Task Force 1-6

Capitol Security Review Taskforce

LTG(R) Russel Honore
Task Force Lead

Mission Overview

“You’ve got to understand there’s a difference between deployment

and employment – the first requires training, preparations, and
prepositioning; the latter places resources against the problem.”

Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the

unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28
C.F.R. Section 0.85).

John Minchillo / AP/AP

 Mission
At the direction of the Speaker of the
House, from 22 January to 5 March 2021,
Task Force 1-6 leads an immediate
collaborative review, through the House
Sergeant at Arms, of the Capitol and
House: security infrastructure, command
and control, interagency processes and
procedures, and training and exercises in
order to safeguard the Nation’s Capitol
and its Members.

https://www.outsidegc.com/ 2
 TF 1-6 Statement of Work / Specified Tasks
Operational Review of Capitol Security.
• Review the current security posture of the House side of the Capitol and House Office Buildings.
Assessment of Member Security in their Congressional District.
• Review current security resources available to Members in their congressional district and in their
residences.
Assessment of Member Travel Security.
• Review current security resources available to Members while traveling.
Assessment of Physical Infrastructure.
• Review current physical infrastructure of the House side of the Capitol and the House Office Buildings
to include identification of vulnerabilities, assessment of security infrastructure.

As a note, several essential Cross-cutting themes emerged during this review and have application to
each of our specified tasks. These include Threats & Risk, Authorities & Jurisdictions.

3
 TF 1-6 Members – Principals

LTG(R) Russel L. Honoré LTG(R) Jeff S. Buchanan LTG(R) Karen H. Gibson HON(R) Terry Gainer MG(R) Errol R. Schwartz MG(R) Linda L. Singh
Task Force 1-6, Lead Task Force 1-6, Dep. Lead Task Force 1-6, Principal Task Force 1-6 Principal Task Force 1-6 Principal Task Force 1-6 Principal

Commander: Commander: Deputy, Director of Natl Chief, US Capitol Police Commander Adjutant General,
• Military District of Intelligence for Natl Sec Senate Sergeant at • U.S. Army National Maryland
• Joint Task Force Washington
Katrina Partnerships Arms Guard, Washington, DC Commander:
• Led Defense Support
• First Army to Civilian Authorities
Senior Intel Director for • Military Department
for Hurricane Maria Overseas Opns Centers of Maryland
US Cyber Command

TF 1-6 Lead for TF 1-6 Lead for TF 1-6 Lead for TF 1-6 Lead for
Threats & Risks Review Operational Review Physical Infrastructure Member Security
Review Review

4
 TF 1-6 Members – Advisors

BG (R) Samuel Kindred SES (R) Richard Majauskas Mary McCord SES (R) Percy Howard COL (R) Arnaldo Claudio

I
COL (R) Karen Lloyd COL (R) Mark Riley COL (R) Steven Rotkoff LTC (R) Ken Gordon LTC (R) Joseph Albrecht 5
 TF 1-6 Initial Draft Recommendations Summary
• Develop the capacity of the USCP to effectively identify, assess, and communicate threat
information across the law enforcement community for action and decision – $15.9M
• The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) requires additional officers to meet its operational
requirements – estimated “plus-up” of 884 officers – $101.6M / year
• Enables improved interagency coordination & training program
• Enhances USCP’s ability to assess and communicate threats for action and decision
• Amend the authorities of CPB and USCP Chief of Police to enable effective decision-making
during crisis situations and advance planning for mass demonstrations
• Establish a dedicated, robust quick reaction force (QRF) – ranging from $40 - $130M / year
• Dignitary protection services must be expanded to meet Member security requirements in
their Congressional Districts and their homes – estimated increase in USCP staffing by 350
officers (included in the 884 “plus-up” above)
• Comprehensive Physical Security improvements are required at the Capitol and House Office
Buildings; implementation spans short-, mid- (~$60M) and long-term time horizons (> $235M)
6
 Threat Identification, Assessment and Sharing - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Observations Findings Recommendations Costs
• Threats against the Capitol and • USCP lacks sufficient manning to • Produce / share daily threat Staffing Costs – See USCP force
Members have changed deal with increased threat reports assessments across USCP structure slide
significantly in volume/nature • Intelligence Div. previously trained / • Collaborate daily with threat Other Costs:
• USCP lack the capacity to focused on foreign terror threats, fusion centers in the NCR • Training – $3.1M
effectively identify, assess, and not violent domestic extremists • Establish a position for the • Data Collection and Analytic
communicate threat information • Outside of NSSEs and below the Intelligence Division in the USCP Tools – $12.8M
for action and decision executive level, USCP is not well Command Center
integrated with other elements • Establish regional focused offices
monitoring threats to the NCR to investigate threats outside NCR
• Historically, threat info was not • Develop and fund a training * Personnel numbers also captured in USCP
Force Structure Plus-up Chart
routinely shared across the USCP program to cover intelligence
functions Analysts for USCP in DC:*
• Purchase modern analytic - 5x for Command Center
software and tools - 10x added analysts
• Increase Staffing - 4x supervisory analysts
- 2x TFOs to work at JTTF
USCP Regional Offices:*
- 20x Threat assessment agents
- 5x Intel Division analysts
Courtesy of USCP
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 7
 USCP Force Structure - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The US Capitol Police (USCP)
require additional officers to
meet operational requirements
• Excessive overtime (O/T):
• at 55% of FY21 O/T - 416k hrs
• 718,310 hours in FY20
• 673,542 hours in FY19
• 735,018 hours in FY18
USCP Current Personnel Strength:
2,072 Authorized Strength
1,839 Assigned Strength*
233 Officers required for
100% staffing
USCP Requested Plus-up:
350 USCP officers (reduces o/t cost)
80 Dedicated CDU Personnel
430 Total
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Findings Recommendations Costs
• USCP is currently staffed at 89%: • Authorize immediate hiring to Initial Estimates:
- 1,839 available of 2,072 achieve 100% staffing • Base Pay $101.6M/Year
authorized • Authorize immediate plus-up to
USCP force structure to meet
• COVID-19 protocols negatively
mission demands and training needs
impact USCP readiness
• Staffing falls short of day-to-day (see supporting chart)
• Adjust hiring practices (direct hires) Note: Training, Equipment,
mission requirements Resourcing, infrastructure costs are
and increase recruiting budget
• Staffing / pace of operations inhibits to be determined.
• Authorize future study of USCP
training force structure
TF 1-6 Observed USCP Personnel Short Fall: USCP
21 Analysts for USCP in DC* Plus-up:
35 Threat Assessment (20), Regl Inv. officers (10), Intel officers (5)*
13 CDU Trainers (5), Planners (2)*, Specl Events Section (2), K9 (4)
884
20 Travel/Member Security Operations Specialists*
USCP Hires
350 Dignitary Protection Specialists/Agents
15 Mounted unit officers / leadership
to 100%:
454 TF 1-6 Recommended USCP Plus-up 233
* USCP analysts, Intel officers, Planners, and Travel
Security Ops Specialists are not sworn officers FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 8
 CPB Emergency Law Enforcement Request Process - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• In extremis - the deliberate
decision-making process used by
the Capitol Police Board (CPB) is ill-
suited to crisis situations when
necessary to save lives, prevent
wanton destruction of property, or
restore government functions
• In advance planning for mass
demonstrations - there is no
avenue for appeal for denial or
inaction by the CPB of a request for
additional LE or NG assistance
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Findings Recommendations Costs
• Current law requires CPB approval to • In extremis – Amend US Code to • None
request outside federal law authorize the USCP Chief of Police
enforcement assistance and to appoint to request federal LE and National
special police officers to assist the Guard assistance without CPB pre-
USCP (2 U.S.C. §§ 1970, 1974) approval; as an oversight
• CPB must declare an emergency exists mechanism, the CPB would have
prior to USCP Chief appointing special veto authority for a specified time
police officers (2 U.S.C. § 1974) • In advance planning for mass
• These requirements apply to assistance demonstrations – Amend CPB
from the NG and federal, state, and Manual of Procedures to allow USCP
local LE agencies without general Chief of Police to appeal denial of or
jurisdiction in DC inaction on a request for LE or NG
• These laws do not apply to DC MPD, assistance
which has general jurisdiction in DC
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 9
 Quick Reaction Force - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Observations Findings
• The District of Columbia does not • Mobilized National Guard. The Air
have a dedicated (24/7/365) rapid and Army NG (to include the DC
response capability; there is no NG) regularly augment security in
robust 911 response force the Capitol
• Federal Law Enforcement. Other
federal LE agencies can respond in
extremis to USCP requests for
assistance
• DC National Guard. DCNG regularly
augments security in the DC area
(USCP, Park Police, MPD, USSS, DC
HSEMA, etc.)
• DCNG has 1x military police
battalion, which must be mobilized
to respond in extremis
www.thebalancecareers.com
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
Establish a standing (24/7/365) Initial Estimates:
quick reaction force (QRF): Pay and Allowances:
• Option 1. Provide a dedicated and • Option 1: $40M/Year
robust federal LE response • Option 2: $130M/Year
capability to support the USCP • Option 3: listed below
• Option 2. Authorize the recurring • Tier 1: $107.1M/Year
mobilization of one NG military • Tier 2: $110.5M/Year
police battalion to DC for six (6) • Tier 3: $124M/Year
months
• Option 3. Authorize a “plus-up” to
the DCNG force structure; a mix of
AGR and Traditional Guardsmen
on Title 32 status:
• Tier 1: Plus-up of a MP battalion
• Tier 2: Plus-up of a MP battalion Note: Training, Equipment,
& Civil Support Team (CST) Resourcing, infrastructure costs
• Tier 3: MP battalion, CST, are to be determined.
Combat Service Support
Battalion, and Security Force
Squadron (USAF)
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 10
 Member Security During Travel - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• Security coordination and support
to Members while traveling and
while in their Districts:
- Involves numerous entities
- Utilizes an email-based process
- Involves ad hoc resourcing
- Requires additional staff training
DPD
Plus-up: 350
High Threat OR
9x Agents/shift
25x Agents/detail
Total Coverage
14 Members
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
• There is no operations center devoted
to security and protection for
Members
• Law Enforcement Coordinators (LECs)
manage member security in Districts
• LEC duties are not always primary
responsibilities
• Dignitary Protection involved entities:
USCP, Transportation Security Admin
(TSA), Federal Air Marshal (FAM),
State / Local Law Enforcement Officers
Medium Threat
4x Agents/shift
15x Agents/detail
Total Coverage
23 Members LECs:
441
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Increase Dignitary Protection Div. Initial Estimates:
(350) and House SAA (20) • Base Pay $32M*
• Assign DPD details by threat model
• Establish DC-based Member Travel
Operations Center (MTOC)
• Establish regionally aligned Member * Costs captured in USCP Force
Travel Security (MTS) Teams Structure Plus-up Chart
• Establish an integrated, secure system
and protocols to: 1) report security
Note: Training, Equipment,
incidents to MSTs, 2) coordinate travel
Resourcing, infrastructure costs
• Establish a training and certification
program for LECs are to be determined.
House SAA
* Map is Illustrative only
Plus-up: 20
MTOC
DC-Based
MTS
Regionally
Aligned Teams
11
 Member Security in Districts - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Observations Findings
• Funding for and monitoring • 441 primary District offices are
of installed security systems protected by security systems
varies across approximately contracted through the House
900 Congressional District Sergeant at Arms (HSAA)
offices • HSAA is paying monitoring fees
• Many District offices lack at 88 secondary offices;
monitored security systems Members must cover installation
and maintenance fees at
secondary District offices
• The HSAA does not provide
support to security systems at
over 400 secondary District
offices
• De-installation and reuse of
security systems components is
not always feasible
https://floridanationalnews.com/
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Authorize funding and Initial Estimates:
installation of security systems • New Installs $6.5M
at all Members’ District Offices • Maintenance $836k/Mo
• Amend monthly service contract • Monitoring $41k/Mo
to enable monitoring of all
installed systems – 100% office
coverage
• Provide physical and cyber
security training to all Members
and staff in District offices
• Re-use of de-installed functional
equipment when feasible
District Office | Congressman
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 12
 Member Security in Residence - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Observations Findings
• Members and their families • Members are using personal
are vulnerable to threats in resources or campaign funds to
their homes procure security systems for their
• Threats directed against homes
Members has increased • Federal Codes and Regulations
significantly in the recent past: govern the use of campaign funds
- 2018 4,900 for security systems (52 U.S.C., 11
- 2019 9,000 CFR)
- January 2021 3,000 • The Federal Elections Commissions
has concluded in two advisory
opinions that campaign funds may
be used for security system
installation and monitoring costs in
members residences as these were
“in connection with members’
duties”
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Advise members of the • Initial Estimated Cost:
approved uses for MRA and • $4.08M*
campaign funding for
residence security system
• Appropriate sufficient HSAA
funds for HSAA to centrally
manage allowance up
$10,000/Member for
residential security systems
*Note: Actual costs will be
dependent upon specifically
installed security systems
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 13
 Perimeter Security - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police

Observations Findings Recommendations Costs

• The US Capitol building is easily • Fencing limits public access to the
accessible to the public: Capitol – limits First Amendment
- First Amendment areas nearby activities and Member access
- Easy approaches by car / foot • Fencing requires surveillance to be
- Few pedestrian barriers effective
- Windows and Doors require • Current fencing requires extensive
repairs, upgrades / hardening resources and time to emplace and
remove; rentals costs are $1.6M per
week
Rapidly Deployable Fencing
• Short-term (6 months - 1 year) Initial Estimated Cost:
- Develop integrated security plan • Mid-term - $60M
- Reroute fence to meet access needs
• Mid-term (1-3 year)
- Replace fencing with mobile fencing
that is rapidly placed and removed
• Long-term/permanent (>3 years)
- Install permanent fencing that can be • Note: Short-term and Long-
raised and lowered on demand term costs are to be determined
- Install cameras/sensors for surveillance
Integrated Retractable Fencing

Illustrative only Illustrative only

https://sportafence.com/ USACE Assessment for TF1-6

https://fancyfence.us/ FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 14
 Perimeter Security – Illustration of the Concept Menu

* Map is Illustrative only Google Map Image

Hidden Fence

Hidden Fence

Mobile Fence

Monuments /
Control Boxes

Integrated Wall

1) Adjust infrastructure (if needed) to limit pedestrian 3) Install integrated (hidden) fencing within Capitol
access in key areas; provides “anchor” for fencing infrastructure (sidewalks, walls, roadways)
2) Add structures to house cameras, sensors, power, etc. as 4) Procure and utilize mobile fencing to enable rapid
needed to operate fencing and enable observation employment / removal of barriers at points of access 15
 Capitol Access and Screening - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Observations Findings
• Access controls for the Capitol and
• Screening portals lack stand-off, and
House office buildings (HOB) is sufficient space for processing people
inadequate: / belongings through X-ray machines
• Screening portals need more space and magnetometers
• Windows and doors require Repair • Contract in progress for window
and / or hardening repair, upgrade; None for doors
• Cameras/Sensors are not linked, • Cameras are not linked to sensors, and
and areas lack adequate coverage some areas in Capitol Complex are not
for USCP monitoring covered and monitored by USCP;
Current approach is ad hoc, and
• Proximity Card (PROX) readers are systems are not integrated
not widely used at the Capitol
• PROX card readers are not widely
• Background checks are not used; 40-45k ID cards issued each
uniformly required for Capitol staff Congressional session
and employees
• Member requested background
• Vehicle Screening with K9s checks for staff do not exceed 10%;
requires ID card only (Passport, etc.)
• Background (fingerprint) checks are
required only for contractors, system
administrators, and shared employees
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Begin construction for contracted N/S Initial Estimates:
portals of Capitol • Screening Portals - $60-80M
• Procure screening portals for HOBs • Windows/Doors - $75-80M
and place appropriately • Camera Assessment - $125k
• Assess and expedite window and • Cameras/Sensors and
door repairs / hardening PROX readers - $50-75M
• Assess and optimize Camera and
Sensor usage and integration to allow
USCP monitoring and response;
USACE from Huntsville, AL (Electronic
Security Systems Mandatory Center
of Expertise)
• Install PROX readers and include RFID
chips in all ID cards
• Require 100% background checks for
everyone issued a House ID card
• Conduct appropriate training and
education for various changes to
process: PROX Card reader and ID
Card protocols
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 16
Additional Recommendations
 Overcoming Obstacles to USCP Growth
• Current estimate to add 1,117 sworn / civilian officers to USCP’s assigned strength requires more than 5 years
• Obstacles to growth
- propensity to serve is down and recruiting is difficult
- competition for hiring with other LE agencies is high
- current basic LE training at FLETC, GA is 5 classes/yr which covers attrition (~ 90/yr) and minimal growth
- approx. 18 applicants are needed using the current system to generate 1 viable recruit
• Recommendations
- increase the USCP recruiting budget to enable better outreach and provide hiring / recruiting incentives
- contract for screening initial applicants: does not require USCP officers to perform this task
- expand contract polygraph examinations
- consider relaxion of some standards (e.g., prior drug use, tattoo policies, etc.)
- develop and employ an incentives package (college tuition payments, bonuses, etc.)
- expand use of FLETC at Artesia, NM & consider creation of a FLETC at USCP’s training facility in Cheltenham, MD
- develop a lateral entry program that recruits from other LE agencies & create a tailored program to certify
transfers; conduct direct hiring
- consider creation of a USCP Reserve Corps, especially to help recruit experienced DP officers to cover
anticipated load FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 18
 DC NG Emergency Authorities - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The DC National Guard
Commander's authority to
provide emergency
assistance to save lives lacks
clarity in the wake of 6JAN
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Findings Recommendations Costs
• DoD Directive 3025.18 provides • Clarify the DC NG • None
commanders with the authority Commander’s “emergency
to respond to extraordinary authority” as defined by DoD
emergency circumstances; e.g. Directive 3025.18
quell large-scale, unexpected
civil disturbances and prevent
loss of life, wanton destruction
of property, and restore
government functions
• DC National Guard is a federal
entity; D.C. Code § 49-409 and
Executive Order 11485
• DC NG Commander’s authority
to respond to extraordinary
emergency circumstances was
withheld 5 JAN 21
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 19
 Integrated DC / NCR Security Plan - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• There is no over-arching
integrated security plan for
either the District of Columbia or
the National Capitol Region
(NCR)
• Federal, state, and local law
enforcement (LE) agencies
cooperate for planned events
such as NSSEs, but response in
emergencies uneven
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
• The National Capitol Region consists
of the District of Columbia, Prince
George’s and Montgomery
counties, Maryland, and Arlington,
Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William
counties, Virginia
• Includes geographic (MPD, USCP)
and functional jurisdictions (FBI,
USSS)
• Overlapping jurisdictions and
differing lines of authority
complicate integrated LE efforts and
true unity of command is difficult
• Mutual Aid Agreements are
maintained through the
Metropolitan Washington Council
of Governments
• Mutual Aid Agreements work well
for fire and EMS services, and well-
planned activities, but less so for LE
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Designate a Lead Federal Agency Initial Estimates:
(e.g. DHS) to coordinate and
develop a comprehensive Any associated Training,
integrated security plan for the Equipment, Resourcing,
NCR infrastructure costs are to be
• Consider DC Mayor designate DC determined.
HSEMA as lead agency to
cooperate with DHS
• Request Maryland and Virginia
designate a lead state entity to
collaborate in plan development
• Once approved by the Executive
Branch, Capitol Police Board, the
DC Mayor, and the governors of
Maryland and Virginia, the plan
would be directive
• The plan must be rehearsed and
enforced in daily operations and
special events such as NSSEs
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 20
 USCP Training & Organizational Learning Program - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The USCP observes standard
law enforcement (LE) training
protocols for individual officers
• The USCP lacks a leader
training and education
program
• The USCP does not conduct
regular collective scenario-
based training
• The USCP does not routinely
conduct after-action reviews
(AAR) for significant
operational events or training
activities.
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
• Annually individual officers are
required to complete 25 hours of
training; this exceeds the national
average of 20 hours
• Firearm qualification is required
twice per year
• USCP leadership is selected from
within the ranks; there is no
formal leader training and
education program
• USCP conducts limited collective
training when congressional
office buildings are closed
• Collective scenario-based training
at all organizational levels
prepare units to respond to
contingencies and rehearse
response procedures
• Recent studies demonstrate value
of AARs for the LE community
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Continue to meet or exceed Initial Estimates:
annual individual training
requirements Note: Training, Equipment,
• Establish a progressive leader Resourcing, infrastructure costs
development and schooling are to be determined.
program (PFC to SGT transition
course)
• Regularly assess officer and
leader proficiency and tailor
training as needed
• Establish a collective scenario-
based training program;
Increase USCP force structure
to enable training opportunities
• Institutionalize and conduct
AARs following major events;
invite interagency partners and
share lessons learned Courtesy of USCP
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 21
 USCP Radios and Body Worn Cameras - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The USCP Radio system was not
effectively employed during
emergency response
• The USCP equipment inventory
does not include Body-Worn
Cameras (BWC)
Courtesy of USCP
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
USCP Radio System
• The USCP radio system is a fully
encrypted, digital trunked system
with 50 “talk channels” capable of
supporting thousands of users
• USCP officers cannot hear radio
transmissions during the chaos and
noise of emergency situations; the
USCP officers’ radios lack earpieces
Body Worn Cameras
• The USCP does not use BWCs
• BWC provide visual and audio
evidence, which can be used to
support better investigations and
prosecution
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
USCP Radios Initial Estimates:
• Conduct drills and exercises to Radios Earpieces
improve command and control • Procurement – TBD
and practice utilization of radio • Life Cycle Costs – TBD
talk groups Body Worn Cameras
• Procure state-of-the-art radio • Procurement – TBD
earpieces for each USCP officer • Life Cycle Costs – TBD
• Info Storage Costs – TBD
Body Worn Cameras • Maintenance Costs – TBD
• Establish USCP policy for BWC use
• Procure BWCs and supporting IT
systems; fund life-cycle and
storage requirements
• Provide training on new systems
to USCP personnel
https://www.zetronix.com/
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 22
 Civil Disturbance Unit - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The USCP Civil Disturbance Unit
(CDU) is only available for
planned events in the US Capitol
Complex
• The USCP Uniformed Services
Bureau (USB) do not have civil
disturbance training and riot gear
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
• CDU cannot be rapidly mobilized
• CDU are assigned to shift work
when not supporting a planned
event
• CDU is a voluntary assignment with
special requirements: Officers must
pass OSHA medical clearance to
wear a protective mask
• CDU can “dress-out” (equip) up to
240 trained USCP officers
• Limited CDU officers authorized to
employ less-lethal riot equipment
• CDU Budget is part of the Special
Operations Division general budget
❑ Architect of the Capitol
Recommendations
• Expand CDU force structure to six
platoons, increase of 80 personnel
• Develop comprehensive training plan
(CDU and other USCP officers); specialty
training and USCP-wide civil disturbance
training
• Provide a dedicated CDU budget
• Procure riot control gear for all
Uniformed Services Bureau officers to
include specific equipment for the CDU
• Establish suitable, readily accessible
locations to store riot control
equipment (near posts)
❑ US Capitol Police
Costs
Initial Estimates:
• Equipment $1.32M
* Pay / Allowances costs
captured in USCP Force
Structure Plus-up Chart
Note: Training, Equipment,
Resourcing, infrastructure
costs are to be determined.

Riot Body Shield

• Estimated Cost: $150 ea
Level IIIA Ballistic Helmet
• Estimated Cost: $500 ea
PR-24 Batons Courtesy of USCP
Courtesy of USCP • Estimated Cost: $60 ea
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 23
 K-9 Teams & Usage - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Observations Findings
• USCP K-9 Explosive Detection • USCP K9 Unit has 52 of 56 EDD
Dog (EDD) Teams are Teams
inadequately staffed and • Operational tempo for K9 Unit is
resourced to meet mission 1,000 missions per day; some
needs teams at 100 missions per day
• Several K9s exceed
recommended replacement age
• Operational tempo has
increased in recent past;
precludes ability to meet
minimum training requirements
• K9 Training Unit is staffed at 20%
• K9 Unit housed in public facility,
which lacks adequate security
Courtesy of USCP
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Hire sufficient personnel to Initial Estimates:
meet 100% staffing level (56) • Payroll $315k
• Procure, train new K9s
• Increase K9 unit force
structure to enable vehicle
screening
• Procure civil disturbance
equipment for K9 units if they
will support CDU
• Conduct adequate training
and after-action reviews to
capture lessons learned
• Relocate K9 Unit to a secure
facility Note: Training, Equipment,
Resourcing, infrastructure costs
are to be determined.
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 24
 Mounted Police Unit - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Observations Findings Recommendations Costs

• USCP no longer has • Mounted units serve as a force • Amend 2 USC §1980 to Initial Estimates:
authorizations for a horse multiplier; can be effectively establish a mounted unit to • Horses and Equipment -
mounted unit; the unit was employed in crowd control role include 12 horses, riders, $1.025M
disbanded in 2005 • USCP mounted unit was equipment, and training • Annual Operational Cost
established in 2004 and • Coordinate with the U.S. Park - $100k
disbanded in 2005 Police for facilities and
• Mounted unit was effectively training in order to limit
used for crowd policing and the direct cost to the USCP
supported 2005 inauguration
• Budget authorizations:
- 2004 - $82k
- 2005 - $145k
• MPD disbanded its mounted
unit in 2020; Park Police
provides no mounted unit
support to the USCP
Courtesy of USCP Courtesy of USCP
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 25
 USCP Implementation of NIMS - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Observations Findings Recommendations Costs
• The USCP has not uniformly applied • The National Incident Management • Establish Standard Operating Initial Estimates:
emergency response (Incident System (NIMS) outlines the Incident Procedures for staging areas using
Command System) principles Command System (ICS) and accepted the Incident Command System (ICS)
related to reception and integration incident response procedures when augmented by outside LE
(check-in), employment, and • The USCP established assembly areas • Use ICS for all incidents Note: Training, Equipment,
demobilization check-out of for responding law enforcement (LE) • Train leaders at all levels on NIMS Resourcing, infrastructure costs
supporting agencies • The USCP completed check-in and and ICS to include exercises and are to be determined.
deputization of nearly 1,700 LE drills
officers during emergency response
• Incidents of improper check-in,
employment and check-out occurred,
to include lack of after-action review
(AAR)
• Some LE entities were employed in an
ad hoc manner

FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 26

 USCP Continuity of Operations - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• The USCP maintains and operates
one fully functional command
center; facilities are tight yet
functional
• There is no established functional
alternate command center
• The USCP Command Center and
Sensitive Compartmentalized
Information Center (SCIF) lack
backup power
Courtesy of USCP
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Findings Recommendations Costs
• The Command Center is staffed and • Finalize the USCP COOP Plan Initial Estimates:
operates 24/7 to provide continuous • Finalize set-up and ensure
awareness of the Capitol Complex; it operational capability of the USCP Note: Training, Equipment,
enables USCP leadership to direct alternate command center Resourcing, infrastructure costs
operations and control USCP officers • Procure the Fairchild building, or are to be determined.
throughout the Capitol Complex suitable alternate, to provide facility
• The continuity of operations plan (COOP) control to the AOC, which would
for the USCP Command Center is in draft allow USCP to control facility access
form and install backup power generation
• An alternate Command Center is in the • Assess USCP facilities and
Fairchild building, but it is not operational headquarters for adequacy of
• The USCP is working to establish another workspace and security, operations,
Command Center at the Alternate storage, training, etc.
Computing Facility (ACF) in Manassas, VA
• The Fairchild building is shared with other
tenants and lacks necessary security and
access controls
• The USCP leases office space in the
Fairchild building, which is not a
government facility; therefore, it has no
backup power system
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 27
 Area Compartmentalization & Wayfinding - Draft
❑ House Sergeant at Arms
Observations
• Planned evacuation procedures
within the US Capitol building did
not address obstacles / threats
from within the building
• The tunnel system connecting the
Capitol and adjacent office
buildings is a potential vulnerability
https://fancyfence.us/
Before Deployment
❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms
Findings
• Planned evacuation routes are
designed for use during fires and other to deny unauthorized access to
special emergencies
• Members were unable to evacuate
from Chamber Galleries on 6JAN
• Members, staff were unfamiliar with
evacuation routes
• Limited emergency wayfinding markers
• The Capitol, surrounding office
buildings lack means to restrict the
movement of people once inside; areas
cannot be compartmentalized
Hidden Barrier
Tunnel application
After Deployment
❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Recommendations Costs
• Create barriers in strategic locations Initial Estimates:
• Capitol Barriers – TBD
corridors around the Chamber, • Tunnel Barriers – TBD
Galleries and staircases • Wayfinding System – TBD
• Install wayfinding devices to assist in
evacuations through tunnels
• Conduct evacuation drills
Pull Down Barrier
Entryway application
USACE Assessment for TF1-6
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 28
 Cyber Security - Draft Recommendations
❑ House Sergeant at Arms ❑ Senate Sergeant at Arms ❑ Architect of the Capitol ❑ US Capitol Police
Observations Findings Recommendations Costs
• Decentralized oversight of House • The House Chief Information • Establish and empower a Initial Estimates:
IT management creates security / Security Officer (CISO) lacks centralized IT and support • Pay: $1.63M
privacy gaps authority over the decentralized authority under CISO • Equipment licensing &
• Nonstandard / unenforced system administrators and visibility • Purchase and provide high- hardware upgrades: $1.75M
policies and procedures to confirm whether correct volume shredders for House and • Mobile Application Security:
• Cyber “best practices” are not procedures are followed District offices $1.0M
followed, creating vulnerabilities • Malicious actors can exploit: • Require Members to complete • Shredder costs: $2.01M
• Insufficient cybersecurity training ▪ Auto-forwarding email initial cybersecurity training and • Online training course
leaves Members and staffs ▪ Uncontrolled use of drives / annual refresher training revision: $25k
unaware of many risks external removable media • Update cybersecurity training
▪ Use of unvetted Cloud services
▪ Use of unvetted software and
mobile apps
▪ Unencrypted mobile devices
• Inconsistent disposal of sensitive
information
• Cyber security training is dated and
not uniformly required

FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 29

Backup & Supporting Information
 TF 1-6 Scope & Methodology
• TF 1-6 was charged with completing a forward-looking six-week review to identify immediate
steps that could be taken to improve Capitol security.
• The review was intended to focus on the House and the House side of the Capitol; however,
much of our work will have greater application to Campus-wide.
• The Task Force is not an investigative body whose purpose includes matters of individual fault
or culpability related to the events of January 6, 2021.
• This review was limited to unclassified material; any classified issues encountered during the
review were passed to the House Sergeant at Arms for action.
• Given the short time frame for the review and limited scope, the members of the Task Force
met with the leadership, staff and members of
• The U.S. Capitol Police
• The Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County Police Department
• The House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and the Architect of the Capitol
• The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCoG)
• Federal Law Enforcement Partners (FBI, DHS, FPS, DoS Dignitary Protection, etc.)
• The Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau and relevant
subordinate commands, such as the D.C. National Guard, and PFPA / DTRA FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 31
 USCP Force Structure - Draft Recommendations
USCP Current Personnel Strength:
2,072 Authorized Strength
1,839 Assigned Strength
233 Officers required for
100% staffing
USCP Requested Plus-up:
430 Additional officers needed
to meet mission requirements
Staffing Recommendations to USCP:
Hire to 100% 233
Increase Authorizations 884
TF 1-6 Observed USCP Personnel Requirements:
10 Investigators for USCP Regional Offices (sworn)
21 Analysts for USCP in DC (civilian)
• 5 x for Command Center (single position, shift work)
• 10 x additional analysts
• 4 x supervisory analysts
• 2 x TFOs to work at JTTF
4 Dog Handlers (sworn)
15 Mounted unit officers / leadership (sworn)
5 CDU cadre/trainers (sworn)
2 Operational planners (civilian)
2 Plus-up to Special Events Section (sworn)
20 Threat assessment agents for USCP Regional Offices (sworn)
5 Intelligence analysts for USCP Regional Offices (civilian)
20 Travel/Member security Operations Specialists (sworn)
350 Dignitary Protection Specialists/Agents (sworn)
454 TF 1-6 Recommended USCP Plus-up
FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 32
US Capitol Police
Total Personnel Assigned (as of 28FEB) 0/0/4 11/0/0

(Appointed / Sworn / Civilian)

16 / 1835 / 374
1/0/9 0/8/2

0/1/1 0/0/2

1/1/7
1/1/0 1/1/1

0/274/18 0/9/41 0/73/47 0/202/53 0/1140/23 0/0/8 0/4/16 0/1/34 0/0/24 1/25/28 0/0/3 0/0/28 0/95/17 0/0/8

FOUO // Law Enforcement Sensitive 33