period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.

In the... case of People v. Olarte

Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,... interrupt the period of... prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court... cannot try the case on the merits.

This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et.
al... held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal's Office also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondent's contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws
is bereft of merit.

There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription.

The... ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws.

In... cases involving special laws

Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription.

In Securities and Exchange Commission... v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,... Court
even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the... prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice

Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused before the Office of the City

Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under BP Blg. 22.

the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of
the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22... being the period within which
herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of... dishonor of the checks...
affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997...
cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because... respondent filed a
civil case for accounting followed by a petition... for suspension of proceedings on the ground of
"prejudicial question"... suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question"

Clearly, it was respondent's own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings,... that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution
of the offender is to file... the requisite complaint.

Decision... instant petition is GRANTED.

Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg.

22 against the respondent.

Principles:

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year... therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with
the aforecited law.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription.

The... ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.

is not controlling in special laws.

commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the
City

Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period... it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The
only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file... the
requisite complaint.