ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715             August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.

ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

 Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.

Discussions:

1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test
and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is
not unconstitutional  per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power
to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of
powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

 Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of
the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the
Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” 33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization
of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

Garcillano vs. House of Representative

FACTS: VirgilioGarcillano filed a petition alleging that he is the person alluded in the
"Hello Garci" tapes. He was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. Thus, Garcillano claimed that he was
directly injured by the House Committee's actions and charged them of electoral fraud.
He prayed to the Court for the petition of prohibition. He filed for the restrain of the
House Representative Committees from using the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. Garcillano
requested that the said recordings should be stricken off the records of inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in
any of the proceedings.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution require publication of the internal rules of the House or
Senate?
RULING: According to Sect. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, "The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." Hence, the
respondent Committee could not, in violation of the constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry until the procedures are so published.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by
its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees. Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot
and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an
act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.
Non-publication of the Rules of Procedure governing legislative investigations is fatal.

Senate vs. Ermita

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29,
2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to
various officials of the AFP for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing
scheduled on September 28, 2005. The AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga
was also invited on that scheduled hearing but requested for its postponement "due to a
pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some
of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
Likewise, Senate President Drilon received letters from Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requesting for the
postponement or cancellation of the said scheduled hearing.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section
6 thereof, took effect immediately.

During the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a
letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and
Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of
National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that
no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the
public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on]
28 September 2005."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga,
the investigation pushed through. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, who were among the officials who attended the hearing, were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 464 is constitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of
Executive Order No. 464 are declared void while Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, valid.

Section 1

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a
prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President
herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further,
unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to
depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered
by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis 
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior
consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour wherein the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of

legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Section 2(a)

Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under
the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being
referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive,
but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive
order."

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in
terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

Section 2(b) and Section 3

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office determines that
a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress,
subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims
of privilege by mere silence.

The Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She
may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the
President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an
extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.

Therefore, when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his

own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking
the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor
the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Neri vs. Senate

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does
not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on
the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in
“her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did
not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.

Akbayan vs. Aquino

FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers,
requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right to information
on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right
to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic
negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of
matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that
occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege?

Held:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the
contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA
after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and
academic. 
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to
the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also
the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. 
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not
mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is
made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the
President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The
Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information

Gudani vs. Senga

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the
“Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before
it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However,
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege,
but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation.  Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The
impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of
the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier  disagreed with the  notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the
very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting
Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost
Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was
compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two
be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani
and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo
be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined
from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate. 

Issue:

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry? 

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?

Held: 

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress
holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior
consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of
the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The
remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial
power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that
it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other
branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before
the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until
his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the
acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily
retired on 4 October 2005

Arnault vs. Nazareno

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates
known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum
and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He
bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able
to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the
Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the transactions
surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only
P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949;
that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited
the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which
he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to
cash, which he himself cashed.

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As
Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this
resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May
18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary
to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.
The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to
any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not
by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse
their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights
might thus be transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom
witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he
would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person
to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that
he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

Facts:
 1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-
fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the
validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate
investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.

2.  It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as
it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by
virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate.  An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity
of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000
in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.

3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and
that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred
to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed.

4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:

a)        Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b)   Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. 
c)   Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person

ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for
contempt

YES.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has
jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear
abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power. 

 It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter  under inquiry. 
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a
constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a
competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of
course with his right under the Constitution.

The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body
and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long as
the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function
involved

Noreco vs. Dumaguete

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in

connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were
the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo
Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac
refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that  the power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the
[old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that
inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative
power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no
provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process
and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners
Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to
claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the
power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being
ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised
where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
David vs. Arroyo

Prof. Randolf David vs. Pres. Arroyo

FACTS:
These 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), Pres. Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Hence, such issuances are
void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and on the same day, she issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.On
March 3, 2006, the President lifted PP 1017 and issued PP 1021. On their defense, the respondents stated that the factual
basis of the issuances of the PP 1017 and GO No. 5 was the conspiracy among some military officers, NPA and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate Pres. Arroyo as the bombing in Bulacan and Bataan.
On Feb. 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “ Oplan Hackle I” which detailed planning and
bombing, attacks and plot to assassinate the President.
The Petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1107 and GO No. 5 including the arrest
(without warrant) of the Petitioner Randolf S. David. David assailed the issuance of PP 1107.
 In Respondent’s Comment, the Solicitor General countered that the Petition should be dismissed for being moot,
Pres. Arroyo shouldn’t necessarily implead as respondent, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis and it does not
violate the people’s right to free expression.

ISSUE:

Procedural:
Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petition moot and academic.
Substantive:
Whether the SC can review the factual basis of PP 1107.
Whether PP 1107 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

RULING:
Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1017 totally lacks of factual basis. The Solicitor General’s
consolidated comments and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1107.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. 

The Constitutional foundation of PP 1107 may be divided into three important provisions:
Calling-out Power - In Sec. 18, Art. 7, the President may call out such armed forces to prevent or supress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Which may be revoke and the SC may review upon appropriate proceedings filed by any
citizen. The petitioners are wrong in stating that PP1107 is a declaration of Martial Law. It is plain that what the president
invoked was her calling-out power. It is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Take Care Power – In Sec. 17, Art. 7, the President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. However,
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue  decrees similar to those issued
by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees.”
Power to take Over- in Sec. 17, Art. 7, it states that "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President.

Licaroz vs. Arroyo

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the
outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan
(SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of
Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz
representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council
until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was
already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor,
Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration
after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him
assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13)
informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of
RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two
accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor
Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified.
Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB
Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six
(6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of
kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that
the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of
his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of
the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that
the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found
in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a
fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed
term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the
office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present
incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his
term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied
constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is
reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create,
by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied
by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of
government functions

Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
 

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment
is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to
alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the
3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that  Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support the case
of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1)
impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3)
violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting
tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives
to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be
declared unconstitutional.
 
RULING:                                                                        
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law
could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions,
the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law
merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts
that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory
taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v.
Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a
license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for
revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect particular
contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens
upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor
can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and
medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of
food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt
under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming
that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the
VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of
taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To
satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations
placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like
the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The
constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as
possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive
tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution
cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are
exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the
1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the
power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must
be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC
went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary
sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of
the President’s veto power.